instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int linear_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct linear_c *lc = (struct linear_c *) ti->private;
return __blkdev_driver_ioctl(lc->dev->bdev, lc->dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | Medium | 172,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Ins_MDRP function in base/ttinterp.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltFindTemplate(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *nameURI) {
xsltTemplatePtr cur;
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return(NULL);
style = ctxt->style;
while (style != NULL) {
cur = style->templates;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, cur->name)) {
if (((nameURI == NULL) && (cur->nameURI == NULL)) ||
((nameURI != NULL) && (cur->nameURI != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(nameURI, cur->nameURI)))) {
return(cur);
}
}
cur = cur->next;
}
style = xsltNextImport(style);
}
return(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int fscrypt_process_policy(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
{
if (policy->version != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) {
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
return create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode, policy);
}
if (is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(inode, policy))
return 0;
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Policy inconsistent with encryption context\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: A missing authorization check in the fscrypt_process_policy function in fs/crypto/policy.c in the ext4 and f2fs filesystem encryption support in the Linux kernel before 4.7.4 allows a user to assign an encryption policy to a directory owned by a different user, potentially creating a denial of service.
Commit Message: fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy
On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access. This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).
Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy. This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.
(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs}
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int jas_memdump(FILE *out, void *data, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
size_t j;
uchar *dp;
dp = data;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(out, "%04zx:", i);
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) {
if (i + j < len) {
fprintf(out, " %02x", dp[i + j]);
}
}
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw6[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (err) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-10-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET6-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET6, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-10-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET6-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET6, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET6, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET6;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = answer->prot->backlog_rcv;
inet_sk(sk)->pinet6 = np = inet6_sk_generic(sk);
np->hop_limit = -1;
np->mcast_hops = IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS;
np->mc_loop = 1;
np->pmtudisc = IPV6_PMTUDISC_WANT;
np->autoflowlabel = ip6_default_np_autolabel(sock_net(sk));
sk->sk_ipv6only = net->ipv6.sysctl.bindv6only;
/* Init the ipv4 part of the socket since we can have sockets
* using v6 API for ipv4.
*/
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
/*
* Increment only the relevant sk_prot->socks debug field, this changes
* the previous behaviour of incrementing both the equivalent to
* answer->prot->socks (inet6_sock_nr) and inet_sock_nr.
*
* This allows better debug granularity as we'll know exactly how many
* UDPv6, TCPv6, etc socks were allocated, not the sum of all IPv6
* transport protocol socks. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err) {
sk_common_release(sk);
goto out;
}
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The networking implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3, as used in Android and other products, does not validate protocol identifiers for certain protocol families, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL function pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging CLONE_NEWUSER support to execute a crafted SOCK_RAW application.
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GDataEntry* GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_folder());
GDataDirectory* dir = new GDataDirectory(parent, directory_service);
dir->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
dir->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
dir->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
dir->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
dir->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
dir->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
DCHECK(edit_link) << "No edit link for dir " << dir->title_;
if (edit_link)
dir->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
dir->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
dir->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
return dir;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ih264d_rest_of_residual_cav_chroma_dc_block(UWORD32 u4_total_coeff_trail_one,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 u4_total_zeroes;
WORD16 i;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_trailing_ones = u4_total_coeff_trail_one & 0xFFFF;
UWORD32 u4_total_coeff = u4_total_coeff_trail_one >> 16;
WORD16 i2_level_arr[4];
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle;
ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map = 0;
pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_4x4->ai2_level[0];
i = u4_total_coeff - 1;
if(u4_trailing_ones)
{
/*********************************************************************/
/* Decode Trailing Ones */
/* read the sign of T1's and put them in level array */
/*********************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_signs, u4_cnt = u4_trailing_ones;
WORD16 (*ppi2_trlone_lkup)[3] =
(WORD16 (*)[3])gai2_ih264d_trailing_one_level;
WORD16 *pi2_trlone_lkup;
GETBITS(u4_signs, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, u4_cnt);
pi2_trlone_lkup = ppi2_trlone_lkup[(1 << u4_cnt) - 2 + u4_signs];
while(u4_cnt--)
i2_level_arr[i--] = *pi2_trlone_lkup++;
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Begins */
/****************************************************************/
if(i >= 0)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* First level is decoded outside the loop as it has lot of */
/* special cases. */
/****************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_lev_suffix, u4_suffix_len, u4_lev_suffix_size;
UWORD16 u2_lev_code, u2_abs_value;
UWORD32 u4_lev_prefix;
/***************************************************************/
/* u4_suffix_len = 0, Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/*********************************************************/
/* Special decoding case when trailing ones are 3 */
/*********************************************************/
u2_lev_code = MIN(15, u4_lev_prefix);
u2_lev_code += (3 == u4_trailing_ones) ? 0 : (2);
if(14 == u4_lev_prefix)
u4_lev_suffix_size = 4;
else if(15 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += 15;
u4_lev_suffix_size = u4_lev_prefix - 3;
}
else
u4_lev_suffix_size = 0;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
if(u4_lev_suffix_size)
{
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code += u4_lev_suffix;
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] = (u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
u4_suffix_len = (u2_abs_value > 3) ? 2 : 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* Now loop over the remaining levels */
/*********************************************************/
while(i >= 0)
{
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_lev_suffix_size =
(15 <= u4_lev_prefix) ?
(u4_lev_prefix - 3) : u4_suffix_len;
/*********************************************************/
/* Compute level code using prefix and suffix */
/*********************************************************/
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code = (MIN(u4_lev_prefix,15) << u4_suffix_len)
+ u4_lev_suffix;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] =
(u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
/*********************************************************/
/* Increment suffix length if required */
/*********************************************************/
u4_suffix_len += (u2_abs_value > (3 << (u4_suffix_len - 1)));
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Ends */
/****************************************************************/
}
if(u4_total_coeff < 4)
{
UWORD32 u4_max_ldz = (4 - u4_total_coeff);
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_LEN(u4_total_zeroes, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf, u4_max_ldz);
}
else
u4_total_zeroes = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Decode the runs and form the coefficient buffer */
/**************************************************************/
{
const UWORD8 *pu1_table_runbefore;
UWORD32 u4_run;
UWORD32 u4_scan_pos = (u4_total_coeff + u4_total_zeroes - 1);
UWORD32 u4_zeroes_left = u4_total_zeroes;
i = u4_total_coeff - 1;
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs for 0 < zeros left <=6 */
/**************************************************************/
pu1_table_runbefore = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_table_run_before;
while(u4_zeroes_left && i)
{
UWORD32 u4_code;
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 3);
u4_code = pu1_table_runbefore[u4_code + (u4_zeroes_left << 3)];
u4_run = u4_code >> 2;
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, (u4_code & 0x03));
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[i--];
u4_zeroes_left -= u4_run;
u4_scan_pos -= (u4_run + 1);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs End */
/**************************************************************/
/**************************************************************/
/* Copy the remaining coefficients */
/**************************************************************/
while(i >= 0)
{
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[i--];
u4_scan_pos--;
}
}
{
WORD32 offset;
offset = (UWORD8 *)pi2_coeff_data - (UWORD8 *)ps_tu_4x4;
offset = ALIGN4(offset);
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data + offset);
}
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer underflows in decoder/ih264d_parse_cavlc.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26399350.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
| High | 173,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ClonePixelCacheRepository(
CacheInfo *restrict clone_info,CacheInfo *restrict cache_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxCacheThreads 2
#define cache_threads(source,destination,chunk) \
num_threads((chunk) < (16*GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource)) ? 1 : \
GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource) < MaxCacheThreads ? \
GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource) : MaxCacheThreads)
MagickBooleanType
status;
NexusInfo
**restrict cache_nexus,
**restrict clone_nexus;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
y;
assert(cache_info != (CacheInfo *) NULL);
assert(clone_info != (CacheInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (cache_info->type == PingCache)
return(MagickTrue);
if (((cache_info->type == MemoryCache) || (cache_info->type == MapCache)) &&
((clone_info->type == MemoryCache) || (clone_info->type == MapCache)) &&
(cache_info->columns == clone_info->columns) &&
(cache_info->rows == clone_info->rows) &&
(cache_info->active_index_channel == clone_info->active_index_channel))
{
/*
Identical pixel cache morphology.
*/
CopyPixels(clone_info->pixels,cache_info->pixels,cache_info->columns*
cache_info->rows);
if ((cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse) &&
(clone_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse))
(void) memcpy(clone_info->indexes,cache_info->indexes,
cache_info->columns*cache_info->rows*sizeof(*cache_info->indexes));
return(MagickTrue);
}
/*
Mismatched pixel cache morphology.
*/
cache_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(MaxCacheThreads);
clone_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(MaxCacheThreads);
if ((cache_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL) ||
(clone_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL))
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) MagickMin(cache_info->columns,clone_info->columns)*
sizeof(*cache_info->pixels);
status=MagickTrue;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
cache_threads(cache_info,clone_info,cache_info->rows)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) cache_info->rows; y++)
{
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
PixelPacket
*pixels;
RectangleInfo
region;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
if (y >= (ssize_t) clone_info->rows)
continue;
region.width=cache_info->columns;
region.height=1;
region.x=0;
region.y=y;
pixels=SetPixelCacheNexusPixels(cache_info,ReadMode,®ion,MagickTrue,
cache_nexus[id],exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
status=ReadPixelCachePixels(cache_info,cache_nexus[id],exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
region.width=clone_info->columns;
pixels=SetPixelCacheNexusPixels(clone_info,WriteMode,®ion,MagickTrue,
clone_nexus[id],exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_nexus[id]->pixels,0,(size_t)
clone_nexus[id]->length);
(void) memcpy(clone_nexus[id]->pixels,cache_nexus[id]->pixels,length);
status=WritePixelCachePixels(clone_info,clone_nexus[id],exception);
}
if ((cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse) &&
(clone_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Clone indexes.
*/
length=(size_t) MagickMin(cache_info->columns,clone_info->columns)*
sizeof(*cache_info->indexes);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
cache_threads(cache_info,clone_info,cache_info->rows)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) cache_info->rows; y++)
{
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
PixelPacket
*pixels;
RectangleInfo
region;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
if (y >= (ssize_t) clone_info->rows)
continue;
region.width=cache_info->columns;
region.height=1;
region.x=0;
region.y=y;
pixels=SetPixelCacheNexusPixels(cache_info,ReadMode,®ion,MagickTrue,
cache_nexus[id],exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
status=ReadPixelCacheIndexes(cache_info,cache_nexus[id],exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
region.width=clone_info->columns;
pixels=SetPixelCacheNexusPixels(clone_info,WriteMode,®ion,MagickTrue,
clone_nexus[id],exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
(void) memcpy(clone_nexus[id]->indexes,cache_nexus[id]->indexes,length);
status=WritePixelCacheIndexes(clone_info,clone_nexus[id],exception);
}
}
cache_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(cache_nexus,MaxCacheThreads);
clone_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(clone_nexus,MaxCacheThreads);
if (cache_info->debug != MagickFalse)
{
char
message[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"%s => %s",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t) cache_info->type),
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickCacheOptions,(ssize_t) clone_info->type));
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",message);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in magick/cache.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperPlatformAudioInput::GetMediaDeviceManager() {
DCHECK(main_message_loop_proxy_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
RenderFrameImpl* const render_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(render_frame_id_);
return render_frame ?
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(render_frame) : NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | High | 171,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_wbxml_tag_defined (proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint32 str_tbl, guint8 *level, guint8 *codepage_stag, guint8 *codepage_attr,
const wbxml_decoding *map)
{
guint32 tvb_len = tvb_reported_length (tvb);
guint32 off = offset;
guint32 len;
guint str_len;
guint32 ent;
guint32 idx;
guint8 peek;
guint32 tag_len; /* Length of the index (uintvar) from a LITERAL tag */
guint8 tag_save_known = 0; /* Will contain peek & 0x3F (tag identity) */
guint8 tag_new_known = 0; /* Will contain peek & 0x3F (tag identity) */
const char *tag_save_literal; /* Will contain the LITERAL tag identity */
const char *tag_new_literal; /* Will contain the LITERAL tag identity */
guint8 parsing_tag_content = FALSE; /* Are we parsing content from a
tag with content: <x>Content</x>
The initial state is FALSE.
This state will trigger recursion. */
tag_save_literal = NULL; /* Prevents compiler warning */
DebugLog(("parse_wbxml_tag_defined (level = %u, offset = %u)\n", *level, offset));
while (off < tvb_len) {
peek = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off);
DebugLog(("STAG: (top of while) level = %3u, peek = 0x%02X, off = %u, tvb_len = %u\n", *level, peek, off, tvb_len));
if ((peek & 0x3F) < 4) switch (peek) { /* Global tokens in state = STAG
but not the LITERAL tokens */
case 0x00: /* SWITCH_PAGE */
*codepage_stag = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 2,
" | Tag | T -->%3d "
"| SWITCH_PAGE (Tag code page) "
"|",
*codepage_stag);
off += 2;
break;
case 0x01: /* END: only possible for Tag with Content */
if (tag_save_known) { /* Known TAG */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (Known Tag 0x%02X) "
"| %s</%s>",
*level, *codepage_stag,
tag_save_known, Indent (*level),
tag_save_literal); /* We already looked it up! */
} else { /* Literal TAG */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (Literal Tag) "
"| %s</%s>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level),
tag_save_literal ? tag_save_literal : "");
}
(*level)--;
off++;
/* Reset code page: not needed as return from recursion */
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n", *level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
case 0x02: /* ENTITY */
ent = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| ENTITY "
"| %s'&#%u;'",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level), ent);
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x03: /* STR_I */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| STR_I (Inline string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent(*level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x40: /* EXT_I_0 */
case 0x41: /* EXT_I_1 */
case 0x42: /* EXT_I_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
len = tvb_strsize (tvb, off+1);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| EXT_I_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s: \'%s\')",
*level, *codepage_stag,
peek & 0x0f, Indent (*level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek),
tvb_format_text (tvb, off+1, len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x43: /* PI */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| PI (XML Processing Instruction) "
"| %s<?xml",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level));
len = parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (tree, tvb, off,
str_tbl, *level, codepage_attr, map);
/* Check that there is still room in packet */
off += len;
if (off >= tvb_len) {
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, ThrowException: len = %u (short frame)\n", *level, off - offset));
/*
* TODO - Do we need to free g_malloc()ed memory?
*/
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off-1, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (PI) "
"| %s?>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level));
break;
case 0x80: /* EXT_T_0 */
case 0x81: /* EXT_T_1 */
case 0x82: /* EXT_T_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
{ char *s;
if (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])
s = (map->ext_t[peek & 0x03])(tvb, idx, str_tbl);
else
s = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "EXT_T_%1x (%s)", peek & 0x03,
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| EXT_T_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, peek & 0x0f, Indent (*level),
s);
}
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0x83: /* STR_T */
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1+len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| STR_T (Tableref string) "
"| %s\'%s\'",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level),
tvb_format_text (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len-1));
off += 1+len;
break;
case 0xC0: /* EXT_0 */
case 0xC1: /* EXT_1 */
case 0xC2: /* EXT_2 */
/* Extension tokens */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| EXT_%1x (Extension Token) "
"| %s(%s)",
*level, *codepage_stag, peek & 0x0f, Indent (*level),
map_token (map->global, 0, peek));
off++;
break;
case 0xC3: /* OPAQUE - WBXML 1.1 and newer */
if (tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, 0)) { /* WBXML 1.x (x > 0) */
char *str;
if (tag_save_known) { /* Knwon tag */
if (map->opaque_binary_tag) {
str = map->opaque_binary_tag(tvb, off + 1,
tag_save_known, *codepage_stag, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_binary_tag(tvb, off + 1,
tag_save_known, *codepage_stag, &len);
}
} else { /* lITERAL tag */
if (map->opaque_literal_tag) {
str = map->opaque_literal_tag(tvb, off + 1,
tag_save_literal, *codepage_stag, &len);
} else {
str = default_opaque_literal_tag(tvb, off + 1,
tag_save_literal, *codepage_stag, &len);
}
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1 + len,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| OPAQUE (Opaque data) "
"| %s%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level), str);
off += 1 + len;
} else { /* WBXML 1.0 - RESERVED_2 token (invalid) */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| RESERVED_2 (Invalid Token!) "
"| WBXML 1.0 parsing stops here.",
*level, *codepage_stag);
/* Stop processing as it is impossible to parse now */
off = tvb_len;
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, Return: len = %u\n", *level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
break;
/* No default clause, as all cases have been treated */
} else { /* LITERAL or Known TAG */
/* We must store the initial tag, and also retrieve the new tag.
* For efficiency reasons, we store the literal tag representation
* for known tags too, so we can easily close the tag without the
* need of a new lookup and avoiding storage of token codepage.
*
* There are 4 possibilities:
*
* 1. Known tag followed by a known tag
* 2. Known tag followed by a LITERAL tag
* 3. LITERAL tag followed by Known tag
* 4. LITERAL tag followed by LITERAL tag
*/
/* Store the new tag */
tag_len = 0;
if ((peek & 0x3F) == 4) { /* LITERAL */
DebugLog(("STAG: LITERAL tag (peek = 0x%02X, off = %u) - TableRef follows!\n", peek, off));
idx = tvb_get_guintvar (tvb, off+1, &tag_len);
str_len = tvb_strsize (tvb, str_tbl+idx);
tag_new_literal = (const gchar*)tvb_get_ptr (tvb, str_tbl+idx, str_len);
tag_new_known = 0; /* invalidate known tag_new */
} else { /* Known tag */
tag_new_known = peek & 0x3F;
tag_new_literal = map_token (map->tags, *codepage_stag,
tag_new_known);
/* Stored looked up tag name string */
}
/* Parsing of TAG starts HERE */
if (peek & 0x40) { /* Content present */
/* Content follows
* [!] An explicit END token is expected in these cases!
* ==> Recursion possible if we encounter a tag with content;
* recursion will return at the explicit END token.
*/
if (parsing_tag_content) { /* Recurse */
DebugLog(("STAG: Tag in Tag - RECURSE! (off = %u)\n", off));
/* Do not process the attribute list:
* recursion will take care of it */
(*level)++;
len = parse_wbxml_tag_defined (tree, tvb, off, str_tbl,
level, codepage_stag, codepage_attr, map);
off += len;
} else { /* Now we will have content to parse */
/* Save the start tag so we can properly close it later. */
if ((peek & 0x3F) == 4) { /* Literal tag */
tag_save_literal = tag_new_literal;
tag_save_known = 0;
} else { /* Known tag */
tag_save_known = tag_new_known;
tag_save_literal = tag_new_literal;
/* The last statement avoids needless lookups */
}
/* Process the attribute list if present */
if (peek & 0x80) { /* Content and Attribute list present */
if (tag_new_known) { /* Known tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| Known Tag 0x%02X (AC) "
"| %s<%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, tag_new_known,
Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
/* Tag string already looked up earlier! */
off++;
} else { /* LITERAL tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| LITERAL_AC (Literal tag) (AC) "
"| %s<%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
off += 1 + tag_len;
}
len = parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (tree, tvb,
off, str_tbl, *level, codepage_attr, map);
/* Check that there is still room in packet */
off += len;
if (off >= tvb_len) {
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, ThrowException: len = %u (short frame)\n",
*level, off - offset));
/*
* TODO - Do we need to free g_malloc()ed memory?
*/
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off-1, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (attribute list) "
"| %s>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level));
} else { /* Content, no Attribute list */
if (tag_new_known) { /* Known tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| Known Tag 0x%02X (.C) "
"| %s<%s>",
*level, *codepage_stag, tag_new_known,
Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
/* Tag string already looked up earlier! */
off++;
} else { /* LITERAL tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| LITERAL_C (Literal Tag) (.C) "
"| %s<%s>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level),
tag_new_literal);
off += 1 + tag_len;
}
}
/* The data that follows in the parsing process
* represents content for the opening tag
* we've just processed in the lines above.
* Next time we encounter a tag with content: recurse
*/
parsing_tag_content = TRUE;
DebugLog(("Tag in Tag - No recursion this time! (off = %u)\n", off));
}
} else { /* No Content */
DebugLog(("<Tag/> in Tag - No recursion! (off = %u)\n", off));
(*level)++;
if (peek & 0x80) { /* No Content, Attribute list present */
if (tag_new_known) { /* Known tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| Known Tag 0x%02X (A.) "
"| %s<%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, tag_new_known,
Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
/* Tag string already looked up earlier! */
off++;
len = parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (tree, tvb,
off, str_tbl, *level, codepage_attr, map);
/* Check that there is still room in packet */
off += len;
if (off > tvb_len) {
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, ThrowException: len = %u (short frame)\n", *level, off - offset));
/*
* TODO - Do we need to free g_malloc()ed memory?
*/
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off-1, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (Known Tag) "
"| %s/>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level));
} else { /* LITERAL tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| LITERAL_A (Literal Tag) (A.) "
"| %s<%s",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
off += 1 + tag_len;
len = parse_wbxml_attribute_list_defined (tree, tvb,
off, str_tbl, *level, codepage_attr, map);
/* Check that there is still room in packet */
off += len;
if (off >= tvb_len) {
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, ThrowException: len = %u (short frame)\n", *level, off - offset));
/*
* TODO - Do we need to free g_malloc()ed memory?
*/
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off-1, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| END (Literal Tag) "
"| %s/>",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level));
}
} else { /* No Content, No Attribute list */
if (tag_new_known) { /* Known tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| Known Tag 0x%02x (..) "
"| %s<%s />",
*level, *codepage_stag, tag_new_known,
Indent (*level), tag_new_literal);
/* Tag string already looked up earlier! */
off++;
} else { /* LITERAL tag */
proto_tree_add_text (tree, tvb, off, 1,
" %3d | Tag | T %3d "
"| LITERAL (Literal Tag) (..) "
"| %s<%s />",
*level, *codepage_stag, Indent (*level),
tag_new_literal);
off += 1 + tag_len;
}
}
(*level)--;
/* TODO: Do I have to reset code page here? */
}
} /* if (tag & 0x3F) >= 5 */
} /* while */
DebugLog(("STAG: level = %u, Return: len = %u (end of function body)\n", *level, off - offset));
return (off - offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-wbxml.c in the WBXML dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 mishandles offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and infinite loop) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int su3000_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
int num)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = i2c_get_adapdata(adap);
u8 obuf[0x40], ibuf[0x40];
if (!d)
return -ENODEV;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&d->i2c_mutex) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
switch (num) {
case 1:
switch (msg[0].addr) {
case SU3000_STREAM_CTRL:
obuf[0] = msg[0].buf[0] + 0x36;
obuf[1] = 3;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 0, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
break;
case DW2102_RC_QUERY:
obuf[0] = 0x10;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 1, ibuf, 2, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
msg[0].buf[1] = ibuf[0];
msg[0].buf[0] = ibuf[1];
break;
default:
/* always i2c write*/
obuf[0] = 0x08;
obuf[1] = msg[0].addr;
obuf[2] = msg[0].len;
memcpy(&obuf[3], msg[0].buf, msg[0].len);
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, msg[0].len + 3,
ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
}
break;
case 2:
/* always i2c read */
obuf[0] = 0x09;
obuf[1] = msg[0].len;
obuf[2] = msg[1].len;
obuf[3] = msg[0].addr;
memcpy(&obuf[4], msg[0].buf, msg[0].len);
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, msg[0].len + 4,
ibuf, msg[1].len + 1, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
memcpy(msg[1].buf, &ibuf[1], msg[1].len);
break;
default:
warn("more than 2 i2c messages at a time is not handled yet.");
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
return num;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.4 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 168,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FolderHeaderView::Update() {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->SetVisible(folder_name_visible_);
if (folder_name_visible_)
folder_name_view_->SetText(base::UTF8ToUTF16(folder_item_->name()));
Layout();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving moving a (1) AUDIO or (2) VIDEO element between documents.
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_update_settings(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
WebKitWebSettings* webSettings = priv->webSettings.get();
Settings* settings = core(webView)->settings();
gchar* defaultEncoding, *cursiveFontFamily, *defaultFontFamily, *fantasyFontFamily, *monospaceFontFamily, *sansSerifFontFamily, *serifFontFamily, *userStylesheetUri, *defaultSpellCheckingLanguages;
gboolean autoLoadImages, autoShrinkImages, printBackgrounds,
enableScripts, enablePlugins, enableDeveloperExtras, resizableTextAreas,
enablePrivateBrowsing, enableCaretBrowsing, enableHTML5Database, enableHTML5LocalStorage,
enableXSSAuditor, enableSpatialNavigation, enableFrameFlattening, javascriptCanOpenWindows,
javaScriptCanAccessClipboard, enableOfflineWebAppCache,
enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI, enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
enableDOMPaste, tabKeyCyclesThroughElements, enableWebGL,
enableSiteSpecificQuirks, usePageCache, enableJavaApplet,
enableHyperlinkAuditing, enableFullscreen, enableDNSPrefetching;
WebKitEditingBehavior editingBehavior;
g_object_get(webSettings,
"default-encoding", &defaultEncoding,
"cursive-font-family", &cursiveFontFamily,
"default-font-family", &defaultFontFamily,
"fantasy-font-family", &fantasyFontFamily,
"monospace-font-family", &monospaceFontFamily,
"sans-serif-font-family", &sansSerifFontFamily,
"serif-font-family", &serifFontFamily,
"auto-load-images", &autoLoadImages,
"auto-shrink-images", &autoShrinkImages,
"print-backgrounds", &printBackgrounds,
"enable-scripts", &enableScripts,
"enable-plugins", &enablePlugins,
"resizable-text-areas", &resizableTextAreas,
"user-stylesheet-uri", &userStylesheetUri,
"enable-developer-extras", &enableDeveloperExtras,
"enable-private-browsing", &enablePrivateBrowsing,
"enable-caret-browsing", &enableCaretBrowsing,
"enable-html5-database", &enableHTML5Database,
"enable-html5-local-storage", &enableHTML5LocalStorage,
"enable-xss-auditor", &enableXSSAuditor,
"enable-spatial-navigation", &enableSpatialNavigation,
"enable-frame-flattening", &enableFrameFlattening,
"javascript-can-open-windows-automatically", &javascriptCanOpenWindows,
"javascript-can-access-clipboard", &javaScriptCanAccessClipboard,
"enable-offline-web-application-cache", &enableOfflineWebAppCache,
"editing-behavior", &editingBehavior,
"enable-universal-access-from-file-uris", &enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-file-access-from-file-uris", &enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-dom-paste", &enableDOMPaste,
"tab-key-cycles-through-elements", &tabKeyCyclesThroughElements,
"enable-site-specific-quirks", &enableSiteSpecificQuirks,
"enable-page-cache", &usePageCache,
"enable-java-applet", &enableJavaApplet,
"enable-hyperlink-auditing", &enableHyperlinkAuditing,
"spell-checking-languages", &defaultSpellCheckingLanguages,
"enable-fullscreen", &enableFullscreen,
"enable-dns-prefetching", &enableDNSPrefetching,
"enable-webgl", &enableWebGL,
NULL);
settings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(defaultEncoding);
settings->setCursiveFontFamily(cursiveFontFamily);
settings->setStandardFontFamily(defaultFontFamily);
settings->setFantasyFontFamily(fantasyFontFamily);
settings->setFixedFontFamily(monospaceFontFamily);
settings->setSansSerifFontFamily(sansSerifFontFamily);
settings->setSerifFontFamily(serifFontFamily);
settings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(autoLoadImages);
settings->setShrinksStandaloneImagesToFit(autoShrinkImages);
settings->setShouldPrintBackgrounds(printBackgrounds);
settings->setJavaScriptEnabled(enableScripts);
settings->setPluginsEnabled(enablePlugins);
settings->setTextAreasAreResizable(resizableTextAreas);
settings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), userStylesheetUri));
settings->setDeveloperExtrasEnabled(enableDeveloperExtras);
settings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(enablePrivateBrowsing);
settings->setCaretBrowsingEnabled(enableCaretBrowsing);
#if ENABLE(DATABASE)
AbstractDatabase::setIsAvailable(enableHTML5Database);
#endif
settings->setLocalStorageEnabled(enableHTML5LocalStorage);
settings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(enableXSSAuditor);
settings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(enableSpatialNavigation);
settings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(enableFrameFlattening);
settings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(javascriptCanOpenWindows);
settings->setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(javaScriptCanAccessClipboard);
settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(enableOfflineWebAppCache);
settings->setEditingBehaviorType(static_cast<WebCore::EditingBehaviorType>(editingBehavior));
settings->setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(enableFileAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setDOMPasteAllowed(enableDOMPaste);
settings->setNeedsSiteSpecificQuirks(enableSiteSpecificQuirks);
settings->setUsesPageCache(usePageCache);
settings->setJavaEnabled(enableJavaApplet);
settings->setHyperlinkAuditingEnabled(enableHyperlinkAuditing);
settings->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(enableDNSPrefetching);
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
settings->setFullScreenEnabled(enableFullscreen);
#endif
#if ENABLE(SPELLCHECK)
WebKit::EditorClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::EditorClient*>(core(webView)->editorClient());
static_cast<WebKit::TextCheckerClientEnchant*>(client->textChecker())->updateSpellCheckingLanguage(defaultSpellCheckingLanguages);
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEBGL)
settings->setWebGLEnabled(enableWebGL);
#endif
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
page->setTabKeyCyclesThroughElements(tabKeyCyclesThroughElements);
g_free(defaultEncoding);
g_free(cursiveFontFamily);
g_free(defaultFontFamily);
g_free(fantasyFontFamily);
g_free(monospaceFontFamily);
g_free(sansSerifFontFamily);
g_free(serifFontFamily);
g_free(userStylesheetUri);
webkit_web_view_screen_changed(GTK_WIDGET(webView), NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to HTML range handling.
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) { // ChapterString ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037C) { // ChapterLanguage ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037E) { // ChapterCountry ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid);
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*
* dd_create_skeleton() creates a new directory and leaves ownership to
* the current user, hence, we have to call dd_reset_ownership() after the
* directory is populated.
*/
dd = dd_create_skeleton(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE, /*no flags*/0);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
}
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* And finally set the right uid and gid */
dd_reset_ownership(dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s' at '%s'", core_basename, user_pwd);
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s at %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, core_basename, user_pwd, (long long)core_size);
}
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | Low | 170,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(rowSize * bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pop_sync_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = NULL;
#endif
pop_data->check_time = 0;
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Marking messages deleted..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, WriteInc, ctx->deleted);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; ret == 0 && i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted && ctx->hdrs[i]->refno != -1)
{
j++;
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, j, -1);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELE %d\r\n", ctx->hdrs[i]->refno);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_bcache_del(pop_data->bcache, ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_delete(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#endif
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->changed)
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buf));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
pop_clear_cache(pop_data);
pop_data->status = POP_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
web_resource_update_scheduled_ = false;
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit,
int *al)
{
unsigned short type, size, len;
/* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
if (data >= limit - 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
if (data > limit - len)
return 1;
while (data <= limit - 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > limit)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::LaunchApp(const std::string& app_id) {
app_service_proxy_->Launch(app_id, ui::EventFlags::EF_NONE,
apps::mojom::LaunchSource::kFromAppListGrid,
display::kDefaultDisplayId);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void veth_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &veth_netdev_ops;
dev->ethtool_ops = &veth_ethtool_ops;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->destructor = veth_dev_free;
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_NO_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vp78_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt, int is_vp7)
{
VP8Context *s = avctx->priv_data;
int ret, i, referenced, num_jobs;
enum AVDiscard skip_thresh;
VP8Frame *av_uninit(curframe), *prev_frame;
if (is_vp7)
ret = vp7_decode_frame_header(s, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
else
ret = vp8_decode_frame_header(s, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
prev_frame = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_CURRENT];
referenced = s->update_last || s->update_golden == VP56_FRAME_CURRENT ||
s->update_altref == VP56_FRAME_CURRENT;
skip_thresh = !referenced ? AVDISCARD_NONREF
: !s->keyframe ? AVDISCARD_NONKEY
: AVDISCARD_ALL;
if (avctx->skip_frame >= skip_thresh) {
s->invisible = 1;
memcpy(&s->next_framep[0], &s->framep[0], sizeof(s->framep[0]) * 4);
goto skip_decode;
}
s->deblock_filter = s->filter.level && avctx->skip_loop_filter < skip_thresh;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
if (s->frames[i].tf.f->data[0] &&
&s->frames[i] != prev_frame &&
&s->frames[i] != s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] &&
&s->frames[i] != s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] &&
&s->frames[i] != s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2])
vp8_release_frame(s, &s->frames[i]);
curframe = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_CURRENT] = vp8_find_free_buffer(s);
if (!s->colorspace)
avctx->colorspace = AVCOL_SPC_BT470BG;
if (s->fullrange)
avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG;
else
avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_MPEG;
/* Given that arithmetic probabilities are updated every frame, it's quite
* likely that the values we have on a random interframe are complete
* junk if we didn't start decode on a keyframe. So just don't display
* anything rather than junk. */
if (!s->keyframe && (!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] ||
!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] ||
!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2])) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Discarding interframe without a prior keyframe!\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto err;
}
curframe->tf.f->key_frame = s->keyframe;
curframe->tf.f->pict_type = s->keyframe ? AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I
: AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P;
if ((ret = vp8_alloc_frame(s, curframe, referenced)) < 0)
goto err;
if (s->update_altref != VP56_FRAME_NONE)
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2] = s->framep[s->update_altref];
else
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2] = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2];
if (s->update_golden != VP56_FRAME_NONE)
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] = s->framep[s->update_golden];
else
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN];
if (s->update_last)
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] = curframe;
else
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS];
s->next_framep[VP56_FRAME_CURRENT] = curframe;
if (avctx->codec->update_thread_context)
ff_thread_finish_setup(avctx);
s->linesize = curframe->tf.f->linesize[0];
s->uvlinesize = curframe->tf.f->linesize[1];
memset(s->top_nnz, 0, s->mb_width * sizeof(*s->top_nnz));
/* Zero macroblock structures for top/top-left prediction
* from outside the frame. */
if (!s->mb_layout)
memset(s->macroblocks + s->mb_height * 2 - 1, 0,
(s->mb_width + 1) * sizeof(*s->macroblocks));
if (!s->mb_layout && s->keyframe)
memset(s->intra4x4_pred_mode_top, DC_PRED, s->mb_width * 4);
memset(s->ref_count, 0, sizeof(s->ref_count));
if (s->mb_layout == 1) {
if (prev_frame && s->segmentation.enabled &&
!s->segmentation.update_map)
ff_thread_await_progress(&prev_frame->tf, 1, 0);
if (is_vp7)
vp7_decode_mv_mb_modes(avctx, curframe, prev_frame);
else
vp8_decode_mv_mb_modes(avctx, curframe, prev_frame);
}
if (avctx->active_thread_type == FF_THREAD_FRAME)
num_jobs = 1;
else
num_jobs = FFMIN(s->num_coeff_partitions, avctx->thread_count);
s->num_jobs = num_jobs;
s->curframe = curframe;
s->prev_frame = prev_frame;
s->mv_bounds.mv_min.y = -MARGIN;
s->mv_bounds.mv_max.y = ((s->mb_height - 1) << 6) + MARGIN;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_THREADS; i++) {
VP8ThreadData *td = &s->thread_data[i];
atomic_init(&td->thread_mb_pos, 0);
atomic_init(&td->wait_mb_pos, INT_MAX);
}
if (is_vp7)
avctx->execute2(avctx, vp7_decode_mb_row_sliced, s->thread_data, NULL,
num_jobs);
else
avctx->execute2(avctx, vp8_decode_mb_row_sliced, s->thread_data, NULL,
num_jobs);
ff_thread_report_progress(&curframe->tf, INT_MAX, 0);
memcpy(&s->framep[0], &s->next_framep[0], sizeof(s->framep[0]) * 4);
skip_decode:
if (!s->update_probabilities)
s->prob[0] = s->prob[1];
if (!s->invisible) {
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, curframe->tf.f)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
}
return avpkt->size;
err:
memcpy(&s->next_framep[0], &s->framep[0], sizeof(s->framep[0]) * 4);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavcodec/webp.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 does not ensure that pix_fmt is set, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file, related to the vp8_decode_mb_row_no_filter and pred8x8_128_dc_8_c functions.
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool NormalPageArena::coalesce() {
if (m_promptlyFreedSize < 1024 * 1024)
return false;
if (getThreadState()->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!hasCurrentAllocationArea());
TRACE_EVENT0("blink_gc", "BaseArena::coalesce");
m_freeList.clear();
size_t freedSize = 0;
for (NormalPage* page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(m_firstPage); page;
page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page->next())) {
Address startOfGap = page->payload();
for (Address headerAddress = startOfGap;
headerAddress < page->payloadEnd();) {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(headerAddress);
size_t size = header->size();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(size < blinkPagePayloadSize());
if (header->isPromptlyFreed()) {
ASSERT(size >= sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
freedSize += size;
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
if (header->isFree()) {
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size < sizeof(FreeListEntry)
? size
: sizeof(FreeListEntry));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
if (startOfGap != headerAddress)
addToFreeList(startOfGap, headerAddress - startOfGap);
headerAddress += size;
startOfGap = headerAddress;
}
if (startOfGap != page->payloadEnd())
addToFreeList(startOfGap, page->payloadEnd() - startOfGap);
}
getThreadState()->decreaseAllocatedObjectSize(freedSize);
ASSERT(m_promptlyFreedSize == freedSize);
m_promptlyFreedSize = 0;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489} | Medium | 172,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cdf_file_property_info(struct magic_set *ms, const cdf_property_info_t *info,
size_t count, const uint64_t clsid[2])
{
size_t i;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
struct timespec ts;
char buf[64];
const char *str = NULL;
const char *s;
int len;
if (!NOTMIME(ms))
str = cdf_clsid_to_mime(clsid, clsid2mime);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
cdf_print_property_name(buf, sizeof(buf), info[i].pi_id);
switch (info[i].pi_type) {
case CDF_NULL:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %hd", buf,
info[i].pi_s16) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %d", buf,
info[i].pi_s32) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %u", buf,
info[i].pi_u32) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %g", buf,
info[i].pi_f) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms, ", %s: %g", buf,
info[i].pi_d) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
len = info[i].pi_str.s_len;
if (len > 1) {
char vbuf[1024];
size_t j, k = 1;
if (info[i].pi_type == CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING)
k++;
s = info[i].pi_str.s_buf;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(vbuf) && len--;
j++, s += k) {
if (*s == '\0')
break;
if (isprint((unsigned char)*s))
vbuf[j] = *s;
}
if (j == sizeof(vbuf))
--j;
vbuf[j] = '\0';
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (vbuf[0]) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s: %s",
buf, vbuf) == -1)
return -1;
}
} else if (str == NULL && info[i].pi_id ==
CDF_PROPERTY_NAME_OF_APPLICATION) {
str = cdf_app_to_mime(vbuf, app2mime);
}
}
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
tp = info[i].pi_tp;
if (tp != 0) {
char tbuf[64];
if (tp < 1000000000000000LL) {
cdf_print_elapsed_time(tbuf,
sizeof(tbuf), tp);
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms,
", %s: %s", buf, tbuf) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
char *c, *ec;
cdf_timestamp_to_timespec(&ts, tp);
c = cdf_ctime(&ts.tv_sec, tbuf);
if (c != NULL &&
(ec = strchr(c, '\n')) != NULL)
*ec = '\0';
if (NOTMIME(ms) && file_printf(ms,
", %s: %s", buf, c) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
}
if (!NOTMIME(ms)) {
if (str == NULL)
return 0;
if (file_printf(ms, "application/%s", str) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdf_read_short_sector function in cdf.c in file before 5.19, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted CDF file.
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions) | Medium | 166,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* pluginView, const Platform::TouchPoint& point)
{
NPEvent npEvent;
NPMouseEvent mouse;
switch (point.m_state) {
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_DOWN;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
mouse.type = MOUSE_MOTION;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary:
return true;
}
mouse.x = point.m_screenPos.x();
mouse.y = point.m_screenPos.y();
mouse.button = mouse.type != MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
mouse.flags = 0;
npEvent.type = NP_MouseEvent;
npEvent.data = &mouse;
pluginView->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0; /* not a peer of original */
else
mnt->mnt_group_id = old->mnt_group_id;
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) && !mnt->mnt_group_id) {
err = mnt_alloc_group_id(mnt);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED);
/* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
/* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
lock_mount_hash();
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &sb->s_mounts);
unlock_mount_hash();
if ((flag & CL_SLAVE) ||
((flag & CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE) && IS_MNT_SHARED(old))) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
mnt->mnt_master = old;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
} else if (!(flag & CL_PRIVATE)) {
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) || IS_MNT_SHARED(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &old->mnt_share);
if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave);
mnt->mnt_master = old->mnt_master;
}
if (flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED)
set_mnt_shared(mnt);
/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list
* as the original if that was on one */
if (flag & CL_EXPIRE) {
if (!list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_expire, &old->mnt_expire);
}
return mnt;
out_free:
mnt_free_id(mnt);
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 does not properly restrict clearing MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOSUID, and MNT_NOEXEC and changing MNT_ATIME_MASK during a remount of a bind mount, which allows local users to gain privileges, interfere with backups and auditing on systems that had atime enabled, or cause a denial of service (excessive filesystem updating) on systems that had atime disabled via a *mount -o remount* command within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int srpt_rx_mgmt_fn_tag(struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx, u64 tag)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_send_ioctx *target;
int ret, i;
ret = -EINVAL;
ch = ioctx->ch;
BUG_ON(!ch);
BUG_ON(!ch->sport);
sdev = ch->sport->sdev;
BUG_ON(!sdev);
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
for (i = 0; i < ch->rq_size; ++i) {
target = ch->ioctx_ring[i];
if (target->cmd.se_lun == ioctx->cmd.se_lun &&
target->cmd.tag == tag &&
srpt_get_cmd_state(target) != SRPT_STATE_DONE) {
ret = 0;
/* now let the target core abort &target->cmd; */
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by using an ABORT_TASK command to abort a device write operation.
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mrb_obj_clone(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct RObject *p;
mrb_value clone;
if (mrb_immediate_p(self)) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't clone %S", self);
}
if (mrb_type(self) == MRB_TT_SCLASS) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't clone singleton class");
}
p = (struct RObject*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, mrb_type(self), mrb_obj_class(mrb, self));
p->c = mrb_singleton_class_clone(mrb, self);
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)p, (struct RBasic*)p->c);
clone = mrb_obj_value(p);
init_copy(mrb, clone, self);
p->flags = mrb_obj_ptr(self)->flags;
return clone;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a NULL pointer dereference in mrb_class, related to certain .clone usage, because mrb_obj_clone in kernel.c copies flags other than the MRB_FLAG_IS_FROZEN flag (e.g., the embedded flag).
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag. | Medium | 169,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent()
{
if (!m_useFallbackContent)
return;
m_useFallbackContent = false;
reattachFallbackContent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-361
Summary: The ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent function in WebKit/Source/core/html/forms/ImageInputType.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.87, does not properly maintain the user agent shadow DOM, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804} | High | 172,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied() {
TRACE_EVENT0(base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::kTraceCategory,
"GlobalMemoryDump.Computation");
DCHECK(!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty());
QueuedRequest* request = &queued_memory_dump_requests_.front();
if (!request->dump_in_progress || request->pending_responses.size() > 0 ||
request->heap_dump_in_progress) {
return;
}
QueuedRequestDispatcher::Finalize(request, tracing_observer_.get());
queued_memory_dump_requests_.pop_front();
request = nullptr;
if (!queued_memory_dump_requests_.empty()) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528} | Medium | 173,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FakePlatformSensorProvider::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(type >= mojom::SensorType::FIRST && type <= mojom::SensorType::LAST);
auto sensor =
base::MakeRefCounted<FakePlatformSensor>(type, std::move(mapping), this);
DoCreateSensorInternal(type, std::move(sensor), callback);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,818 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
source_stride_ = (width_ + 31) & ~31;
reference_stride_ = width_ * 2;
rnd_.Reset(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int udhcpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
int server_socket = -1, retval;
uint8_t *state;
unsigned timeout_end;
unsigned num_ips;
unsigned opt;
struct option_set *option;
char *str_I = str_I;
const char *str_a = "2000";
unsigned arpping_ms;
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(char *str_P;)
setup_common_bufsiz();
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(SERVER_PORT = 67;)
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(CLIENT_PORT = 68;)
opt = getopt32(argv, "^"
"fSI:va:"IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT("P:")
"\0"
#if defined CONFIG_UDHCP_DEBUG && CONFIG_UDHCP_DEBUG >= 1
"vv"
#endif
, &str_I
, &str_a
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(, &str_P)
IF_UDHCP_VERBOSE(, &dhcp_verbose)
);
if (!(opt & 1)) { /* no -f */
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(0, argv);
logmode = LOGMODE_NONE;
}
/* update argv after the possible vfork+exec in daemonize */
argv += optind;
if (opt & 2) { /* -S */
openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
logmode |= LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
}
if (opt & 4) { /* -I */
len_and_sockaddr *lsa = xhost_and_af2sockaddr(str_I, 0, AF_INET);
server_config.server_nip = lsa->u.sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
free(lsa);
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT
if (opt & 32) { /* -P */
SERVER_PORT = xatou16(str_P);
CLIENT_PORT = SERVER_PORT + 1;
}
#endif
arpping_ms = xatou(str_a);
/* Would rather not do read_config before daemonization -
* otherwise NOMMU machines will parse config twice */
read_config(argv[0] ? argv[0] : DHCPD_CONF_FILE);
/* prevent poll timeout overflow */
if (server_config.auto_time > INT_MAX / 1000)
server_config.auto_time = INT_MAX / 1000;
/* Make sure fd 0,1,2 are open */
bb_sanitize_stdio();
/* Create pidfile */
write_pidfile(server_config.pidfile);
/* if (!..) bb_perror_msg("can't create pidfile %s", pidfile); */
bb_error_msg("started, v"BB_VER);
option = udhcp_find_option(server_config.options, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
server_config.max_lease_sec = DEFAULT_LEASE_TIME;
if (option) {
move_from_unaligned32(server_config.max_lease_sec, option->data + OPT_DATA);
server_config.max_lease_sec = ntohl(server_config.max_lease_sec);
}
/* Sanity check */
num_ips = server_config.end_ip - server_config.start_ip + 1;
if (server_config.max_leases > num_ips) {
bb_error_msg("max_leases=%u is too big, setting to %u",
(unsigned)server_config.max_leases, num_ips);
server_config.max_leases = num_ips;
}
/* this sets g_leases */
SET_PTR_TO_GLOBALS(xzalloc(server_config.max_leases * sizeof(g_leases[0])));
read_leases(server_config.lease_file);
if (udhcp_read_interface(server_config.interface,
&server_config.ifindex,
(server_config.server_nip == 0 ? &server_config.server_nip : NULL),
server_config.server_mac)
) {
retval = 1;
goto ret;
}
/* Setup the signal pipe */
udhcp_sp_setup();
continue_with_autotime:
timeout_end = monotonic_sec() + server_config.auto_time;
while (1) { /* loop until universe collapses */
struct pollfd pfds[2];
struct dhcp_packet packet;
int bytes;
int tv;
uint8_t *server_id_opt;
uint8_t *requested_ip_opt;
uint32_t requested_nip = requested_nip; /* for compiler */
uint32_t static_lease_nip;
struct dyn_lease *lease, fake_lease;
if (server_socket < 0) {
server_socket = udhcp_listen_socket(/*INADDR_ANY,*/ SERVER_PORT,
server_config.interface);
}
udhcp_sp_fd_set(pfds, server_socket);
new_tv:
tv = -1;
if (server_config.auto_time) {
tv = timeout_end - monotonic_sec();
if (tv <= 0) {
write_leases:
write_leases();
goto continue_with_autotime;
}
tv *= 1000;
}
/* Block here waiting for either signal or packet */
retval = poll(pfds, 2, tv);
if (retval <= 0) {
if (retval == 0)
goto write_leases;
if (errno == EINTR)
goto new_tv;
/* < 0 and not EINTR: should not happen */
bb_perror_msg_and_die("poll");
}
if (pfds[0].revents) switch (udhcp_sp_read()) {
case SIGUSR1:
bb_error_msg("received %s", "SIGUSR1");
write_leases();
/* why not just reset the timeout, eh */
goto continue_with_autotime;
case SIGTERM:
bb_error_msg("received %s", "SIGTERM");
write_leases();
goto ret0;
}
/* Is it a packet? */
if (!pfds[1].revents)
continue; /* no */
/* Note: we do not block here, we block on poll() instead.
* Blocking here would prevent SIGTERM from working:
* socket read inside this call is restarted on caught signals.
*/
bytes = udhcp_recv_kernel_packet(&packet, server_socket);
if (bytes < 0) {
/* bytes can also be -2 ("bad packet data") */
if (bytes == -1 && errno != EINTR) {
log1("read error: "STRERROR_FMT", reopening socket" STRERROR_ERRNO);
close(server_socket);
server_socket = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (packet.hlen != 6) {
bb_error_msg("MAC length != 6, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
if (packet.op != BOOTREQUEST) {
bb_error_msg("not a REQUEST, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
state = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
if (state == NULL || state[0] < DHCP_MINTYPE || state[0] > DHCP_MAXTYPE) {
bb_error_msg("no or bad message type option, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
/* Get SERVER_ID if present */
server_id_opt = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
if (server_id_opt) {
uint32_t server_id_network_order;
move_from_unaligned32(server_id_network_order, server_id_opt);
if (server_id_network_order != server_config.server_nip) {
/* client talks to somebody else */
log1("server ID doesn't match, ignoring");
continue;
}
}
/* Look for a static/dynamic lease */
static_lease_nip = get_static_nip_by_mac(server_config.static_leases, &packet.chaddr);
if (static_lease_nip) {
bb_error_msg("found static lease: %x", static_lease_nip);
memcpy(&fake_lease.lease_mac, &packet.chaddr, 6);
fake_lease.lease_nip = static_lease_nip;
fake_lease.expires = 0;
lease = &fake_lease;
} else {
lease = find_lease_by_mac(packet.chaddr);
}
/* Get REQUESTED_IP if present */
requested_ip_opt = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP);
if (requested_ip_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(requested_nip, requested_ip_opt);
}
switch (state[0]) {
case DHCPDISCOVER:
log1("received %s", "DISCOVER");
send_offer(&packet, static_lease_nip, lease, requested_ip_opt, arpping_ms);
break;
case DHCPREQUEST:
log1("received %s", "REQUEST");
/* RFC 2131:
o DHCPREQUEST generated during SELECTING state:
Client inserts the address of the selected server in 'server
identifier', 'ciaddr' MUST be zero, 'requested IP address' MUST be
filled in with the yiaddr value from the chosen DHCPOFFER.
Note that the client may choose to collect several DHCPOFFER
messages and select the "best" offer. The client indicates its
selection by identifying the offering server in the DHCPREQUEST
message. If the client receives no acceptable offers, the client
may choose to try another DHCPDISCOVER message. Therefore, the
servers may not receive a specific DHCPREQUEST from which they can
decide whether or not the client has accepted the offer.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during INIT-REBOOT state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST be filled in with client's notion of its previously
assigned address. 'ciaddr' MUST be zero. The client is seeking to
verify a previously allocated, cached configuration. Server SHOULD
send a DHCPNAK message to the client if the 'requested IP address'
is incorrect, or is on the wrong network.
Determining whether a client in the INIT-REBOOT state is on the
correct network is done by examining the contents of 'giaddr', the
'requested IP address' option, and a database lookup. If the DHCP
server detects that the client is on the wrong net (i.e., the
result of applying the local subnet mask or remote subnet mask (if
'giaddr' is not zero) to 'requested IP address' option value
doesn't match reality), then the server SHOULD send a DHCPNAK
message to the client.
If the network is correct, then the DHCP server should check if
the client's notion of its IP address is correct. If not, then the
server SHOULD send a DHCPNAK message to the client. If the DHCP
server has no record of this client, then it MUST remain silent,
and MAY output a warning to the network administrator. This
behavior is necessary for peaceful coexistence of non-
communicating DHCP servers on the same wire.
If 'giaddr' is 0x0 in the DHCPREQUEST message, the client is on
the same subnet as the server. The server MUST broadcast the
DHCPNAK message to the 0xffffffff broadcast address because the
client may not have a correct network address or subnet mask, and
the client may not be answering ARP requests.
If 'giaddr' is set in the DHCPREQUEST message, the client is on a
different subnet. The server MUST set the broadcast bit in the
DHCPNAK, so that the relay agent will broadcast the DHCPNAK to the
client, because the client may not have a correct network address
or subnet mask, and the client may not be answering ARP requests.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during RENEWING state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message will
be unicast, so no relay agents will be involved in its
transmission. Because 'giaddr' is therefore not filled in, the
DHCP server will trust the value in 'ciaddr', and use it when
replying to the client.
A client MAY choose to renew or extend its lease prior to T1. The
server may choose not to extend the lease (as a policy decision by
the network administrator), but should return a DHCPACK message
regardless.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during REBINDING state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message MUST
be broadcast to the 0xffffffff IP broadcast address. The DHCP
server SHOULD check 'ciaddr' for correctness before replying to
the DHCPREQUEST.
The DHCPREQUEST from a REBINDING client is intended to accommodate
sites that have multiple DHCP servers and a mechanism for
maintaining consistency among leases managed by multiple servers.
A DHCP server MAY extend a client's lease only if it has local
administrative authority to do so.
*/
if (!requested_ip_opt) {
requested_nip = packet.ciaddr;
if (requested_nip == 0) {
log1("no requested IP and no ciaddr, ignoring");
break;
}
}
if (lease && requested_nip == lease->lease_nip) {
/* client requested or configured IP matches the lease.
* ACK it, and bump lease expiration time. */
send_ACK(&packet, lease->lease_nip);
break;
}
/* No lease for this MAC, or lease IP != requested IP */
if (server_id_opt /* client is in SELECTING state */
|| requested_ip_opt /* client is in INIT-REBOOT state */
) {
/* "No, we don't have this IP for you" */
send_NAK(&packet);
} /* else: client is in RENEWING or REBINDING, do not answer */
break;
case DHCPDECLINE:
/* RFC 2131:
* "If the server receives a DHCPDECLINE message,
* the client has discovered through some other means
* that the suggested network address is already
* in use. The server MUST mark the network address
* as not available and SHOULD notify the local
* sysadmin of a possible configuration problem."
*
* SERVER_ID must be present,
* REQUESTED_IP must be present,
* chaddr must be filled in,
* ciaddr must be 0 (we do not check this)
*/
log1("received %s", "DECLINE");
if (server_id_opt
&& requested_ip_opt
&& lease /* chaddr matches this lease */
&& requested_nip == lease->lease_nip
) {
memset(lease->lease_mac, 0, sizeof(lease->lease_mac));
lease->expires = time(NULL) + server_config.decline_time;
}
break;
case DHCPRELEASE:
/* "Upon receipt of a DHCPRELEASE message, the server
* marks the network address as not allocated."
*
* SERVER_ID must be present,
* REQUESTED_IP must not be present (we do not check this),
* chaddr must be filled in,
* ciaddr must be filled in
*/
log1("received %s", "RELEASE");
if (server_id_opt
&& lease /* chaddr matches this lease */
&& packet.ciaddr == lease->lease_nip
) {
lease->expires = time(NULL);
}
break;
case DHCPINFORM:
log1("received %s", "INFORM");
send_inform(&packet);
break;
}
}
ret0:
retval = 0;
ret:
/*if (server_config.pidfile) - server_config.pidfile is never NULL */
remove_pidfile(server_config.pidfile);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in BusyBox before 1.30.0. An out of bounds read in udhcp components (consumed by the DHCP server, client, and relay) allows a remote attacker to leak sensitive information from the stack by sending a crafted DHCP message. This is related to verification in udhcp_get_option() in networking/udhcp/common.c that 4-byte options are indeed 4 bytes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
__wsum csum;
int tnl_hlen;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
/* Set the IPv6 fragment id if not set yet */
if (!skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id)
ipv6_proxy_select_ident(dev_net(skb->dev), skb);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
(SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL|SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM))
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features, true);
else {
const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
struct udphdr *uh;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
goto out;
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
uh->check = 0;
csum = skb_checksum(skb, 0, skb->len, 0);
uh->check = udp_v6_check(skb->len, &ipv6h->saddr,
&ipv6h->daddr, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* If there is no outer header we can fake a checksum offload
* due to the fact that we have already done the checksum in
* software prior to segmenting the frame.
*/
if (!skb->encap_hdr_csum)
features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
if (skb->mac_header < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
goto out;
}
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
if (!skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id)
ipv6_proxy_select_ident(dev_net(skb->dev), skb);
fptr->identification = skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id;
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
}
out:
return segs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 fragmentation implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 does not consider that the nexthdr field may be associated with an invalid option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted socket and send system calls.
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InputMethodDescriptors* ChromeOSGetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors() {
InputMethodDescriptors* input_methods = new InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(chromeos::kIBusEngines); ++i) {
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].name)) {
input_methods->push_back(chromeos::CreateInputMethodDescriptor(
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].name,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].longname,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].layout,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].language));
}
}
return input_methods;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
static const unsigned char empty[]="";
unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
unsigned char *exp_label;
unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
int client_write;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
int *mac_secret_size;
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
comp);
printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
reuse_dd = 1;
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
else
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand=NULL;
}
if (comp != NULL)
{
s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->expand == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
goto err;
}
#endif
/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
}
else
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
reuse_dd = 1;
else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
else
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
if (s->compress == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
}
#endif
/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
}
if (reuse_dd)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
else
k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
{
ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
client_write=1;
}
else
{
n=i;
ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
client_write=0;
}
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err2;
}
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
{
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
#endif
if (is_export)
{
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
*/
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
exp_label,exp_label_len,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL,0,NULL,0,
key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
goto err2;
key=tmp1;
if (k > 0)
{
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL,0,NULL,0,
empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
goto err2;
if (client_write)
iv=iv1;
else
iv= &(iv1[k]);
}
}
s->session->key_arg_length=0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int i;
printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
printf("\n");
printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
{
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
}
else
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\niv=");
{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
return(1);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The DTLS retransmission implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0l and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1f does not properly maintain data structures for digest and encryption contexts, which might allow man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger the use of a different context and cause a denial of service (application crash) by interfering with packet delivery, related to ssl/d1_both.c and ssl/t1_enc.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;
struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma =
container_of(xprt, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_xprt);
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_argp;
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp;
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary, *rp_ary;
int ret;
int inline_bytes;
struct page *res_page;
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec;
u32 inv_rkey;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("svcrdma: sending response for rqstp=%p\n", rqstp);
/* Get the RDMA request header. The receive logic always
* places this at the start of page 0.
*/
rdma_argp = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[0]);
svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(rdma_argp, &wr_ary, &rp_ary);
inv_rkey = 0;
if (rdma->sc_snd_w_inv)
inv_rkey = svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(rdma_argp, wr_ary, rp_ary);
/* Build an req vec for the XDR */
vec = svc_rdma_get_req_map(rdma);
ret = svc_rdma_map_xdr(rdma, &rqstp->rq_res, vec, wr_ary != NULL);
if (ret)
goto err0;
inline_bytes = rqstp->rq_res.len;
/* Create the RDMA response header. xprt->xpt_mutex,
* acquired in svc_send(), serializes RPC replies. The
* code path below that inserts the credit grant value
* into each transport header runs only inside this
* critical section.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
res_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res_page)
goto err0;
rdma_resp = page_address(res_page);
p = &rdma_resp->rm_xid;
*p++ = rdma_argp->rm_xid;
*p++ = rdma_argp->rm_vers;
*p++ = rdma->sc_fc_credits;
*p++ = rp_ary ? rdma_nomsg : rdma_msg;
/* Start with empty chunks */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p = xdr_zero;
/* Send any write-chunk data and build resp write-list */
if (wr_ary) {
ret = send_write_chunks(rdma, wr_ary, rdma_resp, rqstp, vec);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
inline_bytes -= ret + xdr_padsize(ret);
}
/* Send any reply-list data and update resp reply-list */
if (rp_ary) {
ret = send_reply_chunks(rdma, rp_ary, rdma_resp, rqstp, vec);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
inline_bytes -= ret;
}
/* Post a fresh Receive buffer _before_ sending the reply */
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(rdma, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
goto err1;
ret = send_reply(rdma, rqstp, res_page, rdma_resp, vec,
inline_bytes, inv_rkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto err0;
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
dprintk("svcrdma: send_reply returns %d\n", ret);
return ret;
err1:
put_page(res_page);
err0:
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
pr_err("svcrdma: Could not send reply, err=%d. Closing transport.\n",
ret);
set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &rdma->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dns_resolver_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
int slen, dlen, ret = 0;
const char *src = key->description, *dsp = match_data->raw_data;
kenter("%s,%s", src, dsp);
if (!src || !dsp)
goto no_match;
if (strcasecmp(src, dsp) == 0)
goto matched;
slen = strlen(src);
dlen = strlen(dsp);
if (slen <= 0 || dlen <= 0)
goto no_match;
if (src[slen - 1] == '.')
slen--;
if (dsp[dlen - 1] == '.')
dlen--;
if (slen != dlen || strncasecmp(src, dsp, slen) != 0)
goto no_match;
matched:
ret = 1;
no_match:
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | High | 168,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void perform_gamma_sbit_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte sbit;
/* The only interesting cases are colour and grayscale, alpha is ignored here
* for overall speed. Only bit depths where sbit is less than the bit depth
* are tested.
*/
for (sbit=pm->sbitlow; sbit<(1<<READ_BDHI); ++sbit)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0, bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int npalette = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &npalette, 1/*gamma*/))
if ((colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0 &&
((colour_type == 3 && sbit < 8) ||
(colour_type != 3 && sbit < bit_depth)))
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<pm->ngamma_tests; ++i)
{
unsigned int j;
for (j=0; j<pm->ngamma_tests; ++j) if (i != j)
{
gamma_transform_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, npalette,
pm->interlace_type, 1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j],
sbit, pm->use_input_precision_sbit, 0 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int inet_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)__sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
__be32 daddr;
int err;
/* Route is OK, nothing to do. */
if (rt)
return 0;
/* Reroute. */
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
if (inet->opt && inet->opt->srr)
daddr = inet->opt->faddr;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), sk, daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = 0;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
/* Routing failed... */
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
/*
* Other protocols have to map its equivalent state to TCP_SYN_SENT.
* DCCP maps its DCCP_REQUESTING state to TCP_SYN_SENT. -acme
*/
if (!sysctl_ip_dynaddr ||
sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT ||
(sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK) ||
(err = inet_sk_reselect_saddr(sk)) != 0)
sk->sk_err_soft = -err;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DeserializeNotificationDatabaseData(const std::string& input,
NotificationDatabaseData* output) {
DCHECK(output);
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
if (!message.ParseFromString(input))
return false;
output->notification_id = message.notification_id();
output->origin = GURL(message.origin());
output->service_worker_registration_id =
message.service_worker_registration_id();
PlatformNotificationData* notification_data = &output->notification_data;
const NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData& payload =
message.notification_data();
notification_data->title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.title());
switch (payload.direction()) {
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO:
notification_data->direction = PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO;
break;
}
notification_data->lang = payload.lang();
notification_data->body = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.body());
notification_data->tag = payload.tag();
notification_data->icon = GURL(payload.icon());
if (payload.vibration_pattern().size() > 0) {
notification_data->vibration_pattern.assign(
payload.vibration_pattern().begin(), payload.vibration_pattern().end());
}
notification_data->timestamp =
base::Time::FromInternalValue(payload.timestamp());
notification_data->silent = payload.silent();
notification_data->require_interaction = payload.require_interaction();
if (payload.data().length()) {
notification_data->data.assign(payload.data().begin(),
payload.data().end());
}
for (const auto& payload_action : payload.actions()) {
PlatformNotificationAction action;
action.action = payload_action.action();
action.title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload_action.title());
notification_data->actions.push_back(action);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649} | High | 171,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_decrypt)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_string_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, Z_STRVAL_PP(mode), iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), MCRYPT_DECRYPT, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
int op_flag,
unsigned int size,
unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
int change = 0;
void *new_data;
if (op_flag > 0) {
if (size > 1024 * 128) /* sane value */
return -EINVAL;
new_data = memdup_user(tlv, size);
if (IS_ERR(new_data))
return PTR_ERR(new_data);
change = ue->tlv_data_size != size;
if (!change)
change = memcmp(ue->tlv_data, new_data, size);
kfree(ue->tlv_data);
ue->tlv_data = new_data;
ue->tlv_data_size = size;
} else {
if (! ue->tlv_data_size || ! ue->tlv_data)
return -ENXIO;
if (size < ue->tlv_data_size)
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_to_user(tlv, ue->tlv_data, ue->tlv_data_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return change;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the tlv handler functionality in the snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv function in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
int expected_pending_entry_id =
render_frame_host->navigation_handle()
? render_frame_host->navigation_handle()->pending_nav_entry_id()
: 0;
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(expected_pending_entry_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
RFCOMM_PARSE_LEN_FIELD(eal, len, p_data);
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In rfc_process_mx_message of rfc_ts_frames.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-80432928
Commit Message: Add bound check for rfc_parse_data
Bug: 78288018
Test: manual
Change-Id: I44349cd22c141483d01bce0f5a2131b727d0feb0
(cherry picked from commit 6039cb7225733195192b396ad19c528800feb735)
| High | 174,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CL_Init( void ) {
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization -----\n" );
Con_Init();
if(!com_fullyInitialized)
{
CL_ClearState();
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED; // no longer CA_UNINITIALIZED
cl_oldGameSet = qfalse;
}
cls.realtime = 0;
CL_InitInput();
cl_noprint = Cvar_Get( "cl_noprint", "0", 0 );
#ifdef UPDATE_SERVER_NAME
cl_motd = Cvar_Get( "cl_motd", "1", 0 );
#endif
cl_timeout = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeout", "200", 0 );
cl_timeNudge = Cvar_Get( "cl_timeNudge", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_shownet = Cvar_Get( "cl_shownet", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showSend = Cvar_Get( "cl_showSend", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_showTimeDelta = Cvar_Get( "cl_showTimeDelta", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_freezeDemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_freezeDemo", "0", CVAR_TEMP );
rcon_client_password = Cvar_Get( "rconPassword", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_activeAction = Cvar_Get( "activeAction", "", CVAR_TEMP );
cl_timedemo = Cvar_Get( "timedemo", "0", 0 );
cl_timedemoLog = Cvar_Get ("cl_timedemoLog", "", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_autoRecordDemo = Cvar_Get ("cl_autoRecordDemo", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviFrameRate = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviFrameRate", "25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_aviMotionJpeg = Cvar_Get ("cl_aviMotionJpeg", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_avidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_avidemo", "0", 0 );
cl_forceavidemo = Cvar_Get( "cl_forceavidemo", "0", 0 );
rconAddress = Cvar_Get( "rconAddress", "", 0 );
cl_yawspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_yawspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_pitchspeed = Cvar_Get( "cl_pitchspeed", "140", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_anglespeedkey = Cvar_Get( "cl_anglespeedkey", "1.5", 0 );
cl_maxpackets = Cvar_Get( "cl_maxpackets", "38", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_packetdup = Cvar_Get( "cl_packetdup", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_run = Cvar_Get( "cl_run", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_sensitivity = Cvar_Get( "sensitivity", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccel = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccel", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_freelook = Cvar_Get( "cl_freelook", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelStyle = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelStyle", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_mouseAccelOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_mouseAccelOffset", "5", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_CheckRange(cl_mouseAccelOffset, 0.001f, 50000.0f, qfalse);
cl_showMouseRate = Cvar_Get( "cl_showmouserate", "0", 0 );
cl_allowDownload = Cvar_Get( "cl_allowDownload", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_CURL_DLOPEN
cl_cURLLib = Cvar_Get("cl_cURLLib", DEFAULT_CURL_LIB, CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoswitch", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_wolfparticles", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_conXOffset = Cvar_Get( "cl_conXOffset", "0", 0 );
cl_inGameVideo = Cvar_Get( "r_inGameVideo", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_serverStatusResendTime = Cvar_Get( "cl_serverStatusResendTime", "750", 0 );
cl_recoilPitch = Cvar_Get( "cg_recoilPitch", "0", CVAR_ROM );
m_pitch = Cvar_Get( "m_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_yaw = Cvar_Get( "m_yaw", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_forward = Cvar_Get( "m_forward", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_side = Cvar_Get( "m_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
m_filter = Cvar_Get( "m_filter", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
j_pitch = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch", "0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw", "-0.022", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward = Cvar_Get ("j_forward", "-0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side = Cvar_Get ("j_side", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up = Cvar_Get ("j_up", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_pitch_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_pitch_axis", "3", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_yaw_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_yaw_axis", "2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_forward_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_forward_axis", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_side_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_side_axis", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
j_up_axis = Cvar_Get ("j_up_axis", "4", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_pitch_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_yaw_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_forward_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_side_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
Cvar_CheckRange(j_up_axis, 0, MAX_JOYSTICK_AXIS-1, qtrue);
cl_motdString = Cvar_Get( "cl_motdString", "", CVAR_ROM );
Cvar_Get( "cl_maxPing", "800", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_lanForcePackets = Cvar_Get ("cl_lanForcePackets", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_guidServerUniq = Cvar_Get ("cl_guidServerUniq", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_consoleKeys = Cvar_Get( "cl_consoleKeys", "~ ` 0x7e 0x60", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_Get( "name", "WolfPlayer", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_rate = Cvar_Get( "rate", "25000", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE ); // NERVE - SMF - changed from 3000
Cvar_Get( "snaps", "20", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "model", "bj2", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "head", "default", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "color", "4", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "handicap", "100", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "sex", "male", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cl_anonymous", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "password", "", CVAR_USERINFO );
Cvar_Get( "cg_predictItems", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
cl_useMumble = Cvar_Get ("cl_useMumble", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
cl_mumbleScale = Cvar_Get ("cl_mumbleScale", "0.0254", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
cl_voipSend = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSend", "0", 0);
cl_voipSendTarget = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipSendTarget", "spatial", 0);
cl_voipGainDuringCapture = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipGainDuringCapture", "0.2", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipCaptureMult = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipCaptureMult", "2.0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipUseVAD = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipUseVAD", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipVADThreshold = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipVADThreshold", "0.25", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voipShowMeter = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipShowMeter", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
cl_voip = Cvar_Get ("cl_voip", "1", CVAR_ARCHIVE);
Cvar_CheckRange( cl_voip, 0, 1, qtrue );
cl_voipProtocol = Cvar_Get ("cl_voipProtocol", cl_voip->integer ? "opus" : "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM);
#endif
Cvar_Get( "cg_autoactivate", "1", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_emptyswitch", "0", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get( "cg_viewsize", "100", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
Cvar_Get ("cg_stereoSeparation", "0", CVAR_ROM);
cl_missionStats = Cvar_Get( "g_missionStats", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_waitForFire = Cvar_Get( "cl_waitForFire", "0", CVAR_ROM );
cl_language = Cvar_Get( "cl_language", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE );
cl_debugTranslation = Cvar_Get( "cl_debugTranslation", "0", 0 );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cmd", CL_ForwardToServer_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "configstrings", CL_Configstrings_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "clientinfo", CL_Clientinfo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "snd_restart", CL_Snd_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "vid_restart", CL_Vid_Restart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "disconnect", CL_Disconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "record", CL_Record_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "demo", CL_PlayDemo_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "demo", CL_CompleteDemoName );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cinematic", CL_PlayCinematic_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "stoprecord", CL_StopRecord_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "connect", CL_Connect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "reconnect", CL_Reconnect_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "localservers", CL_LocalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "globalservers", CL_GlobalServers_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "rcon", CL_Rcon_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "rcon", CL_CompleteRcon );
Cmd_AddCommand( "ping", CL_Ping_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "serverstatus", CL_ServerStatus_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "showip", CL_ShowIP_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_openedList", CL_OpenedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "fs_referencedList", CL_ReferencedPK3List_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("video", CL_Video_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("stopvideo", CL_StopVideo_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_startgather", CL_Cache_StartGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_usedfile", CL_Cache_UsedFile_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_setindex", CL_Cache_SetIndex_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_mapchange", CL_Cache_MapChange_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cache_endgather", CL_Cache_EndGather_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatehunkusage", CL_UpdateLevelHunkUsage );
Cmd_AddCommand( "updatescreen", SCR_UpdateScreen );
Cmd_AddCommand( "cld", CL_ClientDamageCommand );
Cmd_AddCommand( "startMultiplayer", CL_startMultiplayer_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "shellExecute", CL_ShellExecute_URL_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "map_restart", CL_MapRestart_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "setRecommended", CL_SetRecommended_f );
CL_InitRef();
SCR_Init();
Cvar_Set( "cl_running", "1" );
CL_GenerateQKey();
Cvar_Get( "cl_guid", "", CVAR_USERINFO | CVAR_ROM );
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
Com_Printf( "----- Client Initialization Complete -----\n" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | High | 170,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int perf_event_task_enable(void)
{
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_enable);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,990 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderThreadStarted() {
chrome_observer_.reset(new ChromeRenderProcessObserver());
extension_dispatcher_.reset(new ExtensionDispatcher());
histogram_snapshots_.reset(new RendererHistogramSnapshots());
net_predictor_.reset(new RendererNetPredictor());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
visited_link_slave_.reset(new VisitedLinkSlave());
phishing_classifier_.reset(safe_browsing::PhishingClassifierFilter::Create());
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::current();
thread->AddFilter(new DevToolsAgentFilter());
thread->AddObserver(chrome_observer_.get());
thread->AddObserver(extension_dispatcher_.get());
thread->AddObserver(histogram_snapshots_.get());
thread->AddObserver(phishing_classifier_.get());
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
thread->AddObserver(visited_link_slave_.get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::ExternalExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::LoadTimesExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::SearchBoxExtension::Get());
v8::Extension* search_extension = extensions_v8::SearchExtension::Get();
if (search_extension)
thread->RegisterExtension(search_extension);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
thread->RegisterExtension(DomAutomationV8Extension::Get());
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableIPCFuzzing)) {
thread->channel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(LoadExternalIPCFuzzer());
}
WebString chrome_ui_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_ui_scheme);
WebString extension_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure(extension_scheme);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly restrict access to internal schemes, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Prevent navigation to chrome-devtools: and chrome-internal: schemas from http
BUG=87815
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7275032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91002 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct buffer_ref *ref = (struct buffer_ref *)buf->private;
ref->ref++;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit | High | 170,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsWithUI(
int document_page_count,
bool has_selection,
bool is_scripted) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (is_scripted) {
PrintingContextDelegate* printing_context_delegate =
static_cast<PrintingContextDelegate*>(printing_context_delegate_.get());
content::WebContents* web_contents =
printing_context_delegate->GetWebContents();
TabAndroid* tab =
web_contents ? TabAndroid::FromWebContents(web_contents) : nullptr;
if (tab)
tab->SetPendingPrint();
}
#endif
printing_context_->AskUserForSettings(
document_page_count, has_selection, is_scripted,
base::Bind(&PostOnOwnerThread, make_scoped_refptr(owner_),
base::Bind(&PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in modal dialog handling in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to prevent a full screen warning from being displayed via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884} | Medium | 172,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void gdImageFillToBorder (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int border, int color)
{
int lastBorder;
/* Seek left */
int leftLimit = -1, rightLimit;
int i, restoreAlphaBlending = 0;
if (border < 0) {
/* Refuse to fill to a non-solid border */
return;
}
if (!im->trueColor) {
if ((color > (im->colorsTotal - 1)) || (border > (im->colorsTotal - 1)) || (color < 0)) {
return;
}
}
restoreAlphaBlending = im->alphaBlendingFlag;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
if (x >= im->sx) {
x = im->sx - 1;
} else if (x < 0) {
x = 0;
}
if (y >= im->sy) {
y = im->sy - 1;
} else if (y < 0) {
y = 0;
}
for (i = x; i >= 0; i--) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
leftLimit = i;
}
if (leftLimit == -1) {
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
return;
}
/* Seek right */
rightLimit = x;
for (i = (x + 1); i < im->sx; i++) {
if (gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y) == border) {
break;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, i, y, color);
rightLimit = i;
}
/* Look at lines above and below and start paints */
/* Above */
if (y > 0) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y - 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y - 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
/* Below */
if (y < ((im->sy) - 1)) {
lastBorder = 1;
for (i = leftLimit; i <= rightLimit; i++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel(im, i, y + 1);
if (lastBorder) {
if ((c != border) && (c != color)) {
gdImageFillToBorder(im, i, y + 1, border, color);
lastBorder = 0;
}
} else if ((c == border) || (c == color)) {
lastBorder = 1;
}
}
}
im->alphaBlendingFlag = restoreAlphaBlending;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack consumption vulnerability in the gdImageFillToBorder function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.2, as used in PHP before 5.6.28 and 7.x before 7.0.13, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation violation) via a crafted imagefilltoborder call that triggers use of a negative color value.
Commit Message: Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met. | Medium | 168,671 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
double out_r[kNumCoeffs];
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
reference_16x16_dct_2d(in, out_r);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
coeff[j] = round(out_r[j]);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, 16));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SSLErrorInfo SSLErrorInfo::CreateError(ErrorType error_type,
net::X509Certificate* cert,
const GURL& request_url) {
string16 title, details, short_description;
std::vector<string16> extra_info;
switch (error_type) {
case CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID: {
title =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_COMMON_NAME_INVALID_TITLE);
std::vector<std::string> dns_names;
cert->GetDNSNames(&dns_names);
DCHECK(!dns_names.empty());
size_t i = 0;
for (; i < dns_names.size(); ++i) {
if (dns_names[i] == cert->subject().common_name)
break;
}
if (i == dns_names.size())
i = 0;
details =
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_COMMON_NAME_INVALID_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
UTF8ToUTF16(dns_names[i]),
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_COMMON_NAME_INVALID_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_COMMON_NAME_INVALID_EXTRA_INFO_2,
UTF8ToUTF16(cert->subject().common_name),
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host())));
break;
}
case CERT_DATE_INVALID:
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
if (cert->HasExpired()) {
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXPIRED_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXPIRED_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
base::TimeFormatFriendlyDateAndTime(base::Time::Now()));
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXPIRED_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXPIRED_DETAILS_EXTRA_INFO_2));
} else {
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
base::TimeFormatFriendlyDateAndTime(base::Time::Now()));
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_DETAILS_EXTRA_INFO_2));
}
break;
case CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_AUTHORITY_INVALID_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_AUTHORITY_INVALID_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_AUTHORITY_INVALID_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_AUTHORITY_INVALID_EXTRA_INFO_2,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()),
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host())));
extra_info.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_AUTHORITY_INVALID_EXTRA_INFO_3));
break;
case CERT_CONTAINS_ERRORS:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_CONTAINS_ERRORS_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_CONTAINS_ERRORS_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_CONTAINS_ERRORS_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host())));
extra_info.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_CONTAINS_ERRORS_EXTRA_INFO_2));
break;
case CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM_DETAILS);
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM_DESCRIPTION);
break;
case CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION_DETAILS);
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION_DESCRIPTION);
break;
case CERT_REVOKED:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_EXTRA_INFO_2));
break;
case CERT_INVALID:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_INVALID_CERT_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_INVALID_CERT_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_INVALID_CERT_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_INVALID_CERT_EXTRA_INFO_2));
break;
case CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DETAILS,
UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_EXTRA_INFO_2));
break;
case CERT_WEAK_KEY:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_KEY_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_KEY_DETAILS, UTF8ToUTF16(request_url.host()));
short_description = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_KEY_DESCRIPTION);
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_EXTRA_INFO_1));
extra_info.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_CERT_ERROR_WEAK_KEY_EXTRA_INFO_2));
break;
case UNKNOWN:
title = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR_TITLE);
details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR_DETAILS);
short_description =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_CERT_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR_DESCRIPTION);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return SSLErrorInfo(title, details, short_description, extra_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in an SSL interstitial page in Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Properly EscapeForHTML potentially malicious input from X.509 certificates.
BUG=142956
TEST=Create an X.509 certificate with a CN field that contains JavaScript.
When you get the SSL error screen, check that the HTML + JavaScript is
escape instead of being treated as HTML and/or script.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10827364
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152210 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::StartNaClExecution() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
nacl::NaClStartParams params;
params.validation_cache_enabled = nacl_browser->ValidationCacheIsEnabled();
params.validation_cache_key = nacl_browser->GetValidationCacheKey();
params.version = chrome::VersionInfo().CreateVersionString();
params.enable_exception_handling = enable_exception_handling_;
params.enable_debug_stub =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableNaClDebug);
params.enable_ipc_proxy = enable_ipc_proxy_;
base::PlatformFile irt_file = nacl_browser->IrtFile();
CHECK_NE(irt_file, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
const ChildProcessData& data = process_->GetData();
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.size(); i++) {
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle,
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr[i], true,
¶ms.handles)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ShareHandleToSelLdr(data.handle, irt_file, false, ¶ms.handles))
return false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::SharedMemory memory_buffer;
base::SharedMemoryCreateOptions options;
options.size = 1;
options.executable = true;
if (!memory_buffer.Create(options)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate memory buffer";
return false;
}
nacl::FileDescriptor memory_fd;
memory_fd.fd = dup(memory_buffer.handle().fd);
if (memory_fd.fd < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() a file descriptor";
return false;
}
memory_fd.auto_close = true;
params.handles.push_back(memory_fd);
#endif
process_->Send(new NaClProcessMsg_Start(params));
internal_->sockets_for_sel_ldr.clear();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
{
static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCAPTIONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*caption,
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*property,
*text;
const char
*gravity,
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
split,
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
height,
width;
TypeMetric
metrics;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"caption:",8) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option+8);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption"));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
gravity=GetImageOption(image_info,"gravity");
if (gravity != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,gravity);
split=MagickFalse;
status=MagickTrue;
if (image->columns == 0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->columns=width;
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
split=MagickTrue;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
image->rows=(size_t) ((i+1)*(metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+draw_info->stroke_width)+0.5);
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon) && (strlen(caption) > 0))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
(void) status;
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=floor((low+high)/2.0-0.5);
}
/*
Draw caption.
*/
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&caption);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",MagickMax(
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : -metrics.bounds.x1,0.0),draw_info->gravity ==
UndefinedGravity ? metrics.ascent : 0.0);
draw_info->geometry=AcquireString(geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption:pointsize",pointsize);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in the caption and label handling code in ImageMagick allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a small memory leak | High | 168,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t qib_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *data,
size_t count, loff_t *off)
{
const struct qib_cmd __user *ucmd;
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd;
const void __user *src;
size_t consumed, copy = 0;
struct qib_cmd cmd;
ssize_t ret = 0;
void *dest;
if (count < sizeof(cmd.type)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
ucmd = (const struct qib_cmd __user *) data;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd.type, &ucmd->type, sizeof(cmd.type))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
consumed = sizeof(cmd.type);
switch (cmd.type) {
case QIB_CMD_ASSIGN_CTXT:
case QIB_CMD_USER_INIT:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.user_info);
dest = &cmd.cmd.user_info;
src = &ucmd->cmd.user_info;
break;
case QIB_CMD_RECV_CTRL:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.recv_ctrl);
dest = &cmd.cmd.recv_ctrl;
src = &ucmd->cmd.recv_ctrl;
break;
case QIB_CMD_CTXT_INFO:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.ctxt_info);
dest = &cmd.cmd.ctxt_info;
src = &ucmd->cmd.ctxt_info;
break;
case QIB_CMD_TID_UPDATE:
case QIB_CMD_TID_FREE:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.tid_info);
dest = &cmd.cmd.tid_info;
src = &ucmd->cmd.tid_info;
break;
case QIB_CMD_SET_PART_KEY:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.part_key);
dest = &cmd.cmd.part_key;
src = &ucmd->cmd.part_key;
break;
case QIB_CMD_DISARM_BUFS:
case QIB_CMD_PIOAVAILUPD: /* force an update of PIOAvail reg */
copy = 0;
src = NULL;
dest = NULL;
break;
case QIB_CMD_POLL_TYPE:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.poll_type);
dest = &cmd.cmd.poll_type;
src = &ucmd->cmd.poll_type;
break;
case QIB_CMD_ARMLAUNCH_CTRL:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.armlaunch_ctrl);
dest = &cmd.cmd.armlaunch_ctrl;
src = &ucmd->cmd.armlaunch_ctrl;
break;
case QIB_CMD_SDMA_INFLIGHT:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.sdma_inflight);
dest = &cmd.cmd.sdma_inflight;
src = &ucmd->cmd.sdma_inflight;
break;
case QIB_CMD_SDMA_COMPLETE:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.sdma_complete);
dest = &cmd.cmd.sdma_complete;
src = &ucmd->cmd.sdma_complete;
break;
case QIB_CMD_ACK_EVENT:
copy = sizeof(cmd.cmd.event_mask);
dest = &cmd.cmd.event_mask;
src = &ucmd->cmd.event_mask;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
if (copy) {
if ((count - consumed) < copy) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
if (copy_from_user(dest, src, copy)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
consumed += copy;
}
rcd = ctxt_fp(fp);
if (!rcd && cmd.type != QIB_CMD_ASSIGN_CTXT) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
switch (cmd.type) {
case QIB_CMD_ASSIGN_CTXT:
ret = qib_assign_ctxt(fp, &cmd.cmd.user_info);
if (ret)
goto bail;
break;
case QIB_CMD_USER_INIT:
ret = qib_do_user_init(fp, &cmd.cmd.user_info);
if (ret)
goto bail;
ret = qib_get_base_info(fp, (void __user *) (unsigned long)
cmd.cmd.user_info.spu_base_info,
cmd.cmd.user_info.spu_base_info_size);
break;
case QIB_CMD_RECV_CTRL:
ret = qib_manage_rcvq(rcd, subctxt_fp(fp), cmd.cmd.recv_ctrl);
break;
case QIB_CMD_CTXT_INFO:
ret = qib_ctxt_info(fp, (struct qib_ctxt_info __user *)
(unsigned long) cmd.cmd.ctxt_info);
break;
case QIB_CMD_TID_UPDATE:
ret = qib_tid_update(rcd, fp, &cmd.cmd.tid_info);
break;
case QIB_CMD_TID_FREE:
ret = qib_tid_free(rcd, subctxt_fp(fp), &cmd.cmd.tid_info);
break;
case QIB_CMD_SET_PART_KEY:
ret = qib_set_part_key(rcd, cmd.cmd.part_key);
break;
case QIB_CMD_DISARM_BUFS:
(void)qib_disarm_piobufs_ifneeded(rcd);
ret = disarm_req_delay(rcd);
break;
case QIB_CMD_PIOAVAILUPD:
qib_force_pio_avail_update(rcd->dd);
break;
case QIB_CMD_POLL_TYPE:
rcd->poll_type = cmd.cmd.poll_type;
break;
case QIB_CMD_ARMLAUNCH_CTRL:
rcd->dd->f_set_armlaunch(rcd->dd, cmd.cmd.armlaunch_ctrl);
break;
case QIB_CMD_SDMA_INFLIGHT:
ret = qib_sdma_get_inflight(user_sdma_queue_fp(fp),
(u32 __user *) (unsigned long)
cmd.cmd.sdma_inflight);
break;
case QIB_CMD_SDMA_COMPLETE:
ret = qib_sdma_get_complete(rcd->ppd,
user_sdma_queue_fp(fp),
(u32 __user *) (unsigned long)
cmd.cmd.sdma_complete);
break;
case QIB_CMD_ACK_EVENT:
ret = qib_user_event_ack(rcd, subctxt_fp(fp),
cmd.cmd.event_mask);
break;
}
if (ret >= 0)
ret = consumed;
bail:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The InfiniBand (aka IB) stack in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 incorrectly relies on the write system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (kernel memory write operation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a uAPI interface.
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> | High | 167,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BinaryUploadService::IsAuthorized(AuthorizationCallback callback) {
if (!timer_.IsRunning()) {
timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24), this,
&BinaryUploadService::ResetAuthorizationData);
}
if (!can_upload_data_.has_value()) {
if (!pending_validate_data_upload_request_) {
std::string dm_token = GetDMToken();
if (dm_token.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
pending_validate_data_upload_request_ = true;
auto request = std::make_unique<ValidateDataUploadRequest>(base::BindOnce(
&BinaryUploadService::ValidateDataUploadRequestCallback,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
request->set_dm_token(dm_token);
UploadForDeepScanning(std::move(request));
}
authorization_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(can_upload_data_.value());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 172,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: hb_buffer_create (unsigned int pre_alloc_size)
{
hb_buffer_t *buffer;
if (!HB_OBJECT_DO_CREATE (hb_buffer_t, buffer))
return &_hb_buffer_nil;
if (pre_alloc_size)
hb_buffer_ensure(buffer, pre_alloc_size);
buffer->unicode = &_hb_unicode_funcs_nil;
return buffer;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The hb_buffer_ensure function in hb-buffer.c in HarfBuzz, as used in Pango 1.28.3, Firefox, and other products, does not verify that memory reallocations succeed, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted OpenType font data that triggers use of an incorrect index.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cid_parse_font_matrix( CID_Face face,
CID_Parser* parser )
{
CID_FaceDict dict;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
if ( parser->num_dict >= 0 && parser->num_dict < face->cid.num_dicts )
{
FT_Matrix* matrix;
FT_Vector* offset;
dict = face->cid.font_dicts + parser->num_dict;
matrix = &dict->font_matrix;
offset = &dict->font_offset;
(void)cid_parser_to_fixed_array( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) t1_parse_font_matrix function in type1/t1load.c, (2) cid_parse_font_matrix function in cid/cidload.c, (3) t42_parse_font_matrix function in type42/t42parse.c, and (4) ps_parser_load_field function in psaux/psobjs.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 do not check return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted font.
Commit Message: | High | 165,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php_serialize) /* {{{ */
{
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *session_vars;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(session_vars);
if (php_var_unserialize(&session_vars, &val, endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &session_vars);
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(session_vars) == IS_NULL) {
array_init(session_vars);
}
PS(http_session_vars) = session_vars;
ZEND_SET_GLOBAL_VAR_WITH_LENGTH("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION"), PS(http_session_vars), Z_REFCOUNT_P(PS(http_session_vars)) + 1, 1);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 does not properly maintain a certain hash data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to session deserialization.
Commit Message: | High | 164,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::DetachFromFrame() {
DCHECK(frame_);
fetcher_->StopFetching();
if (frame_ && !SentDidFinishLoad())
LoadFailed(ResourceError::CancelledError(Url()));
fetcher_->ClearContext();
if (!frame_)
return;
application_cache_host_->DetachFromDocumentLoader();
application_cache_host_.Clear();
service_worker_network_provider_ = nullptr;
WeakIdentifierMap<DocumentLoader>::NotifyObjectDestroyed(this);
ClearResource();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The update_dimensions function in libavcodec/vp8.c in FFmpeg through 2.8.1, as used in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 and other products, relies on a coefficient-partition count during multi-threaded operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (race condition and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted WebM file.
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967} | Medium | 171,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<DocumentFragment> XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment(Node* sourceNode, Document* outputDoc)
{
String resultMIMEType;
String resultString;
String resultEncoding;
if (outputDoc->isHTMLDocument())
resultMIMEType = "text/html";
if (!transformToString(sourceNode, resultMIMEType, resultString, resultEncoding))
return 0;
return createFragmentFromSource(resultString, resultMIMEType, outputDoc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* plugin, const Platform::TouchEvent& event)
{
if (!event.neverHadMultiTouch())
return false;
if (event.isDoubleTap() || event.isTouchHold() || event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel) {
NPTouchEvent npTouchEvent;
if (event.isDoubleTap())
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_DOUBLETAP;
else if (event.isTouchHold())
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_TOUCHHOLD;
else if (event.m_type == Platform::TouchEvent::TouchCancel)
npTouchEvent.type = TOUCH_EVENT_CANCEL;
npTouchEvent.points = 0;
npTouchEvent.size = event.m_points.size();
if (npTouchEvent.size) {
npTouchEvent.points = new NPTouchPoint[npTouchEvent.size];
for (int i = 0; i < npTouchEvent.size; i++) {
npTouchEvent.points[i].touchId = event.m_points[i].m_id;
npTouchEvent.points[i].clientX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].clientY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y();
npTouchEvent.points[i].screenX = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].screenY = event.m_points[i].m_screenPos.y();
npTouchEvent.points[i].pageX = event.m_points[i].m_pos.x();
npTouchEvent.points[i].pageY = event.m_points[i].m_pos.y();
}
}
NPEvent npEvent;
npEvent.type = NP_TouchEvent;
npEvent.data = &npTouchEvent;
plugin->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
delete[] npTouchEvent.points;
return true;
}
dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(plugin, event.m_points[0]);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *)
(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET);
struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb;
unsigned int blocksize;
if (F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC != le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Magic Mismatch, valid(0x%x) - read(0x%x)",
F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB page cache size */
if (F2FS_BLKSIZE != PAGE_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid page_cache_size (%lu), supports only 4KB\n",
PAGE_SIZE);
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB block size */
blocksize = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
if (blocksize != F2FS_BLKSIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid blocksize (%u), supports only 4KB\n",
blocksize);
return 1;
}
/* check log blocks per segment */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg) != 9) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log blocks per segment (%u)\n",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support 512/1024/2048/4096 bytes sector size */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) >
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) <
F2FS_MIN_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Invalid log sectorsize (%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block) +
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) !=
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log sectors per block(%u) log sectorsize(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino) != 3) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid Fs Meta Ino: node(%u) meta(%u) root(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino));
return 1;
}
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The sanity_check_raw_super function in fs/f2fs/super.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.1 does not validate the segment count, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check segment count
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> | High | 168,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct file *get_empty_filp(void)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
static long old_max;
struct file *f;
int error;
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_zalloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!f))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
error = security_file_alloc(f);
if (unlikely(error)) {
file_free(f);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->f_u.fu_list);
atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
eventpoll_init_file(f);
/* f->f_version: 0 */
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long CuePoint::GetTime(const Segment* pSegment) const
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long time = scale * m_timecode;
return time;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The php_pgsql_meta_data function in pgsql.c in the PostgreSQL (aka pgsql) extension in PHP before 5.4.42, 5.5.x before 5.5.26, and 5.6.x before 5.6.10 does not validate token extraction for table names, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted name. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-1352.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sec_recv(RD_BOOL * is_fastpath)
{
uint8 fastpath_hdr, fastpath_flags;
uint16 sec_flags;
uint16 channel;
STREAM s;
while ((s = mcs_recv(&channel, is_fastpath, &fastpath_hdr)) != NULL)
{
if (*is_fastpath == True)
{
/* If fastpath packet is encrypted, read data
signature and decrypt */
/* FIXME: extracting flags from hdr could be made less obscure */
fastpath_flags = (fastpath_hdr & 0xC0) >> 6;
if (fastpath_flags & FASTPATH_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED)
{
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
}
return s;
}
if (g_encryption || (!g_licence_issued && !g_licence_error_result))
{
/* TS_SECURITY_HEADER */
in_uint16_le(s, sec_flags);
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* skip sec_flags_hi */
if (g_encryption)
{
if (sec_flags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
}
if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENSE_PKT)
{
licence_process(s);
continue;
}
if (sec_flags & SEC_REDIRECTION_PKT)
{
uint8 swapbyte;
in_uint8s(s, 8); /* signature */
sec_decrypt(s->p, s->end - s->p);
/* Check for a redirect packet, starts with 00 04 */
if (s->p[0] == 0 && s->p[1] == 4)
{
/* for some reason the PDU and the length seem to be swapped.
This isn't good, but we're going to do a byte for byte
swap. So the first four value appear as: 00 04 XX YY,
where XX YY is the little endian length. We're going to
use 04 00 as the PDU type, so after our swap this will look
like: XX YY 04 00 */
swapbyte = s->p[0];
s->p[0] = s->p[2];
s->p[2] = swapbyte;
swapbyte = s->p[1];
s->p[1] = s->p[3];
s->p[3] = swapbyte;
swapbyte = s->p[2];
s->p[2] = s->p[3];
s->p[3] = swapbyte;
}
}
}
else
{
if (sec_flags & SEC_LICENSE_PKT)
{
licence_process(s);
continue;
}
s->p -= 4;
}
}
if (channel != MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL)
{
channel_process(s, channel);
continue;
}
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,811 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: generic_ret *init_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen, slen;
char *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (! (ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle))) {
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
}
free_server_handle(handle);
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(NULL, ret.code);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Request: kadm5_init, %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s, "
"vers=%d, flavor=%d"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt),
ret.api_version & ~(KADM5_API_VERSION_MASK),
rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(NULL, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
return(&ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int read_part_of_packet(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t *pts,
int *len, int *strid, int read_packet) {
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
PVAContext *pvactx = s->priv_data;
int syncword, streamid, reserved, flags, length, pts_flag;
int64_t pva_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE, startpos;
int ret;
recover:
startpos = avio_tell(pb);
syncword = avio_rb16(pb);
streamid = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* counter not used */
reserved = avio_r8(pb);
flags = avio_r8(pb);
length = avio_rb16(pb);
pts_flag = flags & 0x10;
if (syncword != PVA_MAGIC) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid syncword\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid != PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && streamid != PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid streamid\n");
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (reserved != 0x55) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected reserved byte to be 0x55\n");
}
if (length > PVA_MAX_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid payload length %u\n", length);
return AVERROR(EIO);
}
if (streamid == PVA_VIDEO_PAYLOAD && pts_flag) {
pva_pts = avio_rb32(pb);
length -= 4;
} else if (streamid == PVA_AUDIO_PAYLOAD) {
/* PVA Audio Packets either start with a signaled PES packet or
* are a continuation of the previous PES packet. New PES packets
* always start at the beginning of a PVA Packet, never somewhere in
* the middle. */
if (!pvactx->continue_pes) {
int pes_signal, pes_header_data_length, pes_packet_length,
pes_flags;
unsigned char pes_header_data[256];
pes_signal = avio_rb24(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
pes_packet_length = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_flags = avio_rb16(pb);
pes_header_data_length = avio_r8(pb);
if (pes_signal != 1 || pes_header_data_length == 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "expected non empty signaled PES packet, "
"trying to recover\n");
avio_skip(pb, length - 9);
if (!read_packet)
return AVERROR(EIO);
goto recover;
}
ret = avio_read(pb, pes_header_data, pes_header_data_length);
if (ret != pes_header_data_length)
return ret < 0 ? ret : AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
length -= 9 + pes_header_data_length;
pes_packet_length -= 3 + pes_header_data_length;
pvactx->continue_pes = pes_packet_length;
if (pes_flags & 0x80 && (pes_header_data[0] & 0xf0) == 0x20) {
if (pes_header_data_length < 5) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "header too short\n");
avio_skip(pb, length);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
pva_pts = ff_parse_pes_pts(pes_header_data);
}
}
pvactx->continue_pes -= length;
if (pvactx->continue_pes < 0) {
pva_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "audio data corruption\n");
pvactx->continue_pes = 0;
}
}
if (pva_pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[streamid-1], startpos, pva_pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
*pts = pva_pts;
*len = length;
*strid = streamid;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: FFmpeg before commit 9807d3976be0e92e4ece3b4b1701be894cd7c2e1 contains a CWE-835: Infinite loop vulnerability in pva format demuxer that can result in a Vulnerability that allows attackers to consume excessive amount of resources like CPU and RAM. This attack appear to be exploitable via specially crafted PVA file has to be provided as input. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 9807d3976be0e92e4ece3b4b1701be894cd7c2e1 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/pva: Check for EOF before retrying in read_part_of_packet()
Fixes: Infinite loop
Fixes: pva-4b1835dbc2027bf3c567005dcc78e85199240d06
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 168,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void traverse_for_entities(
const char *old,
size_t oldlen,
char *ret, /* should have allocated TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(olden) */
size_t *retlen,
int all,
int flags,
const entity_ht *inv_map,
enum entity_charset charset)
{
const char *p,
*lim;
char *q;
int doctype = flags & ENT_HTML_DOC_TYPE_MASK;
lim = old + oldlen; /* terminator address */
assert(*lim == '\0');
for (p = old, q = ret; p < lim;) {
unsigned code, code2 = 0;
const char *next = NULL; /* when set, next > p, otherwise possible inf loop */
/* Shift JIS, Big5 and HKSCS use multi-byte encodings where an
* ASCII range byte can be part of a multi-byte sequence.
* However, they start at 0x40, therefore if we find a 0x26 byte,
* we're sure it represents the '&' character. */
/* assumes there are no single-char entities */
if (p[0] != '&' || (p + 3 >= lim)) {
*(q++) = *(p++);
continue;
}
/* now p[3] is surely valid and is no terminator */
/* numerical entity */
if (p[1] == '#') {
next = &p[2];
if (process_numeric_entity(&next, &code) == FAILURE)
goto invalid_code;
/* If we're in htmlspecialchars_decode, we're only decoding entities
* that represent &, <, >, " and '. Is this one of them? */
if (!all && (code > 63U ||
stage3_table_be_apos_00000[code].data.ent.entity == NULL))
goto invalid_code;
/* are we allowed to decode this entity in this document type?
* HTML 5 is the only that has a character that cannot be used in
* a numeric entity but is allowed literally (U+000D). The
* unoptimized version would be ... || !numeric_entity_is_allowed(code) */
if (!unicode_cp_is_allowed(code, doctype) ||
(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5 && code == 0x0D))
goto invalid_code;
} else {
const char *start;
size_t ent_len;
next = &p[1];
start = next;
if (process_named_entity_html(&next, &start, &ent_len) == FAILURE)
goto invalid_code;
if (resolve_named_entity_html(start, ent_len, inv_map, &code, &code2) == FAILURE) {
if (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML && ent_len == 4 && start[0] == 'a'
&& start[1] == 'p' && start[2] == 'o' && start[3] == 's') {
/* uses html4 inv_map, which doesn't include apos;. This is a
* hack to support it */
code = (unsigned) '\'';
} else {
goto invalid_code;
}
}
}
assert(*next == ';');
if (((code == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
(code == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE)))
/* && code2 == '\0' always true for current maps */)
goto invalid_code;
/* UTF-8 doesn't need mapping (ISO-8859-1 doesn't either, but
* the call is needed to ensure the codepoint <= U+00FF) */
if (charset != cs_utf_8) {
/* replace unicode code point */
if (map_from_unicode(code, charset, &code) == FAILURE || code2 != 0)
goto invalid_code; /* not representable in target charset */
}
q += write_octet_sequence(q, charset, code);
if (code2) {
q += write_octet_sequence(q, charset, code2);
}
/* jump over the valid entity; may go beyond size of buffer; np */
p = next + 1;
continue;
invalid_code:
for (; p < next; p++) {
*(q++) = *p;
}
}
*q = '\0';
*retlen = (size_t)(q - ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 167,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const
{
if (m_duration < 0)
return -1;
assert(m_timecodeScale >= 1);
const double dd = double(m_duration) * double(m_timecodeScale);
const long long d = static_cast<long long>(dd);
return d;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PageCaptureCustomBindings::PageCaptureCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("CreateBlob",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::CreateBlob,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("SendResponseAck",
base::Bind(&PageCaptureCustomBindings::SendResponseAck,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282} | Medium | 173,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned int table_len;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
table_len = le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
if (sizeof(*lvd) + table_len > sb->s_blocksize) {
udf_err(sb, "error loading logical volume descriptor: "
"Partition table too long (%u > %lu)\n", table_len,
sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(*lvd));
goto out_bh;
}
ret = udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(sb, le32_to_cpu(lvd->numPartitionMaps));
if (ret)
goto out_bh;
for (i = 0, offset = 0;
i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < table_len;
i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength) {
struct udf_part_map *map = &sbi->s_partmaps[i];
gpm = (struct genericPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
type = gpm->partitionMapType;
if (type == 1) {
struct genericPartitionMap1 *gpm1 =
(struct genericPartitionMap1 *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_TYPE1_MAP15;
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->partitionNum);
map->s_partition_func = NULL;
} else if (type == 2) {
struct udfPartitionMap2 *upm2 =
(struct udfPartitionMap2 *)gpm;
if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident, UDF_ID_VIRTUAL,
strlen(UDF_ID_VIRTUAL))) {
u16 suf =
le16_to_cpu(((__le16 *)upm2->partIdent.
identSuffix)[0]);
if (suf < 0x0200) {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP15;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt15;
} else {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP20;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt20;
}
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARABLE,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARABLE))) {
uint32_t loc;
struct sparingTable *st;
struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =
(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =
le16_to_cpu(spm->packetLength);
for (j = 0; j < spm->numSparingTables; j++) {
struct buffer_head *bh2;
loc = le32_to_cpu(
spm->locSparingTable[j]);
bh2 = udf_read_tagged(sb, loc, loc,
&ident);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = bh2;
if (bh2 == NULL)
continue;
st = (struct sparingTable *)bh2->b_data;
if (ident != 0 || strncmp(
st->sparingIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARING,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING))) {
brelse(bh2);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = NULL;
}
}
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_spar15;
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_METADATA,
strlen(UDF_ID_METADATA))) {
struct udf_meta_data *mdata =
&map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
struct metadataPartitionMap *mdm =
(struct metadataPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
udf_debug("Parsing Logical vol part %d type %d id=%s\n",
i, type, UDF_ID_METADATA);
map->s_partition_type = UDF_METADATA_MAP25;
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_meta25;
mdata->s_meta_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc);
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc);
mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc);
mdata->s_alloc_unit_size =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize);
mdata->s_align_unit_size =
le16_to_cpu(mdm->alignUnitSize);
if (mdm->flags & 0x01)
mdata->s_flags |= MF_DUPLICATE_MD;
udf_debug("Metadata Ident suffix=0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)
mdm->partIdent.identSuffix));
udf_debug("Metadata part num=%d\n",
le16_to_cpu(mdm->partitionNum));
udf_debug("Metadata part alloc unit size=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize));
udf_debug("Metadata file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc));
udf_debug("Mirror file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc));
udf_debug("Bitmap file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc));
udf_debug("Flags: %d %d\n",
mdata->s_flags, mdm->flags);
} else {
udf_debug("Unknown ident: %s\n",
upm2->partIdent.ident);
continue;
}
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(upm2->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(upm2->partitionNum);
}
udf_debug("Partition (%d:%d) type %d on volume %d\n",
i, map->s_partition_num, type, map->s_volumeseqnum);
}
if (fileset) {
struct long_ad *la = (struct long_ad *)&(lvd->logicalVolContentsUse[0]);
*fileset = lelb_to_cpu(la->extLocation);
udf_debug("FileSet found in LogicalVolDesc at block=%d, partition=%d\n",
fileset->logicalBlockNum,
fileset->partitionReferenceNum);
}
if (lvd->integritySeqExt.extLength)
udf_load_logicalvolint(sb, leea_to_cpu(lvd->integritySeqExt));
out_bh:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the udf_load_logicalvol function in fs/udf/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted UDF filesystem.
Commit Message: udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | High | 169,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(3 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnPpapiChannelCreated(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
DCHECK(enable_ipc_proxy_);
ReplyToRenderer(channel_handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,726 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate::Create(const SendTabToSelfEntry* entry) {
return base::WrapUnique(new SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate(entry));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Type confusion in libGLESv2 in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android possibly allowed a remote attacker to bypass buffer validation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854} | Medium | 172,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::localDescription()
{
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::ConnectVSyncProvider() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__
<< ": IsPresentationFocused()=" << IsPresentationFocused()
<< " vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound()="
<< vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound();
if (!IsPresentationFocused() || vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound())
return;
display_->GetVRVSyncProvider(mojo::MakeRequest(&vr_v_sync_provider_));
vr_v_sync_provider_.set_connection_error_handler(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSyncConnectionError, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
if (pending_raf_ && !display_blurred_) {
pending_vsync_ = true;
vr_v_sync_provider_->GetVSync(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSync, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167} | High | 171,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", (long long)*offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
int32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, (long long)*offset, depth);
if (kUseHexDump) {
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
}
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f') && !mMoofFound) {
mMoofFound = true;
mMoofOffset = *offset;
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (chunk_size < 20 || pssh.datalen > chunk_size - 20) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (!timescale) {
ALOGE("timescale should not be ZERO.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0 && mLastTrack->timescale != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
if (max_size > SIZE_MAX - 10 * 2) {
ALOGE("max sample size too big: %zu", max_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
uint32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, (int32_t*)&width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight,(int32_t*) &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
} else {
if (width > 32768 || height > 32768) {
ALOGE("can't support %u x %u video", width, height);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC(0xA9, 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v')) {
ESDS esds(&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
uint8_t objectTypeIndication;
if (esds.getObjectTypeIndication(&objectTypeIndication) == OK) {
if (objectTypeIndication >= 0x60 && objectTypeIndication <= 0x65) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG2);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", (long long)chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
bool isParsingMetaKeys = underQTMetaPath(mPath, 2);
if (!isParsingMetaKeys) {
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return OK;
}
*offset += sizeof(buffer);
}
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
mMdatFound = true;
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
break;
}
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
if (mLastTrack != NULL) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('k', 'e', 'y', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaKey(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if ((chunk_size > SIZE_MAX) || (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %" PRId64 " and data_offset = %" PRId64,
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0 || static_cast<uint64_t>(chunk_data_size) >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaVal(chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not check whether memory allocation succeeds, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28471206.
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
| High | 173,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t in_read(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
int read;
DEBUG("read %zu bytes, state: %d", bytes, in->common.state);
if (in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED)
{
DEBUG("stream suspended");
return -1;
}
/* only allow autostarting if we are in stopped or standby */
if ((in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED) ||
(in->common.state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY))
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&in->common.lock);
if (start_audio_datapath(&in->common) < 0)
{
/* emulate time this write represents to avoid very fast write
failures during transition periods or remote suspend */
int us_delay = calc_audiotime(in->common.cfg, bytes);
DEBUG("emulate a2dp read delay (%d us)", us_delay);
usleep(us_delay);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
return -1;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->common.lock);
}
else if (in->common.state != AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STARTED)
{
ERROR("stream not in stopped or standby");
return -1;
}
read = skt_read(in->common.audio_fd, buffer, bytes);
if (read == -1)
{
skt_disconnect(in->common.audio_fd);
in->common.audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
in->common.state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
} else if (read == 0) {
DEBUG("read time out - return zeros");
memset(buffer, 0, bytes);
read = bytes;
}
DEBUG("read %d bytes out of %zu bytes", read, bytes);
return read;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidatorTest& Properties(
const RefCountedPropertyTreeState& state) {
data_.chunks.back().properties = state;
return *this;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
sandbox::ResultCode result;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0);
sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
}
policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
}
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitPendingTransaction(
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback present_callback) {
DCHECK(pending_transaction_);
ResourceRefs resources_to_release;
resources_to_release.swap(current_frame_resources_);
current_frame_resources_.clear();
current_frame_resources_.swap(pending_frame_resources_);
pending_frame_resources_.clear();
SurfaceControl::Transaction::OnCompleteCb callback = base::BindOnce(
&GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::OnTransactionAckOnGpuThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(present_callback), std::move(resources_to_release));
pending_transaction_->SetOnCompleteCb(std::move(callback), gpu_task_runner_);
pending_transaction_->Apply();
pending_transaction_.reset();
DCHECK_GE(surface_list_.size(), pending_surfaces_count_);
surface_list_.resize(pending_surfaces_count_);
pending_surfaces_count_ = 0u;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852} | Medium | 172,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
| High | 174,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: grub_ext2_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
int (*hook) (const char *filename,
enum grub_fshelp_filetype filetype,
grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void *closure),
void *closure)
{
unsigned int fpos = 0;
struct grub_fshelp_node *diro = (struct grub_fshelp_node *) dir;
if (! diro->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data, diro->ino, &diro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
}
/* Search the file. */
if (hook)
while (fpos < grub_le_to_cpu32 (diro->inode.size))
{
struct ext2_dirent dirent;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, NULL, NULL, 0, fpos, sizeof (dirent),
(char *) &dirent);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
if (dirent.direntlen == 0)
return 0;
if (dirent.namelen != 0)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char filename[dirent.namelen + 1];
#else
char * filename = grub_malloc (dirent.namelen + 1);
#endif
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_UNKNOWN;
grub_ext2_read_file (diro, 0, 0, 0,
fpos + sizeof (struct ext2_dirent),
dirent.namelen, filename);
if (grub_errno)
return 0;
fdiro = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_fshelp_node));
if (! fdiro)
return 0;
fdiro->data = diro->data;
fdiro->ino = grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode);
filename[dirent.namelen] = '\0';
if (dirent.filetype != FILETYPE_UNKNOWN)
{
fdiro->inode_read = 0;
if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if (dirent.filetype == FILETYPE_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
else
{
/* The filetype can not be read from the dirent, read
the inode to get more information. */
grub_ext2_read_inode (diro->data,
grub_le_to_cpu32 (dirent.inode),
&fdiro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
{
grub_free (fdiro);
return 0;
}
fdiro->inode_read = 1;
if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_DIRECTORY)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_SYMLINK)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK;
else if ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (fdiro->inode.mode)
& FILETYPE_INO_MASK) == FILETYPE_INO_REG)
type = GRUB_FSHELP_REG;
}
if (hook (filename, type, fdiro, closure))
return 1;
}
fpos += grub_le_to_cpu16 (dirent.direntlen);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The grub_memmove function in shlr/grub/kern/misc.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer underflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file, possibly related to a buffer underflow in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB 2.02.
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove | Medium | 168,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2cap_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_l2 la;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&la, 0, sizeof(la));
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(la), alen);
memcpy(&la, addr, len);
if (la.l2_cid)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && !la.l2_psm) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
if (enable_ertm)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case BT_CONNECT:
case BT_CONNECT2:
case BT_CONFIG:
/* Already connecting */
goto wait;
case BT_CONNECTED:
/* Already connected */
goto done;
case BT_OPEN:
case BT_BOUND:
/* Can connect */
break;
default:
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
/* Set destination address and psm */
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->dst, &la.l2_bdaddr);
l2cap_pi(sk)->psm = la.l2_psm;
err = l2cap_do_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto done;
wait:
err = bt_sock_wait_state(sk, BT_CONNECTED,
sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK));
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The native Bluetooth stack in the Linux Kernel (BlueZ), starting at the Linux kernel version 2.6.32 and up to and including 4.13.1, are vulnerable to a stack overflow vulnerability in the processing of L2CAP configuration responses resulting in Remote code execution in kernel space.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size LockScreenMediaControlsView::CalculatePreferredSize() const {
return gfx::Size(kMediaControlsTotalWidthDp, kMediaControlsTotalHeightDp);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,338 |
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