instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const
{
const int value = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
return static_cast<Lacing>(value);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char* allocFromUTF16(const char16_t* in, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0) return getEmptyString();
const ssize_t bytes = utf16_to_utf8_length(in, len);
if (bytes < 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(bytes+1);
ALOG_ASSERT(buf, "Unable to allocate shared buffer");
if (!buf) {
return getEmptyString();
}
char* str = (char*)buf->data();
utf16_to_utf8(in, len, str);
return str;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibUtils in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 mishandles conversions between Unicode character encodings with different encoding widths, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 29250543.
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
| High | 173,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ipxitf_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
int rc = -EINVAL;
struct ifreq ifr;
int val;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface_definition f;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (sipx->sipx_family != AF_IPX)
break;
f.ipx_network = sipx->sipx_network;
memcpy(f.ipx_device, ifr.ifr_name,
sizeof(f.ipx_device));
memcpy(f.ipx_node, sipx->sipx_node, IPX_NODE_LEN);
f.ipx_dlink_type = sipx->sipx_type;
f.ipx_special = sipx->sipx_special;
if (sipx->sipx_action == IPX_DLTITF)
rc = ipxitf_delete(&f);
else
rc = ipxitf_create(&f);
break;
}
case SIOCGIFADDR: {
struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx;
struct ipx_interface *ipxif;
struct net_device *dev;
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, arg, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)&ifr.ifr_addr;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(&init_net, ifr.ifr_name);
rc = -ENODEV;
if (!dev)
break;
ipxif = ipxitf_find_using_phys(dev,
ipx_map_frame_type(sipx->sipx_type));
rc = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipxif)
break;
sipx->sipx_family = AF_IPX;
sipx->sipx_network = ipxif->if_netnum;
memcpy(sipx->sipx_node, ipxif->if_node,
sizeof(sipx->sipx_node));
rc = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ifr, sizeof(ifr)))
break;
ipxitf_put(ipxif);
rc = 0;
break;
}
case SIOCAIPXITFCRT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_auto_create_interfaces = val;
break;
case SIOCAIPXPRISLT:
rc = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(val, (unsigned char __user *) arg))
break;
rc = 0;
ipxcfg_set_auto_select(val);
break;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The ipxitf_ioctl function in net/ipx/af_ipx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a failed SIOCGIFADDR ioctl call for an IPX interface.
Commit Message: ipx: call ipxitf_put() in ioctl error path
We should call ipxitf_put() if the copy_to_user() fails.
Reported-by: 李强 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void build_l4proto_sctp(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_PORT, n, NTA_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
if (!nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_SCTP_STATE))
return;
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_SCTP_STATE, n, NTA_SCTP_STATE);
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_SCTP_VTAG_ORIG, n, NTA_SCTP_VTAG_ORIG);
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_SCTP_VTAG_REPL, n, NTA_SCTP_VTAG_REPL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: conntrackd in conntrack-tools 1.4.2 and earlier does not ensure that the optional kernel modules are loaded before using them, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a (1) DCCP, (2) SCTP, or (3) ICMPv6 packet.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return;
if ((algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if ((algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/mcryptd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.15 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by using an AF_ALG socket with an incompatible algorithm, as demonstrated by mcryptd(md5).
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
height,
pixels_length,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth != 1) && (sun_info.depth != 8) &&
(sun_info.depth != 24) && (sun_info.depth != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
image->matte=sun_info.depth == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (sun_info.length == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) (image->columns*image->rows);
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8UL*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(sun_info.width,sun_info.depth) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.length,
sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
quantum=sun_info.depth == 1 ? 15 : 7;
bytes_per_line+=quantum;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+quantum))
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
bytes_per_line>>=4;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(height,bytes_per_line) != MagickFalse)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixels_length=height*bytes_per_line;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(pixels_length,
sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
ResetMagickMemory(sun_pixels,0,pixels_length*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
status=DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,pixels_length);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
else
{
if (sun_info.length > pixels_length)
{
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(sun_pixels,sun_data,sun_info.length);
}
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01));
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+7-bit,(*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p));
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
bytes_per_pixel++;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(q)].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(q)].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(q)].blue);
}
q++;
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 6.9.7. A specially crafted sun file triggers a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/375
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/376 | Medium | 168,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer()));
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: In libavformat/asfdec_f.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_build_simple_index() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large *ict* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the for loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 167,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BackendImpl::OnEntryDestroyEnd() {
DecreaseNumRefs();
if (data_->header.num_bytes > max_size_ && !read_only_ &&
(up_ticks_ > kTrimDelay || user_flags_ & kNoRandom))
eviction_.TrimCache(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Re-entry of a destructor in Networking Disk Cache in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103} | Medium | 172,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2);
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They have a buffer overflow via base64 data.
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report. | High | 169,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void die_codec(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx, const char *s) {
const char *detail = vpx_codec_error_detail(ctx);
printf("%s: %s\n", s, vpx_codec_error(ctx));
if(detail)
printf(" %s\n",detail);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int huft_build(const unsigned *b, const unsigned n,
const unsigned s, const unsigned short *d,
const unsigned char *e, huft_t **t, unsigned *m)
{
unsigned a; /* counter for codes of length k */
unsigned c[BMAX + 1]; /* bit length count table */
unsigned eob_len; /* length of end-of-block code (value 256) */
unsigned f; /* i repeats in table every f entries */
int g; /* maximum code length */
int htl; /* table level */
unsigned i; /* counter, current code */
unsigned j; /* counter */
int k; /* number of bits in current code */
unsigned *p; /* pointer into c[], b[], or v[] */
huft_t *q; /* points to current table */
huft_t r; /* table entry for structure assignment */
huft_t *u[BMAX]; /* table stack */
unsigned v[N_MAX]; /* values in order of bit length */
int ws[BMAX + 1]; /* bits decoded stack */
int w; /* bits decoded */
unsigned x[BMAX + 1]; /* bit offsets, then code stack */
int y; /* number of dummy codes added */
unsigned z; /* number of entries in current table */
/* Length of EOB code, if any */
eob_len = n > 256 ? b[256] : BMAX;
*t = NULL;
/* Generate counts for each bit length */
memset(c, 0, sizeof(c));
p = (unsigned *) b; /* cast allows us to reuse p for pointing to b */
i = n;
do {
c[*p]++; /* assume all entries <= BMAX */
} while (--i);
if (c[0] == n) { /* null input - all zero length codes */
*m = 0;
return 2;
}
/* Find minimum and maximum length, bound *m by those */
for (j = 1; (j <= BMAX) && (c[j] == 0); j++)
continue;
k = j; /* minimum code length */
for (i = BMAX; (c[i] == 0) && i; i--)
continue;
g = i; /* maximum code length */
*m = (*m < j) ? j : ((*m > i) ? i : *m);
/* Adjust last length count to fill out codes, if needed */
for (y = 1 << j; j < i; j++, y <<= 1) {
y -= c[j];
if (y < 0)
return 2; /* bad input: more codes than bits */
}
y -= c[i];
if (y < 0)
return 2;
c[i] += y;
/* Generate starting offsets into the value table for each length */
x[1] = j = 0;
p = c + 1;
xp = x + 2;
while (--i) { /* note that i == g from above */
j += *p++;
*xp++ = j;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: huft_build in archival/libarchive/decompress_gunzip.c in BusyBox before 1.27.2 misuses a pointer, causing segfaults and an application crash during an unzip operation on a specially crafted ZIP file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltChoose(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr comp ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xmlNodePtr cur;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
/*
* TODO: Content model checks should be done only at compilation
* time.
*/
cur = inst->children;
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:choose: The instruction has no content.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* We don't check the content model during transformation.
*/
#else
if ((! IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur)) || (! IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "when"))) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:choose: xsl:when expected first\n");
return;
}
#endif
{
int testRes = 0, res = 0;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
int oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
int oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
int oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemWhenPtr wcomp = NULL;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr wcomp = NULL;
#endif
/*
* Process xsl:when ---------------------------------------------------
*/
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur) && IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "when")) {
wcomp = cur->psvi;
if ((wcomp == NULL) || (wcomp->test == NULL) ||
(wcomp->comp == NULL))
{
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"Internal error in xsltChoose(): "
"The XSLT 'when' instruction was not compiled.\n");
goto error;
}
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE) {
/*
* TODO: Isn't comp->templ always NULL for xsl:choose?
*/
xslHandleDebugger(cur, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test %s\n", wcomp->test));
#endif
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (wcomp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = wcomp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = wcomp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = wcomp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = wcomp->nsNr;
#endif
#ifdef XSLT_FAST_IF
res = xmlXPathCompiledEvalToBoolean(wcomp->comp, xpctxt);
if (res == -1) {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
testRes = (res == 1) ? 1 : 0;
#else /* XSLT_FAST_IF */
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(wcomp->comp, xpctxt);
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type != XPATH_BOOLEAN)
res = xmlXPathConvertBoolean(res);
if (res->type == XPATH_BOOLEAN)
testRes = res->boolval;
else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test didn't evaluate to a boolean\n"));
#endif
goto error;
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
res = NULL;
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
#endif /* else of XSLT_FAST_IF */
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltChoose: test evaluate to %d\n", testRes));
#endif
if (testRes)
goto test_is_true;
cur = cur->next;
}
/*
* Process xsl:otherwise ----------------------------------------------
*/
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(cur) && IS_XSLT_NAME(cur, "otherwise")) {
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(cur, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_CHOOSE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"evaluating xsl:otherwise\n"));
#endif
goto test_is_true;
}
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
goto exit;
test_is_true:
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
goto process_sequence;
}
process_sequence:
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor.
*/
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, ctxt->node, cur->children,
NULL);
exit:
error:
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_2to10(UWORD32 u4_isdc,
UWORD32 u4_total_coeff_trail_one, /*!<TotalCoefficients<<16+trailingones*/
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 u4_total_zeroes;
WORD32 i;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_trailing_ones = u4_total_coeff_trail_one & 0xFFFF;
UWORD32 u4_total_coeff = u4_total_coeff_trail_one >> 16;
WORD16 i2_level_arr[16];
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle;
ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map = 0;
pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_4x4->ai2_level[0];
i = u4_total_coeff - 1;
if(u4_trailing_ones)
{
/*********************************************************************/
/* Decode Trailing Ones */
/* read the sign of T1's and put them in level array */
/*********************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_signs, u4_cnt = u4_trailing_ones;
WORD16 (*ppi2_trlone_lkup)[3] =
(WORD16 (*)[3])gai2_ih264d_trailing_one_level;
WORD16 *pi2_trlone_lkup;
GETBITS(u4_signs, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, u4_cnt);
pi2_trlone_lkup = ppi2_trlone_lkup[(1 << u4_cnt) - 2 + u4_signs];
while(u4_cnt--)
i2_level_arr[i--] = *pi2_trlone_lkup++;
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Begins */
/****************************************************************/
if(i >= 0)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* First level is decoded outside the loop as it has lot of */
/* special cases. */
/****************************************************************/
UWORD32 u4_lev_suffix, u4_suffix_len, u4_lev_suffix_size;
WORD32 u2_lev_code, u2_abs_value;
UWORD32 u4_lev_prefix;
/***************************************************************/
/* u4_suffix_len = 0, Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/*********************************************************/
/* Special decoding case when trailing ones are 3 */
/*********************************************************/
u2_lev_code = MIN(15, u4_lev_prefix);
u2_lev_code += (3 == u4_trailing_ones) ? 0 : 2;
if(14 == u4_lev_prefix)
u4_lev_suffix_size = 4;
else if(15 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += 15;
u4_lev_suffix_size = u4_lev_prefix - 3;
}
else
u4_lev_suffix_size = 0;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
if(u4_lev_suffix_size)
{
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code += u4_lev_suffix;
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] = (u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
u4_suffix_len = (u2_abs_value > 3) ? 2 : 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* Now loop over the remaining levels */
/*********************************************************/
while(i >= 0)
{
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_32(u4_lev_prefix, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_lev_suffix_size =
(15 <= u4_lev_prefix) ?
(u4_lev_prefix - 3) : u4_suffix_len;
/*********************************************************/
/* Compute level code using prefix and suffix */
/*********************************************************/
GETBITS(u4_lev_suffix, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_lev_suffix_size);
u2_lev_code = (MIN(15,u4_lev_prefix) << u4_suffix_len)
+ u4_lev_suffix;
if(16 <= u4_lev_prefix)
{
u2_lev_code += ((1 << (u4_lev_prefix - 3)) - 4096);
}
u2_abs_value = (u2_lev_code + 2) >> 1;
/*********************************************************/
/* If Level code is odd, level is negative else positive */
/*********************************************************/
i2_level_arr[i--] =
(u2_lev_code & 1) ? -u2_abs_value : u2_abs_value;
/*********************************************************/
/* Increment suffix length if required */
/*********************************************************/
u4_suffix_len +=
(u4_suffix_len < 6) ?
(u2_abs_value
> (3
<< (u4_suffix_len
- 1))) :
0;
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding Levels Ends */
/****************************************************************/
}
/****************************************************************/
/* Decoding total zeros as in section 9.2.3, table 9.7 */
/****************************************************************/
{
UWORD32 u4_index;
const UWORD8 (*ppu1_total_zero_lkup)[64] =
(const UWORD8 (*)[64])gau1_ih264d_table_total_zero_2to10;
NEXTBITS(u4_index, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 6);
u4_total_zeroes = ppu1_total_zero_lkup[u4_total_coeff - 2][u4_index];
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, (u4_total_zeroes >> 4));
u4_total_zeroes &= 0xf;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Decode the runs and form the coefficient buffer */
/**************************************************************/
{
const UWORD8 *pu1_table_runbefore;
UWORD32 u4_run;
WORD32 k;
UWORD32 u4_scan_pos = u4_total_coeff + u4_total_zeroes - 1 + u4_isdc;
WORD32 u4_zeroes_left = u4_total_zeroes;
k = u4_total_coeff - 1;
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs Begin for zeros left > 6 */
/**************************************************************/
while((u4_zeroes_left > 6) && k)
{
UWORD32 u4_code;
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 3);
if(u4_code != 0)
{
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, 3);
u4_run = (7 - u4_code);
}
else
{
FIND_ONE_IN_STREAM_LEN(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset,
pu4_bitstrm_buf, 11);
u4_run = (4 + u4_code);
}
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[k--];
u4_zeroes_left -= u4_run;
u4_scan_pos -= (u4_run + 1);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs for 0 < zeros left <=6 */
/**************************************************************/
pu1_table_runbefore = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_table_run_before;
while((u4_zeroes_left > 0) && k)
{
UWORD32 u4_code;
NEXTBITS(u4_code, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf, 3);
u4_code = pu1_table_runbefore[u4_code + (u4_zeroes_left << 3)];
u4_run = u4_code >> 2;
FLUSHBITS(u4_bitstream_offset, (u4_code & 0x03));
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[k--];
u4_zeroes_left -= u4_run;
u4_scan_pos -= (u4_run + 1);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Decoding Runs End */
/**************************************************************/
/**************************************************************/
/* Copy the remaining coefficients */
/**************************************************************/
if(u4_zeroes_left < 0)
return -1;
while(k >= 0)
{
SET_BIT(ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map, u4_scan_pos);
*pi2_coeff_data++ = i2_level_arr[k--];
u4_scan_pos--;
}
}
{
WORD32 offset;
offset = (UWORD8 *)pi2_coeff_data - (UWORD8 *)ps_tu_4x4;
offset = ALIGN4(offset);
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data + offset);
}
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer underflows in decoder/ih264d_parse_cavlc.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26399350.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
| High | 173,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DesktopSessionWin::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DataView::setUint8Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DataView.setUint8");
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
DataView* imp = V8DataView::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(unsigned, byteOffset, toUInt32(args[0]));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, value, toInt32(args[1]));
imp->setUint8(byteOffset, static_cast<uint8_t>(value), ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int socket_create(uint16_t port)
{
int sfd = -1;
int yes = 1;
#ifdef WIN32
WSADATA wsa_data;
if (!wsa_init) {
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa_data) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "WSAStartup failed!\n");
ExitProcess(-1);
}
wsa_init = 1;
}
#endif
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
if (0 > (sfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP))) {
perror("socket()");
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, (void*)&yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) {
perror("setsockopt()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
#endif
memset((void *) &saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (0 > bind(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, sizeof(saddr))) {
perror("bind()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(sfd, 1) == -1) {
perror("listen()");
socket_close(sfd);
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The socket_create function in common/socket.c in libimobiledevice and libusbmuxd allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and communicate with services on iOS devices by connecting to an IPv4 TCP socket.
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally | Medium | 169,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: size_t compile_tree(struct filter_op **fop)
{
int i = 1;
struct filter_op *array = NULL;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
BUG_IF(tree_root == NULL);
fprintf(stdout, " Unfolding the meta-tree ");
fflush(stdout);
/* start the recursion on the tree */
unfold_blk(&tree_root);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
/* substitute the virtual labels with real offsets */
labels_to_offsets();
/* convert the tailq into an array */
TAILQ_FOREACH(ue, &unfolded_tree, next) {
/* label == 0 means a real instruction */
if (ue->label == 0) {
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
memcpy(&array[i - 1], &ue->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
i++;
}
}
/* always append the exit function to a script */
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
array[i - 1].opcode = FOP_EXIT;
/* return the pointer to the array */
*fop = array;
return (i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The compile_tree function in ef_compiler.c in the Etterfilter utility in Ettercap 0.8.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted filter.
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782) | Medium | 168,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BOOL transport_connect_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (!transport_connect_tls(transport))
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = AUTHENTICATIONERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Authentication failure, check credentials.\n"
"If credentials are valid, the NTLMSSP implementation may be to blame.\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | Medium | 167,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *path_name(struct strbuf *path, const char *name)
{
struct strbuf ret = STRBUF_INIT;
if (path)
strbuf_addbuf(&ret, path);
strbuf_addstr(&ret, name);
return strbuf_detach(&ret, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWindow(
RenderFrameHost* opener,
int32_t render_view_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_widget_route_id,
const mojom::CreateNewWindowParams& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_widget_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK(opener);
int render_process_id = opener->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstance* source_site_instance = opener->GetSiteInstance();
DCHECK(!RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id));
bool is_guest = BrowserPluginGuest::IsGuest(this);
DCHECK(!params.opener_suppressed || render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
params.opener_suppressed && !is_guest
? SiteInstance::CreateForURL(GetBrowserContext(), params.target_url)
: source_site_instance;
const std::string& partition_id =
GetContentClient()->browser()->
GetStoragePartitionIdForSite(GetBrowserContext(),
site_instance->GetSiteURL());
StoragePartition* partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
DOMStorageContextWrapper* dom_storage_context =
static_cast<DOMStorageContextWrapper*>(partition->GetDOMStorageContext());
SessionStorageNamespaceImpl* session_storage_namespace_impl =
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(session_storage_namespace);
CHECK(session_storage_namespace_impl->IsFromContext(dom_storage_context));
if (delegate_ &&
!delegate_->ShouldCreateWebContents(
this, opener, source_site_instance, render_view_route_id,
main_frame_route_id, main_frame_widget_route_id,
params.window_container_type, opener->GetLastCommittedURL(),
params.frame_name, params.target_url, partition_id,
session_storage_namespace)) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id);
if (rfh) {
DCHECK(rfh->IsRenderFrameLive());
rfh->Init();
}
return;
}
CreateParams create_params(GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
create_params.routing_id = render_view_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_routing_id = main_frame_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_widget_routing_id = main_frame_widget_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_name = params.frame_name;
create_params.opener_render_process_id = render_process_id;
create_params.opener_render_frame_id = opener->GetRoutingID();
create_params.opener_suppressed = params.opener_suppressed;
if (params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB)
create_params.initially_hidden = true;
create_params.renderer_initiated_creation =
main_frame_route_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents;
if (!is_guest) {
create_params.context = view_->GetNativeView();
create_params.initial_size = GetContainerBounds().size();
new_contents = WebContents::Create(create_params);
} else {
new_contents = base::WrapUnique(
GetBrowserPluginGuest()->CreateNewGuestWindow(create_params));
}
WebContentsImpl* raw_new_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_contents.get());
raw_new_contents->GetController().SetSessionStorageNamespace(
partition_id, session_storage_namespace);
if (!params.frame_name.empty())
raw_new_contents->GetRenderManager()->CreateProxiesForNewNamedFrame();
if (!params.opener_suppressed) {
if (!is_guest) {
WebContentsView* new_view = raw_new_contents->view_.get();
new_view->CreateViewForWidget(
new_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(), false);
}
DCHECK_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, main_frame_widget_route_id);
pending_contents_[std::make_pair(render_process_id,
main_frame_widget_route_id)] =
std::move(new_contents);
AddDestructionObserver(raw_new_contents);
}
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->WebContentsCreated(this, render_process_id,
opener->GetRoutingID(), params.frame_name,
params.target_url, raw_new_contents);
}
if (opener) {
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidOpenRequestedURL(raw_new_contents, opener, params.target_url,
params.referrer, params.disposition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false, // started_from_context_menu
true); // renderer_initiated
}
}
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
if (params.opener_suppressed) {
bool was_blocked = false;
base::WeakPtr<WebContentsImpl> weak_new_contents =
raw_new_contents->weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
if (delegate_) {
gfx::Rect initial_rect;
delegate_->AddNewContents(this, std::move(new_contents),
params.disposition, initial_rect,
params.mimic_user_gesture, &was_blocked);
if (!weak_new_contents)
return; // The delegate deleted |new_contents| during AddNewContents().
}
if (!was_blocked) {
OpenURLParams open_params(params.target_url, params.referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */);
open_params.user_gesture = params.mimic_user_gesture;
if (delegate_ && !is_guest &&
!delegate_->ShouldResumeRequestsForCreatedWindow()) {
DCHECK(weak_new_contents);
weak_new_contents->delayed_open_url_params_.reset(
new OpenURLParams(open_params));
} else {
weak_new_contents->OpenURL(open_params);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect dialog placement in WebContents in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335} | Medium | 172,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
nla_for_each_nested(nla, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST], nla_rem)
if (nla->nla_type == NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAG) {
if (iter > CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
return -EINVAL;
doi_def->tags[iter++] = nla_get_u8(nla);
}
if (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
doi_def->tags[iter] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 2.6.20, there is an off-by-one bug in net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c where it is possible to overflow the doi_def->tags[] array.
Commit Message: NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | High | 169,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void processInputBuffer(client *c) {
server.current_client = c;
/* Keep processing while there is something in the input buffer */
while(sdslen(c->querybuf)) {
/* Return if clients are paused. */
if (!(c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && clientsArePaused()) break;
/* Immediately abort if the client is in the middle of something. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) break;
/* CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY closes the connection once the reply is
* written to the client. Make sure to not let the reply grow after
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands). */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) break;
/* Determine request type when unknown. */
if (!c->reqtype) {
if (c->querybuf[0] == '*') {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK;
} else {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_INLINE;
}
}
if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_INLINE) {
if (processInlineBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK) {
if (processMultibulkBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown request type");
}
/* Multibulk processing could see a <= 0 length. */
if (c->argc == 0) {
resetClient(c);
} else {
/* Only reset the client when the command was executed. */
if (processCommand(c) == C_OK)
resetClient(c);
/* freeMemoryIfNeeded may flush slave output buffers. This may result
* into a slave, that may be the active client, to be freed. */
if (server.current_client == NULL) break;
}
}
server.current_client = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: networking.c in Redis before 3.2.7 allows *Cross Protocol Scripting* because it lacks a check for POST and Host: strings, which are not valid in the Redis protocol (but commonly occur when an attack triggers an HTTP request to the Redis TCP port).
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed. | Medium | 168,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer_proxy(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_U8 *pmem_data_buf = NULL;
int push_cnt = 0;
unsigned nBufIndex = 0;
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
encoder_media_buffer_type *media_buffer = NULL;
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int fd = 0;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETBProxy: buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer->pBuffer);
if (buffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid buffer[%p]", buffer);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (meta_mode_enable && !mUsesColorConversion) {
bool met_error = false;
nBufIndex = buffer - meta_buffer_hdr;
if (nBufIndex >= m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid meta-bufIndex = %u", nBufIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
media_buffer = (encoder_media_buffer_type *)meta_buffer_hdr[nBufIndex].pBuffer;
if (media_buffer) {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type != kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource &&
media_buffer->buffer_type != kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
met_error = true;
} else {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource) {
if (media_buffer->meta_handle == NULL)
met_error = true;
else if ((media_buffer->meta_handle->numFds != 1 &&
media_buffer->meta_handle->numInts != 2))
met_error = true;
}
}
} else
met_error = true;
if (met_error) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unkown source/metahandle in ETB call");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else {
nBufIndex = buffer - ((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (nBufIndex >= m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Invalid bufIndex = %u", nBufIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
pending_input_buffers++;
if (input_flush_progress == true) {
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: Input flush in progress");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (!meta_mode_enable) {
fd = m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].fd;
}
#endif
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable && !mUseProxyColorFormat) {
struct pmem Input_pmem_info;
if (!media_buffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: invalid media_buffer",__FUNCTION__);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource) {
Input_pmem_info.buffer = media_buffer;
Input_pmem_info.fd = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[0];
#ifdef _MSM8974_
fd = Input_pmem_info.fd;
#endif
Input_pmem_info.offset = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[1];
Input_pmem_info.size = media_buffer->meta_handle->data[2];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (meta-Camera) fd = %d, offset = %d, size = %d",
Input_pmem_info.fd, Input_pmem_info.offset,
Input_pmem_info.size);
} else {
private_handle_t *handle = (private_handle_t *)media_buffer->meta_handle;
Input_pmem_info.buffer = media_buffer;
Input_pmem_info.fd = handle->fd;
#ifdef _MSM8974_
fd = Input_pmem_info.fd;
#endif
Input_pmem_info.offset = 0;
Input_pmem_info.size = handle->size;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (meta-gralloc) fd = %d, offset = %d, size = %d",
Input_pmem_info.fd, Input_pmem_info.offset,
Input_pmem_info.size);
}
if (dev_use_buf(&Input_pmem_info,PORT_INDEX_IN,0) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: in dev_use_buf");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (meta_mode_enable && !mUsesColorConversion) {
if (media_buffer->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
private_handle_t *handle = (private_handle_t *)media_buffer->meta_handle;
fd = handle->fd;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (opaque-gralloc) fd = %d, size = %d",
fd, handle->size);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid bufferType for buffer with Opaque"
" color format");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (input_use_buffer && !m_use_input_pmem)
#else
if (input_use_buffer && !m_use_input_pmem)
#endif
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Heap UseBuffer case, so memcpy the data");
pmem_data_buf = (OMX_U8 *)m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].buffer;
memcpy (pmem_data_buf, (buffer->pBuffer + buffer->nOffset),
buffer->nFilledLen);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("memcpy() done in ETBProxy for i/p Heap UseBuf");
} else if (mUseProxyColorFormat) {
fd = m_pInput_pmem[nBufIndex].fd;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB (color-converted) fd = %d, size = %u",
fd, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
} else if (m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat ==
OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
if (!dev_color_align(buffer, m_sInPortDef.format.video.nFrameWidth,
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to adjust buffer color");
post_event((unsigned long)buffer, 0, OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (dev_empty_buf(buffer, pmem_data_buf,nBufIndex,fd) != true)
#else
if (dev_empty_buf(buffer, pmem_data_buf,0,0) != true)
#endif
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETBProxy: dev_empty_buf failed");
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
omx_release_meta_buffer(buffer);
#endif
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
/*Generate an async error and move to invalid state*/
pending_input_buffers--;
if (hw_overload) {
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27903498.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
| High | 173,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat4(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kSegCountOffset = 6;
const size_t kEndCountOffset = 14;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 16;
const size_t kSegmentSize = 8; // total size of array elements for one segment
if (kEndCountOffset > size) {
return false;
}
size_t segCount = readU16(data, kSegCountOffset) >> 1;
if (kHeaderSize + segCount * kSegmentSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < segCount; i++) {
uint32_t end = readU16(data, kEndCountOffset + 2 * i);
uint32_t start = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (segCount + i));
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
uint32_t rangeOffset = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (3 * segCount + i));
if (rangeOffset == 0) {
uint32_t delta = readU16(data, kHeaderSize + 2 * (2 * segCount + i));
if (((end + delta) & 0xffff) > end - start) {
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1);
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
if (((j + delta) & 0xffff) != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
} else {
for (uint32_t j = start; j < end + 1; j++) {
uint32_t actualRangeOffset = kHeaderSize + 6 * segCount + rangeOffset +
(i + j - start) * 2;
if (actualRangeOffset + 2 > size) {
continue;
}
uint32_t glyphId = readU16(data, actualRangeOffset);
if (glyphId != 0) {
addRange(coverage, j, j + 1);
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
| Medium | 173,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In versions of mruby up to and including 1.4.0, a use-after-free vulnerability exists in src/io.c::File#initilialize_copy(). An attacker that can cause Ruby code to be run can possibly use this to execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof | High | 169,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CreateFileHelper(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> result, const String& name, const KURL& url, FileSystemType type)
: m_result(result)
, m_name(name)
, m_url(url)
, m_type(type)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long debugctlmsr;
/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked))
vmx->entry_time = ktime_get();
/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return;
if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
}
if (vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs) {
copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
}
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RSP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RIP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
* exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
* case. */
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* placeholder for guest rcx */
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
"je 1f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RSP_RDX) "\n\t"
"1: \n\t"
/* Reload cr2 if changed */
"mov %c[cr2](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_AX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"je 2f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX", %%cr2 \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
/* Check if vmlaunch of vmresume is needed */
"cmpl $0, %c[launched](%0) \n\t"
/* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */
"mov %c[rax](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%0), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdx](%0), %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rsi](%0), %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdi](%0), %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbp](%0), %%" _ASM_BP " \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %c[r8](%0), %%r8 \n\t"
"mov %c[r9](%0), %%r9 \n\t"
"mov %c[r10](%0), %%r10 \n\t"
"mov %c[r11](%0), %%r11 \n\t"
"mov %c[r12](%0), %%r12 \n\t"
"mov %c[r13](%0), %%r13 \n\t"
"mov %c[r14](%0), %%r14 \n\t"
"mov %c[r15](%0), %%r15 \n\t"
#endif
"mov %c[rcx](%0), %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* kills %0 (ecx) */
/* Enter guest mode */
"jne 1f \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMLAUNCH) "\n\t"
"jmp 2f \n\t"
"1: " __ex(ASM_VMX_VMRESUME) "\n\t"
"2: "
/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
"pop %0 \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DX ", %c[rdx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SI ", %c[rsi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DI ", %c[rdi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BP ", %c[rbp](%0) \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %%r8, %c[r8](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r9, %c[r9](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r10, %c[r10](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r11, %c[r11](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r12, %c[r12](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
#endif
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
"pop %%" _ASM_BP "; pop %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
".global vmx_return \n\t"
"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"
".popsection"
: : "c"(vmx), "d"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
[launched]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, __launched)),
[fail]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, fail)),
[host_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, host_rsp)),
[rax]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX])),
[rbx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX])),
[rcx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX])),
[rdx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX])),
[rsi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI])),
[rdi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI])),
[rbp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP])),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
[r8]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8])),
[r9]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9])),
[r10]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10])),
[r11]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11])),
[r12]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12])),
[r13]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13])),
[r14]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14])),
[r15]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15])),
#endif
[cr2]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.cr2)),
[wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
: "cc", "memory"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
, "rax", "rbx", "rdi", "rsi"
, "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15"
#else
, "eax", "ebx", "edi", "esi"
#endif
);
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
* a reasonable value ourselves.
*
* We can't defer this to vmx_load_host_state() since that function
* may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and restore segments
* around it, nullifying its effect.
*/
loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
#endif
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
/*
* the KVM_REQ_EVENT optimization bit is only on for one entry, and if
* we did not inject a still-pending event to L1 now because of
* nested_run_pending, we need to re-enable this bit.
*/
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
vmx_complete_atomic_exit(vmx);
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.17.2 on Intel processors does not ensure that the value in the CR4 control register remains the same after a VM entry, which allows host OS users to kill arbitrary processes or cause a denial of service (system disruption) by leveraging /dev/kvm access, as demonstrated by PR_SET_TSC prctl calls within a modified copy of QEMU.
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnCompleted(net::URLRequest* request,
bool started) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "URLRequest", request);
if (request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::SUCCESS) {
int64 received_content_length = request->received_response_content_length();
bool is_http = request->url().SchemeIs("http");
bool is_https = request->url().SchemeIs("https");
if (!request->was_cached() && // Don't record cached content
received_content_length && // Zero-byte responses aren't useful.
(is_http || is_https)) { // Only record for HTTP or HTTPS urls.
int64 original_content_length =
request->response_info().headers->GetInt64HeaderValue(
"x-original-content-length");
bool via_data_reduction_proxy =
request->response_info().headers->HasHeaderValue(
"via", "1.1 Chrome Compression Proxy");
int64 adjusted_original_content_length = original_content_length;
if (adjusted_original_content_length == -1)
adjusted_original_content_length = received_content_length;
base::TimeDelta freshness_lifetime =
request->response_info().headers->GetFreshnessLifetime(
request->response_info().response_time);
AccumulateContentLength(received_content_length,
adjusted_original_content_length,
via_data_reduction_proxy);
RecordContentLengthHistograms(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
freshness_lifetime);
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__
<< " received content length: " << received_content_length
<< " original content length: " << original_content_length
<< " url: " << request->url();
}
bool is_redirect = request->response_headers() &&
net::HttpResponseHeaders::IsRedirectResponseCode(
request->response_headers()->response_code());
if (!is_redirect) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnCompleted(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request);
}
} else if (request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED ||
request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::CANCELED) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnErrorOccurred(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request, started);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
ForwardProxyErrors(request, event_router_.get(), profile_);
ForwardRequestStatus(REQUEST_DONE, request, profile_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,332 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Type confusion in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
[email protected]
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826} | Medium | 172,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int resno;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: Division-by-zero vulnerabilities in the functions pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_cprl, and pi_next_rpcl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
return;
}
const char32_t *cur_utf32 = src;
const char32_t *end_utf32 = src + src_len;
char *cur = dst;
while (cur_utf32 < end_utf32) {
size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*cur_utf32);
utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t *)cur, *cur_utf32++, len);
cur += len;
}
*cur = '\0';
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibUtils in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 mishandles conversions between Unicode character encodings with different encoding widths, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 29250543.
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
| High | 173,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
{
int nid;
long ret;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (cmd) {
case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr)
ret = 1;
else
ret = 0;
p7->detached = ret;
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION);
ret = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The PKCS#7 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not properly handle a lack of outer ContentInfo, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by leveraging an application that processes arbitrary PKCS#7 data and providing malformed data with ASN.1 encoding, related to crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c and crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lldp_mgmt_addr_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
uint8_t mgmt_addr_len, intf_num_subtype, oid_len;
const u_char *tptr;
u_int tlen;
char *mgmt_addr;
tlen = len;
tptr = pptr;
if (tlen < 1) {
return 0;
}
mgmt_addr_len = *tptr++;
tlen--;
if (tlen < mgmt_addr_len) {
return 0;
}
mgmt_addr = lldp_network_addr_print(ndo, tptr, mgmt_addr_len);
if (mgmt_addr == NULL) {
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Management Address length %u, %s",
mgmt_addr_len, mgmt_addr));
tptr += mgmt_addr_len;
tlen -= mgmt_addr_len;
if (tlen < LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN) {
return 0;
}
intf_num_subtype = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Interface Numbering (%u): %u",
tok2str(lldp_intf_numb_subtype_values, "Unknown", intf_num_subtype),
intf_num_subtype,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 1)));
tptr += LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN;
tlen -= LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN;
/*
* The OID is optional.
*/
if (tlen) {
oid_len = *tptr;
if (tlen < oid_len) {
return 0;
}
if (oid_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t OID length %u", oid_len));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 1, oid_len);
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LLDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-lldp.c:lldp_mgmt_addr_tlv_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13027/LLDP: Fix a bounds check.
The total length of the OID is the OID length plus the length of the OID
length itself.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | High | 167,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_opt_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13025/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file' | High | 167,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const std::string& AppControllerImpl::MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(
const std::string& app_id) {
const auto& package_name_it = android_package_map_.find(app_id);
if (package_name_it != android_package_map_.end()) {
return package_name_it->second;
}
ArcAppListPrefs* arc_prefs_ = ArcAppListPrefs::Get(profile_);
if (!arc_prefs_) {
return base::EmptyString();
}
std::unique_ptr<ArcAppListPrefs::AppInfo> arc_info =
arc_prefs_->GetApp(app_id);
if (!arc_info) {
return base::EmptyString();
}
android_package_map_[app_id] = arc_info->package_name;
return android_package_map_[app_id];
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandlePauseSync(const base::ListValue* args) {
DCHECK(AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsDiceEnabledForProfile(profile_));
SigninManager* signin_manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
DCHECK(signin_manager->IsAuthenticated());
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->UpdateCredentials(
signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountId(),
OAuth2TokenServiceDelegate::kInvalidRefreshToken);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181} | Medium | 172,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message: | High | 165,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_accept(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
{
struct tcp_conn_t *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
if (conn == NULL) {
ERR("Calloc for connection struct failed");
goto error;
}
conn->sd = accept(sock->sd, NULL, NULL);
if (conn->sd < 0) {
ERR("accept failed");
goto error;
}
return conn;
error:
if (conn != NULL)
free(conn);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: IPPUSBXD before 1.22 listens on all interfaces, which allows remote attackers to obtain access to USB connected printers via a direct request.
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally. | High | 166,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewDataService::RemoveEntry(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
PreviewDataStoreMap::iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str);
if (it != data_store_map_.end())
data_store_map_.erase(it);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int on_http_message_complete(http_parser* parser)
{
struct clt_info *info = parser->data;
ws_svr *svr = ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses);
info->request->version_major = parser->http_major;
info->request->version_minor = parser->http_minor;
info->request->method = parser->method;
dict_entry *entry;
dict_iterator *iter = dict_get_iterator(info->request->headers);
while ((entry = dict_next(iter)) != NULL) {
log_trace("Header: %s: %s", (char *)entry->key, (char *)entry->val);
}
dict_release_iterator(iter);
if (info->request->method != HTTP_GET)
goto error;
if (http_request_get_header(info->request, "Host") == NULL)
goto error;
double version = info->request->version_major + info->request->version_minor * 0.1;
if (version < 1.1)
goto error;
const char *upgrade = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Upgrade");
if (upgrade == NULL || strcasecmp(upgrade, "websocket") != 0)
goto error;
const char *connection = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Connection");
if (connection == NULL)
goto error;
else {
bool found_upgrade = false;
int count;
sds *tokens = sdssplitlen(connection, strlen(connection), ",", 1, &count);
if (tokens == NULL)
goto error;
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
sds token = tokens[i];
sdstrim(token, " ");
if (strcasecmp(token, "Upgrade") == 0) {
found_upgrade = true;
break;
}
}
sdsfreesplitres(tokens, count);
if (!found_upgrade)
goto error;
}
const char *ws_version = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Version");
if (ws_version == NULL || strcmp(ws_version, "13") != 0)
goto error;
const char *ws_key = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Key");
if (ws_key == NULL)
goto error;
const char *protocol_list = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
if (protocol_list && !is_good_protocol(protocol_list, svr->protocol))
goto error;
if (strlen(svr->origin) > 0) {
const char *origin = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Origin");
if (origin == NULL || !is_good_origin(origin, svr->origin))
goto error;
}
if (svr->type.on_privdata_alloc) {
info->privdata = svr->type.on_privdata_alloc(svr);
if (info->privdata == NULL)
goto error;
}
info->upgrade = true;
info->remote = sdsnew(http_get_remote_ip(info->ses, info->request));
info->url = sdsnew(info->request->url);
if (svr->type.on_upgrade) {
svr->type.on_upgrade(info->ses, info->remote);
}
if (protocol_list) {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, svr->protocol, ws_key);
} else {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, NULL, ws_key);
}
return 0;
error:
ws_svr_close_clt(ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses), info->ses);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: utils/ut_ws_svr.c in ViaBTC Exchange Server before 2018-08-21 has an integer overflow leading to memory corruption.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows | High | 169,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void r_bin_dwarf_dump_debug_info(FILE *f, const RBinDwarfDebugInfo *inf) {
size_t i, j, k;
RBinDwarfDIE *dies;
RBinDwarfAttrValue *values;
if (!inf || !f) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < inf->length; i++) {
fprintf (f, " Compilation Unit @ offset 0x%"PFMT64x":\n", inf->comp_units [i].offset);
fprintf (f, " Length: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.length);
fprintf (f, " Version: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.version);
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Offset: 0x%x\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.abbrev_offset);
fprintf (f, " Pointer Size: %d\n", inf->comp_units [i].hdr.pointer_size);
dies = inf->comp_units[i].dies;
for (j = 0; j < inf->comp_units[i].length; j++) {
fprintf (f, " Abbrev Number: %"PFMT64u" ", dies[j].abbrev_code);
if (dies[j].tag && dies[j].tag <= DW_TAG_volatile_type &&
dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]) {
fprintf (f, "(%s)\n", dwarf_tag_name_encodings[dies[j].tag]);
} else {
fprintf (f, "(Unknown abbrev tag)\n");
}
if (!dies[j].abbrev_code) {
continue;
}
values = dies[j].attr_values;
for (k = 0; k < dies[j].length; k++) {
if (!values[k].name)
continue;
if (values[k].name < DW_AT_vtable_elem_location &&
dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]) {
fprintf (f, " %-18s : ", dwarf_attr_encodings[values[k].name]);
} else {
fprintf (f, " TODO\t");
}
r_bin_dwarf_dump_attr_value (&values[k], f);
fprintf (f, "\n");
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser | Medium | 167,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_enum_print)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, (int) a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message: | High | 164,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int set_register(pegasus_t *pegasus, __u16 indx, __u8 data)
{
int ret;
ret = usb_control_msg(pegasus->usb, usb_sndctrlpipe(pegasus->usb, 0),
PEGASUS_REQ_SET_REG, PEGASUS_REQT_WRITE, data,
indx, &data, 1, 1000);
if (ret < 0)
netif_dbg(pegasus, drv, pegasus->net,
"%s returned %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.11 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::GetTexParameterImpl(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat* fparams, GLint* iparams,
const char* function_name) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
switch (pname) {
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT:
if (workarounds().init_texture_max_anisotropy) {
texture->InitTextureMaxAnisotropyIfNeeded(target);
}
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_IMMUTABLE_LEVELS:
if (gl_version_info().IsLowerThanGL(4, 2)) {
GLint levels = texture->GetImmutableLevels();
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(levels);
} else {
iparams[0] = levels;
}
return;
}
break;
if (workarounds().use_shadowed_tex_level_params) {
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->base_level());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->base_level();
}
return;
}
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_LEVEL:
if (workarounds().use_shadowed_tex_level_params) {
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->max_level());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->max_level();
}
return;
}
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_R:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_r());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_r();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_G:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_g());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_g();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_B:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_b());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_b();
}
return;
case GL_TEXTURE_SWIZZLE_A:
if (fparams) {
fparams[0] = static_cast<GLfloat>(texture->swizzle_a());
} else {
iparams[0] = texture->swizzle_a();
}
return;
default:
break;
}
if (fparams) {
api()->glGetTexParameterfvFn(target, pname, fparams);
} else {
api()->glGetTexParameterivFn(target, pname, iparams);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap buffer overflow in GPU in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264} | Medium | 172,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnSoundTriggerHwService::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case LIST_MODULES: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
unsigned int numModulesReq = data.readInt32();
unsigned int numModules = numModulesReq;
struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *modules =
(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *)calloc(numModulesReq,
sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
status_t status = listModules(modules, &numModules);
reply->writeInt32(status);
reply->writeInt32(numModules);
ALOGV("LIST_MODULES status %d got numModules %d", status, numModules);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
if (numModulesReq > numModules) {
numModulesReq = numModules;
}
reply->write(modules,
numModulesReq * sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
}
free(modules);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
sound_trigger_module_handle_t handle;
data.read(&handle, sizeof(sound_trigger_module_handle_t));
sp<ISoundTriggerClient> client =
interface_cast<ISoundTriggerClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
sp<ISoundTrigger> module;
status_t status = attach(handle, client, module);
reply->writeInt32(status);
if (module != 0) {
reply->writeInt32(1);
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(module));
} else {
reply->writeInt32(0);
}
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CAPTURE_STATE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(setCaptureState((bool)data.readInt32()));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in soundtrigger/ISoundTriggerHwService.cpp in Android allows attacks to cause a denial of service via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Check memory allocation in ISoundTriggerHwService
Add memory allocation check in ISoundTriggerHwService::listModules().
Bug: 19385640.
Change-Id: Iaf74b6f154c3437e1bfc9da78b773d64b16a7604
| Medium | 174,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | High | 170,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
int utype;
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
|| (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
if (!*pval)
return -1;
}
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
/* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
utype = strtmp->type;
*putype = utype;
} else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
/* If ANY set type and pointer to value */
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
utype = typ->type;
*putype = utype;
pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
} else
utype = *putype;
switch (utype) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
cont = otmp->data;
len = otmp->length;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
cont = NULL;
len = 0;
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
if (*tbool == -1)
return -1;
if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) {
/*
* Default handling if value == size field then omit
*/
if (*tbool && (it->size > 0))
return -1;
if (!*tbool && !it->size)
return -1;
}
c = (unsigned char)*tbool;
cont = &c;
len = 1;
break;
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval,
cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
/*
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
break;
}
if (cout && len)
memcpy(cout, cont, len);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ASN.1 implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1o and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2c allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer underflow and memory corruption) via an ANY field in crafted serialized data, aka the "negative zero" issue.
Commit Message: | High | 165,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
{
int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
if (s->divider == 0)
return;
/* Start bit. */
frame_size = 1;
/* Parity bit. */
frame_size++;
if (s->lcr & 0x10)
parity = 'E';
else
parity = 'O';
} else {
parity = 'N';
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The serial_update_parameters function in hw/char/serial.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and QEMU process crash) via vectors involving a value of divider greater than baud base.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,910 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->bit_depth == 16)
{
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->red_sBIT > 8) that->red_sBIT = 8;
if (that->green_sBIT > 8) that->green_sBIT = 8;
if (that->blue_sBIT > 8) that->blue_sBIT = 8;
if (that->alpha_sBIT > 8) that->alpha_sBIT = 8;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void check_preempt_curr(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
if (p->sched_class == rq->curr->sched_class) {
rq->curr->sched_class->check_preempt_curr(rq, p, flags);
} else {
for_each_class(class) {
if (class == rq->curr->sched_class)
break;
if (class == p->sched_class) {
resched_task(rq->curr);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* A queue event has occurred, and we're going to schedule. In
* this case, we can save a useless back to back clock update.
*/
if (test_tsk_need_resched(rq->curr))
rq->skip_clock_update = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateInt(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateFloat(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
int ret;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
xEvent *first;
XEventClass *list;
struct tmask tmp[EMASKSIZE];
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
(stuff->num_events * bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xEvent))))
return BadLength;
ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
if (stuff->num_events == 0)
return ret;
/* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */
first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]);
if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first->u.u.type) &&
(first->u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = first->u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events);
return ret;
ret = (SendEvent(client, dev, stuff->destination,
stuff->propagate, (xEvent *) &stuff[1],
tmp[stuff->deviceid].mask, stuff->num_events));
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the X.Org X server before 2017-06-19, a user authenticated to an X Session could crash or execute code in the context of the X Server by exploiting a stack overflow in the endianness conversion of X Events.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UWORD16 impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr = 0;
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN) == MB_ESCAPE_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN);
u2_mb_addr_incr += 33;
}
u2_mb_addr_incr += impeg2d_dec_vld_symbol(ps_stream,gai2_impeg2d_mb_addr_incr,MB_ADDR_INCR_LEN) +
MB_ADDR_INCR_OFFSET;
return(u2_mb_addr_incr);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
| Medium | 173,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Track::Info::Clear()
{
delete[] nameAsUTF8;
nameAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] language;
language = NULL;
delete[] codecId;
codecId = NULL;
delete[] codecPrivate;
codecPrivate = NULL;
codecPrivateSize = 0;
delete[] codecNameAsUTF8;
codecNameAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry *pce;
zval obj;
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp((char *)name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp((char *)name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_UNDEF) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_BINARY)) {
zend_string *new_str = NULL;
if (ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC() != Z_STR(ent1->data)) {
new_str = php_base64_decode(
(unsigned char *)Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
if (new_str) {
ZVAL_STR(&ent1->data, new_str);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(&ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval fname, retval;
ZVAL_STRING(&fname, "__wakeup");
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, &fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
zval_ptr_dtor(&fname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (Z_ISUNDEF(ent2->data)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(&ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
zend_string_forget_hash_val(Z_STR(ent1->data));
if ((pce = zend_hash_find_ptr(EG(class_table), Z_STR(ent1->data))) == NULL) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
if (pce != PHP_IC_ENTRY && (pce->serialize || pce->unserialize)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ent2->data);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Class %s can not be unserialized", Z_STRVAL(ent1->data));
} else {
/* Initialize target object */
object_init_ex(&obj, pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP(obj),
Z_ARRVAL(ent2->data),
zval_add_ref, 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(&obj, Z_STRVAL(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&ent2->data, &obj);
}
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE(ent2->data);
add_property_zval(&ent2->data, ent1->varname, &ent1->data);
if Z_REFCOUNTED(ent1->data) Z_DELREF(ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_str_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname), &ent1->data);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The php_wddx_pop_element function in ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP 7.0.x before 7.0.15 and 7.1.x before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an inapplicable class name in a wddxPacket XML document, leading to mishandling in a wddx_deserialize call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object | Medium | 168,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
rc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
else
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/uwb/uwbd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (general protection fault and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 167,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: id3_skip (SF_PRIVATE * psf)
{ unsigned char buf [10] ;
memset (buf, 0, sizeof (buf)) ;
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "pb", 0, buf, 10) ;
if (buf [0] == 'I' && buf [1] == 'D' && buf [2] == '3')
{ int offset = buf [6] & 0x7f ;
offset = (offset << 7) | (buf [7] & 0x7f) ;
offset = (offset << 7) | (buf [8] & 0x7f) ;
offset = (offset << 7) | (buf [9] & 0x7f) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "ID3 length : %d\n--------------------\n", offset) ;
/* Never want to jump backwards in a file. */
if (offset < 0)
return 0 ;
/* Calculate new file offset and position ourselves there. */
psf->fileoffset += offset + 10 ;
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "p", psf->fileoffset) ;
return 1 ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* id3_skip */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/id3.c : Improve error handling | Medium | 168,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params_in_pixel,
int gpu_host_id) {
surface_route_id_ = params_in_pixel.route_id;
if (params_in_pixel.protection_state_id &&
params_in_pixel.protection_state_id != protection_state_id_) {
DCHECK(!current_surface_);
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
if (ShouldFastACK(params_in_pixel.surface_handle)) {
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, false, NULL);
return;
}
current_surface_ = params_in_pixel.surface_handle;
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
UpdateExternalTexture();
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
if (!compositor) {
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack)
InsertSyncPointAndACK(params_in_pixel.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, NULL);
} else {
DCHECK(image_transport_clients_.find(params_in_pixel.surface_handle) !=
image_transport_clients_.end());
gfx::Size surface_size_in_pixel =
image_transport_clients_[params_in_pixel.surface_handle]->size();
gfx::Size surface_size = ConvertSizeToDIP(this, surface_size_in_pixel);
window_->SchedulePaintInRect(gfx::Rect(surface_size));
if (!params_in_pixel.skip_ack) {
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.push_back(
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InsertSyncPointAndACK,
params_in_pixel.route_id,
gpu_host_id,
true));
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int64 GetOriginalListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*original_update_, index);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s;
struct kex *kex;
int r;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
"[email protected],zlib,none" : "none,[email protected],zlib";
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
&options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
} else {
/* Enforce default */
options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FindBarController::ChangeTabContents(TabContentsWrapper* contents) {
if (tab_contents_) {
registrar_.RemoveAll();
find_bar_->StopAnimation();
}
tab_contents_ = contents;
if (find_bar_->IsFindBarVisible() &&
(!tab_contents_ || !tab_contents_->GetFindManager()->find_ui_active())) {
find_bar_->Hide(false);
}
if (!tab_contents_)
return;
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE,
Source<TabContents>(tab_contents_->tab_contents()));
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(&tab_contents_->controller()));
MaybeSetPrepopulateText();
if (tab_contents_->GetFindManager()->find_ui_active()) {
find_bar_->Show(false);
}
UpdateFindBarForCurrentResult();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fiber_switch(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_int len, const mrb_value *a, mrb_bool resume, mrb_bool vmexec)
{
struct mrb_context *c = fiber_check(mrb, self);
struct mrb_context *old_c = mrb->c;
mrb_value value;
fiber_check_cfunc(mrb, c);
if (resume && c->status == MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming transferred fiber");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_RUNNING || c->status == MRB_FIBER_RESUMED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "double resume (fib)");
}
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "resuming dead fiber");
}
mrb->c->status = resume ? MRB_FIBER_RESUMED : MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED;
c->prev = resume ? mrb->c : (c->prev ? c->prev : mrb->root_c);
if (c->status == MRB_FIBER_CREATED) {
mrb_value *b, *e;
if (len >= c->stend - c->stack) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "too many arguments to fiber");
}
b = c->stack+1;
e = b + len;
while (b<e) {
*b++ = *a++;
}
c->cibase->argc = (int)len;
value = c->stack[0] = MRB_PROC_ENV(c->ci->proc)->stack[0];
}
else {
value = fiber_result(mrb, a, len);
}
fiber_switch_context(mrb, c);
if (vmexec) {
c->vmexec = TRUE;
value = mrb_vm_exec(mrb, c->ci[-1].proc, c->ci->pc);
mrb->c = old_c;
}
else {
MARK_CONTEXT_MODIFY(c);
}
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a heap-based buffer over-read associated with OP_ENTER because mrbgems/mruby-fiber/src/fiber.c does not extend the stack in cases of many arguments to fiber.
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038 | Medium | 169,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TabsCustomBindings::TabsCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToTab",
base::Bind(&TabsCustomBindings::OpenChannelToTab,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710} | Medium | 172,244 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadJP2Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
Image
*image;
int
jp2_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
opj_codec_t
*jp2_codec;
opj_codestream_index_t
*codestream_index = (opj_codestream_index_t *) NULL;
opj_dparameters_t
parameters;
opj_image_t
*jp2_image;
opj_stream_t
*jp2_stream;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
sans[4];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize JP2 codec.
*/
if (ReadBlob(image,4,sans) != 4)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SeekBlob(image,SEEK_SET,0);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JPT") == 0)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JPT);
else
if (IsJ2K(sans,4) != MagickFalse)
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_J2K);
else
jp2_codec=opj_create_decompress(OPJ_CODEC_JP2);
opj_set_warning_handler(jp2_codec,JP2WarningHandler,exception);
opj_set_error_handler(jp2_codec,JP2ErrorHandler,exception);
opj_set_default_decoder_parameters(¶meters);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:reduce-factor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_reduce=StringToInteger(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:quality-layers");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:layer-number");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_layer=StringToInteger(option);
if (opj_setup_decoder(jp2_codec,¶meters) == 0)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToManageJP2Stream");
}
jp2_stream=opj_stream_create(OPJ_J2K_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,OPJ_TRUE);
opj_stream_set_read_function(jp2_stream,JP2ReadHandler);
opj_stream_set_write_function(jp2_stream,JP2WriteHandler);
opj_stream_set_seek_function(jp2_stream,JP2SeekHandler);
opj_stream_set_skip_function(jp2_stream,JP2SkipHandler);
opj_stream_set_user_data(jp2_stream,image,NULL);
opj_stream_set_user_data_length(jp2_stream,GetBlobSize(image));
if (opj_read_header(jp2_stream,jp2_codec,&jp2_image) == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
jp2_status=1;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
/*
Extract an area from the image.
*/
jp2_status=opj_set_decode_area(jp2_codec,jp2_image,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.x,(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.y,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.x+(ssize_t) image->columns,
(OPJ_INT32) image->extract_info.y+(ssize_t) image->rows);
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
}
if ((image_info->number_scenes != 0) && (image_info->scene != 0))
jp2_status=opj_get_decoded_tile(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image,
(unsigned int) image_info->scene-1);
else
if (image->ping == MagickFalse)
{
jp2_status=opj_decode(jp2_codec,jp2_stream,jp2_image);
if (jp2_status != 0)
jp2_status=opj_end_decompress(jp2_codec,jp2_stream);
}
if (jp2_status == 0)
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(DelegateError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
}
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
if ((jp2_image->comps[0].dx == 0) || (jp2_image->comps[0].dy == 0) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].dx != jp2_image->comps[i].dx) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].dy != jp2_image->comps[i].dy) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].prec != jp2_image->comps[i].prec) ||
(jp2_image->comps[0].sgnd != jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd))
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"IrregularChannelGeometryNotSupported")
}
}
/*
Convert JP2 image.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].w;
image->rows=(size_t) jp2_image->comps[0].h;
image->depth=jp2_image->comps[0].prec;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
if (jp2_image->color_space == 2)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 1)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
if (jp2_image->color_space == 3)
SetImageColorspace(image,Rec601YCbCrColorspace);
if (jp2_image->numcomps > 3)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (jp2_image->icc_profile_buf != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
StringInfo
*profile;
profile=BlobToStringInfo(jp2_image->icc_profile_buf,
jp2_image->icc_profile_len);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
}
if (image->ping != MagickFalse)
{
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)
{
double
pixel,
scale;
scale=QuantumRange/(double) ((1UL << jp2_image->comps[i].prec)-1);
pixel=scale*(jp2_image->comps[i].data[y/jp2_image->comps[i].dy*
image->columns/jp2_image->comps[i].dx+x/jp2_image->comps[i].dx]+
(jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd ? 1UL << (jp2_image->comps[i].prec-1) : 0));
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
q->red=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
q->green=q->red;
q->blue=q->red;
q->opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (jp2_image->numcomps == 2)
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange-pixel);
break;
}
q->green=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 2:
{
q->blue=ClampToQuantum(pixel);
break;
}
case 3:
{
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange-pixel);
break;
}
}
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
opj_destroy_cstr_index(&codestream_index);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.8-8 and 7.x before 7.0.5-9, the ReadJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c does not properly validate the channel geometry, leading to a crash.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 170,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SecureProxyChecker::CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation(
"data_reduction_proxy_secure_proxy_check", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server. Proceeds "
"with using a secure connection to the proxy only if the "
"response is not blocked or modified by an intermediary."
trigger:
"A request can be sent whenever the browser is determining how "
"to configure its connection to the data reduction proxy. This "
"happens on startup and network changes."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop "
"it is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = params::GetSecureProxyCheckURL();
resource_request->load_flags =
net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE | net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE |
network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_5XX);
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
fetcher_callback_ = fetcher_callback;
secure_proxy_check_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649} | Medium | 172,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: modify_principal_2_svc(mprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_principal((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: i915_gem_execbuffer2(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file)
{
struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *args = data;
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec2_list = NULL;
int ret;
if (args->buffer_count < 1) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf2 with %d buffers\n", args->buffer_count);
return -EINVAL;
}
exec2_list = kmalloc(sizeof(*exec2_list)*args->buffer_count,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
if (exec2_list == NULL)
exec2_list = drm_malloc_ab(sizeof(*exec2_list),
args->buffer_count);
if (exec2_list == NULL) {
DRM_DEBUG("Failed to allocate exec list for %d buffers\n",
args->buffer_count);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = copy_from_user(exec2_list,
(struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret != 0) {
DRM_DEBUG("copy %d exec entries failed %d\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return -EFAULT;
}
ret = i915_gem_do_execbuffer(dev, data, file, args, exec2_list);
if (!ret) {
/* Copy the new buffer offsets back to the user's exec list. */
ret = copy_to_user((struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
exec2_list,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
DRM_DEBUG("failed to copy %d exec entries "
"back to user (%d)\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
}
}
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the i915_gem_execbuffer2 function in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c in the Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.3.5 on 32-bit platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_execbuffer2()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: push_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds)
{
if (ds->idx >= ds->stacksize)
{
fprintf (stderr, "ERROR: decoder stack overflow!\n");
abort ();
}
ds->stack[ds->idx++] = ds->cur;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ber-decoder.c in Libksba before 1.3.3 does not properly handle decoder stack overflows, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (abort) via crafted BER data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateObject( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_Object;
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
unsigned int target_offset,
unsigned int next_offset)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const char *e = base;
if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
return -EINVAL;
if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) * 4 >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max())
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.97 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to PPAPI image buffers.
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,672 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GURL SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& real_url) {
if (real_url.SchemeIs(kGuestScheme))
return real_url;
GURL url = SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, real_url);
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
url::Origin isolated_origin;
if (policy->GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(origin, &isolated_origin))
return isolated_origin.GetURL();
if (!origin.host().empty() && origin.scheme() != url::kFileScheme) {
std::string domain = net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry(
origin.host(),
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
std::string site = origin.scheme();
site += url::kStandardSchemeSeparator;
site += domain.empty() ? origin.host() : domain;
return GURL(site);
}
if (!origin.unique()) {
DCHECK(!origin.scheme().empty());
return GURL(origin.scheme() + ":");
} else if (url.has_scheme()) {
if (url.SchemeIsBlob()) {
if (url.has_ref()) {
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.ClearRef();
url = url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
return url;
}
DCHECK(!url.scheme().empty());
return GURL(url.scheme() + ":");
}
DCHECK(!url.is_valid()) << url;
return GURL();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023} | Medium | 173,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int phar_zip_flush(phar_archive_data *phar, char *user_stub, long len, int defaultstub, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *pos;
smart_str main_metadata_str = {0};
static const char newstub[] = "<?php // zip-based phar archive stub file\n__HALT_COMPILER();";
char halt_stub[] = "__HALT_COMPILER();";
char *tmp;
php_stream *stubfile, *oldfile;
php_serialize_data_t metadata_hash;
int free_user_stub, closeoldfile = 0;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
char *temperr = NULL;
struct _phar_zip_pass pass;
phar_zip_dir_end eocd;
php_uint32 cdir_size, cdir_offset;
pass.error = &temperr;
entry.flags = PHAR_ENT_PERM_DEF_FILE;
entry.timestamp = time(NULL);
entry.is_modified = 1;
entry.is_zip = 1;
entry.phar = phar;
entry.fp_type = PHAR_MOD;
if (phar->is_persistent) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "internal error: attempt to flush cached zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (phar->is_data) {
goto nostub;
}
/* set alias */
if (!phar->is_temporary_alias && phar->alias_len) {
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
if (phar->alias_len != (int)php_stream_write(entry.fp, phar->alias, phar->alias_len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set alias in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize = phar->alias_len;
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set alias in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
} else {
zend_hash_del(&phar->manifest, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1);
}
/* register alias */
if (phar->alias_len) {
if (FAILURE == phar_get_archive(&phar, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, phar->alias, phar->alias_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
return EOF;
}
}
/* set stub */
if (user_stub && !defaultstub) {
if (len < 0) {
/* resource passed in */
if (!(php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stubfile, (zval **)user_stub))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to access resource to copy stub to new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (len == -1) {
len = PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL;
} else {
len = -len;
}
user_stub = 0;
if (!(len = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stubfile, &user_stub, len, 0)) || !user_stub) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to read resource to copy stub to new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
free_user_stub = 1;
} else {
free_user_stub = 0;
}
tmp = estrndup(user_stub, len);
if ((pos = php_stristr(tmp, halt_stub, len, sizeof(halt_stub) - 1)) == NULL) {
efree(tmp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "illegal stub for zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
return EOF;
}
pos = user_stub + (pos - tmp);
efree(tmp);
len = pos - user_stub + 18;
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = len + 5;
if ((size_t)len != php_stream_write(entry.fp, user_stub, len)
|| 5 != php_stream_write(entry.fp, " ?>\r\n", 5)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to create stub from string in new zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
return EOF;
}
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to set stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
if (free_user_stub) {
efree(user_stub);
}
} else {
/* Either this is a brand new phar (add the stub), or the default stub is required (overwrite the stub) */
entry.fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (entry.fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return EOF;
}
if (sizeof(newstub)-1 != php_stream_write(entry.fp, newstub, sizeof(newstub)-1)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to %s stub in%szip-based phar \"%s\", failed", user_stub ? "overwrite" : "create", user_stub ? " " : " new ", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize = sizeof(newstub) - 1;
entry.filename = estrndup(".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1);
entry.filename_len = sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1;
if (!defaultstub) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&phar->manifest, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to create stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
} else {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&phar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), NULL)) {
php_stream_close(entry.fp);
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unable to overwrite stub in zip-based phar \"%s\"", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
}
}
nostub:
if (phar->fp && !phar->is_brandnew) {
oldfile = phar->fp;
closeoldfile = 0;
php_stream_rewind(oldfile);
} else {
oldfile = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar->fname, "rb", 0, NULL);
closeoldfile = oldfile != NULL;
}
/* save modified files to the zip */
pass.old = oldfile;
pass.filefp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!pass.filefp) {
fperror:
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to open temporary file", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
pass.centralfp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (!pass.centralfp) {
goto fperror;
}
pass.free_fp = pass.free_ufp = 1;
memset(&eocd, 0, sizeof(eocd));
strncpy(eocd.signature, "PK\5\6", 4);
if (!phar->is_data && !phar->sig_flags) {
phar->sig_flags = PHAR_SIG_SHA1;
}
if (phar->sig_flags) {
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.counthere, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest) + 1);
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.count, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest) + 1);
} else {
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.counthere, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest));
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.count, zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest));
}
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(&phar->manifest, phar_zip_changed_apply, (void *) &pass TSRMLS_CC);
if (phar->metadata) {
/* set phar metadata */
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_INIT(metadata_hash);
php_var_serialize(&main_metadata_str, &phar->metadata, &metadata_hash TSRMLS_CC);
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(metadata_hash);
}
if (temperr) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: %s", phar->fname, temperr);
}
efree(temperr);
temperror:
php_stream_close(pass.centralfp);
nocentralerror:
if (phar->metadata) {
smart_str_free(&main_metadata_str);
}
php_stream_close(pass.filefp);
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
return EOF;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_zip_applysignature(phar, &pass, &main_metadata_str TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto temperror;
}
/* save zip */
cdir_size = php_stream_tell(pass.centralfp);
cdir_offset = php_stream_tell(pass.filefp);
PHAR_SET_32(eocd.cdir_size, cdir_size);
PHAR_SET_32(eocd.cdir_offset, cdir_offset);
php_stream_seek(pass.centralfp, 0, SEEK_SET);
{
size_t clen;
int ret = phar_stream_copy_to_stream(pass.centralfp, pass.filefp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, &clen);
if (SUCCESS != ret || clen != cdir_size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto temperror;
}
}
php_stream_close(pass.centralfp);
if (phar->metadata) {
/* set phar metadata */
PHAR_SET_16(eocd.comment_len, main_metadata_str.len);
if (sizeof(eocd) != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, (char *)&eocd, sizeof(eocd))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write end of central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
if (main_metadata_str.len != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, main_metadata_str.c, main_metadata_str.len)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write metadata to zip comment", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
smart_str_free(&main_metadata_str);
} else {
if (sizeof(eocd) != php_stream_write(pass.filefp, (char *)&eocd, sizeof(eocd))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip flush of \"%s\" failed: unable to write end of central-directory", phar->fname);
}
goto nocentralerror;
}
}
if (phar->fp && pass.free_fp) {
php_stream_close(phar->fp);
}
if (phar->ufp) {
if (pass.free_ufp) {
php_stream_close(phar->ufp);
}
phar->ufp = NULL;
}
/* re-open */
phar->is_brandnew = 0;
if (phar->donotflush) {
/* deferred flush */
phar->fp = pass.filefp;
} else {
phar->fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar->fname, "w+b", IGNORE_URL|STREAM_MUST_SEEK|REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (!phar->fp) {
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
phar->fp = pass.filefp;
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "unable to open new phar \"%s\" for writing", phar->fname);
}
return EOF;
}
php_stream_rewind(pass.filefp);
phar_stream_copy_to_stream(pass.filefp, phar->fp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, NULL);
/* we could also reopen the file in "rb" mode but there is no need for that */
php_stream_close(pass.filefp);
}
if (closeoldfile) {
php_stream_close(oldfile);
}
return EOF;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The phar_parse_zipfile function in zip.c in the PHAR extension in PHP before 5.5.33 and 5.6.x before 5.6.19 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) by placing a PK\x05\x06 signature at an invalid location.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_netscreen_hex_dump(FILE_T fh, int pkt_len, const char *cap_int,
const char *cap_dst, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer* buf,
int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
guint8 *pd;
gchar line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
gchar *p;
int n, i = 0, offset = 0;
gchar dststr[13];
/* Make sure we have enough room for the packet */
ws_buffer_assure_space(buf, NETSCREEN_MAX_PACKET_LEN);
pd = ws_buffer_start_ptr(buf);
while(1) {
/* The last packet is not delimited by an empty line, but by EOF
* So accept EOF as a valid delimiter too
*/
if (file_gets(line, NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
break;
}
/*
* Skip blanks.
* The number of blanks is not fixed - for wireless
* interfaces, there may be 14 extra spaces before
* the hex data.
*/
for (p = &line[0]; g_ascii_isspace(*p); p++)
;
/* packets are delimited with empty lines */
if (*p == '\0') {
break;
}
n = parse_single_hex_dump_line(p, pd, offset);
/* the smallest packet has a length of 6 bytes, if
* the first hex-data is less then check whether
* it is a info-line and act accordingly
*/
if (offset == 0 && n < 6) {
if (info_line(line)) {
if (++i <= NETSCREEN_MAX_INFOLINES) {
continue;
}
} else {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
}
/* If there is no more data and the line was not empty,
* then there must be an error in the file
*/
if(n == -1) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
/* Adjust the offset to the data that was just added to the buffer */
offset += n;
/* If there was more hex-data than was announced in the len=x
* header, then then there must be an error in the file
*/
if(offset > pkt_len) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: too much hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
}
/*
* Determine the encapsulation type, based on the
* first 4 characters of the interface name
*
* XXX convert this to a 'case' structure when adding more
* (non-ethernet) interfacetypes
*/
if (strncmp(cap_int, "adsl", 4) == 0) {
/* The ADSL interface can be bridged with or without
* PPP encapsulation. Check whether the first six bytes
* of the hex data are the same as the destination mac
* address in the header. If they are, assume ethernet
* LinkLayer or else PPP
*/
g_snprintf(dststr, 13, "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
pd[0], pd[1], pd[2], pd[3], pd[4], pd[5]);
if (strncmp(dststr, cap_dst, 12) == 0)
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
else
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PPP;
}
else if (strncmp(cap_int, "seri", 4) == 0)
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PPP;
else
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
phdr->caplen = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: wiretap/netscreen.c in the NetScreen file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,148 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct in_device *in_dev,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u32 tos)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct rtable *rth;
int err;
struct in_device *out_dev;
unsigned int flags = 0;
bool do_cache;
u32 itag = 0;
/* get a working reference to the output device */
out_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(FIB_RES_DEV(*res));
if (out_dev == NULL) {
net_crit_ratelimited("Bug in ip_route_input_slow(). Please report.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos, FIB_RES_OIF(*res),
in_dev->dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0) {
ip_handle_martian_source(in_dev->dev, in_dev, skb, daddr,
saddr);
goto cleanup;
}
do_cache = res->fi && !itag;
if (out_dev == in_dev && err && IN_DEV_TX_REDIRECTS(out_dev) &&
(IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(out_dev) ||
inet_addr_onlink(out_dev, saddr, FIB_RES_GW(*res)))) {
flags |= RTCF_DOREDIRECT;
do_cache = false;
}
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/* Not IP (i.e. ARP). Do not create route, if it is
* invalid for proxy arp. DNAT routes are always valid.
*
* Proxy arp feature have been extended to allow, ARP
* replies back to the same interface, to support
* Private VLAN switch technologies. See arp.c.
*/
if (out_dev == in_dev &&
IN_DEV_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN(in_dev) == 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
if (do_cache) {
if (fnhe != NULL)
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
else
rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
}
}
rth = rt_dst_alloc(out_dev->dev,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(out_dev, NOXFRM), do_cache);
if (!rth) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto cleanup;
}
rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
rth->rt_flags = flags;
rth->rt_type = res->type;
rth->rt_is_input = 1;
rth->rt_iif = 0;
rth->rt_pmtu = 0;
rth->rt_gateway = 0;
rth->rt_uses_gateway = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rth->rt_uncached);
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
rth->dst.input = ip_forward;
rth->dst.output = ip_output;
rt_set_nexthop(rth, daddr, res, fnhe, res->fi, res->type, itag);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
out:
err = 0;
cleanup:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 does not properly consider the length of the Read-Copy Update (RCU) grace period for redirecting lookups in the absence of caching, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a flood of packets.
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_report_cipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_cipher rcipher;
snprintf(rcipher.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "cipher");
rcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
rcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_CIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_cipher), &rcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 166,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void FocusInCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
const gchar* path,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->FocusIn(path);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GDataDirectory::FromProto(const GDataDirectoryProto& proto) {
DCHECK(proto.gdata_entry().file_info().is_directory());
DCHECK(!proto.gdata_entry().has_file_specific_info());
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_files_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> file(new GDataFile(NULL, directory_service_));
if (!file->FromProto(proto.child_files(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(file.release());
}
for (int i = 0; i < proto.child_directories_size(); ++i) {
scoped_ptr<GDataDirectory> dir(new GDataDirectory(NULL,
directory_service_));
if (!dir->FromProto(proto.child_directories(i))) {
RemoveChildren();
return false;
}
AddEntry(dir.release());
}
if (!GDataEntry::FromProto(proto.gdata_entry()))
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadController::CreateGETDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
bool must_download,
const DownloadInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadController::StartAndroidDownload,
base::Unretained(this),
wc_getter, must_download, info));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The UnescapeURLWithAdjustmentsImpl implementation in net/base/escape.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 does not prevent display of Unicode LOCK characters in the omnibox, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the SSL lock icon by placing one of these characters at the end of a URL, as demonstrated by the omnibox in localizations for right-to-left languages.
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332} | Medium | 171,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool MediaStreamDevicesController::IsRequestAllowedByDefault() const {
if (ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin())
return true;
struct {
bool has_capability;
const char* policy_name;
const char* list_policy_name;
ContentSettingsType settings_type;
} device_checks[] = {
{ microphone_requested_, prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowedUrls, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC },
{ webcam_requested_, prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowedUrls,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(device_checks); ++i) {
if (!device_checks[i].has_capability)
continue;
DevicePolicy policy = GetDevicePolicy(device_checks[i].policy_name,
device_checks[i].list_policy_name);
if (policy == ALWAYS_DENY ||
(policy == POLICY_NOT_SET &&
profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
device_checks[i].settings_type, NO_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER) !=
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Flash plug-in in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.116, as used on Google Chrome OS before 27.0.1453.116 and separately, does not properly determine whether a user wishes to permit camera or microphone access by a Flash application, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from a machine's physical environment via a clickjacking attack, as demonstrated by an attack using a crafted Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) opacity property.
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
| High | 173,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void btif_dm_upstreams_evt(UINT16 event, char* p_param)
{
tBTA_DM_SEC *p_data = (tBTA_DM_SEC*)p_param;
tBTA_SERVICE_MASK service_mask;
uint32_t i;
bt_bdaddr_t bd_addr;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("btif_dm_upstreams_cback ev: %s", dump_dm_event(event));
switch (event)
{
case BTA_DM_ENABLE_EVT:
{
BD_NAME bdname;
bt_status_t status;
bt_property_t prop;
prop.type = BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME;
prop.len = BD_NAME_LEN;
prop.val = (void*)bdname;
status = btif_storage_get_adapter_property(&prop);
if (status == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
/* A name exists in the storage. Make this the device name */
BTA_DmSetDeviceName((char*)prop.val);
}
else
{
/* Storage does not have a name yet.
* Use the default name and write it to the chip
*/
BTA_DmSetDeviceName(btif_get_default_local_name());
}
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
/* Enable local privacy */
BTA_DmBleConfigLocalPrivacy(BLE_LOCAL_PRIVACY_ENABLED);
#endif
/* for each of the enabled services in the mask, trigger the profile
* enable */
service_mask = btif_get_enabled_services_mask();
for (i=0; i <= BTA_MAX_SERVICE_ID; i++)
{
if (service_mask &
(tBTA_SERVICE_MASK)(BTA_SERVICE_ID_TO_SERVICE_MASK(i)))
{
btif_in_execute_service_request(i, TRUE);
}
}
/* clear control blocks */
memset(&pairing_cb, 0, sizeof(btif_dm_pairing_cb_t));
pairing_cb.bond_type = BOND_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
/* This function will also trigger the adapter_properties_cb
** and bonded_devices_info_cb
*/
btif_storage_load_bonded_devices();
btif_storage_load_autopair_device_list();
btif_enable_bluetooth_evt(p_data->enable.status);
}
break;
case BTA_DM_DISABLE_EVT:
/* for each of the enabled services in the mask, trigger the profile
* disable */
service_mask = btif_get_enabled_services_mask();
for (i=0; i <= BTA_MAX_SERVICE_ID; i++)
{
if (service_mask &
(tBTA_SERVICE_MASK)(BTA_SERVICE_ID_TO_SERVICE_MASK(i)))
{
btif_in_execute_service_request(i, FALSE);
}
}
btif_disable_bluetooth_evt();
break;
case BTA_DM_PIN_REQ_EVT:
btif_dm_pin_req_evt(&p_data->pin_req);
break;
case BTA_DM_AUTH_CMPL_EVT:
btif_dm_auth_cmpl_evt(&p_data->auth_cmpl);
break;
case BTA_DM_BOND_CANCEL_CMPL_EVT:
if (pairing_cb.state == BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING)
{
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, pairing_cb.bd_addr);
btm_set_bond_type_dev(pairing_cb.bd_addr, BOND_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
bond_state_changed(p_data->bond_cancel_cmpl.result, &bd_addr, BT_BOND_STATE_NONE);
}
break;
case BTA_DM_SP_CFM_REQ_EVT:
btif_dm_ssp_cfm_req_evt(&p_data->cfm_req);
break;
case BTA_DM_SP_KEY_NOTIF_EVT:
btif_dm_ssp_key_notif_evt(&p_data->key_notif);
break;
case BTA_DM_DEV_UNPAIRED_EVT:
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_data->link_down.bd_addr);
btm_set_bond_type_dev(p_data->link_down.bd_addr, BOND_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
/*special handling for HID devices */
#if (defined(BTA_HH_INCLUDED) && (BTA_HH_INCLUDED == TRUE))
btif_hh_remove_device(bd_addr);
#endif
btif_storage_remove_bonded_device(&bd_addr);
bond_state_changed(BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, &bd_addr, BT_BOND_STATE_NONE);
break;
case BTA_DM_BUSY_LEVEL_EVT:
{
if (p_data->busy_level.level_flags & BTM_BL_INQUIRY_PAGING_MASK)
{
if (p_data->busy_level.level_flags == BTM_BL_INQUIRY_STARTED)
{
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, discovery_state_changed_cb,
BT_DISCOVERY_STARTED);
btif_dm_inquiry_in_progress = TRUE;
}
else if (p_data->busy_level.level_flags == BTM_BL_INQUIRY_CANCELLED)
{
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, discovery_state_changed_cb,
BT_DISCOVERY_STOPPED);
btif_dm_inquiry_in_progress = FALSE;
}
else if (p_data->busy_level.level_flags == BTM_BL_INQUIRY_COMPLETE)
{
btif_dm_inquiry_in_progress = FALSE;
}
}
}break;
case BTA_DM_LINK_UP_EVT:
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_data->link_up.bd_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_LINK_UP_EVT. Sending BT_ACL_STATE_CONNECTED");
btif_update_remote_version_property(&bd_addr);
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, acl_state_changed_cb, BT_STATUS_SUCCESS,
&bd_addr, BT_ACL_STATE_CONNECTED);
break;
case BTA_DM_LINK_DOWN_EVT:
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_data->link_down.bd_addr);
btm_set_bond_type_dev(p_data->link_down.bd_addr, BOND_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_LINK_DOWN_EVT. Sending BT_ACL_STATE_DISCONNECTED");
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, acl_state_changed_cb, BT_STATUS_SUCCESS,
&bd_addr, BT_ACL_STATE_DISCONNECTED);
break;
case BTA_DM_HW_ERROR_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Received H/W Error. ");
/* Flush storage data */
btif_config_flush();
usleep(100000); /* 100milliseconds */
/* Killing the process to force a restart as part of fault tolerance */
kill(getpid(), SIGKILL);
break;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
case BTA_DM_BLE_KEY_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_KEY_EVT key_type=0x%02x ", p_data->ble_key.key_type);
/* If this pairing is by-product of local initiated GATT client Read or Write,
BTA would not have sent BTA_DM_BLE_SEC_REQ_EVT event and Bond state would not
have setup properly. Setup pairing_cb and notify App about Bonding state now*/
if (pairing_cb.state != BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Bond state not sent to App so far.Notify the app now");
bond_state_changed(BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, (bt_bdaddr_t*)p_data->ble_key.bd_addr,
BT_BOND_STATE_BONDING);
}
else if (memcmp (pairing_cb.bd_addr, p_data->ble_key.bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN)!=0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("BD mismatch discard BLE key_type=%d ",p_data->ble_key.key_type);
break;
}
switch (p_data->ble_key.key_type)
{
case BTA_LE_KEY_PENC:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_PENC");
pairing_cb.ble.is_penc_key_rcvd = TRUE;
pairing_cb.ble.penc_key = p_data->ble_key.p_key_value->penc_key;
break;
case BTA_LE_KEY_PID:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_PID");
pairing_cb.ble.is_pid_key_rcvd = TRUE;
pairing_cb.ble.pid_key = p_data->ble_key.p_key_value->pid_key;
break;
case BTA_LE_KEY_PCSRK:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_PCSRK");
pairing_cb.ble.is_pcsrk_key_rcvd = TRUE;
pairing_cb.ble.pcsrk_key = p_data->ble_key.p_key_value->pcsrk_key;
break;
case BTA_LE_KEY_LENC:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_LENC");
pairing_cb.ble.is_lenc_key_rcvd = TRUE;
pairing_cb.ble.lenc_key = p_data->ble_key.p_key_value->lenc_key;
break;
case BTA_LE_KEY_LCSRK:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_LCSRK");
pairing_cb.ble.is_lcsrk_key_rcvd = TRUE;
pairing_cb.ble.lcsrk_key = p_data->ble_key.p_key_value->lcsrk_key;
break;
case BTA_LE_KEY_LID:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Rcv BTA_LE_KEY_LID");
pairing_cb.ble.is_lidk_key_rcvd = TRUE;
break;
default:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("unknown BLE key type (0x%02x)", p_data->ble_key.key_type);
break;
}
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_SEC_REQ_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_SEC_REQ_EVT. ");
btif_dm_ble_sec_req_evt(&p_data->ble_req);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_PASSKEY_NOTIF_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_PASSKEY_NOTIF_EVT. ");
btif_dm_ble_key_notif_evt(&p_data->key_notif);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT. ");
btif_dm_ble_passkey_req_evt(&p_data->pin_req);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_NC_REQ_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT. ");
btif_dm_ble_key_nc_req_evt(&p_data->key_notif);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_OOB_REQ_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_OOB_REQ_EVT. ");
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_LOCAL_IR_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_LOCAL_IR_EVT. ");
ble_local_key_cb.is_id_keys_rcvd = TRUE;
memcpy(&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.irk[0],
&p_data->ble_id_keys.irk[0], sizeof(BT_OCTET16));
memcpy(&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.ir[0],
&p_data->ble_id_keys.ir[0], sizeof(BT_OCTET16));
memcpy(&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.dhk[0],
&p_data->ble_id_keys.dhk[0], sizeof(BT_OCTET16));
btif_storage_add_ble_local_key( (char *)&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.irk[0],
BTIF_DM_LE_LOCAL_KEY_IRK,
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
btif_storage_add_ble_local_key( (char *)&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.ir[0],
BTIF_DM_LE_LOCAL_KEY_IR,
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
btif_storage_add_ble_local_key( (char *)&ble_local_key_cb.id_keys.dhk[0],
BTIF_DM_LE_LOCAL_KEY_DHK,
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_LOCAL_ER_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_LOCAL_ER_EVT. ");
ble_local_key_cb.is_er_rcvd = TRUE;
memcpy(&ble_local_key_cb.er[0], &p_data->ble_er[0], sizeof(BT_OCTET16));
btif_storage_add_ble_local_key( (char *)&ble_local_key_cb.er[0],
BTIF_DM_LE_LOCAL_KEY_ER,
BT_OCTET16_LEN);
break;
case BTA_DM_BLE_AUTH_CMPL_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_DM_BLE_AUTH_CMPL_EVT. ");
btif_dm_ble_auth_cmpl_evt(&p_data->auth_cmpl);
break;
case BTA_DM_LE_FEATURES_READ:
{
tBTM_BLE_VSC_CB cmn_vsc_cb;
bt_local_le_features_t local_le_features;
char buf[512];
bt_property_t prop;
prop.type = BT_PROPERTY_LOCAL_LE_FEATURES;
prop.val = (void*)buf;
prop.len = sizeof(buf);
/* LE features are not stored in storage. Should be retrived from stack */
BTM_BleGetVendorCapabilities(&cmn_vsc_cb);
local_le_features.local_privacy_enabled = BTM_BleLocalPrivacyEnabled();
prop.len = sizeof (bt_local_le_features_t);
if (cmn_vsc_cb.filter_support == 1)
local_le_features.max_adv_filter_supported = cmn_vsc_cb.max_filter;
else
local_le_features.max_adv_filter_supported = 0;
local_le_features.max_adv_instance = cmn_vsc_cb.adv_inst_max;
local_le_features.max_irk_list_size = cmn_vsc_cb.max_irk_list_sz;
local_le_features.rpa_offload_supported = cmn_vsc_cb.rpa_offloading;
local_le_features.activity_energy_info_supported = cmn_vsc_cb.energy_support;
local_le_features.scan_result_storage_size = cmn_vsc_cb.tot_scan_results_strg;
local_le_features.version_supported = cmn_vsc_cb.version_supported;
local_le_features.total_trackable_advertisers =
cmn_vsc_cb.total_trackable_advertisers;
local_le_features.extended_scan_support = cmn_vsc_cb.extended_scan_support > 0;
local_le_features.debug_logging_supported = cmn_vsc_cb.debug_logging_supported > 0;
memcpy(prop.val, &local_le_features, prop.len);
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, adapter_properties_cb, BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, 1, &prop);
break;
}
case BTA_DM_ENER_INFO_READ:
{
btif_activity_energy_info_cb_t *p_ener_data = (btif_activity_energy_info_cb_t*) p_param;
bt_activity_energy_info energy_info;
energy_info.status = p_ener_data->status;
energy_info.ctrl_state = p_ener_data->ctrl_state;
energy_info.rx_time = p_ener_data->rx_time;
energy_info.tx_time = p_ener_data->tx_time;
energy_info.idle_time = p_ener_data->idle_time;
energy_info.energy_used = p_ener_data->energy_used;
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, energy_info_cb, &energy_info);
break;
}
#endif
case BTA_DM_AUTHORIZE_EVT:
case BTA_DM_SIG_STRENGTH_EVT:
case BTA_DM_SP_RMT_OOB_EVT:
case BTA_DM_SP_KEYPRESS_EVT:
case BTA_DM_ROLE_CHG_EVT:
default:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING( "btif_dm_cback : unhandled event (%d)", event );
break;
}
btif_dm_data_free(event, p_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: verify_client_san(krb5_context context,
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx,
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_const_principal client,
int *valid_san)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
krb5_principal *upns = NULL;
int i;
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
char *client_string = NULL, *san_string;
#endif
*valid_san = 0;
retval = crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&princs,
plgctx->opts->allow_upn ? &upns : NULL,
NULL);
if (retval == ENOENT) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_NO_SAN(context);
goto out;
} else if (retval) {
pkiDebug("%s: error from retrieve_certificate_sans()\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* XXX Verify this is consistent with client side XXX */
#if 0
retval = call_san_checking_plugins(context, plgctx, reqctx, princs,
upns, NULL, &plugin_decision, &ignore);
pkiDebug("%s: call_san_checking_plugins() returned retval %d\n",
__FUNCTION__);
if (retval) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
pkiDebug("%s: call_san_checking_plugins() returned decision %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, plugin_decision);
if (plugin_decision != NO_DECISION) {
retval = plugin_decision;
goto out;
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &client_string);
#endif
pkiDebug("%s: Checking pkinit sans\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; princs != NULL && princs[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, princs[i], &san_string);
pkiDebug("%s: Comparing client '%s' to pkinit san value '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, client_string, san_string);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, san_string);
#endif
if (cb->match_client(context, rock, princs[i])) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_MATCHING_SAN_FOUND(context);
*valid_san = 1;
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: no pkinit san match found\n", __FUNCTION__);
/*
* XXX if cert has names but none match, should we
* be returning KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH here?
*/
if (upns == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no upn sans (or we wouldn't accept them anyway)\n",
__FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
pkiDebug("%s: Checking upn sans\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, upns[i], &san_string);
pkiDebug("%s: Comparing client '%s' to upn san value '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, client_string, san_string);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, san_string);
#endif
if (cb->match_client(context, rock, upns[i])) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_MATCHING_UPN_FOUND(context);
*valid_san = 1;
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: no upn san match found\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* We found no match */
if (princs != NULL || upns != NULL) {
*valid_san = 0;
/* XXX ??? If there was one or more name in the cert, but
* none matched the client name, then return mismatch? */
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
}
retval = 0;
out:
if (princs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
}
if (upns != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]);
free(upns);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
if (client_string != NULL)
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, client_string);
#endif
pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_san %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_san);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: An authentication bypass flaw was found in the way krb5's certauth interface before 1.16.1 handled the validation of client certificates. A remote attacker able to communicate with the KDC could potentially use this flaw to impersonate arbitrary principals under rare and erroneous circumstances.
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561 | Medium | 170,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 0;
}
/* send off the data */
DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
*len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
s2n(*len, *p);
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
*len += 2;
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0d, if a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service attack.
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, hello, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
MessagePortArray messagePortArrayTransferList;
ArrayBufferArray arrayBufferArrayTransferList;
if (args.Length() > 2) {
if (!extractTransferables(args[2], messagePortArrayTransferList, arrayBufferArrayTransferList))
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Could not extract transferables");
}
bool dataDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[1], &messagePortArrayTransferList, &arrayBufferArrayTransferList, dataDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (dataDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
RefPtr<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface> impl = TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::create(hello, data, messagePortArrayTransferList);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
int ok = 0;
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(&priv_key, in, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return NULL;
}
if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (a)
*a = ret;
} else
ret = *a;
ret = *a;
if (priv_key->parameters) {
if (ret->group)
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
}
if (ret->group == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->version = priv_key->version;
if (priv_key->privateKey) {
ret->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey),
M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey),
ret->priv_key);
if (ret->priv_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key->publicKey) {
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
size_t pub_oct_len;
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
/* save the point conversion form */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) {
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
if (ret)
EC_KEY_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
if (priv_key)
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the d2i_ECPrivateKey function in crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a malformed Elliptic Curve (EC) private-key file that is improperly handled during import.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_addr saddr, daddr;
struct sock *sk;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, saddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &saddr.lsap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, daddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &daddr.lsap);
sk = __llc_lookup(sap, &saddr, &daddr);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This has to be done here and not at the upper layer ->accept
* method because of the way the PROCOM state machine works:
* it needs to set several state variables (see, for instance,
* llc_adm_actions_2 in net/llc/llc_c_st.c) and send a packet to
* the originator of the new connection, and this state has to be
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
&saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
* Can't be skb_set_owner_r, this will be done at the
* llc_conn_state_process function, later on, when we will use
* skb_queue_rcv_skb to send it to upper layers, this is
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
skb->sk = sk;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
drop_unlock:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The LLC subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.9.13 does not ensure that a certain destructor exists in required circumstances, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: logger_get_mask_expanded (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, const char *mask)
{
char *mask2, *mask_decoded, *mask_decoded2, *mask_decoded3, *mask_decoded4;
char *mask_decoded5;
const char *dir_separator;
int length;
time_t seconds;
struct tm *date_tmp;
mask2 = NULL;
mask_decoded = NULL;
mask_decoded2 = NULL;
mask_decoded3 = NULL;
mask_decoded4 = NULL;
mask_decoded5 = NULL;
dir_separator = weechat_info_get ("dir_separator", "");
if (!dir_separator)
return NULL;
/*
* we first replace directory separator (commonly '/') by \01 because
* buffer mask can contain this char, and will be replaced by replacement
* char ('_' by default)
*/
mask2 = weechat_string_replace (mask, dir_separator, "\01");
if (!mask2)
goto end;
mask_decoded = weechat_buffer_string_replace_local_var (buffer, mask2);
if (!mask_decoded)
goto end;
mask_decoded2 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded,
dir_separator,
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
if (!mask_decoded2)
goto end;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
mask_decoded3 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded2, "\\",
weechat_config_string (logger_config_file_replacement_char));
#else
mask_decoded3 = strdup (mask_decoded2);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
if (!mask_decoded3)
goto end;
/* restore directory separator */
mask_decoded4 = weechat_string_replace (mask_decoded3,
"\01", dir_separator);
if (!mask_decoded4)
goto end;
/* replace date/time specifiers in mask */
length = strlen (mask_decoded4) + 256 + 1;
mask_decoded5 = malloc (length);
if (!mask_decoded5)
goto end;
seconds = time (NULL);
date_tmp = localtime (&seconds);
mask_decoded5[0] = '\0';
strftime (mask_decoded5, length - 1, mask_decoded4, date_tmp);
/* convert to lower case? */
if (weechat_config_boolean (logger_config_file_name_lower_case))
weechat_string_tolower (mask_decoded5);
if (weechat_logger_plugin->debug)
{
weechat_printf_date_tags (NULL, 0, "no_log",
"%s: buffer = \"%s\", mask = \"%s\", "
"decoded mask = \"%s\"",
LOGGER_PLUGIN_NAME,
weechat_buffer_get_string (buffer, "name"),
mask, mask_decoded5);
}
end:
if (mask2)
free (mask2);
if (mask_decoded)
free (mask_decoded);
if (mask_decoded2)
free (mask_decoded2);
if (mask_decoded3)
free (mask_decoded3);
if (mask_decoded4)
free (mask_decoded4);
return mask_decoded5;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: logger.c in the logger plugin in WeeChat before 1.9.1 allows a crash via strftime date/time specifiers, because a buffer is not initialized.
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables | Medium | 167,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()
|| defParams->nSize
!= sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
const PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.itemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
memcpy(defParams, &port->mDef, sizeof(port->mDef));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CMD_FUNC(m_authenticate)
{
aClient *agent_p = NULL;
/* Failing to use CAP REQ for sasl is a protocol violation. */
if (!SASL_SERVER || !MyConnect(sptr) || BadPtr(parv[1]) || !CHECKPROTO(sptr, PROTO_SASL))
return 0;
if (sptr->local->sasl_complete)
{
sendto_one(sptr, err_str(ERR_SASLALREADY), me.name, BadPtr(sptr->name) ? "*" : sptr->name);
return 0;
}
if (strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
{
sendto_one(sptr, err_str(ERR_SASLTOOLONG), me.name, BadPtr(sptr->name) ? "*" : sptr->name);
return 0;
}
if (*sptr->local->sasl_agent)
agent_p = find_client(sptr->local->sasl_agent, NULL);
if (agent_p == NULL)
{
char *addr = BadPtr(sptr->ip) ? "0" : sptr->ip;
char *certfp = moddata_client_get(sptr, "certfp");
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s H %s %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), addr, addr);
if (certfp)
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s S %s %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), parv[1], certfp);
else
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s S %s",
me.name, SASL_SERVER, encode_puid(sptr), parv[1]);
}
else
sendto_server(NULL, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s C %s",
me.name, AGENT_SID(agent_p), encode_puid(sptr), parv[1]);
sptr->local->sasl_out++;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: The m_authenticate function in modules/m_sasl.c in UnrealIRCd before 3.2.10.7 and 4.x before 4.0.6 allows remote attackers to spoof certificate fingerprints and consequently log in as another user via a crafted AUTHENTICATE parameter.
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug | Medium | 168,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count < DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the logi_dj_ll_raw_request function in drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that specifies a large report size for an LED report.
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i], strlen(atts[i]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i], strlen(atts[i])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The php_wddx_push_element function in ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer access and out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an incorrect boolean element in a wddxPacket XML document, leading to mishandling in a wddx_deserialize call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c | Medium | 166,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_INOUT OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
switch ((unsigned long)configIndex) {
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigInterlaced: {
OMX_QCOM_CONFIG_INTERLACETYPE *configFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_CONFIG_INTERLACETYPE *) configData;
if (configFmt->nPortIndex == 1) {
if (configFmt->nIndex == 0) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType = OMX_QCOM_InterlaceFrameProgressive;
} else if (configFmt->nIndex == 1) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType =
OMX_QCOM_InterlaceInterleaveFrameTopFieldFirst;
} else if (configFmt->nIndex == 2) {
configFmt->eInterlaceType =
OMX_QCOM_InterlaceInterleaveFrameBottomFieldFirst;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: OMX_QcomIndexConfigInterlaced:"
" NoMore Interlaced formats");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: Bad port index %d queried on only o/p port",
(int)configFmt->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexQueryNumberOfVideoDecInstance: {
QOMX_VIDEO_QUERY_DECODER_INSTANCES *decoderinstances =
(QOMX_VIDEO_QUERY_DECODER_INSTANCES*)configData;
decoderinstances->nNumOfInstances = 16;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigVideoFramePackingArrangement: {
if (drv_ctx.decoder_format == VDEC_CODECTYPE_H264) {
OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *configFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT *) configData;
memcpy(configFmt, &m_frame_pack_arrangement,
sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: Framepack data not supported for non H264 codecs");
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop: {
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rect = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *) configData;
memcpy(rect, &rectangle, sizeof(OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("get_config: crop info: L: %u, T: %u, R: %u, B: %u",
rectangle.nLeft, rectangle.nTop,
rectangle.nWidth, rectangle.nHeight);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel: {
struct v4l2_control control;
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting performance level: %d", errno);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
switch (control.value) {
case V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO:
perf->ePerfLevel = OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo;
break;
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Unknown perf level %d, reporting Nominal instead", control.value);
/* Fall through */
case V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL:
perf->ePerfLevel = OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal;
break;
}
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_config: unknown param %d",configIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
| High | 173,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
const gpu::Mailbox& mailbox,
const gpu::SyncToken& sync_token,
unsigned texture_id,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper,
IntSize mailbox_size)
: paint_image_content_id_(cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId()) {
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<MailboxTextureHolder>(
mailbox, sync_token, texture_id, std::move(context_provider_wrapper),
mailbox_size);
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,589 |
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