instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UpdateLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetUpdateLibrary() {
return update_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer(int32 size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->CreateTransferBuffer(size, id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Block::Frame& Block::GetFrame(int idx) const
{
assert(idx >= 0);
assert(idx < m_frame_count);
const Frame& f = m_frames[idx];
assert(f.pos > 0);
assert(f.len > 0);
return f;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::GetFrameContext(
const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic,
Vp9FrameContext* frame_ctx) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "Frame context update not supported";
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void fput(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
init_task_work(&file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, ____fput);
if (!task_work_add(task, &file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, true))
return;
/*
* After this task has run exit_task_work(),
* task_work_add() will fail. Fall through to delayed
* fput to avoid leaking *file.
*/
}
if (llist_add(&file->f_u.fu_llist, &delayed_fput_list))
schedule_work(&delayed_fput_work);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dv_extract_audio(uint8_t* frame, uint8_t* ppcm[4],
const DVprofile *sys)
{
int size, chan, i, j, d, of, smpls, freq, quant, half_ch;
uint16_t lc, rc;
const uint8_t* as_pack;
uint8_t *pcm, ipcm;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack) /* No audio ? */
return 0;
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
if (quant > 1)
return -1; /* unsupported quantization */
size = (sys->audio_min_samples[freq] + smpls) * 4; /* 2ch, 2bytes */
half_ch = sys->difseg_size / 2;
/* We work with 720p frames split in half, thus even frames have
* channels 0,1 and odd 2,3. */
ipcm = (sys->height == 720 && !(frame[1] & 0x0C)) ? 2 : 0;
pcm = ppcm[ipcm++];
/* for each DIF channel */
for (chan = 0; chan < sys->n_difchan; chan++) {
/* for each DIF segment */
for (i = 0; i < sys->difseg_size; i++) {
frame += 6 * 80; /* skip DIF segment header */
break;
}
/* for each AV sequence */
for (j = 0; j < 9; j++) {
for (d = 8; d < 80; d += 2) {
if (quant == 0) { /* 16bit quantization */
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i][j] + (d - 8) / 2 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = frame[d+1]; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = frame[d]; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
if (pcm[of*2+1] == 0x80 && pcm[of*2] == 0x00)
pcm[of*2+1] = 0;
} else { /* 12bit quantization */
lc = ((uint16_t)frame[d] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] >> 4);
rc = ((uint16_t)frame[d+1] << 4) |
((uint16_t)frame[d+2] & 0x0f);
lc = (lc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(lc));
rc = (rc == 0x800 ? 0 : dv_audio_12to16(rc));
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch][j] + (d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
if (of*2 >= size)
continue;
pcm[of*2] = lc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = lc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
of = sys->audio_shuffle[i%half_ch+half_ch][j] +
(d - 8) / 3 * sys->audio_stride;
pcm[of*2] = rc & 0xff; // FIXME: maybe we have to admit
pcm[of*2+1] = rc >> 8; // that DV is a big-endian PCM
++d;
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
}
frame += 16 * 80; /* 15 Video DIFs + 1 Audio DIF */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The dv_extract_audio function in libavcodec in FFmpeg 0.7.x before 0.7.12 and 0.8.x before 0.8.11 and in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.5, and 0.8.x before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted DV file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,242 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCINImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MonoColorType 1
#define RGBColorType 3
char
property[MagickPathExtent];
CINInfo
cin;
const unsigned char
*pixels;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
register Quantum
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[4];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
File information.
*/
offset=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,magick);
offset+=count;
if ((count != 4) ||
((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"\200\052\137\327",4) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
memset(&cin,0,sizeof(cin));
image->endian=(magick[0] == 0x80) && (magick[1] == 0x2a) &&
(magick[2] == 0x5f) && (magick[3] == 0xd7) ? MSBEndian : LSBEndian;
cin.file.image_offset=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.file.generic_length=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.file.industry_length=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.file.user_length=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.file.file_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.file.version),(unsigned char *)
cin.file.version);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.file.version,sizeof(cin.file.version));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.version",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.file.filename),(unsigned char *)
cin.file.filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.file.filename,sizeof(cin.file.filename));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.filename",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.file.create_date),(unsigned char *)
cin.file.create_date);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.file.create_date,
sizeof(cin.file.create_date));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.create_date",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.file.create_time),(unsigned char *)
cin.file.create_time);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.file.create_time,
sizeof(cin.file.create_time));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.create_time",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.file.reserve),(unsigned char *)
cin.file.reserve);
/*
Image information.
*/
cin.image.orientation=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
if (cin.image.orientation != (unsigned char) (~0))
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:image.orientation","%d",
cin.image.orientation);
switch (cin.image.orientation)
{
default:
case 0: image->orientation=TopLeftOrientation; break;
case 1: image->orientation=TopRightOrientation; break;
case 2: image->orientation=BottomLeftOrientation; break;
case 3: image->orientation=BottomRightOrientation; break;
case 4: image->orientation=LeftTopOrientation; break;
case 5: image->orientation=RightTopOrientation; break;
case 6: image->orientation=LeftBottomOrientation; break;
case 7: image->orientation=RightBottomOrientation; break;
}
cin.image.number_channels=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.image.reserve1),(unsigned char *)
cin.image.reserve1);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
cin.image.channel[i].designator[0]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.image.channel[i].designator[1]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.image.channel[i].bits_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.image.channel[i].reserve=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.image.channel[i].pixels_per_line=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.image.channel[i].lines_per_image=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.image.channel[i].min_data=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
cin.image.channel[i].min_quantity=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
cin.image.channel[i].max_data=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
cin.image.channel[i].max_quantity=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
}
cin.image.white_point[0]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.white_point[0]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=cin.image.white_point[0];
cin.image.white_point[1]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.white_point[1]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=cin.image.white_point[1];
cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[0]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[0]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[0];
cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[1]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[1]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=cin.image.red_primary_chromaticity[1];
cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[0]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[0]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[0];
cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[1]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[1]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=cin.image.green_primary_chromaticity[1];
cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[0]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[0]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[0];
cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[1]=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[1]) != MagickFalse)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=cin.image.blue_primary_chromaticity[1];
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.image.label),(unsigned char *)
cin.image.label);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.image.label,sizeof(cin.image.label));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:image.label",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.image.reserve),(unsigned char *)
cin.image.reserve);
/*
Image data format information.
*/
cin.data_format.interleave=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.data_format.packing=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.data_format.sign=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.data_format.sense=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.data_format.line_pad=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
cin.data_format.channel_pad=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.data_format.reserve),(unsigned char *)
cin.data_format.reserve);
/*
Image origination information.
*/
cin.origination.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
offset+=4;
if ((size_t) cin.origination.x_offset != ~0UL)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.x_offset","%.20g",
(double) cin.origination.x_offset);
cin.origination.y_offset=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if ((size_t) cin.origination.y_offset != ~0UL)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.y_offset","%.20g",
(double) cin.origination.y_offset);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.filename),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.filename,
sizeof(cin.origination.filename));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.filename",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.create_date),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.create_date);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.create_date,
sizeof(cin.origination.create_date));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.create_date",property,
exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.create_time),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.create_time);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.create_time,
sizeof(cin.origination.create_time));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.create_time",property,
exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.device),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.device);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.device,
sizeof(cin.origination.device));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.device",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.model),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.model);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.model,
sizeof(cin.origination.model));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.model",property,exception);
(void) memset(cin.origination.serial,0,
sizeof(cin.origination.serial));
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.serial),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.serial);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.origination.serial,
sizeof(cin.origination.serial));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:origination.serial",property,exception);
cin.origination.x_pitch=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
cin.origination.y_pitch=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
cin.origination.gamma=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.origination.gamma) != MagickFalse)
image->gamma=cin.origination.gamma;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.origination.reserve),(unsigned char *)
cin.origination.reserve);
if ((cin.file.image_offset > 2048) && (cin.file.user_length != 0))
{
int
c;
/*
Image film information.
*/
cin.film.id=ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
c=cin.film.id;
if (c != ~0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.id","%d",cin.film.id);
cin.film.type=ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
c=cin.film.type;
if (c != ~0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.type","%d",cin.film.type);
cin.film.offset=ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
c=cin.film.offset;
if (c != ~0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.offset","%d",
cin.film.offset);
cin.film.reserve1=ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
cin.film.prefix=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (cin.film.prefix != ~0UL)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.prefix","%.20g",(double)
cin.film.prefix);
cin.film.count=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.film.format),(unsigned char *)
cin.film.format);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.film.format,sizeof(cin.film.format));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.format",property,exception);
cin.film.frame_position=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (cin.film.frame_position != ~0UL)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_position","%.20g",
(double) cin.film.frame_position);
cin.film.frame_rate=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(cin.film.frame_rate) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_rate","%g",
cin.film.frame_rate);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.film.frame_id),(unsigned char *)
cin.film.frame_id);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.film.frame_id,
sizeof(cin.film.frame_id));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_id",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.film.slate_info),(unsigned char *)
cin.film.slate_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(property,cin.film.slate_info,
sizeof(cin.film.slate_info));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.slate_info",property,exception);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(cin.film.reserve),(unsigned char *)
cin.film.reserve);
}
if ((cin.file.image_offset > 2048) && (cin.file.user_length != 0))
{
StringInfo
*profile;
/*
User defined data.
*/
if (cin.file.user_length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const unsigned char *) NULL,
cin.file.user_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
offset+=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"dpx:user.data",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
image->depth=cin.image.channel[0].bits_per_pixel;
image->columns=cin.image.channel[0].pixels_per_line;
image->rows=cin.image.channel[0].lines_per_image;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
for ( ; offset < (MagickOffsetType) cin.file.image_offset; offset++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
if (offset < (MagickOffsetType) cin.file.image_offset)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
/*
Convert CIN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_info->quantum=32;
quantum_info->pack=MagickFalse;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
length=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
length=GetBytesPerRow(image->columns,3,image->depth,MagickTrue);
if (cin.image.number_channels == 1)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
length=GetBytesPerRow(image->columns,1,image->depth,MagickTrue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if ((size_t) count != length)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
SetImageColorspace(image,LogColorspace,exception);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: The cineon parsing component in ImageMagick 7.0.8-26 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (uncontrolled resource consumption) by crafting a Cineon image with an incorrect claimed image size. This occurs because ReadCINImage in coders/cin.c lacks a check for insufficient image data in a file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472 | High | 169,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_call(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
long rel = ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->_eip;
jmp_rel(ctxt, rel);
return em_push(ctxt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 169,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleLocaltime(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
std::string time_string;
if (!iter.ReadString(&time_string) || time_string.size() != sizeof(time_t))
return;
time_t time;
memcpy(&time, time_string.data(), sizeof(time));
const struct tm* expanded_time = localtime(&time);
std::string result_string;
const char* time_zone_string = "";
if (expanded_time) {
result_string = std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(expanded_time),
sizeof(struct tm));
time_zone_string = expanded_time->tm_zone;
}
base::Pickle reply;
reply.WriteString(result_string);
reply.WriteString(time_zone_string);
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect serialization in IPC in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to leak the value of a pointer via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948} | Medium | 172,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the SRP_VBASE_get_by_user implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by providing an invalid username in a connection attempt, related to apps/s_server.c and crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = calloc(1, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, polent.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
ret = krb5_copy_principal(handle->context, entry->principal, &kdb->princ);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-90
Summary: MIT krb5 1.6 or later allows an authenticated kadmin with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database to circumvent a DN containership check by supplying both a *linkdn* and *containerdn* database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within the container DN.
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next | Medium | 169,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetGPUProcessID() {
return host_ ? host_->gpu_process_id() : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::UpdateCompositingLayersAfterScroll() {
PaintLayerCompositor* compositor = GetLayoutBox()->View()->Compositor();
if (!compositor->InCompositingMode())
return;
if (UsesCompositedScrolling()) {
DCHECK(Layer()->HasCompositedLayerMapping());
ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator = GetScrollingCoordinator();
bool handled_scroll =
Layer()->IsRootLayer() && scrolling_coordinator &&
scrolling_coordinator->UpdateCompositedScrollOffset(this);
if (!handled_scroll) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
Layer()->GetCompositedLayerMapping()->SetNeedsGraphicsLayerUpdate(
kGraphicsLayerUpdateSubtree);
}
compositor->SetNeedsCompositingUpdate(
kCompositingUpdateAfterGeometryChange);
}
if (Layer()->IsRootLayer()) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->View() &&
frame->View()->HasViewportConstrainedObjects()) {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
} else {
Layer()->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, mishandles deferred page loads, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942} | Medium | 172,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buff[1024];
int fd, nr, nw;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s output-filename\n"
" %s |output-command\n"
" %s :host:port\n", argv[0], argv[0], argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fd = open_gen_fd(argv[1]);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open_gen_fd");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
while ((nr = read(0, buff, sizeof (buff))) != 0) {
if (nr < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
perror("read");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
nw = write(fd, buff, nr);
if (nw < 0) {
perror("write");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Boa through 0.94.14rc21 allows remote attackers to trigger a memory leak because of missing calls to the free function.
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix | Low | 169,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftAMR::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumSamplesOutput = 0;
}
const uint8_t *inputPtr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int32_t numBytesRead;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: NB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
numBytesRead =
AMRDecode(mState,
(Frame_Type_3GPP)((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f),
(UWord8 *)&inputPtr[1],
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
MIME_IETF);
if (numBytesRead == -1) {
ALOGE("PV AMR decoder AMRDecode() call failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
++numBytesRead; // Include the frame type header byte.
if (static_cast<size_t>(numBytesRead) > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
} else {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGE("b/27662364: WB expected output buffer %zu bytes vs %u",
kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t), outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27662364");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorOverflow, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
if (mode >= 10 && mode <= 13) {
ALOGE("encountered illegal frame type %d in AMR WB content.",
mode);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mode);
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, frameSize);
int16_t *outPtr = (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer;
if (mode >= 9) {
memset(outPtr, 0, kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t));
} else if (mode < 9) {
int16 frameType;
RX_State_wb rx_state;
mime_unsorting(
const_cast<uint8_t *>(&inputPtr[1]),
mInputSampleBuffer,
&frameType, &mode, 1, &rx_state);
int16_t numSamplesOutput;
pvDecoder_AmrWb(
mode, mInputSampleBuffer,
outPtr,
&numSamplesOutput,
mDecoderBuf, frameType, mDecoderCookie);
CHECK_EQ((int)numSamplesOutput, (int)kNumSamplesPerFrameWB);
for (int i = 0; i < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB; ++i) {
/* Delete the 2 LSBs (14-bit output) */
outPtr[i] &= 0xfffC;
}
}
numBytesRead = frameSize;
}
inHeader->nOffset += numBytesRead;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= numBytesRead;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateNB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameNB;
} else {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateWB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameWB;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: codecs/amrnb/dec/SoftAMR.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bugs 27662364 and 27843673.
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check input buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I47380545ea7d85845e141e722b0d84f498d27145
| High | 174,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!key->type->update)
goto error;
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
up_write(&key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
out:
return key_ref;
error:
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 167,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidCreateInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& instance_data) {
PepperRendererInstanceData data = instance_data;
data.render_process_id = render_process_id_;
in_process_host_->AddInstance(instance, data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696} | Medium | 172,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bgp_update_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
struct bgp bgp;
const u_char *p;
int withdrawn_routes_len;
int len;
int i;
ND_TCHECK2(dat[0], BGP_SIZE);
if (length < BGP_SIZE)
goto trunc;
memcpy(&bgp, dat, BGP_SIZE);
p = dat + BGP_SIZE; /*XXX*/
length -= BGP_SIZE;
/* Unfeasible routes */
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
withdrawn_routes_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (withdrawn_routes_len) {
/*
* Without keeping state from the original NLRI message,
* it's not possible to tell if this a v4 or v6 route,
* so only try to decode it if we're not v6 enabled.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], withdrawn_routes_len);
if (length < withdrawn_routes_len)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Withdrawn routes: %d bytes", withdrawn_routes_len));
p += withdrawn_routes_len;
length -= withdrawn_routes_len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (withdrawn_routes_len == 0 && len == 0 && length == 0) {
/* No withdrawn routes, no path attributes, no NLRI */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
return;
}
if (len) {
/* do something more useful!*/
while (len) {
int aflags, atype, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *p;
atype = *(p + 1);
p += 2;
len -= 2;
length -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, p);
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
if (length < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, p);
p += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
length -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values, "Unknown Attribute",
atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
if (len < alen)
goto trunc;
if (length < alen)
goto trunc;
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, p, alen))
goto trunc;
p += alen;
len -= alen;
length -= alen;
}
}
if (length) {
/*
* XXX - what if they're using the "Advertisement of
* Multiple Paths in BGP" feature:
*
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-add-paths/
*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-idr-add-paths-06
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Updated routes:"));
while (length) {
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
i = decode_prefix4(ndo, p, length, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
break;
} else if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (i == -3)
goto trunc; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
p += i;
length -= i;
}
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 allows stack consumption in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print() because of unlimited recursion.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit. | Medium | 169,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EAS_BOOL WT_CheckSampleEnd (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame, EAS_BOOL update)
{
EAS_U32 endPhaseAccum;
EAS_U32 endPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_BOOL done = EAS_FALSE;
/* check to see if we hit the end of the waveform this time */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
endPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac + (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement << SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
endPhaseAccum = pWTVoice->phaseAccum + GET_PHASE_INT_PART(endPhaseFrac);
if (endPhaseAccum >= pWTVoice->loopEnd)
{
/* calculate how far current ptr is from end */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd - pWTVoice->phaseAccum);
/* now account for the fractional portion */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) ((numSamples << NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS) - pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
if (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement) {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 1 + (numSamples / pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement);
} else {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = numSamples;
}
if (pWTIntFrame->numSamples < 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 0;
}
/* sound will be done this frame */
done = EAS_TRUE;
}
/* update data for off-chip synth */
if (update)
{
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = endPhaseFrac;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = endPhaseAccum;
}
return done;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
| High | 174,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error = 0;
if (!acl)
goto set_acl;
error = -E2BIG;
if (acl->a_count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (error <= 0) {
acl = NULL;
if (error < 0)
return error;
}
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
set_acl:
return __xfs_set_acl(inode, type, acl);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.8.2 preserves the setgid bit during a setxattr call, which allows local users to gain group privileges by leveraging the existence of a setgid program with restrictions on execute permissions.
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> | Low | 166,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin, negState;
send_token_flag return_token;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mic_in, mic_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
int sendTokenInit = 0, tmpret;
mechtok_in = mic_in = mic_out = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated mech's gss_accept_sec_context function
* and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* Step one determines whether the negotiation requires a MIC exchange,
* while steps two and three share responsibility for determining when
* the exchange is complete. If the selected mech completes in this
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 2 will decide. If a
* MIC exchange is expected, then step 3 will decide. If an error
* occurs in any step, the exchange will be aborted, possibly with an
* error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* return_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should
* be generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
/* Step 1: Perform mechanism negotiation. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)verifier_cred_handle;
if (sc == NULL || sc->internal_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
/* Process an initial token or request for NegHints. */
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
if (input_token->length == 0) {
ret = acc_ctx_hints(minor_status,
context_handle, spcred,
&mic_out,
&negState,
&return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sendTokenInit = 1;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
/* Can set negState to REQUEST_MIC */
ret = acc_ctx_new(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, spcred,
&mechtok_in, &mic_in,
&negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
} else {
/* Process a response token. Can set negState to
* ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE. */
ret = acc_ctx_cont(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, &mechtok_in,
&mic_in, &negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
/* Step 2: invoke the negotiated mechanism's gss_accept_sec_context
* function. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/*
* Handle mechtok_in and mic_in only if they are
* present in input_token. If neither is present, whether
* this is an error depends on whether this is the first
* round-trip. RET is set to a default value according to
* whether it is the first round-trip.
*/
if (negState != REQUEST_MIC && mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = acc_ctx_call_acc(minor_status, sc, spcred,
mechtok_in, mech_type, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&negState, &return_token);
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && sc->mech_complete &&
(sc->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status, mic_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
sc, &mic_out,
&negState, &return_token);
}
cleanup:
if (return_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND && sendTokenInit) {
assert(sc != NULL);
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(sc, 1, mic_out, 0,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
return_token, output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
} else if (return_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND &&
return_token != CHECK_MIC) {
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState,
sc ? sc->internal_mech :
GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mic_out,
return_token,
output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc->ctx_handle;
if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
src_name != NULL) {
*src_name = sc->internal_name;
sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (sc != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mic_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_in);
free(mic_in);
}
if (mic_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_out);
free(mic_out);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int res;
dst = inet6_csk_route_socket(sk, &fl6);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
rcu_read_lock();
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfs4_proc_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr,
int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
int status = 0;
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred)) {
status = PTR_ERR(cred);
goto out;
}
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, flags, sattr, cred);
d_drop(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
status = PTR_ERR(state);
goto out_putcred;
}
d_add(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
status = nfs4_do_setattr(state->inode, cred, &fattr, sattr, state);
if (status == 0)
nfs_setattr_update_inode(state->inode, sattr);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(state->inode, &fattr);
}
if (status == 0 && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_OPEN) != 0)
status = nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
else
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, flags);
out_putcred:
put_rpccred(cred);
out:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: exsltFuncFunctionFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr oldResult, ret;
exsltFuncData *data;
exsltFuncFunctionData *func;
xmlNodePtr paramNode, oldInsert, fake;
int oldBase;
xsltStackElemPtr params = NULL, param;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
int i, notSet;
struct objChain {
struct objChain *next;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
};
struct objChain *savedObjChain = NULL, *savedObj;
/*
* retrieve func:function template
*/
data = (exsltFuncData *) xsltGetExtData (tctxt,
EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
oldResult = data->result;
data->result = NULL;
func = (exsltFuncFunctionData*) xmlHashLookup2 (data->funcs,
ctxt->context->functionURI,
ctxt->context->function);
/*
* params handling
*/
if (nargs > func->nargs) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"{%s}%s: called with too many arguments\n",
ctxt->context->functionURI, ctxt->context->function);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
if (func->content != NULL) {
paramNode = func->content->prev;
}
else
paramNode = NULL;
if ((paramNode == NULL) && (func->nargs != 0)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionFunction: nargs != 0 and "
"param == NULL\n");
return;
}
if (tctxt->funcLevel > MAX_FUNC_RECURSION) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"{%s}%s: detected a recursion\n",
ctxt->context->functionURI, ctxt->context->function);
ctxt->error = XPATH_MEMORY_ERROR;
return;
}
tctxt->funcLevel++;
/*
* We have a problem with the evaluation of function parameters.
* The original library code did not evaluate XPath expressions until
* the last moment. After version 1.1.17 of the libxslt, the logic
* of other parts of the library was changed, and the evaluation of
* XPath expressions within parameters now takes place as soon as the
* parameter is parsed/evaluated (xsltParseStylesheetCallerParam).
* This means that the parameters need to be evaluated in lexical
* order (since a variable is "in scope" as soon as it is declared).
* However, on entry to this routine, the values (from the caller) are
* in reverse order (held on the XPath context variable stack). To
* accomplish what is required, I have added code to pop the XPath
* objects off of the stack at the beginning and save them, then use
* them (in the reverse order) as the params are evaluated. This
* requires an xmlMalloc/xmlFree for each param set by the caller,
* which is not very nice. There is probably a much better solution
* (like change other code to delay the evaluation).
*/
/*
* In order to give the function params and variables a new 'scope'
* we change varsBase in the context.
*/
oldBase = tctxt->varsBase;
tctxt->varsBase = tctxt->varsNr;
/* If there are any parameters */
if (paramNode != NULL) {
/* Fetch the stored argument values from the caller */
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
savedObj = xmlMalloc(sizeof(struct objChain));
savedObj->next = savedObjChain;
savedObj->obj = valuePop(ctxt);
savedObjChain = savedObj;
}
/*
* Prepare to process params in reverse order. First, go to
* the beginning of the param chain.
*/
for (i = 1; i <= func->nargs; i++) {
if (paramNode->prev == NULL)
break;
paramNode = paramNode->prev;
}
/*
* i has total # params found, nargs is number which are present
* as arguments from the caller
* Calculate the number of un-set parameters
*/
notSet = func->nargs - nargs;
for (; i > 0; i--) {
param = xsltParseStylesheetCallerParam (tctxt, paramNode);
if (i > notSet) { /* if parameter value set */
param->computed = 1;
if (param->value != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(param->value);
savedObj = savedObjChain; /* get next val from chain */
param->value = savedObj->obj;
savedObjChain = savedObjChain->next;
xmlFree(savedObj);
}
xsltLocalVariablePush(tctxt, param, -1);
param->next = params;
params = param;
paramNode = paramNode->next;
}
}
/*
* actual processing
*/
fake = xmlNewDocNode(tctxt->output, NULL,
(const xmlChar *)"fake", NULL);
oldInsert = tctxt->insert;
tctxt->insert = fake;
xsltApplyOneTemplate (tctxt, xmlXPathGetContextNode(ctxt),
func->content, NULL, NULL);
xsltLocalVariablePop(tctxt, tctxt->varsBase, -2);
tctxt->insert = oldInsert;
tctxt->varsBase = oldBase; /* restore original scope */
if (params != NULL)
xsltFreeStackElemList(params);
if (data->error != 0)
goto error;
if (data->result != NULL) {
ret = data->result;
} else
ret = xmlXPathNewCString("");
data->result = oldResult;
/*
* It is an error if the instantiation of the template results in
* the generation of result nodes.
*/
if (fake->children != NULL) {
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
xmlDebugDumpNode (stderr, fake, 1);
#endif
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"{%s}%s: cannot write to result tree while "
"executing a function\n",
ctxt->context->functionURI, ctxt->context->function);
xmlFreeNode(fake);
goto error;
}
xmlFreeNode(fake);
valuePush(ctxt, ret);
error:
/*
* IMPORTANT: This enables previously tree fragments marked as
* being results of a function, to be garbage-collected after
* the calling process exits.
*/
xsltExtensionInstructionResultFinalize(tctxt);
tctxt->funcLevel--;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned code_key_a, size_t num)
{
const uni_to_enc *l = table,
*h = &table[num-1],
*m;
unsigned short code_key;
/* we have no mappings outside the BMP */
if (code_key_a > 0xFFFFU)
return 0;
code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
while (l <= h) {
m = l + (h - l) / 2;
if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
h = m - 1;
else if (code_key > m->un_code_point)
l = m + 1;
else
return m->cs_code;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 167,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::ShowInternal() {
BrowserWindowGtk* browser_window =
BrowserWindowGtk::GetBrowserWindowForNativeWindow(
browser_->window()->GetNativeHandle());
GtkWidget* reference_widget = NULL;
if (type_ == BROWSER_ACTION) {
BrowserActionsToolbarGtk* toolbar =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetBrowserActionsToolbar();
if (toolbar->animating() && animation_wait_retries_-- > 0) {
MessageLoopForUI::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::ShowInternal, this),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kAnimationWaitMS));
return;
}
reference_widget = toolbar->GetBrowserActionWidget(extension_);
gtk_container_check_resize(GTK_CONTAINER(
browser_window->GetToolbar()->widget()));
if (reference_widget && !gtk_widget_get_visible(reference_widget)) {
reference_widget = gtk_widget_get_visible(toolbar->chevron()) ?
toolbar->chevron() : NULL;
}
} else if (type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
LocationBarViewGtk* location_bar_view =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetLocationBarView();
location_bar_view->SetPreviewEnabledPageAction(extension_->page_action(),
true); // preview_enabled
reference_widget = location_bar_view->GetPageActionWidget(
extension_->page_action());
gtk_container_check_resize(GTK_CONTAINER(
browser_window->GetToolbar()->widget()));
DCHECK(reference_widget);
} else if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
LocationBarViewGtk* location_bar_view =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetLocationBarView();
reference_widget = location_bar_view->location_entry_widget();
DCHECK(reference_widget);
}
if (reference_widget == NULL)
reference_widget = browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetAppMenuButton();
GtkThemeService* theme_provider = GtkThemeService::GetFrom(
browser_->profile());
GtkWidget* bubble_content = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, kHorizontalColumnSpacing);
gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(bubble_content), kContentBorder);
if (!icon_.isNull()) {
GdkPixbuf* pixbuf = gfx::GdkPixbufFromSkBitmap(&icon_);
gfx::Size size(icon_.width(), icon_.height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize) {
if (size.width() > size.height()) {
size.set_height(size.height() * kIconSize / size.width());
size.set_width(kIconSize);
} else {
size.set_width(size.width() * kIconSize / size.height());
size.set_height(kIconSize);
}
GdkPixbuf* old = pixbuf;
pixbuf = gdk_pixbuf_scale_simple(pixbuf, size.width(), size.height(),
GDK_INTERP_BILINEAR);
g_object_unref(old);
}
GtkWidget* icon_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), icon_column, FALSE, FALSE,
kIconPadding);
GtkWidget* image = gtk_image_new_from_pixbuf(pixbuf);
g_object_unref(pixbuf);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(icon_column), image, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
GtkWidget* text_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, kTextColumnVerticalSpacing);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), text_column, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
GtkWidget* heading_label = gtk_label_new(NULL);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension_->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
std::string heading_text = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING, extension_name,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
char* markup = g_markup_printf_escaped("<span size=\"larger\">%s</span>",
heading_text.c_str());
gtk_label_set_markup(GTK_LABEL(heading_label), markup);
g_free(markup);
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(heading_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), heading_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
if (type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
GtkWidget* info_label = gtk_label_new(l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(info_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), info_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
GtkWidget* info_label = gtk_label_new(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension_->omnibox_keyword())).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(info_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), info_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
GtkWidget* manage_label = gtk_label_new(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(manage_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), manage_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
GtkWidget* close_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), close_column, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
close_button_.reset(CustomDrawButton::CloseButton(theme_provider));
g_signal_connect(close_button_->widget(), "clicked",
G_CALLBACK(OnButtonClick), this);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(close_column), close_button_->widget(),
FALSE, FALSE, 0);
BubbleGtk::ArrowLocationGtk arrow_location =
!base::i18n::IsRTL() ?
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_RIGHT :
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_LEFT;
gfx::Rect bounds = gtk_util::WidgetBounds(reference_widget);
if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
arrow_location =
!base::i18n::IsRTL() ?
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_LEFT :
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_RIGHT;
if (base::i18n::IsRTL())
bounds.Offset(bounds.width(), 0);
bounds.set_width(0);
}
bubble_ = BubbleGtk::Show(reference_widget,
&bounds,
bubble_content,
arrow_location,
true, // match_system_theme
true, // grab_input
theme_provider,
this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,982 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL];
if ((p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) && !rt)
return -EINVAL;
if (!rt)
return 0;
if (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP)
return -EINVAL;
if (p->replay_window != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not verify that the actual Netlink message length is consistent with a certain header field, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a (1) new or (2) updated state.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:
1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
code later on.
2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.
To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.
To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const char *cJSON_GetErrorPtr( void )
{
return ep;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
#endif
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return offset;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return offset;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & (FLAGS_DID_NOTE|FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID)) ==
(FLAGS_DID_NOTE|FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID))
goto core;
if (namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "SuSE") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_VERSION && descsz == 2) {
file_printf(ms, ", for SuSE %d.%d", nbuf[doff], nbuf[doff + 1]);
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "GNU") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_VERSION && descsz == 16) {
uint32_t desc[4];
(void)memcpy(desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
if (file_printf(ms, ", for GNU/") == -1)
return size;
switch (elf_getu32(swap, desc[0])) {
case GNU_OS_LINUX:
if (file_printf(ms, "Linux") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_HURD:
if (file_printf(ms, "Hurd") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_SOLARIS:
if (file_printf(ms, "Solaris") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_KFREEBSD:
if (file_printf(ms, "kFreeBSD") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_KNETBSD:
if (file_printf(ms, "kNetBSD") == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, "<unknown>") == -1)
return size;
}
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d.%d", elf_getu32(swap, desc[1]),
elf_getu32(swap, desc[2]), elf_getu32(swap, desc[3])) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "GNU") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_BUILD_ID && (descsz == 16 || descsz == 20)) {
uint8_t desc[20];
uint32_t i;
if (file_printf(ms, ", BuildID[%s]=", descsz == 16 ? "md5/uuid" :
"sha1") == -1)
return size;
(void)memcpy(desc, &nbuf[doff], descsz);
for (i = 0; i < descsz; i++)
if (file_printf(ms, "%02x", desc[i]) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID;
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "PaX") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_NETBSD_PAX && descsz == 4) {
static const char *pax[] = {
"+mprotect",
"-mprotect",
"+segvguard",
"-segvguard",
"+ASLR",
"-ASLR",
};
uint32_t desc;
size_t i;
int did = 0;
(void)memcpy(&desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (desc && file_printf(ms, ", PaX: ") == -1)
return size;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(pax); i++) {
if (((1 << i) & desc) == 0)
continue;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s%s", did++ ? "," : "",
pax[i]) == -1)
return size;
}
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
if (descsz == 4) {
do_note_netbsd_version(ms, swap, &nbuf[doff]);
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
break;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
if (namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0) {
if (xnh_type == NT_FREEBSD_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
do_note_freebsd_version(ms, swap, &nbuf[doff]);
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
}
if (namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "OpenBSD") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_OPENBSD_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", for OpenBSD") == -1)
return size;
/* Content of note is always 0 */
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
if (namesz == 10 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "DragonFly") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_DRAGONFLY_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
uint32_t desc;
if (file_printf(ms, ", for DragonFly") == -1)
return size;
(void)memcpy(&desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10, desc % 10000) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
core:
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
#ifdef ELFCORE
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) != 0)
return size;
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (xnh_type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
uint32_t signo;
/*
* Extract the program name. It is at
* offset 0x7c, and is up to 32-bytes,
* including the terminating NUL.
*/
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s'",
&nbuf[doff + 0x7c]) == -1)
return size;
/*
* Extract the signal number. It is at
* offset 0x08.
*/
(void)memcpy(&signo, &nbuf[doff + 0x08],
sizeof(signo));
if (file_printf(ms, " (signal %u)",
elf_getu32(swap, signo)) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return size;
}
break;
default:
if (xnh_type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS ; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; *cp && isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return size;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The donote function in readelf.c in file through 5.20, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP 5.4.34, does not ensure that sufficient note headers are present, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix note bounds reading, Francisco Alonso / Red Hat | Medium | 166,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 1 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 3 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
}
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->storage_class != PseudoClass))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImproperImageHeader");
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image,
exception);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if ((has_merged_image != MagickFalse) || (GetImageListLength(image) == 1))
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel,exception);
image->background_color.alpha=TransparentAlpha;
image->background_color.alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDImage function in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Added extra check to fix https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/93 | Medium | 168,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: getword(f, word, newlinep, filename)
FILE *f;
char *word;
int *newlinep;
char *filename;
{
int c, len, escape;
int quoted, comment;
int value, digit, got, n;
#define isoctal(c) ((c) >= '0' && (c) < '8')
*newlinep = 0;
len = 0;
escape = 0;
comment = 0;
quoted = 0;
/*
* First skip white-space and comments.
*/
for (;;) {
c = getc(f);
if (c == EOF)
break;
/*
* A newline means the end of a comment; backslash-newline
* is ignored. Note that we cannot have escape && comment.
*/
if (c == '\n') {
if (!escape) {
*newlinep = 1;
comment = 0;
} else
escape = 0;
continue;
}
/*
* Ignore characters other than newline in a comment.
*/
if (comment)
continue;
/*
* If this character is escaped, we have a word start.
*/
if (escape)
break;
/*
* If this is the escape character, look at the next character.
*/
if (c == '\\') {
escape = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* If this is the start of a comment, ignore the rest of the line.
*/
if (c == '#') {
comment = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* A non-whitespace character is the start of a word.
*/
if (!isspace(c))
break;
}
/*
* Process characters until the end of the word.
*/
while (c != EOF) {
if (escape) {
/*
* This character is escaped: backslash-newline is ignored,
* various other characters indicate particular values
* as for C backslash-escapes.
*/
escape = 0;
if (c == '\n') {
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
got = 0;
switch (c) {
case 'a':
value = '\a';
break;
case 'b':
value = '\b';
break;
case 'f':
value = '\f';
break;
case 'n':
value = '\n';
break;
case 'r':
value = '\r';
break;
case 's':
value = ' ';
break;
case 't':
value = '\t';
break;
default:
if (isoctal(c)) {
/*
* \ddd octal sequence
*/
value = 0;
for (n = 0; n < 3 && isoctal(c); ++n) {
value = (value << 3) + (c & 07);
c = getc(f);
}
got = 1;
break;
}
if (c == 'x') {
/*
* \x<hex_string> sequence
*/
value = 0;
c = getc(f);
for (n = 0; n < 2 && isxdigit(c); ++n) {
digit = toupper(c) - '0';
if (digit > 10)
digit += '0' + 10 - 'A';
value = (value << 4) + digit;
c = getc (f);
}
got = 1;
break;
}
/*
* Otherwise the character stands for itself.
*/
value = c;
break;
}
/*
* Store the resulting character for the escape sequence.
*/
if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1)
word[len] = value;
++len;
if (!got)
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
/*
* Backslash starts a new escape sequence.
*/
if (c == '\\') {
escape = 1;
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
/*
* Not escaped: check for the start or end of a quoted
* section and see if we've reached the end of the word.
*/
if (quoted) {
if (c == quoted) {
quoted = 0;
c = getc(f);
continue;
}
} else if (c == '"' || c == '\'') {
quoted = c;
c = getc(f);
continue;
} else if (isspace(c) || c == '#') {
ungetc (c, f);
break;
}
/*
* An ordinary character: store it in the word and get another.
*/
if (len < MAXWORDLEN-1)
word[len] = c;
++len;
c = getc(f);
}
/*
* End of the word: check for errors.
*/
if (c == EOF) {
if (ferror(f)) {
if (errno == 0)
errno = EIO;
option_error("Error reading %s: %m", filename);
die(1);
}
/*
* If len is zero, then we didn't find a word before the
* end of the file.
*/
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (quoted)
option_error("warning: quoted word runs to end of file (%.20s...)",
filename, word);
}
/*
* Warn if the word was too long, and append a terminating null.
*/
if (len >= MAXWORDLEN) {
option_error("warning: word in file %s too long (%.20s...)",
filename, word);
len = MAXWORDLEN - 1;
}
word[len] = 0;
return 1;
#undef isoctal
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in the getword function in options.c in pppd in Paul's PPP Package (ppp) before 2.4.7 allows attackers to *access privileged options* via a long word in an options file, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow that *[corrupts] security-relevant variables.*
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> | High | 166,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src,
struct flowi4 *fl4, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid,
u32 seq, int event, int nowait, unsigned int flags)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct rtmsg *r;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned long expires = 0;
u32 error;
u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX];
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*r), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_INET;
r->rtm_dst_len = 32;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_tos = fl4->flowi4_tos;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_TABLE, RT_TABLE_MAIN))
goto nla_put_failure;
r->rtm_type = rt->rt_type;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = RTPROT_UNSPEC;
r->rtm_flags = (rt->rt_flags & ~0xFFFF) | RTM_F_CLONED;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_NOTIFY)
r->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_NOTIFY;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_DST, dst))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (src) {
r->rtm_src_len = 32;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_SRC, src))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->dst.dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_OIF, rt->dst.dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
if (rt->dst.tclassid &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_FLOW, rt->dst.tclassid))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (!rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
fl4->saddr != src) {
if (nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_PREFSRC, fl4->saddr))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rt->rt_uses_gateway &&
nla_put_be32(skb, RTA_GATEWAY, rt->rt_gateway))
goto nla_put_failure;
expires = rt->dst.expires;
if (expires) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
if (time_before(now, expires))
expires -= now;
else
expires = 0;
}
memcpy(metrics, dst_metrics_ptr(&rt->dst), sizeof(metrics));
if (rt->rt_pmtu && expires)
metrics[RTAX_MTU - 1] = rt->rt_pmtu;
if (rtnetlink_put_metrics(skb, metrics) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (fl4->flowi4_mark &&
nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_MARK, fl4->flowi4_mark))
goto nla_put_failure;
error = rt->dst.error;
if (rt_is_input_route(rt)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (ipv4_is_multicast(dst) && !ipv4_is_local_multicast(dst) &&
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
fl4->saddr, fl4->daddr,
r, nowait);
if (err <= 0) {
if (!nowait) {
if (err == 0)
return 0;
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (err == -EMSGSIZE)
goto nla_put_failure;
error = err;
}
}
} else
#endif
if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_IIF, skb->dev->ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (rtnl_put_cacheinfo(skb, &rt->dst, 0, expires, error) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 does not properly consider the length of the Read-Copy Update (RCU) grace period for redirecting lookups in the absence of caching, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a flood of packets.
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserMainParts::PostDestroyThreads() {
if (BrowserProcessMain::GetInstance()->GetProcessModel() ==
PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS) {
BrowserContext::AssertNoContextsExist();
}
device_client_.reset();
display::Screen::SetScreenInstance(nullptr);
gpu::oxide_shim::SetGLShareGroup(nullptr);
gl_share_context_ = nullptr;
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
gpu::SetGpuInfoCollectorOxideLinux(nullptr);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Cluster::EOS() const
//// long long element_size)
{
return (m_pSegment == NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zstatus(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
switch (r_type(op)) {
case t_file:
{
stream *s;
make_bool(op, (file_is_valid(s, op) ? 1 : 0));
}
return 0;
case t_string:
{
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
struct stat fstat;
int code = parse_file_name(op, &pname,
i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions, imemory);
if (code < 0) {
if (code == gs_error_undefinedfilename) {
make_bool(op, 0);
code = 0;
}
return code;
}
code = gs_terminate_file_name(&pname, imemory, "status");
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_terminate_file_name(&pname, imemory, "status");
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = (*pname.iodev->procs.file_status)(pname.iodev,
pname.fname, &fstat);
switch (code) {
case 0:
check_ostack(4);
make_int(op - 4, stat_blocks(&fstat));
make_int(op - 3, fstat.st_size);
/*
* We can't check the value simply by using ==,
* because signed/unsigned == does the wrong thing.
* Instead, since integer assignment only keeps the
* bottom bits, we convert the values to double
* and then test for equality. This handles all
* cases of signed/unsigned or width mismatch.
*/
if ((double)op[-4].value.intval !=
(double)stat_blocks(&fstat) ||
(double)op[-3].value.intval !=
(double)fstat.st_size
)
return_error(gs_error_limitcheck);
make_int(op - 2, fstat.st_mtime);
make_int(op - 1, fstat.st_ctime);
make_bool(op, 1);
break;
case gs_error_undefinedfilename:
make_bool(op, 0);
code = 0;
}
gs_free_file_name(&pname, "status");
return code;
}
default:
return_op_typecheck(op);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: psi/zfile.c in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.21rc1 permits the status command even if -dSAFER is used, which might allow remote attackers to determine the existence and size of arbitrary files, a similar issue to CVE-2016-7977.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void registerBlobURLFromTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->srcURL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: modifier_current_encoding(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, color_encoding *ce)
{
if (pm->current_encoding != 0)
*ce = *pm->current_encoding;
else
memset(ce, 0, sizeof *ce);
ce->gamma = pm->current_gamma;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,669 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message: | High | 165,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len < 1 || len > 8) {
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
const unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
| High | 174,229 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = __crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm);
struct skcipher_alg *alg = crypto_skcipher_alg(skcipher);
if (tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_blkcipher_type)
return crypto_init_skcipher_ops_blkcipher(tfm);
if (tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_ablkcipher_type ||
tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_givcipher_type)
return crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(tfm);
skcipher->setkey = alg->setkey;
skcipher->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
skcipher->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
skcipher->ivsize = alg->ivsize;
skcipher->keysize = alg->max_keysize;
if (alg->exit)
skcipher->base.exit = crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm;
if (alg->init)
return alg->init(skcipher);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The crypto_skcipher_init_tfm function in crypto/skcipher.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.2 relies on a setkey function that lacks a key-size check, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->offset = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = ntohl(*p++);
p++; /* totalcount - unused */
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2);
/* set up somewhere to store response.
* We take pages, put them on reslist and include in iovec
*/
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: create_policy_2_svc(cpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int StreamTcpPacket (ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p, StreamTcpThread *stt,
PacketQueue *pq)
{
SCEnter();
DEBUG_ASSERT_FLOW_LOCKED(p->flow);
SCLogDebug("p->pcap_cnt %"PRIu64, p->pcap_cnt);
/* assign the thread id to the flow */
if (unlikely(p->flow->thread_id == 0)) {
p->flow->thread_id = (FlowThreadId)tv->id;
#ifdef DEBUG
} else if (unlikely((FlowThreadId)tv->id != p->flow->thread_id)) {
SCLogDebug("wrong thread: flow has %u, we are %d", p->flow->thread_id, tv->id);
#endif
}
TcpSession *ssn = (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx;
/* track TCP flags */
if (ssn != NULL) {
ssn->tcp_packet_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p))
ssn->client.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
else if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p))
ssn->server.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
/* check if we need to unset the ASYNC flag */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC &&
ssn->client.tcp_flags != 0 &&
ssn->server.tcp_flags != 0)
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: removing ASYNC flag as we have packets on both sides", ssn);
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
}
}
/* update counters */
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_synack);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_syn);
}
if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_RST)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_rst);
}
/* broken TCP http://ask.wireshark.org/questions/3183/acknowledgment-number-broken-tcp-the-acknowledge-field-is-nonzero-while-the-ack-flag-is-not-set */
if (!(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && TCP_GET_ACK(p) != 0) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_PKT_BROKEN_ACK);
}
/* If we are on IPS mode, and got a drop action triggered from
* the IP only module, or from a reassembled msg and/or from an
* applayer detection, then drop the rest of the packets of the
* same stream and avoid inspecting it any further */
if (StreamTcpCheckFlowDrops(p) == 1) {
SCLogDebug("This flow/stream triggered a drop rule");
FlowSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p->flow);
DecodeSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p);
StreamTcpDisableAppLayer(p->flow);
PACKET_DROP(p);
/* return the segments to the pool */
StreamTcpSessionPktFree(p);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
if (ssn == NULL || ssn->state == TCP_NONE) {
if (StreamTcpPacketStateNone(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue) == -1) {
goto error;
}
if (ssn != NULL)
SCLogDebug("ssn->alproto %"PRIu16"", p->flow->alproto);
} else {
/* special case for PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END packets:
* bypass the state handling and various packet checks,
* we care about reassembly here. */
if (p->flags & PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END) {
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
} else {
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
}
/* straight to 'skip' as we already handled reassembly */
goto skip;
}
/* check if the packet is in right direction, when we missed the
SYN packet and picked up midstream session. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM_SYNACK)
StreamTcpPacketSwitchDir(ssn, p);
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAlive(ssn, p) == 1) {
goto skip;
}
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAliveACK(ssn, p) == 1) {
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
goto skip;
}
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
/* if packet is not a valid window update, check if it is perhaps
* a bad window update that we should ignore (and alert on) */
if (StreamTcpPacketIsFinShutdownAck(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsWindowUpdate(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsBadWindowUpdate(ssn,p))
goto skip;
switch (ssn->state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynRecv(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateEstablished(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait1(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait2(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateClosing(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateCloseWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateLastAck(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_TIME_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateTimeWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSED:
/* TCP session memory is not returned to pool until timeout. */
SCLogDebug("packet received on closed state");
break;
default:
SCLogDebug("packet received on default state");
break;
}
skip:
if (ssn->state >= TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_EST;
}
}
/* deal with a pseudo packet that is created upon receiving a RST
* segment. To be sure we process both sides of the connection, we
* inject a fake packet into the system, forcing reassembly of the
* opposing direction.
* There should be only one, but to be sure we do a while loop. */
if (ssn != NULL) {
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end");
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
/* process the opposing direction of the original packet */
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(np)) {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to server");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, np, NULL);
} else {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to client");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, np, NULL);
}
/* enqueue this packet so we inspect it in detect etc */
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end done");
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
/* check for conditions that may make us not want to log this packet */
/* streams that hit depth */
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) ||
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
/* encrypted packets */
if ((PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p) && (ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)) ||
(PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) && (ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_BYPASS) {
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
/* if stream is dead and we have no detect engine at all, bypass. */
} else if (g_detect_disabled &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
StreamTcpBypassEnabled())
{
SCLogDebug("bypass as stream is dead and we have no rules");
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
SCReturnInt(0);
error:
/* make sure we don't leave packets in our pseudo queue */
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
if (StreamTcpInlineDropInvalid()) {
/* disable payload inspection as we're dropping this packet
* anyway. Doesn't disable all detection, so we can still
* match on the stream event that was set. */
DecodeSetNoPayloadInspectionFlag(p);
PACKET_DROP(p);
}
SCReturnInt(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received).
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin | Medium | 169,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct net_device *_init_airo_card( unsigned short irq, int port,
int is_pcmcia, struct pci_dev *pci,
struct device *dmdev )
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct airo_info *ai;
int i, rc;
CapabilityRid cap_rid;
/* Create the network device object. */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*ai), "", ether_setup);
if (!dev) {
airo_print_err("", "Couldn't alloc_etherdev");
return NULL;
}
ai = dev->ml_priv = netdev_priv(dev);
ai->wifidev = NULL;
ai->flags = 1 << FLAG_RADIO_DOWN;
ai->jobs = 0;
ai->dev = dev;
if (pci && (pci->device == 0x5000 || pci->device == 0xa504)) {
airo_print_dbg("", "Found an MPI350 card");
set_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags);
}
spin_lock_init(&ai->aux_lock);
sema_init(&ai->sem, 1);
ai->config.len = 0;
ai->pci = pci;
init_waitqueue_head (&ai->thr_wait);
ai->tfm = NULL;
add_airo_dev(ai);
if (airo_networks_allocate (ai))
goto err_out_free;
airo_networks_initialize (ai);
skb_queue_head_init (&ai->txq);
/* The Airo-specific entries in the device structure. */
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
dev->netdev_ops = &mpi_netdev_ops;
else
dev->netdev_ops = &airo_netdev_ops;
dev->wireless_handlers = &airo_handler_def;
ai->wireless_data.spy_data = &ai->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &ai->wireless_data;
dev->irq = irq;
dev->base_addr = port;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, dmdev);
reset_card (dev, 1);
msleep(400);
if (!is_pcmcia) {
if (!request_region(dev->base_addr, 64, DRV_NAME)) {
rc = -EBUSY;
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't request region");
goto err_out_nets;
}
}
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
if (mpi_map_card(ai, pci)) {
airo_print_err("", "Could not map memory");
goto err_out_res;
}
}
if (probe) {
if (setup_card(ai, dev->dev_addr, 1) != SUCCESS) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "MAC could not be enabled" );
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_map;
}
} else if (!test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
ai->bap_read = fast_bap_read;
set_bit(FLAG_FLASHING, &ai->flags);
}
strcpy(dev->name, "eth%d");
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "Couldn't register_netdev");
goto err_out_map;
}
ai->wifidev = init_wifidev(ai, dev);
if (!ai->wifidev)
goto err_out_reg;
rc = readCapabilityRid(ai, &cap_rid, 1);
if (rc != SUCCESS) {
rc = -EIO;
goto err_out_wifi;
}
/* WEP capability discovery */
ai->wep_capable = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x02)) ? 1 : 0;
ai->max_wep_idx = (cap_rid.softCap & cpu_to_le16(0x80)) ? 3 : 0;
airo_print_info(dev->name, "Firmware version %x.%x.%02d",
((le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) >> 8) & 0xF),
(le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) & 0xFF),
le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer));
/* Test for WPA support */
/* Only firmware versions 5.30.17 or better can do WPA */
if (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) > 0x530
|| (le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softVer) == 0x530
&& le16_to_cpu(cap_rid.softSubVer) >= 17)) {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA supported.");
set_bit(FLAG_WPA_CAPABLE, &ai->flags);
ai->bssListFirst = RID_WPA_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_WPA_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid);
} else {
airo_print_info(ai->dev->name, "WPA unsupported with firmware "
"versions older than 5.30.17.");
ai->bssListFirst = RID_BSSLISTFIRST;
ai->bssListNext = RID_BSSLISTNEXT;
ai->bssListRidLen = sizeof(BSSListRid) - sizeof(BSSListRidExtra);
}
set_bit(FLAG_REGISTERED,&ai->flags);
airo_print_info(dev->name, "MAC enabled %pM", dev->dev_addr);
/* Allocate the transmit buffers */
if (probe && !test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS; i++ )
ai->fids[i] = transmit_allocate(ai,AIRO_DEF_MTU,i>=MAX_FIDS/2);
if (setup_proc_entry(dev, dev->ml_priv) < 0)
goto err_out_wifi;
return dev;
err_out_wifi:
unregister_netdev(ai->wifidev);
free_netdev(ai->wifidev);
err_out_reg:
unregister_netdev(dev);
err_out_map:
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags) && pci) {
pci_free_consistent(pci, PCI_SHARED_LEN, ai->shared, ai->shared_dma);
iounmap(ai->pciaux);
iounmap(ai->pcimem);
mpi_unmap_card(ai->pci);
}
err_out_res:
if (!is_pcmcia)
release_region( dev->base_addr, 64 );
err_out_nets:
airo_networks_free(ai);
err_out_free:
del_airo_dev(ai);
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned bs = crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(
&ctx->req));
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned long iovlen;
struct iovec *iov;
int err = -EAGAIN;
int used;
long copied = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
iovlen--, iov++) {
unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
while (seglen) {
sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
sg = sgl->sg;
while (!sg->length)
sg++;
used = ctx->used;
if (!used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
used = min_t(unsigned long, used, seglen);
used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, from, used, 1);
err = used;
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
used -= used % bs;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!used)
goto free;
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg,
ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
ctx->iv);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
ctx->enc ?
crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
if (err)
goto unlock;
copied += used;
from += used;
seglen -= used;
skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used);
}
}
err = 0;
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_obj_populate(unsigned long obj,
struct utee_attribute *usr_attrs,
unsigned long attr_count)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *attrs = NULL;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_obj_get(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx),
tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(obj), &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Must be a transient object */
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_PERSISTENT) != 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
/* Must not be initialized already */
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) != 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(o->info.objectType);
if (!type_props)
return TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
attrs = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * attr_count);
if (!attrs)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx), usr_attrs, attr_count,
attrs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_svc_cryp_check_attr(ATTR_USAGE_POPULATE, type_props,
attrs, attr_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_svc_cryp_obj_populate_type(o, type_props, attrs, attr_count);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS)
o->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
out:
free(attrs);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Code execution in context of TEE core (kernel). The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in syscall_cryp_obj_populate
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0009: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]> | High | 169,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval *key, *data, **old_data;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
return 0;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_dtor(key);
FREE_ZVAL(key);
zval_dtor(data);
FREE_ZVAL(data);
return 0;
}
if (!objprops) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) {
case IS_LONG:
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
}
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
break;
}
} else {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(key);
zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data,
sizeof data, NULL);
}
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the process_nested_data function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.4.36, 5.5.x before 5.5.20, and 5.6.x before 5.6.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted unserialize call that leverages improper handling of duplicate keys within the serialized properties of an object, a different vulnerability than CVE-2004-1019.
Commit Message: | High | 164,893 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int SoundPool::play(int sampleID, float leftVolume, float rightVolume,
int priority, int loop, float rate)
{
ALOGV("play sampleID=%d, leftVolume=%f, rightVolume=%f, priority=%d, loop=%d, rate=%f",
sampleID, leftVolume, rightVolume, priority, loop, rate);
sp<Sample> sample;
SoundChannel* channel;
int channelID;
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
if (mQuit) {
return 0;
}
sample = findSample(sampleID);
if ((sample == 0) || (sample->state() != Sample::READY)) {
ALOGW(" sample %d not READY", sampleID);
return 0;
}
dump();
channel = allocateChannel_l(priority);
if (!channel) {
ALOGV("No channel allocated");
return 0;
}
channelID = ++mNextChannelID;
ALOGV("play channel %p state = %d", channel, channel->state());
channel->play(sample, channelID, leftVolume, rightVolume, priority, loop, rate);
return channelID;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: media/libmedia/SoundPool.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G, and 6.x before 2016-02-01 mishandles locking requirements, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25781119.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
| Medium | 173,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void __init acpi_initrd_override(void *data, size_t size)
{
int sig, no, table_nr = 0, total_offset = 0;
long offset = 0;
struct acpi_table_header *table;
char cpio_path[32] = "kernel/firmware/acpi/";
struct cpio_data file;
if (data == NULL || size == 0)
return;
for (no = 0; no < ACPI_OVERRIDE_TABLES; no++) {
file = find_cpio_data(cpio_path, data, size, &offset);
if (!file.data)
break;
data += offset;
size -= offset;
if (file.size < sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Table smaller than ACPI header [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
table = file.data;
for (sig = 0; table_sigs[sig]; sig++)
if (!memcmp(table->signature, table_sigs[sig], 4))
break;
if (!table_sigs[sig]) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Unknown signature [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (file.size != table->length) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: File length does not match table length [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (acpi_table_checksum(file.data, table->length)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Bad table checksum [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
pr_info("%4.4s ACPI table found in initrd [%s%s][0x%x]\n",
table->signature, cpio_path, file.name, table->length);
all_tables_size += table->length;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].data = file.data;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].size = file.size;
table_nr++;
}
if (table_nr == 0)
return;
acpi_tables_addr =
memblock_find_in_range(0, max_low_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!acpi_tables_addr) {
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/*
* Only calling e820_add_reserve does not work and the
* tables are invalid (memory got used) later.
* memblock_reserve works as expected and the tables won't get modified.
* But it's not enough on X86 because ioremap will
* complain later (used by acpi_os_map_memory) that the pages
* that should get mapped are not marked "reserved".
* Both memblock_reserve and e820_add_region (via arch_reserve_mem_area)
* works fine.
*/
memblock_reserve(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
/*
* early_ioremap only can remap 256k one time. If we map all
* tables one time, we will hit the limit. Need to map chunks
* one by one during copying the same as that in relocate_initrd().
*/
for (no = 0; no < table_nr; no++) {
unsigned char *src_p = acpi_initrd_files[no].data;
phys_addr_t size = acpi_initrd_files[no].size;
phys_addr_t dest_addr = acpi_tables_addr + total_offset;
phys_addr_t slop, clen;
char *dest_p;
total_offset += size;
while (size) {
slop = dest_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
clen = size;
if (clen > MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop)
clen = MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop;
dest_p = early_ioremap(dest_addr & PAGE_MASK,
clen + slop);
memcpy(dest_p + slop, src_p, clen);
early_iounmap(dest_p, clen + slop);
src_p += clen;
dest_addr += clen;
size -= clen;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel, as used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2 and Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2 and when booted with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, allows local users to bypass intended Secure Boot restrictions and execute untrusted code by appending ACPI tables to the initrd.
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
int i, j;
p = buff1;
i = ctm->length;
str = (char *)ctm->data;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 10);
p += 10;
str += 10;
} else {
if (i < 13)
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 12);
p += 12;
str += 12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
*(p++) = '0';
*(p++) = '0';
} else {
*(p++) = *(str++);
*(p++) = *(str++);
/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
if (*str == '.') {
str++;
while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
str++;
}
}
*(p++) = 'Z';
*(p++) = '\0';
if (*str == 'Z')
offset = 0;
else {
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
if (*str == '-')
offset = -offset;
}
atm.type = ctm->type;
atm.flags = 0;
atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
if (i < 50)
i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
if (j < 50)
j += 100;
if (i < j)
return -1;
if (i > j)
return 1;
}
i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
return -1;
else
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The X509_cmp_time function in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zg, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0s, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted length field in ASN1_TIME data, as demonstrated by an attack against a server that supports client authentication with a custom verification callback.
Commit Message: Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_image_compose(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *dst, Jbig2Image *src, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
int i, j;
int w, h;
int leftbyte, rightbyte;
int shift;
uint8_t *s, *ss;
uint8_t *d, *dd;
uint8_t mask, rightmask;
if (op != JBIG2_COMPOSE_OR) {
/* hand off the the general routine */
return jbig2_image_compose_unopt(ctx, dst, src, x, y, op);
}
/* clip */
w = src->width;
h = src->height;
ss = src->data;
if (x < 0) {
w += x;
x = 0;
}
if (y < 0) {
h += y;
y = 0;
}
w = (x + w < dst->width) ? w : dst->width - x;
h = (y + h < dst->height) ? h : dst->height - y;
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "compositing %dx%d at (%d, %d) after clipping\n", w, h, x, y);
#endif
/* check for zero clipping region */
if ((w <= 0) || (h <= 0)) {
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "zero clipping region");
#endif
return 0;
}
#if 0
/* special case complete/strip replacement */
/* disabled because it's only safe to do when the destination
buffer is all-blank. */
if ((x == 0) && (w == src->width)) {
memcpy(dst->data + y * dst->stride, src->data, h * src->stride);
return 0;
}
#endif
leftbyte = x >> 3;
rightbyte = (x + w - 1) >> 3;
shift = x & 7;
/* general OR case */
s = ss;
d = dd = dst->data + y * dst->stride + leftbyte;
if (d < dst->data || leftbyte > dst->stride || h * dst->stride < 0 || d - leftbyte + h * dst->stride > dst->data + dst->height * dst->stride) {
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "preventing heap overflow in jbig2_image_compose");
}
if (leftbyte == rightbyte) {
mask = 0x100 - (0x100 >> w);
for (j = 0; j < h; j++) {
*d |= (*s & mask) >> shift;
d += dst->stride;
s += src->stride;
}
} else if (shift == 0) {
rightmask = (w & 7) ? 0x100 - (1 << (8 - (w & 7))) : 0xFF;
for (j = 0; j < h; j++) {
for (i = leftbyte; i < rightbyte; i++)
*d++ |= *s++;
*d |= *s & rightmask;
d = (dd += dst->stride);
s = (ss += src->stride);
}
} else {
bool overlap = (((w + 7) >> 3) < ((x + w + 7) >> 3) - (x >> 3));
mask = 0x100 - (1 << shift);
if (overlap)
rightmask = (0x100 - (0x100 >> ((x + w) & 7))) >> (8 - shift);
else
rightmask = 0x100 - (0x100 >> (w & 7));
for (j = 0; j < h; j++) {
*d++ |= (*s & mask) >> shift;
for (i = leftbyte; i < rightbyte - 1; i++) {
*d |= ((*s++ & ~mask) << (8 - shift));
*d++ |= ((*s & mask) >> shift);
}
if (overlap)
*d |= (*s & rightmask) << (8 - shift);
else
*d |= ((s[0] & ~mask) << (8 - shift)) | ((s[1] & rightmask) >> shift);
d = (dd += dst->stride);
s = (ss += src->stride);
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InternalPageInfoBubbleView::InternalPageInfoBubbleView(
views::View* anchor_view,
const gfx::Rect& anchor_rect,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
const GURL& url)
: BubbleDialogDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT) {
g_shown_bubble_type = PageInfoBubbleView::BUBBLE_INTERNAL_PAGE;
g_page_info_bubble = this;
set_parent_window(parent_window);
if (!anchor_view)
SetAnchorRect(anchor_rect);
int text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_INTERNAL_PAGE;
int icon = IDR_PRODUCT_LOGO_16;
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_EXTENSION_PAGE;
icon = IDR_PLUGINS_FAVICON;
} else if (url.SchemeIs(content::kViewSourceScheme)) {
text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_VIEW_SOURCE_PAGE;
icon = IDR_PRODUCT_LOGO_16;
} else if (!url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(
GetLayoutConstant(LOCATION_BAR_BUBBLE_ANCHOR_VERTICAL_INSET), 0));
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
gfx::Insets(kSpacing), kSpacing));
set_margins(gfx::Insets());
if (ChromeLayoutProvider::Get()->ShouldShowWindowIcon()) {
views::ImageView* icon_view = new NonAccessibleImageView();
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
icon_view->SetImage(rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(icon));
AddChildView(icon_view);
}
views::Label* label = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(text));
label->SetMultiLine(true);
label->SetAllowCharacterBreak(true);
label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(label);
views::BubbleDialogDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 61.0.3163.81 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624} | Medium | 172,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mark_desktop_file_trusted (CommonJob *common,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GFile *file,
gboolean interactive)
{
char *contents, *new_contents;
gsize length, new_length;
GError *error;
guint32 current_perms, new_perms;
int response;
GFileInfo *info;
retry:
error = NULL;
if (!g_file_load_contents (file,
cancellable,
&contents, &length,
NULL, &error))
{
if (interactive)
{
response = run_error (common,
g_strdup (_("Unable to mark launcher trusted (executable)")),
error->message,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, RETRY,
NULL);
}
else
{
response = 0;
}
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (common);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
if (!g_str_has_prefix (contents, "#!"))
{
new_length = length + strlen (TRUSTED_SHEBANG);
new_contents = g_malloc (new_length);
strcpy (new_contents, TRUSTED_SHEBANG);
memcpy (new_contents + strlen (TRUSTED_SHEBANG),
contents, length);
if (!g_file_replace_contents (file,
new_contents,
new_length,
NULL,
FALSE, 0,
NULL, cancellable, &error))
{
g_free (contents);
g_free (new_contents);
if (interactive)
{
response = run_error (common,
g_strdup (_("Unable to mark launcher trusted (executable)")),
error->message,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, RETRY,
NULL);
}
else
{
response = 0;
}
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (common);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
g_free (new_contents);
}
g_free (contents);
info = g_file_query_info (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
&error);
if (info == NULL)
{
if (interactive)
{
response = run_error (common,
g_strdup (_("Unable to mark launcher trusted (executable)")),
error->message,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, RETRY,
NULL);
}
else
{
response = 0;
}
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (common);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
if (g_file_info_has_attribute (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE))
{
current_perms = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint32 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE);
new_perms = current_perms | S_IXGRP | S_IXUSR | S_IXOTH;
if ((current_perms != new_perms) &&
!g_file_set_attribute_uint32 (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
new_perms, G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable, &error))
{
g_object_unref (info);
if (interactive)
{
response = run_error (common,
g_strdup (_("Unable to mark launcher trusted (executable)")),
error->message,
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, RETRY,
NULL);
}
else
{
response = 0;
}
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (common);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
}
g_object_unref (info);
out:
;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991 | Medium | 167,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long BlockGroup::Parse()
{
const long status = m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
if (status)
return status;
m_block.SetKey((m_prev > 0) && (m_next <= 0));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Release() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Release";
pincode_callback_.Reset();
passkey_callback_.Reset();
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
UnregisterAgent();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547} | Medium | 173,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Add bounds check before signature length read | Medium | 169,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void decode_residue(vorb *f, float *residue_buffers[], int ch, int n, int rn, uint8 *do_not_decode)
{
int i,j,pass;
Residue *r = f->residue_config + rn;
int rtype = f->residue_types[rn];
int c = r->classbook;
int classwords = f->codebooks[c].dimensions;
int n_read = r->end - r->begin;
int part_read = n_read / r->part_size;
int temp_alloc_point = temp_alloc_save(f);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
uint8 ***part_classdata = (uint8 ***) temp_block_array(f,f->channels, part_read * sizeof(**part_classdata));
#else
int **classifications = (int **) temp_block_array(f,f->channels, part_read * sizeof(**classifications));
#endif
CHECK(f);
for (i=0; i < ch; ++i)
if (!do_not_decode[i])
memset(residue_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(float) * n);
if (rtype == 2 && ch != 1) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j)
if (!do_not_decode[j])
break;
if (j == ch)
goto done;
for (pass=0; pass < 8; ++pass) {
int pcount = 0, class_set = 0;
if (ch == 2) {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = (z & 1), p_inter = z>>1;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
#else
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
#endif
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = z & 1;
p_inter = z >> 1;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
} else if (ch == 1) {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = 0, p_inter = z;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = 0;
p_inter = z;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
} else {
while (pcount < part_read) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
int c_inter = z % ch, p_inter = z/ch;
if (pass == 0) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int q;
DECODE(q,f,c);
if (q == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[0][class_set] = r->classdata[q];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[0][i+pcount] = q % r->classifications;
q /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
int z = r->begin + pcount*r->part_size;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[0][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[0][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(f, book, residue_buffers, ch, &c_inter, &p_inter, n, r->part_size))
goto done;
} else {
z += r->part_size;
c_inter = z % ch;
p_inter = z / ch;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
}
}
goto done;
}
CHECK(f);
for (pass=0; pass < 8; ++pass) {
int pcount = 0, class_set=0;
while (pcount < part_read) {
if (pass == 0) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j) {
if (!do_not_decode[j]) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+r->classbook;
int temp;
DECODE(temp,f,c);
if (temp == EOP) goto done;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
part_classdata[j][class_set] = r->classdata[temp];
#else
for (i=classwords-1; i >= 0; --i) {
classifications[j][i+pcount] = temp % r->classifications;
temp /= r->classifications;
}
#endif
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < classwords && pcount < part_read; ++i, ++pcount) {
for (j=0; j < ch; ++j) {
if (!do_not_decode[j]) {
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
int c = part_classdata[j][class_set][i];
#else
int c = classifications[j][pcount];
#endif
int b = r->residue_books[c][pass];
if (b >= 0) {
float *target = residue_buffers[j];
int offset = r->begin + pcount * r->part_size;
int n = r->part_size;
Codebook *book = f->codebooks + b;
if (!residue_decode(f, book, target, offset, n, rtype))
goto done;
}
}
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
++class_set;
#endif
}
}
done:
CHECK(f);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
temp_free(f,part_classdata);
#else
temp_free(f,classifications);
#endif
temp_alloc_restore(f,temp_alloc_point);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sean Barrett stb_vorbis version 1.12 and earlier contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in All vorbis decoding paths. that can result in memory corruption, denial of service, comprised execution of host program. This attack appear to be exploitable via Victim must open a specially crafted Ogg Vorbis file. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.13.
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files | Medium | 168,944 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted | Low | 169,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FlushImeConfig() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
bool active_input_methods_are_changed = false;
InputMethodConfigRequests::iterator iter =
pending_config_requests_.begin();
while (iter != pending_config_requests_.end()) {
const std::string& section = iter->first.first;
const std::string& config_name = iter->first.second;
ImeConfigValue& value = iter->second;
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
!tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string>::iterator engine_iter = std::find(
value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_);
if (engine_iter != value.string_list_value.end()) {
std::rotate(value.string_list_value.begin(),
engine_iter, // this becomes the new first element
value.string_list_value.end());
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << tentative_current_input_method_id_
<< " is not in preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
tentative_current_input_method_id_.erase();
}
if (chromeos::SetImeConfig(input_method_status_connection_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
value)) {
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName) {
active_input_methods_are_changed = true;
VLOG(1) << "Updated preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
pending_config_requests_.erase(iter++);
} else {
break;
}
}
if (active_input_methods_are_changed) {
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
ActiveInputMethodsChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GDataEntry* GDataFile::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_hosted_document() || doc->is_file());
GDataFile* file = new GDataFile(parent, directory_service);
file->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
if (doc->is_file()) {
file->file_info_.size = doc->file_size();
file->file_md5_ = doc->file_md5();
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_EDIT_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
file->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
} else {
file->document_extension_ = doc->GetHostedDocumentExtension();
file->file_info_.size = 0;
}
file->kind_ = doc->kind();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
if (edit_link)
file->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
file->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
file->content_mime_type_ = doc->content_mime_type();
file->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
file->is_hosted_document_ = doc->is_hosted_document();
file->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
file->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
file->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
file->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
file->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
file->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
const Link* thumbnail_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::THUMBNAIL);
if (thumbnail_link)
file->thumbnail_url_ = thumbnail_link->href();
const Link* alternate_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::ALTERNATE);
if (alternate_link)
file->alternate_url_ = alternate_link->href();
return file;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
if (!is_hidden_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown");
is_hidden_ = false;
if (new_content_rendering_timeout_ &&
new_content_rendering_timeout_->IsRunning()) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Stop();
ClearDisplayedGraphics();
}
SendScreenRects();
RestartHangMonitorTimeoutIfNecessary();
bool needs_repainting = true;
needs_repainting_on_restore_ = false;
Send(new ViewMsg_WasShown(routing_id_, needs_repainting, latency_info));
process_->WidgetRestored();
bool is_visible = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<bool>(&is_visible));
WasResized();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Lack of clearing the previous site before loading alerts from a new one in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518} | Medium | 173,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: z_check_file_permissions(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname, const int len, const char *permission)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = get_minst_from_memory(mem)->i_ctx_p;
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
const char *permitgroup = permission[0] == 'r' ? "PermitFileReading" : "PermitFileWriting";
int code = gs_parse_file_name(&pname, fname, len, imemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (pname.iodev && i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions && strcmp(pname.iodev->dname, "%pipe%") == 0)
return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
code = check_file_permissions(i_ctx_p, fname, len, permitgroup);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: psi/zfile.c in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.21rc1 permits the status command even if -dSAFER is used, which might allow remote attackers to determine the existence and size of arbitrary files, a similar issue to CVE-2016-7977.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void btif_config_flush(void) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
alarm_cancel(alarm_timer);
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: btif_config.c in Bluetooth in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and persistent daemon crash) by triggering a large number of configuration entries, and consequently exceeding the maximum size of a configuration file, aka internal bug 26071376.
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
| Low | 173,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gplotCreate(const char *rootname,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *title,
const char *xlabel,
const char *ylabel)
{
char *newroot;
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 badchar;
GPLOT *gplot;
PROCNAME("gplotCreate");
if (!rootname)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("rootname not defined", procName, NULL);
if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS &&
outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("outformat invalid", procName, NULL);
stringCheckForChars(rootname, "`;&|><\"?*", &badchar);
if (badchar) /* danger of command injection */
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("invalid rootname", procName, NULL);
if ((gplot = (GPLOT *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(GPLOT))) == NULL)
return (GPLOT *)ERROR_PTR("gplot not made", procName, NULL);
gplot->cmddata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->datanames = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotdata = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plottitles = sarrayCreate(0);
gplot->plotstyles = numaCreate(0);
/* Save title, labels, rootname, outformat, cmdname, outname */
newroot = genPathname(rootname, NULL);
gplot->rootname = newroot;
gplot->outformat = outformat;
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.cmd", rootname);
gplot->cmdname = stringNew(buf);
if (outformat == GPLOT_PNG)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.png", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_PS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.ps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_EPS)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.eps", newroot);
else if (outformat == GPLOT_LATEX)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.tex", newroot);
gplot->outname = stringNew(buf);
if (title) gplot->title = stringNew(title);
if (xlabel) gplot->xlabel = stringNew(xlabel);
if (ylabel) gplot->ylabel = stringNew(ylabel);
return gplot;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). | High | 169,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zlib_advance(struct zlib *zlib, png_uint_32 nbytes)
/* Read nbytes compressed bytes; the stream will be initialized if required.
* Bytes are always being reread and errors are fatal. The return code is as
* follows:
*
* -1: saw the "too far back" error
* 0: ok, keep going
* 1: saw Z_STREAM_END (zlib->extra_bytes indicates too much data)
* 2: a zlib error that cannot be corrected (error message already
* output if required.)
*/
# define ZLIB_TOO_FAR_BACK (-1)
# define ZLIB_OK 0
# define ZLIB_STREAM_END 1
# define ZLIB_FATAL 2
{
int state = zlib->state;
int endrc = ZLIB_OK;
png_uint_32 in_bytes = 0;
struct file *file = zlib->file;
assert(state >= 0);
while (in_bytes < nbytes && endrc == ZLIB_OK)
{
png_uint_32 out_bytes;
int flush;
png_byte bIn = reread_byte(file);
png_byte bOut;
switch (state)
{
case 0: /* first header byte */
{
int file_bits = 8+(bIn >> 4);
int new_bits = zlib->window_bits;
zlib->file_bits = file_bits;
/* Check against the existing value - it may not need to be
* changed.
*/
if (new_bits == 0) /* no change */
zlib->window_bits = file_bits;
else if (new_bits != file_bits) /* rewrite required */
bIn = (png_byte)((bIn & 0xf) + ((new_bits-8) << 4));
}
zlib->header[0] = bIn;
zlib->state = state = 1;
break;
case 1: /* second header byte */
{
int b2 = bIn & 0xe0; /* top 3 bits */
/* The checksum calculation, on the first 11 bits: */
b2 += 0x1f - ((zlib->header[0] << 8) + b2) % 0x1f;
/* Update the checksum byte if required: */
if (bIn != b2)
{
/* If the first byte wasn't changed this indicates an error in
* the checksum calculation; signal this by setting file_bits
* (not window_bits) to 0.
*/
if (zlib->file_bits == zlib->window_bits)
zlib->cksum = 1;
bIn = (png_byte)b2;
}
}
zlib->header[1] = bIn;
zlib->state = state = 2;
break;
default: /* After the header bytes */
break;
}
/* For some streams, perhaps only those compressed with 'superfast
* compression' (which results in a lot of copying) Z_BUF_ERROR can happen
* immediately after all output has been flushed on the next input byte.
* This is handled below when Z_BUF_ERROR is detected by adding an output
* byte.
*/
zlib->z.next_in = &bIn;
zlib->z.avail_in = 1;
zlib->z.next_out = &bOut;
zlib->z.avail_out = 0; /* Initially */
/* Initially use Z_NO_FLUSH in an attempt to persuade zlib to look at this
* byte without confusing what is going on with output.
*/
flush = Z_NO_FLUSH;
out_bytes = 0;
/* NOTE: expression 3 is only evaluted on 'continue', because of the
* 'break' at the end of this loop below.
*/
for (;endrc == ZLIB_OK;
flush = Z_SYNC_FLUSH,
zlib->z.next_out = &bOut,
zlib->z.avail_out = 1,
++out_bytes)
{
zlib->rc = inflate(&zlib->z, flush);
out_bytes -= zlib->z.avail_out;
switch (zlib->rc)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
if (zlib->z.avail_out == 0)
continue; /* Try another output byte. */
if (zlib->z.avail_in == 0)
break; /* Try another input byte */
/* Both avail_out and avail_in are 1 yet zlib returned a code
* indicating no progress was possible. This is unexpected.
*/
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL; /* stop processing */
break;
case Z_OK:
/* Zlib is supposed to have made progress: */
assert(zlib->z.avail_out == 0 || zlib->z.avail_in == 0);
continue;
case Z_STREAM_END:
/* This is the successful end. */
zlib->state = 3; /* end of stream */
endrc = ZLIB_STREAM_END;
break;
case Z_NEED_DICT:
zlib_message(zlib, 0/*stream error*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL;
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
/* The too far back error can be corrected, others cannot: */
if (zlib->z.msg != NULL &&
strcmp(zlib->z.msg, "invalid distance too far back") == 0)
{
endrc = ZLIB_TOO_FAR_BACK;
break;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
default:
zlib_message(zlib, 0/*stream error*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL;
break;
} /* switch (inflate rc) */
/* Control gets here when further output is not possible; endrc may
* still be ZLIB_OK if more input is required.
*/
break;
} /* for (output bytes) */
/* Keep a running count of output byte produced: */
zlib->uncompressed_digits = uarb_add32(zlib->uncompressed_bytes,
zlib->uncompressed_digits, out_bytes);
/* Keep going, the loop will terminate when endrc is no longer set to
* ZLIB_OK or all the input bytes have been consumed; meanwhile keep
* adding input bytes.
*/
assert(zlib->z.avail_in == 0 || endrc != ZLIB_OK);
in_bytes += 1 - zlib->z.avail_in;
} /* while (input bytes) */
assert(in_bytes == nbytes || endrc != ZLIB_OK);
/* Update the running total of input bytes consumed */
zlib->compressed_digits = uarb_add32(zlib->compressed_bytes,
zlib->compressed_digits, in_bytes - zlib->z.avail_in);
/* At the end of the stream update the chunk with the accumulated
* information if it is an improvement:
*/
if (endrc == ZLIB_STREAM_END && zlib->window_bits < zlib->ok_bits)
{
struct chunk *chunk = zlib->chunk;
chunk->uncompressed_digits = uarb_copy(chunk->uncompressed_bytes,
zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits);
chunk->compressed_digits = uarb_copy(chunk->compressed_bytes,
zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits);
chunk->rewrite_buffer[0] = zlib->header[0];
chunk->rewrite_buffer[1] = zlib->header[1];
if (zlib->window_bits != zlib->file_bits || zlib->cksum)
{
/* A rewrite is required */
chunk->rewrite_offset = zlib->rewrite_offset;
chunk->rewrite_length = 2;
}
else
{
chunk->rewrite_offset = 0;
chunk->rewrite_length = 0;
}
if (in_bytes < nbytes)
chunk_message(chunk, "extra compressed data");
zlib->extra_bytes = nbytes - in_bytes;
zlib->ok_bits = zlib->window_bits;
}
return endrc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void SkipRGBMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int pixel_size)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i=1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) w * h * pixel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ImageLoader::ImageLoader(Element* element)
: m_element(element),
m_derefElementTimer(this, &ImageLoader::timerFired),
m_hasPendingLoadEvent(false),
m_hasPendingErrorEvent(false),
m_imageComplete(true),
m_loadingImageDocument(false),
m_elementIsProtected(false),
m_suppressErrorEvents(false) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "new ImageLoader " << this;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927} | High | 171,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
/* ANSI C-90 limits strings to 509 characters, so use a string array: */
size_t i;
static const char *usage_string[] = {
" Tests, optimizes and optionally fixes the zlib header in PNG files.",
" Optionally, when fixing, strips ancilliary chunks from the file.",
0,
"OPTIONS",
" OPERATION",
" By default files are just checked for readability with a summary of the",
" of zlib issues founds for each compressed chunk and the IDAT stream in",
" the file.",
" --optimize (-o):",
" Find the smallest deflate window size for the compressed data.",
" --strip=[none|crc|unsafe|unused|transform|color|all]:",
" none (default): Retain all chunks.",
" crc: Remove chunks with a bad CRC.",
" unsafe: Remove chunks that may be unsafe to retain if the image data",
" is modified. This is set automatically if --max is given but",
" may be cancelled by a later --strip=none.",
" unused: Remove chunks not used by libpng when decoding an image.",
" This retains any chunks that might be used by libpng image",
" transformations.",
" transform: unused+bKGD.",
" color: transform+iCCP and cHRM.",
" all: color+gAMA and sRGB.",
" Only ancillary chunks are ever removed. In addition the tRNS and sBIT",
" chunks are never removed as they affect exact interpretation of the",
" image pixel values. The following known chunks are treated specially",
" by the above options:",
" gAMA, sRGB [all]: These specify the gamma encoding used for the pixel",
" values.",
" cHRM, iCCP [color]: These specify how colors are encoded. iCCP also",
" specifies the exact encoding of a pixel value however in practice",
" most programs will ignore it.",
" bKGD [transform]: This is used by libpng transforms."
" --max=<number>:",
" Use IDAT chunks sized <number>. If no number is given the the IDAT",
" chunks will be the maximum size permitted; 2^31-1 bytes. If the option",
" is omitted the original chunk sizes will not be changed. When the",
" option is given --strip=unsafe is set automatically, this may be",
" cancelled if you know that all unknown unsafe-to-copy chunks really are",
" safe to copy across an IDAT size change. This is true of all chunks",
" that have ever been formally proposed as PNG extensions.",
" MESSAGES",
" By default the program only outputs summaries for each file.",
" --quiet (-q):",
" Do not output the summaries except for files which cannot be read. With",
" two --quiets these are not output either.",
" --errors (-e):",
" Output errors from libpng and the program (except too-far-back).",
" --warnings (-w):",
" Output warnings from libpng.",
" OUTPUT",
" By default nothing is written.",
" --out=<file>:",
" Write the optimized/corrected version of the next PNG to <file>. This",
" overrides the following two options",
" --suffix=<suffix>:",
" Set --out=<name><suffix> for all following files unless overridden on",
" a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" --prefix=<prefix>:",
" Set --out=<prefix><name> for all the following files unless overridden",
" on a per-file basis by explicit --out.",
" These two options can be used together to produce a suffix and prefix.",
" INTERNAL OPTIONS",
#if 0 /*NYI*/
#ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
" --test:",
" Test the PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW option. Setting this disables",
" output as this would produce a broken file.",
#endif
#endif
0,
"EXIT CODES",
" *** SUBJECT TO CHANGE ***",
" The program exit code is value in the range 0..127 holding a bit mask of",
" the following codes. Notice that the results for each file are combined",
" together - check one file at a time to get a meaningful error code!",
" 0x01: The zlib too-far-back error existed in at least one chunk.",
" 0x02: At least once chunk had a CRC error.",
" 0x04: A chunk length was incorrect.",
" 0x08: The file was truncated.",
" Errors less than 16 are potentially recoverable, for a single file if the",
" exit code is less than 16 the file could be read (with corrections if a",
" non-zero code is returned).",
" 0x10: The file could not be read, even with corrections.",
" 0x20: The output file could not be written.",
" 0x40: An unexpected, potentially internal, error occured.",
" If the command line arguments are incorrect the program exits with exit",
" 255. Some older operating systems only support 7-bit exit codes, on those",
" systems it is suggested that this program is first tested by supplying",
" invalid arguments.",
0,
"DESCRIPTION",
" " PROGRAM_NAME ":",
" checks each PNG file on the command line for errors. By default errors are",
" not output and the program just returns an exit code and prints a summary.",
" With the --quiet (-q) option the summaries are suppressed too and the",
" program only outputs unexpected errors (internal errors and file open",
" errors).",
" Various known problems in PNG files are fixed while the file is being read",
" The exit code says what problems were fixed. In particular the zlib error:",
0,
" \"invalid distance too far back\"",
0,
" caused by an incorrect optimization of a zlib stream is fixed in any",
" compressed chunk in which it is encountered. An integrity problem of the",
" PNG stream caused by a bug in libpng which wrote an incorrect chunk length",
" is also fixed. Chunk CRC errors are automatically fixed up.",
0,
" Setting one of the \"OUTPUT\" options causes the possibly modified file to",
" be written to a new file.",
0,
" Notice that some PNG files with the zlib optimization problem can still be",
" read by libpng under some circumstances. This program will still detect",
" and, if requested, correct the error.",
0,
" The program will reliably process all files on the command line unless",
" either an invalid argument causes the usage message (this message) to be",
" produced or the program crashes.",
0,
" The summary lines describe issues encountered with the zlib compressed",
" stream of a chunk. They have the following format, which is SUBJECT TO",
" CHANGE in the future:",
0,
" chunk reason comp-level p1 p2 p3 p4 file",
0,
" p1 through p4 vary according to the 'reason'. There are always 8 space",
" separated fields. Reasons specific formats are:",
0,
" chunk ERR status code read-errno write-errno message file",
" chunk SKP comp-level file-bits zlib-rc compressed message file",
" chunk ??? comp-level file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompress file",
0,
" The various fields are",
0,
"$1 chunk: The chunk type of a chunk in the file or 'HEAD' if a problem",
" is reported by libpng at the start of the IDAT stream.",
"$2 reason: One of:",
" CHK: A zlib header checksum was detected and fixed.",
" TFB: The zlib too far back error was detected and fixed.",
" OK : No errors were detected in the zlib stream and optimization",
" was not requested, or was not possible.",
" OPT: The zlib stream window bits value could be improved (and was).",
" SKP: The chunk was skipped because of a zlib issue (zlib-rc) with",
" explanation 'message'",
" ERR: The read of the file was aborted. The parameters explain why.",
"$3 status: For 'ERR' the accumulate status code from 'EXIT CODES' above.",
" This is printed as a 2 digit hexadecimal value",
" comp-level: The recorded compression level (FLEVEL) of a zlib stream",
" expressed as a string {supfast,stdfast,default,maximum}",
"$4 code: The file exit code; where stop was called, as a fairly terse",
" string {warning,libpng,zlib,invalid,read,write,unexpected}.",
" file-bits: The zlib window bits recorded in the file.",
"$5 read-errno: A system errno value from a read translated by strerror(3).",
" zlib-rc: A zlib return code as a string (see zlib.h).",
" ok-bits: The smallest zlib window bits value that works.",
"$6 write-errno:A system errno value from a write translated by strerror(3).",
" compressed: The count of compressed bytes in the zlib stream, when the",
" reason is 'SKP'; this is a count of the bytes read from the",
" stream when the fatal error was encountered.",
"$7 message: An error message (spaces replaced by _, as in all parameters),",
" uncompress: The count of bytes from uncompressing the zlib stream; this",
" may not be the same as the number of bytes in the image.",
"$8 file: The name of the file (this may contain spaces).",
};
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s {[options] png-file}\n", prog);
for (i=0; i < (sizeof usage_string)/(sizeof usage_string[0]); ++i)
{
if (usage_string[i] != 0)
fputs(usage_string[i], stderr);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
exit(255);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) do_siocgstamp and (2) do_siocgstampns functions in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.4 use an incorrect argument order, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(ExecutionContext* context,
MediaStream* stream,
const MediaRecorderOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state)
: PausableObject(context),
stream_(stream),
mime_type_(options->hasMimeType() ? options->mimeType()
: kDefaultMimeType),
stopped_(true),
audio_bits_per_second_(0),
video_bits_per_second_(0),
state_(State::kInactive),
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_(AsyncMethodRunner<MediaRecorder>::Create(
this,
&MediaRecorder::DispatchScheduledEvent,
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation))) {
DCHECK(stream_->getTracks().size());
recorder_handler_ = Platform::Current()->CreateMediaRecorderHandler(
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMediaRealTime));
DCHECK(recorder_handler_);
if (!recorder_handler_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No MediaRecorder handler can be created.");
return;
}
AllocateVideoAndAudioBitrates(exception_state, context, options, stream,
&audio_bits_per_second_,
&video_bits_per_second_);
const ContentType content_type(mime_type_);
if (!recorder_handler_->Initialize(
this, stream->Descriptor(), content_type.GetType(),
content_type.Parameter("codecs"), audio_bits_per_second_,
video_bits_per_second_)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to initialize native MediaRecorder the type provided (" +
mime_type_ + ") is not supported.");
return;
}
if (options->mimeType().IsEmpty()) {
const String actual_mime_type = recorder_handler_->ActualMimeType();
if (!actual_mime_type.IsEmpty())
mime_type_ = actual_mime_type;
}
stopped_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle in MediaRecorder in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242} | Medium | 172,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t) TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point",
exception);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV",exception);
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK",exception);
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR",exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown",exception);
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric",
exception));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb",exception);
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb",exception);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping,exception);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if (IsStringFalse(option) == MagickFalse) /* enabled by default */
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->resolution.x=x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->resolution.x-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->resolution.y-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MagickPathExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MagickPathExtent,
"%dx%d",horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor,exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified",exception);
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated",
exception);
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated",
exception);
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
value=(unsigned short) image->scene;
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%u",
(unsigned int) rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value,exception);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*pow(2,ceil(log(
bits_per_sample)/log(2))));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) *(p+3)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(rows,sizeof(*tile_pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,rows*
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q,
*magick_restrict tile;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+
x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(image->rows,sizeof(*pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns-1);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p--;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The AcquireQuantumPixels function in MagickCore/quantum.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3-1 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image file, which triggers a memory allocation failure.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/268 | Medium | 168,767 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (user_alloc && (mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = &kvm->memslots->memslots[mem->slot];
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
slots->memslots[mem->slot].flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
slots->memslots[mem->slot] = new;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not check whether kernel addresses are specified during allocation of memory slots for use in a guest's physical address space, which allows local users to gain privileges or obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application, related to arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c.
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ContainerNode::removeChildren()
{
if (!m_firstChild)
return;
RefPtr<ContainerNode> protect(this);
if (FullscreenElementStack* fullscreen = FullscreenElementStack::fromIfExists(&document()))
fullscreen->removeFullScreenElementOfSubtree(this, true);
willRemoveChildren(protect.get());
{
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(this);
document().removeFocusedElementOfSubtree(this, true);
}
NodeVector removedChildren;
{
RenderWidget::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
{
NoEventDispatchAssertion assertNoEventDispatch;
removedChildren.reserveInitialCapacity(childNodeCount());
while (m_firstChild) {
removedChildren.append(m_firstChild);
removeBetween(0, m_firstChild->nextSibling(), m_firstChild);
}
}
childrenChanged(false, 0, 0, -static_cast<int>(removedChildren.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < removedChildren.size(); ++i)
ChildNodeRemovalNotifier(this).notify(removedChildren[i].get());
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of DOM range objects in circumstances that require child node removal after a (1) mutation or (2) blur event.
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int r;
#endif
if (session_id + len > limit) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
goto err;
case 0: /* No ticket found */
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
try_session_cache = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
#endif
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL &&
!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = len;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret == NULL)
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
}
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
/*
* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
* to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
* callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
* reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
* thread-safe).
*/
if (copy)
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/*
* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
* well if and only if we are supposed to.
*/
if (!
(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
/*
* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
* very strange
*/
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/*
* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
* use it in this context.
*/
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
/*
* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
* which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
* should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
* case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
* cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
* noticing).
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
unsigned char buf[5], *p;
unsigned long l;
p = buf;
l = ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l, p);
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
goto err;
}
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = ret;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (!try_session_cache) {
/*
* The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
* the new session
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
#endif
}
if (fatal)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void die(const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vprintf(fmt, ap);
if(fmt[strlen(fmt)-1] != '\n')
printf("\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GetNetworkList(NetworkInterfaceList* networks, int policy) {
if (networks == NULL)
return false;
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
ifaddrs* interfaces;
if (getifaddrs(&interfaces) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "getifaddrs";
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<internal::IPAttributesGetter> ip_attributes_getter;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
ip_attributes_getter = base::MakeUnique<internal::IPAttributesGetterMac>();
#endif
bool result = internal::IfaddrsToNetworkInterfaceList(
policy, interfaces, ip_attributes_getter.get(), networks);
freeifaddrs(interfaces);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in ChromeVox in Google Chrome OS prior to 62.0.3202.74 allowed a remote attacker in a privileged network position to observe or tamper with certain cleartext HTTP requests by leveraging that position.
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123} | Medium | 173,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: Division-by-zero vulnerabilities in the functions opj_pi_next_cprl, opj_pi_next_pcrl, and opj_pi_next_rpcl in pi.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via crafted j2k files.
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49 | Medium | 168,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The check_alu_op function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect sign extension.
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (!channel_->renderer_process())
return;
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_process(),
&transfer_buffer);
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Edition::~Edition()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bmpr_read_rle(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
if(!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 && rctx->bitcount==8) &&
!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4 && rctx->bitcount==4))
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression type incompatible with image type");
}
if(rctx->topdown) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression not allowed with top-down images");
}
rctx->img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGBA;
rctx->img->bit_depth = 8;
rctx->img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(rctx->width,32);
rctx->img->pixels = (iw_byte*)iw_malloc_large(rctx->ctx,rctx->img->bpr,rctx->img->height);
if(!rctx->img->pixels) goto done;
if(!bmpr_read_rle_internal(rctx)) goto done;
if(!bmpr_has_transparency(rctx->img)) {
bmpr_strip_alpha(rctx->img);
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: imagew-main.c:960:12 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer underflow) via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c.
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21 | Medium | 168,117 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: read_gif(Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler handler)
{
Gif_Stream *gfs;
Gif_Image *gfi;
Gif_Context gfc;
int unknown_block_type = 0;
if (gifgetc(grr) != 'G' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'I' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'F')
return 0;
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
gfs = Gif_NewStream();
gfi = Gif_NewImage();
gfc.stream = gfs;
gfc.prefix = Gif_NewArray(Gif_Code, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.suffix = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.length = Gif_NewArray(uint16_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.handler = handler;
gfc.gfi = gfi;
gfc.errors[0] = gfc.errors[1] = 0;
if (!gfs || !gfi || !gfc.prefix || !gfc.suffix || !gfc.length)
goto done;
gfs->landmark = landmark;
GIF_DEBUG(("\nGIF "));
if (!read_logical_screen_descriptor(gfs, grr))
goto done;
GIF_DEBUG(("logscrdesc "));
while (!gifeof(grr)) {
uint8_t block = gifgetbyte(grr);
switch (block) {
case ',': /* image block */
GIF_DEBUG(("imageread %d ", gfs->nimages));
gfi->identifier = last_name;
last_name = 0;
if (!Gif_AddImage(gfs, gfi))
goto done;
else if (!read_image(grr, &gfc, gfi, read_flags)) {
Gif_RemoveImage(gfs, gfs->nimages - 1);
gfi = 0;
goto done;
}
gfc.gfi = gfi = Gif_NewImage();
if (!gfi)
goto done;
break;
case ';': /* terminator */
GIF_DEBUG(("term\n"));
goto done;
case '!': /* extension */
block = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("ext(0x%02X) ", block));
switch (block) {
case 0xF9:
read_graphic_control_extension(&gfc, gfi, grr);
break;
case 0xCE:
last_name = suck_data(last_name, 0, grr);
break;
case 0xFE:
if (!read_comment_extension(gfi, grr)) goto done;
break;
case 0xFF:
read_application_extension(&gfc, grr);
break;
default:
read_unknown_extension(&gfc, grr, block, 0, 0);
break;
}
break;
default:
if (!unknown_block_type) {
char buf[256];
sprintf(buf, "unknown block type %d at file offset %u", block, grr->pos - 1);
gif_read_error(&gfc, 1, buf);
unknown_block_type = 1;
}
break;
}
}
done:
/* Move comments and extensions after last image into stream. */
if (gfs && gfi) {
Gif_Extension* gfex;
gfs->end_comment = gfi->comment;
gfi->comment = 0;
gfs->end_extension_list = gfi->extension_list;
gfi->extension_list = 0;
for (gfex = gfs->end_extension_list; gfex; gfex = gfex->next)
gfex->image = NULL;
}
Gif_DeleteImage(gfi);
Gif_DeleteArray(last_name);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.prefix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.suffix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.length);
gfc.gfi = 0;
if (gfs)
gfs->errors = gfc.errors[1];
if (gfs && gfc.errors[1] == 0
&& !(read_flags & GIF_READ_TRAILING_GARBAGE_OK)
&& !grr->eofer(grr))
gif_read_error(&gfc, 0, "trailing garbage after GIF ignored");
/* finally, export last message */
gif_read_error(&gfc, -1, 0);
return gfs;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double-free bug in the read_gif function in gifread.c in gifsicle 1.90 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service attack or unspecified other impact via a maliciously crafted file, because last_name is mishandled, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-1000421.
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program. | Medium | 169,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ResetScreenHandler::UpdateStatusChanged(
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status) {
if (status.status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_ERROR) {
base::DictionaryValue params;
params.SetInteger("uiState", kErrorUIStateRollback);
ShowScreen(OobeUI::kScreenErrorMessage, ¶ms);
} else if (status.status ==
UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RequestRestart();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in modules/webaudio/AudioScheduledSourceNode.cpp in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
return em_pop(ctxt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 169,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool KeyMap::Press(const scoped_refptr<WindowProxy>& window,
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
const wchar_t& key) {
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_SHIFT) {
shift_ = !shift_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_CONTROL) {
control_ = !control_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_MENU) { // ALT
alt_ = !alt_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_COMMAND) {
command_ = !command_;
}
int modifiers = 0;
if (shift_ || shifted_keys_.find(key) != shifted_keys_.end()) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_SHIFT_DOWN;
}
if (control_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN;
}
if (alt_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_ALT_DOWN;
}
if (command_) {
VLOG(1) << "Pressing command key on linux!!";
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_COMMAND_DOWN;
}
window->SimulateOSKeyPress(key_code, modifiers);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < kcontrol->count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 does not ensure possession of a read/write lock, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) and obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!location->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = m_debuggerContext.Get(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(location), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void opl3_panning(int dev, int voice, int value)
{
devc->voc[voice].panning = value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple array index errors in sound/oss/opl3.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allow local users to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging write access to /dev/sequencer.
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | High | 165,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ui::ModalType ExtensionInstallDialogView::GetModalType() const {
return ui::MODAL_TYPE_WINDOW;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The Web Store inline-installer implementation in the Extensions UI in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not block installations upon deletion of an installation frame, which makes it easier for remote attackers to trick a user into believing that an installation request originated from the user's next navigation target via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925} | Medium | 172,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::SetDownloadStatusAndNotifyImpl(
DownloadStatus status,
ContentSetting setting) {
DCHECK((GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status) == setting) ||
(GetDownloadStatusFromSetting(setting) == status))
<< "status " << status << " and setting " << setting
<< " do not correspond to each other";
ContentSetting last_setting = GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status_);
DownloadUiStatus last_ui_status = ui_status_;
status_ = status;
ui_status_ = GetUiStatusFromDownloadStatus(status_, download_seen_);
if (!web_contents())
return;
if (last_setting == setting && last_ui_status == ui_status_)
return;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(web_contents()),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Lack of proper state tracking in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437} | Low | 173,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
{
if (likely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
return;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
return;
lg_local_lock(&files_lglock);
__file_sb_list_add(file, sb);
lg_local_unlock(&files_lglock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
int pkt_len;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
gboolean cap_dir;
char cap_dst[13];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header */
pkt_len = parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(&wth->phdr, line, cap_int, &cap_dir,
cap_dst, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
/* Convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data, and fill in some
struct wtap_pkthdr fields */
if (!parse_netscreen_hex_dump(wth->fh, pkt_len, cap_int,
cap_dst, &wth->phdr, wth->frame_buffer, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: wiretap/netscreen.c in the NetScreen file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadXWDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CheckOverflowException(length,width,height) \
(((height) != 0) && ((length)/((size_t) height) != ((size_t) width)))
char
*comment;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
int
x_status;
MagickBooleanType
authentic_colormap;
MagickStatusType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
pixel;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*ximage;
XWDFileHeader
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read in header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDheader,(unsigned char *) &header);
if (count != sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageHeader");
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &header,sz_XWDheader);
/*
Check to see if the dump file is in the proper format.
*/
if (header.file_version != XWD_FILE_VERSION)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
if (header.header_size < sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((header.bits_per_pixel == 0) || (header.bits_per_pixel > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((header.bitmap_pad % 8) != 0) || (header.bitmap_pad > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.bitmap_unit > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.ncolors > 256)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.visual_class)
{
case StaticGray:
case GrayScale:
case StaticColor:
case PseudoColor:
case TrueColor:
case DirectColor:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.pixmap_format)
{
case XYBitmap:
case XYPixmap:
case ZPixmap:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
length=(size_t) (header.header_size-sz_XWDheader);
if ((length+1) != ((size_t) ((CARD32) (length+1))))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
/*
Initialize the X image.
*/
ximage=(XImage *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*ximage));
if (ximage == (XImage *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ximage->depth=(int) header.pixmap_depth;
ximage->format=(int) header.pixmap_format;
ximage->xoffset=(int) header.xoffset;
ximage->data=(char *) NULL;
ximage->width=(int) header.pixmap_width;
ximage->height=(int) header.pixmap_height;
ximage->bitmap_pad=(int) header.bitmap_pad;
ximage->bytes_per_line=(int) header.bytes_per_line;
ximage->byte_order=(int) header.byte_order;
ximage->bitmap_unit=(int) header.bitmap_unit;
ximage->bitmap_bit_order=(int) header.bitmap_bit_order;
ximage->bits_per_pixel=(int) header.bits_per_pixel;
ximage->red_mask=header.red_mask;
ximage->green_mask=header.green_mask;
ximage->blue_mask=header.blue_mask;
if ((ximage->width < 0) || (ximage->height < 0) || (ximage->depth < 0) ||
(ximage->format < 0) || (ximage->byte_order < 0) ||
(ximage->bitmap_bit_order < 0) || (ximage->bitmap_pad < 0) ||
(ximage->bytes_per_line < 0))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->width > 65535) || (ximage->height > 65535))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->bits_per_pixel > 32) || (ximage->bitmap_unit > 32))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
x_status=XInitImage(ximage);
if (x_status == 0)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
/*
Read colormap.
*/
authentic_colormap=MagickFalse;
colors=(XColor *) NULL;
if (header.ncolors != 0)
{
XWDColor
color;
length=(size_t) header.ncolors;
if (length > ((~0UL)/sizeof(*colors)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDColor,(unsigned char *) &color);
if (count != sz_XWDColor)
{
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
colors[i].pixel=color.pixel;
colors[i].red=color.red;
colors[i].green=color.green;
colors[i].blue=color.blue;
colors[i].flags=(char) color.flags;
if (color.flags != 0)
authentic_colormap=MagickTrue;
}
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &colors[i].pixel,
sizeof(colors[i].pixel));
MSBOrderShort((unsigned char *) &colors[i].red,3*
sizeof(colors[i].red));
}
}
/*
Allocate the pixel buffer.
*/
length=(size_t) ximage->bytes_per_line*ximage->height;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,ximage->bytes_per_line,ximage->height))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (ximage->format != ZPixmap)
{
size_t
extent;
extent=length;
length*=ximage->depth;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,extent,ximage->depth))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
ximage->data=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*ximage->data));
if (ximage->data == (char *) NULL)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) ximage->data);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
/*
Convert image to MIFF format.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) ximage->width;
image->rows=(size_t) ximage->height;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((header.ncolors == 0U) || (ximage->red_mask != 0) ||
(ximage->green_mask != 0) || (ximage->blue_mask != 0))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
else
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=header.ncolors;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=ximage->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=ximage->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=ximage->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((image->colors != 0) && (authentic_colormap != MagickFalse))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
red_shift) & red_mask);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].red));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
green_shift) & green_mask);
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t)
index].green));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
blue_shift) & blue_mask);
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].blue));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
if (red_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
if (green_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
if (blue_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].blue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) XGetPixel(ximage,(int)
x,(int) y));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
/*
Free image and colormap.
*/
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: ReadXWDImage in coders/xwd.c in the XWD image parsing component of ImageMagick 7.0.8-41 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (divide-by-zero error) by crafting an XWD image file in which the header indicates neither LSB first nor MSB first.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546 | Medium | 169,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PaintPropertyTreeBuilderFragmentContext()
: current_effect(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root()) {
current.clip = absolute_position.clip = fixed_position.clip =
ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
current.transform = absolute_position.transform = fixed_position.transform =
TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root();
current.scroll = absolute_position.scroll = fixed_position.scroll =
ScrollPaintPropertyNode::Root();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceNew(
int32 width_in_pixel,
int32 height_in_pixel,
uint64 surface_handle) {
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> surface(factory->CreateTransportClient(
gfx::Size(width_in_pixel, height_in_pixel), device_scale_factor_,
surface_handle));
if (!surface) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create ImageTransport texture";
return;
}
image_transport_clients_[surface_handle] = surface;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError(
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to register agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
UnregisterAgent();
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorAlreadyExists)
error_code = ERROR_INPROGRESS;
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 167,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void llc_sap_rcv(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PDU;
ev->reason = 0;
skb->sk = sk;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The LLC subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.9.13 does not ensure that a certain destructor exists in required circumstances, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,349 |
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