instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::InnerAttachClient(DevToolsAgentHostClient* client) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHostImpl> protect(this);
DevToolsSession* session = new DevToolsSession(this, client);
sessions_.insert(session);
session_by_client_[client].reset(session);
AttachSession(session);
if (sessions_.size() == 1)
NotifyAttached();
DevToolsManager* manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
if (manager->delegate())
manager->delegate()->ClientAttached(this, client);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < kMaximumSecondsBetweenDoubleClick;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly handle Tibetan text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
{
int i;
const char *str;
X509 *peer;
long verify_error;
MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
char *client_princ;
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
#endif
unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
i = SSL_accept(con);
#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
{
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP
&& SSL_state(con) == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C) {
fprintf(stderr,
"LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n");
i = SSL_accept(con);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
return (1);
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result(con);
if (verify_error != X509_V_OK) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
}
/* Always print any error messages */
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return (0);
}
if (s_brief)
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con));
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
if (peer != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
X509_free(peer);
}
if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con);
ssl_print_curves(bio_s_out, con, 0);
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)");
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
if (next_proto_neg) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is ");
BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
{
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
= SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
if (srtp_profile)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
srtp_profile->name);
}
#endif
if (SSL_cache_hit(con))
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n");
if (SSL_ctrl(con, SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS, 0, NULL) &
TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Peer has incorrect TLSv1 block padding\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
client_princ = kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(con));
if (client_princ != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Kerberos peer principal is %s\n",
client_princ);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0)) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
}
}
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the SRP_VBASE_get_by_user implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by providing an invalid username in a connection attempt, related to apps/s_server.c and crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int start_decoder(vorb *f)
{
uint8 header[6], x,y;
int len,i,j,k, max_submaps = 0;
int longest_floorlist=0;
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!(f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_first_page)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_last_page) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_continued_packet) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segment_count != 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segments[0] != 30) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (get8(f) != VORBIS_packet_id) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!getn(f, header, 6)) return error(f, VORBIS_unexpected_eof);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (get32(f) != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
f->channels = get8(f); if (!f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->channels > STB_VORBIS_MAX_CHANNELS) return error(f, VORBIS_too_many_channels);
f->sample_rate = get32(f); if (!f->sample_rate) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
get32(f); // bitrate_maximum
get32(f); // bitrate_nominal
get32(f); // bitrate_minimum
x = get8(f);
{
int log0,log1;
log0 = x & 15;
log1 = x >> 4;
f->blocksize_0 = 1 << log0;
f->blocksize_1 = 1 << log1;
if (log0 < 6 || log0 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log1 < 6 || log1 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log0 > log1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
x = get8(f);
if (!(x & 1)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
do {
len = next_segment(f);
skip(f, len);
f->bytes_in_seg = 0;
} while (len);
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_PUSHDATA_API
if (IS_PUSH_MODE(f)) {
if (!is_whole_packet_present(f, TRUE)) {
if (f->error == VORBIS_invalid_stream)
f->error = VORBIS_invalid_setup;
return FALSE;
}
}
#endif
crc32_init(); // always init it, to avoid multithread race conditions
if (get8_packet(f) != VORBIS_packet_setup) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (i=0; i < 6; ++i) header[i] = get8_packet(f);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
f->codebook_count = get_bits(f,8) + 1;
f->codebooks = (Codebook *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
if (f->codebooks == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->codebooks, 0, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
for (i=0; i < f->codebook_count; ++i) {
uint32 *values;
int ordered, sorted_count;
int total=0;
uint8 *lengths;
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+i;
CHECK(f);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x42) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x43) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x56) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8);
c->dimensions = (get_bits(f, 8)<<8) + x;
x = get_bits(f, 8);
y = get_bits(f, 8);
c->entries = (get_bits(f, 8)<<16) + (y<<8) + x;
ordered = get_bits(f,1);
c->sparse = ordered ? 0 : get_bits(f,1);
if (c->dimensions == 0 && c->entries != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->sparse)
lengths = (uint8 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, c->entries);
else
lengths = c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (!lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (ordered) {
int current_entry = 0;
int current_length = get_bits(f,5) + 1;
while (current_entry < c->entries) {
int limit = c->entries - current_entry;
int n = get_bits(f, ilog(limit));
if (current_entry + n > (int) c->entries) { return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
memset(lengths + current_entry, current_length, n);
current_entry += n;
++current_length;
}
} else {
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j) {
int present = c->sparse ? get_bits(f,1) : 1;
if (present) {
lengths[j] = get_bits(f, 5) + 1;
++total;
if (lengths[j] == 32)
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
lengths[j] = NO_CODE;
}
}
}
if (c->sparse && total >= c->entries >> 2) {
if (c->entries > (int) f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = c->entries;
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (c->codeword_lengths == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memcpy(c->codeword_lengths, lengths, c->entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries); // note this is only safe if there have been no intervening temp mallocs!
lengths = c->codeword_lengths;
c->sparse = 0;
}
if (c->sparse) {
sorted_count = total;
} else {
sorted_count = 0;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_HUFFMAN_BINARY_SEARCH
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j)
if (lengths[j] > STB_VORBIS_FAST_HUFFMAN_LENGTH && lengths[j] != NO_CODE)
++sorted_count;
#endif
}
c->sorted_entries = sorted_count;
values = NULL;
CHECK(f);
if (!c->sparse) {
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->codewords[0]) * c->entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
} else {
unsigned int size;
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codeword_lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->codewords) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
values = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*values) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!values) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
size = c->entries + (sizeof(*c->codewords) + sizeof(*values)) * c->sorted_entries;
if (size > f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = size;
}
if (!compute_codewords(c, lengths, c->entries, values)) {
if (c->sparse) setup_temp_free(f, values, 0);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->sorted_codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_codewords) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_codewords == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->sorted_values = ( int *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_values ) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_values == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
++c->sorted_values;
c->sorted_values[-1] = -1;
compute_sorted_huffman(c, lengths, values);
}
if (c->sparse) {
setup_temp_free(f, values, sizeof(*values)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, c->codewords, sizeof(*c->codewords)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries);
c->codewords = NULL;
}
compute_accelerated_huffman(c);
CHECK(f);
c->lookup_type = get_bits(f, 4);
if (c->lookup_type > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->lookup_type > 0) {
uint16 *mults;
c->minimum_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->delta_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->value_bits = get_bits(f, 4)+1;
c->sequence_p = get_bits(f,1);
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
c->lookup_values = lookup1_values(c->entries, c->dimensions);
} else {
c->lookup_values = c->entries * c->dimensions;
}
if (c->lookup_values == 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
mults = (uint16 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(mults[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (mults == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
int q = get_bits(f, c->value_bits);
if (q == EOP) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
mults[j] = q;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
int len, sparse = c->sparse;
float last=0;
if (sparse) {
if (c->sorted_entries == 0) goto skip;
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->sorted_entries * c->dimensions);
} else
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->entries * c->dimensions);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
len = sparse ? c->sorted_entries : c->entries;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
unsigned int z = sparse ? c->sorted_values[j] : j;
unsigned int div=1;
for (k=0; k < c->dimensions; ++k) {
int off = (z / div) % c->lookup_values;
float val = mults[off];
val = mults[off]*c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j*c->dimensions + k] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
if (k+1 < c->dimensions) {
if (div > UINT_MAX / (unsigned int) c->lookup_values) {
setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
div *= c->lookup_values;
}
}
}
c->lookup_type = 2;
}
else
#endif
{
float last=0;
CHECK(f);
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
float val = mults[j] * c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
skip:;
#endif
setup_temp_free(f, mults, sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
CHECK(f);
}
CHECK(f);
}
x = get_bits(f, 6) + 1;
for (i=0; i < x; ++i) {
uint32 z = get_bits(f, 16);
if (z != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
f->floor_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->floor_config = (Floor *) setup_malloc(f, f->floor_count * sizeof(*f->floor_config));
if (f->floor_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (i=0; i < f->floor_count; ++i) {
f->floor_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->floor_types[i] > 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (f->floor_types[i] == 0) {
Floor0 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor0;
g->order = get_bits(f,8);
g->rate = get_bits(f,16);
g->bark_map_size = get_bits(f,16);
g->amplitude_bits = get_bits(f,6);
g->amplitude_offset = get_bits(f,8);
g->number_of_books = get_bits(f,4) + 1;
for (j=0; j < g->number_of_books; ++j)
g->book_list[j] = get_bits(f,8);
return error(f, VORBIS_feature_not_supported);
} else {
stbv__floor_ordering p[31*8+2];
Floor1 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor1;
int max_class = -1;
g->partitions = get_bits(f, 5);
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
g->partition_class_list[j] = get_bits(f, 4);
if (g->partition_class_list[j] > max_class)
max_class = g->partition_class_list[j];
}
for (j=0; j <= max_class; ++j) {
g->class_dimensions[j] = get_bits(f, 3)+1;
g->class_subclasses[j] = get_bits(f, 2);
if (g->class_subclasses[j]) {
g->class_masterbooks[j] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (g->class_masterbooks[j] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
for (k=0; k < 1 << g->class_subclasses[j]; ++k) {
g->subclass_books[j][k] = get_bits(f,8)-1;
if (g->subclass_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
g->floor1_multiplier = get_bits(f,2)+1;
g->rangebits = get_bits(f,4);
g->Xlist[0] = 0;
g->Xlist[1] = 1 << g->rangebits;
g->values = 2;
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
int c = g->partition_class_list[j];
for (k=0; k < g->class_dimensions[c]; ++k) {
g->Xlist[g->values] = get_bits(f, g->rangebits);
++g->values;
}
}
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j) {
p[j].x = g->Xlist[j];
p[j].id = j;
}
qsort(p, g->values, sizeof(p[0]), point_compare);
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j)
g->sorted_order[j] = (uint8) p[j].id;
for (j=2; j < g->values; ++j) {
int low,hi;
neighbors(g->Xlist, j, &low,&hi);
g->neighbors[j][0] = low;
g->neighbors[j][1] = hi;
}
if (g->values > longest_floorlist)
longest_floorlist = g->values;
}
}
f->residue_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->residue_config = (Residue *) setup_malloc(f, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
if (f->residue_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->residue_config, 0, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
uint8 residue_cascade[64];
Residue *r = f->residue_config+i;
f->residue_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->residue_types[i] > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->begin = get_bits(f, 24);
r->end = get_bits(f, 24);
if (r->end < r->begin) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->part_size = get_bits(f,24)+1;
r->classifications = get_bits(f,6)+1;
r->classbook = get_bits(f,8);
if (r->classbook >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
uint8 high_bits=0;
uint8 low_bits=get_bits(f,3);
if (get_bits(f,1))
high_bits = get_bits(f,5);
residue_cascade[j] = high_bits*8 + low_bits;
}
r->residue_books = (short (*)[8]) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->residue_books[0]) * r->classifications);
if (r->residue_books == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
for (k=0; k < 8; ++k) {
if (residue_cascade[j] & (1 << k)) {
r->residue_books[j][k] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (r->residue_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
r->residue_books[j][k] = -1;
}
}
}
r->classdata = (uint8 **) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
if (!r->classdata) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(r->classdata, 0, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
for (j=0; j < f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries; ++j) {
int classwords = f->codebooks[r->classbook].dimensions;
int temp = j;
r->classdata[j] = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->classdata[j][0]) * classwords);
if (r->classdata[j] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (k=classwords-1; k >= 0; --k) {
r->classdata[j][k] = temp % r->classifications;
temp /= r->classifications;
}
}
}
f->mapping_count = get_bits(f,6)+1;
f->mapping = (Mapping *) setup_malloc(f, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
if (f->mapping == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->mapping, 0, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
for (i=0; i < f->mapping_count; ++i) {
Mapping *m = f->mapping + i;
int mapping_type = get_bits(f,16);
if (mapping_type != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
m->chan = (MappingChannel *) setup_malloc(f, f->channels * sizeof(*m->chan));
if (m->chan == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (get_bits(f,1))
m->submaps = get_bits(f,4)+1;
else
m->submaps = 1;
if (m->submaps > max_submaps)
max_submaps = m->submaps;
if (get_bits(f,1)) {
m->coupling_steps = get_bits(f,8)+1;
for (k=0; k < m->coupling_steps; ++k) {
m->chan[k].magnitude = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
m->chan[k].angle = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
if (m->chan[k].magnitude >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].angle >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].magnitude == m->chan[k].angle) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
m->coupling_steps = 0;
if (get_bits(f,2)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submaps > 1) {
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j) {
m->chan[j].mux = get_bits(f, 4);
if (m->chan[j].mux >= m->submaps) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j)
m->chan[j].mux = 0;
for (j=0; j < m->submaps; ++j) {
get_bits(f,8); // discard
m->submap_floor[j] = get_bits(f,8);
m->submap_residue[j] = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->submap_floor[j] >= f->floor_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submap_residue[j] >= f->residue_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
f->mode_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
for (i=0; i < f->mode_count; ++i) {
Mode *m = f->mode_config+i;
m->blockflag = get_bits(f,1);
m->windowtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->transformtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->mapping = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->windowtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->transformtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->mapping >= f->mapping_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
flush_packet(f);
f->previous_length = 0;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
f->channel_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1);
f->previous_window[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
f->finalY[i] = (int16 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(int16) * longest_floorlist);
if (f->channel_buffers[i] == NULL || f->previous_window[i] == NULL || f->finalY[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_NO_DEFER_FLOOR
f->floor_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
if (f->floor_buffers[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
#endif
}
if (!init_blocksize(f, 0, f->blocksize_0)) return FALSE;
if (!init_blocksize(f, 1, f->blocksize_1)) return FALSE;
f->blocksize[0] = f->blocksize_0;
f->blocksize[1] = f->blocksize_1;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (integer_divide_table[1][1]==0)
for (i=0; i < DIVTAB_NUMER; ++i)
for (j=1; j < DIVTAB_DENOM; ++j)
integer_divide_table[i][j] = i / j;
#endif
{
uint32 imdct_mem = (f->blocksize_1 * sizeof(float) >> 1);
uint32 classify_mem;
int i,max_part_read=0;
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
Residue *r = f->residue_config + i;
int n_read = r->end - r->begin;
int part_read = n_read / r->part_size;
if (part_read > max_part_read)
max_part_read = part_read;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(uint8 *));
#else
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(int *));
#endif
f->temp_memory_required = classify_mem;
if (imdct_mem > f->temp_memory_required)
f->temp_memory_required = imdct_mem;
}
f->first_decode = TRUE;
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer) {
assert(f->temp_offset == f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes);
if (f->setup_offset + sizeof(*f) + f->temp_memory_required > (unsigned) f->temp_offset)
return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
f->first_audio_page_offset = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sean Barrett stb_vorbis version 1.12 and earlier contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in All vorbis decoding paths. that can result in memory corruption, denial of service, comprised execution of host program. This attack appear to be exploitable via Victim must open a specially crafted Ogg Vorbis file. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.13.
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files | Medium | 168,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
int i, j, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint16 bps, nstrips, planar, strips_per_sample;
uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps;
uint32 rows_this_strip = 0;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
if (obuf == NULL)
{
TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer","Invalid buffer argument");
return (0);
}
memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs));
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
if (rps > length)
rps = length;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
src_rowsize = ((bps * width) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * width * spp) + 7) / 8;
dst = obuf;
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 3))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Image width %d, length %d, Scanline size, %4d bytes",
width, length, scanlinesize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d, Shift width %d",
bps, spp, shift_width);
}
/* Libtiff seems to assume/require that data for separate planes are
* written one complete plane after another and not interleaved in any way.
* Multiple scanlines and possibly strips of the same plane must be
* written before data for any other plane.
*/
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp;
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if (!buff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate strip read buffer for sample %d", s);
for (i = 0; i < s; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[s] = buff;
}
rows_processed = 0;
for (j = 0; (j < strips_per_sample) && (result == 1); j++)
{
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j;
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu for sample %d",
(unsigned long) strip, s + 1);
result = 0;
break;
}
#ifdef DEVELMODE
TIFFError("", "Strip %2d, read %5d bytes for %4d scanlines, shift width %d",
strip, bytes_read, rows_this_strip, shift_width);
#endif
}
if (rps > rows_this_strip)
rps = rows_this_strip;
dst = obuf + (dst_rowsize * rows_processed);
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateSamplesBytes (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateSamples8bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateSamples16bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateSamples24bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateSamples32bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
result = 0;
break;
}
}
if ((rows_processed + rps) > length)
{
rows_processed = length;
rps = length - rows_processed;
}
else
rows_processed += rps;
}
/* free any buffers allocated for each plane or scanline and
* any temporary buffers
*/
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
if (buff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(buff);
}
return (result);
} /* end readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 reads an undefined buffer in readContigStripsIntoBuffer() because of a uint16 integer overflow. Reported as MSVR 35100.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindCacheForGroup(int64_t group_id,
CacheRecord* record) {
DCHECK(record);
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard, update_time, cache_size"
" FROM Caches WHERE group_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, group_id);
if (!statement.Step())
return false;
ReadCacheRecord(statement, record);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
/* Update with new address */
if (options.compression) {
ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
(ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jffs2_do_setattr (struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct jffs2_full_dnode *old_metadata, *new_metadata;
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(inode->i_sb);
struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri;
union jffs2_device_node dev;
unsigned char *mdata = NULL;
int mdatalen = 0;
unsigned int ivalid;
uint32_t alloclen;
int ret;
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): ino #%lu\n", inode->i_ino));
ret = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Special cases - we don't want more than one data node
for these types on the medium at any time. So setattr
/* Special cases - we don't want more than one data node
for these types on the medium at any time. So setattr
must read the original data associated with the node
(i.e. the device numbers or the target name) and write
it out again with the appropriate data attached */
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* For these, we don't actually need to read the old node */
mdatalen = jffs2_encode_dev(&dev, inode->i_rdev);
mdata = (char *)&dev;
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): Writing %d bytes of kdev_t\n", mdatalen));
} else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
down(&f->sem);
mdatalen = f->metadata->size;
mdata = kmalloc(f->metadata->size, GFP_USER);
if (!mdata) {
up(&f->sem);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = jffs2_read_dnode(c, f, f->metadata, mdata, 0, mdatalen);
if (ret) {
up(&f->sem);
kfree(mdata);
return ret;
}
up(&f->sem);
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): Writing %d bytes of symlink target\n", mdatalen));
}
ri = jffs2_alloc_raw_inode();
if (!ri) {
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(mdata);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = jffs2_reserve_space(c, sizeof(*ri) + mdatalen, &alloclen,
ALLOC_NORMAL, JFFS2_SUMMARY_INODE_SIZE);
if (ret) {
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode & S_IFMT))
kfree(mdata);
return ret;
}
down(&f->sem);
ivalid = iattr->ia_valid;
ri->magic = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK);
ri->nodetype = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_NODETYPE_INODE);
ri->totlen = cpu_to_je32(sizeof(*ri) + mdatalen);
ri->hdr_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, ri, sizeof(struct jffs2_unknown_node)-4));
ri->ino = cpu_to_je32(inode->i_ino);
ri->version = cpu_to_je32(++f->highest_version);
ri->uid = cpu_to_je16((ivalid & ATTR_UID)?iattr->ia_uid:inode->i_uid);
ri->gid = cpu_to_je16((ivalid & ATTR_GID)?iattr->ia_gid:inode->i_gid);
if (ivalid & ATTR_MODE)
if (iattr->ia_mode & S_ISGID &&
!in_group_p(je16_to_cpu(ri->gid)) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(iattr->ia_mode & ~S_ISGID);
else
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(iattr->ia_mode);
else
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(inode->i_mode);
ri->isize = cpu_to_je32((ivalid & ATTR_SIZE)?iattr->ia_size:inode->i_size);
ri->atime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_ATIME)?iattr->ia_atime:inode->i_atime));
ri->mtime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_MTIME)?iattr->ia_mtime:inode->i_mtime));
ri->ctime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_CTIME)?iattr->ia_ctime:inode->i_ctime));
ri->offset = cpu_to_je32(0);
ri->csize = ri->dsize = cpu_to_je32(mdatalen);
ri->compr = JFFS2_COMPR_NONE;
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size < iattr->ia_size) {
/* It's an extension. Make it a hole node */
ri->compr = JFFS2_COMPR_ZERO;
ri->dsize = cpu_to_je32(iattr->ia_size - inode->i_size);
ri->offset = cpu_to_je32(inode->i_size);
}
ri->node_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, ri, sizeof(*ri)-8));
if (mdatalen)
ri->data_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, mdata, mdatalen));
else
ri->data_crc = cpu_to_je32(0);
new_metadata = jffs2_write_dnode(c, f, ri, mdata, mdatalen, ALLOC_NORMAL);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(mdata);
if (IS_ERR(new_metadata)) {
jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
up(&f->sem);
return PTR_ERR(new_metadata);
}
/* It worked. Update the inode */
inode->i_atime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->atime));
inode->i_ctime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->ctime));
inode->i_mtime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->mtime));
inode->i_mode = jemode_to_cpu(ri->mode);
inode->i_uid = je16_to_cpu(ri->uid);
inode->i_gid = je16_to_cpu(ri->gid);
old_metadata = f->metadata;
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size > iattr->ia_size)
jffs2_truncate_fragtree (c, &f->fragtree, iattr->ia_size);
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size < iattr->ia_size) {
jffs2_add_full_dnode_to_inode(c, f, new_metadata);
inode->i_size = iattr->ia_size;
f->metadata = NULL;
} else {
f->metadata = new_metadata;
}
if (old_metadata) {
jffs2_mark_node_obsolete(c, old_metadata->raw);
jffs2_free_full_dnode(old_metadata);
}
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
up(&f->sem);
jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
/* We have to do the vmtruncate() without f->sem held, since
some pages may be locked and waiting for it in readpage().
We are protected from a simultaneous write() extending i_size
back past iattr->ia_size, because do_truncate() holds the
generic inode semaphore. */
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size > iattr->ia_size)
vmtruncate(inode, iattr->ia_size);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: JFFS2, as used on One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) build 542 and possibly other Linux systems, when POSIX ACL support is enabled, does not properly store permissions during (1) inode creation or (2) ACL setting, which might allow local users to access restricted files or directories after a remount of a filesystem, related to "legacy modes" and an inconsistency between dentry permissions and inode permissions.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()))
return true;
}
else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (gid_eq(gid, current_fsgid()))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not have appropriate capability requirements for the uid_map and gid_map files, which allows local users to gain privileges by opening a file within an unprivileged process and then modifying the file within a privileged process.
Commit Message: userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting the id_map
When we require privilege for setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map or
/proc/<pid>/gid_map no longer allow an unprivileged user to
open the file and pass it to a privileged program to write
to the file.
Instead when privilege is required require both the opener and the
writer to have the necessary capabilities.
I have tested this code and verified that setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map
fails when an unprivileged user opens the file and a privielged user
attempts to set the mapping, that unprivileged users can still map
their own id, and that a privileged users can still setup an arbitrary
mapping.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> | Low | 166,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int trigger_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0, init_l;
/* approx 10ms */
u32 timeout = 10000;
/* make sure the FPGA_can access the EEPROM */
toggle_fpga_eeprom_bus(false);
/* assert CONF_SEL_L to be able to drive FPGA_PROG_L */
qrio_gpio_direction_output(GPIO_A, CONF_SEL_L, 0);
/* trigger the config start */
qrio_gpio_direction_output(GPIO_A, FPGA_PROG_L, 0);
/* small delay for INIT_L line */
udelay(10);
/* wait for FPGA_INIT to be asserted */
do {
init_l = qrio_get_gpio(GPIO_A, FPGA_INIT_L);
if (timeout-- == 0) {
printf("FPGA_INIT timeout\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
udelay(10);
} while (init_l);
/* deassert FPGA_PROG, config should start */
qrio_set_gpio(GPIO_A, FPGA_PROG_L, 1);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes | High | 169,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::functionLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Function> function)
{
int scriptId = function->ScriptId();
if (scriptId == v8::UnboundScript::kNoScriptId)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
int lineNumber = function->GetScriptLineNumber();
int columnNumber = function->GetScriptColumnNumber();
if (lineNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound || columnNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound)
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> location = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "scriptId"), toV8String(m_isolate, String16::fromInteger(scriptId))).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, lineNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!location->Set(context, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, columnNumber)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, location, V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithSequenceArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithSequenceArg");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(sequence<ScriptProfile>*, sequenceArg, toNativeArray<ScriptProfile>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithSequenceArg(sequenceArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport Image *AdaptiveThresholdImage(const Image *image,
const size_t width,const size_t height,const double bias,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define AdaptiveThresholdImageTag "AdaptiveThreshold/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*threshold_view;
Image
*threshold_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Initialize threshold image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
threshold_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (threshold_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (width == 0)
return(threshold_image);
status=SetImageStorageClass(threshold_image,DirectClass,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Threshold image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) width*height;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
threshold_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(threshold_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,threshold_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
channel_bias[MaxPixelChannels],
channel_sum[MaxPixelChannels];
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict pixels;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
center,
u,
v;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-((ssize_t) width/2L),y-(ssize_t)
(height/2L),image->columns+width,height,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,0,y,threshold_image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
center=(ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+width)*(height/2L)+
GetPixelChannels(image)*(width/2);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
pixels=p;
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
channel_sum[channel]=0.0;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
for (u=0; u < (ssize_t) width; u++)
{
if (u == (ssize_t) (width-1))
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*image->columns;
}
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
mean;
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait threshold_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(threshold_image,
channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(threshold_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((threshold_traits & CopyPixelTrait) != 0)
{
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,p[center+i],q);
continue;
}
channel_sum[channel]-=channel_bias[channel];
channel_bias[channel]=0.0;
pixels=p;
for (v=0; v < (ssize_t) height; v++)
{
channel_bias[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=(width-1)*GetPixelChannels(image);
channel_sum[channel]+=pixels[i];
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+1);
}
mean=(double) (channel_sum[channel]/number_pixels+bias);
SetPixelChannel(threshold_image,channel,(Quantum) ((double)
p[center+i] <= mean ? 0 : QuantumRange),q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(threshold_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(threshold_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,AdaptiveThresholdImageTag,progress,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
threshold_image->type=image->type;
threshold_view=DestroyCacheView(threshold_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
threshold_image=DestroyImage(threshold_image);
return(threshold_image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/threshold.c in AdaptiveThresholdImage because a height of zero is mishandled.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609 | Medium | 170,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int misaligned_fpu_load(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_paired_load)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int destreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
destreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
__u32 buflo, bufhi;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
if (__copy_user(&buffer, (const void *)(int)address, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
/* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so
context switch the registers into memory so they can be
indexed by register number. */
if (last_task_used_math == current) {
enable_fpu();
save_fpu(current);
disable_fpu();
last_task_used_math = NULL;
regs->sr |= SR_FD;
}
buflo = *(__u32*) &buffer;
bufhi = *(1 + (__u32*) &buffer);
switch (width_shift) {
case 2:
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
break;
case 3:
if (do_paired_load) {
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = bufhi;
} else {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = bufhi;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = buflo;
#else
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = bufhi;
#endif
}
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
return 0;
} else {
die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0);
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static netdev_tx_t hns_nic_net_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
int ret;
assert(skb->queue_mapping < ndev->ae_handle->q_num);
ret = hns_nic_net_xmit_hw(ndev, skb,
&tx_ring_data(priv, skb->queue_mapping));
if (ret == NETDEV_TX_OK) {
netif_trans_update(ndev);
ndev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
ndev->stats.tx_packets++;
}
return (netdev_tx_t)ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, local users can cause a denial of service (use-after-free and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging differences in skb handling between hns_nic_net_xmit_hw and hns_nic_net_xmit.
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 169,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline struct futex_hash_bucket *queue_lock(struct futex_q *q)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
get_futex_key_refs(&q->key);
hb = hash_futex(&q->key);
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
return hb;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The futex_wait function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during requeue operations, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that triggers a zero count.
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 166,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/* if no number follows "/CharStrings", let's read the next line */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
/* pdftex_warn("no number found after `%s', I assume it's on the next line",
charstringname); */
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
/* t1_getline always appends EOL to t1_line_array; let's change it to
* space before appending the next line
*/
*(strend(t1_buf_array) - 1) = ' ';
t1_getline();
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in t1_check_unusual_charstring functions in writet1.c files in TeX Live before 2018-09-21. A buffer overflow in the handling of Type 1 fonts allows arbitrary code execution when a malicious font is loaded by one of the vulnerable tools: pdflatex, pdftex, dvips, or luatex.
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751 | Medium | 169,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer(WebCore::GraphicsLayer* graphicsLayer)
{
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->removeAllChildren();
if (graphicsLayer)
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->addChild(graphicsLayer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the SVG Filters implementation in WebCore in WebKit in Google Chrome before 11.0.696.68 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,619 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nfc_llcp_build_gb(struct nfc_llcp_local *local)
{
u8 *gb_cur, *version_tlv, version, version_length;
u8 *lto_tlv, lto_length;
u8 *wks_tlv, wks_length;
u8 *miux_tlv, miux_length;
__be16 wks = cpu_to_be16(local->local_wks);
u8 gb_len = 0;
int ret = 0;
version = LLCP_VERSION_11;
version_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_VERSION, &version,
1, &version_length);
gb_len += version_length;
lto_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_LTO, &local->lto, 1, <o_length);
gb_len += lto_length;
pr_debug("Local wks 0x%lx\n", local->local_wks);
wks_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_WKS, (u8 *)&wks, 2, &wks_length);
gb_len += wks_length;
miux_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_MIUX, (u8 *)&local->miux, 0,
&miux_length);
gb_len += miux_length;
gb_len += ARRAY_SIZE(llcp_magic);
if (gb_len > NFC_MAX_GT_LEN) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
gb_cur = local->gb;
memcpy(gb_cur, llcp_magic, ARRAY_SIZE(llcp_magic));
gb_cur += ARRAY_SIZE(llcp_magic);
memcpy(gb_cur, version_tlv, version_length);
gb_cur += version_length;
memcpy(gb_cur, lto_tlv, lto_length);
gb_cur += lto_length;
memcpy(gb_cur, wks_tlv, wks_length);
gb_cur += wks_length;
memcpy(gb_cur, miux_tlv, miux_length);
gb_cur += miux_length;
local->gb_len = gb_len;
out:
kfree(version_tlv);
kfree(lto_tlv);
kfree(wks_tlv);
kfree(miux_tlv);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.20.15. The nfc_llcp_build_tlv function in net/nfc/llcp_commands.c may return NULL. If the caller does not check for this, it will trigger a NULL pointer dereference. This will cause denial of service. This affects nfc_llcp_build_gb in net/nfc/llcp_core.c.
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image,StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
int
components;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
if (q > (exif+length-12))
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS)
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
if (components < 0)
break; /* corrupt EXIF */
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
if (~length < number_bytes)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.x+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.y+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: MagickCore/profile.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3-2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280 | Medium | 168,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr,
struct bgp_nlri *packet)
{
u_char *pnt;
u_char *lim;
struct prefix p;
int psize;
int prefixlen;
u_int16_t type;
struct rd_as rd_as;
struct rd_ip rd_ip;
struct prefix_rd prd;
u_char *tagpnt;
/* Check peer status. */
if (peer->status != Established)
return 0;
/* Make prefix_rd */
prd.family = AF_UNSPEC;
prd.prefixlen = 64;
pnt = packet->nlri;
lim = pnt + packet->length;
for (; pnt < lim; pnt += psize)
{
/* Clear prefix structure. */
/* Fetch prefix length. */
prefixlen = *pnt++;
p.family = AF_INET;
psize = PSIZE (prefixlen);
if (prefixlen < 88)
{
zlog_err ("prefix length is less than 88: %d", prefixlen);
return -1;
}
/* Copyr label to prefix. */
tagpnt = pnt;;
/* Copy routing distinguisher to rd. */
memcpy (&prd.val, pnt + 3, 8);
else if (type == RD_TYPE_IP)
zlog_info ("prefix %ld:%s:%ld:%s/%d", label, inet_ntoa (rd_ip.ip),
rd_ip.val, inet_ntoa (p.u.prefix4), p.prefixlen);
#endif /* 0 */
if (pnt + psize > lim)
return -1;
if (attr)
bgp_update (peer, &p, attr, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN,
ZEBRA_ROUTE_BGP, BGP_ROUTE_NORMAL, &prd, tagpnt, 0);
else
return -1;
}
p.prefixlen = prefixlen - 88;
memcpy (&p.u.prefix, pnt + 11, psize - 11);
#if 0
if (type == RD_TYPE_AS)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The bgp_nlri_parse_vpnv4 function in bgp_mplsvpn.c in the VPNv4 NLRI parser in bgpd in Quagga before 1.0.20160309, when a certain VPNv4 configuration is used, relies on a Labeled-VPN SAFI routes-data length field during a data copy, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: | High | 165,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TabContentsTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,015 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static const char *check_secret(int module, const char *user, const char *group,
const char *challenge, const char *pass)
{
char line[1024];
char pass2[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
const char *fname = lp_secrets_file(module);
STRUCT_STAT st;
int fd, ok = 1;
int user_len = strlen(user);
int group_len = group ? strlen(group) : 0;
char *err;
if (!fname || !*fname || (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
return "no secrets file";
if (do_fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "fstat(%s)", fname);
ok = 0;
} else if (lp_strict_modes(module)) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must not be other-accessible (see strict modes option)\n");
ok = 0;
} else if (MY_UID() == 0 && st.st_uid != 0) {
rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must be owned by root when running as root (see strict modes)\n");
ok = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The check_secret function in authenticate.c in rsync 3.1.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and CPU consumption) via a user name which does not exist in the secrets file.
Commit Message: | High | 165,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, valgrind_mode = 0;
int valgrind_tool = 0;
int valgrind_gdbserver = 0;
char buf[16384], **args, *home;
char valgrind_path[PATH_MAX] = "";
const char *valgrind_log = NULL;
Eina_Bool really_know = EINA_FALSE;
struct sigaction action;
pid_t child = -1;
#ifdef E_CSERVE
pid_t cs_child = -1;
Eina_Bool cs_use = EINA_FALSE;
#endif
#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) && !defined(__FreeBSD__) && \
!defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) && !(defined (__MACH__) && defined (__APPLE__))
Eina_Bool restart = EINA_TRUE;
#endif
unsetenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET");
/* Setup USR1 to detach from the child process and let it get gdb by advanced users */
action.sa_sigaction = _sigusr1;
action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
sigaction(SIGUSR1, &action, NULL);
eina_init();
/* reexcute myself with dbus-launch if dbus-launch is not running yet */
if ((!getenv("DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS")) &&
(!getenv("DBUS_LAUNCHD_SESSION_BUS_SOCKET")))
{
char **dbus_argv;
dbus_argv = alloca((argc + 3) * sizeof (char *));
dbus_argv[0] = "dbus-launch";
dbus_argv[1] = "--exit-with-session";
copy_args(dbus_argv + 2, argv, argc);
dbus_argv[2 + argc] = NULL;
execvp("dbus-launch", dbus_argv);
}
prefix_determine(argv[0]);
env_set("E_START", argv[0]);
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
{
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-valgrind-gdb"))
valgrind_gdbserver = 1;
else if (!strncmp(argv[i], "-valgrind", sizeof("-valgrind") - 1))
{
const char *val = argv[i] + sizeof("-valgrind") - 1;
if (*val == '\0') valgrind_mode = 1;
else if (*val == '-')
{
val++;
if (!strncmp(val, "log-file=", sizeof("log-file=") - 1))
{
valgrind_log = val + sizeof("log-file=") - 1;
if (*valgrind_log == '\0') valgrind_log = NULL;
}
}
else if (*val == '=')
{
val++;
if (!strcmp(val, "all")) valgrind_mode = VALGRIND_MODE_ALL;
else valgrind_mode = atoi(val);
}
else
printf("Unknown valgrind option: %s\n", argv[i]);
}
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-display"))
{
i++;
env_set("DISPLAY", argv[i]);
}
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-massif"))
valgrind_tool = 1;
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-callgrind"))
valgrind_tool = 2;
else if ((!strcmp(argv[i], "-h")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "-help")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "--help")))
{
printf
(
"Options:\n"
"\t-valgrind[=MODE]\n"
"\t\tRun enlightenment from inside valgrind, mode is OR of:\n"
"\t\t 1 = plain valgrind to catch crashes (default)\n"
"\t\t 2 = trace children (thumbnailer, efm slaves, ...)\n"
"\t\t 4 = check leak\n"
"\t\t 8 = show reachable after processes finish.\n"
"\t\t all = all of above\n"
"\t-massif\n"
"\t\tRun enlightenment from inside massif valgrind tool.\n"
"\t-callgrind\n"
"\t\tRun enlightenment from inside callgrind valgrind tool.\n"
"\t-valgrind-log-file=<FILENAME>\n"
"\t\tSave valgrind log to file, see valgrind's --log-file for details.\n"
"\n"
"Please run:\n"
"\tenlightenment %s\n"
"for more options.\n",
argv[i]);
exit(0);
}
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-i-really-know-what-i-am-doing-and-accept-full-responsibility-for-it"))
really_know = EINA_TRUE;
}
if (really_know)
_env_path_append("PATH", eina_prefix_bin_get(pfx));
else
_env_path_prepend("PATH", eina_prefix_bin_get(pfx));
if (valgrind_mode || valgrind_tool)
{
if (!find_valgrind(valgrind_path, sizeof(valgrind_path)))
{
printf("E - valgrind required but no binary found! Ignoring request.\n");
valgrind_mode = 0;
}
}
printf("E - PID=%i, valgrind=%d", getpid(), valgrind_mode);
if (valgrind_mode)
{
printf(" valgrind-command='%s'", valgrind_path);
if (valgrind_log) printf(" valgrind-log-file='%s'", valgrind_log);
}
putchar('\n');
/* mtrack memory tracker support */
home = getenv("HOME");
if (home)
{
FILE *f;
/* if you have ~/.e-mtrack, then the tracker will be enabled
* using the content of this file as the path to the mtrack.so
* shared object that is the mtrack preload */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.e-mtrack", home);
f = fopen(buf, "r");
if (f)
{
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
{
int len = strlen(buf);
if ((len > 1) && (buf[len - 1] == '\n'))
{
buf[len - 1] = 0;
len--;
}
env_set("LD_PRELOAD", buf);
env_set("MTRACK", "track");
env_set("E_START_MTRACK", "track");
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.e-mtrack.log", home);
env_set("MTRACK_TRACE_FILE", buf);
}
fclose(f);
}
}
/* run e directly now */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/enlightenment", eina_prefix_bin_get(pfx));
args = alloca((argc + 2 + VALGRIND_MAX_ARGS) * sizeof(char *));
i = valgrind_append(args, valgrind_gdbserver, valgrind_mode, valgrind_tool, valgrind_path, valgrind_log);
args[i++] = buf;
copy_args(args + i, argv + 1, argc - 1);
args[i + argc - 1] = NULL;
if (valgrind_tool || valgrind_mode)
really_know = EINA_TRUE;
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || \
defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) || (defined (__MACH__) && defined (__APPLE__))
execv(args[0], args);
#endif
/* not run at the moment !! */
#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) && !defined(__FreeBSD__) && \
!defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) && !(defined (__MACH__) && defined (__APPLE__))
#ifdef E_CSERVE
if (getenv("E_CSERVE"))
{
cs_use = EINA_TRUE;
cs_child = _cserve2_start();
}
#endif
/* Now looping until */
while (restart)
{
stop_ptrace = EINA_FALSE;
child = fork();
if (child < 0) /* failed attempt */
return -1;
else if (child == 0)
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
/* in the child */
ptrace(PT_TRACE_ME, 0, NULL, NULL);
#endif
execv(args[0], args);
return 0; /* We failed, 0 mean normal exit from E with no restart or crash so let exit */
}
else
{
env_set("E_RESTART", "1");
/* in the parent */
pid_t result;
int status;
Eina_Bool done = EINA_FALSE;
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
ptrace(PT_ATTACH, child, NULL, NULL);
result = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
if ((!really_know) && (!stop_ptrace))
{
if (WIFSTOPPED(status))
ptrace(PT_CONTINUE, child, NULL, NULL);
}
#endif
while (!done)
{
Eina_Bool remember_sigill = EINA_FALSE;
Eina_Bool remember_sigusr1 = EINA_FALSE;
result = waitpid(child, &status, WNOHANG);
if (!result)
{
/* Wait for evas_cserve2 and E */
result = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
}
if (result == child)
{
if ((WIFSTOPPED(status)) && (!stop_ptrace))
{
char buffer[4096];
char *backtrace_str = NULL;
siginfo_t sig;
int r = 0;
int back;
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
r = ptrace(PT_GETSIGINFO, child, NULL, &sig);
#endif
back = r == 0 &&
sig.si_signo != SIGTRAP ? sig.si_signo : 0;
if (sig.si_signo == SIGUSR1)
{
if (remember_sigill)
remember_sigusr1 = EINA_TRUE;
}
else if (sig.si_signo == SIGILL)
{
remember_sigill = EINA_TRUE;
}
else
{
remember_sigill = EINA_FALSE;
}
if (r != 0 ||
(sig.si_signo != SIGSEGV &&
sig.si_signo != SIGFPE &&
sig.si_signo != SIGABRT))
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
ptrace(PT_CONTINUE, child, NULL, back);
#endif
continue;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
/* E18 should be in pause, we can detach */
ptrace(PT_DETACH, child, NULL, back);
#endif
/* And call gdb if available */
r = 0;
if (home)
{
/* call e_sys gdb */
snprintf(buffer, 4096,
"%s/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_sys gdb %i %s/.e-crashdump.txt",
eina_prefix_lib_get(pfx),
child,
home);
r = system(buffer);
r = system(buffer);
fprintf(stderr, "called gdb with '%s' = %i\n",
buffer, WEXITSTATUS(r));
snprintf(buffer, 4096,
"%s/.e-crashdump.txt",
home);
backtrace_str = strdup(buffer);
r = WEXITSTATUS(r);
}
/* call e_alert */
snprintf(buffer, 4096,
backtrace_str ?
"%s/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_alert %i %i '%s' %i" :
"%s/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_alert %i %i '%s' %i",
eina_prefix_lib_get(pfx),
sig.si_signo == SIGSEGV && remember_sigusr1 ? SIGILL : sig.si_signo,
child,
backtrace_str,
r);
r = system(buffer);
/* kill e */
kill(child, SIGKILL);
if (WEXITSTATUS(r) != 1)
{
restart = EINA_FALSE;
}
}
else if (!WIFEXITED(status))
{
done = EINA_TRUE;
}
else if (stop_ptrace)
{
done = EINA_TRUE;
}
}
else if (result == -1)
{
if (errno != EINTR)
{
done = EINA_TRUE;
restart = EINA_FALSE;
}
else
{
if (stop_ptrace)
{
kill(child, SIGSTOP);
usleep(200000);
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
if (!really_know)
ptrace(PT_DETACH, child, NULL, NULL);
#endif
}
}
}
#ifdef E_CSERVE
else if (cs_use && (result == cs_child))
{
if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
{
printf("E - cserve2 terminated with signal %d\n",
WTERMSIG(status));
cs_child = _cserve2_start();
}
else if (WIFEXITED(status))
{
printf("E - cserve2 exited with code %d\n",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
cs_child = -1;
}
}
#endif
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef E_CSERVE
if (cs_child > 0)
{
pid_t result;
int status;
alarm(2);
kill(cs_child, SIGINT);
result = waitpid(cs_child, &status, 0);
if (result != cs_child)
{
printf("E - cserve2 did not shutdown in 2 seconds, killing!\n");
kill(cs_child, SIGKILL);
}
}
#endif
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Enlightenment before 0.17.6 might allow local users to gain privileges via vectors involving the gdb method.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
content::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, 0, client_id);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::DocumentAttached(Document* document) {
DCHECK(document);
use_secure_keyboard_entry_when_active_ = false;
selection_editor_->DocumentAttached(document);
SetContext(document);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | High | 171,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void* ipc_alloc(int size)
{
void* out;
if(size > PAGE_SIZE)
out = vmalloc(size);
else
out = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,982 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int accept_server_socket(int sfd)
{
struct sockaddr_un remote;
struct pollfd pfd;
int fd;
socklen_t len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept fd %d", sfd);
/* make sure there is data to process */
pfd.fd = sfd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, 0) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept poll timeout");
return -1;
}
if ((fd = accept(sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &len)) == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock accept failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateSimpleBlock(
long long st,
long long sz)
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow) SimpleBlock(this, idx, st, sz);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
SimpleBlock* const p = static_cast<SimpleBlock*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0)
{
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_user_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,8);
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
| Medium | 173,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsOverMinFlickSpeed() {
return velocity_calculator_.VelocitySquared() > kMinFlickSpeedSquared;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly handle Tibetan text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf, __u8 *data)
{
struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
nfca_poll->rats_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
data, nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
}
break;
case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
data, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
}
break;
default:
pr_err("unsupported activation_rf_tech_and_mode 0x%x\n",
ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode);
return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NCI_STATUS_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <[email protected]>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <[email protected]>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void get_socket_name(SingleInstData* data, char* buf, int len)
{
const char* dpy = g_getenv("DISPLAY");
char* host = NULL;
int dpynum;
if(dpy)
{
const char* p = strrchr(dpy, ':');
host = g_strndup(dpy, (p - dpy));
dpynum = atoi(p + 1);
}
else
dpynum = 0;
g_snprintf(buf, len, "%s/.%s-socket-%s-%d-%s",
g_get_tmp_dir(),
data->prog_name,
host ? host : "",
dpynum,
g_get_user_name());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: PCManFM 1.2.5 insecurely uses /tmp for a socket file, allowing a local user to cause a denial of service (application unavailability).
Commit Message: | Low | 164,816 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::GetPluginsCallback(
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<webkit::WebPluginInfo>& all_plugins) {
PluginServiceFilter* filter = PluginServiceImpl::GetInstance()->GetFilter();
std::vector<webkit::WebPluginInfo> plugins;
int child_process_id = -1;
int routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
for (size_t i = 0; i < all_plugins.size(); ++i) {
webkit::WebPluginInfo plugin(all_plugins[i]);
if (!filter || filter->IsPluginEnabled(child_process_id,
routing_id,
resource_context_,
GURL(),
GURL(),
&plugin)) {
plugins.push_back(plugin);
}
}
ViewHostMsg_GetPlugins::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, plugins);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage the interaction between the browser process and renderer processes during authorization of the loading of a plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via vectors involving a blocked plug-in.
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int BrowserMainLoop::PreCreateThreads() {
if (parts_) {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup",
"BrowserMainLoop::CreateThreads:PreCreateThreads");
result_code_ = parts_->PreCreateThreads();
}
if (!base::SequencedWorkerPool::IsEnabled())
base::SequencedWorkerPool::EnableForProcess();
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
base::FeatureList::InitializeInstance(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kEnableFeatures),
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kDisableFeatures));
InitializeMemoryManagementComponent();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::CommandLine::InitializedForCurrentProcess() &&
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableHeapProfiling)) {
base::allocator::PeriodicallyShimNewMallocZones();
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "BrowserMainLoop::CreateThreads:PluginService");
PluginService::GetInstance()->Init();
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_LIBRARY_CDMS)
CdmRegistry::GetInstance()->Init();
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
ui::WindowResizeHelperMac::Get()->Init(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
#endif
GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
#if defined(USE_X11)
gpu_data_manager_visual_proxy_.reset(
new internal::GpuDataManagerVisualProxy(gpu_data_manager));
#endif
gpu_data_manager->Initialize();
#if !defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (parsed_command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess))
RenderProcessHost::SetRunRendererInProcess(true);
#endif
std::vector<url::Origin> origins =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetOriginsRequiringDedicatedProcess();
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
for (auto origin : origins)
policy->AddIsolatedOrigin(origin);
EVP_set_buggy_rsa_parser(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kBuggyRSAParser));
return result_code_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in BoringSSL SPAKE2 in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to leak the low-order bits of SHA512(password) by inspecting protocol traffic.
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774} | Medium | 172,933 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithCallWith());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefCallWith(callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx)
{
byte *cmapdata, *entry;
int pid, eid;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount)
return;
cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable;
entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8;
pid = u16(entry + 0);
eid = u16(entry + 2);
font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4);
font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,782 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::SimulatedToken HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::Simulate(
const CompactHTMLToken& token,
HTMLTokenizer* tokenizer) {
SimulatedToken simulated_token = kOtherToken;
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(SVG);
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(kMathML);
if (InForeignContent() && TokenExitsForeignContent(token))
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG && TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML && TokenExitsMath(token)))
namespace_stack_.push_back(HTML);
if (!InForeignContent()) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, textareaTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, titleTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRCDATAState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kScriptDataState);
simulated_token = kScriptStart;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, linkTag)) {
simulated_token = kLink;
} else if (!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, plaintextTag) &&
!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kPLAINTEXTState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, iframeTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, xmpTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noembedTag) &&
options_.plugins_enabled) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noframesTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noscriptTag) &&
options_.script_enabled)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRAWTEXTState);
}
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = true;
} else if (in_select_insertion_mode_ && TokenExitsInSelect(token)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
}
}
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kEndTag ||
(token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag && token.SelfClosing() &&
InForeignContent())) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(SVG) && namespace_stack_.back() == HTML &&
TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(kMathML) &&
namespace_stack_.back() == HTML && TokenExitsMath(token))) {
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
if (!InForeignContent())
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kDataState);
return kScriptEnd;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag))
simulated_token = kStyleEnd;
}
tokenizer->SetForceNullCharacterReplacement(InForeignContent());
tokenizer->SetShouldAllowCDATA(InForeignContent());
return simulated_token;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Insufficient data validation in HTML parser in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634} | Medium | 173,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebSocket::sendCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebSocket.send()");
if (!args.Length())
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
WebSocket* webSocket = V8WebSocket::toNative(args.Holder());
v8::Handle<v8::Value> message = args[0];
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
bool result;
if (V8ArrayBuffer::HasInstance(message)) {
ArrayBuffer* arrayBuffer = V8ArrayBuffer::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(message));
ASSERT(arrayBuffer);
result = webSocket->send(arrayBuffer, ec);
} else if (V8Blob::HasInstance(message)) {
Blob* blob = V8Blob::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(message));
ASSERT(blob);
result = webSocket->send(blob, ec);
} else {
v8::TryCatch tryCatch;
v8::Handle<v8::String> stringMessage = message->ToString();
if (tryCatch.HasCaught())
return throwError(tryCatch.Exception(), args.GetIsolate());
result = webSocket->send(toWebCoreString(stringMessage), ec);
}
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8Boolean(result);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In the Linux kernel through 4.14.13, the rds_message_alloc_sgs() function does not validate a value that is used during DMA page allocation, leading to a heap-based out-of-bounds write (related to the rds_rdma_extra_size function in net/rds/rdma.c).
Commit Message: RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 169,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
}
return new_ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: isis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length)
{
const struct isis_common_header *isis_header;
const struct isis_iih_lan_header *header_iih_lan;
const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *header_iih_ptp;
const struct isis_lsp_header *header_lsp;
const struct isis_csnp_header *header_csnp;
const struct isis_psnp_header *header_psnp;
const struct isis_tlv_lsp *tlv_lsp;
const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *tlv_ptp_adj;
const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *tlv_is_reach;
const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *tlv_es_reach;
uint8_t pdu_type, max_area, id_length, tlv_type, tlv_len, tmp, alen, lan_alen, prefix_len;
uint8_t ext_is_len, ext_ip_len, mt_len;
const uint8_t *optr, *pptr, *tptr;
u_short packet_len,pdu_len, key_id;
u_int i,vendor_id;
int sigcheck;
packet_len=length;
optr = p; /* initialize the _o_riginal pointer to the packet start -
need it for parsing the checksum TLV and authentication
TLV verification */
isis_header = (const struct isis_common_header *)p;
ND_TCHECK(*isis_header);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
pptr = p+(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE);
header_iih_lan = (const struct isis_iih_lan_header *)pptr;
header_iih_ptp = (const struct isis_iih_ptp_header *)pptr;
header_lsp = (const struct isis_lsp_header *)pptr;
header_csnp = (const struct isis_csnp_header *)pptr;
header_psnp = (const struct isis_psnp_header *)pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IS-IS"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (isis_header->version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->version));
return (0);
}
if ((isis_header->id_length != SYSTEM_ID_LEN) && (isis_header->id_length != 0)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "system ID length of %d is not supported",
isis_header->id_length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->pdu_version != ISIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", isis_header->pdu_version));
return (0);
}
if (length < isis_header->fixed_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u > packet length %u", isis_header->fixed_len, length));
return (0);
}
if (isis_header->fixed_len < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "fixed header length %u < minimum header size %u", isis_header->fixed_len, (u_int)ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
max_area = isis_header->max_area;
switch(max_area) {
case 0:
max_area = 3; /* silly shit */
break;
case 255:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- 255 areas"));
return (0);
default:
break;
}
id_length = isis_header->id_length;
switch(id_length) {
case 0:
id_length = 6; /* silly shit again */
break;
case 1: /* 1-8 are valid sys-ID lenghts */
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
break;
case 255:
id_length = 0; /* entirely useless */
break;
default:
break;
}
/* toss any non 6-byte sys-ID len PDUs */
if (id_length != 6 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "bad packet -- illegal sys-ID length (%u)", id_length));
return (0);
}
pdu_type=isis_header->pdu_type;
/* in non-verbose mode print the basic PDU Type plus PDU specific brief information*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values, "unknown PDU-Type %u", pdu_type)));
} else {
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s, hlen: %u, v: %u, pdu-v: %u, sys-id-len: %u (%u), max-area: %u (%u)",
tok2str(isis_pdu_values,
"unknown, type %u",
pdu_type),
isis_header->fixed_len,
isis_header->version,
isis_header->pdu_version,
id_length,
isis_header->id_length,
max_area,
isis_header->max_area));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", 8)) /* provide the _o_riginal pointer */
return (0); /* for optionally debugging the common header */
}
}
switch (pdu_type) {
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LAN_IIH:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LAN_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_lan);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lan-id %s, prio %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id,NODE_ID_LEN),
header_iih_lan->priority));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_lan->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_lan->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lan-id: %s, Priority: %u, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_iih_lan->lan_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
(header_iih_lan->priority) & ISIS_LAN_PRIORITY_MASK,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_LAN_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_PTP_IIH:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_iih_ptp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, holding time: %us, Flags: [%s]",
isis_print_id(header_iih_ptp->source_id,SYSTEM_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_iih_ptp->holding_time),
tok2str(isis_iih_circuit_type_values,
"unknown circuit type 0x%02x",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t circuit-id: 0x%02x, PDU length: %u",
header_iih_ptp->circuit_id,
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_IIH_PTP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_LSP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_LSP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_lsp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lsp-id %s, seq 0x%08x, lifetime %5us",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s, seq: 0x%08x, lifetime: %5us\n\t chksum: 0x%04x",
isis_print_id(header_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN),
EXTRACT_32BITS(header_lsp->sequence_number),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->remaining_lifetime),
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, (const uint8_t *)header_lsp->lsp_id,
EXTRACT_16BITS(header_lsp->checksum),
12, length-12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PDU length: %u, Flags: [ %s",
pdu_len,
ISIS_MASK_LSP_OL_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "Overload bit set, " : ""));
if (ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DEFAULT_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "default " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_DELAY_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "delay " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_EXPENSE_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "expense " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_ATT_ERROR_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "error " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ATT bit set, "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ISIS_MASK_LSP_PARTITION_BIT(header_lsp->typeblock) ? "P bit set, " : ""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ]", tok2str(isis_lsp_istype_values, "Unknown(0x%x)",
ISIS_MASK_LSP_ISTYPE_BITS(header_lsp->typeblock))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_LSP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_CSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_CSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_csnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_csnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t start lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->start_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t end lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(header_csnp->end_lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_CSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
case ISIS_PDU_L1_PSNP:
case ISIS_PDU_L2_PSNP:
if (isis_header->fixed_len != (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "- bogus fixed header length %u should be %lu",
isis_header->fixed_len, (unsigned long)(ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*header_psnp);
if (length < ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", src-id %s", isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
pdu_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(header_psnp->pdu_len);
if (packet_len>pdu_len) {
packet_len=pdu_len; /* do TLV decoding as long as it makes sense */
length=pdu_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t source-id: %s, PDU length: %u",
isis_print_id(header_psnp->source_id, NODE_ID_LEN),
pdu_len));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE))
return (0);
}
packet_len -= (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
pptr = p + (ISIS_COMMON_HEADER_SIZE+ISIS_PSNP_HEADER_SIZE);
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return (1);
}
(void)print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length);
return (0);
}
/*
* Now print the TLV's.
*/
while (packet_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
if (packet_len < 2)
goto trunc;
tlv_type = *pptr++;
tlv_len = *pptr++;
tmp =tlv_len; /* copy temporary len & pointer to packet data */
tptr = pptr;
packet_len -= 2;
/* first lets see if we know the TLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_tlv_values,
"unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
if (tlv_len == 0) /* something is invalid */
continue;
if (packet_len < tlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* now check if we have a decoder otherwise do a hexdump at the end*/
switch (tlv_type) {
case ISIS_TLV_AREA_ADDR:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
while (tmp && alen < tmp) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Area address (length: %u): %s",
alen,
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, alen)));
tptr += alen;
tmp -= alen + 1;
if (tmp==0) /* if this is the last area address do not attemt a boundary check */
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
alen = *tptr++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH:
while (tmp >= ETHER_ADDR_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SNPA: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, ETHER_ADDR_LEN)));
tmp -= ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
tptr += ETHER_ADDR_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ISNEIGH_VARLEN:
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1) || tmp < 3) /* min. TLV length */
goto trunctlv;
lan_alen = *tptr++; /* LAN address length */
if (lan_alen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length 0 bytes (invalid)"));
break;
}
tmp --;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LAN address length %u bytes ", lan_alen));
while (tmp >= lan_alen) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lan_alen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tIS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, lan_alen)));
tmp -= lan_alen;
tptr +=lan_alen;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PADDING:
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IS_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp >= 2+NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) {
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_ALIAS_ID:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IS_REACH:
while (tmp >= NODE_ID_LEN+3+1) { /* is it worth attempting a decode ? */
ext_is_len = isis_print_ext_is_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_type);
if (ext_is_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tmp-=ext_is_len;
tptr+=ext_is_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IS_REACH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,1); /* check if there is one byte left to read out the virtual flag */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s",
tok2str(isis_is_reach_virtual_values,
"bogus virtual flag 0x%02x",
*tptr++)));
tlv_is_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_is_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_is_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_is_reach->neighbor_nodeid, NODE_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_is_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_is_reach);
tlv_is_reach++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_ESNEIGH:
tlv_es_reach = (const struct isis_tlv_es_reach *)tptr;
while (tmp >= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach)) {
ND_TCHECK(*tlv_es_reach);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ES Neighbor: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_es_reach->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, &tlv_es_reach->isis_metric_block);
tmp -= sizeof(struct isis_tlv_es_reach);
tlv_es_reach++;
}
break;
/* those two TLVs share the same format */
case ISIS_TLV_INT_IP_REACH:
case ISIS_TLV_EXT_IP_REACH:
if (!isis_print_tlv_ip_reach(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return (1);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_EXTD_IP_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6_REACH:
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_IP6_REACH:
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) { /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
}
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
while (tmp>0) {
ext_ip_len = isis_print_extd_ip_reach(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", AF_INET6);
if (ext_ip_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=ext_ip_len;
tmp-=ext_ip_len;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IP6ADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 interface address: %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_AUTH:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s: ",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_auth_values,
"unknown Authentication type 0x%02x",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_SIMPLE:
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 1, tlv_len - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5:
for(i=1;i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
if (tlv_len != ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_MD5_LEN+1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (invalid subTLV) "));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, optr, length, tptr + 1,
isis_clear_checksum_lifetime,
header_lsp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_GENERIC:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + 1), 2);
key_id = EXTRACT_16BITS((tptr+1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u, password: ", key_id));
for(i=1 + sizeof(uint16_t);i<tlv_len;i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr + i), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(tptr + i)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_AUTH_PRIVATE:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + 1, "\n\t\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PTP_ADJ:
tlv_ptp_adj = (const struct isis_tlv_ptp_adj *)tptr;
if(tmp>=1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Adjacency State: %s (%u)",
tok2str(isis_ptp_adjancey_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tmp--;
}
if(tmp>sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id)));
tmp-=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->extd_local_circuit_id);
}
if(tmp>=SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_sysid, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
if(tmp>=sizeof(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)) {
ND_TCHECK(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Extended Local circuit-ID: 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptp_adj->neighbor_extd_local_circuit_id)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PROTOCOLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NLPID(s): "));
while (tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (tmp>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_PORT_CAP:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 12),
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) & 0x0fff)));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
}
case ISIS_TLV_MT_CAPABILITY:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t O: %d, RES: %d, MTID(s): %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 15) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x07,
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) & 0x0fff));
tmp = tmp-2;
tptr = tptr+2;
if (tmp)
isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(ndo, tptr, tmp);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_TE_ROUTER_ID:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Traffic Engineering Router ID: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IPADDR:
while (tmp>=sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_HOSTNAME:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hostname: "));
if (fn_printzp(ndo, tptr, tmp, ndo->ndo_snapend))
goto trunctlv;
break;
case ISIS_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP:
if (tmp < NODE_ID_LEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, NODE_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IS Neighbor: %s", isis_print_id(tptr, NODE_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=(NODE_ID_LEN);
tmp-=(NODE_ID_LEN);
if (tmp < 1)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s]", ISIS_MASK_TLV_SHARED_RISK_GROUP(*tptr++) ? "numbered" : "unnumbered"));
tmp--;
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 interface address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
if (tmp < sizeof(struct in_addr))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 neighbor address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tmp-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
while (tmp>=4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link-ID: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=4;
tmp-=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP:
tlv_lsp = (const struct isis_tlv_lsp *)tptr;
while(tmp>=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp)) {
ND_TCHECK((tlv_lsp->lsp_id)[LSP_ID_LEN-1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t lsp-id: %s",
isis_print_id(tlv_lsp->lsp_id, LSP_ID_LEN)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->sequence_number, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq: 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_lsp->sequence_number)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", lifetime: %5ds", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->remaining_lifetime)));
ND_TCHECK2(tlv_lsp->checksum, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", chksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_lsp->checksum)));
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_tlv_lsp);
tlv_lsp++;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_CHECKSUM_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t checksum: 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
/* do not attempt to verify the checksum if it is zero
* most likely a HMAC-MD5 TLV is also present and
* to avoid conflicts the checksum TLV is zeroed.
* see rfc3358 for details
*/
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), tptr-optr,
length);
break;
case ISIS_TLV_POI:
if (tlv_len >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Purge Originator System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
if (tlv_len == 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2 * SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Received from System-ID: %s",
isis_print_id(tptr + SYSTEM_ID_LEN + 1, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_MT_SUPPORTED_MINLEN)
break;
while (tmp>1) {
/* length can only be a multiple of 2, otherwise there is
something broken -> so decode down until length is 1 */
if (tmp!=1) {
mt_len = isis_print_mtid(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ");
if (mt_len == 0) /* did something go wrong ? */
goto trunctlv;
tptr+=mt_len;
tmp-=mt_len;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t invalid MT-ID"));
break;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING:
/* first attempt to decode the flags */
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(isis_restart_flag_values, "none", *tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_FLAGLEN;
/* is there anything other than the flags field? */
if (tmp == 0)
break;
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Remaining holding time %us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr+=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
tmp-=ISIS_TLV_RESTART_SIGNALING_HOLDTIMELEN;
/* is there an additional sysid field present ?*/
if (tmp == SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", for %s", isis_print_id(tptr,SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IDRP_INFO_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Inter-Domain Information Type: %s",
tok2str(isis_subtlv_idrp_values,
"Unknown (0x%02x)",
*tptr)));
switch (*tptr++) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_ASN:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2); /* fetch AS number */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AS Number: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_LOCAL:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_IDRP_RES:
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len - 1))
return(0);
break;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_LSP_BUFFERSIZE_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t LSP Buffersize: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PART_DIS:
while (tmp >= SYSTEM_ID_LEN) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isis_print_id(tptr, SYSTEM_ID_LEN)));
tptr+=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
tmp-=SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_PREFIX_NEIGH:
if (tmp < sizeof(struct isis_metric_block))
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct isis_metric_block));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Metric Block"));
isis_print_metric_block(ndo, (const struct isis_metric_block *)tptr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
tmp-=sizeof(struct isis_metric_block);
while(tmp>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
prefix_len=*tptr++; /* read out prefix length in semioctets*/
if (prefix_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: prefix length %u < 2", prefix_len));
break;
}
tmp--;
if (tmp < prefix_len/2)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, prefix_len / 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAddress: %s/%u",
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, prefix_len / 2), prefix_len * 4));
tptr+=prefix_len/2;
tmp-=prefix_len/2;
}
break;
case ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_IIH_SEQNR_MINLEN); /* check if four bytes are on the wire */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE:
if (tmp < ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_TLV_VENDOR_PRIVATE_MINLEN); /* check if enough byte for a full oui */
vendor_id = EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor: %s (%u)",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", vendor_id),
vendor_id));
tptr+=3;
tmp-=3;
if (tmp > 0) /* hexdump the rest */
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t", tmp))
return(0);
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ISIS_TLV_DECNET_PHASE4:
case ISIS_TLV_LUCENT_PRIVATE:
case ISIS_TLV_IPAUTH:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE1:
case ISIS_TLV_NORTEL_PRIVATE2:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t\t", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1) {
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", tlv_len))
return(0);
}
pptr += tlv_len;
packet_len -= tlv_len;
}
if (packet_len != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u straggler bytes", packet_len));
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (1);
trunctlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isis_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12999/IS-IS: Add a missing length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GDataCacheMetadataMap::ScanCacheDirectory(
const std::vector<FilePath>& cache_paths,
GDataCache::CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type,
CacheMap* cache_map,
ResourceIdToFilePathMap* processed_file_map) {
DCHECK(cache_map);
DCHECK(processed_file_map);
file_util::FileEnumerator enumerator(
cache_paths[sub_dir_type],
false, // not recursive
static_cast<file_util::FileEnumerator::FileType>(
file_util::FileEnumerator::FILES |
file_util::FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS),
util::kWildCard);
for (FilePath current = enumerator.Next(); !current.empty();
current = enumerator.Next()) {
std::string resource_id;
std::string md5;
std::string extra_extension;
util::ParseCacheFilePath(current, &resource_id, &md5, &extra_extension);
int cache_state = GDataCache::CACHE_STATE_NONE;
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
std::string reason;
if (!IsValidSymbolicLink(current, sub_dir_type, cache_paths, &reason)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an invalid symlink: " << current.value()
<< ": " << reason;
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (iter != cache_map->end()) { // Entry exists, update pinned state.
iter->second.cache_state =
GDataCache::SetCachePinned(iter->second.cache_state);
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
continue;
}
cache_state = GDataCache::SetCachePinned(cache_state);
} else if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING) {
std::string reason;
if (!IsValidSymbolicLink(current, sub_dir_type, cache_paths, &reason)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an invalid symlink: " << current.value()
<< ": " << reason;
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (iter == cache_map->end() || !iter->second.IsDirty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing an symlink to a non-dirty file: "
<< current.value();
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
continue;
} else if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT ||
sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_TMP) {
FilePath unused;
if (file_util::ReadSymbolicLink(current, &unused)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing a symlink in persistent/tmp directory"
<< current.value();
util::DeleteSymlink(current);
continue;
}
if (extra_extension == util::kMountedArchiveFileExtension) {
DCHECK(sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT);
file_util::Delete(current, false);
} else {
cache_state = GDataCache::SetCachePresent(cache_state);
if (md5 == util::kLocallyModifiedFileExtension) {
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT) {
cache_state |= GDataCache::SetCacheDirty(cache_state);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing a dirty file in tmp directory: "
<< current.value();
file_util::Delete(current, false);
continue;
}
}
}
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected sub directory type: " << sub_dir_type;
}
cache_map->insert(std::make_pair(
resource_id, GDataCache::CacheEntry(md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state)));
processed_file_map->insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, current));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size(module, dir));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FrameImpl::FrameImpl(std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents,
chromium::web::FrameObserverPtr observer)
: web_contents_(std::move(web_contents)), observer_(std::move(observer)) {
Observe(web_contents.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155} | High | 172,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: http_rxchunk(struct http *hp)
{
char *q;
int l, i;
l = hp->prxbuf;
do
(void)http_rxchar(hp, 1, 0);
while (hp->rxbuf[hp->prxbuf - 1] != '\n');
vtc_dump(hp->vl, 4, "len", hp->rxbuf + l, -1);
i = strtoul(hp->rxbuf + l, &q, 16);
bprintf(hp->chunklen, "%d", i);
if ((q == hp->rxbuf + l) ||
(*q != '\0' && !vct_islws(*q))) {
vtc_log(hp->vl, hp->fatal, "chunked fail %02x @ %d",
*q, q - (hp->rxbuf + l));
}
assert(q != hp->rxbuf + l);
assert(*q == '\0' || vct_islws(*q));
hp->prxbuf = l;
if (i > 0) {
(void)http_rxchar(hp, i, 0);
vtc_dump(hp->vl, 4, "chunk",
hp->rxbuf + l, i);
}
l = hp->prxbuf;
(void)http_rxchar(hp, 2, 0);
if(!vct_iscrlf(hp->rxbuf[l]))
vtc_log(hp->vl, hp->fatal,
"Wrong chunk tail[0] = %02x",
hp->rxbuf[l] & 0xff);
if(!vct_iscrlf(hp->rxbuf[l + 1]))
vtc_log(hp->vl, hp->fatal,
"Wrong chunk tail[1] = %02x",
hp->rxbuf[l + 1] & 0xff);
hp->prxbuf = l;
hp->rxbuf[l] = '\0';
return (i);
}
Vulnerability Type: Http R.Spl.
CWE ID:
Summary: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] [email protected] | Medium | 169,999 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaRecorderHandler::~MediaRecorderHandler() {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_)
client_->WriteData(
nullptr, 0u, true,
(TimeTicks::Now() - TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()).InMillisecondsF());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in MediaRecorder in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242} | Medium | 172,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
__uint128_t tmp;
void *valp = &tmp;
u64 off;
int err = 0;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (validate_core_offset(reg))
return -EINVAL;
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) > sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(valp, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (off == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE_REG(regs.pstate)) {
u32 mode = (*(u32 *)valp) & PSR_AA32_MODE_MASK;
switch (mode) {
case PSR_AA32_MODE_USR:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_FIQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_IRQ:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT:
case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND:
case PSR_MODE_EL0t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1t:
case PSR_MODE_EL1h:
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
memcpy((u32 *)regs + off, valp, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id));
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c in KVM in the Linux kernel before 4.18.12 on the arm64 platform mishandles the KVM_SET_ON_REG ioctl. This is exploitable by attackers who can create virtual machines. An attacker can arbitrarily redirect the hypervisor flow of control (with full register control). An attacker can also cause a denial of service (hypervisor panic) via an illegal exception return. This occurs because of insufficient restrictions on userspace access to the core register file, and because PSTATE.M validation does not prevent unintended execution modes.
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Sanitize PSTATE.M when being set from userspace
Not all execution modes are valid for a guest, and some of them
depend on what the HW actually supports. Let's verify that what
userspace provides is compatible with both the VM settings and
the HW capabilities.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0d854a60b1d7 ("arm64: KVM: enable initialization of a 32bit vcpu")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> | Low | 170,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int git_pkt_parse_line(
git_pkt **head, const char *line, const char **out, size_t bufflen)
{
int ret;
int32_t len;
/* Not even enough for the length */
if (bufflen > 0 && bufflen < PKT_LEN_SIZE)
return GIT_EBUFS;
len = parse_len(line);
if (len < 0) {
/*
* If we fail to parse the length, it might be because the
* server is trying to send us the packfile already.
*/
if (bufflen >= 4 && !git__prefixcmp(line, "PACK")) {
giterr_clear();
*out = line;
return pack_pkt(head);
}
return (int)len;
}
/*
* If we were given a buffer length, then make sure there is
* enough in the buffer to satisfy this line
*/
if (bufflen > 0 && bufflen < (size_t)len)
return GIT_EBUFS;
/*
* The length has to be exactly 0 in case of a flush
* packet or greater than PKT_LEN_SIZE, as the decoded
* length includes its own encoded length of four bytes.
*/
if (len != 0 && len < PKT_LEN_SIZE)
return GIT_ERROR;
line += PKT_LEN_SIZE;
/*
* TODO: How do we deal with empty lines? Try again? with the next
* line?
*/
if (len == PKT_LEN_SIZE) {
*head = NULL;
*out = line;
return 0;
}
if (len == 0) { /* Flush pkt */
*out = line;
return flush_pkt(head);
}
len -= PKT_LEN_SIZE; /* the encoded length includes its own size */
if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_DATA)
ret = data_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_PROGRESS)
ret = sideband_progress_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_ERROR)
ret = sideband_error_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ACK"))
ret = ack_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "NAK"))
ret = nak_pkt(head);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ERR "))
ret = err_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == '#')
ret = comment_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ok"))
ret = ok_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ng"))
ret = ng_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "unpack"))
ret = unpack_pkt(head, line, len);
else
ret = ref_pkt(head, line, len);
*out = line + len;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Git Smart Protocol support in libgit2 before 0.24.6 and 0.25.x before 0.25.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via an empty packet line.
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do. | Medium | 168,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __init pf_init(void)
{ /* preliminary initialisation */
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pf_init_units();
if (pf_detect())
return -ENODEV;
pf_busy = 0;
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++)
put_disk(pf->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
struct gendisk *disk = pf->disk;
if (!pf->present)
continue;
disk->private_data = pf;
add_disk(disk);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size ShellWindowFrameView::GetMinimumSize() {
gfx::Size min_size = frame_->client_view()->GetMinimumSize();
gfx::Rect client_bounds = GetBoundsForClientView();
min_size.Enlarge(0, client_bounds.y());
int closeButtonOffsetX =
(kCaptionHeight - close_button_->height()) / 2;
int header_width = close_button_->width() + closeButtonOffsetX * 2;
if (header_width > min_size.width())
min_size.set_width(header_width);
return min_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!po->running)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->fanout)
return -EALREADY;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
po->rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*po->rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!po->rollover)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_failed, 0);
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (err) {
kfree(po->rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.13 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a multithreaded application that makes PACKET_FANOUT setsockopt system calls.
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed(bool allowed) {
if (allowed) {
CHECK(RunLoop::IsNestingAllowedOnCurrentThread());
pump_->ScheduleWork();
}
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = allowed;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263} | High | 171,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const void *params, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
CLOG_CONFIG(setConfig, "%s(%#x), %zu@%p)", asString(extIndex), index, size, params);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SetConfig(
mHandle, index, const_cast<void *>(params));
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lib_file_open(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile)
{ /* i_ctx_p is NULL running arg (@) files.
* lib_path and mem are never NULL
*/
bool starting_arg_file = (i_ctx_p == NULL) ? true : i_ctx_p->starting_arg_file;
bool search_with_no_combine = false;
bool search_with_combine = false;
char fmode[2] = { 'r', 0};
gx_io_device *iodev = iodev_default(mem);
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
int code;
/* when starting arg files (@ files) iodev_default is not yet set */
if (iodev == 0)
iodev = (gx_io_device *)gx_io_device_table[0];
search_with_combine = false;
} else {
search_with_no_combine = starting_arg_file;
search_with_combine = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Ghostscript before 9.21 might allow remote attackers to bypass the SAFER mode protection mechanism and consequently read arbitrary files via the use of the .libfile operator in a crafted postscript document.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = data.readInt64();
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(slotMask);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(w, h);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t defaultFormat = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact function in libs/gui/IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not initialize a certain slot variable, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an ATTACH_BUFFER action, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26338113.
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferConsumer: fix ATTACH_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338113
Change-Id: I019c4df2c6adbc944122df96968ddd11a02ebe33
| Medium | 173,933 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void fillWidgetStates(AXObject& axObject,
protocol::Array<AXProperty>& properties) {
AccessibilityRole role = axObject.roleValue();
if (roleAllowsChecked(role)) {
AccessibilityButtonState checked = axObject.checkboxOrRadioValue();
switch (checked) {
case ButtonStateOff:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateOn:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
case ButtonStateMixed:
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Checked,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
break;
}
}
AccessibilityExpanded expanded = axObject.isExpanded();
switch (expanded) {
case ExpandedUndefined:
break;
case ExpandedCollapsed:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(false, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
case ExpandedExpanded:
properties.addItem(createProperty(
AXWidgetStatesEnum::Expanded,
createBooleanValue(true, AXValueTypeEnum::BooleanOrUndefined)));
break;
}
if (role == ToggleButtonRole) {
if (!axObject.isPressed()) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("false", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
} else {
const AtomicString& pressedAttr =
axObject.getAttribute(HTMLNames::aria_pressedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(pressedAttr, "mixed"))
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("mixed", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
else
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Pressed,
createValue("true", AXValueTypeEnum::Tristate)));
}
}
if (roleAllowsSelected(role)) {
properties.addItem(
createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Selected,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isSelected())));
}
if (roleAllowsModal(role)) {
properties.addItem(createProperty(AXWidgetStatesEnum::Modal,
createBooleanValue(axObject.isModal())));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::StopCasting(const std::string& activity_id) {
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.stopCastMirroring('user-stop');");
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the DocumentLoader::maybeCreateArchive function in core/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via crafted MHTML content, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663} | Medium | 171,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool generic_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff, unsigned int *timeouts)
{
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18 generates incorrect conntrack entries during handling of certain iptables rule sets for the SCTP, DCCP, GRE, and UDP-Lite protocols, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via packets with disallowed port numbers.
Commit Message: netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) + len > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read | Medium | 169,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WildMidi_Open function in WildMIDI since commit d8a466829c67cacbb1700beded25c448d99514e5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178. | Medium | 169,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CreatePrintSettingsDictionary(DictionaryValue* dict) {
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, false);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, printing::GRAY);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, printing::SIMPLEX);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, 1);
dict->SetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, "dummy");
dict->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, "0xb33fbeef");
dict->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, 12345);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType, printing::DEFAULT_MARGINS);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPreviewModifiable, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
{
int result;
if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal, args,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ima_lsm_rule_init function in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, when the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework is disabled, allows local users to bypass Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) rules in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging an administrator's addition of an IMA rule for LSM.
Commit Message: ima: fix add LSM rule bug
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: David Safford <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 165,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mov_write_audio_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int version = 0;
uint32_t tag = track->tag;
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV) {
if (track->timescale > UINT16_MAX) {
if (mov_get_lpcm_flags(track->par->codec_id))
tag = AV_RL32("lpcm");
version = 2;
} else if (track->audio_vbr || mov_pcm_le_gt16(track->par->codec_id) ||
mov_pcm_be_gt16(track->par->codec_id) ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MS ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_WAV ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_QDM2) {
version = 1;
}
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
if (mov->encryption_scheme != MOV_ENC_NONE) {
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "enca");
} else {
avio_wl32(pb, tag); // store it byteswapped
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Data-reference index, XXX == 1 */
/* SoundDescription */
avio_wb16(pb, version); /* Version */
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Revision level */
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
if (version == 2) {
avio_wb16(pb, 3);
avio_wb16(pb, 16);
avio_wb16(pb, 0xfffe);
avio_wb16(pb, 0);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x00010000);
avio_wb32(pb, 72);
avio_wb64(pb, av_double2int(track->par->sample_rate));
avio_wb32(pb, track->par->channels);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x7F000000);
avio_wb32(pb, av_get_bits_per_sample(track->par->codec_id));
avio_wb32(pb, mov_get_lpcm_flags(track->par->codec_id));
avio_wb32(pb, track->sample_size);
avio_wb32(pb, get_samples_per_packet(track));
} else {
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV) {
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->channels);
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_U8 ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S8)
avio_wb16(pb, 8); /* bits per sample */
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_G726)
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->bits_per_coded_sample);
else
avio_wb16(pb, 16);
avio_wb16(pb, track->audio_vbr ? -2 : 0); /* compression ID */
} else { /* reserved for mp4/3gp */
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_FLAC ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_OPUS) {
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->channels);
} else {
avio_wb16(pb, 2);
}
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_FLAC) {
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->bits_per_raw_sample);
} else {
avio_wb16(pb, 16);
}
avio_wb16(pb, 0);
}
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* packet size (= 0) */
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_OPUS)
avio_wb16(pb, 48000);
else
avio_wb16(pb, track->par->sample_rate <= UINT16_MAX ?
track->par->sample_rate : 0);
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
}
if (version == 1) { /* SoundDescription V1 extended info */
if (mov_pcm_le_gt16(track->par->codec_id) ||
mov_pcm_be_gt16(track->par->codec_id))
avio_wb32(pb, 1); /* must be 1 for uncompressed formats */
else
avio_wb32(pb, track->par->frame_size); /* Samples per packet */
avio_wb32(pb, track->sample_size / track->par->channels); /* Bytes per packet */
avio_wb32(pb, track->sample_size); /* Bytes per frame */
avio_wb32(pb, 2); /* Bytes per sample */
}
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV &&
(track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AAC ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AC3 ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_EAC3 ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AMR_NB ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ALAC ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MS ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_WAV ||
track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_QDM2 ||
(mov_pcm_le_gt16(track->par->codec_id) && version==1) ||
(mov_pcm_be_gt16(track->par->codec_id) && version==1)))
mov_write_wave_tag(s, pb, track);
else if (track->tag == MKTAG('m','p','4','a'))
mov_write_esds_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AMR_NB)
mov_write_amr_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_AC3)
mov_write_ac3_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_EAC3)
mov_write_eac3_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ALAC)
mov_write_extradata_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_WMAPRO)
mov_write_wfex_tag(s, pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_FLAC)
mov_write_dfla_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_OPUS)
mov_write_dops_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->vos_len > 0)
mov_write_glbl_tag(pb, track);
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV && track->par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO)
mov_write_chan_tag(s, pb, track);
if (mov->encryption_scheme != MOV_ENC_NONE) {
ff_mov_cenc_write_sinf_tag(track, pb, mov->encryption_kid);
}
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: libavformat/movenc.c in FFmpeg before 4.0.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash caused by a divide-by-zero error) with a user crafted audio file when converting to the MOV audio format.
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,117 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void testInspectorManualAttachDetach(CustomInspectorTest* test, gconstpointer)
{
test->showInWindowAndWaitUntilMapped(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
test->resizeView(200, 200);
test->loadHtml("<html><body><p>WebKitGTK+ Inspector test</p></body></html>", 0);
test->waitUntilLoadFinished();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(false);
test->assertObjectIsDeletedWhenTestFinishes(G_OBJECT(webkit_web_inspector_get_web_view(test->m_inspector)));
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
Vector<InspectorTest::InspectorEvents>& events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Attach);
test->m_events.clear();
test->detachAndWaitUntilWindowOpened();
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
test->m_events.clear();
test->closeAndWaitUntilClosed();
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::Closed);
test->m_events.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a malformed name for the font encoding.
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data = node->data;
struct grub_ext2_inode *inode = &node->inode;
int blknr = -1;
unsigned int blksz = EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE (data);
int log2_blksz = LOG2_EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE (data);
if (grub_le_to_cpu32(inode->flags) & EXT4_EXTENTS_FLAG)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char buf[EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE (data)];
#else
char * buf = grub_malloc (EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE(data));
#endif
struct grub_ext4_extent_header *leaf;
struct grub_ext4_extent *ext;
int i;
leaf = grub_ext4_find_leaf (data, buf,
(struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) inode->blocks.dir_blocks,
fileblock);
if (! leaf)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid extent");
return -1;
}
ext = (struct grub_ext4_extent *) (leaf + 1);
for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries); i++)
{
if (fileblock < grub_le_to_cpu32 (ext[i].block))
break;
}
if (--i >= 0)
{
fileblock -= grub_le_to_cpu32 (ext[i].block);
if (fileblock >= grub_le_to_cpu16 (ext[i].len))
return 0;
else
{
grub_disk_addr_t start;
start = grub_le_to_cpu16 (ext[i].start_hi);
start = (start << 32) + grub_le_to_cpu32 (ext[i].start);
return fileblock + start;
}
}
else
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "something wrong with extent");
return -1;
}
}
/* Direct blocks. */
if (fileblock < INDIRECT_BLOCKS)
blknr = grub_le_to_cpu32 (inode->blocks.dir_blocks[fileblock]);
/* Indirect. */
else if (fileblock < INDIRECT_BLOCKS + blksz / 4)
{
grub_uint32_t *indir;
indir = grub_malloc (blksz);
if (! indir)
return grub_errno;
if (grub_disk_read (data->disk,
((grub_disk_addr_t)
grub_le_to_cpu32 (inode->blocks.indir_block))
<< log2_blksz,
0, blksz, indir))
return grub_errno;
blknr = grub_le_to_cpu32 (indir[fileblock - INDIRECT_BLOCKS]);
grub_free (indir);
}
/* Double indirect. */
else if (fileblock < (grub_disk_addr_t)(INDIRECT_BLOCKS + blksz / 4) \
* (grub_disk_addr_t)(blksz / 4 + 1))
{
unsigned int perblock = blksz / 4;
unsigned int rblock = fileblock - (INDIRECT_BLOCKS
+ blksz / 4);
grub_uint32_t *indir;
indir = grub_malloc (blksz);
if (! indir)
return grub_errno;
if (grub_disk_read (data->disk,
((grub_disk_addr_t)
grub_le_to_cpu32 (inode->blocks.double_indir_block))
<< log2_blksz,
0, blksz, indir))
return grub_errno;
if (grub_disk_read (data->disk,
((grub_disk_addr_t)
grub_le_to_cpu32 (indir[rblock / perblock]))
<< log2_blksz,
0, blksz, indir))
return grub_errno;
blknr = grub_le_to_cpu32 (indir[rblock % perblock]);
grub_free (indir);
}
/* triple indirect. */
else
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
"ext2fs doesn't support triple indirect blocks");
}
return blknr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The grub_memmove function in shlr/grub/kern/misc.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer underflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file, possibly related to a buffer underflow in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB 2.02.
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove | Medium | 168,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len);
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) {
/* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else {
/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the complete_emulated_mmio function in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.6 allows guest OS users to execute arbitrary code on the host OS by leveraging a loop that triggers an invalid memory copy affecting certain cancel_work_item data.
Commit Message: kvm: x86: fix emulator buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0049)
The problem occurs when the guest performs a pusha with the stack
address pointing to an mmio address (or an invalid guest physical
address) to start with, but then extending into an ordinary guest
physical address. When doing repeated emulated pushes
emulator_read_write sets mmio_needed to 1 on the first one. On a
later push when the stack points to regular memory,
mmio_nr_fragments is set to 0, but mmio_is_needed is not set to 0.
As a result, KVM exits to userspace, and then returns to
complete_emulated_mmio. In complete_emulated_mmio
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment is incremented. The termination condition of
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments is never achieved.
The code bounces back and fourth to userspace incrementing
mmio_cur_fragment past it's buffer. If the guest does nothing else it
eventually leads to a a crash on a memcpy from invalid memory address.
However if a guest code can cause the vm to be destroyed in another
vcpu with excellent timing, then kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue
can be used by the guest to control the data that's pointed to by the
call to cancel_work_item, which can be used to gain execution.
Fixes: f78146b0f9230765c6315b2e14f56112513389ad
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (3.5+)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | High | 166,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_MD *digest;
VALUE vpass, vsalt, viter, vdigest;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *salt = NULL;
int iter;
rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "13", &vpass, &vsalt, &viter, &vdigest);
StringValue(vpass);
if(!NIL_P(vsalt)){
StringValue(vsalt);
if(RSTRING_LEN(vsalt) != PKCS5_SALT_LEN)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, "salt must be an 8-octet string");
salt = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vsalt);
}
iter = NIL_P(viter) ? 2048 : NUM2INT(viter);
digest = NIL_P(vdigest) ? EVP_md5() : GetDigestPtr(vdigest);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), digest, salt,
(unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vpass), RSTRING_LENINT(vpass), iter, key, iv);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof key);
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof iv);
return Qnil;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl gem for Ruby uses the same initialization vector (IV) in GCM Mode (aes-*-gcm) when the IV is set before the key, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to bypass the encryption protection mechanism.
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49 | Medium | 168,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LookupModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const void *priv, xkb_atom_t field,
enum expr_value_type type, xkb_mod_mask_t *val_rtrn)
{
const char *str;
xkb_mod_index_t ndx;
const LookupModMaskPriv *arg = priv;
const struct xkb_mod_set *mods = arg->mods;
enum mod_type mod_type = arg->mod_type;
if (type != EXPR_TYPE_INT)
return false;
str = xkb_atom_text(ctx, field);
if (istreq(str, "all")) {
*val_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
if (istreq(str, "none")) {
*val_rtrn = 0;
return true;
}
ndx = XkbModNameToIndex(mods, field, mod_type);
if (ndx == XKB_MOD_INVALID)
return false;
*val_rtrn = (1u << ndx);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Unchecked NULL pointer usage in LookupModMask in xkbcomp/expr.c in xkbcommon before 0.8.2 could be used by local attackers to crash (NULL pointer dereference) the xkbcommon parser by supplying a crafted keymap file with invalid virtual modifiers.
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <[email protected]> | Low | 169,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948} | Medium | 172,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void do_ade(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int __user *pc;
mm_segment_t seg;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, regs->cp0_badvaddr);
/*
* Did we catch a fault trying to load an instruction?
* Or are we running in MIPS16 mode?
*/
if ((regs->cp0_badvaddr == regs->cp0_epc) || (regs->cp0_epc & 0x1))
goto sigbus;
pc = (unsigned int __user *) exception_epc(regs);
if (user_mode(regs) && !test_thread_flag(TIF_FIXADE))
goto sigbus;
if (unaligned_action == UNALIGNED_ACTION_SIGNAL)
goto sigbus;
else if (unaligned_action == UNALIGNED_ACTION_SHOW)
show_registers(regs);
/*
* Do branch emulation only if we didn't forward the exception.
* This is all so but ugly ...
*/
seg = get_fs();
if (!user_mode(regs))
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
emulate_load_store_insn(regs, (void __user *)regs->cp0_badvaddr, pc);
set_fs(seg);
return;
sigbus:
die_if_kernel("Kernel unaligned instruction access", regs);
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
/*
* XXX On return from the signal handler we should advance the epc
*/
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fmtid;
int id;
char *infile;
jas_stream_t *instream;
jas_image_t *image;
int width;
int height;
int depth;
int numcmpts;
int verbose;
char *fmtname;
int debug;
size_t max_mem;
if (jas_init()) {
abort();
}
cmdname = argv[0];
infile = 0;
verbose = 0;
debug = 0;
#if defined(JAS_DEFAULT_MAX_MEM_USAGE)
max_mem = JAS_DEFAULT_MAX_MEM_USAGE;
#endif
/* Parse the command line options. */
while ((id = jas_getopt(argc, argv, opts)) >= 0) {
switch (id) {
case OPT_VERBOSE:
verbose = 1;
break;
case OPT_VERSION:
printf("%s\n", JAS_VERSION);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
break;
case OPT_DEBUG:
debug = atoi(jas_optarg);
break;
case OPT_INFILE:
infile = jas_optarg;
break;
case OPT_MAXMEM:
max_mem = strtoull(jas_optarg, 0, 10);
break;
case OPT_HELP:
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
jas_setdbglevel(debug);
#if defined(JAS_DEFAULT_MAX_MEM_USAGE)
jas_set_max_mem_usage(max_mem);
#endif
/* Open the image file. */
if (infile) {
/* The image is to be read from a file. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fopen(infile, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open input image file %s\n", infile);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
} else {
/* The image is to be read from standard input. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fdopen(0, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open standard input\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if ((fmtid = jas_image_getfmt(instream)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unknown image format\n");
}
/* Decode the image. */
if (!(image = jas_image_decode(instream, fmtid, 0))) {
jas_stream_close(instream);
fprintf(stderr, "cannot load image\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* Close the image file. */
jas_stream_close(instream);
if (!(numcmpts = jas_image_numcmpts(image))) {
fprintf(stderr, "warning: image has no components\n");
}
if (numcmpts) {
width = jas_image_cmptwidth(image, 0);
height = jas_image_cmptheight(image, 0);
depth = jas_image_cmptprec(image, 0);
} else {
width = 0;
height = 0;
depth = 0;
}
if (!(fmtname = jas_image_fmttostr(fmtid))) {
abort();
}
printf("%s %d %d %d %d %ld\n", fmtname, numcmpts, width, height, depth, (long) jas_image_rawsize(image));
jas_image_destroy(image);
jas_image_clearfmts();
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not enforce a minimum size for UTF-16 strings containing a Byte Order Mark (BOM), which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer underflow and memory corruption) via crafted 3GPP metadata, aka internal bug 20923261, a related issue to CVE-2015-3826.
Commit Message: Prevent integer underflow if size is below 6
When processing 3GPP metadata, a subtraction operation may underflow and
lead to a rather large linear byteswap operation in the subsequent
framedata decoding code. Bound the 'size' value to prevent this from
occurring.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: I35dfbc8878c6b65cfe8b8adb7351a77ad4d604e5
(cherry picked from commit 9458e715d391ee8fe455fc31f07ff35ce12e0531)
| High | 173,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int p4_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
int overflow;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/* catch in-flight IRQs */
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
hwc = &event->hw;
WARN_ON_ONCE(hwc->idx != idx);
/* it might be unflagged overflow */
overflow = p4_pmu_clear_cccr_ovf(hwc);
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (!overflow && (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1))))
continue;
handled += overflow;
/* event overflow for sure */
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
/*
* When dealing with the unmasking of the LVTPC on P4 perf hw, it has
* been observed that the OVF bit flag has to be cleared first _before_
* the LVTPC can be unmasked.
*
* The reason is the NMI line will continue to be asserted while the OVF
* bit is set. This causes a second NMI to generate if the LVTPC is
* unmasked before the OVF bit is cleared, leading to unknown NMI
* messages.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_parse_path(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict, fz_xml *root)
{
fz_xml *node;
char *fill_uri;
char *stroke_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *data_att;
char *fill_att;
char *stroke_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
fz_xml *transform_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *clip_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *data_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *fill_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *stroke_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
char *stroke_opacity_att = NULL;
char *stroke_dash_array_att;
char *stroke_dash_cap_att;
char *stroke_dash_offset_att;
char *stroke_end_line_cap_att;
char *stroke_start_line_cap_att;
char *stroke_line_join_att;
char *stroke_miter_limit_att;
char *stroke_thickness_att;
char *navigate_uri_att;
fz_stroke_state *stroke = NULL;
fz_matrix transform;
float samples[32];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
fz_path *path = NULL;
fz_path *stroke_path = NULL;
fz_rect area;
int fill_rule;
int dash_len = 0;
fz_matrix local_ctm;
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
transform_att = fz_xml_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Clip");
data_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Data");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Fill");
stroke_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Stroke");
opacity_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OpacityMask");
stroke_dash_array_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashArray");
stroke_dash_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashCap");
stroke_dash_offset_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashOffset");
stroke_end_line_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeEndLineCap");
stroke_start_line_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeStartLineCap");
stroke_line_join_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeLineJoin");
stroke_miter_limit_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeMiterLimit");
stroke_thickness_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeThickness");
navigate_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FixedPage.NavigateUri");
for (node = fz_xml_down(root); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Clip"))
clip_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Fill"))
fill_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Stroke"))
stroke_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Data"))
data_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
stroke_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &data_att, &data_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &stroke_att, &stroke_tag, &stroke_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Act on the information we have gathered:
*/
if (!data_att && !data_tag)
return;
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (stroke_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(stroke_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
stroke_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(stroke_tag, "Opacity");
stroke_att = fz_xml_att(stroke_tag, "Color");
stroke_tag = NULL;
}
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
{
if (stroke_dash_array_att)
{
char *s = stroke_dash_array_att;
while (*s)
{
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (*s) /* needed in case of a space before the last quote */
dash_len++;
while (*s && *s != ' ')
s++;
}
}
stroke = fz_new_stroke_state_with_dash_len(doc->ctx, dash_len);
stroke->start_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_start_line_cap_att);
stroke->dash_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_dash_cap_att);
stroke->end_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_end_line_cap_att);
stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_MITER_XPS;
if (stroke_line_join_att)
{
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Miter")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_MITER_XPS;
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Round")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_ROUND;
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Bevel")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_BEVEL;
}
stroke->miterlimit = 10;
if (stroke_miter_limit_att)
stroke->miterlimit = fz_atof(stroke_miter_limit_att);
stroke->linewidth = 1;
if (stroke_thickness_att)
stroke->linewidth = fz_atof(stroke_thickness_att);
stroke->dash_phase = 0;
stroke->dash_len = 0;
if (stroke_dash_array_att)
{
char *s = stroke_dash_array_att;
if (stroke_dash_offset_att)
stroke->dash_phase = fz_atof(stroke_dash_offset_att) * stroke->linewidth;
while (*s)
{
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (*s) /* needed in case of a space before the last quote */
stroke->dash_list[stroke->dash_len++] = fz_atof(s) * stroke->linewidth;
while (*s && *s != ' ')
s++;
}
stroke->dash_len = dash_len;
}
}
transform = fz_identity;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(doc, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(doc, transform_tag, &transform);
fz_concat(&local_ctm, &transform, ctm);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
xps_clip(doc, &local_ctm, dict, clip_att, clip_tag);
fill_rule = 0;
if (data_att)
path = xps_parse_abbreviated_geometry(doc, data_att, &fill_rule);
else if (data_tag)
{
path = xps_parse_path_geometry(doc, dict, data_tag, 0, &fill_rule);
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
stroke_path = xps_parse_path_geometry(doc, dict, data_tag, 1, &fill_rule);
}
if (!stroke_path)
stroke_path = path;
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
{
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, stroke_path, stroke, &local_ctm, &area);
if (stroke_path != path && (fill_att || fill_tag)) {
fz_rect bounds;
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, path, NULL, &local_ctm, &bounds);
fz_union_rect(&area, &bounds);
}
}
else
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, path, NULL, &local_ctm, &area);
if (navigate_uri_att)
xps_add_link(doc, &area, base_uri, navigate_uri_att);
xps_begin_opacity(doc, &local_ctm, &area, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
if (fill_att)
{
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_fill_path(doc->dev, path, fill_rule == 0, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
if (fill_tag)
{
fz_clip_path(doc->dev, path, &area, fill_rule == 0, &local_ctm);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
if (stroke_att)
{
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, stroke_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (stroke_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(stroke_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_stroke_path(doc->dev, stroke_path, stroke, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
if (stroke_tag)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(doc->dev, stroke_path, &area, stroke, &local_ctm);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, stroke_uri, dict, stroke_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
xps_end_opacity(doc, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
if (stroke_path != path)
fz_free_path(doc->ctx, stroke_path);
fz_free_path(doc->ctx, path);
path = NULL;
fz_drop_stroke_state(doc->ctx, stroke);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the xps_parse_color function in xps/xps-common.c in MuPDF 1.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of entries in the ContextColor value of the Fill attribute in a Path element.
Commit Message: | High | 165,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int do_tkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SI_TKILL;
info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The do_tkill function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application that makes a (1) tkill or (2) tgkill system call.
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 166,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
unsigned start, end, next, blksize;
sector_t block = page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
int ret;
blksize = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
next = end = 0;
while (next < from) {
next += blksize;
block++;
}
start = next;
do {
next += blksize;
ret = needs_empty_write(block, inode);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
if (ret == 0) {
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start,
gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
end = 0;
}
start = next;
}
else
end = next;
block++;
} while (next < to);
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start, gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The fallocate implementation in the GFS2 filesystem in the Linux kernel before 3.2 relies on the page cache, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service by preallocating blocks in certain situations involving insufficient memory.
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]> | Low | 166,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
height,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
else
{
if (sun_info.length > (height*bytes_per_line))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(sun_pixels,sun_data,sun_info.length);
}
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+bytes_per_line % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/sun.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted SUN file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 170,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_field(netdissect_options *ndo, const char **pptr, int *len)
{
const char *s;
if (*len <= 0 || !pptr || !*pptr)
return NULL;
if (*pptr > (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend)
return NULL;
s = *pptr;
while (*pptr <= (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend && *len >= 0 && **pptr) {
(*pptr)++;
(*len)--;
}
(*pptr)++;
(*len)--;
if (*len < 0 || *pptr > (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend)
return NULL;
return s;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Zephyr parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-zephyr.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12902/Zephyr: Fix bounds checking.
Use ND_TTEST() rather than comparing against ndo->ndo_snapend ourselves;
it's easy to get the tests wrong.
Check for running out of packet data before checking for running out of
captured data, and distinguish between running out of packet data (which
might just mean "no more strings") and running out of captured data
(which means "truncated").
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t *args)
{
int newsize, forkoff, retval;
trace_xfs_attr_sf_addname(args);
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_lookup(args);
if ((args->flags & ATTR_REPLACE) && (retval == -ENOATTR)) {
return retval;
} else if (retval == -EEXIST) {
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
return retval;
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
ASSERT(retval == 0);
}
if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||
args->valuelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX)
return -ENOSPC;
newsize = XFS_ATTR_SF_TOTSIZE(args->dp);
newsize += XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_BYNAME(args->namelen, args->valuelen);
forkoff = xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit(args->dp, newsize);
if (!forkoff)
return -ENOSPC;
xfs_attr_shortform_add(args, forkoff);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.17, a local attacker able to set attributes on an xfs filesystem could make this filesystem non-operational until the next mount by triggering an unchecked error condition during an xfs attribute change, because xfs_attr_shortform_addname in fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c mishandles ATTR_REPLACE operations with conversion of an attr from short to long form.
Commit Message: xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Layer::SetScrollOffset(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (layer_tree_host()) {
scroll_offset = layer_tree_host()->DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
scroll_offset, this);
}
if (scroll_offset_ == scroll_offset)
return;
scroll_offset_ = scroll_offset;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the XSLT ProcessingInstruction implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to an applyXSLTransform call involving (1) an HTML document or (2) an xsl:processing-instruction element that is still in the process of loading.
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UpdateForDataChange(int days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(original_update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(received_update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
if (days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
original_update_.Get(), received_update_.Get(),
days_since_last_update);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: eval_js(WebKitWebView * web_view, gchar *script, GString *result) {
WebKitWebFrame *frame;
JSGlobalContextRef context;
JSObjectRef globalobject;
JSStringRef var_name;
JSStringRef js_script;
JSValueRef js_result;
JSStringRef js_result_string;
size_t js_result_size;
js_init();
frame = webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(web_view));
context = webkit_web_frame_get_global_context(frame);
globalobject = JSContextGetGlobalObject(context);
/* uzbl javascript namespace */
var_name = JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString("Uzbl");
JSObjectSetProperty(context, globalobject, var_name,
JSObjectMake(context, uzbl.js.classref, NULL),
kJSClassAttributeNone, NULL);
/* evaluate the script and get return value*/
js_script = JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString(script);
js_result = JSEvaluateScript(context, js_script, globalobject, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (js_result && !JSValueIsUndefined(context, js_result)) {
js_result_string = JSValueToStringCopy(context, js_result, NULL);
js_result_size = JSStringGetMaximumUTF8CStringSize(js_result_string);
if (js_result_size) {
char js_result_utf8[js_result_size];
JSStringGetUTF8CString(js_result_string, js_result_utf8, js_result_size);
g_string_assign(result, js_result_utf8);
}
JSStringRelease(js_result_string);
}
/* cleanup */
JSObjectDeleteProperty(context, globalobject, var_name, NULL);
JSStringRelease(var_name);
JSStringRelease(js_script);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The eval_js function in uzbl-core.c in Uzbl before 2010.01.05 exposes the run method of the Uzbl object, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via JavaScript code.
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem. | High | 165,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (!template_url_service_) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
if (!template_url) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
GURL logo_url;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL)) {
logo_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
logo_url = template_url->logo_url();
#endif
}
GURL base_url;
GURL doodle_url;
const bool is_google = template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs(
template_url_service_->search_terms_data());
if (is_google) {
base_url =
GURL(template_url_service_->search_terms_data().GoogleBaseURLValue());
doodle_url = search_provider_logos::GetGoogleDoodleURL(base_url);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kThirdPartyDoodles)) {
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL)) {
doodle_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL));
} else {
std::string override_url = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
features::kThirdPartyDoodles,
features::kThirdPartyDoodlesOverrideUrlParam);
if (!override_url.empty()) {
doodle_url = GURL(override_url);
} else {
doodle_url = template_url->doodle_url();
}
}
base_url = doodle_url.GetOrigin();
}
if (!logo_url.is_valid() && !doodle_url.is_valid()) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const bool use_fixed_logo = !doodle_url.is_valid();
if (!logo_tracker_) {
std::unique_ptr<LogoCache> logo_cache = std::move(logo_cache_for_test_);
if (!logo_cache) {
logo_cache = std::make_unique<LogoCache>(cache_directory_);
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock = std::move(clock_for_test_);
if (!clock) {
clock = std::make_unique<base::DefaultClock>();
}
logo_tracker_ = std::make_unique<LogoTracker>(
request_context_getter_,
std::make_unique<LogoDelegateImpl>(std::move(image_decoder_)),
std::move(logo_cache), std::move(clock));
}
if (use_fixed_logo) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
logo_url, base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::ParseFixedLogoResponse),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::UseFixedLogoUrl));
} else if (is_google) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleParseLogoResponseCallback(base_url),
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleAppendQueryparamsCallback(
use_gray_background_));
} else {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewParseLogoResponse,
base_url),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewAppendQueryparamsToLogoURL,
use_gray_background_));
}
logo_tracker_->GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374} | High | 171,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SendRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!service_)
return;
bool is_extended_reporting = false;
if (item_->GetBrowserContext()) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(item_->GetBrowserContext());
is_extended_reporting = profile &&
profile->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingExtendedReportingEnabled);
}
ClientDownloadRequest request;
if (is_extended_reporting) {
request.mutable_population()->set_user_population(
ChromeUserPopulation::EXTENDED_REPORTING);
} else {
request.mutable_population()->set_user_population(
ChromeUserPopulation::SAFE_BROWSING);
}
request.set_url(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetUrlChain().back()));
request.mutable_digests()->set_sha256(item_->GetHash());
request.set_length(item_->GetReceivedBytes());
for (size_t i = 0; i < item_->GetUrlChain().size(); ++i) {
ClientDownloadRequest::Resource* resource = request.add_resources();
resource->set_url(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetUrlChain()[i]));
if (i == item_->GetUrlChain().size() - 1) {
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_URL);
resource->set_referrer(SanitizeUrl(item_->GetReferrerUrl()));
DVLOG(2) << "dl url " << resource->url();
if (!item_->GetRemoteAddress().empty()) {
resource->set_remote_ip(item_->GetRemoteAddress());
DVLOG(2) << " dl url remote addr: " << resource->remote_ip();
}
DVLOG(2) << "dl referrer " << resource->referrer();
} else {
DVLOG(2) << "dl redirect " << i << " " << resource->url();
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT);
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < tab_redirects_.size(); ++i) {
ClientDownloadRequest::Resource* resource = request.add_resources();
DVLOG(2) << "tab redirect " << i << " " << tab_redirects_[i].spec();
resource->set_url(SanitizeUrl(tab_redirects_[i]));
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::TAB_REDIRECT);
}
if (tab_url_.is_valid()) {
ClientDownloadRequest::Resource* resource = request.add_resources();
resource->set_url(SanitizeUrl(tab_url_));
DVLOG(2) << "tab url " << resource->url();
resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::TAB_URL);
if (tab_referrer_url_.is_valid()) {
resource->set_referrer(SanitizeUrl(tab_referrer_url_));
DVLOG(2) << "tab referrer " << resource->referrer();
}
}
request.set_user_initiated(item_->HasUserGesture());
request.set_file_basename(
item_->GetTargetFilePath().BaseName().AsUTF8Unsafe());
request.set_download_type(type_);
request.mutable_signature()->CopyFrom(signature_info_);
if (image_headers_)
request.set_allocated_image_headers(image_headers_.release());
if (zipped_executable_)
request.mutable_archived_binary()->Swap(&archived_binary_);
if (!request.SerializeToString(&client_download_request_data_)) {
FinishRequest(UNKNOWN, REASON_INVALID_REQUEST_PROTO);
return;
}
service_->client_download_request_callbacks_.Notify(item_, &request);
DVLOG(2) << "Sending a request for URL: "
<< item_->GetUrlChain().back();
fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0 /* ID used for testing */,
GetDownloadRequestUrl(),
net::URLFetcher::POST, this);
fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE);
fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false); // Don't retry on error.
fetcher_->SetRequestContext(service_->request_context_getter_.get());
fetcher_->SetUploadData("application/octet-stream",
client_download_request_data_);
request_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SBClientDownload.DownloadRequestPayloadSize",
client_download_request_data_.size());
fetcher_->Start();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876} | High | 171,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by leveraging incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data on error. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-8887.
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error. | Medium | 168,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _bdf_parse_glyphs( char* line,
unsigned long linelen,
unsigned long lineno,
void* call_data,
void* client_data )
{
int c, mask_index;
char* s;
unsigned char* bp;
unsigned long i, slen, nibbles;
_bdf_parse_t* p;
bdf_glyph_t* glyph;
bdf_font_t* font;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
FT_UNUSED( call_data );
FT_UNUSED( lineno ); /* only used in debug mode */
p = (_bdf_parse_t *)client_data;
font = p->font;
memory = font->memory;
/* Check for a comment. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
linelen -= 7;
s = line + 7;
if ( *s != 0 )
{
s++;
linelen--;
}
error = _bdf_add_comment( p->font, s, linelen );
goto Exit;
}
/* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) )
{
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->cnt = font->glyphs_size = _bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Make sure the number of glyphs is non-zero. */
if ( p->cnt == 0 )
font->glyphs_size = 64;
/* Limit ourselves to 1,114,112 glyphs in the font (this is the */
/* number of code points available in Unicode). */
if ( p->cnt >= 0x110000UL )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "CHARS" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs, font->glyphs_size ) )
goto Exit;
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPHS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDFONT field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 )
{
/* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */
ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_used,
sizeof ( bdf_glyph_t ),
by_encoding );
p->flags &= ~_BDF_START;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 )
{
p->glyph_enc = 0;
p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check whether a glyph is being scanned but should be */
/* ignored because it is an unencoded glyph. */
if ( ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) &&
p->glyph_enc == -1 &&
p->opts->keep_unencoded == 0 )
goto Exit;
/* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 )
{
/* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */
/* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
_bdf_list_shift( &p->list, 1 );
s = _bdf_list_join( &p->list, ' ', &slen );
if ( !s )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG8, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( p->glyph_name, slen + 1 ) )
goto Exit;
FT_MEM_COPY( p->glyph_name, s, slen + 1 );
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH;
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG1, lineno, s ));
goto Exit;
}
/* Check for the ENCODING field. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
{
/* Missing STARTCHAR field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "STARTCHAR" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Startchar_Field;
goto Exit;
}
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
/* Normalize negative encoding values. The specification only */
/* allows -1, but we can be more generous here. */
if ( p->glyph_enc < -1 )
p->glyph_enc = -1;
/* Check for alternative encoding format. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 && p->list.used > 2 )
p->glyph_enc = _bdf_atol( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
FT_TRACE4(( DBGMSG2, p->glyph_enc ));
/* Check that the encoding is in the Unicode range because */
sizeof ( unsigned long ) * 32 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG5, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
}
/* Check whether this encoding has already been encountered. */
/* If it has then change it to unencoded so it gets added if */
/* indicated. */
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
if ( _bdf_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc ) )
{
/* Emit a message saying a glyph has been moved to the */
/* unencoded area. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG12,
p->glyph_enc, p->glyph_name ));
p->glyph_enc = -1;
font->modified = 1;
}
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( p->have, p->glyph_enc );
}
if ( p->glyph_enc >= 0 )
{
/* Make sure there are enough glyphs allocated in case the */
/* number of characters happen to be wrong. */
if ( font->glyphs_used == font->glyphs_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->glyphs,
font->glyphs_size,
font->glyphs_size + 64 ) )
goto Exit;
font->glyphs_size += 64;
}
glyph = font->glyphs + font->glyphs_used++;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = p->glyph_enc;
/* Reset the initial glyph info. */
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded glyph. Check whether it should */
/* be added or not. */
if ( p->opts->keep_unencoded != 0 )
{
/* Allocate the next unencoded glyph. */
if ( font->unencoded_used == font->unencoded_size )
{
if ( FT_RENEW_ARRAY( font->unencoded ,
font->unencoded_size,
font->unencoded_size + 4 ) )
goto Exit;
font->unencoded_size += 4;
}
glyph = font->unencoded + font->unencoded_used;
glyph->name = p->glyph_name;
glyph->encoding = font->unencoded_used++;
}
else
/* Free up the glyph name if the unencoded shouldn't be */
/* kept. */
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
p->glyph_name = 0;
}
/* Clear the flags that might be added when width and height are */
/* checked for consistency. */
p->flags &= ~( _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK | _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK );
p->flags |= _BDF_ENCODING;
goto Exit;
}
/* Point at the glyph being constructed. */
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
glyph = font->unencoded + ( font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
glyph = font->glyphs + ( font->glyphs_used - 1 );
/* Check whether a bitmap is being constructed. */
if ( p->flags & _BDF_BITMAP )
{
/* If there are more rows than are specified in the glyph metrics, */
/* ignore the remaining lines. */
if ( p->row >= (unsigned long)glyph->bbx.height )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG13, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_HEIGHT_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
goto Exit;
}
/* Only collect the number of nibbles indicated by the glyph */
/* metrics. If there are more columns, they are simply ignored. */
nibbles = glyph->bpr << 1;
bp = glyph->bitmap + p->row * glyph->bpr;
for ( i = 0; i < nibbles; i++ )
{
c = line[i];
if ( !sbitset( hdigits, c ) )
break;
*bp = (FT_Byte)( ( *bp << 4 ) + a2i[c] );
if ( i + 1 < nibbles && ( i & 1 ) )
*++bp = 0;
}
/* If any line has not enough columns, */
/* indicate they have been padded with zero bits. */
if ( i < nibbles &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG16, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
/* Remove possible garbage at the right. */
mask_index = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp ) & 7;
if ( glyph->bbx.width )
*bp &= nibble_mask[mask_index];
/* If any line has extra columns, indicate they have been removed. */
if ( i == nibbles &&
sbitset( hdigits, line[nibbles] ) &&
!( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG14, glyph->encoding ));
p->flags |= _BDF_GLYPH_WIDTH_CHECK;
font->modified = 1;
}
p->row++;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->dwidth = (unsigned short)_bdf_atoul( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing SWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the scalable width from the device width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG9, lineno ));
glyph->swidth = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
}
p->flags |= _BDF_DWIDTH;
goto Exit;
}
/* Expect the BBX field next. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 )
{
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) )
goto Missing_Encoding;
error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
glyph->bbx.width = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[1], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.height = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[2], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.x_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[3], 0, 10 );
glyph->bbx.y_offset = _bdf_atos( p->list.field[4], 0, 10 );
/* Generate the ascent and descent of the character. */
glyph->bbx.ascent = (short)( glyph->bbx.height + glyph->bbx.y_offset );
glyph->bbx.descent = (short)( -glyph->bbx.y_offset );
/* Determine the overall font bounding box as the characters are */
/* loaded so corrections can be done later if indicated. */
p->maxas = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.ascent, p->maxas );
p->maxds = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.descent, p->maxds );
p->rbearing = (short)( glyph->bbx.width + glyph->bbx.x_offset );
p->maxrb = (short)FT_MAX( p->rbearing, p->maxrb );
p->minlb = (short)FT_MIN( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->minlb );
p->maxlb = (short)FT_MAX( glyph->bbx.x_offset, p->maxlb );
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_DWIDTH ) )
{
/* Missing DWIDTH field. Emit an auto correction message and set */
/* the device width to the glyph width. */
FT_TRACE2(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ACMSG10, lineno ));
glyph->dwidth = glyph->bbx.width;
}
/* If the BDF_CORRECT_METRICS flag is set, then adjust the SWIDTH */
/* value if necessary. */
if ( p->opts->correct_metrics != 0 )
{
/* Determine the point size of the glyph. */
unsigned short sw = (unsigned short)FT_MulDiv(
glyph->dwidth, 72000L,
(FT_Long)( font->point_size *
font->resolution_x ) );
if ( sw != glyph->swidth )
{
glyph->swidth = sw;
if ( p->glyph_enc == -1 )
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->umod,
font->unencoded_used - 1 );
else
_bdf_set_glyph_modified( font->nmod, glyph->encoding );
p->flags |= _BDF_SWIDTH_ADJ;
font->modified = 1;
}
}
p->flags |= _BDF_BBX;
goto Exit;
}
/* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */
if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 )
{
unsigned long bitmap_size;
if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_BBX ) )
{
/* Missing BBX field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "BBX" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Bbx_Field;
goto Exit;
}
/* Allocate enough space for the bitmap. */
glyph->bpr = ( glyph->bbx.width * p->font->bpp + 7 ) >> 3;
bitmap_size = glyph->bpr * glyph->bbx.height;
if ( glyph->bpr > 0xFFFFU || bitmap_size > 0xFFFFU )
{
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG4, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Bbx_Too_Big;
goto Exit;
}
else
glyph->bytes = (unsigned short)bitmap_size;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->bitmap, glyph->bytes ) )
goto Exit;
p->row = 0;
p->flags |= _BDF_BITMAP;
goto Exit;
}
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG9, lineno ));
error = BDF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
Missing_Encoding:
/* Missing ENCODING field. */
FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENCODING" ));
error = BDF_Err_Missing_Encoding_Field;
Exit:
if ( error && ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) )
FT_FREE( p->glyph_name );
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The _bdf_parse_glyphs function in FreeType before 2.4.11 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and crash) via vectors related to BDF fonts and an ENCODING field with a negative value.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::loadSimpleDefaultStyle()
{
ASSERT(!defaultStyle);
ASSERT(!simpleDefaultStyleSheet);
defaultStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultPrintStyle = defaultStyle;
defaultQuirksStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
simpleDefaultStyleSheet = parseUASheet(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet, strlen(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet));
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(simpleDefaultStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(parseUASheet(ViewportStyle::viewportStyleSheet()), screenEval());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int setup_dev_console(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs,
const struct lxc_console *console)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat s;
int ret;
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/console", rootfs->mount);
if (ret >= sizeof(path)) {
ERROR("console path too long");
return -1;
}
if (access(path, F_OK)) {
WARN("rootfs specified but no console found at '%s'", path);
return 0;
}
if (console->master < 0) {
INFO("no console");
return 0;
}
if (stat(path, &s)) {
SYSERROR("failed to stat '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
if (chmod(console->name, s.st_mode)) {
SYSERROR("failed to set mode '0%o' to '%s'",
s.st_mode, console->name);
return -1;
}
if (mount(console->name, path, "none", MS_BIND, 0)) {
ERROR("failed to mount '%s' on '%s'", console->name, path);
return -1;
}
INFO("console has been setup");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 166,720 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_async_error (IncrementData *data)
{
GError *error;
error = g_error_new (MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"%s",
"this method always loses");
dbus_g_method_return_error (data->context, error);
g_free (data);
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, renderer_process);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: StateBase* writeBlob(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
Blob* blob = V8Blob::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!blob)
return 0;
if (blob->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A Blob object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(blob->uuid(), blob->blobDataHandle());
if (appendBlobInfo(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size(), &blobIndex))
m_writer.writeBlobIndex(blobIndex);
else
m_writer.writeBlob(blob->uuid(), blob->type(), blob->size());
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of HashMap add operations instead of HashMap set operations, related to bindings/core/v8/DOMWrapperMap.h and bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp.
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos,
long long stop,
long long& id,
long long& size)
{
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
return aac_compat_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, (unsigned long)arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The aac_compat_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.8 does not require the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *url_decode_r(char *to, char *url, size_t size) {
char *s = url, // source
*d = to, // destination
*e = &to[size - 1]; // destination end
while(*s && d < e) {
if(unlikely(*s == '%')) {
if(likely(s[1] && s[2])) {
*d++ = from_hex(s[1]) << 4 | from_hex(s[2]);
s += 2;
}
}
else if(unlikely(*s == '+'))
*d++ = ' ';
else
*d++ = *s;
s++;
}
*d = '\0';
return to;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in Netdata 1.10.0. Full Path Disclosure (FPD) exists via api/v1/alarms. NOTE: the vendor says *is intentional.*
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521) | Medium | 169,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: on_handler_vanished(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
char *reason;
reason = g_strdup_printf("Cannot find handler bus name: "
"org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
handler->subtype);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE, reason));
g_free(reason);
}
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: tcmu-runner version 1.0.5 to 1.2.0 is vulnerable to a dbus triggered NULL pointer dereference in the tcmu-runner daemon's on_unregister_handler() function resulting in denial of service
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable. | Medium | 167,632 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void setPathFromConvexPoints(SkPath* path, size_t numPoints, const FloatPoint* points)
{
path->incReserve(numPoints);
path->moveTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[0].y()));
for (size_t i = 1; i < numPoints; ++i) {
path->lineTo(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].x()),
WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(points[i].y()));
}
path->setIsConvex(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 16.0.912.77, does not perform all required initialization of values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,976 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void snd_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer * timer, unsigned long ticks_left)
{
struct snd_timer_instance *ti, *ts, *tmp;
unsigned long resolution, ticks;
struct list_head *p, *ack_list_head;
unsigned long flags;
int use_tasklet = 0;
if (timer == NULL)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
/* remember the current resolution */
if (timer->hw.c_resolution)
resolution = timer->hw.c_resolution(timer);
else
resolution = timer->hw.resolution;
/* loop for all active instances
* Here we cannot use list_for_each_entry because the active_list of a
* processed instance is relinked to done_list_head before the callback
* is called.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(ti, tmp, &timer->active_list_head,
active_list) {
if (!(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING))
continue;
ti->pticks += ticks_left;
ti->resolution = resolution;
if (ti->cticks < ticks_left)
ti->cticks = 0;
else
ti->cticks -= ticks_left;
if (ti->cticks) /* not expired */
continue;
if (ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO) {
ti->cticks = ti->ticks;
} else {
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
if (--timer->running)
list_del(&ti->active_list);
}
if ((timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_TASKLET) ||
(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST))
ack_list_head = &timer->ack_list_head;
else
ack_list_head = &timer->sack_list_head;
if (list_empty(&ti->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ti->ack_list, ack_list_head);
list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list) {
ts->pticks = ti->pticks;
ts->resolution = resolution;
if (list_empty(&ts->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ts->ack_list, ack_list_head);
}
}
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED)
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, timer->sticks);
if (timer->running) {
if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_STOP) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
timer->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
}
if (!(timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_AUTO) ||
(timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE)) {
/* restart timer */
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
} else {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
}
/* now process all fast callbacks */
while (!list_empty(&timer->ack_list_head)) {
p = timer->ack_list_head.next; /* get first item */
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, ack_list);
/* remove from ack_list and make empty */
list_del_init(p);
ticks = ti->pticks;
ti->pticks = 0;
ti->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
if (ti->callback)
ti->callback(ti, resolution, ticks);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
}
/* do we have any slow callbacks? */
use_tasklet = !list_empty(&timer->sack_list_head);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
if (use_tasklet)
tasklet_schedule(&timer->task_queue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The snd_timer_interrupt function in sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 does not properly maintain a certain linked list, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (race condition and system crash) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix double unlink of active_list
ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are
unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile
snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves
the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice,
and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer.
The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,408 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.