instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data)
{
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct pt_regs *regs = data;
perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr);
if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs))
perf_swevent_event(bp, 1, 1, &sample, regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
ND_TCHECK_8BITS(tptr);
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VTP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-vtp.c:vtp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13033/VTP: Add more bound and length checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another VTP test's .out file for this change.
Don't treate a TLV type or length of 0 as invalid; a type of 0 should
just be reported as illegal if that type isn't used, and the length is
the length of the *value*, not the length of the entire TLV, so if it's
zero there won't be an infinite loop. (It's still not *legal*, as the
values of all the TLVs we handle are 1 16-bit word long; we added a
check for that.)
Update some comments while we're at it, to give a new URL for one Cisco
page and a non-Cisco URL for another former Cisco page (Cisco's UniverCD
pages don't seem to be available any more, and Cisco's robots.txt file
didn't allow the Wayback Machine to archive it). | High | 167,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheDispatcherHost::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
if (appcache_service_.get()) {
backend_impl_.Initialize(
appcache_service_.get(), &frontend_proxy_, process_id_);
get_status_callback_ =
base::Bind(&AppCacheDispatcherHost::GetStatusCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
start_update_callback_ =
base::Bind(&AppCacheDispatcherHost::StartUpdateCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
swap_cache_callback_ =
base::Bind(&AppCacheDispatcherHost::SwapCacheCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in content/browser/appcache/appcache_dispatcher_host.cc in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect pointer maintenance associated with certain callbacks.
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930} | High | 171,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_services_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_services_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t svc_set_id[2];
uint8_t dir_iif[4];
};
const struct juniper_services_header *sh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_SERVICES;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
sh = (const struct juniper_services_header *)p;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "service-id %u flags 0x%02x service-set-id 0x%04x iif %u: ",
sh->svc_id,
sh->flags_len,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&sh->svc_set_id),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&sh->dir_iif[1])));
/* no proto field - lets guess by first byte of IP header*/
ip_heuristic_guess (ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string SanitizeEndpoint(const std::string& value) {
if (value.find('&') != std::string::npos
|| value.find('?') != std::string::npos)
return std::string();
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926} | Medium | 172,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
free(name);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Git before 2.14.5, 2.15.x before 2.15.3, 2.16.x before 2.16.5, 2.17.x before 2.17.2, 2.18.x before 2.18.1, and 2.19.x before 2.19.1 allows remote code execution during processing of a recursive *git clone* of a superproject if a .gitmodules file has a URL field beginning with a '-' character.
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 169,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool LayoutSVGViewportContainer::calculateLocalTransform()
{
if (!m_needsTransformUpdate)
return false;
m_localToParentTransform = AffineTransform::translation(m_viewport.x(), m_viewport.y()) * viewportTransform();
m_needsTransformUpdate = false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950} | High | 171,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSCTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
magick[2];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickRealType
height,
width;
Quantum
pixel;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
buffer[768];
size_t
separations,
separations_mask,
units;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read control block.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,80,buffer);
(void) count;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CT",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"LW",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"PG",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"TX",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"LW",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"PG",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"TX",2) == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"OnlyContinuousTonePictureSupported");
count=ReadBlob(image,174,buffer);
count=ReadBlob(image,768,buffer);
/*
Read paramter block.
*/
units=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
if (units == 0)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
separations=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
separations_mask=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,14,buffer);
buffer[14]='\0';
height=StringToDouble((char *) buffer,(char **) NULL);
count=ReadBlob(image,14,buffer);
width=StringToDouble((char *) buffer,(char **) NULL);
count=ReadBlob(image,12,buffer);
buffer[12]='\0';
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) buffer);
count=ReadBlob(image,12,buffer);
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) buffer);
count=ReadBlob(image,200,buffer);
count=ReadBlob(image,768,buffer);
if (separations_mask == 0x0f)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
image->x_resolution=1.0*image->columns/width;
image->y_resolution=1.0*image->rows/height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert SCT raster image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) separations; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
pixel=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-pixel);
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,pixel);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,pixel);
break;
}
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* pad */
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int start_decoder(vorb *f)
{
uint8 header[6], x,y;
int len,i,j,k, max_submaps = 0;
int longest_floorlist=0;
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!(f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_first_page)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_last_page) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_continued_packet) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segment_count != 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segments[0] != 30) {
if (f->segments[0] == 64 &&
getn(f, header, 6) &&
header[0] == 'f' &&
header[1] == 'i' &&
header[2] == 's' &&
header[3] == 'h' &&
header[4] == 'e' &&
header[5] == 'a' &&
get8(f) == 'd' &&
get8(f) == '\0') return error(f, VORBIS_ogg_skeleton_not_supported);
else
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
}
if (get8(f) != VORBIS_packet_id) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!getn(f, header, 6)) return error(f, VORBIS_unexpected_eof);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (get32(f) != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
f->channels = get8(f); if (!f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->channels > STB_VORBIS_MAX_CHANNELS) return error(f, VORBIS_too_many_channels);
f->sample_rate = get32(f); if (!f->sample_rate) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
get32(f); // bitrate_maximum
get32(f); // bitrate_nominal
get32(f); // bitrate_minimum
x = get8(f);
{
int log0,log1;
log0 = x & 15;
log1 = x >> 4;
f->blocksize_0 = 1 << log0;
f->blocksize_1 = 1 << log1;
if (log0 < 6 || log0 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log1 < 6 || log1 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log0 > log1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
x = get8(f);
if (!(x & 1)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
do {
len = next_segment(f);
skip(f, len);
f->bytes_in_seg = 0;
} while (len);
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_PUSHDATA_API
if (IS_PUSH_MODE(f)) {
if (!is_whole_packet_present(f, TRUE)) {
if (f->error == VORBIS_invalid_stream)
f->error = VORBIS_invalid_setup;
return FALSE;
}
}
#endif
crc32_init(); // always init it, to avoid multithread race conditions
if (get8_packet(f) != VORBIS_packet_setup) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (i=0; i < 6; ++i) header[i] = get8_packet(f);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
f->codebook_count = get_bits(f,8) + 1;
f->codebooks = (Codebook *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
if (f->codebooks == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->codebooks, 0, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
for (i=0; i < f->codebook_count; ++i) {
uint32 *values;
int ordered, sorted_count;
int total=0;
uint8 *lengths;
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+i;
CHECK(f);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x42) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x43) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x56) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8);
c->dimensions = (get_bits(f, 8)<<8) + x;
x = get_bits(f, 8);
y = get_bits(f, 8);
c->entries = (get_bits(f, 8)<<16) + (y<<8) + x;
ordered = get_bits(f,1);
c->sparse = ordered ? 0 : get_bits(f,1);
if (c->dimensions == 0 && c->entries != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->sparse)
lengths = (uint8 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, c->entries);
else
lengths = c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (!lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (ordered) {
int current_entry = 0;
int current_length = get_bits(f,5) + 1;
while (current_entry < c->entries) {
int limit = c->entries - current_entry;
int n = get_bits(f, ilog(limit));
if (current_entry + n > (int) c->entries) { return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
memset(lengths + current_entry, current_length, n);
current_entry += n;
++current_length;
}
} else {
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j) {
int present = c->sparse ? get_bits(f,1) : 1;
if (present) {
lengths[j] = get_bits(f, 5) + 1;
++total;
if (lengths[j] == 32)
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
lengths[j] = NO_CODE;
}
}
}
if (c->sparse && total >= c->entries >> 2) {
if (c->entries > (int) f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = c->entries;
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (c->codeword_lengths == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memcpy(c->codeword_lengths, lengths, c->entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries); // note this is only safe if there have been no intervening temp mallocs!
lengths = c->codeword_lengths;
c->sparse = 0;
}
if (c->sparse) {
sorted_count = total;
} else {
sorted_count = 0;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_HUFFMAN_BINARY_SEARCH
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j)
if (lengths[j] > STB_VORBIS_FAST_HUFFMAN_LENGTH && lengths[j] != NO_CODE)
++sorted_count;
#endif
}
c->sorted_entries = sorted_count;
values = NULL;
CHECK(f);
if (!c->sparse) {
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->codewords[0]) * c->entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
} else {
unsigned int size;
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codeword_lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->codewords) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
values = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*values) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!values) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
size = c->entries + (sizeof(*c->codewords) + sizeof(*values)) * c->sorted_entries;
if (size > f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = size;
}
if (!compute_codewords(c, lengths, c->entries, values)) {
if (c->sparse) setup_temp_free(f, values, 0);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->sorted_codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_codewords) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_codewords == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->sorted_values = ( int *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_values ) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_values == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
++c->sorted_values;
c->sorted_values[-1] = -1;
compute_sorted_huffman(c, lengths, values);
}
if (c->sparse) {
setup_temp_free(f, values, sizeof(*values)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, c->codewords, sizeof(*c->codewords)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries);
c->codewords = NULL;
}
compute_accelerated_huffman(c);
CHECK(f);
c->lookup_type = get_bits(f, 4);
if (c->lookup_type > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->lookup_type > 0) {
uint16 *mults;
c->minimum_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->delta_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->value_bits = get_bits(f, 4)+1;
c->sequence_p = get_bits(f,1);
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
c->lookup_values = lookup1_values(c->entries, c->dimensions);
} else {
c->lookup_values = c->entries * c->dimensions;
}
if (c->lookup_values == 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
mults = (uint16 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(mults[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (mults == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
int q = get_bits(f, c->value_bits);
if (q == EOP) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
mults[j] = q;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
int len, sparse = c->sparse;
float last=0;
if (sparse) {
if (c->sorted_entries == 0) goto skip;
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->sorted_entries * c->dimensions);
} else
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->entries * c->dimensions);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
len = sparse ? c->sorted_entries : c->entries;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
unsigned int z = sparse ? c->sorted_values[j] : j;
unsigned int div=1;
for (k=0; k < c->dimensions; ++k) {
int off = (z / div) % c->lookup_values;
float val = mults[off];
val = mults[off]*c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j*c->dimensions + k] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
if (k+1 < c->dimensions) {
if (div > UINT_MAX / (unsigned int) c->lookup_values) {
setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
div *= c->lookup_values;
}
}
}
c->lookup_type = 2;
}
else
#endif
{
float last=0;
CHECK(f);
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
float val = mults[j] * c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
skip:;
#endif
setup_temp_free(f, mults, sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
CHECK(f);
}
CHECK(f);
}
x = get_bits(f, 6) + 1;
for (i=0; i < x; ++i) {
uint32 z = get_bits(f, 16);
if (z != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
f->floor_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->floor_config = (Floor *) setup_malloc(f, f->floor_count * sizeof(*f->floor_config));
if (f->floor_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (i=0; i < f->floor_count; ++i) {
f->floor_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->floor_types[i] > 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (f->floor_types[i] == 0) {
Floor0 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor0;
g->order = get_bits(f,8);
g->rate = get_bits(f,16);
g->bark_map_size = get_bits(f,16);
g->amplitude_bits = get_bits(f,6);
g->amplitude_offset = get_bits(f,8);
g->number_of_books = get_bits(f,4) + 1;
for (j=0; j < g->number_of_books; ++j)
g->book_list[j] = get_bits(f,8);
return error(f, VORBIS_feature_not_supported);
} else {
stbv__floor_ordering p[31*8+2];
Floor1 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor1;
int max_class = -1;
g->partitions = get_bits(f, 5);
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
g->partition_class_list[j] = get_bits(f, 4);
if (g->partition_class_list[j] > max_class)
max_class = g->partition_class_list[j];
}
for (j=0; j <= max_class; ++j) {
g->class_dimensions[j] = get_bits(f, 3)+1;
g->class_subclasses[j] = get_bits(f, 2);
if (g->class_subclasses[j]) {
g->class_masterbooks[j] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (g->class_masterbooks[j] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
for (k=0; k < 1 << g->class_subclasses[j]; ++k) {
g->subclass_books[j][k] = get_bits(f,8)-1;
if (g->subclass_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
g->floor1_multiplier = get_bits(f,2)+1;
g->rangebits = get_bits(f,4);
g->Xlist[0] = 0;
g->Xlist[1] = 1 << g->rangebits;
g->values = 2;
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
int c = g->partition_class_list[j];
for (k=0; k < g->class_dimensions[c]; ++k) {
g->Xlist[g->values] = get_bits(f, g->rangebits);
++g->values;
}
}
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j) {
p[j].x = g->Xlist[j];
p[j].id = j;
}
qsort(p, g->values, sizeof(p[0]), point_compare);
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j)
g->sorted_order[j] = (uint8) p[j].id;
for (j=2; j < g->values; ++j) {
int low,hi;
neighbors(g->Xlist, j, &low,&hi);
g->neighbors[j][0] = low;
g->neighbors[j][1] = hi;
}
if (g->values > longest_floorlist)
longest_floorlist = g->values;
}
}
f->residue_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->residue_config = (Residue *) setup_malloc(f, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
if (f->residue_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->residue_config, 0, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
uint8 residue_cascade[64];
Residue *r = f->residue_config+i;
f->residue_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->residue_types[i] > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->begin = get_bits(f, 24);
r->end = get_bits(f, 24);
if (r->end < r->begin) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->part_size = get_bits(f,24)+1;
r->classifications = get_bits(f,6)+1;
r->classbook = get_bits(f,8);
if (r->classbook >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
uint8 high_bits=0;
uint8 low_bits=get_bits(f,3);
if (get_bits(f,1))
high_bits = get_bits(f,5);
residue_cascade[j] = high_bits*8 + low_bits;
}
r->residue_books = (short (*)[8]) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->residue_books[0]) * r->classifications);
if (r->residue_books == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
for (k=0; k < 8; ++k) {
if (residue_cascade[j] & (1 << k)) {
r->residue_books[j][k] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (r->residue_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
r->residue_books[j][k] = -1;
}
}
}
r->classdata = (uint8 **) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
if (!r->classdata) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(r->classdata, 0, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
for (j=0; j < f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries; ++j) {
int classwords = f->codebooks[r->classbook].dimensions;
int temp = j;
r->classdata[j] = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->classdata[j][0]) * classwords);
if (r->classdata[j] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (k=classwords-1; k >= 0; --k) {
r->classdata[j][k] = temp % r->classifications;
temp /= r->classifications;
}
}
}
f->mapping_count = get_bits(f,6)+1;
f->mapping = (Mapping *) setup_malloc(f, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
if (f->mapping == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->mapping, 0, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
for (i=0; i < f->mapping_count; ++i) {
Mapping *m = f->mapping + i;
int mapping_type = get_bits(f,16);
if (mapping_type != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
m->chan = (MappingChannel *) setup_malloc(f, f->channels * sizeof(*m->chan));
if (m->chan == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (get_bits(f,1))
m->submaps = get_bits(f,4)+1;
else
m->submaps = 1;
if (m->submaps > max_submaps)
max_submaps = m->submaps;
if (get_bits(f,1)) {
m->coupling_steps = get_bits(f,8)+1;
for (k=0; k < m->coupling_steps; ++k) {
m->chan[k].magnitude = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
m->chan[k].angle = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
if (m->chan[k].magnitude >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].angle >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].magnitude == m->chan[k].angle) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
m->coupling_steps = 0;
if (get_bits(f,2)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submaps > 1) {
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j) {
m->chan[j].mux = get_bits(f, 4);
if (m->chan[j].mux >= m->submaps) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j)
m->chan[j].mux = 0;
for (j=0; j < m->submaps; ++j) {
get_bits(f,8); // discard
m->submap_floor[j] = get_bits(f,8);
m->submap_residue[j] = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->submap_floor[j] >= f->floor_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submap_residue[j] >= f->residue_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
f->mode_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
for (i=0; i < f->mode_count; ++i) {
Mode *m = f->mode_config+i;
m->blockflag = get_bits(f,1);
m->windowtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->transformtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->mapping = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->windowtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->transformtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->mapping >= f->mapping_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
flush_packet(f);
f->previous_length = 0;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
f->channel_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1);
f->previous_window[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
f->finalY[i] = (int16 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(int16) * longest_floorlist);
if (f->channel_buffers[i] == NULL || f->previous_window[i] == NULL || f->finalY[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->channel_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1);
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_NO_DEFER_FLOOR
f->floor_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
if (f->floor_buffers[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
#endif
}
if (!init_blocksize(f, 0, f->blocksize_0)) return FALSE;
if (!init_blocksize(f, 1, f->blocksize_1)) return FALSE;
f->blocksize[0] = f->blocksize_0;
f->blocksize[1] = f->blocksize_1;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (integer_divide_table[1][1]==0)
for (i=0; i < DIVTAB_NUMER; ++i)
for (j=1; j < DIVTAB_DENOM; ++j)
integer_divide_table[i][j] = i / j;
#endif
{
uint32 imdct_mem = (f->blocksize_1 * sizeof(float) >> 1);
uint32 classify_mem;
int i,max_part_read=0;
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
Residue *r = f->residue_config + i;
unsigned int actual_size = f->blocksize_1 / 2;
unsigned int limit_r_begin = r->begin < actual_size ? r->begin : actual_size;
unsigned int limit_r_end = r->end < actual_size ? r->end : actual_size;
int n_read = limit_r_end - limit_r_begin;
int part_read = n_read / r->part_size;
if (part_read > max_part_read)
max_part_read = part_read;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(uint8 *));
#else
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(int *));
#endif
f->temp_memory_required = classify_mem;
if (imdct_mem > f->temp_memory_required)
f->temp_memory_required = imdct_mem;
}
f->first_decode = TRUE;
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer) {
assert(f->temp_offset == f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes);
if (f->setup_offset + sizeof(*f) + f->temp_memory_required > (unsigned) f->temp_offset)
return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
f->first_audio_page_offset = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point() | Medium | 169,617 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncControls));
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncOptions));
if (!PVGetDefaultEncOption(mEncParams, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get default encoding parameters");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEncParams->encMode = mEncodeMode;
mEncParams->encWidth[0] = mWidth;
mEncParams->encHeight[0] = mHeight;
mEncParams->encFrameRate[0] = mFramerate >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16 format
mEncParams->rcType = VBR_1;
mEncParams->vbvDelay = 5.0f;
mEncParams->profile_level = CORE_PROFILE_LEVEL2;
mEncParams->packetSize = 32;
mEncParams->rvlcEnable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->numLayers = 1;
mEncParams->timeIncRes = 1000;
mEncParams->tickPerSrc = ((int64_t)mEncParams->timeIncRes << 16) / mFramerate;
mEncParams->bitRate[0] = mBitrate;
mEncParams->iQuant[0] = 15;
mEncParams->pQuant[0] = 12;
mEncParams->quantType[0] = 0;
mEncParams->noFrameSkipped = PV_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->intraPeriod =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16;
}
mEncParams->numIntraMB = 0;
mEncParams->sceneDetect = PV_ON;
mEncParams->searchRange = 16;
mEncParams->mv8x8Enable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->gobHeaderInterval = 0;
mEncParams->useACPred = PV_ON;
mEncParams->intraDCVlcTh = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G, and 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a large memory allocation in the (1) SoftMPEG4Encoder or (2) SoftVPXEncoder component, aka internal bug 25812794.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - libstagefright: check requested memory size before allocation for SoftMPEG4Encoder and SoftVPXEncoder.
Bug: 25812794
Change-Id: I96dc74734380d462583f6efa33d09946f9532809
(cherry picked from commit 87f8cbb223ee516803dbb99699320c2484cbf3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0462975291796e414891e04bcec9da993914e458)
| High | 173,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void *btif_hl_select_thread(void *arg){
fd_set org_set, curr_set;
int r, max_curr_s, max_org_s;
UNUSED(arg);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("entered btif_hl_select_thread");
FD_ZERO(&org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_select_wakeup_init(&org_set);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("max_s=%d ", max_org_s);
for (;;)
{
r = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("set curr_set = org_set ");
curr_set = org_set;
max_curr_s = max_org_s;
int ret = select((max_curr_s + 1), &curr_set, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select unblocked ret=%d", ret);
if (ret == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select() ret -1, exit the thread");
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
select_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
else if (ret)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal ret=%d", ret);
if (btif_hl_select_wake_signaled(&curr_set))
{
r = btif_hl_select_wake_reset();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal:%d", r);
if (r == btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup || r == btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected )
{
btif_hl_select_wakeup_callback(&org_set, r);
}
else if( r == btif_hl_signal_select_exit)
{
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Exit hl_select_thread for btif_hl_signal_select_exit");
return 0;
}
}
btif_hl_select_monitor_callback(&curr_set, &org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_update_maxfd(max_org_s);
}
else
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d\n", ret);
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("leaving hl_select_thread");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MojoAudioOutputIPC::StreamCreated(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_memory,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(socket.is_valid());
DCHECK(shared_memory.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile socket_handle;
auto result = mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket), &socket_handle);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
bool read_only = false;
size_t memory_length = 0;
result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(
std::move(shared_memory), &memory_handle, &memory_length, &read_only);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
DCHECK(!read_only);
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(memory_handle, socket_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparate2ContigByRow)
{
tsize_t scanlinesizein = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t scanlinesizeout = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tdata_t inbuf;
tdata_t outbuf;
register uint8 *inp, *outp;
register uint32 n;
uint32 row;
tsample_t s;
inbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizein);
outbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizeout);
if (!inbuf || !outbuf)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemset(inbuf, 0, scanlinesizein);
_TIFFmemset(outbuf, 0, scanlinesizeout);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row++) {
/* merge channels */
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
if (TIFFReadScanline(in, inbuf, row, s) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
inp = (uint8*)inbuf;
outp = ((uint8*)outbuf) + s;
for (n = imagewidth; n-- > 0;) {
*outp = *inp++;
outp += spp;
}
}
if (TIFFWriteScanline(out, outbuf, row, 0) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
}
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 1;
bad:
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibTIFF version 4.0.7 is vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow in the tools/tiffcp resulting in DoS or code execution via a crafted BitsPerSample value.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: error out cleanly in cpContig2SeparateByRow and
cpSeparate2ContigByRow if BitsPerSample != 8 to avoid heap based overflow.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2656 and
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2657 | High | 168,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The dnxhd decoder in FFmpeg before 3.2.6, and 3.3.x before 3.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted mov file.
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::ChunkPropertiesChanged(
const RefCountedPropertyTreeState& new_chunk_state,
const PaintChunkInfo& new_chunk,
const PaintChunkInfo& old_chunk,
const PropertyTreeState& layer_state) const {
if (!ApproximatelyEqual(new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_transform,
old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_transform))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
if (new_chunk_state.Effect() != old_chunk.effect_state ||
new_chunk_state.Effect()->Changed(*layer_state.Effect()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
if (new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.IsTight() &&
old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.IsTight()) {
if (new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip == old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip)
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
if (ClipByLayerBounds(new_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.Rect()) ==
ClipByLayerBounds(old_chunk.chunk_to_layer_clip.Rect()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
return PaintInvalidationReason::kIncremental;
}
if (new_chunk_state.Clip() != old_chunk.clip_state ||
new_chunk_state.Clip()->Changed(*layer_state.Clip()))
return PaintInvalidationReason::kPaintProperty;
return PaintInvalidationReason::kNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: P2PQuicStreamImpl* P2PQuicTransportImpl::CreateStreamInternal(
quic::QuicStreamId id) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(crypto_stream_);
DCHECK(IsEncryptionEstablished());
DCHECK(!IsClosed());
return new P2PQuicStreamImpl(id, this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766} | Medium | 172,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void btsnoop_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
if (logfile_fd != INVALID_FD)
write(logfile_fd, data, length);
btsnoop_net_write(data, length);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sem_undo *find_alloc_undo(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid)
{
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sem_undo_list *ulp;
struct sem_undo *un, *new;
int nsems;
int error;
error = get_undo_list(&ulp);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock(&ulp->lock);
un = lookup_undo(ulp, semid);
spin_unlock(&ulp->lock);
if (likely(un!=NULL))
goto out;
/* no undo structure around - allocate one. */
/* step 1: figure out the size of the semaphore array */
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_CAST(sma);
}
nsems = sma->sem_nsems;
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
rcu_read_unlock();
/* step 2: allocate new undo structure */
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sem_undo) + sizeof(short)*nsems, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new) {
sem_putref(sma);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
/* step 3: Acquire the lock on semaphore array */
sem_lock_and_putref(sma);
if (sma->sem_perm.deleted) {
sem_unlock(sma);
kfree(new);
un = ERR_PTR(-EIDRM);
goto out;
}
spin_lock(&ulp->lock);
/*
* step 4: check for races: did someone else allocate the undo struct?
*/
un = lookup_undo(ulp, semid);
if (un) {
kfree(new);
goto success;
}
/* step 5: initialize & link new undo structure */
new->semadj = (short *) &new[1];
new->ulp = ulp;
new->semid = semid;
assert_spin_locked(&ulp->lock);
list_add_rcu(&new->list_proc, &ulp->list_proc);
assert_spin_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
list_add(&new->list_id, &sma->list_id);
un = new;
success:
spin_unlock(&ulp->lock);
rcu_read_lock();
sem_unlock(sma);
out:
return un;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int parse_index(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
int error = 0;
unsigned int i;
struct index_header header = { 0 };
git_oid checksum_calculated, checksum_expected;
const char *last = NULL;
const char *empty = "";
#define seek_forward(_increase) { \
if (_increase >= buffer_size) { \
error = index_error_invalid("ran out of data while parsing"); \
goto done; } \
buffer += _increase; \
buffer_size -= _increase;\
}
if (buffer_size < INDEX_HEADER_SIZE + INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return index_error_invalid("insufficient buffer space");
/* Precalculate the SHA1 of the files's contents -- we'll match it to
* the provided SHA1 in the footer */
git_hash_buf(&checksum_calculated, buffer, buffer_size - INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE);
/* Parse header */
if ((error = read_header(&header, buffer)) < 0)
return error;
index->version = header.version;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = empty;
seek_forward(INDEX_HEADER_SIZE);
assert(!index->entries.length);
if (index->ignore_case)
git_idxmap_icase_resize((khash_t(idxicase) *) index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
else
git_idxmap_resize(index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
/* Parse all the entries */
for (i = 0; i < header.entry_count && buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE; ++i) {
git_index_entry *entry = NULL;
size_t entry_size = read_entry(&entry, index, buffer, buffer_size, last);
/* 0 bytes read means an object corruption */
if (entry_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("invalid entry");
goto done;
}
if ((error = git_vector_insert(&index->entries, entry)) < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
INSERT_IN_MAP(index, entry, &error);
if (error < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
error = 0;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = entry->path;
seek_forward(entry_size);
}
if (i != header.entry_count) {
error = index_error_invalid("header entries changed while parsing");
goto done;
}
/* There's still space for some extensions! */
while (buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
size_t extension_size;
extension_size = read_extension(index, buffer, buffer_size);
/* see if we have read any bytes from the extension */
if (extension_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("extension is truncated");
goto done;
}
seek_forward(extension_size);
}
if (buffer_size != INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"buffer size does not match index footer size");
goto done;
}
/* 160-bit SHA-1 over the content of the index file before this checksum. */
git_oid_fromraw(&checksum_expected, (const unsigned char *)buffer);
if (git_oid__cmp(&checksum_calculated, &checksum_expected) != 0) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"calculated checksum does not match expected");
goto done;
}
git_oid_cpy(&index->checksum, &checksum_calculated);
#undef seek_forward
/* Entries are stored case-sensitively on disk, so re-sort now if
* in-memory index is supposed to be case-insensitive
*/
git_vector_set_sorted(&index->entries, !index->ignore_case);
git_vector_sort(&index->entries);
done:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Incorrect returning of an error code in the index.c:read_entry() function leads to a double free in libgit2 before v0.26.2, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gamma_display_init(gamma_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
double file_gamma, double screen_gamma, png_byte sbit, int threshold_test,
int use_input_precision, int scale16, int expand16,
int do_background, PNG_CONST png_color_16 *pointer_to_the_background_color,
double background_gamma)
{
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->file_gamma = file_gamma;
dp->screen_gamma = screen_gamma;
dp->background_gamma = background_gamma;
dp->sbit = sbit;
dp->threshold_test = threshold_test;
dp->use_input_precision = use_input_precision;
dp->scale16 = scale16;
dp->expand16 = expand16;
dp->do_background = do_background;
if (do_background && pointer_to_the_background_color != 0)
dp->background_color = *pointer_to_the_background_color;
else
memset(&dp->background_color, 0, sizeof dp->background_color);
/* Local variable fields */
dp->maxerrout = dp->maxerrpc = dp->maxerrabs = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,611 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished(
base::WeakPtr<RenderWidgetHostViewAura> render_widget_host_view,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
bool result) {
callback.Run(result);
if (!render_widget_host_view.get())
return;
--render_widget_host_view->pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
render_widget_host_view->AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not validate the relationship between chunk sizes and skip sizes, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer underflow and memory corruption) via crafted MPEG-4 covr atoms, aka internal bug 20923261.
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow in covr MPEG4 processing
When the 'chunk_data_size' variable is less than 'kSkipBytesOfDataBox', an
integer underflow can occur. This causes an extraordinarily large value to
be passed to MetaData::setData, leading to a buffer overflow.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: Icd28f63594ad941eabb3a12c750a4a2d5d2bf94b
| High | 173,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 165,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CloudPolicySubsystem::StopAutoRetry() {
cloud_policy_controller_->StopAutoRetry();
device_token_fetcher_->StopAutoRetry();
data_store_->Reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T impeg2d_api_entity(iv_obj_t *ps_dechdl,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
iv_obj_t *ps_dec_handle;
dec_state_t *ps_dec_state;
dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core;
impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 bytes_remaining;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
ps_dec_ip = (impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
memset(ps_dec_op,0,sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec_handle = (iv_obj_t *)ps_dechdl;
if(ps_dechdl == NULL)
{
return(IV_FAIL);
}
ps_dec_state_multi_core = ps_dec_handle->pv_codec_handle;
ps_dec_state = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
}
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = NULL;
ps_dec_state->i4_frame_decoded = 0;
/*rest bytes consumed */
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
if((ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer == NULL)&&(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if (ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded > NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IMPEG2D_SAMPLE_VERSION_LIMIT_ERR;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(((0 == ps_dec_state->u2_header_done) || (ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header == 1)) && (ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0))
{
impeg2d_dec_hdr(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip ,ps_dec_op);
bytes_remaining -= ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed;
}
if((1 != ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header) && ((bytes_remaining > 0) || ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm))
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[1] = NULL;
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
else if(ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] != NULL)
{
impeg2_disp_mgr_add(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0], ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id);
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0]->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_dec_state->aps_ref_pics[0] = NULL;
}
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec_state->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec_state->i4_disp_buf_id);
ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
}
else
{
WORD32 fmt_conv;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2];
fmt_conv = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
fmt_conv = 0;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec_state->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
fmt_conv = 1;
}
}
if(fmt_conv == 1)
{
iv_yuv_buf_t *ps_dst;
ps_dst = &(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace && (0 == ps_dec_state->u2_progressive_frame))
{
impeg2d_deinterlace(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
else
{
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec_state,
ps_disp_pic,
ps_dst,
0,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_disp_pic;
}
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
return(IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm = 0;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
}
else if(ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm==0)
{
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(impeg2d_video_decode_op_t);
if(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes < 4)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(1 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
if(0 == impeg2_buf_mgr_check_free(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg))
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code =
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_output_format = (IV_COLOR_FORMAT_T)ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_is_ref_flag = (B_PIC != ps_dec_state->e_pic_type);
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = IV_PROGRESSIVE;
if (0 == ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = (ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size);
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_y_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size >> 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_size = sizeof(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf);
switch(ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat)
{
case IV_YUV_420SP_UV:
case IV_YUV_420SP_VU:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_strd = ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride;
break;
case IV_YUV_422ILE:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_u_ht = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_wd = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.s_disp_frm_buf.u4_v_ht = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
if( ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt = 0;
/*************************************************************************/
/* Frame Decode */
/*************************************************************************/
impeg2d_dec_frm(ps_dec_state,ps_dec_ip,ps_dec_op);
if (IVD_ERROR_NONE ==
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
{
if(ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done == 0)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_first_frame_done = 1;
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 1;
switch(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
case P_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_P_FRAME;
break;
case B_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
break;
case D_PIC:
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_I_FRAME;
break;
default :
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_FRAMETYPE_DEFAULT;
break;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
}
ps_dec_state->u4_num_frames_decoded++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushcnt++;
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic)
{
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_ts = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->u4_ts;
if(0 == ps_dec_state->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
}
if(ps_dec_state->u4_deinterlace)
{
if(ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic)
{
impeg2_buf_mgr_release(ps_dec_state->pv_pic_buf_mg,
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic->i4_buf_id,
MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
}
ps_dec_state->ps_deint_pic = ps_dec_state->ps_disp_pic;
}
if(1 == ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_output_present)
{
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size,
ps_dec_state->i4_chromaFormat,
ps_dec_state->u2_horizontal_size,
ps_dec_state->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e4_fld_type = ps_dec_state->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
if(ps_dec_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code)
return IV_FAIL;
else
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libmpeg2 in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35219737.
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
| High | 174,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptorsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& descriptor) {
if (!getGatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!getGatt()->device()->isValidCharacteristic(
m_characteristic->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kInvalidCharacteristic));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
getGatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!descriptor.isEmpty())
uuid = descriptor;
service->RemoteCharacteristicGetDescriptors(
m_characteristic->instance_id, quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::GetDescriptorsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_characteristic->instance_id,
quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809} | High | 172,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The check_acl function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not verify that a certain ACL file is a regular file, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a special file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.IsManaged();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948} | Medium | 172,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftGSM::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if(((inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * kMSGSMFrameSize) != inHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("input buffer not multiple of %d (%d).", kMSGSMFrameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int n = mSignalledError ? 0 : DecodeGSM(mGsm,
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer), inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = n * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes for the GSM and G711 codecs, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27793367.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
| High | 173,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mp_pack(lua_State *L) {
int nargs = lua_gettop(L);
int i;
mp_buf *buf;
if (nargs == 0)
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "MessagePack pack needs input.");
if (!lua_checkstack(L, nargs))
return luaL_argerror(L, 0, "Too many arguments for MessagePack pack.");
buf = mp_buf_new(L);
for(i = 1; i <= nargs; i++) {
/* Copy argument i to top of stack for _encode processing;
* the encode function pops it from the stack when complete. */
lua_pushvalue(L, i);
mp_encode_lua_type(L,buf,0);
lua_pushlstring(L,(char*)buf->b,buf->len);
/* Reuse the buffer for the next operation by
* setting its free count to the total buffer size
* and the current position to zero. */
buf->free += buf->len;
buf->len = 0;
}
mp_buf_free(L, buf);
/* Concatenate all nargs buffers together */
lua_concat(L, nargs);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems. | High | 169,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CCLayerTreeHost::initialize()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCLayerTreeHost::initialize", this, 0);
if (m_settings.enableCompositorThread) {
m_settings.acceleratePainting = false;
m_settings.showFPSCounter = false;
m_settings.showPlatformLayerTree = false;
m_proxy = CCThreadProxy::create(this);
} else
m_proxy = CCSingleThreadProxy::create(this);
m_proxy->start();
if (!m_proxy->initializeLayerRenderer())
return false;
m_compositorIdentifier = m_proxy->compositorIdentifier();
m_settings.acceleratePainting = m_proxy->layerRendererCapabilities().usingAcceleratedPainting;
setNeedsCommitThenRedraw();
m_contentsTextureManager = TextureManager::create(TextureManager::highLimitBytes(), m_proxy->layerRendererCapabilities().maxTextureSize);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when the nf_conntrack_ipv6 module is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via certain types of fragmented IPv6 packets.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> | High | 165,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context * auth_context,
/* IN */
krb5_pointer fd,
char *appl_version,
krb5_principal server,
krb5_int32 flags,
krb5_keytab keytab,
/* OUT */
krb5_ticket ** ticket,
krb5_data *version)
{
krb5_auth_context new_auth_context;
krb5_flags ap_option = 0;
krb5_error_code retval, problem;
krb5_data inbuf;
krb5_data outbuf;
krb5_rcache rcache = 0;
krb5_octet response;
krb5_data null_server;
int need_error_free = 0;
int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0;
/*
* Zero out problem variable. If problem is set at the end of
* the intial version negotiation section, it means that we
* need to send an error code back to the client application
* and exit.
*/
problem = 0;
response = 0;
if (!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION)) {
/*
* First read the sendauth version string and check it.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
free(inbuf.data);
}
if (flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_BADAUTHVERS) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
/*
* Do the same thing for the application version string.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
if (!problem) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
response = 2;
}
}
if (version && !problem)
*version = inbuf;
else
free(inbuf.data);
/*
* Now we actually write the response. If the response is non-zero,
* exit with a return value of problem
*/
if ((krb5_net_write(context, *((int *)fd), (char *)&response, 1)) < 0) {
return(problem); /* We'll return the top-level problem */
}
if (problem)
return(problem);
/* We are clear of errors here */
/*
* Now, let's read the AP_REQ message and decode it
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return retval;
if (*auth_context == NULL) {
problem = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &new_auth_context);
*auth_context = new_auth_context;
local_authcon = 1;
}
krb5_auth_con_getrcache(context, *auth_context, &rcache);
if ((!problem) && rcache == NULL) {
/*
* Setup the replay cache.
*/
if (server != NULL && server->length > 0) {
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &server->data[0],
&rcache);
} else {
null_server.length = 7;
null_server.data = "default";
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &null_server, &rcache);
}
if (!problem)
problem = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, rcache);
local_rcache = 1;
}
if (!problem) {
problem = krb5_rd_req(context, auth_context, &inbuf, server,
keytab, &ap_option, ticket);
free(inbuf.data);
}
/*
* If there was a problem, send back a krb5_error message,
* preceeded by the length of the krb5_error message. If
* everything's ok, send back 0 for the length.
*/
if (problem) {
krb5_error error;
const char *message;
memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error));
krb5_us_timeofday(context, &error.stime, &error.susec);
if(server)
error.server = server;
else {
/* If this fails - ie. ENOMEM we are hosed
we cannot even send the error if we wanted to... */
(void) krb5_parse_name(context, "????", &error.server);
need_error_free = 1;
}
error.error = problem - ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (error.error > 127)
error.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
message = error_message(problem);
error.text.length = strlen(message) + 1;
error.text.data = strdup(message);
if (!error.text.data) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = krb5_mk_error(context, &error, &outbuf))) {
free(error.text.data);
goto cleanup;
}
free(error.text.data);
if(need_error_free)
krb5_free_principal(context, error.server);
} else {
outbuf.length = 0;
outbuf.data = 0;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
if (outbuf.data) {
free(outbuf.data);
/* We sent back an error, we need cleanup then return */
retval = problem;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Here lies the mutual authentication stuff... */
if ((ap_option & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
if ((retval = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, &outbuf))) {
return(retval);
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
free(outbuf.data);
}
cleanup:;
if (retval) {
if (local_authcon) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, *auth_context);
} else if (local_rcache && rcache != NULL) {
krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, NULL);
}
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.13.1 incorrectly expects that a krb5_read_message data field is represented as a string ending with a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a zero-byte version string or (2) cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by omitting the '0' character, related to appl/user_user/server.c and lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c.
Commit Message: Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355]
In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of
krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no
guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected
krb5_data value and use data_eq().
In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received
client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf
and krb5_parse_name.
CVE-2014-5355:
In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an
unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by
sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of
allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string.
The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly
vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name
string.
The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client
using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure
containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth
assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to
strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet
sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference
a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a
non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end
of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash.
uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal
name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without
verifying that it is a valid C string.
The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized
versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually
run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming
connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a
complete denial of service.
Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVSS score]
ticket: 8050 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | Medium | 166,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_prog *prog;
prog = __bpf_prog_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
atomic_inc(&prog->aux->refcnt);
fdput(f);
return prog;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The BPF subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application on (1) a system with more than 32 Gb of memory, related to the program reference count or (2) a 1 Tb system, related to the map reference count.
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SavePayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *payload, uint32_t index)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return;
uint32_t *MP4buffer = NULL;
if (index < mp4->indexcount && mp4->mediafp && payload)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, mp4->metaoffsets[index], SEEK_SET);
fwrite(payload, 1, mp4->metasizes[index], mp4->mediafp);
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader | Medium | 169,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab,
int arg_num,
size_t *len_sent,
const char __user *p,
char *buf)
{
char arg_num_len_buf[12];
const char __user *tmp_p = p;
/* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
size_t len, len_left, to_send;
size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
int ret;
/* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
/*
* We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
* we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
* for strings that are too long, we should not have created
* any.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
/* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
do {
if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
else
to_send = len_left;
ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
/*
* There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
* copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
* space yet.
*/
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
if (has_cntl) {
/*
* hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
* send half as much in each message
*/
max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
break;
}
len_left -= to_send;
tmp_p += to_send;
} while (len_left > 0);
len_left = len;
if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
too_long = 1;
/* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
int room_left;
if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
else
to_send = len_left;
/* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
if (has_cntl)
room_left -= (to_send * 2);
else
room_left -= to_send;
if (room_left < 0) {
*len_sent = 0;
audit_log_end(*ab);
*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
if (!*ab)
return 0;
}
/*
* first record needs to say how long the original string was
* so we can be sure nothing was lost.
*/
if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
/*
* normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
* filled buf above when we checked for control characters
* so don't bother with another copy_from_user
*/
if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
else
ret = 0;
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
/* actually log it */
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
if (too_long)
audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
if (has_cntl)
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
else
audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
p += to_send;
len_left -= to_send;
*len_sent += arg_num_len;
if (has_cntl)
*len_sent += to_send * 2;
else
*len_sent += to_send;
}
/* include the null we didn't log */
return len + 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the audit_log_single_execve_arg function in kernel/auditsc.c in the Linux kernel through 4.7 allows local users to bypass intended character-set restrictions or disrupt system-call auditing by changing a certain string, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> | Low | 167,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
interface_factory_ptr_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 171,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pdf_read_new_xref_section(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, fz_stream *stm, int64_t i0, int i1, int w0, int w1, int w2)
{
pdf_xref_entry *table;
pdf_xref_entry *table;
int i, n;
if (i0 < 0 || i1 < 0 || i0 > INT_MAX - i1)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "negative xref stream entry index");
table = pdf_xref_find_subsection(ctx, doc, i0, i1);
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
for (i = i0; i < i0 + i1; i++)
{
pdf_xref_entry *entry = &table[i-i0];
int a = 0;
int64_t b = 0;
int c = 0;
if (fz_is_eof(ctx, stm))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "truncated xref stream");
for (n = 0; n < w0; n++)
a = (a << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w1; n++)
b = (b << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
for (n = 0; n < w2; n++)
c = (c << 8) + fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (!entry->type)
{
int t = w0 ? a : 1;
entry->type = t == 0 ? 'f' : t == 1 ? 'n' : t == 2 ? 'o' : 0;
entry->ofs = w1 ? b : 0;
entry->gen = w2 ? c : 0;
entry->num = i;
}
}
doc->has_xref_streams = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the ensure_solid_xref function in pdf/pdf-xref.c in Artifex MuPDF 1.12.0 allows a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, because xref subsection object numbers are unrestricted.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
ASSERT(context);
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(context->isDocument());
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_readlinkargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfsd_readlinkargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
#endif
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if ((m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((unsigned long)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (OMX_DirOutput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition OP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
m_display_id = portDefn->format.video.pNativeWindow;
unsigned int buffer_size;
/* update output port resolution with client supplied dimensions
in case scaling is enabled, else it follows input resolution set
*/
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam OP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
if (portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != 0x0 &&
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != 0x0) {
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height) ||
(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width)) {
port_format_changed = true;
}
update_resolution(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
/* set crop info */
rectangle.nLeft = 0;
rectangle.nTop = 0;
rectangle.nWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
rectangle.nHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height, fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (secure_mode) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SECURE_SCALING_THRESHOLD;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting secure scaling threshold : %d, id was : %x", errno, control.id);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
/* This is a workaround for a bug in fw which uses stride
* and slice instead of width and height to check against
* the threshold.
*/
OMX_U32 stride, slice;
if (drv_ctx.output_format == VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12) {
stride = VENUS_Y_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
slice = VENUS_Y_SCANLINES(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
} else {
stride = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
slice = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Stride is %d, slice is %d, sxs is %d\n", stride, slice, stride * slice);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Threshold value is %d\n", control.value);
if (stride * slice <= (OMX_U32)control.value) {
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Enabling secure scalar out of CPZ");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NON_SECURE_OUTPUT2;
control.value = 1;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Enabling non-secure output2 failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
}
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting buffer requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else if (!port_format_changed) {
if ( portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount &&
portDefn->nBufferSize >= drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size ) {
drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size = portDefn->nBufferSize;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.count = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.size = drv_ctx.extradata_info.count *
drv_ctx.extradata_info.buffer_size;
eRet = set_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone)
m_port_def = *portDefn;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
} else if (OMX_DirInput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition IP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
if ((portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) > 0 &&
(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) <= MAX_SUPPORTED_FPS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: frm_int(%u) fps(%.2f)",
(unsigned int)frm_int, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
(float)drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, performance might be affected");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
}
if (drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight ||
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam IP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
port_format_changed = true;
OMX_U32 frameWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
OMX_U32 frameHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
if (frameHeight != 0x0 && frameWidth != 0x0) {
if (m_smoothstreaming_mode &&
((frameWidth * frameHeight) <
(m_smoothstreaming_width * m_smoothstreaming_height))) {
frameWidth = m_smoothstreaming_width;
frameHeight = m_smoothstreaming_height;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("NOTE: Setting resolution %u x %u "
"for adaptive-playback/smooth-streaming",
(unsigned int)frameWidth, (unsigned int)frameHeight);
}
update_resolution(frameWidth, frameHeight,
frameWidth, frameHeight);
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height,fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
if (!is_down_scalar_enabled)
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
}
if (m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize
&& (portDefn->nBufferSize > m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size set by client: %d, trying to set: %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize, portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount
|| portDefn->nBufferSize != drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size) {
port_format_changed = true;
vdec_allocatorproperty *buffer_prop = &drv_ctx.ip_buf;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size = (portDefn->nBufferSize + buffer_prop->alignment - 1) &
(~(buffer_prop->alignment - 1));
eRet = set_buffer_req(buffer_prop);
}
if (false == port_format_changed) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: IP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (portDefn->eDir == OMX_DirMax) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat 0x%x, port: %u",
portFmt->eColorFormat, (unsigned int)portFmt->nPortIndex);
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (1 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
enum vdec_output_fromat op_format;
if (portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32mMultiView ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)
op_format = (enum vdec_output_fromat)VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
drv_ctx.output_format = op_format;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set output format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (!client_buffers.set_color_format(portFmt->eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set color format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
/* Input port */
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat == OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_Arbitrary) {
if (secure_mode) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("setparameter: cannot set to arbitary bytes mode in secure session");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
} else if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat ==
OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_OnlyOneCompleteFrame) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.arbitrarybytes.mode", property_value, "0");
if (atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("arbitrary_bytes enabled via property command");
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
#endif
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown FramePacking format %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port");
if ( (portFmt->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
portFmt->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) &&
portFmt->nCacheAttr == OMX_QCOM_CacheAttrNone) {
m_out_mem_region_smi = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx311", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx4", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ( (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.wmv",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE) ||
(!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vpx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_priority_mgm.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_priority_mgm.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_buffer_supplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER);
QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *pictureOrder =
(QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int pic_order,rc=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder %d",
pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder);
if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DISPLAY;
} else if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DECODE_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = pic_order;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamConcealMBMapExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(VDEC_EXTRADATA_MB_ERROR_MAP, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamFrameInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamInterlaceExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_INTERLACE_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264TimeInfo:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_TIMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoFramePackingExtradata:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_QP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoInputBitsInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_BITSINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableExtnUserData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamMpeg2SeqDispExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDivx: {
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE* divXType = (QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE *) paramData;
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port");
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN* entryType = (OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN *) paramData;
if (entryType->type != OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: Platform Private entry type (%d) not supported.", entryType->type);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode: {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set idr only decoding for thumbnail mode");
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
drv_ctx.idr_only_decoding = 1;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE_ENABLE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
/*Setting sync frame decoding on driver might change buffer
* requirements so update them here*/
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer i/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer o/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *extradataIndexType = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *) paramData;
if ((extradataIndexType->nIndex == OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) &&
(extradataIndexType->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
(extradataIndexType->nPortIndex == 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType SmoothStreaming");
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_PORTDEF_EXTRADATA, false, extradataIndexType->bEnabled);
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableSmoothStreaming: {
#ifndef SMOOTH_STREAMING_DISABLED
eRet = enable_smoothstreaming();
#else
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
#endif
}
break;
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
/* Need to allow following two set_parameters even in Idle
* state. This is ANDROID architecture which is not in sync
* with openmax standard. */
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexEnableAndroidNativeBuffers: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams);
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams* enableNativeBuffers = (EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams *) paramData;
if (enableNativeBuffers) {
m_enable_android_native_buffers = enableNativeBuffers->enable;
}
#if !defined(FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED)
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
if(!client_buffers.set_color_format(getPreferredColorFormatDefaultMode(0))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set native color format!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
}
break;
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, UseAndroidNativeBufferParams);
eRet = use_android_native_buffer(hComp, paramData);
}
break;
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableTimeStampReorder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER);
QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *reorder = (QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *)paramData;
if (drv_ctx.picture_order == (vdec_output_order)QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
frm_int =0;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
} else
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam) {
m_profile_lvl.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_profile_lvl.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *metabuffer =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *)paramData;
if (!metabuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid param: %p", metabuffer);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Dynamic buffer mode disabled by setprop");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (metabuffer->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_ALLOC_MODE_OUTPUT;
if (metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true) {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_DYNAMIC;
} else {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STATIC;
}
int rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL,&control);
if (!rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "Enabled dynamic" : "Disabled dynamic");
dynamic_buf_mode = metabuffer->bStoreMetaData;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to %s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "enable dynamic" : "disable dynamic");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode not supported for port: %u",
(unsigned int)metabuffer->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR);
QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR* pParam = (QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR*)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
if (pParam) {
is_down_scalar_enabled = pParam->bEnable;
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_SECONDARY;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar value = %d", pParam->bEnable);
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set down scalar on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_KEEP_ASPECT_RATIO;
control.value = 1;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set keep aspect ratio on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
}
#ifdef ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK_SUPPORTED
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoAdaptivePlaybackMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexPrepareForAdaptivePlayback");
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* pParams =
(PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *) paramData;
if (pParams->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (!pParams->bEnable) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (pParams->nMaxFrameWidth > maxSmoothStreamingWidth
|| pParams->nMaxFrameHeight > maxSmoothStreamingHeight) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Adaptive playback request exceeds max supported resolution : [%u x %u] vs [%u x %u]",
(unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, (unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameHeight,
(unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingWidth, (unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingHeight);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
eRet = enable_adaptive_playback(pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, pParams->nMaxFrameHeight);
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Prepare for adaptive playback supported only on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize");
QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_BUFFER_SIZE_LIMIT;
control.value = pParam->nBufferSize;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set input buffer size");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Successfully set custom input buffer size = %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to get buffer requirement");
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size in not supported on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
if (eRet != OMX_ErrorNone)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Error: 0x%x, setting param 0x%x", eRet, paramIndex);
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27661749.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
| High | 173,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The H.264 decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain slice data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165661.
Commit Message: Fix slice params for interlaced video
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I912a86bd78ebf0617fd2bc6eb2b5a61afc17bf53
| High | 173,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DefragIPv4TooLargeTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* Create a fragment that would extend past the max allowable size
* for an IPv4 packet. */
p = BuildTestPacket(1, 8183, 0, 'A', 71);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (!ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_PKT_TOO_LARGE))
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should have
* been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,297 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageWebpCtx function in gd_webp.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) through 2.2.3, as used in PHP through 7.0.11, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted imagewebp and imagedestroy calls.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'pull-request/296' | High | 166,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::FocusChanged() {
vr_v_sync_provider_.reset();
ConnectVSyncProvider();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167} | High | 171,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MojoJpegDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer,
const scoped_refptr<VideoFrame>& video_frame) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(jpeg_decoder_.is_bound());
DCHECK(
base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(video_frame->shared_memory_handle()));
base::SharedMemoryHandle output_handle =
base::SharedMemory::DuplicateHandle(video_frame->shared_memory_handle());
if (!base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(output_handle)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to duplicate handle of VideoFrame";
return;
}
size_t output_buffer_size = VideoFrame::AllocationSize(
video_frame->format(), video_frame->coded_size());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle output_frame_handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(output_handle, output_buffer_size,
false /* read_only */);
jpeg_decoder_->Decode(bitstream_buffer, video_frame->coded_size(),
std::move(output_frame_handle),
base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(output_buffer_size),
base::Bind(&MojoJpegDecodeAccelerator::OnDecodeAck,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void MSLStartElement(void *context,const xmlChar *tag,
const xmlChar **attributes)
{
AffineMatrix
affine,
current;
ChannelType
channel;
char
key[MaxTextExtent],
*value;
const char
*attribute,
*keyword;
double
angle;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
flags;
ssize_t
option,
j,
n,
x,
y;
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Called when an opening tag has been processed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.startElement(%s",tag);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
n=msl_info->n;
keyword=(const char *) NULL;
value=(char *) NULL;
SetGeometryInfo(&geometry_info);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&geometry,0,sizeof(geometry));
channel=DefaultChannels;
switch (*tag)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"add-noise") == 0)
{
Image
*noise_image;
NoiseType
noise;
/*
Add noise image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
noise=UniformNoise;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"noise") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickNoiseOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedNoiseType",
value);
noise=(NoiseType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
noise_image=AddNoiseImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],channel,noise,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (noise_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=noise_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"annotate") == 0)
{
char
text[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Annotate image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->draw_info[n]);
angle=0.0;
current=draw_info->affine;
GetAffineMatrix(&affine);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"affine") == 0)
{
char
*p;
p=value;
draw_info->affine.sx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.rx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ry=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.sy=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.tx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ty=StringToDouble(p,&p);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"align") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlignOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAlignType",
value);
draw_info->align=(AlignType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"antialias") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
draw_info->stroke_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
draw_info->text_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"density") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->density,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"encoding") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"family") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->family,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"font") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->font,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gravity") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",
value);
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pointsize") == 0)
{
draw_info->pointsize=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rotate") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.sx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.rx=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.ry=(-sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0))));
affine.sy=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scale") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.sx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.sy=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewX") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.ry=tan(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,
360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewY") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.rx=tan(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,
360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"stretch") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStretchOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStretchType",
value);
draw_info->stretch=(StretchType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "stroke") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"strokewidth") == 0)
{
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"style") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStyleType",
value);
draw_info->style=(StyleType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"text") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->text,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"translate") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.tx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.ty=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "undercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"weight") == 0)
{
draw_info->weight=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(text,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) geometry.width,(double)
geometry.height,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,text);
draw_info->affine.sx=affine.sx*current.sx+affine.ry*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.rx=affine.rx*current.sx+affine.sy*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.ry=affine.sx*current.ry+affine.ry*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.sy=affine.rx*current.ry+affine.sy*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.tx=affine.sx*current.tx+affine.ry*current.ty+
affine.tx;
draw_info->affine.ty=affine.rx*current.tx+affine.sy*current.ty+
affine.ty;
(void) AnnotateImage(msl_info->image[n],draw_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"append") == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
MagickBooleanType
stack;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
stack=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"stack") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
stack=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
append_image=AppendImages(msl_info->image[n],stack,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=append_image;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"blur") == 0)
{
Image
*blur_image;
/*
Blur image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sigma") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
blur_image=BlurImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],channel,
geometry_info.rho,geometry_info.sigma,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (blur_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=blur_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"border") == 0)
{
Image
*border_image;
/*
Border image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compose") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedComposeType",
value);
msl_info->image[n]->compose=(CompositeOperator) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,
&msl_info->image[n]->border_color,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
border_image=BorderImage(msl_info->image[n],&geometry,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (border_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=border_image;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"colorize") == 0)
{
char
opacity[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*colorize_image;
PixelPacket
target;
/*
Add noise image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
target=msl_info->image[n]->background_color;
(void) CopyMagickString(opacity,"100",MaxTextExtent);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&target,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opacity") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(opacity,value,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
colorize_image=ColorizeImage(msl_info->image[n],opacity,target,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (colorize_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=colorize_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "charcoal") == 0)
{
double radius = 0.0,
sigma = 1.0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
/*
NOTE: charcoal can have no attributes, since we use all the defaults!
*/
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
{
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
radius=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sigma") == 0)
{
sigma = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
}
/*
charcoal image.
*/
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=CharcoalImage(msl_info->image[n],radius,sigma,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
}
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"chop") == 0)
{
Image
*chop_image;
/*
Chop image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
chop_image=ChopImage(msl_info->image[n],&geometry,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (chop_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=chop_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"color-floodfill") == 0)
{
PaintMethod
paint_method;
MagickPixelPacket
target;
/*
Color floodfill image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->draw_info[n]);
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
paint_method=FloodfillMethod;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bordercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryMagickColor(value,&target,exception);
paint_method=FillToBorderMethod;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fuzz") == 0)
{
msl_info->image[n]->fuzz=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) FloodfillPaintImage(msl_info->image[n],DefaultChannels,
draw_info,&target,geometry.x,geometry.y,
paint_method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"comment") == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"composite") == 0)
{
char
composite_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*composite_image,
*rotate_image;
PixelPacket
target;
/*
Composite image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
composite_image=NewImageList();
compose=OverCompositeOp;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compose") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedComposeType",
value);
compose=(CompositeOperator) option;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*attribute;
attribute=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if ((attribute != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(attribute,value) == 0))
{
composite_image=CloneImage(msl_info->image[j],0,0,
MagickFalse,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
rotate_image=NewImageList();
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blend") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageArtifact(composite_image,
"compose:args",value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,
&composite_image->background_color,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compose") == 0)
break;
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixel(msl_info->image[n],geometry.x,
geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gravity") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",
value);
msl_info->image[n]->gravity=(GravityType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
break;
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mask") == 0)
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*attribute;
attribute=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if ((attribute != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(value,value) == 0))
{
SetImageType(composite_image,TrueColorMatteType);
(void) CompositeImage(composite_image,
CopyOpacityCompositeOp,msl_info->image[j],0,0);
break;
}
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opacity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
opacity,
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
CacheView
*composite_view;
opacity=QuantumRange-StringToLong(value);
if (compose != DissolveCompositeOp)
{
(void) SetImageOpacity(composite_image,(Quantum)
opacity);
break;
}
(void) SetImageArtifact(msl_info->image[n],
"compose:args",value);
if (composite_image->matte != MagickTrue)
(void) SetImageOpacity(composite_image,OpaqueOpacity);
composite_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(composite_image,
exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) composite_image->rows ; y++)
{
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(composite_view,0,y,
(ssize_t) composite_image->columns,1,exception);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) composite_image->columns; x++)
{
if (q->opacity == OpaqueOpacity)
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(opacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(composite_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
composite_view=DestroyCacheView(composite_view);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rotate") == 0)
{
rotate_image=RotateImage(composite_image,
StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL),exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile") == 0)
{
MagickBooleanType
tile;
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
tile=(MagickBooleanType) option;
(void) tile;
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) SetImageArtifact(rotate_image,
"compose:outside-overlay","false");
else
(void) SetImageArtifact(composite_image,
"compose:outside-overlay","false");
image=msl_info->image[n];
height=composite_image->rows;
width=composite_image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) height)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=(ssize_t) width)
{
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) CompositeImage(image,compose,rotate_image,
x,y);
else
(void) CompositeImage(image,compose,
composite_image,x,y);
}
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL)
rotate_image=DestroyImage(rotate_image);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualPixel(msl_info->image[n],geometry.x,
geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualPixel(msl_info->image[n],geometry.x,
geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
image=msl_info->image[n];
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) composite_image->columns,
(double) composite_image->rows,(double) geometry.x,(double)
geometry.y);
flags=ParseGravityGeometry(image,composite_geometry,&geometry,
exception);
if (rotate_image == (Image *) NULL)
CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,compose,composite_image,
geometry.x,geometry.y);
else
{
/*
Rotate image.
*/
geometry.x-=(ssize_t) (rotate_image->columns-
composite_image->columns)/2;
geometry.y-=(ssize_t) (rotate_image->rows-composite_image->rows)/2;
CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,compose,rotate_image,
geometry.x,geometry.y);
rotate_image=DestroyImage(rotate_image);
}
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"contrast") == 0)
{
MagickBooleanType
sharpen;
/*
Contrast image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
sharpen=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sharpen") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
sharpen=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) ContrastImage(msl_info->image[n],sharpen);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"crop") == 0)
{
Image
*crop_image;
/*
Crop image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGravityGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
crop_image=CropImage(msl_info->image[n],&geometry,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (crop_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=crop_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"cycle-colormap") == 0)
{
ssize_t
display;
/*
Cycle-colormap image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
display=0;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"display") == 0)
{
display=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) CycleColormapImage(msl_info->image[n],display);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"despeckle") == 0)
{
Image
*despeckle_image;
/*
Despeckle image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
despeckle_image=DespeckleImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (despeckle_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=despeckle_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"display") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) DisplayImages(msl_info->image_info[n],msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"draw") == 0)
{
char
text[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Annotate image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->draw_info[n]);
angle=0.0;
current=draw_info->affine;
GetAffineMatrix(&affine);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"affine") == 0)
{
char
*p;
p=value;
draw_info->affine.sx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.rx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ry=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.sy=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.tx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ty=StringToDouble(p,&p);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"align") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlignOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAlignType",
value);
draw_info->align=(AlignType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"antialias") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
draw_info->stroke_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
draw_info->text_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"density") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->density,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"encoding") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"family") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->family,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"font") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->font,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gravity") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",
value);
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"points") == 0)
{
if (LocaleCompare(draw_info->primitive,"path") == 0)
{
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive," '");
ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,value);
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,"'");
}
else
{
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive," ");
ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,value);
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pointsize") == 0)
{
draw_info->pointsize=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"primitive") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->primitive,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rotate") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.sx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.rx=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.ry=(-sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0))));
affine.sy=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scale") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.sx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.sy=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewX") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.ry=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewY") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.rx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"stretch") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStretchOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStretchType",
value);
draw_info->stretch=(StretchType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "stroke") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"strokewidth") == 0)
{
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"style") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStyleType",
value);
draw_info->style=(StyleType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"text") == 0)
{
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive," '");
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,value);
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,"'");
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"translate") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.tx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.ty=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "undercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"weight") == 0)
{
draw_info->weight=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(text,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) geometry.width,(double)
geometry.height,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,text);
draw_info->affine.sx=affine.sx*current.sx+affine.ry*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.rx=affine.rx*current.sx+affine.sy*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.ry=affine.sx*current.ry+affine.ry*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.sy=affine.rx*current.ry+affine.sy*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.tx=affine.sx*current.tx+affine.ry*current.ty+
affine.tx;
draw_info->affine.ty=affine.rx*current.tx+affine.sy*current.ty+
affine.ty;
(void) DrawImage(msl_info->image[n],draw_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"edge") == 0)
{
Image
*edge_image;
/*
Edge image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
edge_image=EdgeImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (edge_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=edge_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"emboss") == 0)
{
Image
*emboss_image;
/*
Emboss image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sigma") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
emboss_image=EmbossImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
geometry_info.sigma,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (emboss_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=emboss_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"enhance") == 0)
{
Image
*enhance_image;
/*
Enhance image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
enhance_image=EnhanceImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (enhance_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=enhance_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"equalize") == 0)
{
/*
Equalize image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) EqualizeImage(msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "flatten") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
/* no attributes here */
/* process the image */
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=MergeImageLayers(msl_info->image[n],FlattenLayer,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
}
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"flip") == 0)
{
Image
*flip_image;
/*
Flip image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
flip_image=FlipImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (flip_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=flip_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"flop") == 0)
{
Image
*flop_image;
/*
Flop image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
flop_image=FlopImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (flop_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=flop_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"frame") == 0)
{
FrameInfo
frame_info;
Image
*frame_image;
/*
Frame image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&frame_info,0,sizeof(frame_info));
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compose") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedComposeType",
value);
msl_info->image[n]->compose=(CompositeOperator) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,
&msl_info->image[n]->matte_color,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
frame_info.width=geometry.width;
frame_info.height=geometry.height;
frame_info.outer_bevel=geometry.x;
frame_info.inner_bevel=geometry.y;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
frame_info.height=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"inner") == 0)
{
frame_info.inner_bevel=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"outer") == 0)
{
frame_info.outer_bevel=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
frame_info.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
frame_info.x=(ssize_t) frame_info.width;
frame_info.y=(ssize_t) frame_info.height;
frame_info.width=msl_info->image[n]->columns+2*frame_info.x;
frame_info.height=msl_info->image[n]->rows+2*frame_info.y;
frame_image=FrameImage(msl_info->image[n],&frame_info,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (frame_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=frame_image;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"gamma") == 0)
{
char
gamma[MaxTextExtent];
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
/*
Gamma image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
channel=UndefinedChannel;
pixel.red=0.0;
pixel.green=0.0;
pixel.blue=0.0;
*gamma='\0';
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue") == 0)
{
pixel.blue=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(gamma,value,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green") == 0)
{
pixel.green=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red") == 0)
{
pixel.red=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
if (*gamma == '\0')
(void) FormatLocaleString(gamma,MaxTextExtent,"%g,%g,%g",
(double) pixel.red,(double) pixel.green,(double) pixel.blue);
switch (channel)
{
default:
{
(void) GammaImage(msl_info->image[n],gamma);
break;
}
case RedChannel:
{
(void) GammaImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],RedChannel,pixel.red);
break;
}
case GreenChannel:
{
(void) GammaImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],GreenChannel,
pixel.green);
break;
}
case BlueChannel:
{
(void) GammaImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],BlueChannel,
pixel.blue);
break;
}
}
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"get") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,(const char *) attributes[i]);
(void) CopyMagickString(key,value,MaxTextExtent);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
(double) msl_info->image[n]->rows);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[n],key,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
(double) msl_info->image[n]->columns);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[n],key,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "group") == 0)
{
msl_info->number_groups++;
msl_info->group_info=(MSLGroupInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
msl_info->group_info,msl_info->number_groups+1UL,
sizeof(*msl_info->group_info));
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"image") == 0)
{
MSLPushImage(msl_info,(Image *) NULL);
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"color") == 0)
{
Image
*next_image;
(void) CopyMagickString(msl_info->image_info[n]->filename,
"xc:",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(msl_info->image_info[n]->
filename,value,MaxTextExtent);
next_image=ReadImage(msl_info->image_info[n],exception);
CatchException(exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
msl_info->image[n]=next_image;
else
{
register Image
*p;
/*
Link image into image list.
*/
p=msl_info->image[n];
while (p->next != (Image *) NULL)
p=GetNextImageInList(p);
next_image->previous=p;
p->next=next_image;
}
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"implode") == 0)
{
Image
*implode_image;
/*
Implode image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"amount") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
implode_image=ImplodeImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (implode_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=implode_image;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"label") == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "level") == 0)
{
double
levelBlack = 0, levelGamma = 1, levelWhite = QuantumRange;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,(const char *) attributes[i]);
(void) CopyMagickString(key,value,MaxTextExtent);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"black") == 0)
{
levelBlack = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
levelGamma = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white") == 0)
{
levelWhite = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/* process image */
{
char level[MaxTextExtent + 1];
(void) FormatLocaleString(level,MaxTextExtent,"%3.6f/%3.6f/%3.6f/",
levelBlack,levelGamma,levelWhite);
LevelImage ( msl_info->image[n], level );
break;
}
}
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"magnify") == 0)
{
Image
*magnify_image;
/*
Magnify image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
magnify_image=MagnifyImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (magnify_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=magnify_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"map") == 0)
{
Image
*affinity_image;
MagickBooleanType
dither;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
/*
Map image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
affinity_image=NewImageList();
dither=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dither") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
dither=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*attribute;
attribute=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if ((attribute != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(attribute,value) == 0))
{
affinity_image=CloneImage(msl_info->image[j],0,0,
MagickFalse,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(msl_info->image_info[n]);
quantize_info->dither=dither;
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,msl_info->image[n],
affinity_image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
affinity_image=DestroyImage(affinity_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"matte-floodfill") == 0)
{
double
opacity;
MagickPixelPacket
target;
PaintMethod
paint_method;
/*
Matte floodfill image.
*/
opacity=0.0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
paint_method=FloodfillMethod;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bordercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryMagickColor(value,&target,exception);
paint_method=FillToBorderMethod;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fuzz") == 0)
{
msl_info->image[n]->fuzz=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opacity") == 0)
{
opacity=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
(void) GetOneVirtualMagickPixel(msl_info->image[n],
geometry.x,geometry.y,&target,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->draw_info[n]);
draw_info->fill.opacity=ClampToQuantum(opacity);
(void) FloodfillPaintImage(msl_info->image[n],OpacityChannel,
draw_info,&target,geometry.x,geometry.y,
paint_method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"median-filter") == 0)
{
Image
*median_image;
/*
Median-filter image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
median_image=StatisticImage(msl_info->image[n],MedianStatistic,
(size_t) geometry_info.rho,(size_t) geometry_info.sigma,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (median_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=median_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"minify") == 0)
{
Image
*minify_image;
/*
Minify image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
minify_image=MinifyImage(msl_info->image[n],
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (minify_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=minify_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"msl") == 0 )
break;
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"modulate") == 0)
{
char
modulate[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Modulate image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
geometry_info.rho=100.0;
geometry_info.sigma=100.0;
geometry_info.xi=100.0;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blackness") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"brightness") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"factor") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"hue") == 0)
{
geometry_info.xi=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"lightness") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"saturation") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"whiteness") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(modulate,MaxTextExtent,"%g,%g,%g",
geometry_info.rho,geometry_info.sigma,geometry_info.xi);
(void) ModulateImage(msl_info->image[n],modulate);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"negate") == 0)
{
MagickBooleanType
gray;
/*
Negate image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
gray=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gray") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
gray=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) NegateImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],channel,gray);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"normalize") == 0)
{
/*
Normalize image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) NormalizeImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],channel);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"oil-paint") == 0)
{
Image
*paint_image;
/*
Oil-paint image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
paint_image=OilPaintImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (paint_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=paint_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"opaque") == 0)
{
MagickPixelPacket
fill_color,
target;
/*
Opaque image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
(void) QueryMagickColor("none",&target,exception);
(void) QueryMagickColor("none",&fill_color,exception);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"channel") == 0)
{
option=ParseChannelOption(value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedChannelType",
value);
channel=(ChannelType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryMagickColor(value,&fill_color,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fuzz") == 0)
{
msl_info->image[n]->fuzz=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) OpaquePaintImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],channel,
&target,&fill_color,MagickFalse);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"print") == 0)
{
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"output") == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "profile") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
Image
*profile_image;
ImageInfo
*profile_info;
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
if (*keyword == '!')
{
/*
Remove a profile from the image.
*/
(void) ProfileImage(msl_info->image[n],keyword,
(const unsigned char *) NULL,0,MagickTrue);
continue;
}
/*
Associate a profile with the image.
*/
profile_info=CloneImageInfo(msl_info->image_info[n]);
profile=GetImageProfile(msl_info->image[n],"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
profile_info->profile=(void *) CloneStringInfo(profile);
profile_image=GetImageCache(profile_info,keyword,exception);
profile_info=DestroyImageInfo(profile_info);
if (profile_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
char
name[MaxTextExtent],
filename[MaxTextExtent];
register char
*p;
StringInfo
*profile;
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,keyword,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(name,keyword,MaxTextExtent);
for (p=filename; *p != '\0'; p++)
if ((*p == ':') && (IsPathDirectory(keyword) < 0) &&
(IsPathAccessible(keyword) == MagickFalse))
{
register char
*q;
/*
Look for profile name (e.g. name:profile).
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(name,filename,(size_t)
(p-filename+1));
for (q=filename; *q != '\0'; q++)
*q=(*++p);
break;
}
profile=FileToStringInfo(filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ProfileImage(msl_info->image[n],name,
GetStringInfoDatum(profile),(size_t)
GetStringInfoLength(profile),MagickFalse);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
continue;
}
ResetImageProfileIterator(profile_image);
name=GetNextImageProfile(profile_image);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(profile_image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
(void) ProfileImage(msl_info->image[n],name,
GetStringInfoDatum(profile),(size_t)
GetStringInfoLength(profile),MagickFalse);
name=GetNextImageProfile(profile_image);
}
profile_image=DestroyImage(profile_image);
}
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'Q':
case 'q':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"quantize") == 0)
{
QuantizeInfo
quantize_info;
/*
Quantize image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
GetQuantizeInfo(&quantize_info);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
quantize_info.number_colors=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,
"UnrecognizedColorspaceType",value);
quantize_info.colorspace=(ColorspaceType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dither") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
quantize_info.dither=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"measure") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
quantize_info.measure_error=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"treedepth") == 0)
{
quantize_info.tree_depth=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) QuantizeImage(&quantize_info,msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"query-font-metrics") == 0)
{
char
text[MaxTextExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
TypeMetric
metrics;
/*
Query font metrics.
*/
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->draw_info[n]);
angle=0.0;
current=draw_info->affine;
GetAffineMatrix(&affine);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"affine") == 0)
{
char
*p;
p=value;
draw_info->affine.sx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.rx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ry=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.sy=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.tx=StringToDouble(p,&p);
if (*p ==',')
p++;
draw_info->affine.ty=StringToDouble(p,&p);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"align") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlignOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAlignType",
value);
draw_info->align=(AlignType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"antialias") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedBooleanType",
value);
draw_info->stroke_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
draw_info->text_antialias=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"density") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->density,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"encoding") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"family") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->family,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"font") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->font,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gravity") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",
value);
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pointsize") == 0)
{
draw_info->pointsize=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rotate") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.sx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.rx=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
affine.ry=(-sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0))));
affine.sy=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scale") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.sx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.sy=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewX") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.ry=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"skewY") == 0)
{
angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
affine.rx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod(angle,360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"stretch") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStretchOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStretchType",
value);
draw_info->stretch=(StretchType) option;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "stroke") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"strokewidth") == 0)
{
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"style") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedStyleType",
value);
draw_info->style=(StyleType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"text") == 0)
{
CloneString(&draw_info->text,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"translate") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
affine.tx=geometry_info.rho;
affine.ty=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "undercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"weight") == 0)
{
draw_info->weight=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(text,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) geometry.width,(double)
geometry.height,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,text);
draw_info->affine.sx=affine.sx*current.sx+affine.ry*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.rx=affine.rx*current.sx+affine.sy*current.rx;
draw_info->affine.ry=affine.sx*current.ry+affine.ry*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.sy=affine.rx*current.ry+affine.sy*current.sy;
draw_info->affine.tx=affine.sx*current.tx+affine.ry*current.ty+
affine.tx;
draw_info->affine.ty=affine.rx*current.tx+affine.sy*current.ty+
affine.ty;
status=GetTypeMetrics(msl_info->attributes[n],draw_info,&metrics);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
Image
*image;
image=msl_info->attributes[n];
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.pixels_per_em.x",
"%g",metrics.pixels_per_em.x);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.pixels_per_em.y",
"%g",metrics.pixels_per_em.y);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.ascent","%g",
metrics.ascent);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.descent","%g",
metrics.descent);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.width","%g",
metrics.width);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.height","%g",
metrics.height);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.max_advance","%g",
metrics.max_advance);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.bounds.x1","%g",
metrics.bounds.x1);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.bounds.y1","%g",
metrics.bounds.y1);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.bounds.x2","%g",
metrics.bounds.x2);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.bounds.y2","%g",
metrics.bounds.y2);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.origin.x","%g",
metrics.origin.x);
FormatImageProperty(image,"msl:font-metrics.origin.y","%g",
metrics.origin.y);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"raise") == 0)
{
MagickBooleanType
raise;
/*
Raise image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
raise=MagickFalse;
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"raise") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedNoiseType",
value);
raise=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) RaiseImage(msl_info->image[n],&geometry,raise);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"read") == 0)
{
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"filename") == 0)
{
Image
*image;
(void) CopyMagickString(msl_info->image_info[n]->filename,
value,MaxTextExtent);
image=ReadImage(msl_info->image_info[n],exception);
CatchException(exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
AppendImageToList(&msl_info->image[n],image);
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"reduce-noise") == 0)
{
Image
*paint_image;
/*
Reduce-noise image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
paint_image=StatisticImage(msl_info->image[n],NonpeakStatistic,
(size_t) geometry_info.rho,(size_t) geometry_info.sigma,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (paint_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=paint_image;
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"repage") == 0)
{
/* init the values */
width=msl_info->image[n]->page.width;
height=msl_info->image[n]->page.height;
x=msl_info->image[n]->page.x;
y=msl_info->image[n]->page.y;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
int
flags;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(value,&geometry);
if ((flags & WidthValue) != 0)
{
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
width=geometry.width;
height=geometry.height;
}
if ((flags & AspectValue) != 0)
{
if ((flags & XValue) != 0)
x+=geometry.x;
if ((flags & YValue) != 0)
y+=geometry.y;
}
else
{
if ((flags & XValue) != 0)
{
x=geometry.x;
if ((width == 0) && (geometry.x > 0))
width=msl_info->image[n]->columns+geometry.x;
}
if ((flags & YValue) != 0)
{
y=geometry.y;
if ((height == 0) && (geometry.y > 0))
height=msl_info->image[n]->rows+geometry.y;
}
}
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
height = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
width = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
x = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
y = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
msl_info->image[n]->page.width=width;
msl_info->image[n]->page.height=height;
msl_info->image[n]->page.x=x;
msl_info->image[n]->page.y=y;
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"resample") == 0)
{
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
x_resolution=DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=DefaultResolution;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blur") == 0)
{
msl_info->image[n]->blur=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
ssize_t
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma*=geometry_info.rho;
x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x-resolution") == 0)
{
x_resolution=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y-resolution") == 0)
{
y_resolution=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
Resample image.
*/
{
double
factor;
Image
*resample_image;
factor=1.0;
if (msl_info->image[n]->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
factor=2.54;
width=(size_t) (x_resolution*msl_info->image[n]->columns/
(factor*(msl_info->image[n]->x_resolution == 0.0 ? DefaultResolution :
msl_info->image[n]->x_resolution))+0.5);
height=(size_t) (y_resolution*msl_info->image[n]->rows/
(factor*(msl_info->image[n]->y_resolution == 0.0 ? DefaultResolution :
msl_info->image[n]->y_resolution))+0.5);
resample_image=ResizeImage(msl_info->image[n],width,height,
msl_info->image[n]->filter,msl_info->image[n]->blur,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (resample_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=resample_image;
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"resize") == 0)
{
double
blur;
FilterTypes
filter;
Image
*resize_image;
/*
Resize image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
filter=UndefinedFilter;
blur=1.0;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"filter") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickFilterOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedNoiseType",
value);
filter=(FilterTypes) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseRegionGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"support") == 0)
{
blur=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
resize_image=ResizeImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry.width,
geometry.height,filter,blur,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (resize_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=resize_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"roll") == 0)
{
Image
*roll_image;
/*
Roll image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
SetGeometry(msl_info->image[n],&geometry);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParsePageGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
if ((flags & HeightValue) == 0)
geometry.height=geometry.width;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry.x=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry.y=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
roll_image=RollImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry.x,geometry.y,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (roll_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=roll_image;
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"roll") == 0)
{
/* init the values */
width=msl_info->image[n]->columns;
height=msl_info->image[n]->rows;
x = y = 0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(value,&x,&y,&width,&height);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
x = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
y = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=RollImage(msl_info->image[n], x, y, &msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"rotate") == 0)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
/*
Rotate image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"degrees") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
rotate_image=RotateImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (rotate_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=rotate_image;
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"rotate") == 0)
{
/* init the values */
double degrees = 0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"degrees") == 0)
{
degrees = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=RotateImage(msl_info->image[n], degrees, &msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
}
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"sample") == 0)
{
Image
*sample_image;
/*
Sample image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseRegionGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
sample_image=SampleImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry.width,
geometry.height,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (sample_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=sample_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"scale") == 0)
{
Image
*scale_image;
/*
Scale image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseRegionGeometry(msl_info->image[n],value,
&geometry,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
geometry.height=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
geometry.width=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
scale_image=ScaleImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry.width,
geometry.height,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (scale_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=scale_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"segment") == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
MagickBooleanType
verbose;
/*
Segment image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
geometry_info.rho=1.0;
geometry_info.sigma=1.5;
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
verbose=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"cluster-threshold") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,
"UnrecognizedColorspaceType",value);
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.5;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"smoothing-threshold") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) SegmentImage(msl_info->image[n],colorspace,verbose,
geometry_info.rho,geometry_info.sigma);
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "set") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"clip-mask") == 0)
{
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if (LocaleCompare(property,value) == 0)
{
SetImageMask(msl_info->image[n],msl_info->image[j]);
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"clip-path") == 0)
{
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if (LocaleCompare(property,value) == 0)
{
SetImageClipMask(msl_info->image[n],msl_info->image[j]);
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (colorspace < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedColorspace",
value);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(msl_info->image[n],
(ColorspaceType) colorspace);
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],keyword,value);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"density") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
msl_info->image[n]->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
msl_info->image[n]->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
msl_info->image[n]->y_resolution=
msl_info->image[n]->x_resolution;
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],keyword,value);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "opacity") == 0)
{
ssize_t opac = OpaqueOpacity,
len = (ssize_t) strlen( value );
if (value[len-1] == '%') {
char tmp[100];
(void) CopyMagickString(tmp,value,len);
opac = StringToLong( tmp );
opac = (int)(QuantumRange * ((float)opac/100));
} else
opac = StringToLong( value );
(void) SetImageOpacity( msl_info->image[n], (Quantum) opac );
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],keyword,value);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "page") == 0)
{
char
page[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*image_option;
MagickStatusType
flags;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&geometry,0,sizeof(geometry));
image_option=GetImageArtifact(msl_info->image[n],"page");
if (image_option != (const char *) NULL)
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_option,&geometry);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(value,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) geometry.width,(double) geometry.height);
if (((flags & XValue) != 0) || ((flags & YValue) != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) geometry.width,
(double) geometry.height,(double) geometry.x,(double)
geometry.y);
(void) SetImageOption(msl_info->image_info[n],keyword,page);
msl_info->image_info[n]->page=GetPageGeometry(page);
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],keyword,value);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],keyword,value);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"shade") == 0)
{
Image
*shade_image;
MagickBooleanType
gray;
/*
Shade image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
gray=MagickFalse;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"azimuth") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"elevation") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gray") == 0)
{
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (option < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedNoiseType",
value);
gray=(MagickBooleanType) option;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
shade_image=ShadeImage(msl_info->image[n],gray,geometry_info.rho,
geometry_info.sigma,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (shade_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=shade_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"shadow") == 0)
{
Image
*shadow_image;
/*
Shear image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'O':
case 'o':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opacity") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sigma") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry_info.xi=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry_info.psi=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
shadow_image=ShadowImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
geometry_info.sigma,(ssize_t) ceil(geometry_info.xi-0.5),(ssize_t)
ceil(geometry_info.psi-0.5),&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (shadow_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=shadow_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"sharpen") == 0)
{
double radius = 0.0,
sigma = 1.0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
/*
NOTE: sharpen can have no attributes, since we use all the defaults!
*/
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
{
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "radius") == 0)
{
radius = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"sigma") == 0)
{
sigma = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
}
/*
sharpen image.
*/
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=SharpenImage(msl_info->image[n],radius,sigma,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
}
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"shave") == 0)
{
/* init the values */
width = height = 0;
x = y = 0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(value,&x,&y,&width,&height);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
{
height = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
{
width = StringToLong( value );
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
{
Image
*newImage;
RectangleInfo
rectInfo;
rectInfo.height = height;
rectInfo.width = width;
rectInfo.x = x;
rectInfo.y = y;
newImage=ShaveImage(msl_info->image[n], &rectInfo,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"shear") == 0)
{
Image
*shear_image;
/*
Shear image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword, "fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(value,
&msl_info->image[n]->background_color,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"x") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"y") == 0)
{
geometry_info.sigma=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
shear_image=ShearImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
geometry_info.sigma,&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (shear_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=shear_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"signature") == 0)
{
/*
Signature image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) SignatureImage(msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"solarize") == 0)
{
/*
Solarize image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
geometry_info.rho=QuantumRange/2.0;
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"threshold") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) SolarizeImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"spread") == 0)
{
Image
*spread_image;
/*
Spread image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"radius") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
spread_image=SpreadImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (spread_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=spread_image;
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"stegano") == 0)
{
Image *
watermark = (Image*) NULL;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
{
for (j=0; j<msl_info->n;j++)
{
const char *
theAttr = GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j], "id");
if (theAttr && LocaleCompare(theAttr, value) == 0)
{
watermark = msl_info->image[j];
break;
}
}
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
if ( watermark != (Image*) NULL )
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=SteganoImage(msl_info->image[n], watermark, &msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
} else
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"MissingWatermarkImage",keyword);
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"stereo") == 0)
{
Image *
stereoImage = (Image*) NULL;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
{
for (j=0; j<msl_info->n;j++)
{
const char *
theAttr = GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j], "id");
if (theAttr && LocaleCompare(theAttr, value) == 0)
{
stereoImage = msl_info->image[j];
break;
}
}
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
if ( stereoImage != (Image*) NULL )
{
Image
*newImage;
newImage=StereoImage(msl_info->image[n], stereoImage, &msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
} else
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"Missing stereo image",keyword);
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"strip") == 0)
{
/*
Strip image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
}
(void) StripImage(msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"swap") == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*swap;
ssize_t
index,
swap_index;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"indexes") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
Swap images.
*/
p=GetImageFromList(msl_info->image[n],index);
q=GetImageFromList(msl_info->image[n],swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoSuchImage",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
swap=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,&p->exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&p,CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,&q->exception));
ReplaceImageInList(&q,swap);
msl_info->image[n]=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"swirl") == 0)
{
Image
*swirl_image;
/*
Swirl image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"degrees") == 0)
{
geometry_info.rho=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"geometry") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
swirl_image=SwirlImage(msl_info->image[n],geometry_info.rho,
&msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (swirl_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=swirl_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"sync") == 0)
{
/*
Sync image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) SyncImage(msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"map") == 0)
{
Image
*texture_image;
/*
Texture image.
*/
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
texture_image=NewImageList();
if (attributes != (const xmlChar **) NULL)
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
attribute=InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]);
CloneString(&value,attribute);
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"image") == 0)
for (j=0; j < msl_info->n; j++)
{
const char
*attribute;
attribute=GetImageProperty(msl_info->attributes[j],"id");
if ((attribute != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(attribute,value) == 0))
{
texture_image=CloneImage(msl_info->image[j],0,0,
MagickFalse,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",
keyword);
break;
}
}
}
(void) TextureImage(msl_info->image[n],texture_image);
texture_image=DestroyImage(texture_image);
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"threshold") == 0)
{
/* init the values */
double threshold = 0;
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"threshold") == 0)
{
threshold = StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
/*
process image.
*/
{
BilevelImageChannel(msl_info->image[n],
(ChannelType) ((ssize_t) (CompositeChannels &~ (ssize_t) OpacityChannel)),
threshold);
break;
}
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "transparent") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"color") == 0)
{
MagickPixelPacket
target;
(void) QueryMagickColor(value,&target,exception);
(void) TransparentPaintImage(msl_info->image[n],&target,
TransparentOpacity,MagickFalse);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
else if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag, "trim") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
/* no attributes here */
/* process the image */
{
Image
*newImage;
RectangleInfo
rectInfo;
/* all zeros on a crop == trim edges! */
rectInfo.height = rectInfo.width = 0;
rectInfo.x = rectInfo.y = 0;
newImage=CropImage(msl_info->image[n],&rectInfo, &msl_info->image[n]->exception);
if (newImage == (Image *) NULL)
break;
msl_info->image[n]=DestroyImage(msl_info->image[n]);
msl_info->image[n]=newImage;
break;
}
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"write") == 0)
{
if (msl_info->image[n] == (Image *) NULL)
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"NoImagesDefined",
(const char *) tag);
break;
}
if (attributes == (const xmlChar **) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; (attributes[i] != (const xmlChar *) NULL); i++)
{
keyword=(const char *) attributes[i++];
CloneString(&value,InterpretImageProperties(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->attributes[n],(const char *) attributes[i]));
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"filename") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(msl_info->image[n]->filename,value,
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
}
default:
{
(void) SetMSLAttributes(msl_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
}
}
/* process */
{
*msl_info->image_info[n]->magick='\0';
(void) WriteImage(msl_info->image_info[n], msl_info->image[n]);
break;
}
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedElement",(const char *) tag);
break;
}
}
if ( value != NULL )
value=DestroyString(value);
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," )");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The MSL interpreter in ImageMagick before 6.9.6-4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault and application crash) via a crafted XML file.
Commit Message: Prevent fault in MSL interpreter | Medium | 168,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PreconnectedRequestStats::PreconnectedRequestStats(const GURL& origin,
bool was_preconnected)
: origin(origin),
was_preconnected(was_preconnected) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void lxc_execute_bind_init(struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int ret;
char path[PATH_MAX], destpath[PATH_MAX], *p;
/* If init exists in the container, don't bind mount a static one */
p = choose_init(conf->rootfs.mount);
if (p) {
free(p);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, SBINDIR "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long searching for lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(path)) {
INFO("%s does not exist on host", path);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(destpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", conf->rootfs.mount, "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long for container's lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(destpath)) {
FILE * pathfile = fopen(destpath, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create mount target '%s'", destpath);
return;
}
fclose(pathfile);
}
ret = mount(path, destpath, "none", MS_BIND, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
SYSERROR("Failed to bind lxc.init.static into container");
INFO("lxc.init.static bound into container at %s", path);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 166,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Edition::ParseAtom(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandAtomsArray())
return -1;
Atom& a = m_atoms[m_atoms_count++];
a.Init();
return a.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image) {
CHECK(image);
DCHECK(!image->isLazyGenerated());
paint_image_ =
CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(std::move(image), cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId())
.TakePaintImage();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
void (*func)(struct perf_event *);
u32 flags = arg;
switch (cmd) {
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE:
func = perf_event_enable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE:
func = perf_event_disable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET:
func = perf_event_reset;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH:
return perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD:
return perf_event_period(event, (u64 __user *)arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID:
{
u64 id = primary_event_id(event);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &id, sizeof(id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT:
{
int ret;
if (arg != -1) {
struct perf_event *output_event;
struct fd output;
ret = perf_fget_light(arg, &output);
if (ret)
return ret;
output_event = output.file->private_data;
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, output_event);
fdput(output);
} else {
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, NULL);
}
return ret;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER:
return perf_event_set_filter(event, (void __user *)arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
if (flags & PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP)
perf_event_for_each(event, func);
else
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::PreviewPageRendered(int page_number,
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
if (!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable() ||
!print_preview_context_.generate_draft_pages()) {
DCHECK(!metafile);
return true;
}
if (!metafile) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(
PREVIEW_ERROR_PAGE_RENDERED_WITHOUT_METAFILE);
return false;
}
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params preview_page_params;
if (!CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(*metafile,
&preview_page_params.metafile_data_handle)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem failed";
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_COPY_FAILED);
return false;
}
preview_page_params.data_size = metafile->GetDataSize();
preview_page_params.page_number = page_number;
preview_page_params.preview_request_id =
print_pages_params_->params.preview_request_id;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage(routing_id(), preview_page_params));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TestWCDelegateForDialogsAndFullscreen()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | Low | 172,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: | High | 168,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void gx_ttfReader__Read(ttfReader *self, void *p, int n)
{
gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self;
const byte *q;
if (!r->error) {
if (r->extra_glyph_index != -1) {
q = r->glyph_data.bits.data + r->pos;
r->error = (r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n ?
gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfont) : 0);
if (r->error == 0)
memcpy(p, q, n);
unsigned int cnt;
for (cnt = 0; cnt < (uint)n; cnt += r->error) {
r->error = r->pfont->data.string_proc(r->pfont, (ulong)r->pos + cnt, (ulong)n - cnt, &q);
if (r->error < 0)
break;
else if ( r->error == 0) {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, n - cnt);
break;
} else {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, r->error);
}
}
}
}
if (r->error) {
memset(p, 0, n);
return;
}
r->pos += n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The gx_ttfReader__Read function in base/gxttfb.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength(size_t index, int64 result) {
if (error_)
return;
if (result == net::ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
return;
} else if (result < 0) {
NotifyFailure(result);
return;
}
DCHECK_LT(index, blob_data_->items().size());
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(index);
DCHECK(IsFileType(item.type()));
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
if (item_length == -1)
item_length = result - item.offset();
DCHECK_LT(index, item_length_list_.size());
item_length_list_[index] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
if (--pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a blob.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bdfReadCharacters(FontFilePtr file, FontPtr pFont, bdfFileState *pState,
int bit, int byte, int glyph, int scan)
{
unsigned char *line;
register CharInfoPtr ci;
int i,
ndx,
nchars,
nignored;
unsigned int char_row, char_col;
int numEncodedGlyphs = 0;
CharInfoPtr *bdfEncoding[256];
BitmapFontPtr bitmapFont;
BitmapExtraPtr bitmapExtra;
CARD32 *bitmapsSizes;
unsigned char lineBuf[BDFLINELEN];
int nencoding;
bitmapFont = (BitmapFontPtr) pFont->fontPrivate;
bitmapExtra = (BitmapExtraPtr) bitmapFont->bitmapExtra;
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapsSizes = bitmapExtra->bitmapsSizes;
for (i = 0; i < GLYPHPADOPTIONS; i++)
bitmapsSizes[i] = 0;
} else
bitmapsSizes = NULL;
bzero(bdfEncoding, sizeof(bdfEncoding));
bitmapFont->metrics = NULL;
ndx = 0;
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "CHARS %d", &nchars) != 1)) {
bdfError("bad 'CHARS' in bdf file\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (nchars < 1) {
bdfError("invalid number of CHARS in BDF file\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (nchars > INT32_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec)) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate pCI (%d*%d)\n", nchars,
(int) sizeof(CharInfoRec));
goto BAILOUT;
}
ci = calloc(nchars, sizeof(CharInfoRec));
if (!ci) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate pCI (%d*%d)\n", nchars,
(int) sizeof(CharInfoRec));
goto BAILOUT;
}
bitmapFont->metrics = ci;
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapExtra->glyphNames = malloc(nchars * sizeof(Atom));
if (!bitmapExtra->glyphNames) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate glyphNames (%d*%d)\n",
nchars, (int) sizeof(Atom));
goto BAILOUT;
}
}
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapExtra->sWidths = malloc(nchars * sizeof(int));
if (!bitmapExtra->sWidths) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate sWidth (%d *%d)\n",
nchars, (int) sizeof(int));
return FALSE;
}
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
pFont->info.firstRow = 256;
pFont->info.lastRow = 0;
pFont->info.firstCol = 256;
pFont->info.lastCol = 0;
nignored = 0;
for (ndx = 0; (ndx < nchars) && (line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "STARTCHAR"));) {
int t;
int wx; /* x component of width */
int wy; /* y component of width */
int bw; /* bounding-box width */
int bh; /* bounding-box height */
int bl; /* bounding-box left */
int bb; /* bounding-box bottom */
int enc,
enc2; /* encoding */
unsigned char *p; /* temp pointer into line */
char charName[100];
int ignore;
if (sscanf((char *) line, "STARTCHAR %s", charName) != 1) {
bdfError("bad character name in BDF file\n");
goto BAILOUT; /* bottom of function, free and return error */
}
if (bitmapExtra)
bitmapExtra->glyphNames[ndx] = bdfForceMakeAtom(charName, NULL);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || (t = sscanf((char *) line, "ENCODING %d %d", &enc, &enc2)) < 1) {
bdfError("bad 'ENCODING' in BDF file\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (enc < -1 || (t == 2 && enc2 < -1)) {
bdfError("bad ENCODING value");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (t == 2 && enc == -1)
enc = enc2;
ignore = 0;
if (enc == -1) {
if (!bitmapExtra) {
nignored++;
ignore = 1;
}
} else if (enc > MAXENCODING) {
bdfError("char '%s' has encoding too large (%d)\n",
charName, enc);
} else {
char_row = (enc >> 8) & 0xFF;
char_col = enc & 0xFF;
if (char_row < pFont->info.firstRow)
pFont->info.firstRow = char_row;
if (char_row > pFont->info.lastRow)
pFont->info.lastRow = char_row;
if (char_col < pFont->info.firstCol)
pFont->info.firstCol = char_col;
if (char_col > pFont->info.lastCol)
pFont->info.lastCol = char_col;
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] == (CharInfoPtr *) NULL) {
bdfEncoding[char_row] = malloc(256 * sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
if (!bdfEncoding[char_row]) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate row %d of encoding (%d*%d)\n",
char_row, INDICES, (int) sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
goto BAILOUT;
}
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
bdfEncoding[char_row][i] = (CharInfoPtr) NULL;
}
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] != NULL) {
bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col] = ci;
numEncodedGlyphs++;
}
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "SWIDTH %d %d", &wx, &wy) != 2)) {
bdfError("bad 'SWIDTH'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (wy != 0) {
bdfError("SWIDTH y value must be zero\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (bitmapExtra)
bitmapExtra->sWidths[ndx] = wx;
/* 5/31/89 (ef) -- we should be able to ditch the character and recover */
/* from all of these. */
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "DWIDTH %d %d", &wx, &wy) != 2)) {
bdfError("bad 'DWIDTH'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (wy != 0) {
bdfError("DWIDTH y value must be zero\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "BBX %d %d %d %d", &bw, &bh, &bl, &bb) != 4)) {
bdfError("bad 'BBX'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if ((bh < 0) || (bw < 0)) {
bdfError("character '%s' has a negative sized bitmap, %dx%d\n",
charName, bw, bh);
goto BAILOUT;
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "ATTRIBUTES"))) {
for (p = line + strlen("ATTRIBUTES ");
(*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t');
p++)
/* empty for loop */ ;
ci->metrics.attributes = (bdfHexByte(p) << 8) + bdfHexByte(p + 2);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
} else
ci->metrics.attributes = 0;
if (!line || !bdfIsPrefix(line, "BITMAP")) {
bdfError("missing 'BITMAP'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
/* collect data for generated properties */
if ((strlen(charName) == 1)) {
if ((charName[0] >= '0') && (charName[0] <= '9')) {
pState->digitWidths += wx;
pState->digitCount++;
} else if (charName[0] == 'x') {
pState->exHeight = (bh + bb) <= 0 ? bh : bh + bb;
}
}
if (!ignore) {
ci->metrics.leftSideBearing = bl;
ci->metrics.rightSideBearing = bl + bw;
ci->metrics.ascent = bh + bb;
ci->metrics.descent = -bb;
ci->metrics.characterWidth = wx;
ci->bits = NULL;
bdfReadBitmap(ci, file, bit, byte, glyph, scan, bitmapsSizes);
ci++;
ndx++;
} else
bdfSkipBitmap(file, bh);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN); /* get STARTCHAR or
* ENDFONT */
}
if (ndx + nignored != nchars) {
bdfError("%d too few characters\n", nchars - (ndx + nignored));
goto BAILOUT;
}
nchars = ndx;
bitmapFont->num_chars = nchars;
if ((line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "STARTCHAR"))) {
bdfError("more characters than specified\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if ((!line) || (!bdfIsPrefix(line, "ENDFONT"))) {
bdfError("missing 'ENDFONT'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (numEncodedGlyphs == 0)
bdfWarning("No characters with valid encodings\n");
nencoding = (pFont->info.lastRow - pFont->info.firstRow + 1) *
(pFont->info.lastCol - pFont->info.firstCol + 1);
bitmapFont->encoding = calloc(NUM_SEGMENTS(nencoding),sizeof(CharInfoPtr*));
if (!bitmapFont->encoding) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate ppCI (%d,%d)\n",
NUM_SEGMENTS(nencoding),
(int) sizeof(CharInfoPtr*));
goto BAILOUT;
}
pFont->info.allExist = TRUE;
i = 0;
for (char_row = pFont->info.firstRow;
char_row <= pFont->info.lastRow;
char_row++) {
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] == (CharInfoPtr *) NULL) {
pFont->info.allExist = FALSE;
i += pFont->info.lastCol - pFont->info.firstCol + 1;
} else {
for (char_col = pFont->info.firstCol;
char_col <= pFont->info.lastCol;
char_col++) {
if (!bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col])
pFont->info.allExist = FALSE;
else {
if (!bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]) {
bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]=
calloc(BITMAP_FONT_SEGMENT_SIZE,
sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
if (!bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)])
goto BAILOUT;
}
ACCESSENCODINGL(bitmapFont->encoding,i) =
bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col];
}
i++;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (bdfEncoding[i])
free(bdfEncoding[i]);
return (TRUE);
BAILOUT:
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (bdfEncoding[i])
free(bdfEncoding[i]);
/* bdfFreeFontBits will clean up the rest */
return (FALSE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the bdfReadCharacters function in bitmap/bdfread.c in X.Org libXfont 1.1 through 1.4.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a long string in a character name in a BDF font file.
Commit Message: | High | 165,333 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sockfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
int err = simple_setattr(dentry, iattr);
if (!err && (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID)) {
struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(d_inode(dentry));
sock->sk->sk_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In net/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.1, there is a race condition between fchownat and close in cases where they target the same socket file descriptor, related to the sock_close and sockfs_setattr functions. fchownat does not increment the file descriptor reference count, which allows close to set the socket to NULL during fchownat's execution, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and system crash.
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 169,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_atoms_count)
return NULL;
return m_atoms + index;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.6 uses an incorrect cleanup code path, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (dentry reference leak) via filesystem operations on a large file in a lower overlayfs layer.
Commit Message: ovl: fix dentry reference leak
In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.
The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.
Without this fix, something like the following is seen:
BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.
An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))
to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.18+ | Medium | 167,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sk_buff **gre_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
const struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
unsigned int hlen, grehlen;
unsigned int off;
int flush = 1;
struct packet_offload *ptype;
__be16 type;
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*greh);
greh = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
greh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!greh))
goto out;
}
/* Only support version 0 and K (key), C (csum) flags. Note that
* although the support for the S (seq#) flag can be added easily
* for GRO, this is problematic for GSO hence can not be enabled
* here because a GRO pkt may end up in the forwarding path, thus
* requiring GSO support to break it up correctly.
*/
if ((greh->flags & ~(GRE_KEY|GRE_CSUM)) != 0)
goto out;
type = greh->protocol;
rcu_read_lock();
ptype = gro_find_receive_by_type(type);
if (!ptype)
goto out_unlock;
grehlen = GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
if (greh->flags & GRE_KEY)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
if (greh->flags & GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
hlen = off + grehlen;
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
greh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!greh))
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Don't bother verifying checksum if we're going to flush anyway. */
if ((greh->flags & GRE_CSUM) && !NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush) {
if (skb_gro_checksum_simple_validate(skb))
goto out_unlock;
skb_gro_checksum_try_convert(skb, IPPROTO_GRE, 0,
null_compute_pseudo);
}
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
const struct gre_base_hdr *greh2;
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
/* The following checks are needed to ensure only pkts
* from the same tunnel are considered for aggregation.
* The criteria for "the same tunnel" includes:
* 1) same version (we only support version 0 here)
* 2) same protocol (we only support ETH_P_IP for now)
* 3) same set of flags
* 4) same key if the key field is present.
*/
greh2 = (struct gre_base_hdr *)(p->data + off);
if (greh2->flags != greh->flags ||
greh2->protocol != greh->protocol) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
if (greh->flags & GRE_KEY) {
/* compare keys */
if (*(__be32 *)(greh2+1) != *(__be32 *)(greh+1)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
}
}
skb_gro_pull(skb, grehlen);
/* Adjusted NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum after skb_gro_pull()*/
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, greh, grehlen);
pp = ptype->callbacks.gro_receive(head, skb);
flush = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The IP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for packets with tunnel stacking, as demonstrated by interleaved IPv4 headers and GRE headers, a related issue to CVE-2016-7039.
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The FRF.16 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-fr.c:mfr_print().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14468/FRF.16: Add a missing length check.
The specification says in a well-formed Magic Number information element
the data is exactly 4 bytes long. In mfr_print() check this before trying
to read those 4 bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 169,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timerfd_create, int, clockid, int, flags)
{
int ufd;
struct timerfd_ctx *ctx;
/* Check the TFD_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(TFD_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TFD_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if ((flags & ~TFD_CREATE_FLAGS) ||
(clockid != CLOCK_MONOTONIC &&
clockid != CLOCK_REALTIME &&
clockid != CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM &&
clockid != CLOCK_BOOTTIME &&
clockid != CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM))
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_WAKE_ALARM) &&
(clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM ||
clockid == CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM))
return -EPERM;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wqh);
ctx->clockid = clockid;
if (isalarm(ctx))
alarm_init(&ctx->t.alarm,
ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM ?
ALARM_REALTIME : ALARM_BOOTTIME,
timerfd_alarmproc);
else
hrtimer_init(&ctx->t.tmr, clockid, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
ctx->moffs = ktime_mono_to_real(0);
ufd = anon_inode_getfd("[timerfd]", &timerfd_fops, ctx,
O_RDWR | (flags & TFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS));
if (ufd < 0)
kfree(ctx);
return ufd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in fs/timerfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.15 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (list corruption or use-after-free) via simultaneous file-descriptor operations that leverage improper might_cancel queueing.
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | High | 168,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0)
{
uintmax_t u;
char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
union block *blk;
char *p;
size_t i;
off_t start;
#define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do \
{ \
char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
char *dst = buf; \
do \
{ \
if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1) \
{ \
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \
file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); \
return false; \
} \
if (src == endp) \
{ \
set_next_block_after (b); \
b = find_next_block (); \
src = b->buffer; \
endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
} \
while (*dst++ != '\n'); \
dst[-1] = 0; \
} while (0)
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
blk = find_next_block ();
p = blk->buffer;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t)))
}
file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u;
file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size,
sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map));
file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++)
{
struct sp_array sp;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.offset = u;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.numbytes = u;
sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp);
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: pax_decode_header in sparse.c in GNU Tar before 1.32 had a NULL pointer dereference when parsing certain archives that have malformed extended headers.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0; /* not a peer of original */
else
mnt->mnt_group_id = old->mnt_group_id;
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) && !mnt->mnt_group_id) {
err = mnt_alloc_group_id(mnt);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_WRITE_HOLD;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &sb->s_mounts);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
if ((flag & CL_SLAVE) ||
((flag & CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE) && IS_MNT_SHARED(old))) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
mnt->mnt_master = old;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
} else if (!(flag & CL_PRIVATE)) {
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) || IS_MNT_SHARED(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &old->mnt_share);
if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave);
mnt->mnt_master = old->mnt_master;
}
if (flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED)
set_mnt_shared(mnt);
/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list
* as the original if that was on one */
if (flag & CL_EXPIRE) {
if (!list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_expire, &old->mnt_expire);
}
return mnt;
out_free:
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The clone_mnt function in fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not properly restrict changes to the MNT_READONLY flag, which allows local users to bypass an intended read-only property of a filesystem by leveraging a separate mount namespace.
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
TSK_HFS_BTREE_CB a_cb, void *ptr)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = &(hfs->fs_info);
uint32_t cur_node; /* node id of the current node */
char *node;
uint16_t nodesize;
uint8_t is_done = 0;
tsk_error_reset();
nodesize = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.nodesize);
if ((node = (char *) tsk_malloc(nodesize)) == NULL)
return 1;
/* start at root node */
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.rootNode);
/* if the root node is zero, then the extents btree is empty */
/* if no files have overflow extents, the Extents B-tree still
exists on disk, but is an empty B-tree containing only
the header node */
if (cur_node == 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: "
"empty extents btree\n");
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: starting at "
"root node %" PRIu32 "; nodesize = %"
PRIu16 "\n", cur_node, nodesize);
/* Recurse down to the needed leaf nodes and then go forward */
is_done = 0;
while (is_done == 0) {
TSK_OFF_T cur_off; /* start address of cur_node */
uint16_t num_rec; /* number of records in this node */
ssize_t cnt;
hfs_btree_node *node_desc;
if (cur_node > tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->catalog_header.totalNodes)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node %d too large for file", cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
cur_off = cur_node * nodesize;
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, cur_off,
node, nodesize, 0);
if (cnt != nodesize) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Error reading node %d at offset %"
PRIuOFF, cur_node, cur_off);
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (nodesize < sizeof(hfs_btree_node)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node size %d is too small to be valid", nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
node_desc = (hfs_btree_node *) node;
num_rec = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, node_desc->num_rec);
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: node %" PRIu32
" @ %" PRIu64 " has %" PRIu16 " records\n",
cur_node, cur_off, num_rec);
if (num_rec == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: zero records in node %"
PRIu32, cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/* With an index node, find the record with the largest key that is smaller
* to or equal to cnid */
if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX) {
uint32_t next_node = 0;
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
" ; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
/* save the info from this record unless it is too big */
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
else if ((retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_LT)
|| (next_node == 0)) {
hfs_btree_index_record *idx_rec;
int keylen =
2 + hfs_get_idxkeylen(hfs, tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
key->key_len), &(hfs->catalog_header));
if (rec_off + keylen > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record and keylength %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node,
(int) rec_off + keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
idx_rec =
(hfs_btree_index_record *) & node[rec_off +
keylen];
next_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, idx_rec->childNode);
}
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_EQGT) {
break;
}
}
if (next_node == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: did not find any keys in index node %d",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
if (next_node == cur_node) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: node %d references itself as next node",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
cur_node = next_node;
}
/* With a leaf, we look for the specific record. */
else if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF) {
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
"; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_LEAF_STOP) {
is_done = 1;
break;
}
else if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
if (is_done == 0) {
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, node_desc->flink);
if (cur_node == 0) {
is_done = 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: moving forward to next leaf");
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: btree node %" PRIu32
" (%" PRIu64 ") is neither index nor leaf (%" PRIu8 ")",
cur_node, cur_off, node_desc->type);
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
free(node);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The Sleuth Kit 4.6.0 and earlier is affected by: Integer Overflow. The impact is: Opening crafted disk image triggers crash in tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237. The component is: Overflow in fls tool used on HFS image. Bug is in tsk/fs/hfs.c file in function hfs_cat_traverse() in lines: 952, 1062. The attack vector is: Victim must open a crafted HFS filesystem image.
Commit Message: hfs: fix keylen check in hfs_cat_traverse()
If key->key_len is 65535, calculating "uint16_t keylen' would
cause an overflow:
uint16_t keylen;
...
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len)
so the code bypasses the sanity check "if (keylen > nodesize)"
which results in crash later:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
=================================================================
==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6210000256a4 (pc 0x00000054812b bp 0x7ffca548a8f0 sp 0x7ffca548a480 T0)
==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x54812a in hfs_dir_open_meta_cb /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237:20
#1 0x51a96c in hfs_cat_traverse /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:1082:21
#2 0x547785 in hfs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:480:9
#3 0x50f57d in tsk_fs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/fs_dir.c:290:14
#4 0x54af17 in tsk_fs_path2inum /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/ifind_lib.c:237:23
#5 0x522266 in hfs_open /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:6579:9
#6 0x508e89 in main /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls.cpp:267:19
#7 0x7f9daf67c2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0)
#8 0x41d679 in _start (/fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls+0x41d679)
Make 'keylen' int type to prevent the overflow and fix that.
Now, I get proper error message instead of crash:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
General file system error (hfs_cat_traverse: length of key 3 in leaf node 1 too large (65537 vs 4096)) | Medium | 169,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
const blink::WebURL& url =
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::createFileSystemURL(args[0]);
args.GetReturnValue().Set(v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(
args.GetIsolate(), url.string().utf8().c_str()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282} | Medium | 173,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> dispatchEventCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.dispatchEvent");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Event*, evt, V8Event::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8Event::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
bool result = imp->dispatchEvent(evt, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return v8Boolean(result);
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
SyslogsLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->syslogs_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: StateBase* writeFile(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
File* file = V8File::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!file)
return 0;
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
m_writer.writeFileIndex(blobIndex);
} else {
m_writer.writeFile(*file);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of HashMap add operations instead of HashMap set operations, related to bindings/core/v8/DOMWrapperMap.h and bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp.
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fd_read_body (const char *downloaded_filename, int fd, FILE *out, wgint toread, wgint startpos,
wgint *qtyread, wgint *qtywritten, double *elapsed, int flags,
FILE *out2)
{
int ret = 0;
#undef max
#define max(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))
int dlbufsize = max (BUFSIZ, 8 * 1024);
char *dlbuf = xmalloc (dlbufsize);
struct ptimer *timer = NULL;
double last_successful_read_tm = 0;
/* The progress gauge, set according to the user preferences. */
void *progress = NULL;
/* Non-zero if the progress gauge is interactive, i.e. if it can
continually update the display. When true, smaller timeout
values are used so that the gauge can update the display when
data arrives slowly. */
bool progress_interactive = false;
bool exact = !!(flags & rb_read_exactly);
/* Used only by HTTP/HTTPS chunked transfer encoding. */
bool chunked = flags & rb_chunked_transfer_encoding;
wgint skip = 0;
/* How much data we've read/written. */
wgint sum_read = 0;
wgint sum_written = 0;
wgint remaining_chunk_size = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
/* try to minimize the number of calls to inflate() and write_data() per
call to fd_read() */
unsigned int gzbufsize = dlbufsize * 4;
char *gzbuf = NULL;
z_stream gzstream;
if (flags & rb_compressed_gzip)
{
gzbuf = xmalloc (gzbufsize);
if (gzbuf != NULL)
{
gzstream.zalloc = zalloc;
gzstream.zfree = zfree;
gzstream.opaque = Z_NULL;
gzstream.next_in = Z_NULL;
gzstream.avail_in = 0;
#define GZIP_DETECT 32 /* gzip format detection */
#define GZIP_WINDOW 15 /* logarithmic window size (default: 15) */
ret = inflateInit2 (&gzstream, GZIP_DETECT | GZIP_WINDOW);
if (ret != Z_OK)
{
xfree (gzbuf);
errno = (ret == Z_MEM_ERROR) ? ENOMEM : EINVAL;
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
}
else
{
errno = ENOMEM;
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
}
#endif
if (flags & rb_skip_startpos)
skip = startpos;
if (opt.show_progress)
{
const char *filename_progress;
/* If we're skipping STARTPOS bytes, pass 0 as the INITIAL
argument to progress_create because the indicator doesn't
(yet) know about "skipping" data. */
wgint start = skip ? 0 : startpos;
if (opt.dir_prefix)
filename_progress = downloaded_filename + strlen (opt.dir_prefix) + 1;
else
filename_progress = downloaded_filename;
progress = progress_create (filename_progress, start, start + toread);
progress_interactive = progress_interactive_p (progress);
}
if (opt.limit_rate)
limit_bandwidth_reset ();
/* A timer is needed for tracking progress, for throttling, and for
tracking elapsed time. If either of these are requested, start
the timer. */
if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed)
{
timer = ptimer_new ();
last_successful_read_tm = 0;
}
/* Use a smaller buffer for low requested bandwidths. For example,
with --limit-rate=2k, it doesn't make sense to slurp in 16K of
data and then sleep for 8s. With buffer size equal to the limit,
we never have to sleep for more than one second. */
if (opt.limit_rate && opt.limit_rate < dlbufsize)
dlbufsize = opt.limit_rate;
/* Read from FD while there is data to read. Normally toread==0
means that it is unknown how much data is to arrive. However, if
EXACT is set, then toread==0 means what it says: that no data
should be read. */
while (!exact || (sum_read < toread))
{
int rdsize;
double tmout = opt.read_timeout;
if (chunked)
{
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
char *line = fd_read_line (fd);
char *endl;
if (line == NULL)
{
ret = -1;
break;
}
else if (out2 != NULL)
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
remaining_chunk_size = strtol (line, &endl, 16);
xfree (line);
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
ret = 0;
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
xfree (line);
}
break;
}
}
rdsize = MIN (remaining_chunk_size, dlbufsize);
}
else
rdsize = exact ? MIN (toread - sum_read, dlbufsize) : dlbufsize;
if (progress_interactive)
{
/* For interactive progress gauges, always specify a ~1s
timeout, so that the gauge can be updated regularly even
when the data arrives very slowly or stalls. */
tmout = 0.95;
if (opt.read_timeout)
{
double waittm;
waittm = ptimer_read (timer) - last_successful_read_tm;
if (waittm + tmout > opt.read_timeout)
{
/* Don't let total idle time exceed read timeout. */
tmout = opt.read_timeout - waittm;
if (tmout < 0)
{
/* We've already exceeded the timeout. */
ret = -1, errno = ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
}
}
}
ret = fd_read (fd, dlbuf, rdsize, tmout);
if (progress_interactive && ret < 0 && errno == ETIMEDOUT)
ret = 0; /* interactive timeout, handled above */
else if (ret <= 0)
break; /* EOF or read error */
if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed)
{
ptimer_measure (timer);
if (ret > 0)
last_successful_read_tm = ptimer_read (timer);
}
if (ret > 0)
{
int write_res;
sum_read += ret;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
if (gzbuf != NULL)
{
int err;
int towrite;
gzstream.avail_in = ret;
gzstream.next_in = (unsigned char *) dlbuf;
do
{
gzstream.avail_out = gzbufsize;
gzstream.next_out = (unsigned char *) gzbuf;
err = inflate (&gzstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
switch (err)
{
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
errno = ENOMEM;
ret = -1;
goto out;
case Z_NEED_DICT:
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
errno = EINVAL;
ret = -1;
goto out;
case Z_STREAM_END:
if (exact && sum_read != toread)
{
DEBUGP(("zlib stream ended unexpectedly after "
"%ld/%ld bytes\n", sum_read, toread));
}
}
towrite = gzbufsize - gzstream.avail_out;
write_res = write_data (out, out2, gzbuf, towrite, &skip,
&sum_written);
if (write_res < 0)
{
ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2;
goto out;
}
}
while (gzstream.avail_out == 0);
}
else
#endif
{
write_res = write_data (out, out2, dlbuf, ret, &skip,
&sum_written);
if (write_res < 0)
{
ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2;
goto out;
}
}
if (chunked)
{
remaining_chunk_size -= ret;
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
char *line = fd_read_line (fd);
if (line == NULL)
{
ret = -1;
break;
}
else
{
if (out2 != NULL)
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
xfree (line);
}
}
}
}
if (opt.limit_rate)
limit_bandwidth (ret, timer);
if (progress)
progress_update (progress, ret, ptimer_read (timer));
#ifdef WINDOWS
if (toread > 0 && opt.show_progress)
ws_percenttitle (100.0 *
(startpos + sum_read) / (startpos + toread));
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The retr.c:fd_read_body() function is called when processing OK responses. When the response is sent chunked in wget before 1.19.2, the chunk parser uses strtol() to read each chunk's length, but doesn't check that the chunk length is a non-negative number. The code then tries to read the chunk in pieces of 8192 bytes by using the MIN() macro, but ends up passing the negative chunk length to retr.c:fd_read(). As fd_read() takes an int argument, the high 32 bits of the chunk length are discarded, leaving fd_read() with a completely attacker controlled length argument. The attacker can corrupt malloc metadata after the allocated buffer.
Commit Message: | High | 164,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _gcry_ecc_eddsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r_r, gcry_mpi_t s, int hashalgo, gcry_mpi_t pk)
{
int rc;
mpi_ec_t ctx = NULL;
int b;
unsigned int tmp;
unsigned char *digest = NULL;
gcry_buffer_t hvec[3];
const void *mbuf;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char *rawmpi = NULL;
unsigned int rawmpilen;
unsigned char *encpk = NULL; /* Encoded public key. */
unsigned int encpklen;
mpi_point_struct I; /* Intermediate value. */
mpi_point_struct Q; /* Public key. */
gcry_mpi_t a, x, y, r;
memset (hvec, 0, sizeof hvec);
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
/* Initialize some helpers. */
point_init (&I);
point_init (&Q);
a = mpi_snew (0);
x = mpi_new (0);
y = mpi_new (0);
r = mpi_new (0);
ctx = _gcry_mpi_ec_p_internal_new (skey->E.model, skey->E.dialect, 0,
skey->E.p, skey->E.a, skey->E.b);
b = (ctx->nbits+7)/8;
if (b != 256/8) {
rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL; /* We only support 256 bit. */
goto leave;
}
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_compute_h_d (&digest, skey->d, ctx);
if (rc)
goto leave;
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (a, digest, 32, 0);
/* Compute the public key if it has not been supplied as optional
parameter. */
if (pk)
{
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_decodepoint (pk, ctx, &Q, &encpk, &encpklen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("* e_pk", encpk, encpklen);
if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&Q, ctx))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_BROKEN_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
}
else
{
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&Q, a, &skey->E.G, ctx);
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&Q, ctx, x, y, 0, &encpk, &encpklen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_pk", encpk, encpklen);
}
/* Compute R. */
mbuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &tmp);
mlen = (tmp +7)/8;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" m", mbuf, mlen);
hvec[0].data = digest;
hvec[0].off = 32;
hvec[0].len = 32;
hvec[1].data = (char*)mbuf;
hvec[1].len = mlen;
rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 2);
if (rc)
goto leave;
reverse_buffer (digest, 64);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" r", digest, 64);
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (r, digest, 64, 0);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, r, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printpnt (" r", &I, ctx);
/* Convert R into affine coordinates and apply encoding. */
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&I, ctx, x, y, 0, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_r", rawmpi, rawmpilen);
/* S = r + a * H(encodepoint(R) + encodepoint(pk) + m) mod n */
hvec[0].data = rawmpi; /* (this is R) */
hvec[0].off = 0;
hvec[0].len = rawmpilen;
hvec[1].data = encpk;
hvec[1].off = 0;
hvec[1].len = encpklen;
hvec[2].data = (char*)mbuf;
hvec[2].off = 0;
hvec[2].len = mlen;
rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 3);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* No more need for RAWMPI thus we now transfer it to R_R. */
mpi_set_opaque (r_r, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8);
rawmpi = NULL;
reverse_buffer (digest, 64);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" H(R+)", digest, 64);
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (s, digest, 64, 0);
mpi_mulm (s, s, a, skey->E.n);
mpi_addm (s, s, r, skey->E.n);
rc = eddsa_encodempi (s, b, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_s", rawmpi, rawmpilen);
mpi_set_opaque (s, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8);
rawmpi = NULL;
rc = 0;
leave:
_gcry_mpi_release (a);
_gcry_mpi_release (x);
_gcry_mpi_release (y);
_gcry_mpi_release (r);
xfree (digest);
_gcry_mpi_ec_free (ctx);
point_free (&I);
point_free (&Q);
xfree (encpk);
xfree (rawmpi);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In Libgcrypt before 1.7.7, an attacker who learns the EdDSA session key (from side-channel observation during the signing process) can easily recover the long-term secret key. 1.7.7 makes a cipher/ecc-eddsa.c change to store this session key in secure memory, to ensure that constant-time point operations are used in the MPI library.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,790 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
char *path;
int len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &path, &len) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, path, len, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
/* intern->type = SPL_FS_INFO; already set */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::ScheduleOverlayPlane(
int z_order,
gfx::OverlayTransform transform,
GLImage* image,
const gfx::Rect& bounds_rect,
const gfx::RectF& crop_rect,
bool enable_blend,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::GpuFence> gpu_fence) {
if (!pending_transaction_)
pending_transaction_.emplace();
bool uninitialized = false;
if (pending_surfaces_count_ == surface_list_.size()) {
uninitialized = true;
surface_list_.emplace_back(*root_surface_);
}
pending_surfaces_count_++;
auto& surface_state = surface_list_.at(pending_surfaces_count_ - 1);
if (uninitialized || surface_state.z_order != z_order) {
surface_state.z_order = z_order;
pending_transaction_->SetZOrder(*surface_state.surface, z_order);
}
AHardwareBuffer* hardware_buffer = nullptr;
base::ScopedFD fence_fd;
auto scoped_hardware_buffer = image->GetAHardwareBuffer();
if (scoped_hardware_buffer) {
hardware_buffer = scoped_hardware_buffer->buffer();
fence_fd = scoped_hardware_buffer->TakeFence();
auto* a_surface = surface_state.surface->surface();
DCHECK_EQ(pending_frame_resources_.count(a_surface), 0u);
auto& resource_ref = pending_frame_resources_[a_surface];
resource_ref.surface = surface_state.surface;
resource_ref.scoped_buffer = std::move(scoped_hardware_buffer);
}
if (uninitialized || surface_state.hardware_buffer != hardware_buffer) {
surface_state.hardware_buffer = hardware_buffer;
if (!fence_fd.is_valid() && gpu_fence && surface_state.hardware_buffer) {
auto fence_handle =
gfx::CloneHandleForIPC(gpu_fence->GetGpuFenceHandle());
DCHECK(!fence_handle.is_null());
fence_fd = base::ScopedFD(fence_handle.native_fd.fd);
}
pending_transaction_->SetBuffer(*surface_state.surface,
surface_state.hardware_buffer,
std::move(fence_fd));
}
if (hardware_buffer) {
gfx::Rect dst = bounds_rect;
gfx::Size buffer_size = GetBufferSize(hardware_buffer);
gfx::RectF scaled_rect =
gfx::RectF(crop_rect.x() * buffer_size.width(),
crop_rect.y() * buffer_size.height(),
crop_rect.width() * buffer_size.width(),
crop_rect.height() * buffer_size.height());
gfx::Rect src = gfx::ToEnclosedRect(scaled_rect);
if (uninitialized || surface_state.src != src || surface_state.dst != dst ||
surface_state.transform != transform) {
surface_state.src = src;
surface_state.dst = dst;
surface_state.transform = transform;
pending_transaction_->SetGeometry(*surface_state.surface, src, dst,
transform);
}
}
bool opaque = !enable_blend;
if (uninitialized || surface_state.opaque != opaque) {
surface_state.opaque = opaque;
pending_transaction_->SetOpaque(*surface_state.surface, opaque);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852} | Medium | 172,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
TabDetachedImpl(contents);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea(WebPagePrivate* webPage, RenderLayer* layer)
: m_webPage(webPage)
, m_layer(layer)
{
ASSERT(webPage);
ASSERT(layer);
m_isNull = false;
RenderObject* layerRenderer = layer->renderer();
ASSERT(layerRenderer);
if (layerRenderer->isRenderView()) { // #document case
FrameView* view = toRenderView(layerRenderer)->frameView();
ASSERT(view);
Frame* frame = view->frame();
ASSERT_UNUSED(frame, frame);
m_scrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(view->scrollPosition());
m_contentsSize = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(view->contentsSize());
m_viewportSize = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(view->visibleContentRect(false /*includeScrollbars*/)).size();
m_visibleWindowRect = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(m_webPage->getRecursiveVisibleWindowRect(view));
IntRect transformedWindowRect = IntRect(IntPoint::zero(), m_webPage->transformedViewportSize());
m_visibleWindowRect.intersect(transformedWindowRect);
m_scrollsHorizontally = view->contentsWidth() > view->visibleWidth();
m_scrollsVertically = view->contentsHeight() > view->visibleHeight();
m_minimumScrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(calculateMinimumScrollPosition(
view->visibleContentRect().size(),
0.0 /*overscrollLimit*/));
m_maximumScrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(calculateMaximumScrollPosition(
view->visibleContentRect().size(),
view->contentsSize(),
0.0 /*overscrollLimit*/));
} else { // RenderBox-based elements case (scrollable boxes (div's, p's, textarea's, etc)).
RenderBox* box = m_layer->renderBox();
ASSERT(box);
ASSERT(box->canBeScrolledAndHasScrollableArea());
ScrollableArea* scrollableArea = static_cast<ScrollableArea*>(m_layer);
m_scrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(scrollableArea->scrollPosition());
m_contentsSize = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(scrollableArea->contentsSize());
m_viewportSize = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(scrollableArea->visibleContentRect(false /*includeScrollbars*/)).size();
m_visibleWindowRect = m_layer->renderer()->absoluteClippedOverflowRect();
m_visibleWindowRect = m_layer->renderer()->frame()->view()->contentsToWindow(m_visibleWindowRect);
IntRect visibleFrameWindowRect = m_webPage->getRecursiveVisibleWindowRect(m_layer->renderer()->frame()->view());
m_visibleWindowRect.intersect(visibleFrameWindowRect);
m_visibleWindowRect = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(m_visibleWindowRect);
IntRect transformedWindowRect = IntRect(IntPoint::zero(), m_webPage->transformedViewportSize());
m_visibleWindowRect.intersect(transformedWindowRect);
m_scrollsHorizontally = box->scrollWidth() != box->clientWidth() && box->scrollsOverflowX();
m_scrollsVertically = box->scrollHeight() != box->clientHeight() && box->scrollsOverflowY();
m_minimumScrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(calculateMinimumScrollPosition(
Platform::IntSize(box->clientWidth(), box->clientHeight()),
0.0 /*overscrollLimit*/));
m_maximumScrollPosition = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(calculateMaximumScrollPosition(
Platform::IntSize(box->clientWidth(), box->clientHeight()),
Platform::IntSize(box->scrollWidth(), box->scrollHeight()),
0.0 /*overscrollLimit*/));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly perform text iteration, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Remove minimum and maximum scroll position as they are no
longer required due to changes in ScrollViewBase.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87298
Patch by Genevieve Mak <[email protected]> on 2012-05-23
Reviewed by Antonio Gomes.
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea):
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.h:
(InRegionScrollableArea):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118233 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::LoadModule(const std::string& module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> source(GetSource(module_name));
if (source.IsEmpty() || source->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "No source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::String> wrapped_source(
WrapSource(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(source)));
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name.c_str(), &v8_module_name)) {
NOTREACHED() << "module_name is too long";
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> func_as_value =
RunString(wrapped_source, v8_module_name);
if (func_as_value.IsEmpty() || func_as_value->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "Bad source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> func = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(func_as_value);
v8::Local<v8::Object> define_object = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
gin::ModuleRegistry::InstallGlobals(GetIsolate(), define_object);
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Object> natives(NewInstance());
CHECK(!natives.IsEmpty()); // this can fail if v8 has issues
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, define_object, "define"),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "require",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireNative",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireAsync",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
exports,
console::AsV8Object(GetIsolate()),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "privates",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetArray(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetFunction(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetJSON(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetObjekt(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetRegExp(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetString(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetError(),
};
{
v8::TryCatch try_catch(GetIsolate());
try_catch.SetCaptureMessage(true);
context_->CallFunction(func, arraysize(args), args);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
HandleException(try_catch);
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
}
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.109 does not prevent use of the Object.defineProperty method to override intended extension behavior, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654} | Medium | 172,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
struct desc_struct *desc = NULL;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries)
desc = &ldt->entries[sel];
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return desc;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return NULL;
return (struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.9, there is a use-after-free for access to an LDT entry because of a race condition between modify_ldt() and a #BR exception for an MPX bounds violation.
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url,
bool is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
bool sensitive_chrome_url = false;
const char kGoogleCom[] = "google.com";
const char kClient[] = "clients";
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
if (origin.DomainIs(kGoogleCom)) {
base::StringPiece host = url.host_piece();
while (host.ends_with("."))
host.remove_suffix(1u);
if (is_request_from_browser_or_webui_renderer) {
base::StringPiece::size_type pos = host.rfind(kClient);
if (pos != base::StringPiece::npos) {
bool match = true;
if (pos > 0 && host[pos - 1] != '.') {
match = false;
} else {
for (base::StringPiece::const_iterator
i = host.begin() + pos + strlen(kClient),
end = host.end() - (strlen(kGoogleCom) + 1);
i != end; ++i) {
if (!isdigit(*i)) {
match = false;
break;
}
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url || match;
}
}
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url ||
(url.DomainIs("chrome.google.com") &&
base::StartsWith(url.path_piece(), "/webstore",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE));
}
return sensitive_chrome_url || extension_urls::IsWebstoreUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsBlacklistUpdateUrl(url) ||
extension_urls::IsSafeBrowsingUrl(origin, url.path_piece());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak user local file data via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187} | Medium | 172,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<InputMethodStatusConnection,
LeakySingletonTraits<InputMethodStatusConnection> >::get();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,535 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContig2SeparateByRow)
{
tsize_t scanlinesizein = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t scanlinesizeout = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tdata_t inbuf;
tdata_t outbuf;
register uint8 *inp, *outp;
register uint32 n;
uint32 row;
tsample_t s;
inbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizein);
outbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizeout);
if (!inbuf || !outbuf)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemset(inbuf, 0, scanlinesizein);
_TIFFmemset(outbuf, 0, scanlinesizeout);
/* unpack channels */
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row++) {
if (TIFFReadScanline(in, inbuf, row, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
inp = ((uint8*)inbuf) + s;
outp = (uint8*)outbuf;
for (n = imagewidth; n-- > 0;) {
*outp++ = *inp;
inp += spp;
}
if (TIFFWriteScanline(out, outbuf, row, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
}
}
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 1;
bad:
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibTIFF version 4.0.7 is vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow in the tools/tiffcp resulting in DoS or code execution via a crafted BitsPerSample value.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: error out cleanly in cpContig2SeparateByRow and
cpSeparate2ContigByRow if BitsPerSample != 8 to avoid heap based overflow.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2656 and
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2657 | High | 168,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_mac_header(skb) < skb->head + frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr);
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not generate Fragment Identification values separately for each destination, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode_t *p_file_type)
{
file_offset this_line = 0;
file_offset first_command_line = -1;
char first_ed_command_letter = 0;
lin fcl_line = 0; /* Pacify 'gcc -W'. */
bool this_is_a_command = false;
bool stars_this_line = false;
bool extended_headers = false;
enum nametype i;
struct stat st[3];
int stat_errno[3];
int version_controlled[3];
enum diff retval;
mode_t file_type;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i]) {
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (invalid_names); i++)
invalid_names[i] = NULL;
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
if (p_timestr[i])
{
free(p_timestr[i]);
p_timestr[i] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
if (p_sha1[i])
{
free (p_sha1[i]);
p_sha1[i] = 0;
}
p_git_diff = false;
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
p_mode[i] = 0;
p_copy[i] = false;
p_rename[i] = false;
}
/* Ed and normal format patches don't have filename headers. */
if (diff_type == ED_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF)
need_header = false;
version_controlled[OLD] = -1;
version_controlled[NEW] = -1;
version_controlled[INDEX] = -1;
p_rfc934_nesting = 0;
p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec = p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec = -1;
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 0;
Fseek (pfp, p_base, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line = p_bline - 1;
for (;;) {
char *s;
char *t;
file_offset previous_line = this_line;
bool last_line_was_command = this_is_a_command;
bool stars_last_line = stars_this_line;
size_t indent = 0;
char ed_command_letter;
bool strip_trailing_cr;
size_t chars_read;
this_line = file_tell (pfp);
chars_read = pget_line (0, 0, false, false);
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
xalloc_die ();
if (! chars_read) {
if (first_ed_command_letter) {
/* nothing but deletes!? */
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else {
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
if (extended_headers)
{
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
return NO_DIFF;
}
}
strip_trailing_cr = 2 <= chars_read && buf[chars_read - 2] == '\r';
for (s = buf; *s == ' ' || *s == '\t' || *s == 'X'; s++) {
if (*s == '\t')
indent = (indent + 8) & ~7;
else
indent++;
}
if (ISDIGIT (*s))
{
for (t = s + 1; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == 'd' || *t == 'c' || *t == 'a')
{
for (t++; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
for (; *t == ' ' || *t == '\t'; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == '\r')
t++;
this_is_a_command = (*t == '\n');
}
}
if (! need_header
&& first_command_line < 0
&& ((ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (s))
|| this_is_a_command)) {
first_command_line = this_line;
first_ed_command_letter = ed_command_letter;
fcl_line = p_input_line;
p_indent = indent; /* assume this for now */
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
if (!stars_last_line && strnEQ(s, "*** ", 4))
{
fetchname (s+4, strippath, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "+++ ", 4))
{
/* Swap with NEW below. */
fetchname (s+4, strippath, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Index:", 6))
{
fetchname (s+6, strippath, &p_name[INDEX], (char **) 0, NULL);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Prereq:", 7))
{
for (t = s + 7; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t); t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
revision = t;
for (t = revision; *t; t++)
if (ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t))
{
char const *u;
for (u = t + 1; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u); u++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*u)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("Prereq: with multiple words at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, this_line));
}
break;
}
if (t == revision)
revision = 0;
else {
char oldc = *t;
*t = '\0';
revision = xstrdup (revision);
*t = oldc;
}
}
else if (strnEQ (s, "diff --git ", 11))
{
char const *u;
if (extended_headers)
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] = parse_name (s + 11, strippath, &u))
&& ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u)
&& (p_name[NEW] = parse_name (u, strippath, &u))
&& (u = skip_spaces (u), ! *u)))
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
p_git_diff = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "index ", 6))
{
char const *u, *v;
if ((u = skip_hex_digits (s + 6))
&& u[0] == '.' && u[1] == '.'
&& (v = skip_hex_digits (u + 2))
&& (! *v || ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *v)))
{
get_sha1(&p_sha1[OLD], s + 6, u);
get_sha1(&p_sha1[NEW], u + 2, v);
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = sha1_says_nonexistent (p_sha1[OLD]);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = sha1_says_nonexistent (p_sha1[NEW]);
if (*(v = skip_spaces (v)))
p_mode[OLD] = p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (v);
extended_headers = true;
}
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "old mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "deleted file mode ", 18))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 18);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new file mode ", 14))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 14);
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename from ", 12))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename to ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy from ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy to ", 8))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (p_git_diff && strnEQ (s, "GIT binary patch", 16))
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = GIT_BINARY_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else
{
for (t = s; t[0] == '-' && t[1] == ' '; t += 2)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(t, "--- ", 4))
{
struct timespec timestamp;
timestamp.tv_sec = -1;
fetchname (t+4, strippath, &p_name[NEW], &p_timestr[NEW],
×tamp);
need_header = false;
if (timestamp.tv_sec != -1)
{
p_timestamp[NEW] = timestamp;
p_rfc934_nesting = (t - s) >> 1;
}
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
}
if (need_header)
continue;
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == ED_DIFF) &&
first_command_line >= 0 &&
strEQ(s, ".\n") ) {
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == UNI_DIFF)
&& strnEQ(s, "@@ -", 4)) {
/* 'p_name', 'p_timestr', and 'p_timestamp' are backwards;
swap them. */
struct timespec ti = p_timestamp[OLD];
p_timestamp[OLD] = p_timestamp[NEW];
p_timestamp[NEW] = ti;
t = p_name[OLD];
p_name[OLD] = p_name[NEW];
p_name[NEW] = t;
t = p_timestr[OLD];
p_timestr[OLD] = p_timestr[NEW];
p_timestr[NEW] = t;
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
while (*s != ' ' && *s != '\n')
s++;
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (s[0] == '+' && s[1] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[2]))
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
p_indent = indent;
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = UNI_DIFF;
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for unified diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
stars_this_line = strnEQ(s, "********", 8);
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF
|| diff_type == CONTEXT_DIFF
|| diff_type == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF)
&& stars_last_line && strnEQ (s, "*** ", 4)) {
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
/* if this is a new context diff the character just before */
/* the newline is a '*'. */
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
p_indent = indent;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
retval = (*(s-1) == '*' ? NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF : CONTEXT_DIFF);
{
/* Scan the first hunk to see whether the file contents
appear to have been deleted. */
file_offset saved_p_base = p_base;
lin saved_p_bline = p_bline;
Fseek (pfp, previous_line, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line -= 2;
if (another_hunk (retval, false)
&& ! p_repl_lines && p_newfirst == 1)
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
next_intuit_at (saved_p_base, saved_p_bline);
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for context diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF) &&
last_line_was_command &&
(strnEQ(s, "< ", 2) || strnEQ(s, "> ", 2)) ) {
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
p_indent = indent;
retval = NORMAL_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
}
scan_exit:
/* The old, new, or old and new file types may be defined. When both
file types are defined, make sure they are the same, or else assume
we do not know the file type. */
file_type = p_mode[OLD] & S_IFMT;
if (file_type)
{
mode_t new_file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (new_file_type && file_type != new_file_type)
file_type = 0;
}
else
{
file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (! file_type)
file_type = S_IFREG;
}
*p_file_type = file_type;
/* To intuit 'inname', the name of the file to patch,
use the algorithm specified by POSIX 1003.1-2001 XCU lines 25680-26599
(with some modifications if posixly_correct is zero):
- Take the old and new names from the context header if present,
and take the index name from the 'Index:' line if present and
if either the old and new names are both absent
or posixly_correct is nonzero.
Consider the file names to be in the order (old, new, index).
- If some named files exist, use the first one if posixly_correct
is nonzero, the best one otherwise.
- If patch_get is nonzero, and no named files exist,
but an RCS or SCCS master file exists,
use the first named file with an RCS or SCCS master.
- If no named files exist, no RCS or SCCS master was found,
some names are given, posixly_correct is zero,
and the patch appears to create a file, then use the best name
requiring the creation of the fewest directories.
- Otherwise, report failure by setting 'inname' to 0;
this causes our invoker to ask the user for a file name. */
i = NONE;
if (!inname)
{
enum nametype i0 = NONE;
if (! posixly_correct && (p_name[OLD] || p_name[NEW]) && p_name[INDEX])
{
free (p_name[INDEX]);
p_name[INDEX] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
if (i0 != NONE && strcmp (p_name[i0], p_name[i]) == 0)
{
/* It's the same name as before; reuse stat results. */
stat_errno[i] = stat_errno[i0];
if (! stat_errno[i])
st[i] = st[i0];
}
else
{
stat_errno[i] = stat_file (p_name[i], &st[i]);
if (! stat_errno[i])
{
if (lookup_file_id (&st[i]) == DELETE_LATER)
stat_errno[i] = ENOENT;
else if (posixly_correct && name_is_valid (p_name[i]))
break;
}
}
i0 = i;
}
if (! posixly_correct)
{
/* The best of all existing files. */
i = best_name (p_name, stat_errno);
if (i == NONE && patch_get)
{
enum nametype nope = NONE;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
char const *cs;
char *getbuf;
char *diffbuf;
bool readonly = (outfile
&& strcmp (outfile, p_name[i]) != 0);
if (nope == NONE || strcmp (p_name[nope], p_name[i]) != 0)
{
cs = (version_controller
(p_name[i], readonly, (struct stat *) 0,
&getbuf, &diffbuf));
version_controlled[i] = !! cs;
if (cs)
{
if (version_get (p_name[i], cs, false, readonly,
getbuf, &st[i]))
stat_errno[i] = 0;
else
version_controlled[i] = 0;
free (getbuf);
free (diffbuf);
if (! stat_errno[i])
break;
}
}
nope = i;
}
}
if (i0 != NONE
&& (i == NONE || (st[i].st_mode & S_IFMT) == file_type)
&& maybe_reverse (p_name[i == NONE ? i0 : i], i == NONE,
i == NONE || st[i].st_size == 0)
&& i == NONE)
i = i0;
if (i == NONE && p_says_nonexistent[reverse])
{
int newdirs[3];
int newdirs_min = INT_MAX;
int distance_from_minimum[3];
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
newdirs[i] = (prefix_components (p_name[i], false)
- prefix_components (p_name[i], true));
if (newdirs[i] < newdirs_min)
newdirs_min = newdirs[i];
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
distance_from_minimum[i] = newdirs[i] - newdirs_min;
/* The best of the filenames which create the fewest directories. */
i = best_name (p_name, distance_from_minimum);
}
}
}
if (i == NONE)
{
if (inname)
inname = xstrdup (p_name[i]);
inerrno = stat_errno[i];
invc = version_controlled[i];
instat = st[i];
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in GNU patch versions which support Git-style patching before 2.7.3 allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files with the permissions of the target user via a .. (dot dot) in a diff file name.
Commit Message: | High | 165,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned char *cmd)
{
int res;
struct request *rq;
Sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp = &srp->header;
int dxfer_len = (int) hp->dxfer_len;
int dxfer_dir = hp->dxfer_direction;
unsigned int iov_count = hp->iovec_count;
Sg_scatter_hold *req_schp = &srp->data;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
struct request_queue *q = sfp->parentdp->device->request_queue;
struct rq_map_data *md, map_data;
int rw = hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_DEV ? WRITE : READ;
unsigned char *long_cmdp = NULL;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_start_req: dxfer_len=%d\n",
dxfer_len));
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB) {
long_cmdp = kzalloc(hp->cmd_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!long_cmdp)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* NOTE
*
* With scsi-mq enabled, there are a fixed number of preallocated
* requests equal in number to shost->can_queue. If all of the
* preallocated requests are already in use, then using GFP_ATOMIC with
* blk_get_request() will return -EWOULDBLOCK, whereas using GFP_KERNEL
* will cause blk_get_request() to sleep until an active command
* completes, freeing up a request. Neither option is ideal, but
* GFP_KERNEL is the better choice to prevent userspace from getting an
* unexpected EWOULDBLOCK.
*
* With scsi-mq disabled, blk_get_request() with GFP_KERNEL usually
* does not sleep except under memory pressure.
*/
rq = blk_get_request(q, rw, GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(rq)) {
kfree(long_cmdp);
return PTR_ERR(rq);
}
blk_rq_set_block_pc(rq);
if (hp->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB)
rq->cmd = long_cmdp;
memcpy(rq->cmd, cmd, hp->cmd_len);
rq->cmd_len = hp->cmd_len;
srp->rq = rq;
rq->end_io_data = srp;
rq->sense = srp->sense_b;
rq->retries = SG_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
if ((dxfer_len <= 0) || (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_NONE))
return 0;
if (sg_allow_dio && hp->flags & SG_FLAG_DIRECT_IO &&
dxfer_dir != SG_DXFER_UNKNOWN && !iov_count &&
!sfp->parentdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma &&
blk_rq_aligned(q, (unsigned long)hp->dxferp, dxfer_len))
md = NULL;
else
md = &map_data;
if (md) {
if (!sg_res_in_use(sfp) && dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen)
sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len);
else {
res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len);
if (res)
return res;
}
md->pages = req_schp->pages;
md->page_order = req_schp->page_order;
md->nr_entries = req_schp->k_use_sg;
md->offset = 0;
md->null_mapped = hp->dxferp ? 0 : 1;
if (dxfer_dir == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV)
md->from_user = 1;
else
md->from_user = 0;
}
if (unlikely(iov_count > MAX_UIOVEC))
return -EINVAL;
if (iov_count) {
int size = sizeof(struct iovec) * iov_count;
struct iovec *iov;
struct iov_iter i;
iov = memdup_user(hp->dxferp, size);
if (IS_ERR(iov))
return PTR_ERR(iov);
iov_iter_init(&i, rw, iov, iov_count,
min_t(size_t, hp->dxfer_len,
iov_length(iov, iov_count)));
res = blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, md, &i, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(iov);
} else
res = blk_rq_map_user(q, rq, md, hp->dxferp,
hp->dxfer_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!res) {
srp->bio = rq->bio;
if (!md) {
req_schp->dio_in_use = 1;
hp->info |= SG_INFO_DIRECT_IO;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the sg_start_req function in drivers/scsi/sg.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.x through 4.x before 4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large iov_count value in a write request.
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): use import_iovec()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
return false;
else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-388
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9 mismanages the #BP and #OF exceptions, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) by declining to handle an exception thrown by an L2 guest.
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 166,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_increment_retval (MyObject *obj, gint32 x)
{
return x + 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dma_rx function in drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly allocate receive buffers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted frame.
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 165,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/bridge/br_mdb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
assert(*p=='E');
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
assert(*p=='N');
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 169,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hugetlbfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo = HUGETLBFS_SB(dentry->d_sb);
struct hstate *h = hstate_inode(dentry->d_inode);
buf->f_type = HUGETLBFS_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = huge_page_size(h);
if (sbinfo) {
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
/* If no limits set, just report 0 for max/free/used
* blocks, like simple_statfs() */
if (sbinfo->max_blocks >= 0) {
buf->f_blocks = sbinfo->max_blocks;
buf->f_bavail = buf->f_bfree = sbinfo->free_blocks;
buf->f_files = sbinfo->max_inodes;
buf->f_ffree = sbinfo->free_inodes;
}
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
}
buf->f_namelen = NAME_MAX;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_palette_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The create_user_ns function in kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not check whether a chroot directory exists that differs from the namespace root directory, which allows local users to bypass intended filesystem restrictions via a crafted clone system call.
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Low | 166,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_SampleName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_sample_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: In libopenmpt before 0.3.19 and 0.4.x before 0.4.9, ModPlug_InstrumentName and ModPlug_SampleName in libopenmpt_modplug.c do not restrict the lengths of libmodplug output-buffer strings in the C API, leading to a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27 | High | 169,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,310 |
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