instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int efx_ethtool_set_ringparam(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_ringparam *ring)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
if (ring->rx_mini_pending || ring->rx_jumbo_pending ||
ring->rx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (ring->rx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"TX and RX queues cannot be smaller than %ld\n",
EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
return efx_realloc_channels(efx, ring->rx_pending, ring->tx_pending);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The sfc (aka Solarflare Solarstorm) driver in the Linux kernel before 3.2.30 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (DMA descriptor consumption and network-controller outage) via crafted TCP packets that trigger a small MSS value.
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> | High | 165,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static js_Ast *callexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a = newexp(J);
loop:
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '(')) { a = EXP2(CALL, a, arguments(J)); jsP_expect(J, ')'); goto loop; }
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: jsparse.c in Artifex MuJS through 1.0.2 does not properly maintain the AST depth for binary expressions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive recursion) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void rpng2_x_redisplay_image(ulg startcol, ulg startrow,
ulg width, ulg height)
{
uch bg_red = rpng2_info.bg_red;
uch bg_green = rpng2_info.bg_green;
uch bg_blue = rpng2_info.bg_blue;
uch *src, *src2=NULL;
char *dest;
uch r, g, b, a;
ulg i, row, lastrow = 0;
ulg pixel;
int ximage_rowbytes = ximage->bytes_per_line;
Trace((stderr, "beginning display loop (image_channels == %d)\n",
rpng2_info.channels))
Trace((stderr, " (width = %ld, rowbytes = %d, ximage_rowbytes = %d)\n",
rpng2_info.width, rpng2_info.rowbytes, ximage_rowbytes))
Trace((stderr, " (bpp = %d)\n", ximage->bits_per_pixel))
Trace((stderr, " (byte_order = %s)\n", ximage->byte_order == MSBFirst?
"MSBFirst" : (ximage->byte_order == LSBFirst? "LSBFirst" : "unknown")))
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aside from the use of the rpng2_info struct and of src2 (for background
image), this routine is identical to rpng_x_display_image() in the non-
progressive version of the program--for the simple reason that redisplay
of the image against a new background happens after the image is fully
decoded and therefore is, by definition, non-progressive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if (depth == 24 || depth == 32) {
ulg red, green, blue;
int bpp = ximage->bits_per_pixel;
for (lastrow = row = startrow; row < startrow+height; ++row) {
src = rpng2_info.image_data + row*rpng2_info.rowbytes;
if (bg_image)
src2 = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
dest = ximage->data + row*ximage_rowbytes;
if (rpng2_info.channels == 3) {
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
red = *src++;
green = *src++;
blue = *src++;
#ifdef NO_24BIT_MASKS
pixel = (red << RShift) |
(green << GShift) |
(blue << BShift);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
if (bpp == 32) {
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 24) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
} else {
/* this assumes bpp == 24 & bits are packed low */
/* (probably need to use RShift, RMask, etc.) */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
#else
red = (RShift < 0)? red << (-RShift) : red >> RShift;
green = (GShift < 0)? green << (-GShift) : green >> GShift;
blue = (BShift < 0)? blue << (-BShift) : blue >> BShift;
pixel = (red & RMask) | (green & GMask) | (blue & BMask);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
if (bpp == 32) {
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 24) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
} else {
/* GRR BUG */
/* this assumes bpp == 24 & bits are packed low */
/* (probably need to use RShift/RMask/etc. here, too) */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
#endif
}
} else /* if (rpng2_info.channels == 4) */ {
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
r = *src++;
g = *src++;
b = *src++;
a = *src++;
if (bg_image) {
bg_red = *src2++;
bg_green = *src2++;
bg_blue = *src2++;
}
if (a == 255) {
red = r;
green = g;
blue = b;
} else if (a == 0) {
red = bg_red;
green = bg_green;
blue = bg_blue;
} else {
/* this macro (from png.h) composites the foreground
* and background values and puts the result into the
* first argument */
alpha_composite(red, r, a, bg_red);
alpha_composite(green, g, a, bg_green);
alpha_composite(blue, b, a, bg_blue);
}
#ifdef NO_24BIT_MASKS
pixel = (red << RShift) |
(green << GShift) |
(blue << BShift);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
if (bpp == 32) {
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 24) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
} else {
/* this assumes bpp == 24 & bits are packed low */
/* (probably need to use RShift, RMask, etc.) */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
#else
red = (RShift < 0)? red << (-RShift) : red >> RShift;
green = (GShift < 0)? green << (-GShift) : green >> GShift;
blue = (BShift < 0)? blue << (-BShift) : blue >> BShift;
pixel = (red & RMask) | (green & GMask) | (blue & BMask);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
if (bpp == 32) {
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 24) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
} else {
/* GRR BUG */
/* this assumes bpp == 24 & bits are packed low */
/* (probably need to use RShift/RMask/etc. here, too) */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 16) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
#endif
}
}
/* display after every 16 lines */
if (((row+1) & 0xf) == 0) {
XPutImage(display, window, gc, ximage, 0, (int)lastrow, 0,
(int)lastrow, rpng2_info.width, 16);
XFlush(display);
lastrow = row + 1;
}
}
} else if (depth == 16) {
ush red, green, blue;
for (lastrow = row = startrow; row < startrow+height; ++row) {
src = rpng2_info.row_pointers[row];
if (bg_image)
src2 = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
dest = ximage->data + row*ximage_rowbytes;
if (rpng2_info.channels == 3) {
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
red = ((ush)(*src) << 8);
++src;
green = ((ush)(*src) << 8);
++src;
blue = ((ush)(*src) << 8);
++src;
pixel = ((red >> RShift) & RMask) |
((green >> GShift) & GMask) |
((blue >> BShift) & BMask);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
} else /* if (rpng2_info.channels == 4) */ {
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
r = *src++;
g = *src++;
b = *src++;
a = *src++;
if (bg_image) {
bg_red = *src2++;
bg_green = *src2++;
bg_blue = *src2++;
}
if (a == 255) {
red = ((ush)r << 8);
green = ((ush)g << 8);
blue = ((ush)b << 8);
} else if (a == 0) {
red = ((ush)bg_red << 8);
green = ((ush)bg_green << 8);
blue = ((ush)bg_blue << 8);
} else {
/* this macro (from png.h) composites the foreground
* and background values and puts the result back into
* the first argument (== fg byte here: safe) */
alpha_composite(r, r, a, bg_red);
alpha_composite(g, g, a, bg_green);
alpha_composite(b, b, a, bg_blue);
red = ((ush)r << 8);
green = ((ush)g << 8);
blue = ((ush)b << 8);
}
pixel = ((red >> RShift) & RMask) |
((green >> GShift) & GMask) |
((blue >> BShift) & BMask);
/* recall that we set ximage->byte_order = MSBFirst above */
*dest++ = (char)((pixel >> 8) & 0xff);
*dest++ = (char)( pixel & 0xff);
}
}
/* display after every 16 lines */
if (((row+1) & 0xf) == 0) {
XPutImage(display, window, gc, ximage, 0, (int)lastrow, 0,
(int)lastrow, rpng2_info.width, 16);
XFlush(display);
lastrow = row + 1;
}
}
} else /* depth == 8 */ {
/* GRR: add 8-bit support */
}
Trace((stderr, "calling final XPutImage()\n"))
if (lastrow < startrow+height) {
XPutImage(display, window, gc, ximage, 0, (int)lastrow, 0,
(int)lastrow, rpng2_info.width, rpng2_info.height-lastrow);
XFlush(display);
}
} /* end function rpng2_x_redisplay_image() */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExprResolveBoolean(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
bool *set_rtrn)
{
bool ok = false;
const char *ident;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_VALUE:
if (expr->expr.value_type != EXPR_TYPE_BOOLEAN) {
log_err(ctx,
"Found constant of type %s where boolean was expected\n",
expr_value_type_to_string(expr->expr.value_type));
return false;
}
*set_rtrn = expr->boolean.set;
return true;
case EXPR_IDENT:
ident = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident);
if (ident) {
if (istreq(ident, "true") ||
istreq(ident, "yes") ||
istreq(ident, "on")) {
*set_rtrn = true;
return true;
}
else if (istreq(ident, "false") ||
istreq(ident, "no") ||
istreq(ident, "off")) {
*set_rtrn = false;
return true;
}
}
log_err(ctx, "Identifier \"%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n", ident);
return false;
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
log_err(ctx, "Default \"%s.%s\" of type boolean is unknown\n",
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element),
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field));
return false;
case EXPR_INVERT:
case EXPR_NOT:
ok = ExprResolveBoolean(ctx, expr, set_rtrn);
if (ok)
*set_rtrn = !*set_rtrn;
return ok;
case EXPR_ADD:
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
case EXPR_ASSIGN:
case EXPR_NEGATE:
case EXPR_UNARY_PLUS:
log_err(ctx, "%s of boolean values not permitted\n",
expr_op_type_to_string(expr->expr.op));
break;
default:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unknown operator %d in ResolveBoolean\n",
expr->expr.op);
break;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: Endless recursion exists in xkbcomp/expr.c in xkbcommon and libxkbcommon before 0.8.1, which could be used by local attackers to crash xkbcommon users by supplying a crafted keymap file that triggers boolean negation.
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix stack overflow when evaluating boolean negation
The expression evaluator would go into an infinite recursion when
evaluating something like this as a boolean: `!True`. Instead of
recursing to just `True` and negating, it recursed to `!True` itself
again.
Bug inherited from xkbcomp.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]> | Low | 169,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
const char *value = NULL;
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
command = crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, client->encrypted);
if (command == NULL) {
return -1;
}
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
goto bail;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
bail:
free_xml(command);
command = NULL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. | Medium | 166,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void php_snmp_getvalue(struct variable_list *vars, zval *snmpval TSRMLS_DC, int valueretrieval)
{
zval *val;
char sbuf[512];
char *buf = &(sbuf[0]);
char *dbuf = (char *)NULL;
int buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
int val_len = vars->val_len;
/* use emalloc() for large values, use static array otherwize */
/* There is no way to know the size of buffer snprint_value() needs in order to print a value there.
* So we are forced to probe it
*/
while ((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) == 0) {
*buf = '\0';
if (snprint_value(buf, buflen, vars->name, vars->name_length, vars) == -1) {
if (val_len > 512*1024) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "snprint_value() asks for a buffer more than 512k, Net-SNMP bug?");
break;
}
/* buffer is not long enough to hold full output, double it */
val_len *= 2;
} else {
break;
}
if (buf == dbuf) {
dbuf = (char *)erealloc(dbuf, val_len + 1);
} else {
dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1);
}
if (!dbuf) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
buf = &(sbuf[0]);
buflen = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
break;
}
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
}
if((valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) && val_len > buflen){
if ((dbuf = (char *)emalloc(val_len + 1))) {
buf = dbuf;
buflen = val_len;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed: %s, fallback to static buffer", strerror(errno));
}
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_PLAIN) {
*buf = 0;
switch (vars->type) {
case ASN_BIT_STR: /* 0x03, asn1.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.bitstring, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_OCTET_STR: /* 0x04, asn1.h */
case ASN_OPAQUE: /* 0x44, snmp_impl.h */
ZVAL_STRINGL(val, (char *)vars->val.string, vars->val_len, 1);
break;
case ASN_NULL: /* 0x05, asn1.h */
ZVAL_NULL(val);
break;
case ASN_OBJECT_ID: /* 0x06, asn1.h */
snprint_objid(buf, buflen, vars->val.objid, vars->val_len / sizeof(oid));
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_IPADDRESS: /* 0x40, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
(vars->val.string)[0], (vars->val.string)[1],
(vars->val.string)[2], (vars->val.string)[3]);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_COUNTER: /* 0x41, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_GAUGE: /* 0x42, snmp_impl.h */
/* ASN_UNSIGNED is the same as ASN_GAUGE */
case ASN_TIMETICKS: /* 0x43, snmp_impl.h */
case ASN_UINTEGER: /* 0x47, snmp_impl.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%lu", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_INTEGER: /* 0x02, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%ld", *vars->val.integer);
buf[buflen]=0;
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
#if defined(NETSNMP_WITH_OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES) || defined(OPAQUE_SPECIAL_TYPES)
case ASN_OPAQUE_FLOAT: /* 0x78, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%f", *vars->val.floatVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_DOUBLE: /* 0x79, asn1.h */
snprintf(buf, buflen, "%Lf", *vars->val.doubleVal);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_I64: /* 0x80, asn1.h */
printI64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
case ASN_OPAQUE_U64: /* 0x81, asn1.h */
#endif
case ASN_COUNTER64: /* 0x46, snmp_impl.h */
printU64(buf, vars->val.counter64);
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
break;
default:
ZVAL_STRING(val, "Unknown value type", 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown value type: %u", vars->type);
break;
}
} else /* use Net-SNMP value translation */ {
/* we have desired string in buffer, just use it */
ZVAL_STRING(val, buf, 1);
}
if (valueretrieval & SNMP_VALUE_OBJECT) {
object_init(snmpval);
add_property_long(snmpval, "type", vars->type);
add_property_zval(snmpval, "value", val);
} else {
*snmpval = *val;
zval_copy_ctor(snmpval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&val);
if(dbuf){ /* malloc was used to store value */
efree(dbuf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message: | High | 164,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: INT_PTR CALLBACK NewVersionCallback(HWND hDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
char cmdline[] = APPLICATION_NAME " -w 150";
static char* filepath = NULL;
static int download_status = 0;
LONG i;
HWND hNotes;
STARTUPINFOA si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
HFONT hyperlink_font = NULL;
EXT_DECL(dl_ext, NULL, __VA_GROUP__("*.exe"), __VA_GROUP__(lmprintf(MSG_037)));
switch (message) {
case WM_INITDIALOG:
apply_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION, hDlg);
download_status = 0;
SetTitleBarIcon(hDlg);
CenterDialog(hDlg);
update_original_proc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(hDlg, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)update_subclass_callback);
hNotes = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_RELEASE_NOTES);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_AUTOURLDETECT, 1, 0);
SendMessageA(hNotes, EM_SETTEXTEX, (WPARAM)&friggin_microsoft_unicode_amateurs, (LPARAM)update.release_notes);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETSEL, -1, -1);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETEVENTMASK, 0, ENM_LINK);
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_YOUR_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_018,
rufus_version[0], rufus_version[1], rufus_version[2]));
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_LATEST_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_019,
update.version[0], update.version[1], update.version[2]));
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_URL), update.download_url);
SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_PROGRESS), PBM_SETRANGE, 0, (MAX_PROGRESS<<16) & 0xFFFF0000);
if (update.download_url == NULL)
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), FALSE);
break;
case WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC:
if ((HWND)lParam != GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_WEBSITE))
return FALSE;
SetBkMode((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
CreateStaticFont((HDC)wParam, &hyperlink_font);
SelectObject((HDC)wParam, hyperlink_font);
SetTextColor((HDC)wParam, RGB(0,0,125)); // DARK_BLUE
return (INT_PTR)CreateSolidBrush(GetSysColor(COLOR_BTNFACE));
case WM_COMMAND:
switch (LOWORD(wParam)) {
case IDCLOSE:
case IDCANCEL:
if (download_status != 1) {
reset_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION);
safe_free(filepath);
EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam));
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
case IDC_WEBSITE:
ShellExecuteA(hDlg, "open", RUFUS_URL, NULL, NULL, SW_SHOWNORMAL);
break;
case IDC_DOWNLOAD: // Also doubles as abort and launch function
switch(download_status) {
case 1: // Abort
FormatStatus = ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR|FAC(FACILITY_STORAGE)|ERROR_CANCELLED;
download_status = 0;
break;
case 2: // Launch newer version and close this one
Sleep(1000); // Add a delay on account of antivirus scanners
if (ValidateSignature(hDlg, filepath) != NO_ERROR)
break;
memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
if (!CreateProcessU(filepath, cmdline, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
PrintInfo(0, MSG_214);
uprintf("Failed to launch new application: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
} else {
PrintInfo(0, MSG_213);
PostMessage(hDlg, WM_COMMAND, (WPARAM)IDCLOSE, 0);
PostMessage(hMainDialog, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0);
}
break;
default: // Download
if (update.download_url == NULL) {
uprintf("Could not get download URL\n");
break;
}
for (i=(int)strlen(update.download_url); (i>0)&&(update.download_url[i]!='/'); i--);
dl_ext.filename = &update.download_url[i+1];
filepath = FileDialog(TRUE, app_dir, &dl_ext, OFN_NOCHANGEDIR);
if (filepath == NULL) {
uprintf("Could not get save path\n");
break;
}
SendMessage(hDlg, WM_NEXTDLGCTL, (WPARAM)GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), TRUE);
DownloadFileThreaded(update.download_url, filepath, hDlg);
break;
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
}
break;
case UM_PROGRESS_INIT:
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), FALSE);
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_038));
FormatStatus = 0;
download_status = 1;
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
case UM_PROGRESS_EXIT:
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), TRUE);
if (wParam) {
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_039));
download_status = 2;
} else {
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_040));
download_status = 0;
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
}
return (INT_PTR)FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-494
Summary: Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. | Medium | 167,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
probe::willSendRequest(global_scope_, identifier, nullptr, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t safecat(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos,
PNG_CONST char *cat)
{
while (pos < bufsize && cat != NULL && *cat != 0)
buffer[pos++] = *cat++;
if (pos >= bufsize)
pos = bufsize-1;
buffer[pos] = 0;
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PluginChannel::OnChannelError() {
base::CloseProcessHandle(renderer_handle_);
renderer_handle_ = 0;
NPChannelBase::OnChannelError();
CleanUp();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AcpiPsCompleteFinalOp (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Op,
ACPI_STATUS Status)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status2;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (PsCompleteFinalOp, WalkState);
/*
* Complete the last Op (if not completed), and clear the scope stack.
* It is easily possible to end an AML "package" with an unbounded number
* of open scopes (such as when several ASL blocks are closed with
* sequential closing braces). We want to terminate each one cleanly.
*/
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_PARSE, "AML package complete at Op %p\n", Op));
do
{
if (Op)
{
if (WalkState->AscendingCallback != NULL)
{
WalkState->Op = Op;
WalkState->OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (Op->Common.AmlOpcode);
WalkState->Opcode = Op->Common.AmlOpcode;
Status = WalkState->AscendingCallback (WalkState);
Status = AcpiPsNextParseState (WalkState, Op, Status);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PENDING)
{
Status = AcpiPsCompleteOp (WalkState, &Op, AE_OK);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
if (Status == AE_CTRL_TERMINATE)
{
Status = AE_OK;
/* Clean up */
do
{
if (Op)
{
Status2 = AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status2))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status2);
}
}
AcpiPsPopScope (&(WalkState->ParserState), &Op,
&WalkState->ArgTypes, &WalkState->ArgCount);
} while (Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
else if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
/* First error is most important */
(void) AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
Status2 = AcpiPsCompleteThisOp (WalkState, Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status2))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status2);
}
}
AcpiPsPopScope (&(WalkState->ParserState), &Op, &WalkState->ArgTypes,
&WalkState->ArgCount);
} while (Op);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The acpi_ps_complete_final_op() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c in the Linux kernel through 4.12.9 does not flush the node and node_ext caches and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of
South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI
early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:
[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10
[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.361873] Call Trace:
[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and
“Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same
slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache were leaked
using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows:
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.372000] Call Trace:
[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-ParseExt: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.392000] Call Trace:
[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.392000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.392000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.392000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.392000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ut_delete_caches() function to delete local caches (acpi_gbl_namespace_
cache, state_cache, operand_cache, ps_node_cache, ps_node_ext_cache).
But the deletion codes in acpi_ut_delete_caches() function only delete
slab caches using kmem_cache_destroy() function, therefore the cache
objects should be flushed before acpi_ut_delete_caches() function.
“Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache are used in an AML parse
function, acpi_ps_parse_loop(). The function should have flush codes to
handle an error state due to invalid AML codes.
This cache leak has a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
To fix ACPI cache leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which has
flush codes in acpi_ps_parse_loop() function.
I hope that this patch improves the security of Linux kernel.
Thank you.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]> | Low | 167,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool LayoutSVGResourceMarker::calculateLocalTransform()
{
return selfNeedsLayout();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950} | High | 171,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(
int id, WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
if (!SupportsCommand(id) || !IsCommandEnabled(id))
return false;
if (browser_->tab_strip_model()->active_index() == TabStripModel::kNoTab)
return true;
DCHECK(command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) << "Invalid/disabled command "
<< id;
switch (id) {
case IDC_BACK:
GoBack(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_FORWARD:
GoForward(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD:
Reload(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_RELOAD_CLEARING_CACHE:
ClearCache(browser_);
FALLTHROUGH;
case IDC_RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE:
ReloadBypassingCache(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_HOME:
Home(browser_, disposition);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL:
OpenCurrentURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_STOP:
Stop(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_WINDOW:
NewWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_INCOGNITO_WINDOW:
NewIncognitoWindow(profile());
break;
case IDC_CLOSE_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseWindowByKey"));
CloseWindow(browser_);
break;
case IDC_NEW_TAB: {
NewTab(browser_);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
auto* new_tab_tracker =
feature_engagement::NewTabTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile());
new_tab_tracker->OnNewTabOpened();
new_tab_tracker->CloseBubble();
#endif
break;
}
case IDC_CLOSE_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CloseTabByKey"));
CloseTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_NEXT_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNextTab"));
SelectNextTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_PREVIOUS_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectPreviousTab"));
SelectPreviousTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_NEXT:
MoveTabNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MOVE_TAB_PREVIOUS:
MoveTabPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_0:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_1:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_2:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_3:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_4:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_5:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_6:
case IDC_SELECT_TAB_7:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectNumberedTab(browser_, id - IDC_SELECT_TAB_0);
break;
case IDC_SELECT_LAST_TAB:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_SelectNumberedTab"));
SelectLastTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB:
DuplicateTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_TAB:
RestoreTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB:
ConvertPopupToTabbedBrowser(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenMode(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_PWA_WINDOW:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("OpenActiveTabInPwaWindow"));
ReparentSecureActiveTabIntoPwaWindow(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_2:
case IDC_VISIT_DESKTOP_OF_LRU_USER_3:
ExecuteVisitDesktopCommand(id, window()->GetNativeWindow());
break;
#endif
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_MINIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Minimize();
break;
case IDC_MAXIMIZE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Maximize();
break;
case IDC_RESTORE_WINDOW:
browser_->window()->Restore();
break;
case IDC_USE_SYSTEM_TITLE_BAR: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame));
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
case IDC_TOGGLE_FULLSCREEN_TOOLBAR:
chrome::ToggleFullscreenToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_JAVASCRIPT_APPLE_EVENTS: {
PrefService* prefs = profile()->GetPrefs();
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents,
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kAllowJavascriptAppleEvents));
break;
}
#endif
case IDC_EXIT:
Exit();
break;
case IDC_SAVE_PAGE:
SavePage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkCurrentPageAllowingExtensionOverrides(browser_);
break;
case IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS:
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_DESKTOP_IN_PRODUCT_HELP)
feature_engagement::BookmarkTrackerFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForProfile(profile())
->OnBookmarkAdded();
#endif
BookmarkAllTabs(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_SOURCE:
browser_->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ViewSource();
break;
case IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION:
EmailPageLocation(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PRINT:
Print(browser_);
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
case IDC_BASIC_PRINT:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Advanced_Print"));
BasicPrint(browser_);
break;
#endif // ENABLE_PRINTING
case IDC_SAVE_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
SaveCreditCard(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MIGRATE_LOCAL_CREDIT_CARD_FOR_PAGE:
MigrateLocalCards(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TRANSLATE_PAGE:
Translate(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_PASSWORDS_FOR_PAGE:
ManagePasswordsForPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CUT:
case IDC_COPY:
case IDC_PASTE:
CutCopyPaste(browser_, id);
break;
case IDC_FIND:
Find(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_NEXT:
FindNext(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS:
FindPrevious(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_PLUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_IN);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_RESET);
break;
case IDC_ZOOM_MINUS:
Zoom(browser_, content::PAGE_ZOOM_OUT);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Toolbar"));
FocusToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Location"));
FocusLocationBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Search"));
FocusSearch(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR:
FocusAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Focus_Bookmarks"));
FocusBookmarksToolbar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_INACTIVE_POPUP_FOR_ACCESSIBILITY:
FocusInactivePopupForAccessibility(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE:
FocusNextPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE:
FocusPreviousPane(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_FILE:
browser_->OpenFile();
break;
case IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUT:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
true /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_INSTALL_PWA:
CreateBookmarkAppFromCurrentWebContents(browser_,
false /* force_shortcut_app */);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::ShowConsolePanel());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_DEVICES:
InspectUI::InspectDevices(browser_);
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Inspect());
break;
case IDC_DEV_TOOLS_TOGGLE:
ToggleDevToolsWindow(browser_, DevToolsToggleAction::Toggle());
break;
case IDC_TASK_MANAGER:
OpenTaskManager(browser_);
break;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case IDC_TAKE_SCREENSHOT:
TakeScreenshot();
break;
#endif
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
case IDC_FEEDBACK:
OpenFeedbackDialog(browser_, kFeedbackSourceBrowserCommand);
break;
#endif
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR:
ToggleBookmarkBar(browser_);
break;
case IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED:
Profiling::Toggle();
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_MANAGER:
ShowBookmarkManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU:
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Accel_Show_App_Menu"));
ShowAppMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_AVATAR_MENU:
ShowAvatarMenu(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_HISTORY:
ShowHistory(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_DOWNLOADS:
ShowDownloads(browser_);
break;
case IDC_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS:
ShowExtensions(browser_, std::string());
break;
case IDC_OPTIONS:
ShowSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
ShowSearchEngineSettings(browser_);
break;
case IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS:
ShowPasswordManager(browser_);
break;
case IDC_CLEAR_BROWSING_DATA:
ShowClearBrowsingDataDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_IMPORT_SETTINGS:
ShowImportDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_TOGGLE_REQUEST_TABLET_SITE:
ToggleRequestTabletSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ABOUT:
ShowAboutChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_UPGRADE_DIALOG:
OpenUpdateChromeDialog(browser_);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_KEYBOARD:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_KEYBOARD);
break;
case IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_MENU:
ShowHelp(browser_, HELP_SOURCE_MENU);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_BETA_FORUM:
ShowBetaForum(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SHOW_SIGNIN:
ShowBrowserSigninOrSettings(
browser_, signin_metrics::AccessPoint::ACCESS_POINT_MENU);
break;
case IDC_DISTILL_PAGE:
DistillCurrentPage(browser_);
break;
case IDC_ROUTE_MEDIA:
RouteMedia(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_MUTE_SITE:
MuteSite(browser_);
break;
case IDC_WINDOW_PIN_TAB:
PinTab(browser_);
break;
case IDC_COPY_URL:
CopyURL(browser_);
break;
case IDC_OPEN_IN_CHROME:
OpenInChrome(browser_);
break;
case IDC_SITE_SETTINGS:
ShowSiteSettings(
browser_,
browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->GetVisibleURL());
break;
case IDC_HOSTED_APP_MENU_APP_INFO:
ShowPageInfoDialog(browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
bubble_anchor_util::kAppMenuButton);
break;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Received Unimplemented Command: " << id;
break;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient restrictions on what can be done with Apple Events in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a local attacker to execute JavaScript via Apple Events.
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268} | Medium | 173,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::Clear() {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
delete it->frame_producer;
}
queue_[i].clear();
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/spdy/spdy_write_queue.cc in the SPDY implementation in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.153 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging incorrect queue maintenance.
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int gtco_probe(struct usb_interface *usbinterface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gtco *gtco;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
struct hid_descriptor *hid_desc;
char *report;
int result = 0, retry;
int error;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
/* Allocate memory for device structure */
gtco = kzalloc(sizeof(struct gtco), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!gtco || !input_dev) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Set pointer to the input device */
gtco->inputdevice = input_dev;
/* Save interface information */
gtco->usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbinterface);
gtco->intf = usbinterface;
/* Allocate some data for incoming reports */
gtco->buffer = usb_alloc_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
GFP_KERNEL, >co->buf_dma);
if (!gtco->buffer) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for us buffers\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Allocate URB for reports */
gtco->urbinfo = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gtco->urbinfo) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "Failed to allocate URB\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_buf;
}
/*
* The endpoint is always altsetting 0, we know this since we know
* this device only has one interrupt endpoint
*/
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
/* Some debug */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "gtco # interfaces: %d\n", usbinterface->num_altsetting);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "num endpoints: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "interface class: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceClass);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: attribute:0x%x type:0x%x\n", endpoint->bmAttributes, endpoint->bDescriptorType);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(endpoint))
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: we have interrupt endpoint\n");
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint extra len:%d\n", usbinterface->altsetting[0].extralen);
/*
* Find the HID descriptor so we can find out the size of the
* HID report descriptor
*/
if (usb_get_extra_descriptor(usbinterface->cur_altsetting,
HID_DEVICE_TYPE, &hid_desc) != 0){
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Can't retrieve exta USB descriptor to get hid report descriptor length\n");
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev,
"Extra descriptor success: type:%d len:%d\n",
hid_desc->bDescriptorType, hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
report = kzalloc(le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!report) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for report\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Couple of tries to get reply */
for (retry = 0; retry < 3; retry++) {
result = usb_control_msg(gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(gtco->usbdev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_DIR_IN,
REPORT_DEVICE_TYPE << 8,
0, /* interface */
report,
le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength),
5000); /* 5 secs */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "usb_control_msg result: %d\n", result);
if (result == le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
parse_hid_report_descriptor(gtco, report, result);
break;
}
}
kfree(report);
/* If we didn't get the report, fail */
if (result != le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Failed to get HID Report Descriptor of size: %d\n",
hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Create a device file node */
usb_make_path(gtco->usbdev, gtco->usbpath, sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
strlcat(gtco->usbpath, "/input0", sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
/* Set Input device functions */
input_dev->open = gtco_input_open;
input_dev->close = gtco_input_close;
/* Set input device information */
input_dev->name = "GTCO_CalComp";
input_dev->phys = gtco->usbpath;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, gtco);
/* Now set up all the input device capabilities */
gtco_setup_caps(input_dev);
/* Set input device required ID information */
usb_to_input_id(gtco->usbdev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &usbinterface->dev;
/* Setup the URB, it will be posted later on open of input device */
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
usb_fill_int_urb(gtco->urbinfo,
gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvintpipe(gtco->usbdev,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
gtco->buffer,
REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco_urb_callback,
gtco,
endpoint->bInterval);
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_dma = gtco->buf_dma;
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* Save gtco pointer in USB interface gtco */
usb_set_intfdata(usbinterface, gtco);
/* All done, now register the input device */
error = input_register_device(input_dev);
if (error)
goto err_free_urb;
return 0;
err_free_urb:
usb_free_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
err_free_buf:
usb_free_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco->buffer, gtco->buf_dma);
err_free_devs:
input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(gtco);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The gtco_probe function in drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickOffsetType TIFFSeekCustomStream(const MagickOffsetType offset,
const int whence,void *user_data)
{
PhotoshopProfile
*profile;
profile=(PhotoshopProfile *) user_data;
switch (whence)
{
case SEEK_SET:
default:
{
if (offset < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_CUR:
{
if ((profile->offset+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset+=offset;
break;
}
case SEEK_END:
{
if (((MagickOffsetType) profile->length+offset) < 0)
return(-1);
profile->offset=profile->length+offset;
break;
}
}
return(profile->offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has an integer overflow vulnerability in the function TIFFSeekCustomStream in coders/tiff.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602 | Medium | 169,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewDataSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
if (!EndsWith(path, "/print.pdf", true)) {
ChromeWebUIDataSource::StartDataRequest(path, is_incognito, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(path, '/', &url_substr);
int page_index = 0;
if (url_substr.size() == 3 && base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index)) {
PrintPreviewDataService::GetInstance()->GetDataEntry(
url_substr[0], page_index, &data);
}
if (data.get()) {
SendResponse(request_id, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> empty_bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes);
SendResponse(request_id, empty_bytes);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_settings_notify(WebKitWebSettings* webSettings, GParamSpec* pspec, WebKitWebView* webView)
{
Settings* settings = core(webView)->settings();
const gchar* name = g_intern_string(pspec->name);
GValue value = { 0, { { 0 } } };
g_value_init(&value, pspec->value_type);
g_object_get_property(G_OBJECT(webSettings), name, &value);
if (name == g_intern_string("default-encoding"))
settings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("cursive-font-family"))
settings->setCursiveFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("default-font-family"))
settings->setStandardFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("fantasy-font-family"))
settings->setFantasyFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("monospace-font-family"))
settings->setFixedFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("sans-serif-font-family"))
settings->setSansSerifFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("serif-font-family"))
settings->setSerifFontFamily(g_value_get_string(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("default-font-size"))
settings->setDefaultFontSize(pixelsFromSize(webView, g_value_get_int(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("default-monospace-font-size"))
settings->setDefaultFixedFontSize(pixelsFromSize(webView, g_value_get_int(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("minimum-font-size"))
settings->setMinimumFontSize(pixelsFromSize(webView, g_value_get_int(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("minimum-logical-font-size"))
settings->setMinimumLogicalFontSize(pixelsFromSize(webView, g_value_get_int(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enforce-96-dpi"))
webkit_web_view_screen_changed(GTK_WIDGET(webView), NULL);
else if (name == g_intern_string("auto-load-images"))
settings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("auto-shrink-images"))
settings->setShrinksStandaloneImagesToFit(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("print-backgrounds"))
settings->setShouldPrintBackgrounds(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-scripts"))
settings->setJavaScriptEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-plugins"))
settings->setPluginsEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-dns-prefetching"))
settings->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("resizable-text-areas"))
settings->setTextAreasAreResizable(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("user-stylesheet-uri"))
settings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), g_value_get_string(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-developer-extras"))
settings->setDeveloperExtrasEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-private-browsing"))
settings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-caret-browsing"))
settings->setCaretBrowsingEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
#if ENABLE(DATABASE)
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-html5-database")) {
AbstractDatabase::setIsAvailable(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
}
#endif
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-html5-local-storage"))
settings->setLocalStorageEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-xss-auditor"))
settings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-spatial-navigation"))
settings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-frame-flattening"))
settings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("javascript-can-open-windows-automatically"))
settings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("javascript-can-access-clipboard"))
settings->setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-offline-web-application-cache"))
settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("editing-behavior"))
settings->setEditingBehaviorType(static_cast<WebCore::EditingBehaviorType>(g_value_get_enum(&value)));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-universal-access-from-file-uris"))
settings->setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-file-access-from-file-uris"))
settings->setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-dom-paste"))
settings->setDOMPasteAllowed(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("tab-key-cycles-through-elements")) {
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
page->setTabKeyCyclesThroughElements(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
} else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-site-specific-quirks"))
settings->setNeedsSiteSpecificQuirks(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-page-cache"))
settings->setUsesPageCache(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-java-applet"))
settings->setJavaEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-hyperlink-auditing"))
settings->setHyperlinkAuditingEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
#if ENABLE(SPELLCHECK)
else if (name == g_intern_string("spell-checking-languages")) {
WebKit::EditorClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::EditorClient*>(core(webView)->editorClient());
static_cast<WebKit::TextCheckerClientEnchant*>(client->textChecker())->updateSpellCheckingLanguage(g_value_get_string(&value));
}
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEBGL)
else if (name == g_intern_string("enable-webgl"))
settings->setWebGLEnabled(g_value_get_boolean(&value));
#endif
else if (!g_object_class_find_property(G_OBJECT_GET_CLASS(webSettings), name))
g_warning("Unexpected setting '%s'", name);
g_value_unset(&value);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to HTML range handling.
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not prevent monitoring of the clipboard after a paste event, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,962 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
{
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The x11_open_helper function in channels.c in ssh in OpenSSH before 6.9, when ForwardX11Trusted mode is not used, lacks a check of the refusal deadline for X connections, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a connection outside of the permitted time window.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGL2RenderingContextBase::isVertexArray(
WebGLVertexArrayObject* vertex_array) {
if (isContextLost() || !vertex_array)
return 0;
if (!vertex_array->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsVertexArrayOES(vertex_array->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void mark_files_ro(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct file *f;
lg_global_lock(&files_lglock);
do_file_list_for_each_entry(sb, f) {
if (!file_count(f))
continue;
if (!(f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
continue;
spin_lock(&f->f_lock);
f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_WRITE;
spin_unlock(&f->f_lock);
if (file_check_writeable(f) != 0)
continue;
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
file_release_write(f);
} while_file_list_for_each_entry;
lg_global_unlock(&files_lglock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftAMR::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumSamplesOutput = 0;
}
const uint8_t *inputPtr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int32_t numBytesRead;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
numBytesRead =
AMRDecode(mState,
(Frame_Type_3GPP)((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f),
(UWord8 *)&inputPtr[1],
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
MIME_IETF);
if (numBytesRead == -1) {
ALOGE("PV AMR decoder AMRDecode() call failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
++numBytesRead; // Include the frame type header byte.
if (static_cast<size_t>(numBytesRead) > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
} else {
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
if (mode >= 10 && mode <= 13) {
ALOGE("encountered illegal frame type %d in AMR WB content.",
mode);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mode);
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, frameSize);
int16_t *outPtr = (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer;
if (mode >= 9) {
memset(outPtr, 0, kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t));
} else if (mode < 9) {
int16 frameType;
RX_State_wb rx_state;
mime_unsorting(
const_cast<uint8_t *>(&inputPtr[1]),
mInputSampleBuffer,
&frameType, &mode, 1, &rx_state);
int16_t numSamplesOutput;
pvDecoder_AmrWb(
mode, mInputSampleBuffer,
outPtr,
&numSamplesOutput,
mDecoderBuf, frameType, mDecoderCookie);
CHECK_EQ((int)numSamplesOutput, (int)kNumSamplesPerFrameWB);
for (int i = 0; i < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB; ++i) {
/* Delete the 2 LSBs (14-bit output) */
outPtr[i] &= 0xfffC;
}
}
numBytesRead = frameSize;
}
inHeader->nOffset += numBytesRead;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= numBytesRead;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateNB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameNB;
} else {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateWB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameWB;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: codecs/amrnb/dec/SoftAMR.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bugs 27662364 and 27843673.
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check output buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I7b26892c41d6f2e690e77478ab855c2fed1ff6b0
| High | 173,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InputImeEventRouter* InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetRouter(Profile* profile) {
if (!profile)
return nullptr;
InputImeEventRouter* router = router_map_[profile];
if (!router) {
router = new InputImeEventRouter(profile);
router_map_[profile] = router;
}
return router;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282} | Medium | 172,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
/*
* Disable the breakpoint request here since ptrace has defined a
* one-shot behaviour for breakpoint exceptions.
*/
attr = bp->attr;
attr.disabled = true;
modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
if (apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile_))
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(long long id,
long long pos, // absolute pos of payload
long long size, long long discard_padding) {
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); // BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) { // haven't parsed anything yet
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry* [m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
} else {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size) {
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry* [entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else // SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::AddResourceTiming(const ResourceTimingInfo& info) {
if (!document_)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = document_->GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
if (info.IsMainResource()) {
DCHECK(frame->Owner());
frame->Owner()->AddResourceTiming(info);
frame->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
return;
}
DOMWindowPerformance::performance(*document_->domWindow())
->GenerateAndAddResourceTiming(info);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Incorrect handling of timer information during navigation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross origin URLs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736} | Medium | 172,656 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg(RedChannel *channel, int msg_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
msg_type);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) red_channel_pipes_add_type and (2) red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg functions in server/red_channel.c in SPICE before 0.12.4 do not properly perform ring loops, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reachable assertion and server exit) by triggering a network error.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void Sp_match(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int len;
const char *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!(re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)) {
js_RegExp_prototype_exec(J, re, text);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
a = text;
e = text + strlen(text);
while (a <= e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break;
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
js_pushlstring(J, b, c - b);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
a = c;
if (c - b == 0)
++a;
}
if (len == 0) {
js_pop(J, 1);
js_pushnull(J);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings. | Medium | 169,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static zval *phar_rename_archive(phar_archive_data *phar, char *ext, zend_bool compress TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *oldname = NULL;
char *oldpath = NULL;
char *basename = NULL, *basepath = NULL;
char *newname = NULL, *newpath = NULL;
zval *ret, arg1;
zend_class_entry *ce;
char *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int ext_len = ext ? strlen(ext) : 0;
int oldname_len;
phar_archive_data **pphar = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (!ext) {
if (phar->is_zip) {
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "zip";
} else {
ext = "phar.zip";
}
} else if (phar->is_tar) {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.gz";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.gz";
}
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.bz2";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.bz2";
}
break;
default:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar";
}
}
} else {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
ext = "phar.gz";
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
ext = "phar.bz2";
break;
default:
ext = "phar";
}
}
} else if (phar_path_check(&ext, &ext_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
if (phar->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ext[0] == '.') {
++ext;
}
oldpath = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
oldname = zend_memrchr(phar->fname, '/', phar->fname_len);
++oldname;
oldname_len = strlen(oldname);
basename = estrndup(oldname, oldname_len);
spprintf(&newname, 0, "%s.%s", strtok(basename, "."), ext);
efree(basename);
basepath = estrndup(oldpath, (strlen(oldpath) - oldname_len));
phar->fname_len = spprintf(&newpath, 0, "%s%s", basepath, newname);
phar->fname = newpath;
phar->ext = newpath + phar->fname_len - strlen(ext) - 1;
efree(basepath);
efree(newname);
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, new phar name is in phar.cache_list", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
if ((*pphar)->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp((*pphar)->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
(*pphar)->is_tar = phar->is_tar;
(*pphar)->is_zip = phar->is_zip;
(*pphar)->is_data = phar->is_data;
(*pphar)->flags = phar->flags;
(*pphar)->fp = phar->fp;
phar->fp = NULL;
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
phar = *pphar;
phar->refcount++;
newpath = oldpath;
goto its_ok;
}
}
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, a phar with that name already exists", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
its_ok:
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path(newpath, &ssb)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" exists and must be unlinked prior to conversion", newpath);
return NULL;
}
if (!phar->is_data) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 1, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
if (phar->alias) {
if (phar->is_temporary_alias) {
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
} else {
phar->alias = estrndup(newpath, strlen(newpath));
phar->alias_len = strlen(newpath);
phar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
}
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 0, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
}
if ((!pphar || phar == *pphar) && SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 1, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
efree(oldpath);
if (phar->is_data) {
ce = phar_ce_data;
} else {
ce = phar_ce_archive;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(ret, ce)) {
zval_dtor(ret);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate phar object when converting archive \"%s\"", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&ret, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the phar_rename_archive function in phar_object.c in PHP before 5.5.22 and 5.6.x before 5.6.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an attempted renaming of a Phar archive to the name of an existing file.
Commit Message: | High | 164,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int make_http_soap_request(zval *this_ptr,
char *buf,
int buf_size,
char *location,
char *soapaction,
int soap_version,
char **buffer,
int *buffer_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *request;
smart_str soap_headers = {0};
smart_str soap_headers_z = {0};
int request_size, err;
php_url *phpurl = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
zval **trace, **tmp;
int use_proxy = 0;
int use_ssl;
char *http_headers, *http_body, *content_type, *http_version, *cookie_itt;
int http_header_size, http_body_size, http_close;
char *connection;
int http_1_1;
int http_status;
int content_type_xml = 0;
long redirect_max = 20;
char *content_encoding;
char *http_msg = NULL;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
zend_bool has_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_proxy_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_cookies = 0;
if (this_ptr == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(this_ptr) != IS_OBJECT) {
return FALSE;
}
request = buf;
request_size = buf_size;
/* Compress request */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "compression", sizeof("compression"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
int level = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & 0x0f;
int kind = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE;
if (level > 9) {level = 9;}
if ((Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_ACCEPT) != 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n");
}
if (level > 0) {
zval func;
zval retval;
zval param1, param2, param3;
zval *params[3];
int n;
params[0] = ¶m1;
INIT_PZVAL(params[0]);
params[1] = ¶m2;
INIT_PZVAL(params[1]);
params[2] = ¶m3;
INIT_PZVAL(params[2]);
ZVAL_STRINGL(params[0], buf, buf_size, 0);
ZVAL_LONG(params[1], level);
if (kind == SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE) {
n = 2;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzcompress", 0);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: deflate\r\n");
} else {
n = 3;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzencode", 0);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n");
ZVAL_LONG(params[2], 0x1f);
}
if (call_user_function(CG(function_table), (zval**)NULL, &func, &retval, n, params TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
request = Z_STRVAL(retval);
request_size = Z_STRLEN(retval);
} else {
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS) {
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream,tmp);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
use_proxy = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
stream = NULL;
}
if (location != NULL && location[0] != '\000') {
phpurl = php_url_parse(location);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr),
"_stream_context", sizeof("_stream_context"), (void**)&tmp)) {
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(*tmp, 0);
}
if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "max_redirects", &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_STRING || !is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp), &redirect_max, NULL, 1)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG)
redirect_max = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
}
}
try_again:
if (phpurl == NULL || phpurl->host == NULL) {
if (phpurl != NULL) {php_url_free(phpurl);}
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unable to parse URL", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
use_ssl = 0;
if (phpurl->scheme != NULL && strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "https") == 0) {
use_ssl = 1;
} else if (phpurl->scheme == NULL || strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "http") != 0) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unknown protocol. Only http and https are allowed.", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
if (use_ssl && php_stream_locate_url_wrapper("https://", NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) == NULL) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "SSL support is not available in this build", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (phpurl->port == 0) {
phpurl->port = use_ssl ? 443 : 80;
}
/* Check if request to the same host */
if (stream != NULL) {
php_url *orig;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
(orig = (php_url *) zend_fetch_resource(tmp TSRMLS_CC, -1, "httpurl", NULL, 1, le_url)) != NULL &&
((use_proxy && !use_ssl) ||
(((use_ssl && orig->scheme != NULL && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") == 0) ||
(!use_ssl && orig->scheme == NULL) ||
(!use_ssl && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") != 0)) &&
strcmp(orig->host, phpurl->host) == 0 &&
orig->port == phpurl->port))) {
} else {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
}
/* Check if keep-alive connection is still opened */
if (stream != NULL && php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
if (!stream) {
stream = http_connect(this_ptr, phpurl, use_ssl, context, &use_proxy TSRMLS_CC);
if (stream) {
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpsocket", php_stream_get_resource_id(stream));
add_property_long(this_ptr, "_use_proxy", use_proxy);
} else {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Could not connect to host", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (stream) {
zval **cookies, **login, **password;
int ret = zend_list_insert(phpurl, le_url TSRMLS_CC);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpurl", ret);
/*zend_list_addref(ret);*/
if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "protocol_version", &tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_DOUBLE &&
Z_DVAL_PP(tmp) == 1.0) {
http_1_1 = 0;
} else {
http_1_1 = 1;
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "POST ");
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->scheme);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "://");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if (http_1_1) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.1\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.0\r\n");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Host: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
if (phpurl->port != (use_ssl?443:80)) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (!http_1_1 ||
(zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_keep_alive", sizeof("_keep_alive"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) == 0)) {
}
if (!http_1_1 ||
(zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_keep_alive", sizeof("_keep_alive"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) == 0)) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n");
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "user_agent", &tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (FG(user_agent)) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, FG(user_agent));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: PHP-SOAP/"PHP_VERSION"\r\n");
}
smart_str_append(&soap_headers, &soap_headers_z);
if (soap_version == SOAP_1_2) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"; action=\"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\"");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8\r\n");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "SOAPAction: \"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Length: ");
smart_str_append_long(&soap_headers, request_size);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
/* HTTP Authentication */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(login) == IS_STRING) {
zval **digest;
has_authorization = 1;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"), (void **)&digest) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(digest) == IS_ARRAY) {
char HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9];
PHP_MD5_CTX md5ctx;
unsigned char hash[16];
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), "%ld", php_rand(TSRMLS_C));
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce));
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(cnonce, hash);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
Z_LVAL_PP(tmp)++;
snprintf(nc, sizeof(nc), "%08ld", Z_LVAL_PP(tmp));
} else {
add_assoc_long(*digest, "nc", 1);
strcpy(nc, "00000001");
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) == sizeof("md5-sess")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), "md5-sess") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"POST:", sizeof("POST:")-1);
if (phpurl->path) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->path, strlen(phpurl->path));
} else {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"/", 1);
}
if (phpurl->query) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"?", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->query, strlen(phpurl->query));
}
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
/*
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) == sizeof("auth-int")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), "auth-int") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, ":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN);
}
*/
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA2, hash);
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)nc, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"auth", sizeof("auth")-1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA2, 32);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(response, hash);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Digest username=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", realm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", uri=\"");
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", qop=\"auth");
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nc=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, nc, 8);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", cnonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, cnonce, 8);
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", response=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, response, 32);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "opaque", sizeof("opaque"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", opaque=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", algorithm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
} else {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
buf = php_base64_encode((unsigned char*)auth.c, auth.len, &len);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Basic ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
}
}
/* Proxy HTTP Authentication */
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
has_proxy_authorization = proxy_authentication(this_ptr, &soap_headers TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* Send cookies along with request */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies"), (void **)&cookies) == SUCCESS) {
zval **data;
}
/* Send cookies along with request */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies"), (void **)&cookies) == SUCCESS) {
zval **data;
char *key;
int i, n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies), (void **)&data);
zend_hash_get_current_key(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies), &key, NULL, FALSE);
if (Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval** value;
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 0, (void**)&value) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
zval **tmp;
if ((zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 1, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE ||
strncmp(phpurl->path?phpurl->path:"/",Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp),Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp)) == 0) &&
(zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 2, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE ||
in_domain(phpurl->host,Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp))) &&
(use_ssl || zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 3, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE)) {
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, key, strlen(key));
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '=');
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(value), Z_STRLEN_PP(value));
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ';');
}
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
}
http_context_headers(context, has_authorization, has_proxy_authorization, has_cookies, &soap_headers TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace"), (void **) &trace) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(trace) > 0) {
add_property_stringl(this_ptr, "__last_request_headers", soap_headers.c, soap_headers.len, 1);
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace"), (void **) &trace) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(trace) > 0) {
add_property_stringl(this_ptr, "__last_request_headers", soap_headers.c, soap_headers.len, 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, request, request_size);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed Sending HTTP SOAP request", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers);
} else {
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed to create stream??", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: PHP before 5.6.7 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an unexpected data type, related to "type confusion" issues in (1) ext/soap/php_encoding.c, (2) ext/soap/php_http.c, and (3) ext/soap/soap.c, a different issue than CVE-2015-4600.
Commit Message: | High | 165,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void copyMono24(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] >> 8;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 174,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_association *new_asoc;
sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init;
struct sctp_chunk *repl;
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev, *ai_ev = NULL;
int error = 0;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p;
struct sock *sk;
/* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
* control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
*/
if (ep == sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock)->ep) {
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* Make sure that the COOKIE_ECHO chunk has a valid length.
* In this case, we check that we have enough for at least a
* chunk header. More detailed verification is done
* in sctp_unpack_cookie().
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations
* on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an
* ABORT.
*/
sk = ep->base.sk;
if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) ||
(sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sk_acceptq_is_full(sk)))
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.
*/
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr =
(struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
goto nomem;
/* 5.1 D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, Endpoint
* "Z" will reply with a COOKIE ACK chunk after building a TCB
* and moving to the ESTABLISHED state.
*/
new_asoc = sctp_unpack_cookie(ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, &error,
&err_chk_p);
/* FIXME:
* If the re-build failed, what is the proper error path
* from here?
*
* [We should abort the association. --piggy]
*/
if (!new_asoc) {
/* FIXME: Several errors are possible. A bad cookie should
* be silently discarded, but think about logging it too.
*/
switch (error) {
case -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
goto nomem;
case -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE:
sctp_send_stale_cookie_err(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
err_chk_p);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
case -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
default:
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
/* Delay state machine commands until later.
*
* Re-build the bind address for the association is done in
* the sctp_unpack_cookie() already.
*/
/* This is a brand-new association, so these are not yet side
* effects--it is safe to run them here.
*/
peer_init = &chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_init[0];
if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk,
&chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_addr,
peer_init, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in
* sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as
* necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK
*/
error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
* is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
* authentication. We've just recreated the association using
* the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
* do the authentication.
*/
if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
struct sctp_chunk auth;
sctp_ierror_t ret;
/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
auth.chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
auth.transport = chunk->transport;
ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
/* We can now safely free the auth_chunk clone */
kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
if (!repl)
goto nomem_init;
/* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association
*
* D) IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: An implementation may choose to
* send the Communication Up notification to the SCTP user
* upon reception of a valid COOKIE ECHO chunk.
*/
ev = sctp_ulpevent_make_assoc_change(new_asoc, 0, SCTP_COMM_UP, 0,
new_asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams,
new_asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams,
NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ev)
goto nomem_ev;
/* Sockets API Draft Section 5.3.1.6
* When a peer sends a Adaptation Layer Indication parameter , SCTP
* delivers this notification to inform the application that of the
* peers requested adaptation layer.
*/
if (new_asoc->peer.adaptation_ind) {
ai_ev = sctp_ulpevent_make_adaptation_indication(new_asoc,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ai_ev)
goto nomem_aiev;
}
/* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created
* everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions
* during side-effect processing and correclty count established
* associations.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_PASSIVEESTABS);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_HB_TIMERS_START, SCTP_NULL());
if (new_asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE])
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE));
/* This will send the COOKIE ACK */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
/* Queue the ASSOC_CHANGE event */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
/* Send up the Adaptation Layer Indication event */
if (ai_ev)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP,
SCTP_ULPEVENT(ai_ev));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
nomem_aiev:
sctp_ulpevent_free(ev);
nomem_ev:
sctp_chunk_free(repl);
nomem_init:
sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce function in net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c in the Linux kernel through 3.13.6 does not validate certain auth_enable and auth_capable fields before making an sctp_sf_authenticate call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via an SCTP handshake with a modified INIT chunk and a crafted AUTH chunk before a COOKIE_ECHO chunk.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:
The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
from the existing association to authenticate the
COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]
Commit bbd0d59809f9 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.
Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.
The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.
Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.
Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809f9 created a skb clone in that case.
I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Cc: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: aiptek_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct aiptek *aiptek;
struct input_dev *inputdev;
int i;
int speeds[] = { 0,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_50,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_400,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_25,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_100,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_200,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_300
};
int err = -ENOMEM;
/* programmableDelay is where the command-line specified
* delay is kept. We make it the first element of speeds[],
* so therefore, your override speed is tried first, then the
* remainder. Note that the default value of 400ms will be tried
* if you do not specify any command line parameter.
*/
speeds[0] = programmableDelay;
aiptek = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aiptek), GFP_KERNEL);
inputdev = input_allocate_device();
if (!aiptek || !inputdev) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev,
"cannot allocate memory or input device\n");
goto fail1;
}
aiptek->data = usb_alloc_coherent(usbdev, AIPTEK_PACKET_LENGTH,
GFP_ATOMIC, &aiptek->data_dma);
if (!aiptek->data) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot allocate usb buffer\n");
goto fail1;
}
aiptek->urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aiptek->urb) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot allocate urb\n");
goto fail2;
}
aiptek->inputdev = inputdev;
aiptek->usbdev = usbdev;
aiptek->intf = intf;
aiptek->ifnum = intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber;
aiptek->inDelay = 0;
aiptek->endDelay = 0;
aiptek->previousJitterable = 0;
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
/* Set up the curSettings struct. Said struct contains the current
* programmable parameters. The newSetting struct contains changes
* the user makes to the settings via the sysfs interface. Those
* changes are not "committed" to curSettings until the user
* writes to the sysfs/.../execute file.
*/
aiptek->curSetting.pointerMode = AIPTEK_POINTER_EITHER_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.coordinateMode = AIPTEK_COORDINATE_ABSOLUTE_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode = AIPTEK_TOOL_BUTTON_PEN_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.xTilt = AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE;
aiptek->curSetting.yTilt = AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonLeft = AIPTEK_MOUSE_LEFT_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonMiddle = AIPTEK_MOUSE_MIDDLE_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonRight = AIPTEK_MOUSE_RIGHT_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonUpper = AIPTEK_STYLUS_UPPER_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonLower = AIPTEK_STYLUS_LOWER_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.jitterDelay = jitterDelay;
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay = programmableDelay;
/* Both structs should have equivalent settings
*/
aiptek->newSetting = aiptek->curSetting;
/* Determine the usb devices' physical path.
* Asketh not why we always pretend we're using "../input0",
* but I suspect this will have to be refactored one
* day if a single USB device can be a keyboard & a mouse
* & a tablet, and the inputX number actually will tell
* us something...
*/
usb_make_path(usbdev, aiptek->features.usbPath,
sizeof(aiptek->features.usbPath));
strlcat(aiptek->features.usbPath, "/input0",
sizeof(aiptek->features.usbPath));
/* Set up client data, pointers to open and close routines
* for the input device.
*/
inputdev->name = "Aiptek";
inputdev->phys = aiptek->features.usbPath;
usb_to_input_id(usbdev, &inputdev->id);
inputdev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(inputdev, aiptek);
inputdev->open = aiptek_open;
inputdev->close = aiptek_close;
/* Now program the capacities of the tablet, in terms of being
* an input device.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(eventTypes); ++i)
__set_bit(eventTypes[i], inputdev->evbit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(absEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(absEvents[i], inputdev->absbit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(relEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(relEvents[i], inputdev->relbit);
__set_bit(MSC_SERIAL, inputdev->mscbit);
/* Set up key and button codes */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(buttonEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(buttonEvents[i], inputdev->keybit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(macroKeyEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(macroKeyEvents[i], inputdev->keybit);
/*
* Program the input device coordinate capacities. We do not yet
* know what maximum X, Y, and Z values are, so we're putting fake
* values in. Later, we'll ask the tablet to put in the correct
* values.
*/
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_X, 0, 2999, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_Y, 0, 2249, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_PRESSURE, 0, 511, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_X, AIPTEK_TILT_MIN, AIPTEK_TILT_MAX, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_Y, AIPTEK_TILT_MIN, AIPTEK_TILT_MAX, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_WHEEL, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MIN, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MAX - 1, 0, 0);
endpoint = &intf->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
/* Go set up our URB, which is called when the tablet receives
* input.
*/
usb_fill_int_urb(aiptek->urb,
aiptek->usbdev,
usb_rcvintpipe(aiptek->usbdev,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
aiptek->data, 8, aiptek_irq, aiptek,
endpoint->bInterval);
aiptek->urb->transfer_dma = aiptek->data_dma;
aiptek->urb->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* Program the tablet. This sets the tablet up in the mode
* specified in newSetting, and also queries the tablet's
* physical capacities.
*
* Sanity check: if a tablet doesn't like the slow programmatic
* delay, we often get sizes of 0x0. Let's use that as an indicator
* to try faster delays, up to 25 ms. If that logic fails, well, you'll
* have to explain to us how your tablet thinks it's 0x0, and yet that's
* not an error :-)
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(speeds); ++i) {
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay = speeds[i];
(void)aiptek_program_tablet(aiptek);
if (input_abs_get_max(aiptek->inputdev, ABS_X) > 0) {
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"Aiptek using %d ms programming speed\n",
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay);
break;
}
}
/* Murphy says that some day someone will have a tablet that fails the
above test. That's you, Frederic Rodrigo */
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(speeds)) {
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"Aiptek tried all speeds, no sane response\n");
goto fail3;
}
/* Associate this driver's struct with the usb interface.
*/
usb_set_intfdata(intf, aiptek);
/* Set up the sysfs files
*/
err = sysfs_create_group(&intf->dev.kobj, &aiptek_attribute_group);
if (err) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot create sysfs group err: %d\n",
err);
goto fail3;
}
/* Register the tablet as an Input Device
*/
err = input_register_device(aiptek->inputdev);
if (err) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev,
"input_register_device returned err: %d\n", err);
goto fail4;
}
return 0;
fail4: sysfs_remove_group(&intf->dev.kobj, &aiptek_attribute_group);
fail3: usb_free_urb(aiptek->urb);
fail2: usb_free_coherent(usbdev, AIPTEK_PACKET_LENGTH, aiptek->data,
aiptek->data_dma);
fail1: usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
input_free_device(inputdev);
kfree(aiptek);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The aiptek_probe function in drivers/input/tablet/aiptek.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted USB device that lacks endpoints.
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: file_trycdf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
cdf_info_t info;
cdf_header_t h;
cdf_sat_t sat, ssat;
cdf_stream_t sst, scn;
cdf_dir_t dir;
int i;
const char *expn = "";
const char *corrupt = "corrupt: ";
info.i_fd = fd;
info.i_buf = buf;
info.i_len = nbytes;
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_APPLE)
return 0;
if (cdf_read_header(&info, &h) == -1)
return 0;
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_header(&h);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_sat(&info, &h, &sat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SAT";
goto out0;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SAT", &sat, CDF_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_ssat(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read SSAT";
goto out1;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SSAT", &ssat, CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &dir)) == -1) {
expn = "Can't read directory";
goto out2;
}
const cdf_directory_t *root_storage;
if ((i = cdf_read_short_stream(&info, &h, &sat, &dir, &sst,
&root_storage)) == -1) {
expn = "Cannot read short stream";
goto out3;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir);
#endif
#ifdef notdef
if (root_storage) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
char clsbuf[128];
if (file_printf(ms, "CLSID %s, ",
format_clsid(clsbuf, sizeof(clsbuf),
root_storage->d_storage_uuid)) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
#endif
if ((i = cdf_read_summary_info(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir,
&scn)) == -1) {
if (errno == ESRCH) {
corrupt = expn;
expn = "No summary info";
} else {
expn = "Cannot read summary info";
}
goto out4;
}
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_summary_info(&h, &scn);
#endif
if ((i = cdf_file_summary_info(ms, &h, &scn,
root_storage->d_storage_uuid)) < 0)
expn = "Can't expand summary_info";
if (i == 0) {
const char *str = NULL;
cdf_directory_t *d;
char name[__arraycount(d->d_name)];
size_t j, k;
for (j = 0; str == NULL && j < dir.dir_len; j++) {
d = &dir.dir_tab[j];
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(name); k++)
name[k] = (char)cdf_tole2(d->d_name[k]);
str = cdf_app_to_mime(name,
NOTMIME(ms) ? name2desc : name2mime);
}
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (str != NULL) {
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
} else {
if (str == NULL)
str = "vnd.ms-office";
if (file_printf(ms, "application/%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
i = 1;
}
}
free(scn.sst_tab);
out4:
free(sst.sst_tab);
out3:
free(dir.dir_tab);
out2:
free(ssat.sat_tab);
out1:
free(sat.sat_tab);
out0:
if (i == -1) {
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (file_printf(ms,
"Composite Document File V2 Document") == -1)
return -1;
if (*expn)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s%s", corrupt, expn) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, "application/CDFV2-corrupt") == -1)
return -1;
}
i = 1;
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdf_read_short_sector function in cdf.c in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions) | Medium | 166,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
image->height = height;
image->delay = 0;
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: libXcursor before 1.1.15 has various integer overflows that could lead to heap buffer overflows when processing malicious cursors, e.g., with programs like GIMP. It is also possible that an attack vector exists against the related code in cursor/xcursor.c in Wayland through 1.14.0.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int csnmp_read_table(host_definition_t *host, data_definition_t *data) {
struct snmp_pdu *req;
struct snmp_pdu *res = NULL;
struct variable_list *vb;
const data_set_t *ds;
size_t oid_list_len = data->values_len + 1;
/* Holds the last OID returned by the device. We use this in the GETNEXT
* request to proceed. */
oid_t oid_list[oid_list_len];
/* Set to false when an OID has left its subtree so we don't re-request it
* again. */
_Bool oid_list_todo[oid_list_len];
int status;
size_t i;
/* `value_list_head' and `value_list_tail' implement a linked list for each
* value. `instance_list_head' and `instance_list_tail' implement a linked
* list of
* instance names. This is used to jump gaps in the table. */
csnmp_list_instances_t *instance_list_head;
csnmp_list_instances_t *instance_list_tail;
csnmp_table_values_t **value_list_head;
csnmp_table_values_t **value_list_tail;
DEBUG("snmp plugin: csnmp_read_table (host = %s, data = %s)", host->name,
data->name);
if (host->sess_handle == NULL) {
DEBUG("snmp plugin: csnmp_read_table: host->sess_handle == NULL");
return (-1);
}
ds = plugin_get_ds(data->type);
if (!ds) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: DataSet `%s' not defined.", data->type);
return (-1);
}
if (ds->ds_num != data->values_len) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: DataSet `%s' requires %zu values, but config talks "
"about %zu",
data->type, ds->ds_num, data->values_len);
return (-1);
}
assert(data->values_len > 0);
/* We need a copy of all the OIDs, because GETNEXT will destroy them. */
memcpy(oid_list, data->values, data->values_len * sizeof(oid_t));
if (data->instance.oid.oid_len > 0)
memcpy(oid_list + data->values_len, &data->instance.oid, sizeof(oid_t));
else /* no InstanceFrom option specified. */
oid_list_len--;
for (i = 0; i < oid_list_len; i++)
oid_list_todo[i] = 1;
/* We're going to construct n linked lists, one for each "value".
* value_list_head will contain pointers to the heads of these linked lists,
* value_list_tail will contain pointers to the tail of the lists. */
value_list_head = calloc(data->values_len, sizeof(*value_list_head));
value_list_tail = calloc(data->values_len, sizeof(*value_list_tail));
if ((value_list_head == NULL) || (value_list_tail == NULL)) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: csnmp_read_table: calloc failed.");
sfree(value_list_head);
sfree(value_list_tail);
return (-1);
}
instance_list_head = NULL;
instance_list_tail = NULL;
status = 0;
while (status == 0) {
int oid_list_todo_num;
req = snmp_pdu_create(SNMP_MSG_GETNEXT);
if (req == NULL) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: snmp_pdu_create failed.");
status = -1;
break;
}
oid_list_todo_num = 0;
for (i = 0; i < oid_list_len; i++) {
/* Do not rerequest already finished OIDs */
if (!oid_list_todo[i])
continue;
oid_list_todo_num++;
snmp_add_null_var(req, oid_list[i].oid, oid_list[i].oid_len);
}
if (oid_list_todo_num == 0) {
/* The request is still empty - so we are finished */
DEBUG("snmp plugin: all variables have left their subtree");
status = 0;
break;
}
res = NULL;
status = snmp_sess_synch_response(host->sess_handle, req, &res);
if ((status != STAT_SUCCESS) || (res == NULL)) {
char *errstr = NULL;
snmp_sess_error(host->sess_handle, NULL, NULL, &errstr);
c_complain(LOG_ERR, &host->complaint,
"snmp plugin: host %s: snmp_sess_synch_response failed: %s",
host->name, (errstr == NULL) ? "Unknown problem" : errstr);
if (res != NULL)
snmp_free_pdu(res);
res = NULL;
/* snmp_synch_response already freed our PDU */
req = NULL;
sfree(errstr);
csnmp_host_close_session(host);
status = -1;
break;
}
status = 0;
assert(res != NULL);
c_release(LOG_INFO, &host->complaint,
"snmp plugin: host %s: snmp_sess_synch_response successful.",
host->name);
vb = res->variables;
if (vb == NULL) {
status = -1;
break;
}
for (vb = res->variables, i = 0; (vb != NULL);
vb = vb->next_variable, i++) {
/* Calculate value index from todo list */
while ((i < oid_list_len) && !oid_list_todo[i])
i++;
/* An instance is configured and the res variable we process is the
* instance value (last index) */
if ((data->instance.oid.oid_len > 0) && (i == data->values_len)) {
if ((vb->type == SNMP_ENDOFMIBVIEW) ||
(snmp_oid_ncompare(
data->instance.oid.oid, data->instance.oid.oid_len, vb->name,
vb->name_length, data->instance.oid.oid_len) != 0)) {
DEBUG("snmp plugin: host = %s; data = %s; Instance left its subtree.",
host->name, data->name);
oid_list_todo[i] = 0;
continue;
}
/* Allocate a new `csnmp_list_instances_t', insert the instance name and
* add it to the list */
if (csnmp_instance_list_add(&instance_list_head, &instance_list_tail,
res, host, data) != 0) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: host %s: csnmp_instance_list_add failed.",
host->name);
status = -1;
break;
}
} else /* The variable we are processing is a normal value */
{
csnmp_table_values_t *vt;
oid_t vb_name;
oid_t suffix;
int ret;
csnmp_oid_init(&vb_name, vb->name, vb->name_length);
/* Calculate the current suffix. This is later used to check that the
* suffix is increasing. This also checks if we left the subtree */
ret = csnmp_oid_suffix(&suffix, &vb_name, data->values + i);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG("snmp plugin: host = %s; data = %s; i = %zu; "
"Value probably left its subtree.",
host->name, data->name, i);
oid_list_todo[i] = 0;
continue;
}
/* Make sure the OIDs returned by the agent are increasing. Otherwise
* our
* table matching algorithm will get confused. */
if ((value_list_tail[i] != NULL) &&
(csnmp_oid_compare(&suffix, &value_list_tail[i]->suffix) <= 0)) {
DEBUG("snmp plugin: host = %s; data = %s; i = %zu; "
"Suffix is not increasing.",
host->name, data->name, i);
oid_list_todo[i] = 0;
continue;
}
vt = calloc(1, sizeof(*vt));
if (vt == NULL) {
ERROR("snmp plugin: calloc failed.");
status = -1;
break;
}
vt->value =
csnmp_value_list_to_value(vb, ds->ds[i].type, data->scale,
data->shift, host->name, data->name);
memcpy(&vt->suffix, &suffix, sizeof(vt->suffix));
vt->next = NULL;
if (value_list_tail[i] == NULL)
value_list_head[i] = vt;
else
value_list_tail[i]->next = vt;
value_list_tail[i] = vt;
}
/* Copy OID to oid_list[i] */
memcpy(oid_list[i].oid, vb->name, sizeof(oid) * vb->name_length);
oid_list[i].oid_len = vb->name_length;
} /* for (vb = res->variables ...) */
if (res != NULL)
snmp_free_pdu(res);
res = NULL;
} /* while (status == 0) */
if (res != NULL)
snmp_free_pdu(res);
res = NULL;
if (req != NULL)
snmp_free_pdu(req);
req = NULL;
if (status == 0)
csnmp_dispatch_table(host, data, instance_list_head, value_list_head);
/* Free all allocated variables here */
while (instance_list_head != NULL) {
csnmp_list_instances_t *next = instance_list_head->next;
sfree(instance_list_head);
instance_list_head = next;
}
for (i = 0; i < data->values_len; i++) {
while (value_list_head[i] != NULL) {
csnmp_table_values_t *next = value_list_head[i]->next;
sfree(value_list_head[i]);
value_list_head[i] = next;
}
}
sfree(value_list_head);
sfree(value_list_tail);
return (0);
} /* int csnmp_read_table */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The csnmp_read_table function in snmp.c in the SNMP plugin in collectd before 5.6.3 is susceptible to a double free in a certain error case, which could lead to a crash (or potentially have other impact).
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <[email protected]> | High | 167,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void re_yyensure_buffer_stack (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
yy_size_t num_to_alloc;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (!yyg->yy_buffer_stack) {
/* First allocation is just for 2 elements, since we don't know if this
* scanner will even need a stack. We use 2 instead of 1 to avoid an
* immediate realloc on the next call.
*/
num_to_alloc = 1; // After all that talk, this was set to 1 anyways...
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyalloc
(num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack, 0, num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top = 0;
return;
}
if (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_top >= (yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max) - 1){
/* Increase the buffer to prepare for a possible push. */
yy_size_t grow_size = 8 /* arbitrary grow size */;
num_to_alloc = yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max + grow_size;
yyg->yy_buffer_stack = (struct yy_buffer_state**)re_yyrealloc
(yyg->yy_buffer_stack,
num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)
, yyscanner);
if ( ! yyg->yy_buffer_stack )
YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in re_yyensure_buffer_stack()" );
/* zero only the new slots.*/
memset(yyg->yy_buffer_stack + yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max, 0, grow_size * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*));
yyg->yy_buffer_stack_max = num_to_alloc;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | Medium | 168,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with USB xHCI controller emulator support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (infinite recursive call) via vectors involving control transfer descriptors sequencing.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ext4_io_end_t *ext4_init_io_end (struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = NULL;
io = kmalloc(sizeof(*io), GFP_NOFS);
if (io) {
igrab(inode);
io->inode = inode;
io->flag = 0;
io->offset = 0;
io->size = 0;
io->error = 0;
INIT_WORK(&io->work, ext4_end_io_work);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&io->list);
}
return io;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_illinois_info(struct sock *sk, u32 ext,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) {
struct tcpvegas_info info = {
.tcpv_enabled = 1,
.tcpv_rttcnt = ca->cnt_rtt,
.tcpv_minrtt = ca->base_rtt,
};
u64 t = ca->sum_rtt;
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
info.tcpv_rtt = t;
nla_put(skb, INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The tcp_illinois_info function in net/ipv4/tcp_illinois.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.19, when the net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control illinois setting is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and OOPS) by reading TCP stats.
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LoadURL() {
WebContents* contents = shell()->web_contents();
WebPreferences prefs =
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWebkitPreferences();
prefs.mock_scrollbars_enabled = true;
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->UpdateWebkitPreferences(prefs);
const GURL data_url(kDataURL);
NavigateToURL(shell(), data_url);
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = GetWidgetHost();
HitTestRegionObserver observer(host->GetFrameSinkId());
observer.WaitForHitTestData();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-281
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to local scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page, related to the unsafe-inline keyword.
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150} | Medium | 172,427 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CancelPendingTask() {
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Ming (aka libming) 0.4.8 has an *fill overflow* vulnerability in the function SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle in blocks/shape.c.
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow | Medium | 169,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct o2nm_cluster *to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(struct o2nm_node *node)
{
/* through the first node_set .parent
* mycluster/nodes/mynode == o2nm_cluster->o2nm_node_group->o2nm_node */
return to_o2nm_cluster(node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c in the Linux kernel before 4.15, local users can cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and BUG) because a required mutex is not used.
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The FrameLoader::startLoad function in WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79, does not prevent frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241} | Medium | 172,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int use_env()
{
int indent;
size_t flags = 0;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
#ifdef _WIN32
/* On Windows, set stdout and stderr to binary mode to avoid
outputting DOS line terminators */
_setmode(_fileno(stdout), _O_BINARY);
_setmode(_fileno(stderr), _O_BINARY);
#endif
indent = getenv_int("JSON_INDENT");
if(indent < 0 || indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", indent);
return 2;
}
if(indent > 0)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(indent);
if(getenv_int("JSON_COMPACT") > 0)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if(getenv_int("JSON_ENSURE_ASCII"))
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if(getenv_int("JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER"))
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if(getenv_int("JSON_SORT_KEYS"))
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if(getenv_int("STRIP")) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
size_t size = 0, used = 0;
char *buffer = NULL;
while(1) {
size_t count;
size = (size == 0 ? 128 : size * 2);
buffer = realloc(buffer, size);
if(!buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate %d bytes\n", (int)size);
return 1;
}
count = fread(buffer + used, 1, size - used, stdin);
if(count < size - used) {
buffer[used + count] = '\0';
break;
}
used += count;
}
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(stdin, 0, &error);
if(!json) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column,
error.position, error.text);
return 1;
}
json_dumpf(json, stdout, flags);
json_decref(json);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 166,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void print_maps(struct pid_info_t* info)
{
FILE *maps;
size_t offset;
char device[10];
long int inode;
char file[PATH_MAX];
strlcat(info->path, "maps", sizeof(info->path));
maps = fopen(info->path, "r");
if (!maps)
goto out;
while (fscanf(maps, "%*x-%*x %*s %zx %s %ld %s\n", &offset, device, &inode,
file) == 4) {
if (inode == 0 || !strcmp(device, "00:00"))
continue;
printf("%-9s %5d %10s %4s %9s %18s %9zd %10ld %s\n",
info->cmdline, info->pid, info->user, "mem",
"???", device, offset, inode, file);
}
fclose(maps);
out:
info->path[info->parent_length] = '\0';
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The print_maps function in toolbox/lsof.c in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows user-assisted attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that attempts to list a long name of a memory-mapped file, aka internal bug 28175237. NOTE: print_maps is not related to the Vic Abell lsof product.
Commit Message: Fix scanf %s in lsof.
Bug: http://b/28175237
Change-Id: Ief0ba299b09693ad9afc0e3d17a8f664c2fbb8c2
| Medium | 173,560 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FaviconWebUIHandler::HandleGetFaviconDominantColor(const ListValue* args) {
std::string path;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &path));
DCHECK(StartsWithASCII(path, "chrome://favicon/", false)) << "path is "
<< path;
path = path.substr(arraysize("chrome://favicon/") - 1);
double id;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &id));
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!favicon_service || path.empty())
return;
FaviconService::Handle handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
history::FAVICON,
&consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, static_cast<int>(id));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 172,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_error_quark (void)
{
static GQuark quark = 0;
if (!quark)
quark = g_quark_from_static_string ("my_object_error");
return quark;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
{
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
*pctx = NULL;
ctx = k5alloc(sizeof(*ctx), &code);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ctx->defcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
ctx->magic = KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT;
ctx->state = IAKERB_AS_REQ;
ctx->count = 0;
code = krb5_gss_init_context(&ctx->k5c);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
*pctx = ctx;
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted IAKERB packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
if (npages && !old.npages) {
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(&new, npages))
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
if (!npages) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map/unmap the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
} else
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, &old);
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
/*
* If the new memory slot is created, we need to clear all
* mmio sptes.
*/
if (npages && old.base_gfn != mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT)
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the __kvm_set_memory_region function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging certain device access to trigger movement of memory slots.
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
if (umin_val) {
/* Sign bit will be cleared */
dst_reg->smin_value = 0;
} else {
/* Lost sign bit information */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
}
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value =
(u64)(dst_reg->smin_value) >> umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect BPF_RSH signed bounds calculations.
Commit Message: bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH
Incorrect signed bounds were being computed.
If the old upper signed bound was positive and the old lower signed bound was
negative, this could cause the new upper signed bound to be too low,
leading to security issues.
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: changed description to reflect bug impact]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static authz_status lua_authz_check(request_rec *r, const char *require_line,
const void *parsed_require_line)
{
apr_pool_t *pool;
ap_lua_vm_spec *spec;
lua_State *L;
ap_lua_server_cfg *server_cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&lua_module);
const ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
&lua_module);
const lua_authz_provider_spec *prov_spec = parsed_require_line;
int result;
int nargs = 0;
spec = create_vm_spec(&pool, r, cfg, server_cfg, prov_spec->file_name,
NULL, 0, prov_spec->function_name, "authz provider");
L = ap_lua_get_lua_state(pool, spec, r);
if (L == NULL) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02314)
"Unable to compile VM for authz provider %s", prov_spec->name);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
lua_getglobal(L, prov_spec->function_name);
if (!lua_isfunction(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(02319)
"Unable to find entry function '%s' in %s (not a valid function)",
prov_spec->function_name, prov_spec->file_name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
ap_lua_run_lua_request(L, r);
if (prov_spec->args) {
int i;
if (!lua_checkstack(L, prov_spec->args->nelts)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02315)
"Error: authz provider %s: too many arguments", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
for (i = 0; i < prov_spec->args->nelts; i++) {
const char *arg = APR_ARRAY_IDX(prov_spec->args, i, const char *);
lua_pushstring(L, arg);
}
nargs = prov_spec->args->nelts;
}
if (lua_pcall(L, 1 + nargs, 1, 0)) {
const char *err = lua_tostring(L, -1);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02316)
"Error executing authz provider %s: %s", prov_spec->name, err);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02317)
"Error: authz provider %s did not return integer", prov_spec->name);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
result = lua_tointeger(L, -1);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
switch (result) {
case AUTHZ_DENIED:
case AUTHZ_GRANTED:
case AUTHZ_NEUTRAL:
case AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR:
case AUTHZ_DENIED_NO_USER:
return result;
default:
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02318)
"Error: authz provider %s: invalid return value %d",
prov_spec->name, result);
}
return AUTHZ_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: mod_lua.c in the mod_lua module in the Apache HTTP Server 2.3.x and 2.4.x through 2.4.10 does not support an httpd configuration in which the same Lua authorization provider is used with different arguments within different contexts, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging multiple Require directives, as demonstrated by a configuration that specifies authorization for one group to access a certain directory, and authorization for a second group to access a second directory.
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline signed int ReadPropertySignedLong(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/property.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.2-1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information via vectors involving the q variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed) | Medium | 169,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Segment::Load() {
assert(m_clusters == NULL);
assert(m_clusterSize == 0);
assert(m_clusterCount == 0);
const long long header_status = ParseHeaders();
if (header_status < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(header_status);
if (header_status > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_pInfo);
assert(m_pTracks);
for (;;) {
const int status = LoadCluster();
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (status >= 1) // no more clusters
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FromMojom(media::mojom::VideoCaptureError input,
media::VideoCaptureError* output) {
switch (input) {
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kNone:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kNone;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush;
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Windows mishandled downloaded files, which allowed a remote attacker to prevent the downloaded file from receiving the Mark of the Web via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538} | Medium | 172,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
int error = 0;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
/* create new threads */
while (nrservs > 0) {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp)) {
error = PTR_ERR(rqstp);
break;
}
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
error = PTR_ERR(task);
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
break;
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
}
/* destroy old threads */
while (nrservs < 0 &&
(task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state)) != NULL) {
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: decoder/ih264d_parse_pslice.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not properly select concealment frames, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28470138.
Commit Message: Decoder: Set u1_long_term_reference_flag to 0 for error concealment
For MBs which are in error, set u1_long_term_reference_flag to zero.
This ensures latest frame is used for concealment
Bug: 28470138
Change-Id: I58eab5bc1da277823f3dbb4103ba50867f8935dc
| High | 173,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PaymentRequest::SatisfiesSkipUIConstraints() const {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebPaymentsSingleAppUiSkip) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(::features::kServiceWorkerPaymentApps) &&
is_show_user_gesture_ && state()->is_get_all_instruments_finished() &&
state()->available_instruments().size() == 1 &&
spec()->stringified_method_data().size() == 1 &&
!spec()->request_shipping() && !spec()->request_payer_name() &&
!spec()->request_payer_phone() &&
!spec()->request_payer_email()
&& spec()->url_payment_method_identifiers().size() == 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822} | Medium | 173,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
memset(srose, 0, msg->msg_namelen);
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags,
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnReusePreviewData(int preview_request_id) {
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("reloadPreviewPages", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616} | Medium | 171,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
struct sk_buff *list_skb = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_t *frag = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frags;
unsigned int mss = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->gso_size;
unsigned int doffset = head_skb->data - skb_mac_header(head_skb);
unsigned int offset = doffset;
unsigned int tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(head_skb);
unsigned int headroom;
unsigned int len;
__be16 proto;
bool csum;
int sg = !!(features & NETIF_F_SG);
int nfrags = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->nr_frags;
int err = -ENOMEM;
int i = 0;
int pos;
proto = skb_network_protocol(head_skb);
if (unlikely(!proto))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
csum = !!can_checksum_protocol(features, proto);
__skb_push(head_skb, doffset);
headroom = skb_headroom(head_skb);
pos = skb_headlen(head_skb);
do {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
skb_frag_t *nskb_frag;
int hsize;
int size;
len = head_skb->len - offset;
if (len > mss)
len = mss;
hsize = skb_headlen(head_skb) - offset;
if (hsize < 0)
hsize = 0;
if (hsize > len || !sg)
hsize = len;
if (!hsize && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
(skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len);
i = 0;
nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
pos += skb_headlen(list_skb);
while (pos < offset + len) {
BUG_ON(i >= nfrags);
size = skb_frag_size(frag);
if (pos + size > offset + len)
break;
i++;
pos += size;
frag++;
}
nskb = skb_clone(list_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
list_skb = list_skb->next;
if (unlikely(!nskb))
goto err;
if (unlikely(pskb_trim(nskb, len))) {
kfree_skb(nskb);
goto err;
}
hsize = skb_end_offset(nskb);
if (skb_cow_head(nskb, doffset + headroom)) {
kfree_skb(nskb);
goto err;
}
nskb->truesize += skb_end_offset(nskb) - hsize;
skb_release_head_state(nskb);
__skb_push(nskb, doffset);
} else {
nskb = __alloc_skb(hsize + doffset + headroom,
GFP_ATOMIC, skb_alloc_rx_flag(head_skb),
NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (unlikely(!nskb))
goto err;
skb_reserve(nskb, headroom);
__skb_put(nskb, doffset);
}
if (segs)
tail->next = nskb;
else
segs = nskb;
tail = nskb;
__copy_skb_header(nskb, head_skb);
nskb->mac_len = head_skb->mac_len;
skb_headers_offset_update(nskb, skb_headroom(nskb) - headroom);
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(head_skb, -tnl_hlen,
nskb->data - tnl_hlen,
doffset + tnl_hlen);
if (nskb->len == len + doffset)
goto perform_csum_check;
if (!sg) {
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
nskb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(head_skb, offset,
skb_put(nskb, len),
len, 0);
continue;
}
nskb_frag = skb_shinfo(nskb)->frags;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(head_skb, offset,
skb_put(nskb, hsize), hsize);
skb_shinfo(nskb)->tx_flags = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->tx_flags &
SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG;
while (pos < offset + len) {
if (i >= nfrags) {
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb));
i = 0;
nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
BUG_ON(!nfrags);
list_skb = list_skb->next;
}
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags >=
MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
net_warn_ratelimited(
"skb_segment: too many frags: %u %u\n",
pos, mss);
goto err;
}
*nskb_frag = *frag;
__skb_frag_ref(nskb_frag);
size = skb_frag_size(nskb_frag);
if (pos < offset) {
nskb_frag->page_offset += offset - pos;
skb_frag_size_sub(nskb_frag, offset - pos);
}
skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags++;
if (pos + size <= offset + len) {
i++;
frag++;
pos += size;
} else {
skb_frag_size_sub(nskb_frag, pos + size - (offset + len));
goto skip_fraglist;
}
nskb_frag++;
}
skip_fraglist:
nskb->data_len = len - hsize;
nskb->len += nskb->data_len;
nskb->truesize += nskb->data_len;
perform_csum_check:
if (!csum) {
nskb->csum = skb_checksum(nskb, doffset,
nskb->len - doffset, 0);
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
} while ((offset += len) < head_skb->len);
return segs;
err:
kfree_skb_list(segs);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the skb_segment function in net/core/skbuff.c in the Linux kernel through 3.13.6 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the absence of a certain orphaning operation.
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_len, unsigned long *p)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr)
goto Efault;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
goto Einval;
/* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
goto Efault;
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_PFNMAP)) {
if (new_len > old_len)
goto Efault;
}
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
locked += new_len - old_len;
if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
goto Eagain;
}
if (!may_expand_vm(mm, (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
goto Enomem;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
goto Efault;
*p = charged;
}
return vma;
Efault: /* very odd choice for most of the cases, but... */
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
Einval:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Enomem:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
Eagain:
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the vma_to_resize function in mm/mremap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) via a crafted mremap system call that expands a memory mapping.
Commit Message: mm: avoid wrapping vm_pgoff in mremap()
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WarmupURLFetcher::WarmupURLFetcher(
CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
WarmupURLFetcherCallback callback,
GetHttpRttCallback get_http_rtt_callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
const std::string& user_agent)
: is_fetch_in_flight_(false),
previous_attempt_counts_(0),
create_custom_proxy_config_callback_(create_custom_proxy_config_callback),
callback_(callback),
get_http_rtt_callback_(get_http_rtt_callback),
user_agent_(user_agent),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner) {
DCHECK(create_custom_proxy_config_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649} | Medium | 172,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopStreamDevice(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
const std::string& device_id,
int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "StopStreamDevice({render_frame_id = " << render_frame_id << "} "
<< ", {device_id = " << device_id << "}, session_id = " << session_id
<< "})";
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
err = dev_get_valid_name(net, dev, name);
if (err)
goto err_free_dev;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In the tun subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.14, dev_get_valid_name is not called before register_netdevice. This allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via an ioctl(TUNSETIFF) call with a dev name containing a / character. This is similar to CVE-2013-4343.
Commit Message: tun: allow positive return values on dev_get_valid_name() call
If the name argument of dev_get_valid_name() contains "%d", it will try
to assign it a unit number in __dev__alloc_name() and return either the
unit number (>= 0) or an error code (< 0).
Considering positive values as error values prevent tun device creations
relying this mechanism, therefor we should only consider negative values
as errors here.
Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
while (current_path != last_path) {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.95 does not properly handle file paths, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
datalen,
datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 167,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int handle_eac3(MOVMuxContext *mov, AVPacket *pkt, MOVTrack *track)
{
AC3HeaderInfo *hdr = NULL;
struct eac3_info *info;
int num_blocks, ret;
if (!track->eac3_priv && !(track->eac3_priv = av_mallocz(sizeof(*info))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
info = track->eac3_priv;
if (avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data, pkt->size) < 0) {
/* drop the packets until we see a good one */
if (!track->entry) {
av_log(mov, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Dropping invalid packet from start of the stream\n");
ret = 0;
} else
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
info->data_rate = FFMAX(info->data_rate, hdr->bit_rate / 1000);
num_blocks = hdr->num_blocks;
if (!info->ec3_done) {
/* AC-3 substream must be the first one */
if (hdr->bitstream_id <= 10 && hdr->substreamid != 0) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
/* this should always be the case, given that our AC-3 parser
* concatenates dependent frames to their independent parent */
if (hdr->frame_type == EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT) {
/* substream ids must be incremental */
if (hdr->substreamid > info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
if (hdr->substreamid == info->num_ind_sub + 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(track->par, "Multiple independent substreams");
ret = AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
goto end;
} else if (hdr->substreamid < info->num_ind_sub ||
hdr->substreamid == 0 && info->substream[0].bsid) {
info->ec3_done = 1;
goto concatenate;
}
}
/* fill the info needed for the "dec3" atom */
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].fscod = hdr->sr_code;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsid = hdr->bitstream_id;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].bsmod = hdr->bitstream_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].acmod = hdr->channel_mode;
info->substream[hdr->substreamid].lfeon = hdr->lfe_on;
/* Parse dependent substream(s), if any */
if (pkt->size != hdr->frame_size) {
int cumul_size = hdr->frame_size;
int parent = hdr->substreamid;
while (cumul_size != pkt->size) {
GetBitContext gbc;
int i;
ret = avpriv_ac3_parse_header(&hdr, pkt->data + cumul_size, pkt->size - cumul_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto end;
if (hdr->frame_type != EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_DEPENDENT) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto end;
}
info->substream[parent].num_dep_sub++;
ret /= 8;
/* header is parsed up to lfeon, but custom channel map may be needed */
init_get_bits8(&gbc, pkt->data + cumul_size + ret, pkt->size - cumul_size - ret);
/* skip bsid */
skip_bits(&gbc, 5);
/* skip volume control params */
for (i = 0; i < (hdr->channel_mode ? 1 : 2); i++) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 5); // skip dialog normalization
if (get_bits1(&gbc)) {
skip_bits(&gbc, 8); // skip compression gain word
}
}
/* get the dependent stream channel map, if exists */
if (get_bits1(&gbc))
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= (get_bits(&gbc, 16) >> 5) & 0x1f;
else
info->substream[parent].chan_loc |= hdr->channel_mode;
cumul_size += hdr->frame_size;
}
}
}
concatenate:
if (!info->num_blocks && num_blocks == 6) {
ret = pkt->size;
goto end;
}
else if (info->num_blocks + num_blocks > 6) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (!info->num_blocks) {
ret = av_packet_ref(&info->pkt, pkt);
if (!ret)
info->num_blocks = num_blocks;
goto end;
} else {
if ((ret = av_grow_packet(&info->pkt, pkt->size)) < 0)
goto end;
memcpy(info->pkt.data + info->pkt.size - pkt->size, pkt->data, pkt->size);
info->num_blocks += num_blocks;
info->pkt.duration += pkt->duration;
if ((ret = av_copy_packet_side_data(&info->pkt, pkt)) < 0)
goto end;
if (info->num_blocks != 6)
goto end;
av_packet_unref(pkt);
av_packet_move_ref(pkt, &info->pkt);
info->num_blocks = 0;
}
ret = pkt->size;
end:
av_free(hdr);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-129
Summary: In FFmpeg 4.0.1, improper handling of frame types (other than EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT) that have multiple independent substreams in the handle_eac3 function in libavformat/movenc.c may trigger an out-of-array access while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Check that frame_types other than EAC3_FRAME_TYPE_INDEPENDENT have a supported substream id
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: ffmpeg_bof_1.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t generic_perform_write(struct file *file,
struct iov_iter *i, loff_t pos)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
const struct address_space_operations *a_ops = mapping->a_ops;
long status = 0;
ssize_t written = 0;
unsigned int flags = 0;
/*
* Copies from kernel address space cannot fail (NFSD is a big user).
*/
if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
flags |= AOP_FLAG_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
do {
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index; /* Pagecache index for current page */
unsigned long offset; /* Offset into pagecache page */
unsigned long bytes; /* Bytes to write to page */
size_t copied; /* Bytes copied from user */
void *fsdata;
offset = (pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1));
index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(i));
again:
/*
* Bring in the user page that we will copy from _first_.
* Otherwise there's a nasty deadlock on copying from the
* same page as we're writing to, without it being marked
* up-to-date.
*
* Not only is this an optimisation, but it is also required
* to check that the address is actually valid, when atomic
* usercopies are used, below.
*/
if (unlikely(iov_iter_fault_in_readable(i, bytes))) {
status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
status = a_ops->write_begin(file, mapping, pos, bytes, flags,
&page, &fsdata);
if (unlikely(status))
break;
pagefault_disable();
copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, i, offset, bytes);
pagefault_enable();
flush_dcache_page(page);
status = a_ops->write_end(file, mapping, pos, bytes, copied,
page, fsdata);
if (unlikely(status < 0))
break;
copied = status;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(copied == 0)) {
/*
* If we were unable to copy any data at all, we must
* fall back to a single segment length write.
*
* If we didn't fallback here, we could livelock
* because not all segments in the iov can be copied at
* once without a pagefault.
*/
bytes = min_t(unsigned long, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_single_seg_count(i));
goto again;
}
iov_iter_advance(i, copied);
pos += copied;
written += copied;
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(mapping);
} while (iov_iter_count(i));
return written ? written : status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/filemap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.25 allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a writev system call that triggers an iovec of zero length, followed by a page fault for an iovec of nonzero length.
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 167,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sas_eh_handle_sas_errors(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct list_head *work_q)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, *n;
enum task_disposition res = TASK_IS_DONE;
int tmf_resp, need_reset;
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(shost->transportt);
unsigned long flags;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(shost);
LIST_HEAD(done);
/* clean out any commands that won the completion vs eh race */
list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, work_q, eh_entry) {
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct sas_task *task;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->done_lock, flags);
/* by this point the lldd has either observed
* SAS_HA_FROZEN and is leaving the task alone, or has
* won the race with eh and decided to complete it
*/
task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (!task)
list_move_tail(&cmd->eh_entry, &done);
}
Again:
list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, work_q, eh_entry) {
struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);
list_del_init(&cmd->eh_entry);
spin_lock_irqsave(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
need_reset = task->task_state_flags & SAS_TASK_NEED_DEV_RESET;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task->task_state_lock, flags);
if (need_reset) {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p requests reset\n",
__func__, task);
goto reset;
}
SAS_DPRINTK("trying to find task 0x%p\n", task);
res = sas_scsi_find_task(task);
switch (res) {
case TASK_IS_DONE:
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is done\n", __func__,
task);
sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd);
continue;
case TASK_IS_ABORTED:
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is aborted\n",
__func__, task);
sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd);
continue;
case TASK_IS_AT_LU:
SAS_DPRINTK("task 0x%p is at LU: lu recover\n", task);
reset:
tmf_resp = sas_recover_lu(task->dev, cmd);
if (tmf_resp == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE) {
SAS_DPRINTK("dev %016llx LU %llx is "
"recovered\n",
SAS_ADDR(task->dev),
cmd->device->lun);
sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd);
sas_scsi_clear_queue_lu(work_q, cmd);
goto Again;
}
/* fallthrough */
case TASK_IS_NOT_AT_LU:
case TASK_ABORT_FAILED:
SAS_DPRINTK("task 0x%p is not at LU: I_T recover\n",
task);
tmf_resp = sas_recover_I_T(task->dev);
if (tmf_resp == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE ||
tmf_resp == -ENODEV) {
struct domain_device *dev = task->dev;
SAS_DPRINTK("I_T %016llx recovered\n",
SAS_ADDR(task->dev->sas_addr));
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
sas_scsi_clear_queue_I_T(work_q, dev);
goto Again;
}
/* Hammer time :-) */
try_to_reset_cmd_device(cmd);
if (i->dft->lldd_clear_nexus_port) {
struct asd_sas_port *port = task->dev->port;
SAS_DPRINTK("clearing nexus for port:%d\n",
port->id);
res = i->dft->lldd_clear_nexus_port(port);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE) {
SAS_DPRINTK("clear nexus port:%d "
"succeeded\n", port->id);
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
sas_scsi_clear_queue_port(work_q,
port);
goto Again;
}
}
if (i->dft->lldd_clear_nexus_ha) {
SAS_DPRINTK("clear nexus ha\n");
res = i->dft->lldd_clear_nexus_ha(ha);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE) {
SAS_DPRINTK("clear nexus ha "
"succeeded\n");
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
goto clear_q;
}
}
/* If we are here -- this means that no amount
* of effort could recover from errors. Quite
* possibly the HA just disappeared.
*/
SAS_DPRINTK("error from device %llx, LUN %llx "
"couldn't be recovered in any way\n",
SAS_ADDR(task->dev->sas_addr),
cmd->device->lun);
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
goto clear_q;
}
}
out:
list_splice_tail(&done, work_q);
list_splice_tail_init(&ha->eh_ata_q, work_q);
return;
clear_q:
SAS_DPRINTK("--- Exit %s -- clear_q\n", __func__);
list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, work_q, eh_entry)
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (ata qc leak) by triggering certain failure conditions. NOTE: a third party disputes the relevance of this report because the failure can only occur for physically proximate attackers who unplug SAS Host Bus Adapter cables.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,262 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ParseNameValue(const char * buffer, int bufsize,
struct NameValueParserData * data)
{
struct xmlparser parser;
data->l_head = NULL;
data->portListing = NULL;
data->portListingLength = 0;
/* init xmlparser object */
parser.xmlstart = buffer;
parser.xmlsize = bufsize;
parser.data = data;
parser.starteltfunc = NameValueParserStartElt;
parser.endeltfunc = NameValueParserEndElt;
parser.datafunc = NameValueParserGetData;
parser.attfunc = 0;
parsexml(&parser);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Uninitialized stack variable vulnerability in NameValueParserEndElt (upnpreplyparse.c) in miniupnpd < 2.0 allows an attacker to cause Denial of Service (Segmentation fault and Memory Corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact
Commit Message: properly initialize data structure for SOAP parsing in ParseNameValue()
topelt field was not properly initialized.
should fix #268 | Medium | 169,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* increase the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_inc();
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {
/* Flush the virtual service */
ret = ip_vs_flush();
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) {
/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
ret = ip_vs_set_timeout((struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = start_sync_thread(dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn, dm->syncid);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = stop_sync_thread(dm->state);
goto out_unlock;
}
usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
udest_compat = (struct ip_vs_dest_user *)(usvc_compat + 1);
/* We only use the new structs internally, so copy userspace compat
* structs to extended internal versions */
ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(&usvc, usvc_compat);
ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(&udest, udest_compat);
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO) {
/* if no service address is set, zero counters in all */
if (!usvc.fwmark && !usvc.addr.ip && !usvc.port) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all();
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Check for valid protocol: TCP or UDP, even for fwmark!=0 */
if (usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
pr_err("set_ctl: invalid protocol: %d %pI4:%d %s\n",
usvc.protocol, &usvc.addr.ip,
ntohs(usvc.port), usvc.sched_name);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Lookup the exact service by <protocol, addr, port> or fwmark */
if (usvc.fwmark == 0)
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
else
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
if (cmd != IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD
&& (svc == NULL || svc->protocol != usvc.protocol)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD:
if (svc != NULL)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = ip_vs_add_service(&usvc, &svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDIT:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DEL:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
if (!ret)
goto out_unlock;
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADDDEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDITDEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (svc)
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
out_dec:
/* decrease the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_dec();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33, when CONFIG_IP_VS is used, allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for (1) a getsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_get_ctl function, or (2) a setsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_set_ctl function.
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented,
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
uint32 sync_point = 0;
if (compositor) {
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
sync_point = factory->InsertSyncPoint();
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
route_id, gpu_host_id, presented, sync_point);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ng_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
{
git_pkt_ng *pkt;
const char *ptr;
size_t alloclen;
pkt = git__malloc(sizeof(*pkt));
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->ref = NULL;
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_NG;
line += 3; /* skip "ng " */
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, ' ')))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, len, 1);
pkt->ref = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt->ref);
memcpy(pkt->ref, line, len);
pkt->ref[len] = '\0';
line = ptr + 1;
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, '\n')))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, len, 1);
pkt->msg = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt->msg);
memcpy(pkt->msg, line, len);
pkt->msg[len] = '\0';
*out = (git_pkt *)pkt;
return 0;
out_err:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "invalid packet line");
git__free(pkt->ref);
git__free(pkt);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In ng_pkt in transports/smart_pkt.c in libgit2 before 0.26.6 and 0.27.x before 0.27.4, a remote attacker can send a crafted smart-protocol *ng* packet that lacks a '0' byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read that leads to DoS.
Commit Message: smart_pkt: fix potential OOB-read when processing ng packet
OSS-fuzz has reported a potential out-of-bounds read when processing a
"ng" smart packet:
==1==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6310000249c0 at pc 0x000000493a92 bp 0x7ffddc882cd0 sp 0x7ffddc882480
READ of size 65529 at 0x6310000249c0 thread T0
SCARINESS: 26 (multi-byte-read-heap-buffer-overflow)
#0 0x493a91 in __interceptor_strchr.part.35 /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:673
#1 0x813960 in ng_pkt libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:320:14
#2 0x810f79 in git_pkt_parse_line libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:478:9
#3 0x82c3c9 in git_smart__store_refs libgit2/src/transports/smart_protocol.c:47:12
#4 0x6373a2 in git_smart__connect libgit2/src/transports/smart.c:251:15
#5 0x57688f in git_remote_connect libgit2/src/remote.c:708:15
#6 0x52e59b in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/download_refs_fuzzer.cc:145:9
#7 0x52ef3f in ExecuteFilesOnyByOne(int, char**) /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:301:5
#8 0x52f4ee in main /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:339:12
#9 0x7f6c910db82f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-Cl5G7W/glibc-2.23/csu/libc-start.c:291
#10 0x41d518 in _start
When parsing an "ng" packet, we keep track of both the current position
as well as the remaining length of the packet itself. But instead of
taking care not to exceed the length, we pass the current pointer's
position to `strchr`, which will search for a certain character until
hitting NUL. It is thus possible to create a crafted packet which
doesn't contain a NUL byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Fix the issue by instead using `memchr`, passing the remaining length as
restriction. Furthermore, verify that we actually have enough bytes left
to produce a match at all.
OSS-Fuzz-Issue: 9406 | Medium | 169,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p +
CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1)) - 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n", i,
inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p,
CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1)));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements; j++, i++) {
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: file before 5.11 and libmagic allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Composite Document File (CDF) file that triggers (1) an out-of-bounds read or (2) an invalid pointer dereference.
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again. | Medium | 165,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::Shutdown() {
base::flat_map<aura::Window*, WindowStateType> windows_in_splitview =
GetCarryOverWindowsInSplitView();
SplitViewController* split_view_controller =
Shell::Get()->split_view_controller();
if (split_view_controller->InSplitViewMode()) {
OverviewController* overview_controller =
Shell::Get()->overview_controller();
if (!overview_controller->InOverviewSession() ||
overview_controller->overview_session()->IsEmpty()) {
Shell::Get()->split_view_controller()->EndSplitView(
SplitViewController::EndReason::kExitTabletMode);
overview_controller->EndOverview();
}
}
for (aura::Window* window : added_windows_)
window->RemoveObserver(this);
added_windows_.clear();
Shell::Get()->RemoveShellObserver(this);
Shell::Get()->session_controller()->RemoveObserver(this);
Shell::Get()->overview_controller()->RemoveObserver(this);
display::Screen::GetScreen()->RemoveObserver(this);
RemoveWindowCreationObservers();
ScopedObserveWindowAnimation scoped_observe(GetTopWindow(), this,
/*exiting_tablet_mode=*/true);
ArrangeWindowsForClamshellMode(windows_in_splitview);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Incorrect handling of picture ID in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.96 for Mac, Windows, and Linux allowed a remote attacker to trigger a race condition via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306} | Medium | 172,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
u32 hash, id;
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(dst, hashrnd);
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(src, hash);
hash ^= net_hash_mix(net);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc)
{
chunk_t *ch;
ch = tor_malloc(alloc);
ch->next = NULL;
ch->datalen = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
ch->DBG_alloc = alloc;
#endif
ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc);
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc;
ch->data = &ch->mem[0];
return ch;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Tor before 0.2.8.9 and 0.2.9.x before 0.2.9.4-alpha had internal functions that were entitled to expect that buf_t data had NUL termination, but the implementation of or/buffers.c did not ensure that NUL termination was present, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (client, hidden service, relay, or authority crash) via crafted data.
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384). | Medium | 168,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void jsR_calllwfunction(js_State *J, int n, js_Function *F, js_Environment *scope)
{
js_Value v;
int i;
jsR_savescope(J, scope);
if (n > F->numparams) {
js_pop(J, F->numparams - n);
n = F->numparams;
}
for (i = n; i < F->varlen; ++i)
js_pushundefined(J);
jsR_run(J, F);
v = *stackidx(J, -1);
TOP = --BOT; /* clear stack */
js_pushvalue(J, v);
jsR_restorescope(J);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the js_stackoverflow function in jsrun.c in Artifex Software, Inc. MuJS allows attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging an error when dropping extra arguments to lightweight functions.
Commit Message: | High | 165,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
const struct name_path *p;
char *n, *m;
int nlen = strlen(name);
int len = nlen + 1;
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len)
len += p->elem_len + 1;
}
n = xmalloc(len);
m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
strcpy(m, name);
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len) {
m -= p->elem_len + 1;
memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
m[p->elem_len] = '/';
}
}
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: revision.c in git before 2.7.4 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES];
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
struct page *localpage = NULL;
int ret;
if (buflen < PAGE_SIZE) {
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
localpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
resp_buf = page_address(localpage);
if (localpage == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
args.acl_pages[0] = localpage;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
args.acl_len = PAGE_SIZE;
} else {
resp_buf = buf;
buf_to_pages(buf, buflen, args.acl_pages, &args.acl_pgbase);
}
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode), &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
if (res.acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, res.acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (res.acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
if (localpage)
memcpy(buf, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
}
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
if (localpage)
__free_page(localpage);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
int normalize)
{
xmlChar limit = 0;
const xmlChar *in = NULL, *start, *end, *last;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
GROW;
in = (xmlChar *) CUR_PTR;
if (*in != '"' && *in != '\'') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
/*
* try to handle in this routine the most common case where no
* allocation of a new string is required and where content is
* pure ASCII.
*/
limit = *in++;
end = ctxt->input->end;
start = in;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
if (normalize) {
/*
* Skip any leading spaces
*/
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) &&
((*in == 0x20) || (*in == 0x9) ||
(*in == 0xA) || (*in == 0xD))) {
in++;
start = in;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
}
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) && (*in >= 0x20) &&
(*in <= 0x7f) && (*in != '&') && (*in != '<')) {
if ((*in++ == 0x20) && (*in == 0x20)) break;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
}
last = in;
/*
* skip the trailing blanks
*/
while ((last[-1] == 0x20) && (last > start)) last--;
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) &&
((*in == 0x20) || (*in == 0x9) ||
(*in == 0xA) || (*in == 0xD))) {
in++;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
last = last + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
}
if (*in != limit) goto need_complex;
} else {
while ((in < end) && (*in != limit) && (*in >= 0x20) &&
(*in <= 0x7f) && (*in != '&') && (*in != '<')) {
in++;
if (in >= end) {
const xmlChar *oldbase = ctxt->input->base;
GROW;
if (oldbase != ctxt->input->base) {
long delta = ctxt->input->base - oldbase;
start = start + delta;
in = in + delta;
}
end = ctxt->input->end;
}
}
last = in;
if (*in != limit) goto need_complex;
}
in++;
if (len != NULL) {
*len = last - start;
ret = (xmlChar *) start;
} else {
if (alloc) *alloc = 1;
ret = xmlStrndup(start, last - start);
}
CUR_PTR = in;
if (alloc) *alloc = 0;
return ret;
need_complex:
if (alloc) *alloc = 1;
return xmlParseAttValueComplex(ctxt, len, normalize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static u32 apic_get_tmcct(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
ktime_t remaining;
s64 ns;
u32 tmcct;
ASSERT(apic != NULL);
/* if initial count is 0, current count should also be 0 */
if (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT) == 0)
return 0;
remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) < 0)
remaining = ktime_set(0, 0);
ns = mod_64(ktime_to_ns(remaining), apic->lapic_timer.period);
tmcct = div64_u64(ns,
(APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count));
return tmcct;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The apic_get_tmcct function in arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and host OS crash) via crafted modifications of the TMICT value.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)
Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash. If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be. If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.
This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_wake_reset(void){
char sig_recv = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_reset");
recv(signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL);
return(int)sig_recv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> | High | 169,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(
const TransportDIB::Handle& handle_in,
TransportDIB::Handle* handle_out) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if ((handle_out->fd = HANDLE_EINTR(dup(handle_in.fd))) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "dup()";
return;
}
handle_out->auto_close = true;
#else
*handle_out = handle_in;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_bslice(dec_struct_t * ps_dec, UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD8 u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp, ui_temp1;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
WORD8 *pi1_buf;
WORD16 *pi2_mv = ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.i2_mv;
WORD32 *pi4_mv = (WORD32*)pi2_mv;
WORD16 *pi16_refFrame;
pi1_buf = ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.i1_ref_frame;
pi16_refFrame = (WORD16*)pi1_buf;
*pi4_mv = 0;
*(pi4_mv + 1) = 0;
*pi16_refFrame = OUT_OF_RANGE_REF;
ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.u1_col_ref_pic_idx = (UWORD8)-1;
ps_dec->s_default_mv_pred.u1_pic_type = (UWORD8)-1;
}
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_override_flag",
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag);
u4_temp = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
ui_temp1 = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
if(ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag)
{
u4_temp = 1 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1",
u4_temp - 1);
ui_temp1 = 1 + ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1",
ui_temp1 - 1);
}
{
UWORD8 u1_max_ref_idx = MAX_FRAMES;
if(ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
u1_max_ref_idx = MAX_FRAMES << 1;
}
if((u4_temp > u1_max_ref_idx) || (ui_temp1 > u1_max_ref_idx))
{
return ERROR_NUM_REF;
}
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0] = u4_temp;
ps_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1] = ui_temp1;
}
/* Initialize the Reference list once in Picture if the slice type */
/* of first slice is between 5 to 9 defined in table 7.3 of standard */
/* If picture contains both P & B slices then Initialize the Reference*/
/* List only when it switches from P to B and B to P */
{
UWORD8 init_idx_flg = (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type
!= ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type);
if(ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic
|| (init_idx_flg & !ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9)
|| ps_dec->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active_prev
!= ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0])
ih264d_init_ref_idx_lx_b(ps_dec);
if(ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic & ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9)
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 0;
}
/* Store the value for future slices in the same picture */
ps_dec->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active_prev =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ref_pic_list_reordering_flag_l0",u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx);
/* Modified temporarily */
if(u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx)
{
WORD8 ret;
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[0];
ret = ih264d_ref_idx_reordering(ps_dec, 0);
if(ret == -1)
return ERROR_REFIDX_ORDER_T;
}
else
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ref_pic_list_reordering_flag_l1",u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx);
/* Modified temporarily */
if(u1_ref_idx_re_flag_lx)
{
WORD8 ret;
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[1];
ret = ih264d_ref_idx_reordering(ps_dec, 1);
if(ret == -1)
return ERROR_REFIDX_ORDER_T;
}
else
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1];
/* Create refIdx to POC mapping */
{
void **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx;
WORD8 idx;
struct pic_buffer_t *ps_pic;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc + FRM_LIST_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
}
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc + FRM_LIST_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx[idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
void **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t, **ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ TOP_LIST_FLD_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ BOT_LIST_FLD_L0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t++;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[0];
idx++)
{
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t += 2;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b += 2;
}
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ TOP_LIST_FLD_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc
+ BOT_LIST_FLD_L1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t++;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[0] = 0;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b++;
for(idx = 0; idx < ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[1];
idx++)
{
UWORD8 u1_tmp_idx = idx << 1;
ps_pic = ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[1][idx];
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[u1_tmp_idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[u1_tmp_idx + 1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1);
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_b[u1_tmp_idx] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_lx_t[u1_tmp_idx + 1] = (ps_pic->pu1_buf1) + 1;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3)
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
memcpy((void *)ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc,
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc,
size);
}
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0))
{
ih264d_convert_frm_mbaff_list(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->u1_wted_bipred_idc == 1)
{
ret = ih264d_parse_pred_weight_table(ps_slice, ps_bitstrm);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ih264d_form_pred_weight_matrix(ps_dec);
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
}
else if(ps_pps->u1_wted_bipred_idc == 2)
{
/* Implicit Weighted prediction */
ps_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = 0x0505;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
ih264d_get_implicit_weights(ps_dec);
}
else
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(ps_dec);
else
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode == CABAC)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_CABAC_INIT_IDC)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_cabac_init_idc = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: cabac_init_idc",ps_slice->u1_cabac_init_idc);
}
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
{
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
(WORD8)(ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp));
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
} COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice = ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cabac;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb = ih264d_parse_bmb_cabac;
ih264d_init_cabac_contexts(B_SLICE, ps_dec);
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
}
else
{
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice = ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cavlc;
ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb = ih264d_parse_bmb_cavlc;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
}
ret = ih264d_cal_col_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u1_B = 1;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_bmb;
ret = ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_slice(ps_dec, ps_slice, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The H.264 decoder in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles Memory Management Control Operation (MMCO) data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25818142.
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
| High | 173,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TransportDIB* TransportDIB::Create(size_t size, uint32 sequence_num) {
const int shmkey = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, size, 0666);
if (shmkey == -1) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create SysV shared memory region"
<< " errno:" << errno;
return NULL;
}
void* address = shmat(shmkey, NULL /* desired address */, 0 /* flags */);
shmctl(shmkey, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (address == kInvalidAddress)
return NULL;
TransportDIB* dib = new TransportDIB;
dib->key_.shmkey = shmkey;
dib->address_ = address;
dib->size_ = size;
return dib;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 on Linux uses weak permissions for shared memory segments, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(PVOID buffer, ULONG size, LPCSTR caller)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket((IPHeader *) buffer, size);
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("CACHE");
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MPC");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMPCImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMPCImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMPC;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Persistent Cache image format");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->module=ConstantString("MPC");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/mpc.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-1 does not enable seekable streams and thus cannot validate blob sizes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an image received from stdin.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 170,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode ||
!psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 ||
!pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 ||
!pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", " (\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/*#3521 */
if(bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* /");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" =~ /");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
/* strcat(szBuffer, "[0-9,a-z,A-Z,\\s]*"); */
/* iBuffer+=17; */
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '/';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in MapServer before 6.0.6, 6.2.x before 6.2.4, 6.4.x before 6.4.5, and 7.0.x before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via vectors involving WFS get feature requests.
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR) | High | 168,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( array, which ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::BluetoothAdapterChromeOS()
: weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->AddObserver(this);
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->AddObserver(this);
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothInputClient()->AddObserver(this);
std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath> object_paths =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->GetAdapters();
if (!object_paths.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << object_paths.size() << " Bluetooth adapter(s) available.";
SetAdapter(object_paths[0]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
{
return m_channels;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,289 |
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