instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct user_struct *user;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;
goto out_free_uid;
}
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(user, inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
goto out_free_uid;
}
atomic_inc(&user->inotify_devs);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
fsnotify_put_group(group);
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
out_free_uid:
free_uid(user);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the inotify subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving failed attempts to create files. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-4250.
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod12Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod12");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, type, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
TestObj::overloadedMethod1(type);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void CloudPrintInfoCallback(bool enabled,
const std::string& email,
const std::string& proxy_id) {
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux relies on an IFRAME source URL to identify an associated extension, which allows remote attackers to conduct extension-bindings injection attacks by leveraging script access to a resource that initially has the about:blank URL.
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131} | Medium | 172,048 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Chapters(
Segment* pSegment,
long long payload_start,
long long payload_size,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(payload_start),
m_size(payload_size),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_editions(NULL),
m_editions_size(0),
m_editions_count(0)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cg_rmdir(const char *path)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *fpath = NULL, *cgdir = NULL, *controller;
const char *cgroup;
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EINVAL;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fprintf(stderr, "rmdir: verifying access to %s:%s (req path %s)\n",
controller, cgdir, path);
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgdir, NULL, O_WRONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!cgfs_remove(controller, cgroup)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::release(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Release: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!releaseJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false // Do not email admin about this action
)) {
text = "Failed to release job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Equalizer_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 3 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 5 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (*pValueSize < (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
*(int16_t *)pValue = -1500;
*((int16_t *)pValue + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int16_t *)pValue = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int32_t *)pValue = EqualizerGetCentreFrequency(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerGetBandFreqRange(pContext, param2, (uint32_t *)pValue, ((uint32_t *)pValue + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetBand(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetNumPresets();
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)pValue;
strncpy(name, EqualizerGetPresetName(param2), *pValueSize - 1);
name[*pValueSize - 1] = 0;
*pValueSize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("\tEqualizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
p[0] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
p[1] = (int16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
p[2 + i] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, i);
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_getParameter */
int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
int Volume_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t position;
uint32_t mute;
uint32_t positionEnabled;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)level);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
mute = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetMute(pContext, mute);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
positionEnabled = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeEnableStereoPosition(pContext, positionEnabled);
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
position = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t)position);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_setParameter */
/****************************************************************************************
* Name : LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16()
* Input : Signed 32-bit integer
* Output : Signed 16-bit integer
* MSB (16) = sign bit
* (15->05) = integer part
* (04->01) = decimal part
* Returns : Db value with respect to full scale
* Description :
* Remarks :
****************************************************************************************/
LVM_INT16 LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(LVM_INT32 Lin_fix)
{
LVM_INT16 db_fix;
LVM_INT16 Shift;
LVM_INT16 SmallRemainder;
LVM_UINT32 Remainder = (LVM_UINT32)Lin_fix;
/* Count leading bits, 1 cycle in assembly*/
for (Shift = 0; Shift<32; Shift++)
{
if ((Remainder & 0x80000000U)!=0)
{
break;
}
Remainder = Remainder << 1;
}
/*
* Based on the approximation equation (for Q11.4 format):
*
* dB = -96 * Shift + 16 * (8 * Remainder - 2 * Remainder^2)
*/
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(-96 * Shift); /* Six dB steps in Q11.4 format*/
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)((Remainder & 0x7fffffff) >> 24);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix + SmallRemainder );
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)(SmallRemainder * SmallRemainder);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - (LVM_INT16)((LVM_UINT16)SmallRemainder >> 9));
/* Correct for small offset */
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - 5);
return db_fix;
}
int Effect_setEnabled(EffectContext *pContext, bool enabled)
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() type %d, enabled %d", pContext->EffectType, enabled);
if (enabled) {
bool tempDisabled = false;
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tempDisabled) {
LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
} else {
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
return 0;
}
int16_t LVC_Convert_VolToDb(uint32_t vol){
int16_t dB;
dB = LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(vol <<7);
dB = (dB +8)>>4;
dB = (dB <-96) ? -96 : dB ;
return dB;
}
} // namespace
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in Audioserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32436341.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I91bd6aadb6c7410163e03101f365db767f4cd2a3
(cherry picked from commit 0872b65cff9129633471945431b9a5a28418049c)
(cherry picked from commit e981cca9fff3608af22bdf8fc1acef5470e25663)
| Medium | 174,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pdf_show_image(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, fz_image *image)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
fz_matrix image_ctm;
fz_rect bbox;
softmask_save softmask = { NULL };
if (pr->super.hidden)
return;
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
bbox = fz_unit_rect;
fz_transform_rect(&bbox, &image_ctm);
if (image->mask)
{
/* apply blend group even though we skip the soft mask */
if (gstate->blendmode)
fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 0, gstate->blendmode, 1);
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image->mask, &image_ctm, &bbox);
}
else
gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask);
if (!image->colorspace)
{
switch (gstate->fill.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_fill_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm,
gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->fill.pattern)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
else
{
fz_fill_image(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
}
if (image->mask)
{
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
if (gstate->blendmode)
fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev);
}
else
pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask);
}
static void
if (pr->clip)
{
gstate->clip_depth++;
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, pr->clip_even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pr->clip = 0;
}
if (pr->super.hidden)
dostroke = dofill = 0;
if (dofill || dostroke)
gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask);
if (dofill && dostroke)
{
/* We may need to push a knockout group */
if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 0)
{
/* No need for group, as stroke won't do anything */
}
else if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 1.0f && gstate->blendmode == FZ_BLEND_NORMAL)
{
/* No need for group, as stroke won't show up */
}
else
{
knockout_group = 1;
fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 1, FZ_BLEND_NORMAL, 1);
}
}
if (dofill)
{
switch (gstate->fill.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_fill_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm,
gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->fill.pattern)
{
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
/* The cluster and page 2 of patterns.pdf shows that fz_fill_shade should NOT be called with gstate->ctm. */
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
if (dostroke)
{
switch (gstate->stroke.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm,
gstate->stroke.colorspace, gstate->stroke.v, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->stroke.pattern)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->stroke.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_STROKE);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->stroke.shade)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->stroke.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
if (knockout_group)
fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev);
if (dofill || dostroke)
pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple reachable assertions in the PDF parser allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (assert crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nlmsvc_grant_reply(struct nlm_cookie *cookie, __be32 status)
{
struct nlm_block *block;
dprintk("grant_reply: looking for cookie %x, s=%d \n",
*(unsigned int *)(cookie->data), status);
if (!(block = nlmsvc_find_block(cookie)))
return;
if (block) {
if (status == nlm_lck_denied_grace_period) {
/* Try again in a couple of seconds */
nlmsvc_insert_block(block, 10 * HZ);
} else {
/* Lock is now held by client, or has been rejected.
* In both cases, the block should be removed. */
nlmsvc_unlink_block(block);
}
}
nlmsvc_release_block(block);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int yam_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct yam_port *yp = netdev_priv(dev);
struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg yi;
struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs *ym;
int ioctl_cmd;
if (copy_from_user(&ioctl_cmd, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
if (yp->magic != YAM_MAGIC)
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd != SIOCDEVPRIVATE)
return -EINVAL;
switch (ioctl_cmd) {
case SIOCYAMRESERVED:
return -EINVAL; /* unused */
case SIOCYAMSMCS:
if (netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((ym = kmalloc(sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
if (copy_from_user(ym, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_mcs))) {
kfree(ym);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (ym->bitrate > YAM_MAXBITRATE) {
kfree(ym);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* setting predef as 0 for loading userdefined mcs data */
add_mcs(ym->bits, ym->bitrate, 0);
kfree(ym);
break;
case SIOCYAMSCFG:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&yi, ifr->ifr_data, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IOBASE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IRQ) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BITRATE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if ((yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BAUDRATE) && netif_running(dev))
return -EINVAL; /* Cannot change this parameter when up */
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IOBASE) {
yp->iobase = yi.cfg.iobase;
dev->base_addr = yi.cfg.iobase;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_IRQ) {
if (yi.cfg.irq > 15)
return -EINVAL;
yp->irq = yi.cfg.irq;
dev->irq = yi.cfg.irq;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BITRATE) {
if (yi.cfg.bitrate > YAM_MAXBITRATE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->bitrate = yi.cfg.bitrate;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_BAUDRATE) {
if (yi.cfg.baudrate > YAM_MAXBAUDRATE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->baudrate = yi.cfg.baudrate;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_MODE) {
if (yi.cfg.mode > YAM_MAXMODE)
return -EINVAL;
yp->dupmode = yi.cfg.mode;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_HOLDDLY) {
if (yi.cfg.holddly > YAM_MAXHOLDDLY)
return -EINVAL;
yp->holdd = yi.cfg.holddly;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_TXDELAY) {
if (yi.cfg.txdelay > YAM_MAXTXDELAY)
return -EINVAL;
yp->txd = yi.cfg.txdelay;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_TXTAIL) {
if (yi.cfg.txtail > YAM_MAXTXTAIL)
return -EINVAL;
yp->txtail = yi.cfg.txtail;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_PERSIST) {
if (yi.cfg.persist > YAM_MAXPERSIST)
return -EINVAL;
yp->pers = yi.cfg.persist;
}
if (yi.cfg.mask & YAM_SLOTTIME) {
if (yi.cfg.slottime > YAM_MAXSLOTTIME)
return -EINVAL;
yp->slot = yi.cfg.slottime;
yp->slotcnt = yp->slot / 10;
}
break;
case SIOCYAMGCFG:
yi.cfg.mask = 0xffffffff;
yi.cfg.iobase = yp->iobase;
yi.cfg.irq = yp->irq;
yi.cfg.bitrate = yp->bitrate;
yi.cfg.baudrate = yp->baudrate;
yi.cfg.mode = yp->dupmode;
yi.cfg.txdelay = yp->txd;
yi.cfg.holddly = yp->holdd;
yi.cfg.txtail = yp->txtail;
yi.cfg.persist = yp->pers;
yi.cfg.slottime = yp->slot;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_data, &yi, sizeof(struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The yam_ioctl function in drivers/net/hamradio/yam.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.8 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for an SIOCYAMGCFG ioctl call.
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gplotGenCommandFile(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
char *cmdstr, *plottitle, *dataname;
l_int32 i, plotstyle, nplots;
FILE *fp;
PROCNAME("gplotGenCommandFile");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
/* Remove any previous command data */
sarrayClear(gplot->cmddata);
/* Generate command data instructions */
if (gplot->title) { /* set title */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set title '%s'", gplot->title);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->xlabel) { /* set xlabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set xlabel '%s'", gplot->xlabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->ylabel) { /* set ylabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set ylabel '%s'", gplot->ylabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Set terminal type and output */
if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PNG) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal png; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal postscript; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_EPS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE,
"set terminal postscript eps; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal latex; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale x");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_Y ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale y");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
nplots = sarrayGetCount(gplot->datanames);
for (i = 0; i < nplots; i++) {
plottitle = sarrayGetString(gplot->plottitles, i, L_NOCOPY);
dataname = sarrayGetString(gplot->datanames, i, L_NOCOPY);
numaGetIValue(gplot->plotstyles, i, &plotstyle);
if (nplots == 1) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
} else {
if (i == 0)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else if (i < nplots - 1)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Write command data to file */
cmdstr = sarrayToString(gplot->cmddata, 1);
if ((fp = fopenWriteStream(gplot->cmdname, "w")) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return ERROR_INT("cmd stream not opened", procName, 1);
}
fwrite(cmdstr, 1, strlen(cmdstr), fp);
fclose(fp);
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). | High | 169,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
{
union cpuid10_edx edx;
union cpuid10_eax eax;
union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
struct event_constraint *c;
unsigned int unused;
int version;
if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
case 0x6:
return p6_pmu_init();
case 0xb:
return knc_pmu_init();
case 0xf:
return p4_pmu_init();
}
return -ENODEV;
}
/*
* Check whether the Architectural PerfMon supports
* Branch Misses Retired hw_event or not.
*/
cpuid(10, &eax.full, &ebx.full, &unused, &edx.full);
if (eax.split.mask_length < ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTS_COUNT)
return -ENODEV;
version = eax.split.version_id;
if (version < 2)
x86_pmu = core_pmu;
else
x86_pmu = intel_pmu;
x86_pmu.version = version;
x86_pmu.num_counters = eax.split.num_counters;
x86_pmu.cntval_bits = eax.split.bit_width;
x86_pmu.cntval_mask = (1ULL << eax.split.bit_width) - 1;
x86_pmu.events_maskl = ebx.full;
x86_pmu.events_mask_len = eax.split.mask_length;
x86_pmu.max_pebs_events = min_t(unsigned, MAX_PEBS_EVENTS, x86_pmu.num_counters);
/*
* Quirk: v2 perfmon does not report fixed-purpose events, so
* assume at least 3 events:
*/
if (version > 1)
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed = max((int)edx.split.num_counters_fixed, 3);
/*
* v2 and above have a perf capabilities MSR
*/
if (version > 1) {
u64 capabilities;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, capabilities);
x86_pmu.intel_cap.capabilities = capabilities;
}
intel_ds_init();
x86_add_quirk(intel_arch_events_quirk); /* Install first, so it runs last */
/*
* Install the hw-cache-events table:
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case 14: /* 65 nm core solo/duo, "Yonah" */
pr_cont("Core events, ");
break;
case 15: /* original 65 nm celeron/pentium/core2/xeon, "Merom"/"Conroe" */
x86_add_quirk(intel_clovertown_quirk);
case 22: /* single-core 65 nm celeron/core2solo "Merom-L"/"Conroe-L" */
case 23: /* current 45 nm celeron/core2/xeon "Penryn"/"Wolfdale" */
case 29: /* six-core 45 nm xeon "Dunnington" */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, core2_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_core();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_core2_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_core2_pebs_event_constraints;
pr_cont("Core2 events, ");
break;
case 26: /* 45 nm nehalem, "Bloomfield" */
case 30: /* 45 nm nehalem, "Lynnfield" */
case 46: /* 45 nm nehalem-ex, "Beckton" */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, nehalem_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, nehalem_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_nhm();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_nehalem_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_nehalem_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.enable_all = intel_pmu_nhm_enable_all;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_nehalem_extra_regs;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.STALLED_CYCLES */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_EXECUTED.CORE_ACTIVE_CYCLES,c=1,i=1 */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x3f, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
x86_add_quirk(intel_nehalem_quirk);
pr_cont("Nehalem events, ");
break;
case 28: /* Atom */
case 38: /* Lincroft */
case 39: /* Penwell */
case 53: /* Cloverview */
case 54: /* Cedarview */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, atom_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_atom();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_gen_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints;
pr_cont("Atom events, ");
break;
case 37: /* 32 nm nehalem, "Clarkdale" */
case 44: /* 32 nm nehalem, "Gulftown" */
case 47: /* 32 nm Xeon E7 */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, westmere_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, nehalem_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_nhm();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_westmere_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.enable_all = intel_pmu_nhm_enable_all;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_westmere_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_westmere_extra_regs;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.STALLED_CYCLES */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_EXECUTED.CORE_ACTIVE_CYCLES,c=1,i=1 */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x3f, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("Westmere events, ");
break;
case 42: /* SandyBridge */
case 45: /* SandyBridge, "Romely-EP" */
x86_add_quirk(intel_sandybridge_quirk);
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_snb();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_snb_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_snb_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_aliases = intel_pebs_aliases_snb;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_snb_extra_regs;
/* all extra regs are per-cpu when HT is on */
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_NO_HT_SHARING;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.ANY,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
/* UOPS_DISPATCHED.THREAD,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles*/
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0xb1, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("SandyBridge events, ");
break;
case 58: /* IvyBridge */
case 62: /* IvyBridge EP */
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids,
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs,
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
intel_pmu_lbr_init_snb();
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_ivb_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = intel_ivb_pebs_event_constraints;
x86_pmu.pebs_aliases = intel_pebs_aliases_snb;
x86_pmu.extra_regs = intel_snb_extra_regs;
/* all extra regs are per-cpu when HT is on */
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_HAS_RSP_1;
x86_pmu.er_flags |= ERF_NO_HT_SHARING;
/* UOPS_ISSUED.ANY,c=1,i=1 to count stall cycles */
intel_perfmon_event_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND] =
X86_CONFIG(.event=0x0e, .umask=0x01, .inv=1, .cmask=1);
pr_cont("IvyBridge events, ");
break;
default:
switch (x86_pmu.version) {
case 1:
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_v1_event_constraints;
pr_cont("generic architected perfmon v1, ");
break;
default:
/*
* default constraints for v2 and up
*/
x86_pmu.event_constraints = intel_gen_event_constraints;
pr_cont("generic architected perfmon, ");
break;
}
}
if (x86_pmu.num_counters > INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) {
WARN(1, KERN_ERR "hw perf events %d > max(%d), clipping!",
x86_pmu.num_counters, INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC);
x86_pmu.num_counters = INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC;
}
x86_pmu.intel_ctrl = (1 << x86_pmu.num_counters) - 1;
if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed > INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED) {
WARN(1, KERN_ERR "hw perf events fixed %d > max(%d), clipping!",
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed, INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed = INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED;
}
x86_pmu.intel_ctrl |=
((1LL << x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed)-1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
if (x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
/*
* event on fixed counter2 (REF_CYCLES) only works on this
* counter, so do not extend mask to generic counters
*/
for_each_event_constraint(c, x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
if (c->cmask != X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK
|| c->idxmsk64 == INTEL_PMC_MSK_FIXED_REF_CYCLES) {
continue;
}
c->idxmsk64 |= (1ULL << x86_pmu.num_counters) - 1;
c->weight += x86_pmu.num_counters;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9, when the Performance Events Subsystem is enabled, specifies an incorrect bitmask, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (general protection fault and system crash) by attempting to set a reserved bit.
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
{
/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
/* This is not really an error but the only means to
for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* PSK: may send PSK identity hints
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
* Also for GOST ciphersuites when
* the client uses its key from the certificate
* for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
* FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
* should be generalized. But it is next step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0)
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted TLS handshake, aka the "CCS Injection" vulnerability.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static PassRefPtr<CSSValue> getPositionOffsetValue(RenderStyle* style, CSSPropertyID propertyID, RenderView* renderView)
{
if (!style)
return 0;
Length l;
switch (propertyID) {
case CSSPropertyLeft:
l = style->left();
break;
case CSSPropertyRight:
l = style->right();
break;
case CSSPropertyTop:
l = style->top();
break;
case CSSPropertyBottom:
l = style->bottom();
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (style->position() == AbsolutePosition || style->position() == FixedPosition) {
if (l.type() == WebCore::Fixed)
return zoomAdjustedPixelValue(l.value(), style);
else if (l.isViewportPercentage())
return zoomAdjustedPixelValue(valueForLength(l, 0, renderView), style);
return cssValuePool().createValue(l);
}
if (style->position() == RelativePosition)
return cssValuePool().createValue(l);
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueAuto);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Windows does not properly handle vertex data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline long object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, zend_class_entry *ce)
{
long elements;
elements = parse_iv2((*p) + 2, p);
(*p) += 2;
if (ce->serialize == NULL) {
object_init_ex(*rval, ce);
} else {
/* If this class implements Serializable, it should not land here but in object_custom(). The passed string
obviously doesn't descend from the regular serializer. */
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Erroneous data format for unserializing '%s'", ce->name);
return 0;
}
return elements;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The object_common1 function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.c in PHP before 5.6.30, 7.0.x before 7.0.15, and 7.1.x before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read and application crash) via crafted serialized data that is mishandled in a finish_nested_data call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73825 - Heap out of bounds read on unserialize in finish_nested_data() | Medium | 168,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: forward_search_range(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end, UChar* s,
UChar* range, UChar** low, UChar** high, UChar** low_prev)
{
UChar *p, *pprev = (UChar* )NULL;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_SEARCH
fprintf(stderr, "forward_search_range: str: %d, end: %d, s: %d, range: %d\n",
(int )str, (int )end, (int )s, (int )range);
#endif
p = s;
if (reg->dmin > 0) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_SINGLEBYTE(reg->enc)) {
p += reg->dmin;
}
else {
UChar *q = p + reg->dmin;
if (q >= end) return 0; /* fail */
while (p < q) p += enclen(reg->enc, p);
}
}
retry:
switch (reg->optimize) {
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT:
p = slow_search(reg->enc, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_IC:
p = slow_search_ic(reg->enc, reg->case_fold_flag,
reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM:
p = bm_search(reg, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM_NOT_REV:
p = bm_search_notrev(reg, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_MAP:
p = map_search(reg->enc, reg->map, p, range);
break;
}
if (p && p < range) {
if (p - reg->dmin < s) {
retry_gate:
pprev = p;
p += enclen(reg->enc, p);
goto retry;
}
if (reg->sub_anchor) {
UChar* prev;
switch (reg->sub_anchor) {
case ANCHOR_BEGIN_LINE:
if (!ON_STR_BEGIN(p)) {
prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
if (!ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, prev, end))
goto retry_gate;
}
break;
case ANCHOR_END_LINE:
if (ON_STR_END(p)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
prev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
if (prev && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, prev, end))
goto retry_gate;
#endif
}
else if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, p, end)
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
&& ! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(reg->enc, p, end)
#endif
)
goto retry_gate;
break;
}
}
if (reg->dmax == 0) {
*low = p;
if (low_prev) {
if (*low > s)
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc, s, p);
else
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
}
}
else {
if (reg->dmax != ONIG_INFINITE_DISTANCE) {
*low = p - reg->dmax;
if (*low > s) {
*low = onigenc_get_right_adjust_char_head_with_prev(reg->enc, s,
*low, (const UChar** )low_prev);
if (low_prev && IS_NULL(*low_prev))
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : s), *low);
}
else {
if (low_prev)
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), *low);
}
}
}
/* no needs to adjust *high, *high is used as range check only */
*high = p - reg->dmin;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_SEARCH
fprintf(stderr,
"forward_search_range success: low: %d, high: %d, dmin: %d, dmax: %d\n",
(int )(*low - str), (int )(*high - str), reg->dmin, reg->dmax);
#endif
return 1; /* success */
}
return 0; /* fail */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A SIGSEGV occurs in left_adjust_char_head() during regular expression compilation. Invalid handling of reg->dmax in forward_search_range() could result in an invalid pointer dereference, normally as an immediate denial-of-service condition.
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value | Medium | 168,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bgp_attr_unknown (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
bgp_size_t total;
struct transit *transit;
struct attr_extra *attre;
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
u_char *const startp = args->startp;
const u_char type = args->type;
const u_char flag = args->flags;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
if (BGP_DEBUG (normal, NORMAL))
zlog_debug ("%s Unknown attribute is received (type %d, length %d)",
peer->host, type, length);
if (BGP_DEBUG (events, EVENTS))
zlog (peer->log, LOG_DEBUG,
"Unknown attribute type %d length %d is received", type, length);
/* Forward read pointer of input stream. */
stream_forward_getp (peer->ibuf, length);
/* If any of the mandatory well-known attributes are not recognized,
then the Error Subcode is set to Unrecognized Well-known
Attribute. The Data field contains the unrecognized attribute
(type, length and value). */
if (!CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL))
{
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_UNREC_ATTR,
args->total);
}
/* Unrecognized non-transitive optional attributes must be quietly
ignored and not passed along to other BGP peers. */
if (! CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS))
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
/* If a path with recognized transitive optional attribute is
accepted and passed along to other BGP peers and the Partial bit
in the Attribute Flags octet is set to 1 by some previous AS, it
is not set back to 0 by the current AS. */
SET_FLAG (*startp, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_PARTIAL);
/* Store transitive attribute to the end of attr->transit. */
if (! ((attre = bgp_attr_extra_get(attr))->transit) )
attre->transit = XCALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT, sizeof (struct transit));
transit = attre->transit;
if (transit->val)
transit->val = XREALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT_VAL, transit->val,
transit->length + total);
else
transit->val = XMALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT_VAL, total);
memcpy (transit->val + transit->length, startp, total);
transit->length += total;
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The bgp_attr_unknown function in bgp_attr.c in Quagga 0.99.21 does not properly initialize the total variable, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (bgpd crash) via a crafted BGP update.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PaintArtifactCompositor::MightOverlap(const PendingLayer& layer_a,
const PendingLayer& layer_b) {
PropertyTreeState root_property_tree_state(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root());
FloatClipRect bounds_a(layer_a.bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(layer_a.property_tree_state,
root_property_tree_state, bounds_a);
FloatClipRect bounds_b(layer_b.bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(layer_b.property_tree_state,
root_property_tree_state, bounds_b);
return bounds_a.Rect().Intersects(bounds_b.Rect());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<FakeMediaStreamUIProxy> CreateMockUI(bool expect_started) {
std::unique_ptr<MockMediaStreamUIProxy> fake_ui =
std::make_unique<MockMediaStreamUIProxy>();
if (expect_started)
EXPECT_CALL(*fake_ui, MockOnStarted(_));
return fake_ui;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[addr] = value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void board_init_f_init_reserve(ulong base)
{
struct global_data *gd_ptr;
/*
* clear GD entirely and set it up.
* Use gd_ptr, as gd may not be properly set yet.
*/
gd_ptr = (struct global_data *)base;
/* zero the area */
memset(gd_ptr, '\0', sizeof(*gd));
/* set GD unless architecture did it already */
#if !defined(CONFIG_ARM)
arch_setup_gd(gd_ptr);
#endif
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(SYS_REPORT_STACK_F_USAGE))
board_init_f_init_stack_protection_addr(base);
/* next alloc will be higher by one GD plus 16-byte alignment */
base += roundup(sizeof(struct global_data), 16);
/*
* record early malloc arena start.
* Use gd as it is now properly set for all architectures.
*/
#if CONFIG_VAL(SYS_MALLOC_F_LEN)
/* go down one 'early malloc arena' */
gd->malloc_base = base;
/* next alloc will be higher by one 'early malloc arena' size */
base += CONFIG_VAL(SYS_MALLOC_F_LEN);
#endif
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(SYS_REPORT_STACK_F_USAGE))
board_init_f_init_stack_protection();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes | High | 169,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SaveTestFileSystem() {
GDataRootDirectoryProto root;
GDataDirectoryProto* root_dir = root.mutable_gdata_directory();
GDataEntryProto* file_base = root_dir->mutable_gdata_entry();
PlatformFileInfoProto* platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("drive");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
GDataFileProto* file = root_dir->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(1048576);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir1 = root_dir->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir1->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("Dir1");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir1->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(555);
GDataDirectoryProto* dir2 = dir1->add_child_directories();
file_base = dir2->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("SubDir2");
platform_info->set_is_directory(true);
file = dir2->add_child_files();
file_base = file->mutable_gdata_entry();
platform_info = file_base->mutable_file_info();
file_base->set_title("File3");
platform_info->set_is_directory(false);
platform_info->set_size(12345);
std::string serialized_proto;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.SerializeToString(&serialized_proto));
ASSERT_TRUE(!serialized_proto.empty());
FilePath cache_dir_path = profile_->GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("GCache/v1/meta/"));
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateDirectory(cache_dir_path));
const int file_size = static_cast<int>(serialized_proto.length());
ASSERT_EQ(file_util::WriteFile(cache_dir_path.Append("file_system.pb"),
serialized_proto.data(), file_size), file_size);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score < best_score)
continue;
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
if (crl_score == best_score) {
int day, sec;
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
continue;
/*
* ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
* and |sec|.
*/
if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
continue;
}
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
if (best_crl) {
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl) {
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2i allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by triggering a CRL operation.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::CreateTransaction(
int64_t transaction_id,
const std::vector<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
connection_->database()->CreateTransaction(transaction_id, connection_.get(),
object_store_ids, mode);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 59.0.3071.117 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page, aka an IndexedDB sandbox escape.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952} | Medium | 172,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXListBoxOption::isEnabled() const {
if (!getNode())
return false;
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_disabledAttr), "true"))
return false;
if (toElement(getNode())->hasAttribute(disabledAttr))
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool InputMethodController::FinishComposingText(
ConfirmCompositionBehavior confirm_behavior) {
if (!HasComposition())
return false;
const bool is_too_long = IsTextTooLongAt(composition_range_->StartPosition());
const String& composing = ComposingText();
if (confirm_behavior == kKeepSelection) {
const bool is_handle_visible = GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible();
const PlainTextRange& old_offsets = GetSelectionOffsets();
Editor::RevealSelectionScope reveal_selection_scope(&GetEditor());
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
}
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& old_selection_range =
EphemeralRangeForOffsets(old_offsets);
if (old_selection_range.IsNull())
return false;
const SelectionInDOMTree& selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(old_selection_range)
.SetIsHandleVisible(is_handle_visible)
.Build();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
selection,
SetSelectionData::Builder().SetShouldCloseTyping(true).Build());
return true;
}
Element* root_editable_element =
GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return false;
PlainTextRange composition_range =
PlainTextRange::Create(*root_editable_element, *composition_range_);
if (composition_range.IsNull())
return false;
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
}
if (!MoveCaret(composition_range.End()))
return false;
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660} | High | 171,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(const int argc, const char * const * const argv)
{
/* For each file on the command line test it with a range of transforms */
int option_end, ilog = 0;
struct display d;
validate_T();
display_init(&d);
for (option_end=1; option_end<argc; ++option_end)
{
const char *name = argv[option_end];
if (strcmp(name, "--verbose") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | VERBOSE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--warnings") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | WARNINGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--errors") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | ERRORS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--quiet") == 0)
d.options = (d.options & ~LEVEL_MASK) | QUIET;
else if (strcmp(name, "--exhaustive") == 0)
d.options |= EXHAUSTIVE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--fast") == 0)
d.options &= ~EXHAUSTIVE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--strict") == 0)
d.options |= STRICT;
else if (strcmp(name, "--relaxed") == 0)
d.options &= ~STRICT;
else if (strcmp(name, "--log") == 0)
{
ilog = option_end; /* prevent display */
d.options |= LOG;
}
else if (strcmp(name, "--nolog") == 0)
d.options &= ~LOG;
else if (strcmp(name, "--continue") == 0)
d.options |= CONTINUE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--stop") == 0)
d.options &= ~CONTINUE;
else if (strcmp(name, "--skip-bugs") == 0)
d.options |= SKIP_BUGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--test-all") == 0)
d.options &= ~SKIP_BUGS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--log-skipped") == 0)
d.options |= LOG_SKIPPED;
else if (strcmp(name, "--nolog-skipped") == 0)
d.options &= ~LOG_SKIPPED;
else if (strcmp(name, "--find-bad-combos") == 0)
d.options |= FIND_BAD_COMBOS;
else if (strcmp(name, "--nofind-bad-combos") == 0)
d.options &= ~FIND_BAD_COMBOS;
else if (name[0] == '-' && name[1] == '-')
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngimage: %s: unknown option\n", name);
return 99;
}
else
break; /* Not an option */
}
{
int i;
int errors = 0;
for (i=option_end; i<argc; ++i)
{
{
int ret = do_test(&d, argv[i]);
if (ret > QUIET) /* abort on user or internal error */
return 99;
}
/* Here on any return, including failures, except user/internal issues
*/
{
const int pass = (d.options & STRICT) ?
RESULT_STRICT(d.results) : RESULT_RELAXED(d.results);
if (!pass)
++errors;
if (d.options & LOG)
{
int j;
printf("%s: pngimage ", pass ? "PASS" : "FAIL");
for (j=1; j<option_end; ++j) if (j != ilog)
printf("%s ", argv[j]);
printf("%s\n", d.filename);
}
}
display_clean(&d);
}
return errors != 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Cirrus VGA emulator (hw/display/cirrus_vga.c) in QEMU before 2.2.0 allows local guest users to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to blit regions. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because an incomplete fix for CVE-2007-1320.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent],
id[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MaxTextExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->background_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->border_color,
exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->matte_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opaque") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
(void) ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in coders/mpc.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.7-4 and 7.x before 7.0.4-4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via vectors involving a pixel cache.
Commit Message: ... | High | 168,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleTextNode()
{
m_lastTextNode = m_node;
int startOffset;
int offsetInNode;
RenderText* renderer = handleFirstLetter(startOffset, offsetInNode);
if (!renderer)
return true;
String text = renderer->text();
if (!renderer->firstTextBox() && text.length() > 0)
return true;
m_positionEndOffset = m_offset;
m_offset = startOffset + offsetInNode;
m_positionNode = m_node;
m_positionStartOffset = m_offset;
ASSERT(0 <= m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(1 <= m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(m_positionStartOffset <= m_positionEndOffset);
m_textLength = m_positionEndOffset - m_positionStartOffset;
m_textCharacters = text.characters() + (m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode);
ASSERT(m_textCharacters >= text.characters());
ASSERT(m_textCharacters + m_textLength <= text.characters() + static_cast<int>(text.length()));
m_lastCharacter = text[m_positionEndOffset - 1];
return !m_shouldHandleFirstLetter;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors related to the handling of text.
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int socket_create(uint16_t port)
{
int sfd = -1;
int yes = 1;
#ifdef WIN32
WSADATA wsa_data;
if (!wsa_init) {
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa_data) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "WSAStartup failed!\n");
ExitProcess(-1);
}
wsa_init = 1;
}
#endif
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
if (0 > (sfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP))) {
perror("socket()");
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
memset((void *) &saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (0 > bind(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, sizeof(saddr))) {
perror("bind()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(sfd, 1) == -1) {
perror("listen()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The socket_create function in common/socket.c in libimobiledevice and libusbmuxd allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and communicate with services on iOS devices by connecting to an IPv4 TCP socket.
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally | Medium | 167,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind. | Medium | 166,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int format8BIM(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
char
temp[MagickPathExtent];
unsigned int
foundOSType;
int
ID,
resCount,
i,
c;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*PString,
*str;
resCount=0;
foundOSType=0; /* found the OSType */
(void) foundOSType;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
while (c != EOF)
{
if (c == '8')
{
unsigned char
buffer[5];
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) c;
for (i=1; i<4; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
buffer[i] = (unsigned char) c;
}
buffer[4]=0;
if (strcmp((const char *)buffer, "8BIM") == 0)
foundOSType=1;
else
continue;
}
else
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
continue;
}
/*
We found the OSType (8BIM) and now grab the ID, PString, and Size fields.
*/
ID=ReadBlobMSBSignedShort(ifile);
if (ID < 0)
return(-1);
{
unsigned char
plen;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
plen = (unsigned char) c;
PString=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (plen+
MagickPathExtent),sizeof(*PString));
if (PString == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return 0;
for (i=0; i<plen; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
PString[i] = (unsigned char) c;
}
PString[ plen ] = 0;
if ((plen & 0x01) == 0)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
}
}
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBSignedLong(ifile);
if ((count < 0) || (count > GetBlobSize(ifile)))
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
/* make a buffer to hold the data and snag it from the input stream */
str=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count,sizeof(*str));
if (str == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
return -1;
}
str[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
/* we currently skip thumbnails, since it does not make
* any sense preserving them in a real world application
*/
if (ID != THUMBNAIL_ID)
{
/* now finish up by formatting this binary data into
* ASCII equivalent
*/
if (strlen((const char *)PString) > 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"8BIM#%d#%s=",ID,
PString);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"8BIM#%d=",ID);
(void) WriteBlobString(ofile,temp);
if (ID == IPTC_ID)
{
formatString(ofile, "IPTC", 4);
formatIPTCfromBuffer(ofile, (char *)str, (ssize_t) count);
}
else
formatString(ofile, (char *)str, (ssize_t) count);
}
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
PString=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(PString);
resCount++;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
}
return resCount;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off-by-one read vulnerability was discovered in ImageMagick before version 7.0.7-28 in the formatIPTCfromBuffer function in coders/meta.c. A local attacker may use this flaw to read beyond the end of the buffer or to crash the program.
Commit Message: ... | Low | 169,720 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options)
{
char *p;
int rc = 0;
int sig_set = 0;
int cipher_name_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_name_set = 0;
int cipher_key_bytes;
int cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
char *sig_src;
char *cipher_name_dst;
char *cipher_name_src;
char *fn_cipher_name_dst;
char *fn_cipher_name_src;
char *fnek_dst;
char *fnek_src;
char *cipher_key_bytes_src;
char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src;
if (!options) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(mount_crypt_stat);
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case ecryptfs_opt_sig:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig:
sig_src = args[0].from;
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
sig_src, 0);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
sig_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_cipher:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_cipher:
cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->
global_default_cipher_name;
strncpy(cipher_name_dst, cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
cipher_name_dst[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes:
cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(cipher_key_bytes_src,
&cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
cipher_key_bytes;
cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_passthrough:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_xattr_metadata:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig:
fnek_src = args[0].from;
fnek_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig;
strncpy(fnek_dst, fnek_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig[
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(
mount_crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
rc);
goto out;
}
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
(ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES
| ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK);
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher:
fn_cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name;
strncpy(fn_cipher_name_dst, fn_cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name[
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
fn_cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes:
fn_cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(fn_cipher_key_bytes_src,
&fn_cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
fn_cipher_key_bytes;
fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_err:
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: eCryptfs: unrecognized option [%s]\n",
__func__, p);
}
}
if (!sig_set) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid "
"auth tok signature as a mount "
"parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n");
goto out;
}
if (!cipher_name_set) {
int cipher_name_len = strlen(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
BUG_ON(cipher_name_len >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_name_set)
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
if (!cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ecryptfs_tfm_exists(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name, NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
"properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
out:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Race condition in the ecryptfs_mount function in fs/ecryptfs/main.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to bypass intended file permissions via a mount.ecryptfs_private mount with a mismatched uid.
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]> | Low | 165,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MemBackendImpl::EvictIfNeeded() {
if (current_size_ <= max_size_)
return;
int target_size = std::max(0, max_size_ - kDefaultEvictionSize);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* entry = lru_list_.head();
while (current_size_ > target_size && entry != lru_list_.end()) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = entry->value();
entry = entry->next();
if (!to_doom->InUse())
to_doom->Doom();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A double-eviction in the Incognito mode cache that lead to a user-after-free in Networking Disk Cache in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236} | Medium | 172,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr;
UWORD16 u2_total_len;
UWORD16 u2_len;
UWORD16 u2_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_next_word;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
else
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(ps_stream);
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_first_mb)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* If the 2nd member of a field picture pair is a P picture and */
/* the first one was an I picture, there cannot be any skipped */
/* MBs in the second field picture */
/****************************************************************/
/*
if((dec->picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE) &&
(dec->f->FieldFuncCall != 0) &&
(dec->las->u1_last_coded_vop_type == I))
{
core0_err_handler((void *)(VOLParams),
ITTMPEG2_ERR_INVALID_MB_SKIP);
}
*/
/****************************************************************/
/* In MPEG-2, the last MB of the row cannot be skipped and the */
/* MBAddrIncr cannot be such that it will take the current MB */
/* beyond the current row */
/* In MPEG-1, the slice could start and end anywhere and is not */
/* restricted to a row like in MPEG-2. Hence this check should */
/* not be done for MPEG-1 streams. */
/****************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 && ((ps_dec->u2_mb_x + u2_mb_addr_incr) > ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb) )
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - ps_dec->u2_mb_x;
}
impeg2d_dec_skip_mbs(ps_dec, (UWORD16)(u2_mb_addr_incr - 1));
}
}
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,16);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* MB type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
u2_mb_type = ps_dec->pu2_mb_type[BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,10)];
u2_len = BITS(u2_mb_type,15,8);
u2_total_len = u2_len;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << u2_len);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* motion type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) && ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type)
{
WORD32 i4_motion_type;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,14);
u2_total_len += MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN);
i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
if((i4_motion_type == 0) ||
(i4_motion_type == 4) ||
(i4_motion_type > 7))
{
i4_motion_type = 1;
}
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dct type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_CODED) && ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = BIT((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15);
u2_total_len += MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN);
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u2_mb_type & MB_QUANT)
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,11);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
u2_total_len += MB_QUANT_SCALE_CODE_LEN;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,u2_total_len);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Set the function pointers */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_coded_mb = (UWORD16)(u2_mb_type & MB_CODED);
if(u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK)
{
UWORD16 refPic = !(u2_mb_type & MB_MV_FORW);
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = (e_pred_direction_t)refPic;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA)
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
impeg2d_dec_intra_mb(ps_dec);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = FORW;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 0;
impeg2d_dec_0mv_coded_mb(ps_dec);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* decode cbp */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if((u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA))
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0x3f;
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
if((ps_dec->u2_coded_mb))
{
UWORD16 cbpValue;
cbpValue = gau2_impeg2d_cbp_code[impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_CBP_LEN)];
ps_dec->u2_cbp = cbpValue & 0xFF;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,(cbpValue >> 8) & 0x0FF);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: decoder/impeg2d_dec_hdr.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a certain negative value, aka internal bug 26070014.
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
| High | 174,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static plist_t parse_bin_node(struct bplist_data *bplist, const char** object)
{
uint16_t type = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
if (!object)
return NULL;
type = (**object) & BPLIST_MASK;
size = (**object) & BPLIST_FILL;
(*object)++;
if (size == BPLIST_FILL) {
switch (type) {
case BPLIST_DATA:
case BPLIST_STRING:
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_DICT:
{
uint16_t next_size = **object & BPLIST_FILL;
if ((**object & BPLIST_MASK) != BPLIST_UINT) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid size node type for node type 0x%02x: found 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x\n", __func__, type, **object & BPLIST_MASK, BPLIST_UINT);
return NULL;
}
(*object)++;
next_size = 1 << next_size;
if (*object + next_size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: size node data bytes for node type 0x%02x point outside of valid range\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
size = UINT_TO_HOST(*object, next_size);
(*object) += next_size;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case BPLIST_NULL:
switch (size)
{
case BPLIST_TRUE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = TRUE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_FALSE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = FALSE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_NULL:
default:
return NULL;
}
case BPLIST_UINT:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UINT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uint_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_REAL:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_real_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATE:
if (3 != size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid data size for BPLIST_DATE node\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_date_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATA:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATA data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_data_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_STRING:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_STRING data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_string_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
if (size*2 < size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Integer overflow when calculating BPLIST_UNICODE data size.\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + size*2 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UNICODE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_unicode_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_ARRAY data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_array_node(bplist, object, size);
case BPLIST_UID:
if (*object + size+1 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UID data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uid_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DICT:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_dict_node(bplist, object, size);
default:
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: unexpected node type 0x%02x\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the parse_string_node function in bplist.c in libimobiledevice libplist 1.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted plist file.
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz | Low | 168,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kg_unseal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 code;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM) != NULL) {
code = kg_unseal_stream_iov(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
} else {
code = kg_unseal_iov_token(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
}
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | High | 166,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault, sig, code;
if (notify_page_fault(regs, fsr))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
/*
* As per x86, we may deadlock here. However, since the kernel only
* validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
* we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
*/
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
goto no_context;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
* which case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
* down_read()
*/
might_sleep();
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
if (!user_mode(regs) &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
goto no_context;
#endif
}
fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, fsr, tsk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0, regs, addr);
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_MINOR)
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0, regs, addr);
/*
* Handle the "normal" case first - VM_FAULT_MAJOR / VM_FAULT_MINOR
*/
if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP | VM_FAULT_BADACCESS))))
return 0;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return to
* userspace (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we
* got oom-killed)
*/
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
}
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we
* have no context to handle this fault with.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
/*
* We had some memory, but were unable to
* successfully fix up this page fault.
*/
sig = SIGBUS;
code = BUS_ADRERR;
} else {
/*
* Something tried to access memory that
* isn't in our memory map..
*/
sig = SIGSEGV;
code = fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ?
SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR;
}
__do_user_fault(tsk, addr, fsr, sig, code, regs);
return 0;
no_context:
__do_kernel_fault(mm, addr, fsr, regs);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::beginString(GfxState *state, GooString *s)
{
int len = s->getLength();
if (needFontUpdate)
updateFont(state);
if (!currentFont)
return;
glyphs = (cairo_glyph_t *) gmalloc (len * sizeof (cairo_glyph_t));
glyphCount = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"IncrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"DecrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::DecrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710} | Medium | 172,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Curl versions 7.14.1 through 7.61.1 are vulnerable to a heap-based buffer over-read in the tool_msgs.c:voutf() function that may result in information exposure and denial of service.
Commit Message: voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr
CVE-2018-16842
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html | Medium | 169,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ReadUserLogState::SetState( const ReadUserLog::FileState &state )
{
const ReadUserLogFileState::FileState *istate;
if ( !convertState(state, istate) ) {
return false;
}
if ( strcmp( istate->m_signature, FileStateSignature ) ) {
m_init_error = true;
return false;
}
if ( istate->m_version != FILESTATE_VERSION ) {
m_init_error = true;
return false;
}
m_base_path = istate->m_base_path;
m_max_rotations = istate->m_max_rotations;
Rotation( istate->m_rotation, false, true );
m_log_type = istate->m_log_type;
m_uniq_id = istate->m_uniq_id;
m_sequence = istate->m_sequence;
m_stat_buf.st_ino = istate->m_inode;
m_stat_buf.st_ctime = istate->m_ctime;
m_stat_buf.st_size = istate->m_size.asint;
m_stat_valid = true;
m_offset = istate->m_offset.asint;
m_event_num = istate->m_event_num.asint;
m_log_position = istate->m_log_position.asint;
m_log_record = istate->m_log_record.asint;
m_update_time = istate->m_update_time;
m_initialized = true;
MyString str;
GetStateString( str, "Restored reader state" );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, str.Value() );
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = malloc(w * sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
ptr = im->data;
per_inc = 100.0 / (((float)w) * h);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
last_per = (int)per;
if (!(progress(im, (int)per, 0, last_y, w, i)))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a GIF image without a colormap.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,340 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.0.0 has unspecified impact and attack vectors, aka internal bug 15342615.
Commit Message: SampleTable: check integer overflow during table alloc
Bug: 15328708
Bug: 15342615
Bug: 15342751
Change-Id: I6bb110a1eba46506799c73be8ff9a4f71c7e7053
| High | 173,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OnImageDecoded(const gfx::Image& decoded_image) {
image_decoded_callback_.Run(decoded_image.AsBitmap());
delete this;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374} | High | 171,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928} | Medium | 173,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, *prev;
int unmapped_error = 0;
int error = -EINVAL;
/*
* If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
* ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
* - this matches the handling in madvise.
*/
vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
if (vma && start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (;;) {
/* Still start < end. */
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!vma)
return error;
/* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (start >= end)
return error;
}
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (end < tmp)
tmp = end;
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */
error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, end,
(const char __user *)arg);
if (error)
return error;
start = tmp;
if (prev && start < prev->vm_end)
start = prev->vm_end;
error = unmapped_error;
if (start >= end)
return error;
if (prev)
vma = prev->vm_next;
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The prctl_set_vma_anon_name function in kernel/sys.c in Android before 5.1.1 LMY49F and 6.0 before 2016-01-01 does not ensure that only one vma is accessed in a certain update action, which allows attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (vma list corruption) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20017123.
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
| High | 173,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> TransformPaintPropertyNode::ToJSON() const {
auto json = JSONObject::Create();
if (Parent())
json->SetString("parent", String::Format("%p", Parent()));
if (!state_.matrix.IsIdentity())
json->SetString("matrix", state_.matrix.ToString());
if (!state_.matrix.IsIdentityOrTranslation())
json->SetString("origin", state_.origin.ToString());
if (!state_.flattens_inherited_transform)
json->SetBoolean("flattensInheritedTransform", false);
if (state_.backface_visibility != BackfaceVisibility::kInherited) {
json->SetString("backface",
state_.backface_visibility == BackfaceVisibility::kVisible
? "visible"
: "hidden");
}
if (state_.rendering_context_id) {
json->SetString("renderingContextId",
String::Format("%x", state_.rendering_context_id));
}
if (state_.direct_compositing_reasons != CompositingReason::kNone) {
json->SetString(
"directCompositingReasons",
CompositingReason::ToString(state_.direct_compositing_reasons));
}
if (state_.compositor_element_id) {
json->SetString("compositorElementId",
state_.compositor_element_id.ToString().c_str());
}
if (state_.scroll)
json->SetString("scroll", String::Format("%p", state_.scroll.get()));
return json;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t fuse_fill_write_pages(struct fuse_req *req,
struct address_space *mapping,
struct iov_iter *ii, loff_t pos)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(mapping->host);
unsigned offset = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
size_t count = 0;
int err;
req->in.argpages = 1;
req->page_descs[0].offset = offset;
do {
size_t tmp;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(ii));
bytes = min_t(size_t, bytes, fc->max_write - count);
again:
err = -EFAULT;
if (iov_iter_fault_in_readable(ii, bytes))
break;
err = -ENOMEM;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, 0);
if (!page)
break;
if (mapping_writably_mapped(mapping))
flush_dcache_page(page);
tmp = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, ii, offset, bytes);
flush_dcache_page(page);
if (!tmp) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
bytes = min(bytes, iov_iter_single_seg_count(ii));
goto again;
}
err = 0;
req->pages[req->num_pages] = page;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].length = tmp;
req->num_pages++;
iov_iter_advance(ii, tmp);
count += tmp;
pos += tmp;
offset += tmp;
if (offset == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
offset = 0;
if (!fc->big_writes)
break;
} while (iov_iter_count(ii) && count < fc->max_write &&
req->num_pages < req->max_pages && offset == 0);
return count > 0 ? count : err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The fuse_fill_write_pages function in fs/fuse/file.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a writev system call that triggers a zero length for the first segment of an iov.
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline bool is_flush_request(struct request *rq,
struct blk_flush_queue *fq, unsigned int tag)
{
return ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FLUSH_SEQ) &&
fq->flush_rq->tag == tag);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In blk_mq_tag_to_rq in blk-mq.c in the upstream kernel, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition when a request has been previously freed by blk_mq_complete_request. This could lead to local escalation of privilege. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-63083046.
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline void process_get_command(conn *c, token_t *tokens, size_t ntokens, bool return_cas) {
char *key;
size_t nkey;
int i = 0;
item *it;
token_t *key_token = &tokens[KEY_TOKEN];
char *suffix;
assert(c != NULL);
do {
while(key_token->length != 0) {
key = key_token->value;
nkey = key_token->length;
if(nkey > KEY_MAX_LENGTH) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
while (i-- > 0) {
item_remove(*(c->ilist + i));
}
return;
}
it = item_get(key, nkey, c, DO_UPDATE);
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_get(key, nkey, NULL != it);
}
if (it) {
if (i >= c->isize) {
item **new_list = realloc(c->ilist, sizeof(item *) * c->isize * 2);
if (new_list) {
c->isize *= 2;
c->ilist = new_list;
} else {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
/*
* Construct the response. Each hit adds three elements to the
* outgoing data list:
* "VALUE "
* key
* " " + flags + " " + data length + "\r\n" + data (with \r\n)
*/
if (return_cas || !settings.inline_ascii_response)
{
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
/* Goofy mid-flight realloc. */
if (i >= c->suffixsize) {
char **new_suffix_list = realloc(c->suffixlist,
sizeof(char *) * c->suffixsize * 2);
if (new_suffix_list) {
c->suffixsize *= 2;
c->suffixlist = new_suffix_list;
} else {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
suffix = do_cache_alloc(c->thread->suffix_cache);
if (suffix == NULL) {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory making CAS suffix");
item_remove(it);
while (i-- > 0) {
item_remove(*(c->ilist + i));
}
return;
}
*(c->suffixlist + i) = suffix;
int suffix_len = make_ascii_get_suffix(suffix, it, return_cas);
if (add_iov(c, "VALUE ", 6) != 0 ||
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey) != 0 ||
(settings.inline_ascii_response && add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix - 2) != 0) ||
add_iov(c, suffix, suffix_len) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_data(it), it->nbytes);
} else if (add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes) != 0) {
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
else
{
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
if (add_iov(c, "VALUE ", 6) != 0 ||
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0)
{
if (add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix + it->nbytes) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
} else if (add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix) != 0 ||
add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes) != 0) {
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, ">%d sending key ", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < it->nkey; ++ii) {
fprintf(stderr, "%c", key[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
/* item_get() has incremented it->refcount for us */
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].get_hits++;
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
*(c->ilist + i) = it;
i++;
} else {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.get_misses++;
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
}
key_token++;
}
/*
* If the command string hasn't been fully processed, get the next set
* of tokens.
*/
if(key_token->value != NULL) {
ntokens = tokenize_command(key_token->value, tokens, MAX_TOKENS);
key_token = tokens;
}
} while(key_token->value != NULL);
c->icurr = c->ilist;
c->ileft = i;
if (return_cas || !settings.inline_ascii_response) {
c->suffixcurr = c->suffixlist;
c->suffixleft = i;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, ">%d END\n", c->sfd);
/*
If the loop was terminated because of out-of-memory, it is not
reliable to add END\r\n to the buffer, because it might not end
in \r\n. So we send SERVER_ERROR instead.
*/
if (key_token->value != NULL || add_iov(c, "END\r\n", 5) != 0
|| (IS_UDP(c->transport) && build_udp_headers(c) != 0)) {
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory writing get response");
}
else {
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->msgcurr = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: memcached version prior to 1.4.37 contains an Integer Overflow vulnerability in items.c:item_free() that can result in data corruption and deadlocks due to items existing in hash table being reused from free list. This attack appear to be exploitable via network connectivity to the memcached service. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.4.37 and later.
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches. | Medium | 168,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
name, value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""),
path.fromMaybe(""), secure.fromMaybe(false),
http_only.fromMaybe(false), same_site.fromMaybe(""),
expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,760 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t f_hidg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offp)
{
struct f_hidg *hidg = file->private_data;
struct usb_request *req;
unsigned long flags;
ssize_t status = -ENOMEM;
if (!access_ok(buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
#define WRITE_COND (!hidg->write_pending)
try_again:
/* write queue */
while (!WRITE_COND) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(
hidg->write_queue, WRITE_COND))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
}
hidg->write_pending = 1;
req = hidg->req;
count = min_t(unsigned, count, hidg->report_length);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
status = copy_from_user(req->buf, buffer, count);
if (status != 0) {
ERROR(hidg->func.config->cdev,
"copy_from_user error\n");
status = -EINVAL;
goto release_write_pending;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
/* when our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, req);
/*
* TODO
* Should we fail with error here?
*/
goto try_again;
}
req->status = 0;
req->zero = 0;
req->length = count;
req->complete = f_hidg_req_complete;
req->context = hidg;
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status < 0) {
ERROR(hidg->func.config->cdev,
"usb_ep_queue error on int endpoint %zd\n", status);
goto release_write_pending_unlocked;
} else {
status = count;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
return status;
release_write_pending:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
release_write_pending_unlocked:
hidg->write_pending = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags);
wake_up(&hidg->write_queue);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.16.4, a double-locking error in drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c may potentially cause a deadlock with f_hid.
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
unsigned long identifier,
Resource* resource,
const ResourceRequest& original_resource_request) {
ResourceRequest resource_request(resource->Url());
resource_request.SetFrameType(original_resource_request.GetFrameType());
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
original_resource_request.GetRequestContext());
Context().DispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(identifier, resource_request,
resource->GetResponse());
Context().DispatchWillSendRequest(identifier, resource_request,
ResourceResponse() /* redirects */,
resource->Options().initiator_info);
Context().DispatchDidReceiveResponse(
identifier, resource->GetResponse(), resource_request.GetFrameType(),
resource_request.GetRequestContext(), resource,
FetchContext::ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache);
if (resource->EncodedSize() > 0)
Context().DispatchDidReceiveData(identifier, 0, resource->EncodedSize());
Context().DispatchDidFinishLoading(
identifier, 0, 0, resource->GetResponse().DecodedBodyLength());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An error in the lha_read_file_header_1() function (archive_read_support_format_lha.c) in libarchive 3.2.2 allows remote attackers to trigger an out-of-bounds read memory access and subsequently cause a crash via a specially crafted archive.
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169 | Medium | 168,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_ofb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "ofb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sandboxing code in libarchive 3.2.0 and earlier mishandles hardlink archive entries of non-zero data size, which might allow remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a crafted archive file.
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert. | Medium | 167,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct rds_connection *__rds_conn_create(struct net *net,
__be32 laddr, __be32 faddr,
struct rds_transport *trans, gfp_t gfp,
int is_outgoing)
{
struct rds_connection *conn, *parent = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head = rds_conn_bucket(laddr, faddr);
struct rds_transport *loop_trans;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
struct rds_transport *otrans = trans;
if (!is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP)
goto new_conn;
rcu_read_lock();
conn = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans);
if (conn && conn->c_loopback && conn->c_trans != &rds_loop_transport &&
laddr == faddr && !is_outgoing) {
/* This is a looped back IB connection, and we're
* called by the code handling the incoming connect.
* We need a second connection object into which we
* can stick the other QP. */
parent = conn;
conn = parent->c_passive;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (conn)
goto out;
new_conn:
conn = kmem_cache_zalloc(rds_conn_slab, gfp);
if (!conn) {
conn = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto out;
}
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&conn->c_hash_node);
conn->c_laddr = laddr;
conn->c_faddr = faddr;
spin_lock_init(&conn->c_lock);
conn->c_next_tx_seq = 1;
rds_conn_net_set(conn, net);
init_waitqueue_head(&conn->c_waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_send_queue);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_retrans);
ret = rds_cong_get_maps(conn);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* This is where a connection becomes loopback. If *any* RDS sockets
* can bind to the destination address then we'd rather the messages
* flow through loopback rather than either transport.
*/
loop_trans = rds_trans_get_preferred(net, faddr);
if (loop_trans) {
rds_trans_put(loop_trans);
conn->c_loopback = 1;
if (is_outgoing && trans->t_prefer_loopback) {
/* "outgoing" connection - and the transport
* says it wants the connection handled by the
* loopback transport. This is what TCP does.
*/
trans = &rds_loop_transport;
}
}
conn->c_trans = trans;
ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
atomic_set(&conn->c_state, RDS_CONN_DOWN);
conn->c_send_gen = 0;
conn->c_reconnect_jiffies = 0;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_send_w, rds_send_worker);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_recv_w, rds_recv_worker);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_conn_w, rds_connect_worker);
INIT_WORK(&conn->c_down_w, rds_shutdown_worker);
mutex_init(&conn->c_cm_lock);
conn->c_flags = 0;
rdsdebug("allocated conn %p for %pI4 -> %pI4 over %s %s\n",
conn, &laddr, &faddr,
trans->t_name ? trans->t_name : "[unknown]",
is_outgoing ? "(outgoing)" : "");
/*
* Since we ran without holding the conn lock, someone could
* have created the same conn (either normal or passive) in the
* interim. We check while holding the lock. If we won, we complete
* init and return our conn. If we lost, we rollback and return the
* other one.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_conn_lock, flags);
if (parent) {
/* Creating passive conn */
if (parent->c_passive) {
trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data);
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = parent->c_passive;
} else {
parent->c_passive = conn;
rds_cong_add_conn(conn);
rds_conn_count++;
}
} else {
/* Creating normal conn */
struct rds_connection *found;
if (!is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP)
found = NULL;
else
found = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans);
if (found) {
trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data);
kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn);
conn = found;
} else {
if ((is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP) ||
(otrans->t_type != RDS_TRANS_TCP)) {
/* Only the active side should be added to
* reconnect list for TCP.
*/
hlist_add_head_rcu(&conn->c_hash_node, head);
}
rds_cong_add_conn(conn);
rds_conn_count++;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_conn_lock, flags);
out:
return conn;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The __rds_conn_create function in net/rds/connection.c in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by using a socket that was not properly bound.
Commit Message: RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection
There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating
a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr.
It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to
send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref:
[135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
[135546.051270] Modules linked in:
[135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527
[135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000
[135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194)
[135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000
[135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038
[135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000
[135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000
[135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[135546.064723] Stack:
[135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008
[135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342
[135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00
[135546.068629] Call Trace:
[135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134)
[135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298)
[135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278)
[135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058)
[135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38)
[135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298)
[135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620)
[135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657)
[135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628)
[135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926)
[135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674)
[135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Tracks::~Tracks()
{
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j)
{
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
delete pTrack;
}
delete[] m_trackEntries;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::Resize(const gfx::Size& size,
float scale_factor,
ColorSpace color_space,
bool has_alpha) {
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852} | Medium | 172,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The H.264 decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain slice data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165661.
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize slice parameters before concealing error MBs
Also memset ps_dec_op structure to zero.
For error input, this ensures dimensions are initialized to zero
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I66eb2ddc5e02e74b7ff04da5f749443920f37141
| High | 174,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: transform_enable(PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Everything starts out enabled, so if we see an 'enable' disabled
* everything else the first time round.
*/
static int all_disabled = 0;
int found_it = 0;
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 1;
found_it = 1;
}
else if (!all_disabled)
list->enable = 0;
list = list->list;
}
all_disabled = 1;
if (!found_it)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-enable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
int is_export, i, n, keya, ek;
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *md;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 10 - s->init_num);
if (i < (10 - s->init_num))
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
s->init_num = 10;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
if (cp == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return (-1);
}
s->session->cipher = cp;
p += 3;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.clear = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.enc = i;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
s->session->key_arg_length = i;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
keya = s->session->key_arg_length;
len =
10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc +
(unsigned long)keya;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 10;
memcpy(s->session->key_arg, &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear + s->s2->tmp.enc]),
(unsigned int)keya);
if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
return (-1);
}
i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &md, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
return (0);
} else
ek = 5;
/* bad decrypt */
# if 1
/*
* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
* secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
*/
if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|| (is_export && ((i != ek)
|| (s->s2->tmp.clear +
(unsigned int)i != (unsigned int)
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) {
ERR_clear_error();
if (is_export)
i = ek;
else
i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0)
return 0;
}
# else
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
int z;
/*
* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet type the first
* time round.
*/
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) {
s->first_packet = 1;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
}
# endif
if (is_export)
i += s->s2->tmp.clear;
if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i < s->version)
s->version = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len =
9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-HELLO */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 9;
/*
* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session structure
* if it is cached
*/
/* session-id */
if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
} else {
if (s->cert == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
}
}
if (!s->hit) {
cs = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
&s->session->ciphers);
if (cs == NULL)
goto mem_err;
cl = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
prio = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
if (prio == NULL)
goto mem_err;
allow = cs;
} else {
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
}
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
* client sent the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
* if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
*/
}
p += s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
/* done cipher selection */
/* session id extracted already */
p += s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
/* challenge */
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s2->challenge, p, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
return (1);
mem_err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The SSLv2 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (s2_lib.c assertion failure and daemon exit) via a crafted CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PlatformSensor::UpdateSharedBuffer(const SensorReading& reading) {
ReadingBuffer* buffer =
static_cast<ReadingBuffer*>(shared_buffer_mapping_.get());
auto& seqlock = buffer->seqlock.value();
seqlock.WriteBegin();
buffer->reading = reading;
seqlock.WriteEnd();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t iblock, unsigned int max_blocks,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, int flags,
unsigned int allocated, struct buffer_head *bh_result,
ext4_fsblk_t newblock)
{
int ret = 0;
int err = 0;
ext4_io_end_t *io = EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u, flags %d, allocated %u",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)iblock, max_blocks,
flags, allocated);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
/* get_block() before submit the IO, split the extent */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) {
ret = ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle,
inode, path, iblock,
max_blocks, flags);
/*
* Flag the inode(non aio case) or end_io struct (aio case)
* that this IO needs to convertion to written when IO is
* completed
*/
if (io)
io->flag = EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN;
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
goto out;
}
/* IO end_io complete, convert the filled extent to written */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) {
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle, inode,
path);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
goto out2;
}
/* buffered IO case */
/*
* repeat fallocate creation request
* we already have an unwritten extent
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT)
goto map_out;
/* buffered READ or buffered write_begin() lookup */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* We have blocks reserved already. We
* return allocated blocks so that delalloc
* won't do block reservation for us. But
* the buffer head will be unmapped so that
* a read from the block returns 0s.
*/
set_buffer_unwritten(bh_result);
goto out1;
}
/* buffered write, writepage time, convert*/
ret = ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle, inode,
path, iblock,
max_blocks);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
out:
if (ret <= 0) {
err = ret;
goto out2;
} else
allocated = ret;
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/*
* if we allocated more blocks than requested
* we need to make sure we unmap the extra block
* allocated. The actual needed block will get
* unmapped later when we find the buffer_head marked
* new.
*/
if (allocated > max_blocks) {
unmap_underlying_metadata_blocks(inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
newblock + max_blocks,
allocated - max_blocks);
allocated = max_blocks;
}
/*
* If we have done fallocate with the offset that is already
* delayed allocated, we would have block reservation
* and quota reservation done in the delayed write path.
* But fallocate would have already updated quota and block
* count for this offset. So cancel these reservation
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated, 0);
map_out:
set_buffer_mapped(bh_result);
out1:
if (allocated > max_blocks)
allocated = max_blocks;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
bh_result->b_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
bh_result->b_blocknr = newblock;
out2:
if (path) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: convert_to_decimal (mpn_t a, size_t extra_zeroes)
{
mp_limb_t *a_ptr = a.limbs;
size_t a_len = a.nlimbs;
/* 0.03345 is slightly larger than log(2)/(9*log(10)). */
size_t c_len = 9 * ((size_t)(a_len * (GMP_LIMB_BITS * 0.03345f)) + 1);
char *c_ptr = (char *) malloc (xsum (c_len, extra_zeroes));
if (c_ptr != NULL)
{
char *d_ptr = c_ptr;
for (; extra_zeroes > 0; extra_zeroes--)
*d_ptr++ = '0';
while (a_len > 0)
{
/* Divide a by 10^9, in-place. */
mp_limb_t remainder = 0;
mp_limb_t *ptr = a_ptr + a_len;
size_t count;
for (count = a_len; count > 0; count--)
{
mp_twolimb_t num =
((mp_twolimb_t) remainder << GMP_LIMB_BITS) | *--ptr;
*ptr = num / 1000000000;
remainder = num % 1000000000;
}
/* Store the remainder as 9 decimal digits. */
for (count = 9; count > 0; count--)
{
*d_ptr++ = '0' + (remainder % 10);
remainder = remainder / 10;
}
/* Normalize a. */
if (a_ptr[a_len - 1] == 0)
a_len--;
}
/* Remove leading zeroes. */
while (d_ptr > c_ptr && d_ptr[-1] == '0')
d_ptr--;
/* But keep at least one zero. */
if (d_ptr == c_ptr)
*d_ptr++ = '0';
/* Terminate the string. */
*d_ptr = '\0';
}
return c_ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convert_to_decimal function in vasnprintf.c in Gnulib before 2018-09-23 has a heap-based buffer overflow because memory is not allocated for a trailing '0' character during %f processing.
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <[email protected]> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test. | Medium | 169,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(int rw, struct kiocb *iocb,
const struct iovec *iov, loff_t offset,
unsigned long nr_segs)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
ssize_t ret;
size_t count = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
loff_t final_size = offset + count;
if (rw == WRITE && final_size <= inode->i_size) {
/*
* We could direct write to holes and fallocate.
*
* Allocated blocks to fill the hole are marked as uninitialized
* to prevent paralel buffered read to expose the stale data
* before DIO complete the data IO.
*
* As to previously fallocated extents, ext4 get_block
* will just simply mark the buffer mapped but still
* keep the extents uninitialized.
*
* for non AIO case, we will convert those unwritten extents
* to written after return back from blockdev_direct_IO.
*
* for async DIO, the conversion needs to be defered when
* the IO is completed. The ext4 end_io callback function
* will be called to take care of the conversion work.
* Here for async case, we allocate an io_end structure to
* hook to the iocb.
*/
iocb->private = NULL;
EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio = NULL;
if (!is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) {
iocb->private = ext4_init_io_end(inode);
if (!iocb->private)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* we save the io structure for current async
* direct IO, so that later ext4_get_blocks()
* could flag the io structure whether there
* is a unwritten extents needs to be converted
* when IO is completed.
*/
EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio = iocb->private;
}
ret = blockdev_direct_IO(rw, iocb, inode,
inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iov,
offset, nr_segs,
ext4_get_block_write,
ext4_end_io_dio);
if (iocb->private)
EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio = NULL;
/*
* The io_end structure takes a reference to the inode,
* that structure needs to be destroyed and the
* reference to the inode need to be dropped, when IO is
* complete, even with 0 byte write, or failed.
*
* In the successful AIO DIO case, the io_end structure will be
* desctroyed and the reference to the inode will be dropped
* after the end_io call back function is called.
*
* In the case there is 0 byte write, or error case, since
* VFS direct IO won't invoke the end_io call back function,
* we need to free the end_io structure here.
*/
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED && ret <= 0 && iocb->private) {
ext4_free_io_end(iocb->private);
iocb->private = NULL;
} else if (ret > 0 && ext4_test_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN)) {
int err;
/*
* for non AIO case, since the IO is already
* completed, we could do the convertion right here
*/
err = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(inode,
offset, ret);
if (err < 0)
ret = err;
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
}
return ret;
}
/* for write the the end of file case, we fall back to old way */
return ext4_ind_direct_IO(rw, iocb, iov, offset, nr_segs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_decode_header(DNXHDContext *ctx, AVFrame *frame,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size,
int first_field)
{
int i, cid, ret;
int old_bit_depth = ctx->bit_depth, bitdepth;
uint64_t header_prefix;
if (buf_size < 0x280) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"buffer too small (%d < 640).\n", buf_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
header_prefix = ff_dnxhd_parse_header_prefix(buf);
if (header_prefix == 0) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"unknown header 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X\n",
buf[0], buf[1], buf[2], buf[3], buf[4]);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (buf[5] & 2) { /* interlaced */
ctx->cur_field = buf[5] & 1;
frame->interlaced_frame = 1;
frame->top_field_first = first_field ^ ctx->cur_field;
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"interlaced %d, cur field %d\n", buf[5] & 3, ctx->cur_field);
} else {
ctx->cur_field = 0;
}
ctx->mbaff = (buf[0x6] >> 5) & 1;
ctx->height = AV_RB16(buf + 0x18);
ctx->width = AV_RB16(buf + 0x1a);
switch(buf[0x21] >> 5) {
case 1: bitdepth = 8; break;
case 2: bitdepth = 10; break;
case 3: bitdepth = 12; break;
default:
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown bitdepth indicator (%d)\n", buf[0x21] >> 5);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
cid = AV_RB32(buf + 0x28);
ctx->avctx->profile = dnxhd_get_profile(cid);
if ((ret = dnxhd_init_vlc(ctx, cid, bitdepth)) < 0)
return ret;
if (ctx->mbaff && ctx->cid_table->cid != 1260)
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Adaptive MB interlace flag in an unsupported profile.\n");
ctx->act = buf[0x2C] & 7;
if (ctx->act && ctx->cid_table->cid != 1256 && ctx->cid_table->cid != 1270)
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Adaptive color transform in an unsupported profile.\n");
ctx->is_444 = (buf[0x2C] >> 6) & 1;
if (ctx->is_444) {
if (bitdepth == 8) {
avpriv_request_sample(ctx->avctx, "4:4:4 8 bits");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (bitdepth == 10) {
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_10_444;
ctx->pix_fmt = ctx->act ? AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10
: AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
} else {
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_12_444;
ctx->pix_fmt = ctx->act ? AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P12
: AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12;
}
} else if (bitdepth == 12) {
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_12;
ctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P12;
} else if (bitdepth == 10) {
if (ctx->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_DNXHR_HQX)
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_10_444;
else
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_10;
ctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10;
} else {
ctx->decode_dct_block = dnxhd_decode_dct_block_8;
ctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P;
}
ctx->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = ctx->bit_depth = bitdepth;
if (ctx->bit_depth != old_bit_depth) {
ff_blockdsp_init(&ctx->bdsp, ctx->avctx);
ff_idctdsp_init(&ctx->idsp, ctx->avctx);
ff_init_scantable(ctx->idsp.idct_permutation, &ctx->scantable,
ff_zigzag_direct);
}
if (ctx->width != ctx->cid_table->width &&
ctx->cid_table->width != DNXHD_VARIABLE) {
av_reduce(&ctx->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&ctx->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
ctx->width, ctx->cid_table->width, 255);
ctx->width = ctx->cid_table->width;
}
if (buf_size < ctx->cid_table->coding_unit_size) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "incorrect frame size (%d < %u).\n",
buf_size, ctx->cid_table->coding_unit_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ctx->mb_width = (ctx->width + 15)>> 4;
ctx->mb_height = AV_RB16(buf + 0x16c);
if ((ctx->height + 15) >> 4 == ctx->mb_height && frame->interlaced_frame)
ctx->height <<= 1;
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "%dx%d, 4:%s %d bits, MBAFF=%d ACT=%d\n",
ctx->width, ctx->height, ctx->is_444 ? "4:4" : "2:2",
ctx->bit_depth, ctx->mbaff, ctx->act);
if (ctx->mb_height > 68 && ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix_hr(header_prefix)) {
ctx->data_offset = 0x170 + (ctx->mb_height << 2);
} else {
if (ctx->mb_height > 68 ||
(ctx->mb_height << frame->interlaced_frame) > (ctx->height + 15) >> 4) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"mb height too big: %d\n", ctx->mb_height);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ctx->data_offset = 0x280;
}
if (buf_size < ctx->data_offset) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"buffer too small (%d < %d).\n", buf_size, ctx->data_offset);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ctx->mb_height > FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(ctx->mb_scan_index)) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"mb_height too big (%d > %"SIZE_SPECIFIER").\n", ctx->mb_height, FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(ctx->mb_scan_index));
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->mb_height; i++) {
ctx->mb_scan_index[i] = AV_RB32(buf + 0x170 + (i << 2));
ff_dlog(ctx->avctx, "mb scan index %d, pos %d: %"PRIu32"\n",
i, 0x170 + (i << 2), ctx->mb_scan_index[i]);
if (buf_size - ctx->data_offset < ctx->mb_scan_index[i]) {
av_log(ctx->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"invalid mb scan index (%"PRIu32" vs %u).\n",
ctx->mb_scan_index[i], buf_size - ctx->data_offset);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The dnxhd_decode_header function in libavcodec/dnxhddec.c in FFmpeg through 3.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted DNxHD file.
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhddec: Move mb height check out of non hr branch
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: poc.dnxhd
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
FILE *infile, *outfile[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t cfg[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_pts_t frame_cnt = 0;
vpx_image_t raw[NUM_ENCODERS];
vpx_codec_err_t res[NUM_ENCODERS];
int i;
long width;
long height;
int frame_avail;
int got_data;
int flags = 0;
/*Currently, only realtime mode is supported in multi-resolution encoding.*/
int arg_deadline = VPX_DL_REALTIME;
/* Set show_psnr to 1/0 to show/not show PSNR. Choose show_psnr=0 if you
don't need to know PSNR, which will skip PSNR calculation and save
encoding time. */
int show_psnr = 0;
uint64_t psnr_sse_total[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
uint64_t psnr_samples_total[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
double psnr_totals[NUM_ENCODERS][4] = {{0,0}};
int psnr_count[NUM_ENCODERS] = {0};
/* Set the required target bitrates for each resolution level.
* If target bitrate for highest-resolution level is set to 0,
* (i.e. target_bitrate[0]=0), we skip encoding at that level.
*/
unsigned int target_bitrate[NUM_ENCODERS]={1000, 500, 100};
/* Enter the frame rate of the input video */
int framerate = 30;
/* Set down-sampling factor for each resolution level.
dsf[0] controls down sampling from level 0 to level 1;
dsf[1] controls down sampling from level 1 to level 2;
dsf[2] is not used. */
vpx_rational_t dsf[NUM_ENCODERS] = {{2, 1}, {2, 1}, {1, 1}};
if(argc!= (5+NUM_ENCODERS))
die("Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile(s)> <output psnr?>\n",
argv[0]);
printf("Using %s\n",vpx_codec_iface_name(interface));
width = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
height = strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0);
if(width < 16 || width%2 || height <16 || height%2)
die("Invalid resolution: %ldx%ld", width, height);
/* Open input video file for encoding */
if(!(infile = fopen(argv[3], "rb")))
die("Failed to open %s for reading", argv[3]);
/* Open output file for each encoder to output bitstreams */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
if(!target_bitrate[i])
{
outfile[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
if(!(outfile[i] = fopen(argv[i+4], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing", argv[i+4]);
}
show_psnr = strtol(argv[NUM_ENCODERS + 4], NULL, 0);
/* Populate default encoder configuration */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
res[i] = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(interface, &cfg[i], 0);
if(res[i]) {
printf("Failed to get config: %s\n", vpx_codec_err_to_string(res[i]));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
/*
* Update the default configuration according to needs of the application.
*/
/* Highest-resolution encoder settings */
cfg[0].g_w = width;
cfg[0].g_h = height;
cfg[0].g_threads = 1; /* number of threads used */
cfg[0].rc_dropframe_thresh = 30;
cfg[0].rc_end_usage = VPX_CBR;
cfg[0].rc_resize_allowed = 0;
cfg[0].rc_min_quantizer = 4;
cfg[0].rc_max_quantizer = 56;
cfg[0].rc_undershoot_pct = 98;
cfg[0].rc_overshoot_pct = 100;
cfg[0].rc_buf_initial_sz = 500;
cfg[0].rc_buf_optimal_sz = 600;
cfg[0].rc_buf_sz = 1000;
cfg[0].g_error_resilient = 1; /* Enable error resilient mode */
cfg[0].g_lag_in_frames = 0;
/* Disable automatic keyframe placement */
/* Note: These 3 settings are copied to all levels. But, except the lowest
* resolution level, all other levels are set to VPX_KF_DISABLED internally.
*/
cfg[0].kf_min_dist = 3000;
cfg[0].kf_max_dist = 3000;
cfg[0].rc_target_bitrate = target_bitrate[0]; /* Set target bitrate */
cfg[0].g_timebase.num = 1; /* Set fps */
cfg[0].g_timebase.den = framerate;
/* Other-resolution encoder settings */
for (i=1; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
memcpy(&cfg[i], &cfg[0], sizeof(vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t));
cfg[i].g_threads = 1; /* number of threads used */
cfg[i].rc_target_bitrate = target_bitrate[i];
/* Note: Width & height of other-resolution encoders are calculated
* from the highest-resolution encoder's size and the corresponding
* down_sampling_factor.
*/
{
unsigned int iw = cfg[i-1].g_w*dsf[i-1].den + dsf[i-1].num - 1;
unsigned int ih = cfg[i-1].g_h*dsf[i-1].den + dsf[i-1].num - 1;
cfg[i].g_w = iw/dsf[i-1].num;
cfg[i].g_h = ih/dsf[i-1].num;
}
/* Make width & height to be multiplier of 2. */
if((cfg[i].g_w)%2)cfg[i].g_w++;
if((cfg[i].g_h)%2)cfg[i].g_h++;
}
/* Allocate image for each encoder */
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
if(!vpx_img_alloc(&raw[i], VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, cfg[i].g_w, cfg[i].g_h, 32))
die("Failed to allocate image", cfg[i].g_w, cfg[i].g_h);
if (raw[0].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y] == raw[0].d_w)
read_frame_p = read_frame;
else
read_frame_p = read_frame_by_row;
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
if(outfile[i])
write_ivf_file_header(outfile[i], &cfg[i], 0);
/* Initialize multi-encoder */
if(vpx_codec_enc_init_multi(&codec[0], interface, &cfg[0], NUM_ENCODERS,
(show_psnr ? VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR : 0), &dsf[0]))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to initialize encoder");
/* The extra encoding configuration parameters can be set as follows. */
/* Set encoding speed */
for ( i=0; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
int speed = -6;
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, speed))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set cpu_used");
}
/* Set static threshold. */
for ( i=0; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
unsigned int static_thresh = 1;
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_STATIC_THRESHOLD, static_thresh))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set static threshold");
}
/* Set NOISE_SENSITIVITY to do TEMPORAL_DENOISING */
/* Enable denoising for the highest-resolution encoder. */
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[0], VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, 1))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to set noise_sensitivity");
for ( i=1; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
if(vpx_codec_control(&codec[i], VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, 0))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to set noise_sensitivity");
}
frame_avail = 1;
got_data = 0;
while(frame_avail || got_data)
{
vpx_codec_iter_t iter[NUM_ENCODERS]={NULL};
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt[NUM_ENCODERS];
flags = 0;
frame_avail = read_frame_p(infile, &raw[0]);
if(frame_avail)
{
for ( i=1; i<NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
/*Scale the image down a number of times by downsampling factor*/
/* FilterMode 1 or 2 give better psnr than FilterMode 0. */
I420Scale(raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_Y], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_U], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
raw[i-1].planes[VPX_PLANE_V], raw[i-1].stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
raw[i-1].d_w, raw[i-1].d_h,
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_Y], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_U], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
raw[i].planes[VPX_PLANE_V], raw[i].stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
raw[i].d_w, raw[i].d_h, 1);
}
}
/* Encode each frame at multi-levels */
if(vpx_codec_encode(&codec[0], frame_avail? &raw[0] : NULL,
frame_cnt, 1, flags, arg_deadline))
die_codec(&codec[0], "Failed to encode frame");
for (i=NUM_ENCODERS-1; i>=0 ; i--)
{
got_data = 0;
while( (pkt[i] = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec[i], &iter[i])) )
{
got_data = 1;
switch(pkt[i]->kind) {
case VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT:
write_ivf_frame_header(outfile[i], pkt[i]);
(void) fwrite(pkt[i]->data.frame.buf, 1,
pkt[i]->data.frame.sz, outfile[i]);
break;
case VPX_CODEC_PSNR_PKT:
if (show_psnr)
{
int j;
psnr_sse_total[i] += pkt[i]->data.psnr.sse[0];
psnr_samples_total[i] += pkt[i]->data.psnr.samples[0];
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
}
psnr_count[i]++;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
printf(pkt[i]->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT
&& (pkt[i]->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)? "K":".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
frame_cnt++;
}
printf("\n");
fclose(infile);
printf("Processed %ld frames.\n",(long int)frame_cnt-1);
for (i=0; i< NUM_ENCODERS; i++)
{
/* Calculate PSNR and print it out */
if ( (show_psnr) && (psnr_count[i]>0) )
{
int j;
double ovpsnr = sse_to_psnr(psnr_samples_total[i], 255.0,
psnr_sse_total[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n ENC%d PSNR (Overall/Avg/Y/U/V)", i);
fprintf(stderr, " %.3lf", ovpsnr);
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
fprintf(stderr, " %.3lf", psnr_totals[i][j]/psnr_count[i]);
}
}
if(vpx_codec_destroy(&codec[i]))
die_codec(&codec[i], "Failed to destroy codec");
vpx_img_free(&raw[i]);
if(!outfile[i])
continue;
/* Try to rewrite the file header with the actual frame count */
if(!fseek(outfile[i], 0, SEEK_SET))
write_ivf_file_header(outfile[i], &cfg[i], frame_cnt-1);
fclose(outfile[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rpki_rtr_pdu_print (netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *tptr, u_int indent)
{
const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
u_int pdu_type, pdu_len, hexdump;
const u_char *msg;
pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
hexdump = FALSE;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sRPKI-RTRv%u, %s PDU (%u), length: %u",
indent_string(8),
pdu_header->version,
tok2str(rpki_rtr_pdu_values, "Unknown", pdu_type),
pdu_type, pdu_len));
switch (pdu_type) {
/*
* The following PDUs share the message format.
*/
case RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_NOTIFY_PDU:
case RPKI_RTR_SERIAL_QUERY_PDU:
case RPKI_RTR_END_OF_DATA_PDU:
msg = (const u_char *)(pdu_header + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sSession ID: 0x%04x, Serial: %u",
indent_string(indent+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu_header->u.session_id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(msg)));
break;
/*
* The following PDUs share the message format.
*/
case RPKI_RTR_RESET_QUERY_PDU:
case RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESET_PDU:
/*
* Zero payload PDUs.
*/
break;
case RPKI_RTR_CACHE_RESPONSE_PDU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sSession ID: 0x%04x",
indent_string(indent+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu_header->u.session_id)));
break;
case RPKI_RTR_IPV4_PREFIX_PDU:
{
const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix *pdu;
pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv4_prefix *)tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 Prefix %s/%u-%u, origin-as %u, flags 0x%02x",
indent_string(indent+2),
ipaddr_string(ndo, pdu->prefix),
pdu->prefix_length, pdu->max_length,
EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->as), pdu->flags));
}
break;
case RPKI_RTR_IPV6_PREFIX_PDU:
{
const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix *pdu;
pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_ipv6_prefix *)tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 Prefix %s/%u-%u, origin-as %u, flags 0x%02x",
indent_string(indent+2),
ip6addr_string(ndo, pdu->prefix),
pdu->prefix_length, pdu->max_length,
EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->as), pdu->flags));
}
break;
case RPKI_RTR_ERROR_REPORT_PDU:
{
const rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report *pdu;
u_int encapsulated_pdu_length, text_length, tlen, error_code;
pdu = (const rpki_rtr_pdu_error_report *)tptr;
encapsulated_pdu_length = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu->encapsulated_pdu_length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, encapsulated_pdu_length);
tlen = pdu_len;
error_code = EXTRACT_16BITS(pdu->pdu_header.u.error_code);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sError code: %s (%u), Encapsulated PDU length: %u",
indent_string(indent+2),
tok2str(rpki_rtr_error_codes, "Unknown", error_code),
error_code, encapsulated_pdu_length));
tptr += sizeof(*pdu);
tlen -= sizeof(*pdu);
/*
* Recurse if there is an encapsulated PDU.
*/
if (encapsulated_pdu_length &&
(encapsulated_pdu_length <= tlen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-----encapsulated PDU-----", indent_string(indent+4)));
if (rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr, indent+2))
goto trunc;
}
tptr += encapsulated_pdu_length;
tlen -= encapsulated_pdu_length;
/*
* Extract, trail-zero and print the Error message.
*/
text_length = 0;
if (tlen > 4) {
text_length = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr += 4;
tlen -= 4;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, text_length);
if (text_length && (text_length <= tlen )) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sError text: ", indent_string(indent+2)));
if (fn_printn(ndo, tptr, text_length, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
default:
/*
* Unknown data, please hexdump.
*/
hexdump = TRUE;
}
/* do we also want to see a hex dump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || (ndo->ndo_vflag && hexdump)) {
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr,"\n\t ", pdu_len);
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The RPKI-Router parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-rpki-rtr.c:rpki_rtr_pdu_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13050/RPKI-Router: fix a few bugs
The decoder didn't properly check that the PDU length stored in the PDU
header is correct. The only check in place was in rpki_rtr_print() and it
tested whether the length is zero but that is not sufficient. Make all
necessary length and bounds checks, both generic and type-specific, in
rpki_rtr_pdu_print() and reduce rpki_rtr_print() to a simple loop.
This also fixes a minor bug and PDU type 0 (Serial Notify from RFC 6810
Section 5.2) is valid again.
In rpki_rtr_pdu_print() any protocol version was considered version 0,
fix it to skip the rest of input if the PDU protocol version is unknown.
Ibid, the PDU type 10 (Error Report from RFC 6810 Section 5.10) case
block didn't consider the "Length of Error Text" data element mandatory,
put it right.
Ibid, when printing an encapsulated PDU, give itself (via recursion)
respective buffer length to make it possible to tell whether the
encapsulated PDU fits. Do not recurse deeper than 2nd level.
Update prior RPKI-Router test cases that now stop to decode earlier
because of the stricter checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline unsigned int get_next_char(
enum entity_charset charset,
const unsigned char *str,
size_t str_len,
size_t *cursor,
int *status)
{
size_t pos = *cursor;
unsigned int this_char = 0;
*status = SUCCESS;
assert(pos <= str_len);
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 1))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
switch (charset) {
case cs_utf_8:
{
/* We'll follow strategy 2. from section 3.6.1 of UTR #36:
* "In a reported illegal byte sequence, do not include any
* non-initial byte that encodes a valid character or is a leading
* byte for a valid sequence." */
unsigned char c;
c = str[pos];
if (c < 0x80) {
this_char = c;
pos++;
} else if (c < 0xc2) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else if (c < 0xe0) {
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
if (!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1])) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]) ? 1 : 2);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x1f) << 6) | (str[pos + 1] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x80) { /* non-shortest form */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c < 0xf0) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 3 ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1]) || !utf8_trail(str[pos + 2])) {
if (avail < 2 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 2]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x0f) << 12) | ((str[pos + 1] & 0x3f) << 6) | (str[pos + 2] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x800) { /* non-shortest form */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
} else if (this_char >= 0xd800 && this_char <= 0xdfff) { /* surrogate */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
}
pos += 3;
} else if (c < 0xf5) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 4 ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 1]) || !utf8_trail(str[pos + 2]) ||
!utf8_trail(str[pos + 3])) {
if (avail < 2 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 1]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 2]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else if (avail < 4 || utf8_lead(str[pos + 3]))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
}
this_char = ((c & 0x07) << 18) | ((str[pos + 1] & 0x3f) << 12) | ((str[pos + 2] & 0x3f) << 6) | (str[pos + 3] & 0x3f);
if (this_char < 0x10000 || this_char > 0x10FFFF) { /* non-shortest form or outside range */
MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
}
pos += 4;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_big5:
/* reference http://demo.icu-project.org/icu-bin/convexp?conv=big5 */
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0x81 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if ((next >= 0x40 && next <= 0x7E) ||
(next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
pos += 2;
} else {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
}
}
break;
case cs_big5hkscs:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0x81 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if ((next >= 0x40 && next <= 0x7E) ||
(next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (next != 0x80 && next != 0xFF) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
}
}
break;
case cs_gb2312: /* EUC-CN */
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (gb2312_trail(next)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (gb2312_lead(next)) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (gb2312_lead(c)) {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_sjis:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if ((c >= 0x81 && c <= 0x9F) || (c >= 0xE0 && c <= 0xFC)) {
unsigned char next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (sjis_trail(next)) {
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else if (sjis_lead(next)) {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c < 0x80 || (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xDF)) {
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
case cs_eucjp:
{
unsigned char c = str[pos];
if (c >= 0xA1 && c <= 0xFE) {
unsigned next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xFE) {
/* this a jis kanji char */
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, (next != 0xA0 && next != 0xFF) ? 1 : 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c == 0x8E) {
unsigned next;
if (!CHECK_LEN(pos, 2))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
next = str[pos + 1];
if (next >= 0xA1 && next <= 0xDF) {
/* JIS X 0201 kana */
this_char = (c << 8) | next;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, (next != 0xA0 && next != 0xFF) ? 1 : 2);
}
pos += 2;
} else if (c == 0x8F) {
size_t avail = str_len - pos;
if (avail < 3 || !(str[pos + 1] >= 0xA1 && str[pos + 1] <= 0xFE) ||
!(str[pos + 2] >= 0xA1 && str[pos + 2] <= 0xFE)) {
if (avail < 2 || (str[pos + 1] != 0xA0 && str[pos + 1] != 0xFF))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
else if (avail < 3 || (str[pos + 2] != 0xA0 && str[pos + 2] != 0xFF))
MB_FAILURE(pos, 2);
else
MB_FAILURE(pos, 3);
} else {
/* JIS X 0212 hojo-kanji */
this_char = (c << 16) | (str[pos + 1] << 8) | str[pos + 2];
}
pos += 3;
} else if (c != 0xA0 && c != 0xFF) {
/* character encoded in 1 code unit */
this_char = c;
pos += 1;
} else {
MB_FAILURE(pos, 1);
}
}
break;
default:
/* single-byte charsets */
this_char = str[pos++];
break;
}
*cursor = pos;
return this_char;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 167,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int lz4_uncompress(const char *source, char *dest, int osize)
{
const BYTE *ip = (const BYTE *) source;
const BYTE *ref;
BYTE *op = (BYTE *) dest;
BYTE * const oend = op + osize;
BYTE *cpy;
unsigned token;
size_t length;
size_t dec32table[] = {0, 3, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0};
#if LZ4_ARCH64
size_t dec64table[] = {0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3};
#endif
while (1) {
/* get runlength */
token = *ip++;
length = (token >> ML_BITS);
if (length == RUN_MASK) {
size_t len;
len = *ip++;
for (; len == 255; length += 255)
len = *ip++;
length += len;
}
/* copy literals */
cpy = op + length;
if (unlikely(cpy > oend - COPYLENGTH)) {
/*
* Error: not enough place for another match
* (min 4) + 5 literals
*/
if (cpy != oend)
goto _output_error;
memcpy(op, ip, length);
ip += length;
break; /* EOF */
}
LZ4_WILDCOPY(ip, op, cpy);
ip -= (op - cpy);
op = cpy;
/* get offset */
LZ4_READ_LITTLEENDIAN_16(ref, cpy, ip);
ip += 2;
/* Error: offset create reference outside destination buffer */
if (unlikely(ref < (BYTE *const) dest))
goto _output_error;
/* get matchlength */
length = token & ML_MASK;
if (length == ML_MASK) {
for (; *ip == 255; length += 255)
ip++;
length += *ip++;
}
/* copy repeated sequence */
if (unlikely((op - ref) < STEPSIZE)) {
#if LZ4_ARCH64
size_t dec64 = dec64table[op - ref];
#else
const int dec64 = 0;
#endif
op[0] = ref[0];
op[1] = ref[1];
op[2] = ref[2];
op[3] = ref[3];
op += 4;
ref += 4;
ref -= dec32table[op-ref];
PUT4(ref, op);
op += STEPSIZE - 4;
ref -= dec64;
} else {
LZ4_COPYSTEP(ref, op);
}
cpy = op + length - (STEPSIZE - 4);
if (cpy > (oend - COPYLENGTH)) {
/* Error: request to write beyond destination buffer */
if (cpy > oend)
goto _output_error;
LZ4_SECURECOPY(ref, op, (oend - COPYLENGTH));
while (op < cpy)
*op++ = *ref++;
op = cpy;
/*
* Check EOF (should never happen, since last 5 bytes
* are supposed to be literals)
*/
if (op == oend)
goto _output_error;
continue;
}
LZ4_SECURECOPY(ref, op, cpy);
op = cpy; /* correction */
}
/* end of decoding */
return (int) (((char *)ip) - source);
/* write overflow error detected */
_output_error:
return (int) (-(((char *)ip) - source));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Integer overflow in the LZ4 algorithm implementation, as used in Yann Collet LZ4 before r118 and in the lz4_uncompress function in lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2, on 32-bit platforms might allow context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Literal Run that would be improperly handled by programs not complying with an API limitation, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-4715.
Commit Message: lz4: ensure length does not wrap
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: path_poly(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
POLYGON *poly;
int size;
int i;
/* This is not very consistent --- other similar cases return NULL ... */
if (!path->closed)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("open path cannot be converted to polygon")));
size = offsetof(POLYGON, p[0]) +sizeof(poly->p[0]) * path->npts;
poly = (POLYGON *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(poly, size);
poly->npts = path->npts;
for (i = 0; i < path->npts; i++)
{
poly->p[i].x = path->p[i].x;
poly->p[i].y = path->p[i].y;
}
make_bound_box(poly);
PG_RETURN_POLYGON_P(poly);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin->sin_port = 0;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(
long& cue_points_size,
long long pos) const
{
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size)
{
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint*[n];
CuePoint** q = qq; //beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; //beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; //end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux(MYSQLND_MEMORY_POOL_CHUNK * row_buffer, zval ** fields,
unsigned int field_count, const MYSQLND_FIELD * fields_metadata,
zend_bool as_int_or_float, zend_bool copy_data, MYSQLND_STATS * stats TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned int i;
zend_bool last_field_was_string = FALSE;
zval **current_field, **end_field, **start_field;
zend_uchar * p = row_buffer->ptr;
size_t data_size = row_buffer->app;
zend_uchar * bit_area = (zend_uchar*) row_buffer->ptr + data_size + 1; /* we allocate from here */
DBG_ENTER("php_mysqlnd_rowp_read_text_protocol_aux");
if (!fields) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
end_field = (start_field = fields) + field_count;
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
DBG_INF("Directly creating zval");
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(*current_field);
if (!*current_field) {
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
}
for (i = 0, current_field = start_field; current_field < end_field; current_field++, i++) {
/* Don't reverse the order. It is significant!*/
zend_uchar *this_field_len_pos = p;
/* php_mysqlnd_net_field_length() call should be after *this_field_len_pos = p; */
unsigned long len = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(&p);
if (copy_data == FALSE && current_field > start_field && last_field_was_string) {
/*
Normal queries:
We have to put \0 now to the end of the previous field, if it was
a string. IS_NULL doesn't matter. Because we have already read our
length, then we can overwrite it in the row buffer.
This statement terminates the previous field, not the current one.
NULL_LENGTH is encoded in one byte, so we can stick a \0 there.
Any string's length is encoded in at least one byte, so we can stick
a \0 there.
*/
*this_field_len_pos = '\0';
}
/* NULL or NOT NULL, this is the question! */
if (len == MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH) {
ZVAL_NULL(*current_field);
last_field_was_string = FALSE;
} else {
#if defined(MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION)
struct st_mysqlnd_perm_bind perm_bind =
mysqlnd_ps_fetch_functions[fields_metadata[i].type];
#endif
if (MYSQLND_G(collect_statistics)) {
enum_mysqlnd_collected_stats statistic;
switch (fields_metadata[i].type) {
case MYSQL_TYPE_DECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT8; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SHORT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT16; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT32; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_FLOAT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_FLOAT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DOUBLE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DOUBLE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NULL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_NULL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIMESTAMP: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIMESTAMP; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONGLONG: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT64; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_INT24: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_INT24; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_TIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_DATETIME: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATETIME; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_YEAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_YEAR; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDATE: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DATE; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VARCHAR: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BIT: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BIT; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_NEWDECIMAL: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_DECIMAL; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_ENUM: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_ENUM; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_SET: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_SET; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_JSON: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_JSON; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_TINY_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_MEDIUM_BLOB:statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_LONG_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_BLOB: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_BLOB; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_VAR_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_STRING: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_STRING; break;
case MYSQL_TYPE_GEOMETRY: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_GEOMETRY; break;
default: statistic = STAT_TEXT_TYPE_FETCHED_OTHER; break;
}
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC_W_VALUE2(stats, statistic, 1, STAT_BYTES_RECEIVED_PURE_DATA_TEXT, len);
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION
if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_LONG) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
if (perm_bind.pack_len < SIZEOF_LONG) {
/* direct conversion */
int64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
atoll((char *) p);
#else
_atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
} else {
uint64_t v =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
(uint64_t) atoll((char *) p);
#else
(uint64_t) _atoi64((char *) p);
#endif
zend_bool uns = fields_metadata[i].flags & UNSIGNED_FLAG? TRUE:FALSE;
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
#if SIZEOF_LONG==8
if (uns == TRUE && v > 9223372036854775807L)
#elif SIZEOF_LONG==4
if ((uns == TRUE && v > L64(2147483647)) ||
(uns == FALSE && (( L64(2147483647) < (int64_t) v) ||
(L64(-2147483648) > (int64_t) v))))
#else
#error Need fix for this architecture
#endif /* SIZEOF */
{
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, 0);
} else {
ZVAL_LONG(*current_field, (long) v); /* the cast is safe */
}
}
*(p + len) = save;
} else if (as_int_or_float && perm_bind.php_type == IS_DOUBLE) {
zend_uchar save = *(p + len);
/* We have to make it ASCIIZ temporarily */
*(p + len) = '\0';
ZVAL_DOUBLE(*current_field, atof((char *) p));
*(p + len) = save;
} else
#endif /* MYSQLND_STRING_TO_INT_CONVERSION */
if (fields_metadata[i].type == MYSQL_TYPE_BIT) {
/*
BIT fields are specially handled. As they come as bit mask, we have
to convert it to human-readable representation. As the bits take
less space in the protocol than the numbers they represent, we don't
have enough space in the packet buffer to overwrite inside.
Thus, a bit more space is pre-allocated at the end of the buffer,
see php_mysqlnd_rowp_read(). And we add the strings at the end.
Definitely not nice, _hackish_ :(, but works.
*/
zend_uchar *start = bit_area;
ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes(*current_field, &(fields_metadata[i]), 0, &p, len TSRMLS_CC);
/*
We have advanced in ps_fetch_from_1_to_8_bytes. We should go back because
later in this function there will be an advancement.
*/
p -= len;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_LONG) {
bit_area += 1 + sprintf((char *)start, "%ld", Z_LVAL_PP(current_field));
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(current_field) == IS_STRING){
memcpy(bit_area, Z_STRVAL_PP(current_field), Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field));
bit_area += Z_STRLEN_PP(current_field);
*bit_area++ = '\0';
zval_dtor(*current_field);
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *) start, bit_area - start - 1, copy_data);
}
} else {
ZVAL_STRINGL(*current_field, (char *)p, len, copy_data);
}
p += len;
last_field_was_string = TRUE;
}
}
if (copy_data == FALSE && last_field_was_string) {
/* Normal queries: The buffer has one more byte at the end, because we need it */
row_buffer->ptr[data_size] = '\0';
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/mysqlnd/mysqlnd_wireprotocol.c in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not verify that a BIT field has the UNSIGNED_FLAG flag, which allows remote MySQL servers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted field metadata.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields | Medium | 166,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return (1);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return (0);
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("server random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("master key\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num))
goto err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
/*
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGB(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
x, y;
unsigned short
color;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType);
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16 && !IsBitMask(
dds_info->pixelformat,0xf800,0x07e0,0x001f,0x0000))
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ReadBlobByte(image)));
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 5) >> 10)/63.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 32)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,QuantumRange);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
SkipRGBMipmaps(image, dds_info, 3);
return MagickTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
int rc = -ENOMEM, xid;
struct cifsSesInfo *ses;
xid = GetXid();
ses = cifs_find_smb_ses(server, volume_info->username);
if (ses) {
cFYI(1, "Existing smb sess found (status=%d)", ses->status);
/* existing SMB ses has a server reference already */
cifs_put_tcp_session(server);
mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex);
rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol(xid, ses);
if (rc) {
mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex);
/* problem -- put our ses reference */
cifs_put_smb_ses(ses);
FreeXid(xid);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (ses->need_reconnect) {
cFYI(1, "Session needs reconnect");
rc = cifs_setup_session(xid, ses,
volume_info->local_nls);
if (rc) {
mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex);
/* problem -- put our reference */
cifs_put_smb_ses(ses);
FreeXid(xid);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex);
FreeXid(xid);
return ses;
}
cFYI(1, "Existing smb sess not found");
ses = sesInfoAlloc();
if (ses == NULL)
goto get_ses_fail;
/* new SMB session uses our server ref */
ses->server = server;
if (server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_family == AF_INET6)
sprintf(ses->serverName, "%pI6",
&server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_addr);
else
sprintf(ses->serverName, "%pI4",
&server->addr.sockAddr.sin_addr.s_addr);
if (volume_info->username)
strncpy(ses->userName, volume_info->username,
MAX_USERNAME_SIZE);
/* volume_info->password freed at unmount */
if (volume_info->password) {
ses->password = kstrdup(volume_info->password, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->password)
goto get_ses_fail;
}
if (volume_info->domainname) {
int len = strlen(volume_info->domainname);
ses->domainName = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses->domainName)
strcpy(ses->domainName, volume_info->domainname);
}
ses->linux_uid = volume_info->linux_uid;
ses->overrideSecFlg = volume_info->secFlg;
mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex);
rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol(xid, ses);
if (!rc)
rc = cifs_setup_session(xid, ses, volume_info->local_nls);
mutex_unlock(&ses->session_mutex);
if (rc)
goto get_ses_fail;
/* success, put it on the list */
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_add(&ses->smb_ses_list, &server->smb_ses_list);
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
FreeXid(xid);
return ses;
get_ses_fail:
sesInfoFree(ses);
FreeXid(xid);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The cifs_find_smb_ses function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 does not properly determine the associations between users and sessions, which allows local users to bypass CIFS share authentication by leveraging a mount of a share by a different user.
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | Low | 166,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map[ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE];
struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
__uint8_t *dst = args->value;
int valuelen = args->valuelen;
int nmap;
int error;
int blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
int i;
int offset = 0;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_get(args);
ASSERT(!(args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL));
while (valuelen > 0) {
nmap = ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(args->dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, map, &nmap,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nmap >= 1);
for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, NULL, mp->m_ddev_targp,
dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp,
&xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino,
&offset, &valuelen,
&dst);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
if (error)
return error;
/* roll attribute extent map forwards */
lblkno += map[i].br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map[i].br_blockcount;
}
}
ASSERT(valuelen == 0);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | High | 166,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2*channels*
next_image->columns,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDChannelPixels function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Fixed overflow. | Medium | 170,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long Segment::CreateInstance(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
Segment*& pSegment) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
pSegment = NULL;
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (available < 0)
return -1;
if ((total >= 0) && (available > total))
return -1;
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) // error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return id;
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result) // error, or too few available bytes
return result;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return size;
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (id == 0x08538067) { // Segment ID
if (size == unknown_size)
size = -1;
else if (total < 0)
size = -1;
else if ((pos + size) > total)
size = -1;
pSegment = new (std::nothrow) Segment(pReader, idpos,
pos, size);
if (pSegment == 0)
return -1; // generic error
return 0; // success
}
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + size) > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
pos += size; // consume payload
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString ustr_host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(ustr_host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) ==
ustr_host.length())
diacritic_remover_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
extra_confusable_mapper_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString ustr_skeleton;
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, ustr_host, ustr_skeleton,
&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status))
return false;
std::string skeleton;
return LookupMatchInTopDomains(ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263} | Low | 173,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::FrameNavigationHelper(
RenderFrameHost* plugin_rfh,
int32_t guest_instance_id,
int32_t element_instance_id,
bool is_full_page_plugin,
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter* filter)
: content::WebContentsObserver(
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(plugin_rfh)),
frame_tree_node_id_(plugin_rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId()),
guest_instance_id_(guest_instance_id),
element_instance_id_(element_instance_id),
is_full_page_plugin_(is_full_page_plugin),
filter_(filter),
parent_site_instance_(plugin_rfh->GetParent()->GetSiteInstance()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(GetGuestView());
NavigateToAboutBlank();
base::PostDelayedTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::
CancelPendingTask,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kAttachFailureDelayMS));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
if (_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: ext/libxml/libxml.c in PHP before 5.5.22 and 5.6.x before 5.6.6, when PHP-FPM is used, does not isolate each thread from libxml_disable_entity_loader changes in other threads, which allows remote attackers to conduct XML External Entity (XXE) and XML Entity Expansion (XEE) attacks via a crafted XML document, a related issue to CVE-2015-5161.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Ensure image extent does not exceed maximum | Medium | 169,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
int check_header_id)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
const unsigned char *p;
struct _7z_folder *folders;
struct _7z_stream_info *si = &(zip->si);
struct _7zip_entry *entries;
uint32_t folderIndex, indexInFolder;
unsigned i;
int eindex, empty_streams, sindex;
if (check_header_id) {
/*
* Read Header.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p != kHeader)
return (-1);
}
/*
* Read ArchiveProperties.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p == kArchiveProperties) {
for (;;) {
uint64_t size;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (*p == 0)
break;
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &size) < 0)
return (-1);
}
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
}
/*
* Read MainStreamsInfo.
*/
if (*p == kMainStreamsInfo) {
if (read_StreamsInfo(a, &(zip->si)) < 0)
return (-1);
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
}
if (*p == kEnd)
return (0);
/*
* Read FilesInfo.
*/
if (*p != kFilesInfo)
return (-1);
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(zip->numFiles)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (UMAX_ENTRY < zip->numFiles)
return (-1);
zip->entries = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles, sizeof(*zip->entries));
if (zip->entries == NULL)
return (-1);
entries = zip->entries;
empty_streams = 0;
for (;;) {
int type;
uint64_t size;
size_t ll;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
type = *p;
if (type == kEnd)
break;
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &size) < 0)
return (-1);
if (zip->header_bytes_remaining < size)
return (-1);
ll = (size_t)size;
switch (type) {
case kEmptyStream:
h->emptyStreamBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
sizeof(*h->emptyStreamBools));
if (h->emptyStreamBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(
a, h->emptyStreamBools, (size_t)zip->numFiles) < 0)
return (-1);
empty_streams = 0;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->emptyStreamBools[i])
empty_streams++;
}
break;
case kEmptyFile:
if (empty_streams <= 0) {
/* Unexcepted sequence. Skip this. */
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
h->emptyFileBools = calloc(empty_streams,
sizeof(*h->emptyFileBools));
if (h->emptyFileBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(a, h->emptyFileBools, empty_streams) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kAnti:
if (empty_streams <= 0) {
/* Unexcepted sequence. Skip this. */
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
h->antiBools = calloc(empty_streams,
sizeof(*h->antiBools));
if (h->antiBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (read_Bools(a, h->antiBools, empty_streams) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kCTime:
case kATime:
case kMTime:
if (read_Times(a, h, type) < 0)
return (-1);
break;
case kName:
{
unsigned char *np;
size_t nl, nb;
/* Skip one byte. */
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
return (-1);
ll--;
if ((ll & 1) || ll < zip->numFiles * 4)
return (-1);
zip->entry_names = malloc(ll);
if (zip->entry_names == NULL)
return (-1);
np = zip->entry_names;
nb = ll;
/*
* Copy whole file names.
* NOTE: This loop prevents from expanding
* the uncompressed buffer in order not to
* use extra memory resource.
*/
while (nb) {
size_t b;
if (nb > UBUFF_SIZE)
b = UBUFF_SIZE;
else
b = nb;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, b)) == NULL)
return (-1);
memcpy(np, p, b);
np += b;
nb -= b;
}
np = zip->entry_names;
nl = ll;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
entries[i].utf16name = np;
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) && defined(_DEBUG)
entries[i].wname = (wchar_t *)np;
#endif
/* Find a terminator. */
while (nl >= 2 && (np[0] || np[1])) {
np += 2;
nl -= 2;
}
if (nl < 2)
return (-1);/* Terminator not found */
entries[i].name_len = np - entries[i].utf16name;
np += 2;
nl -= 2;
}
break;
}
case kAttributes:
{
int allAreDefined;
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 2)) == NULL)
return (-1);
allAreDefined = *p;
h->attrBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
sizeof(*h->attrBools));
if (h->attrBools == NULL)
return (-1);
if (allAreDefined)
memset(h->attrBools, 1, (size_t)zip->numFiles);
else {
if (read_Bools(a, h->attrBools,
(size_t)zip->numFiles) < 0)
return (-1);
}
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->attrBools[i]) {
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 4)) == NULL)
return (-1);
entries[i].attr = archive_le32dec(p);
}
}
break;
}
case kDummy:
if (ll == 0)
break;
default:
if (header_bytes(a, ll) == NULL)
return (-1);
break;
}
}
/*
* Set up entry's attributes.
*/
folders = si->ci.folders;
eindex = sindex = 0;
folderIndex = indexInFolder = 0;
for (i = 0; i < zip->numFiles; i++) {
if (h->emptyStreamBools == NULL || h->emptyStreamBools[i] == 0)
entries[i].flg |= HAS_STREAM;
/* The high 16 bits of attributes is a posix file mode. */
entries[i].mode = entries[i].attr >> 16;
if (entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) {
if ((size_t)sindex >= si->ss.unpack_streams)
return (-1);
if (entries[i].mode == 0)
entries[i].mode = AE_IFREG | 0666;
if (si->ss.digestsDefined[sindex])
entries[i].flg |= CRC32_IS_SET;
entries[i].ssIndex = sindex;
sindex++;
} else {
int dir;
if (h->emptyFileBools == NULL)
dir = 1;
else {
if (h->emptyFileBools[eindex])
dir = 0;
else
dir = 1;
eindex++;
}
if (entries[i].mode == 0) {
if (dir)
entries[i].mode = AE_IFDIR | 0777;
else
entries[i].mode = AE_IFREG | 0666;
} else if (dir &&
(entries[i].mode & AE_IFMT) != AE_IFDIR) {
entries[i].mode &= ~AE_IFMT;
entries[i].mode |= AE_IFDIR;
}
if ((entries[i].mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFDIR &&
entries[i].name_len >= 2 &&
(entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len-2] != '/' ||
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len-1] != 0)) {
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len] = '/';
entries[i].utf16name[entries[i].name_len+1] = 0;
entries[i].name_len += 2;
}
entries[i].ssIndex = -1;
}
if (entries[i].attr & 0x01)
entries[i].mode &= ~0222;/* Read only. */
if ((entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) == 0 && indexInFolder == 0) {
/*
* The entry is an empty file or a directory file,
* those both have no contents.
*/
entries[i].folderIndex = -1;
continue;
}
if (indexInFolder == 0) {
for (;;) {
if (folderIndex >= si->ci.numFolders)
return (-1);
if (folders[folderIndex].numUnpackStreams)
break;
folderIndex++;
}
}
entries[i].folderIndex = folderIndex;
if ((entries[i].flg & HAS_STREAM) == 0)
continue;
indexInFolder++;
if (indexInFolder >= folders[folderIndex].numUnpackStreams) {
folderIndex++;
indexInFolder = 0;
}
}
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The read_Header function in archive_read_support_format_7zip.c in libarchive 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via multiple EmptyStream attributes in a header in a 7zip archive.
Commit Message: Issue 761: Heap overflow reading corrupted 7Zip files
The sample file that demonstrated this had multiple 'EmptyStream'
attributes. The first one ended up being used to calculate
certain statistics, then was overwritten by the second which
was incompatible with those statistics.
The fix here is to reject any header with multiple EmptyStream
attributes. While here, also reject headers with multiple
EmptyFile, AntiFile, Name, or Attributes markers. | Medium | 168,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: In CollectValuesOrEntriesImpl of elements.cc, there is possible remote code execution due to type confusion. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android. Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-111274046
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
| High | 174,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: standard_info_part1(standard_display *dp, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
if (png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi) != dp->bit_depth)
png_error(pp, "validate: bit depth changed");
if (png_get_color_type(pp, pi) != dp->colour_type)
png_error(pp, "validate: color type changed");
if (png_get_filter_type(pp, pi) != PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE)
png_error(pp, "validate: filter type changed");
if (png_get_interlace_type(pp, pi) != dp->interlace_type)
png_error(pp, "validate: interlacing changed");
if (png_get_compression_type(pp, pi) != PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE)
png_error(pp, "validate: compression type changed");
dp->w = png_get_image_width(pp, pi);
if (dp->w != standard_width(pp, dp->id))
png_error(pp, "validate: image width changed");
dp->h = png_get_image_height(pp, pi);
if (dp->h != standard_height(pp, dp->id))
png_error(pp, "validate: image height changed");
/* Record (but don't check at present) the input sBIT according to the colour
* type information.
*/
{
png_color_8p sBIT = 0;
if (png_get_sBIT(pp, pi, &sBIT) & PNG_INFO_sBIT)
{
int sBIT_invalid = 0;
if (sBIT == 0)
png_error(pp, "validate: unexpected png_get_sBIT result");
if (dp->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
if (sBIT->red == 0 || sBIT->red > dp->bit_depth)
sBIT_invalid = 1;
else
dp->red_sBIT = sBIT->red;
if (sBIT->green == 0 || sBIT->green > dp->bit_depth)
sBIT_invalid = 1;
else
dp->green_sBIT = sBIT->green;
if (sBIT->blue == 0 || sBIT->blue > dp->bit_depth)
sBIT_invalid = 1;
else
dp->blue_sBIT = sBIT->blue;
}
else /* !COLOR */
{
if (sBIT->gray == 0 || sBIT->gray > dp->bit_depth)
sBIT_invalid = 1;
else
dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->red_sBIT = sBIT->gray;
}
/* All 8 bits in tRNS for a palette image are significant - see the
* spec.
*/
if (dp->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
{
if (sBIT->alpha == 0 || sBIT->alpha > dp->bit_depth)
sBIT_invalid = 1;
else
dp->alpha_sBIT = sBIT->alpha;
}
if (sBIT_invalid)
png_error(pp, "validate: sBIT value out of range");
}
}
/* Important: this is validating the value *before* any transforms have been
* put in place. It doesn't matter for the standard tests, where there are
* no transforms, but it does for other tests where rowbytes may change after
* png_read_update_info.
*/
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) != standard_rowsize(pp, dp->id))
png_error(pp, "validate: row size changed");
/* Validate the colour type 3 palette (this can be present on other color
* types.)
*/
standard_palette_validate(dp, pp, pi);
/* In any case always check for a tranparent color (notice that the
* colour type 3 case must not give a successful return on the get_tRNS call
* with these arguments!)
*/
{
png_color_16p trans_color = 0;
if (png_get_tRNS(pp, pi, 0, 0, &trans_color) & PNG_INFO_tRNS)
{
if (trans_color == 0)
png_error(pp, "validate: unexpected png_get_tRNS (color) result");
switch (dp->colour_type)
{
case 0:
dp->transparent.red = dp->transparent.green = dp->transparent.blue =
trans_color->gray;
dp->is_transparent = 1;
break;
case 2:
dp->transparent.red = trans_color->red;
dp->transparent.green = trans_color->green;
dp->transparent.blue = trans_color->blue;
dp->is_transparent = 1;
break;
case 3:
/* Not expected because it should result in the array case
* above.
*/
png_error(pp, "validate: unexpected png_get_tRNS result");
break;
default:
png_error(pp, "validate: invalid tRNS chunk with alpha image");
}
}
}
/* Read the number of passes - expected to match the value used when
* creating the image (interlaced or not). This has the side effect of
* turning on interlace handling (if do_interlace is not set.)
*/
dp->npasses = npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, dp->interlace_type);
if (!dp->do_interlace && dp->npasses != png_set_interlace_handling(pp))
png_error(pp, "validate: file changed interlace type");
/* Caller calls png_read_update_info or png_start_read_image now, then calls
* part2.
*/
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::sendCommand(
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd, OMX_S32 param) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
if (param == OMX_StateIdle) {
bufferSource->omxIdle();
} else if (param == OMX_StateLoaded) {
bufferSource->omxLoaded();
setGraphicBufferSource(NULL);
}
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
const char *paramString =
cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet ? asString((OMX_STATETYPE)param) : portString(param);
CLOG_STATE(sendCommand, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SendCommand(mHandle, cmd, param, NULL);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(sendCommand, err, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ProcessMSLScript(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image **image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*msl_image;
int
status;
ssize_t
n;
MSLInfo
msl_info;
xmlSAXHandler
sax_modules;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr
sax_handler;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(image != (Image **) NULL);
msl_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,msl_image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
msl_image->filename);
msl_image=DestroyImageList(msl_image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
msl_image->columns=1;
msl_image->rows=1;
/*
Parse MSL file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&msl_info,0,sizeof(msl_info));
msl_info.exception=exception;
msl_info.image_info=(ImageInfo **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.image_info));
msl_info.draw_info=(DrawInfo **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.draw_info));
/* top of the stack is the MSL file itself */
msl_info.image=(Image **) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*msl_info.image));
msl_info.attributes=(Image **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.attributes));
msl_info.group_info=(MSLGroupInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.group_info));
if ((msl_info.image_info == (ImageInfo **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.image == (Image **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.attributes == (Image **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.group_info == (MSLGroupInfo *) NULL))
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"UnableToInterpretMSLImage");
*msl_info.image_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
*msl_info.draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
*msl_info.attributes=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
msl_info.group_info[0].numImages=0;
/* the first slot is used to point to the MSL file image */
*msl_info.image=msl_image;
if (*image != (Image *) NULL)
MSLPushImage(&msl_info,*image);
(void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sax_modules,0,sizeof(sax_modules));
sax_modules.internalSubset=MSLInternalSubset;
sax_modules.isStandalone=MSLIsStandalone;
sax_modules.hasInternalSubset=MSLHasInternalSubset;
sax_modules.hasExternalSubset=MSLHasExternalSubset;
sax_modules.resolveEntity=MSLResolveEntity;
sax_modules.getEntity=MSLGetEntity;
sax_modules.entityDecl=MSLEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.notationDecl=MSLNotationDeclaration;
sax_modules.attributeDecl=MSLAttributeDeclaration;
sax_modules.elementDecl=MSLElementDeclaration;
sax_modules.unparsedEntityDecl=MSLUnparsedEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.setDocumentLocator=MSLSetDocumentLocator;
sax_modules.startDocument=MSLStartDocument;
sax_modules.endDocument=MSLEndDocument;
sax_modules.startElement=MSLStartElement;
sax_modules.endElement=MSLEndElement;
sax_modules.reference=MSLReference;
sax_modules.characters=MSLCharacters;
sax_modules.ignorableWhitespace=MSLIgnorableWhitespace;
sax_modules.processingInstruction=MSLProcessingInstructions;
sax_modules.comment=MSLComment;
sax_modules.warning=MSLWarning;
sax_modules.error=MSLError;
sax_modules.fatalError=MSLError;
sax_modules.getParameterEntity=MSLGetParameterEntity;
sax_modules.cdataBlock=MSLCDataBlock;
sax_modules.externalSubset=MSLExternalSubset;
sax_handler=(&sax_modules);
msl_info.parser=xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(sax_handler,&msl_info,(char *) NULL,0,
msl_image->filename);
while (ReadBlobString(msl_image,message) != (char *) NULL)
{
n=(ssize_t) strlen(message);
if (n == 0)
continue;
status=xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser,message,(int) n,MagickFalse);
if (status != 0)
break;
(void) xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser," ",1,MagickFalse);
if (msl_info.exception->severity >= ErrorException)
break;
}
if (msl_info.exception->severity == UndefinedException)
(void) xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser," ",1,MagickTrue);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(msl_info.parser);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end SAX");
msl_info.group_info=(MSLGroupInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
msl_info.group_info);
if (*image == (Image *) NULL)
*image=(*msl_info.image);
if (msl_info.exception->severity != UndefinedException)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The ProcessMSLScript function in coders/msl.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.9-5 and 7.x before 7.0.6-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory leak) via a crafted file, related to the WriteMSLImage function.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636 | Medium | 167,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
| High | 173,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnCheckForCancel(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int preview_request_id,
bool* cancel) {
*cancel =
(print_preview_pages_remaining_ == print_preview_cancel_page_number_);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,847 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FoFiType1C::convertToType0(char *psName, int *codeMap, int nCodes,
FoFiOutputFunc outputFunc,
void *outputStream) {
int *cidMap;
Type1CIndex subrIdx;
Type1CIndexVal val;
int nCIDs;
GooString *buf;
Type1CEexecBuf eb;
GBool ok;
int fd, i, j, k;
if (codeMap) {
nCIDs = nCodes;
cidMap = (int *)gmallocn(nCIDs, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < nCodes; ++i) {
if (codeMap[i] >= 0 && codeMap[i] < nGlyphs) {
cidMap[i] = codeMap[i];
} else {
cidMap[i] = -1;
}
}
} else if (topDict.firstOp == 0x0c1e) {
nCIDs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nGlyphs && i < charsetLength; ++i) {
if (charset[i] >= nCIDs) {
nCIDs = charset[i] + 1;
}
}
cidMap = (int *)gmallocn(nCIDs, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < nCIDs; ++i) {
cidMap[i] = -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nGlyphs && i < charsetLength; ++i) {
cidMap[charset[i]] = i;
}
} else {
nCIDs = nGlyphs;
cidMap = (int *)gmallocn(nCIDs, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < nCIDs; ++i) {
cidMap[i] = i;
}
}
if (privateDicts) {
for (i = 0; i < nCIDs; i += 256) {
fd = 0;
if (fdSelect) {
for (j = i==0 ? 1 : 0; j < 256 && i+j < nCIDs; ++j) {
if (cidMap[i+j] >= 0) {
fd = fdSelect[cidMap[i+j]];
break;
}
}
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "16 dict begin\n", 14);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontName /", 11);
delete buf;
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontType 1 def\n", 16);
if (privateDicts[fd].hasFontMatrix) {
buf = GooString::format("/FontMatrix [{0:.8g} {1:.8g} {2:.8g} {3:.8g} {4:.8g} {5:.8g}] def\n",
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[0],
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[1],
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[2],
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[3],
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[4],
privateDicts[fd].fontMatrix[5]);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
} else if (topDict.hasFontMatrix) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontMatrix [1 0 0 1 0 0] def\n", 30);
} else {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream,
"/FontMatrix [0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0] def\n", 38);
}
buf = GooString::format("/FontBBox [{0:.4g} {1:.4g} {2:.4g} {3:.4g}] def\n",
topDict.fontBBox[0], topDict.fontBBox[1],
topDict.fontBBox[2], topDict.fontBBox[3]);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
buf = GooString::format("/PaintType {0:d} def\n", topDict.paintType);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
if (topDict.paintType != 0) {
buf = GooString::format("/StrokeWidth {0:.4g} def\n", topDict.strokeWidth);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/Encoding 256 array\n", 20);
for (j = 0; j < 256 && i+j < nCIDs; ++j) {
buf = GooString::format("dup {0:d} /c{1:02x} put\n", j, j);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
}
if (j < 256) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:d} 1 255 {{ 1 index exch /.notdef put }} for\n",
j);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "readonly def\n", 13);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "currentdict end\n", 16);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "currentfile eexec\n", 18);
eb.outputFunc = outputFunc;
eb.outputStream = outputStream;
eb.ascii = gTrue;
eb.r1 = 55665;
eb.line = 0;
eexecWrite(&eb, "\x83\xca\x73\xd5");
eexecWrite(&eb, "dup /Private 32 dict dup begin\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "/RD {string currentfile exch readstring pop}"
" executeonly def\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "/ND {noaccess def} executeonly def\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "/NP {noaccess put} executeonly def\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "/MinFeature {16 16} def\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "/password 5839 def\n");
if (privateDicts[fd].nBlueValues) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/BlueValues [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nBlueValues; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:d}",
k > 0 ? " " : "",
privateDicts[fd].blueValues[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].nOtherBlues) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/OtherBlues [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nOtherBlues; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:d}",
k > 0 ? " " : "",
privateDicts[fd].otherBlues[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].nFamilyBlues) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/FamilyBlues [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nFamilyBlues; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:d}", k > 0 ? " " : "",
privateDicts[fd].familyBlues[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].nFamilyOtherBlues) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/FamilyOtherBlues [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nFamilyOtherBlues; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:d}", k > 0 ? " " : "",
privateDicts[fd].familyOtherBlues[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].blueScale != 0.039625) {
buf = GooString::format("/BlueScale {0:.4g} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].blueScale);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].blueShift != 7) {
buf = GooString::format("/BlueShift {0:d} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].blueShift);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].blueFuzz != 1) {
buf = GooString::format("/BlueFuzz {0:d} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].blueFuzz);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].hasStdHW) {
buf = GooString::format("/StdHW [{0:.4g}] def\n", privateDicts[fd].stdHW);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].hasStdVW) {
buf = GooString::format("/StdVW [{0:.4g}] def\n", privateDicts[fd].stdVW);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].nStemSnapH) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/StemSnapH [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nStemSnapH; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:.4g}",
k > 0 ? " " : "", privateDicts[fd].stemSnapH[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].nStemSnapV) {
eexecWrite(&eb, "/StemSnapV [");
for (k = 0; k < privateDicts[fd].nStemSnapV; ++k) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:s}{1:.4g}",
k > 0 ? " " : "", privateDicts[fd].stemSnapV[k]);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "] def\n");
}
if (privateDicts[fd].hasForceBold) {
buf = GooString::format("/ForceBold {0:s} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].forceBold ? "true" : "false");
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].forceBoldThreshold != 0) {
buf = GooString::format("/ForceBoldThreshold {0:.4g} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].forceBoldThreshold);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].languageGroup != 0) {
buf = GooString::format("/LanguageGroup {0:d} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].languageGroup);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
if (privateDicts[fd].expansionFactor != 0.06) {
buf = GooString::format("/ExpansionFactor {0:.4g} def\n",
privateDicts[fd].expansionFactor);
eexecWrite(&eb, buf->getCString());
delete buf;
}
ok = gTrue;
getIndex(privateDicts[fd].subrsOffset, &subrIdx, &ok);
if (!ok) {
subrIdx.pos = -1;
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "2 index /CharStrings 256 dict dup begin\n");
ok = gTrue;
getIndexVal(&charStringsIdx, 0, &val, &ok);
if (ok) {
eexecCvtGlyph(&eb, ".notdef", val.pos, val.len,
&subrIdx, &privateDicts[fd]);
}
for (j = 0; j < 256 && i+j < nCIDs; ++j) {
if (cidMap[i+j] >= 0) {
ok = gTrue;
getIndexVal(&charStringsIdx, cidMap[i+j], &val, &ok);
if (ok) {
buf = GooString::format("c{0:02x}", j);
eexecCvtGlyph(&eb, buf->getCString(), val.pos, val.len,
&subrIdx, &privateDicts[fd]);
delete buf;
}
}
}
eexecWrite(&eb, "end\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "end\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "readonly put\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "noaccess put\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "dup /FontName get exch definefont pop\n");
eexecWrite(&eb, "mark currentfile closefile\n");
if (eb.line > 0) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "\n", 1);
}
for (j = 0; j < 8; ++j) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n", 65);
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "cleartomark\n", 12);
}
} else {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "FoFiType1C::convertToType0 without privateDicts");
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "16 dict begin\n", 14);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontName /", 11);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, psName, strlen(psName));
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, " def\n", 5);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontType 0 def\n", 16);
if (topDict.hasFontMatrix) {
buf = GooString::format("/FontMatrix [{0:.8g} {1:.8g} {2:.8g} {3:.8g} {4:.8g} {5:.8g}] def\n",
topDict.fontMatrix[0], topDict.fontMatrix[1],
topDict.fontMatrix[2], topDict.fontMatrix[3],
topDict.fontMatrix[4], topDict.fontMatrix[5]);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
} else {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FontMatrix [1 0 0 1 0 0] def\n", 30);
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FMapType 2 def\n", 16);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/Encoding [\n", 12);
for (i = 0; i < nCIDs; i += 256) {
buf = GooString::format("{0:d}\n", i >> 8);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "] def\n", 6);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/FDepVector [\n", 14);
for (i = 0; i < nCIDs; i += 256) {
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "/", 1);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, psName, strlen(psName));
buf = GooString::format("_{0:02x} findfont\n", i >> 8);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, buf->getCString(), buf->getLength());
delete buf;
}
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "] def\n", 6);
(*outputFunc)(outputStream, "FontName currentdict end definefont pop\n", 40);
gfree(cidMap);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The FoFiType1C::convertToType0 function in FoFiType1C.cc in Poppler 0.59.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read vulnerability if an out-of-bounds font dictionary index is encountered, which allows an attacker to launch a denial of service attack.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,665 |
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