instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsDomainHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerMS::HasSingleSecurityOrigin() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | Medium | 172,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_@_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, char *name, size_t sizeof_name,
size_t *pos, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, " +@");
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct path lowerpath;
struct path upperpath;
struct path workpath;
struct inode *root_inode;
struct dentry *root_dentry;
struct ovl_entry *oe;
struct ovl_fs *ufs;
struct kstatfs statfs;
int err;
err = -ENOMEM;
ufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ovl_fs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ufs)
goto out;
err = ovl_parse_opt((char *) data, &ufs->config);
if (err)
goto out_free_config;
/* FIXME: workdir is not needed for a R/O mount */
err = -EINVAL;
if (!ufs->config.upperdir || !ufs->config.lowerdir ||
!ufs->config.workdir) {
pr_err("overlayfs: missing upperdir or lowerdir or workdir\n");
goto out_free_config;
}
err = -ENOMEM;
oe = ovl_alloc_entry();
if (oe == NULL)
goto out_free_config;
err = ovl_mount_dir(ufs->config.upperdir, &upperpath);
if (err)
goto out_free_oe;
err = ovl_mount_dir(ufs->config.lowerdir, &lowerpath);
if (err)
goto out_put_upperpath;
err = ovl_mount_dir(ufs->config.workdir, &workpath);
if (err)
goto out_put_lowerpath;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISDIR(upperpath.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
!S_ISDIR(lowerpath.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
!S_ISDIR(workpath.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: upperdir or lowerdir or workdir not a directory\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
if (upperpath.mnt != workpath.mnt) {
pr_err("overlayfs: workdir and upperdir must reside under the same mount\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
if (!ovl_workdir_ok(workpath.dentry, upperpath.dentry)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: workdir and upperdir must be separate subtrees\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
if (!ovl_is_allowed_fs_type(upperpath.dentry)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: filesystem of upperdir is not supported\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
if (!ovl_is_allowed_fs_type(lowerpath.dentry)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: filesystem of lowerdir is not supported\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
err = vfs_statfs(&lowerpath, &statfs);
if (err) {
pr_err("overlayfs: statfs failed on lowerpath\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
ufs->lower_namelen = statfs.f_namelen;
ufs->upper_mnt = clone_private_mount(&upperpath);
err = PTR_ERR(ufs->upper_mnt);
if (IS_ERR(ufs->upper_mnt)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: failed to clone upperpath\n");
goto out_put_workpath;
}
ufs->lower_mnt = clone_private_mount(&lowerpath);
err = PTR_ERR(ufs->lower_mnt);
if (IS_ERR(ufs->lower_mnt)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: failed to clone lowerpath\n");
goto out_put_upper_mnt;
}
ufs->workdir = ovl_workdir_create(ufs->upper_mnt, workpath.dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(ufs->workdir);
if (IS_ERR(ufs->workdir)) {
pr_err("overlayfs: failed to create directory %s/%s\n",
ufs->config.workdir, OVL_WORKDIR_NAME);
goto out_put_lower_mnt;
}
/*
* Make lower_mnt R/O. That way fchmod/fchown on lower file
* will fail instead of modifying lower fs.
*/
ufs->lower_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
/* If the upper fs is r/o, we mark overlayfs r/o too */
if (ufs->upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
err = -ENOMEM;
root_inode = ovl_new_inode(sb, S_IFDIR, oe);
if (!root_inode)
goto out_put_workdir;
root_dentry = d_make_root(root_inode);
if (!root_dentry)
goto out_put_workdir;
mntput(upperpath.mnt);
mntput(lowerpath.mnt);
path_put(&workpath);
oe->__upperdentry = upperpath.dentry;
oe->lowerdentry = lowerpath.dentry;
root_dentry->d_fsdata = oe;
sb->s_magic = OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &ovl_super_operations;
sb->s_root = root_dentry;
sb->s_fs_info = ufs;
return 0;
out_put_workdir:
dput(ufs->workdir);
out_put_lower_mnt:
mntput(ufs->lower_mnt);
out_put_upper_mnt:
mntput(ufs->upper_mnt);
out_put_workpath:
path_put(&workpath);
out_put_lowerpath:
path_put(&lowerpath);
out_put_upperpath:
path_put(&upperpath);
out_free_oe:
kfree(oe);
out_free_config:
kfree(ufs->config.lowerdir);
kfree(ufs->config.upperdir);
kfree(ufs->config.workdir);
kfree(ufs);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges via a large filesystem stack that includes an overlayfs layer, related to fs/ecryptfs/main.c and fs/overlayfs/super.c.
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> | High | 168,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
| High | 174,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateInnerBorderRadiusClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsInnerBorderRadiusClip(object_)) {
const LayoutBox& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
if (box.IsLayoutReplaced()) {
state.clip_rect = box.StyleRef().GetRoundedInnerBorderFor(
LayoutRect(context_.current.paint_offset, box.Size()),
LayoutRectOutsets(-(box.PaddingTop() + box.BorderTop()),
-(box.PaddingRight() + box.BorderRight()),
-(box.PaddingBottom() + box.BorderBottom()),
-(box.PaddingLeft() + box.BorderLeft())));
} else {
state.clip_rect = box.StyleRef().GetRoundedInnerBorderFor(
LayoutRect(context_.current.paint_offset, box.Size()));
}
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateInnerBorderRadiusClip(
context_.current.clip, std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearInnerBorderRadiusClip());
}
}
if (auto* border_radius_clip = properties_->InnerBorderRadiusClip())
context_.current.clip = border_radius_clip;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | High | 166,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::FocusedOrActiveStateChanged() {
bool active_and_focused = FrameIsFocusedAndActive();
if (Element* element = GetDocument().FocusedElement())
element->FocusStateChanged();
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
auto* view = GetDocument().GetLayoutView();
if (view)
layout_selection_->InvalidatePaintForSelection();
if (active_and_focused)
SetSelectionFromNone();
frame_caret_->SetCaretVisibility(active_and_focused
? CaretVisibility::kVisible
: CaretVisibility::kHidden);
frame_->GetEventHandler().CapsLockStateMayHaveChanged();
if (use_secure_keyboard_entry_when_active_)
SetUseSecureKeyboardEntry(active_and_focused);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | High | 171,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android permitted navigation to blob URLs with non-canonical origins, which allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278} | Medium | 172,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sgi_clock_get(clockid_t clockid, struct timespec *tp)
{
u64 nsec;
nsec = rtc_time() * sgi_clock_period
+ sgi_clock_offset.tv_nsec;
tp->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &tp->tv_nsec)
+ sgi_clock_offset.tv_sec;
return 0;
};
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sco_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sco_options opts;
struct sco_conninfo cinfo;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SCO_OPTIONS:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
opts.mtu = sco_pi(sk)->conn->mtu;
BT_DBG("mtu %d", opts.mtu);
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(opts));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *)&opts, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case SCO_CONNINFO:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
cinfo.hci_handle = sco_pi(sk)->conn->hcon->handle;
memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, sco_pi(sk)->conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(cinfo));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *)&cinfo, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The sco_sock_getsockopt_old function in net/bluetooth/sco.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not initialize a certain structure, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory via the SCO_CONNINFO option.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]> | Low | 165,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bigint *sig_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
bigint *modulus, bigint *pub_exp)
{
int i, size;
bigint *decrypted_bi, *dat_bi;
bigint *bir = NULL;
uint8_t *block = (uint8_t *)malloc(sig_len);
/* decrypt */
dat_bi = bi_import(ctx, sig, sig_len);
ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
/* convert to a normal block */
decrypted_bi = bi_mod_power2(ctx, dat_bi, modulus, pub_exp);
bi_export(ctx, decrypted_bi, block, sig_len);
ctx->mod_offset = BIGINT_M_OFFSET;
i = 10; /* start at the first possible non-padded byte */
while (block[i++] && i < sig_len);
size = sig_len - i;
/* get only the bit we want */
if (size > 0)
{
int len;
const uint8_t *sig_ptr = get_signature(&block[i], &len);
if (sig_ptr)
{
bir = bi_import(ctx, sig_ptr, len);
}
}
free(block);
/* save a few bytes of memory */
bi_clear_cache(ctx);
return bir;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-347
Summary: In sig_verify() in x509.c in axTLS version 2.1.3 and before, the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification does not properly verify the ASN.1 metadata. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used, which could lead to impersonation through fake X.509 certificates. This is an even more permissive variant of CVE-2006-4790 and CVE-2014-1568.
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info. | Medium | 169,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_decode_symbol_dict(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2SymbolDictParams *params, const byte *data, size_t size, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats, Jbig2ArithCx *GR_stats)
{
Jbig2SymbolDict *SDNEWSYMS = NULL;
Jbig2SymbolDict *SDEXSYMS = NULL;
uint32_t HCHEIGHT;
uint32_t NSYMSDECODED;
uint32_t SYMWIDTH, TOTWIDTH;
uint32_t HCFIRSTSYM;
uint32_t *SDNEWSYMWIDTHS = NULL;
int SBSYMCODELEN = 0;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanState *hs = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanTable *SDHUFFRDX = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanTable *SBHUFFRSIZE = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IADH = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IADW = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IAEX = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IAAI = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIaidCtx *IAID = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IARDX = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IARDY = NULL;
int code = 0;
Jbig2SymbolDict **refagg_dicts = NULL;
int n_refagg_dicts = 1;
Jbig2TextRegionParams *tparams = NULL;
/* 6.5.5 (3) */
HCHEIGHT = 0;
NSYMSDECODED = 0;
ws = jbig2_word_stream_buf_new(ctx, data, size);
if (ws == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate ws in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
return NULL;
}
as = jbig2_arith_new(ctx, ws);
if (as == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate as in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
return NULL;
}
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
IADH = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IADW = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IAEX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IAAI = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
if ((IADH == NULL) || (IADW == NULL) || (IAEX == NULL) || (IAAI == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup1;
}
if (params->SDREFAGG) {
int64_t tmp = params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS;
for (SBSYMCODELEN = 0; ((int64_t) 1 << SBSYMCODELEN) < tmp; SBSYMCODELEN++);
IAID = jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_new(ctx, SBSYMCODELEN);
IARDX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IARDY = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
if ((IAID == NULL) || (IARDX == NULL) || (IARDY == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup2;
}
}
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "huffman coded symbol dictionary");
hs = jbig2_huffman_new(ctx, ws);
SDHUFFRDX = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O);
SBHUFFRSIZE = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_A);
if ((hs == NULL) || (SDHUFFRDX == NULL) || (SBHUFFRSIZE == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup2;
}
if (!params->SDREFAGG) {
SDNEWSYMWIDTHS = jbig2_new(ctx, uint32_t, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (SDNEWSYMWIDTHS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "could not allocate storage for (%u) symbol widths", params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
goto cleanup2;
}
}
}
SDNEWSYMS = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (SDNEWSYMS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "could not allocate storage for (%u) new symbols", params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
goto cleanup2;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4a) */
while (NSYMSDECODED < params->SDNUMNEWSYMS) {
int32_t HCDH, DW;
/* 6.5.6 */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
HCDH = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFDH, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IADH, as, &HCDH);
}
if (code != 0) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "error or OOB decoding height class delta (%d)\n", code);
}
if (!params->SDHUFF && jbig2_arith_has_reached_marker(as)) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "prevent DOS while decoding height classes");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4b) */
HCHEIGHT = HCHEIGHT + HCDH;
SYMWIDTH = 0;
TOTWIDTH = 0;
HCFIRSTSYM = NSYMSDECODED;
if ((int32_t) HCHEIGHT < 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Invalid HCHEIGHT value");
goto cleanup2;
}
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "HCHEIGHT = %d", HCHEIGHT);
#endif
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "decoding height class %d with %d syms decoded", HCHEIGHT, NSYMSDECODED);
for (;;) {
/* 6.5.7 */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
DW = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFDW, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IADW, as, &DW);
}
if (code < 0)
goto cleanup4;
/* 6.5.5 (4c.i) */
if (code == 1) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, " OOB signals end of height class %d", HCHEIGHT);
break;
}
/* check for broken symbol table */
if (NSYMSDECODED >= params->SDNUMNEWSYMS) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "No OOB signalling end of height class %d", HCHEIGHT);
goto cleanup4;
}
SYMWIDTH = SYMWIDTH + DW;
TOTWIDTH = TOTWIDTH + SYMWIDTH;
if ((int32_t) SYMWIDTH < 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Invalid SYMWIDTH value (%d) at symbol %d", SYMWIDTH, NSYMSDECODED + 1);
goto cleanup4;
}
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "SYMWIDTH = %d TOTWIDTH = %d", SYMWIDTH, TOTWIDTH);
#endif
/* 6.5.5 (4c.ii) */
if (!params->SDHUFF || params->SDREFAGG) {
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "SDHUFF = %d; SDREFAGG = %d", params->SDHUFF, params->SDREFAGG);
#endif
/* 6.5.8 */
if (!params->SDREFAGG) {
Jbig2GenericRegionParams region_params;
int sdat_bytes;
Jbig2Image *image;
/* Table 16 */
region_params.MMR = 0;
region_params.GBTEMPLATE = params->SDTEMPLATE;
region_params.TPGDON = 0;
region_params.USESKIP = 0;
sdat_bytes = params->SDTEMPLATE == 0 ? 8 : 2;
memcpy(region_params.gbat, params->sdat, sdat_bytes);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate image in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
goto cleanup4;
}
code = jbig2_decode_generic_region(ctx, segment, ®ion_params, as, image, GB_stats);
if (code < 0) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
} else {
/* 6.5.8.2 refinement/aggregate symbol */
uint32_t REFAGGNINST;
if (params->SDHUFF) {
REFAGGNINST = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFAGGINST, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IAAI, as, (int32_t *) & REFAGGNINST);
}
if (code || (int32_t) REFAGGNINST <= 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "invalid number of symbols or OOB in aggregate glyph");
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "aggregate symbol coding (%d instances)", REFAGGNINST);
if (REFAGGNINST > 1) {
Jbig2Image *image;
int i;
if (tparams == NULL) {
/* First time through, we need to initialise the */
/* various tables for Huffman or adaptive encoding */
/* as well as the text region parameters structure */
refagg_dicts = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *, n_refagg_dicts);
if (refagg_dicts == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory allocating dictionary array");
goto cleanup4;
}
refagg_dicts[0] = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (refagg_dicts[0] == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory allocating symbol dictionary");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, refagg_dicts);
goto cleanup4;
}
for (i = 0; i < params->SDNUMINSYMS; i++) {
refagg_dicts[0]->glyphs[i] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[i]);
}
tparams = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2TextRegionParams, 1);
if (tparams == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating text region params");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
/* Values from Table 17, section 6.5.8.2 (2) */
tparams->IADT = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IAFS = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IADS = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IAIT = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
/* Table 31 */
for (SBSYMCODELEN = 0; (1 << SBSYMCODELEN) < (int)(params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS); SBSYMCODELEN++);
tparams->IAID = jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_new(ctx, SBSYMCODELEN);
tparams->IARI = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDW = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDH = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDY = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
} else {
tparams->SBHUFFFS = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_F); /* Table B.6 */
tparams->SBHUFFDS = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_H); /* Table B.8 */
tparams->SBHUFFDT = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_K); /* Table B.11 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDW = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDH = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDX = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDY = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
}
tparams->SBHUFF = params->SDHUFF;
tparams->SBREFINE = 1;
tparams->SBSTRIPS = 1;
tparams->SBDEFPIXEL = 0;
tparams->SBCOMBOP = JBIG2_COMPOSE_OR;
tparams->TRANSPOSED = 0;
tparams->REFCORNER = JBIG2_CORNER_TOPLEFT;
tparams->SBDSOFFSET = 0;
tparams->SBRTEMPLATE = params->SDRTEMPLATE;
}
tparams->SBNUMINSTANCES = REFAGGNINST;
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating symbol image");
goto cleanup4;
}
/* multiple symbols are handled as a text region */
jbig2_decode_text_region(ctx, segment, tparams, (const Jbig2SymbolDict * const *)refagg_dicts,
n_refagg_dicts, image, data, size, GR_stats, as, ws);
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
refagg_dicts[0]->glyphs[params->SDNUMINSYMS + NSYMSDECODED] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED]);
} else {
/* 6.5.8.2.2 */
/* bool SBHUFF = params->SDHUFF; */
Jbig2RefinementRegionParams rparams;
Jbig2Image *image;
uint32_t ID;
int32_t RDX, RDY;
int BMSIZE = 0;
int ninsyms = params->SDNUMINSYMS;
int code1 = 0;
int code2 = 0;
int code3 = 0;
int code4 = 0;
/* 6.5.8.2.2 (2, 3, 4, 5) */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
ID = jbig2_huffman_get_bits(hs, SBSYMCODELEN, &code4);
RDX = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SDHUFFRDX, &code1);
RDY = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SDHUFFRDX, &code2);
BMSIZE = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SBHUFFRSIZE, &code3);
jbig2_huffman_skip(hs);
} else {
code1 = jbig2_arith_iaid_decode(IAID, as, (int32_t *) & ID);
code2 = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IARDX, as, &RDX);
code3 = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IARDY, as, &RDY);
}
if ((code1 < 0) || (code2 < 0) || (code3 < 0) || (code4 < 0)) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to decode data");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (ID >= ninsyms + NSYMSDECODED) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "refinement references unknown symbol %d", ID);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"symbol is a refinement of id %d with the " "refinement applied at (%d,%d)", ID, RDX, RDY);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating symbol image");
goto cleanup4;
}
/* Table 18 */
rparams.GRTEMPLATE = params->SDRTEMPLATE;
rparams.reference = (ID < ninsyms) ? params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[ID] : SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[ID - ninsyms];
/* SumatraPDF: fail on missing glyphs */
if (rparams.reference == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "missing glyph %d/%d!", ID, ninsyms);
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
rparams.DX = RDX;
rparams.DY = RDY;
rparams.TPGRON = 0;
memcpy(rparams.grat, params->sdrat, 4);
code = jbig2_decode_refinement_region(ctx, segment, &rparams, as, image, GR_stats);
if (code < 0)
goto cleanup4;
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
/* 6.5.8.2.2 (7) */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
if (BMSIZE == 0)
BMSIZE = image->height * image->stride;
jbig2_huffman_advance(hs, BMSIZE);
}
}
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
{
char name[64];
FILE *out;
snprintf(name, 64, "sd.%04d.%04d.pbm", segment->number, NSYMSDECODED);
out = fopen(name, "wb");
jbig2_image_write_pbm(SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED], out);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "writing out glyph as '%s' ...", name);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
}
/* 6.5.5 (4c.iii) */
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[NSYMSDECODED] = SYMWIDTH;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4c.iv) */
NSYMSDECODED = NSYMSDECODED + 1;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "decoded symbol %u of %u (%ux%u)", NSYMSDECODED, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
} /* end height class decode loop */
/* 6.5.5 (4d) */
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
/* 6.5.9 */
Jbig2Image *image;
int BMSIZE = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFBMSIZE, &code);
int j, x;
if (code || (BMSIZE < 0)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error decoding size of collective bitmap!");
}
/* skip any bits before the next byte boundary */
jbig2_huffman_skip(hs);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, TOTWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "could not allocate collective bitmap image!");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (BMSIZE == 0) {
/* if BMSIZE == 0 bitmap is uncompressed */
const byte *src = data + jbig2_huffman_offset(hs);
const int stride = (image->width >> 3) + ((image->width & 7) ? 1 : 0);
byte *dst = image->data;
/* SumatraPDF: prevent read access violation */
if (size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs) < image->height * stride) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "not enough data for decoding (%d/%d)", image->height * stride,
size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs));
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
BMSIZE = image->height * stride;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"reading %dx%d uncompressed bitmap" " for %d symbols (%d bytes)", image->width, image->height, NSYMSDECODED - HCFIRSTSYM, BMSIZE);
for (j = 0; j < image->height; j++) {
memcpy(dst, src, stride);
dst += image->stride;
src += stride;
}
} else {
Jbig2GenericRegionParams rparams;
/* SumatraPDF: prevent read access violation */
if (size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs) < BMSIZE) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "not enough data for decoding (%d/%d)", BMSIZE, size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs));
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"reading %dx%d collective bitmap for %d symbols (%d bytes)", image->width, image->height, NSYMSDECODED - HCFIRSTSYM, BMSIZE);
rparams.MMR = 1;
code = jbig2_decode_generic_mmr(ctx, segment, &rparams, data + jbig2_huffman_offset(hs), BMSIZE, image);
if (code) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error decoding MMR bitmap image!");
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
}
/* advance past the data we've just read */
jbig2_huffman_advance(hs, BMSIZE);
/* copy the collective bitmap into the symbol dictionary */
x = 0;
for (j = HCFIRSTSYM; j < NSYMSDECODED; j++) {
Jbig2Image *glyph;
glyph = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[j], HCHEIGHT);
if (glyph == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to copy the collective bitmap into symbol dictionary");
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, glyph, image, -x, 0, JBIG2_COMPOSE_REPLACE);
x += SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[j];
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[j] = glyph;
}
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
}
} /* end of symbol decode loop */
/* 6.5.10 */
SDEXSYMS = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMEXSYMS);
if (SDEXSYMS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate symbols exported from symbols dictionary");
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate symbols exported from symbols dictionary");
goto cleanup4;
} else {
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
int k;
int exflag = 0;
int64_t limit = params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS;
int32_t exrunlength;
int zerolength = 0;
while (i < limit) {
if (params->SDHUFF)
exrunlength = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SBHUFFRSIZE, &code);
else
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IAEX, as, &exrunlength);
/* prevent infinite loop */
zerolength = exrunlength > 0 ? 0 : zerolength + 1;
if (code || (exrunlength > limit - i) || (exrunlength < 0) || (zerolength > 4) || (exflag && (exrunlength > params->SDNUMEXSYMS - j))) {
if (code)
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to decode exrunlength for exported symbols");
else if (exrunlength <= 0)
else
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number,
"runlength too large in export symbol table (%d > %d - %d)\n", exrunlength, params->SDNUMEXSYMS, j);
/* skip to the cleanup code and return SDEXSYMS = NULL */
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, SDEXSYMS);
SDEXSYMS = NULL;
break;
}
for (k = 0; k < exrunlength; k++) {
if (exflag) {
SDEXSYMS->glyphs[j++] = (i < params->SDNUMINSYMS) ?
jbig2_image_clone(ctx, params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[i]) : jbig2_image_clone(ctx, SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[i - params->SDNUMINSYMS]);
}
i++;
}
exflag = !exflag;
}
}
cleanup4:
if (tparams != NULL) {
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IADT);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAFS);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IADS);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAIT);
jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAID);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARI);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDW);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDH);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDY);
} else {
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFFS);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFDS);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFDT);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDX);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDY);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDW);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDH);
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, tparams);
}
if (refagg_dicts != NULL) {
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, refagg_dicts[0]);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, refagg_dicts);
}
cleanup2:
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, SDNEWSYMS);
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, SDNEWSYMWIDTHS);
}
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, SDHUFFRDX);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, SBHUFFRSIZE);
jbig2_huffman_free(ctx, hs);
jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_free(ctx, IAID);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IARDX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IARDY);
cleanup1:
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, as);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IADH);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IADW);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IAEX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IAAI);
return SDEXSYMS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SessionRestore::IsRestoring(const Profile* profile) {
return (profiles_getting_restored &&
profiles_getting_restored->find(profile) !=
profiles_getting_restored->end());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly draw hairlines, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t *len,
struct iovec **iovec,
bool compat)
{
ssize_t ret;
*nr_segs = *len;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* len now reflect bytes instead of segs */
*len = ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in the aio_setup_single_vector function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel 4.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a CVE-2012-6701 regression.
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | High | 170,003 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SegmentInfo::SegmentInfo(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pTitleAsUTF8(NULL)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BOOTP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bootp.c:bootp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13028/BOOTP: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file' | High | 170,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HttpBridge::MakeAsynchronousPost() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
if (fetch_state_.aborted)
return;
fetch_state_.url_poster = new URLFetcher(url_for_request_,
URLFetcher::POST, this);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_request_context(context_getter_for_request_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_upload_data(content_type_, request_content_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_extra_request_headers(extra_headers_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_load_flags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES);
fetch_state_.url_poster->Start();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to media selectors.
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int xc2028_set_config(struct dvb_frontend *fe, void *priv_cfg)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
struct xc2028_ctrl *p = priv_cfg;
int rc = 0;
tuner_dbg("%s called\n", __func__);
mutex_lock(&priv->lock);
/*
* Copy the config data.
* For the firmware name, keep a local copy of the string,
* in order to avoid troubles during device release.
*/
kfree(priv->ctrl.fname);
memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl));
if (p->fname) {
priv->ctrl.fname = kstrdup(p->fname, GFP_KERNEL);
if (priv->ctrl.fname == NULL)
rc = -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* If firmware name changed, frees firmware. As free_firmware will
* reset the status to NO_FIRMWARE, this forces a new request_firmware
*/
if (!firmware_name[0] && p->fname &&
priv->fname && strcmp(p->fname, priv->fname))
free_firmware(priv);
if (priv->ctrl.max_len < 9)
priv->ctrl.max_len = 13;
if (priv->state == XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE) {
if (!firmware_name[0])
priv->fname = priv->ctrl.fname;
else
priv->fname = firmware_name;
rc = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1,
priv->fname,
priv->i2c_props.adap->dev.parent,
GFP_KERNEL,
fe, load_firmware_cb);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Failed to request firmware %s\n",
priv->fname);
priv->state = XC2028_NODEV;
} else
priv->state = XC2028_WAITING_FIRMWARE;
}
mutex_unlock(&priv->lock);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The xc2028_set_config function in drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via vectors involving omission of the firmware name from a certain data structure.
Commit Message: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 166,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Strgrow(Str x)
{
char *old = x->ptr;
int newlen;
newlen = x->length * 6 / 5;
if (newlen == x->length)
newlen += 2;
x->ptr = GC_MALLOC_ATOMIC(newlen);
x->area_size = newlen;
bcopy((void *)old, (void *)x->ptr, x->length);
GC_free(old);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Tatsuya Kinoshita w3m fork before 0.5.3-31. w3m allows remote attackers to cause memory corruption in certain conditions via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #27 from kcwu/fix-strgrow
Fix potential heap buffer corruption due to Strgrow | Medium | 166,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
/*
* Can't pass hstate in here because it is called from the
* compound page destructor.
*/
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(page);
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
struct address_space *mapping;
mapping = (struct address_space *) page_private(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(page_mapcount(page));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid] && huge_page_order(h) < MAX_ORDER) {
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->surplus_huge_pages--;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
} else {
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (mapping)
hugetlb_put_quota(mapping, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
u8 *byteStrmStart;
u8 *byteStrm;
u32 strmLen;
u32 picSize;
H264SwDecInst decInst;
H264SwDecRet ret;
H264SwDecInput decInput;
H264SwDecOutput decOutput;
H264SwDecPicture decPicture;
H264SwDecInfo decInfo;
u32 picNumber;
FILE *finput;
FILE *foutput;
/* Check that enough command line arguments given, if not -> print usage
* information out */
if (argc < 2)
{
printf( "Usage: %s file.h264\n", argv[0]);
return -1;
}
/* open output file for writing, output file named out.yuv. If file open
* fails -> exit */
foutput = fopen("out.yuv", "wb");
if (foutput == NULL)
{
printf("UNABLE TO OPEN OUTPUT FILE\n");
return -1;
}
/* open input file for reading, file name given by user. If file open
* fails -> exit */
finput = fopen(argv[argc-1], "rb");
if (finput == NULL)
{
printf("UNABLE TO OPEN INPUT FILE\n");
return -1;
}
/* check size of the input file -> length of the stream in bytes */
fseek(finput, 0L, SEEK_END);
strmLen = (u32)ftell(finput);
rewind(finput);
/* allocate memory for stream buffer, exit if unsuccessful */
byteStrm = byteStrmStart = (u8 *)H264SwDecMalloc(sizeof(u8)*strmLen);
if (byteStrm == NULL)
{
printf("UNABLE TO ALLOCATE MEMORY\n");
return -1;
}
/* read input stream from file to buffer and close input file */
fread(byteStrm, sizeof(u8), strmLen, finput);
fclose(finput);
/* initialize decoder. If unsuccessful -> exit */
ret = H264SwDecInit(&decInst, 0);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
{
printf("DECODER INITIALIZATION FAILED\n");
return -1;
}
/* initialize H264SwDecDecode() input structure */
decInput.pStream = byteStrmStart;
decInput.dataLen = strmLen;
decInput.intraConcealmentMethod = 0;
picNumber = 0;
/* For performance measurements, read the start time (in seconds) here.
* The decoding time should be measured over several frames and after
* that average fps (frames/second) can be calculated.
*
* startTime = GetTime();
*
* To prevent calculating file I/O latensies as a decoding time,
* comment out WriteOutput function call. Also prints to stdout might
* consume considerable amount of cycles during measurement */
/* main decoding loop */
do
{
/* call API function to perform decoding */
ret = H264SwDecDecode(decInst, &decInput, &decOutput);
switch(ret)
{
case H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
/* picture dimensions are available for query now */
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decInst, &decInfo);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
return -1;
/* picture size in pixels */
picSize = decInfo.picWidth * decInfo.picHeight;
/* memory needed for YCbCr 4:2:0 picture in bytes */
picSize = (3 * picSize)/2;
/* memory needed for 16-bit RGB picture in bytes
* picSize = (decInfo.picWidth * decInfo.picHeight) * 2; */
printf("Width %d Height %d\n",
decInfo.picWidth, decInfo.picHeight);
/* update H264SwDecDecode() input structure, number of bytes
* "consumed" is computed as difference between the new stream
* pointer and old stream pointer */
decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decOutput.pStrmCurrPos - decInput.pStream);
decInput.pStream = decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
break;
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY:
/* update H264SwDecDecode() input structure, number of bytes
* "consumed" is computed as difference between the new stream
* pointer and old stream pointer */
decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decOutput.pStrmCurrPos - decInput.pStream);
decInput.pStream = decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
/* use function H264SwDecNextPicture() to obtain next picture
* in display order. Function is called until no more images
* are ready for display */
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decInst, &decPicture, 0) ==
H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY) { picNumber++;
printf("PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n", picNumber,
decPicture.isIdrPicture ? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs);
fflush(stdout);
/* Do color conversion if needed to get display image
* in RGB-format
*
* YuvToRgb( decPicture.pOutputPicture, pRgbPicture ); */
/* write next display image to output file */
WriteOutput(foutput, (u8*)decPicture.pOutputPicture,
picSize);
}
break;
case H264SWDEC_EVALUATION_LIMIT_EXCEEDED:
/* evaluation version of the decoder has limited decoding
* capabilities */
printf("EVALUATION LIMIT REACHED\n");
goto end;
default:
printf("UNRECOVERABLE ERROR\n");
return -1;
}
/* keep decoding until all data from input stream buffer consumed */
} while (decInput.dataLen > 0);
end:
/* if output in display order is preferred, the decoder shall be forced
* to output pictures remaining in decoded picture buffer. Use function
* H264SwDecNextPicture() to obtain next picture in display order. Function
* is called until no more images are ready for display. Second parameter
* for the function is set to '1' to indicate that this is end of the
* stream and all pictures shall be output */
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decInst, &decPicture, 1) ==
H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY) {
picNumber++;
printf("PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n", picNumber,
decPicture.isIdrPicture ? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs);
fflush(stdout);
/* Do color conversion if needed to get display image
* in RGB-format
*
* YuvToRgb( decPicture.pOutputPicture, pRgbPicture ); */
/* write next display image to output file */
WriteOutput(foutput, (u8*)decPicture.pOutputPicture, picSize);
}
/* For performance measurements, read the end time (in seconds) here.
*
* endTime = GetTime();
*
* Now the performance can be calculated as frames per second:
* fps = picNumber / (endTime - startTime); */
/* release decoder instance */
H264SwDecRelease(decInst);
/* close output file */
fclose(foutput);
/* free byte stream buffer */
free(byteStrmStart);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the h264dec component in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a large memory allocation, aka internal bug 27855419.
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
| High | 173,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int au1100fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *fbi, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev;
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
fbdev = to_au1100fb_device(fbi);
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= (6 << 9); //CCA=6
if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot)) {
return -EAGAIN;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The uio_mmap_physical function in drivers/uio/uio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not validate the size of a memory block, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges via crafted mmap operations, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4511.
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]. | Medium | 165,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MakeGroupObsolete() {
PushNextTask(
base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_MakeGroupObsolete,
base::Unretained(this)));
MakeCacheAndGroup(kManifestUrl, 1, 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
entry_record.cache_id = 1;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::FALLBACK;
entry_record.response_id = 1;
entry_record.url = kEntryUrl;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord fallback_namespace_record;
fallback_namespace_record.cache_id = 1;
fallback_namespace_record.namespace_.target_url = kEntryUrl;
fallback_namespace_record.namespace_.namespace_url = kFallbackNamespace;
fallback_namespace_record.origin = url::Origin::Create(kManifestUrl);
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertNamespace(&fallback_namespace_record));
AppCacheDatabase::OnlineWhiteListRecord online_whitelist_record;
online_whitelist_record.cache_id = 1;
online_whitelist_record.namespace_url = kOnlineNamespace;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertOnlineWhiteList(&online_whitelist_record));
storage()->MakeGroupObsolete(group_.get(), delegate(), 0);
EXPECT_FALSE(group_->is_obsolete());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,987 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + (tim.length - 3),
(tim.length - 3));
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c:parse_elements().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12987/IEEE 802.11: Fix processing of TIM IE.
The arguments to memcpy() were completely wrong.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter. | High | 170,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *nci_extract_rf_params_nfca_passive_poll(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfca_poll *nfca_poll,
__u8 *data)
{
nfca_poll->sens_res = __le16_to_cpu(*((__u16 *)data));
data += 2;
nfca_poll->nfcid1_len = *data++;
pr_debug("sens_res 0x%x, nfcid1_len %d\n",
nfca_poll->sens_res, nfca_poll->nfcid1_len);
memcpy(nfca_poll->nfcid1, data, nfca_poll->nfcid1_len);
data += nfca_poll->nfcid1_len;
nfca_poll->sel_res_len = *data++;
if (nfca_poll->sel_res_len != 0)
nfca_poll->sel_res = *data++;
pr_debug("sel_res_len %d, sel_res 0x%x\n",
nfca_poll->sel_res_len,
nfca_poll->sel_res);
return data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <[email protected]>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <[email protected]>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int PrintPreviewUI::GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
return print_preview_data_service()->GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
preview_ui_addr_str_);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers,
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 1 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 3 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->matte=MagickFalse;
}
}
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length+16,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
(void) ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,
&has_merged_image);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if (has_merged_image != MagickFalse || GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image,&psd_info,
exception);
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse && GetImageListLength(image) == 1 &&
length != 0)
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse && GetImageListLength(image) > 1)
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel);
image->background_color.opacity=TransparentOpacity;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GestureProviderAura::OnTouchEventAck(bool event_consumed) {
DCHECK(pending_gestures_.empty());
DCHECK(!handling_event_);
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_event(&handling_event_, true);
filtered_gesture_provider_.OnTouchEventAck(event_consumed);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 29.0.1547.57 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BaseShadow::log_except(const char *msg)
{
ShadowExceptionEvent event;
bool exception_already_logged = false;
if(!msg) msg = "";
sprintf(event.message, msg);
if ( BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr ) {
BaseShadow *shadow = BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr;
event.recvd_bytes = shadow->bytesSent();
event.sent_bytes = shadow->bytesReceived();
exception_already_logged = shadow->exception_already_logged;
if (shadow->began_execution) {
event.began_execution = TRUE;
}
} else {
event.recvd_bytes = 0.0;
event.sent_bytes = 0.0;
}
if (!exception_already_logged && !uLog.writeEventNoFsync (&event,NULL))
{
::dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to log ULOG_SHADOW_EXCEPTION event\n");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nfs_can_extend_write(struct file *file, struct page *page, struct inode *inode)
{
if (file->f_flags & O_DSYNC)
return 0;
if (NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_WRITE))
return 1;
if (nfs_write_pageuptodate(page, inode) && (inode->i_flock == NULL ||
(inode->i_flock->fl_start == 0 &&
inode->i_flock->fl_end == OFFSET_MAX &&
inode->i_flock->fl_type != F_RDLCK)))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The nfs_can_extend_write function in fs/nfs/write.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.3 relies on a write delegation to extend a write operation without a certain up-to-date verification, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory in opportunistic circumstances by writing to a file in an NFS filesystem and then reading the same file.
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Low | 166,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
base::Unretained(this), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528} | Medium | 173,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Failure to disallow PWA installation from CSP sandboxed pages in AppManifest in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to access privileged APIs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121} | Medium | 172,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jpc_streamlist_t *jpc_ppmstabtostreams(jpc_ppxstab_t *tab)
{
jpc_streamlist_t *streams;
uchar *dataptr;
uint_fast32_t datacnt;
uint_fast32_t tpcnt;
jpc_ppxstabent_t *ent;
int entno;
jas_stream_t *stream;
int n;
if (!(streams = jpc_streamlist_create())) {
goto error;
}
if (!tab->numents) {
return streams;
}
entno = 0;
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
for (;;) {
/* Get the length of the packet header data for the current
tile-part. */
if (datacnt < 4) {
goto error;
}
if (!(stream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jpc_streamlist_insert(streams, jpc_streamlist_numstreams(streams),
stream)) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt = (dataptr[0] << 24) | (dataptr[1] << 16) | (dataptr[2] << 8)
| dataptr[3];
datacnt -= 4;
dataptr += 4;
/* Get the packet header data for the current tile-part. */
while (tpcnt) {
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
goto error;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
n = JAS_MIN(tpcnt, datacnt);
if (jas_stream_write(stream, dataptr, n) != n) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt -= n;
dataptr += n;
datacnt -= n;
}
jas_stream_rewind(stream);
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
break;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
}
return streams;
error:
if (streams) {
jpc_streamlist_destroy(streams);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::BindRequest(
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void detect_allow_debuggers(int argc, char **argv) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--allow-debuggers") == 0) {
arg_allow_debuggers = 1;
break;
}
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--") == 0)
break;
if (strncmp(argv[i], "--", 2) != 0)
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.4, when running on a Linux kernel before 4.8, allows context-dependent attackers to bypass a seccomp-based sandbox protection mechanism via the --allow-debuggers argument.
Commit Message: security fix | Medium | 168,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ip4_datagram_release_cb(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
if (! __sk_dst_get(sk) || __sk_dst_check(sk, 0))
return;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk, daddr,
inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_dport,
inet->inet_sport, sk->sk_protocol,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!IS_ERR(rt))
__sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the ip4_datagram_release_cb function in net/ipv4/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging incorrect expectations about locking during multithreaded access to internal data structures for IPv4 UDP sockets.
Commit Message: ipv4: fix a race in ip4_datagram_release_cb()
Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint
at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando
in the past [2]
Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and
concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread,
is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in
ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8)
It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and
sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock
(sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions.
TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold
the socket lock.
[1]
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check
Read of size 2 by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116
[<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531
[<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0
[<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413
[<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Freed by thread T15455:
[<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251
[<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280
[<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Allocated by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171
[<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406
[< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70
__mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939
[<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161
[<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249
[<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
[2]
<4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
<4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio
<4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1
<4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013
<4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000
<4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282
<4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040
<4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200
<4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800
<4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce
<4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
<4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
<4>[196727.311713] Stack:
<4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42
<4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0
<4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0
<4>[196727.311885] Call Trace:
<4>[196727.311907] <IRQ>
<4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0
<4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80
<4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0
<4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820
<4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150
<4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230
<4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90
<4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360
<4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan]
<4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640
<4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150
<4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0
<4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140
<4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe]
<4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210
<4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270
<4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
<4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
<4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60
<4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
<4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a
<4>[196727.312722] <EOI>
<1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70>
<4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]---
<0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Alexey Preobrazhensky <[email protected]>
Reported-by: dormando <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8141ed9fcedb2 ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static uint16_t transmit_data(serial_data_type_t type, uint8_t *data, uint16_t length) {
assert(data != NULL);
assert(length > 0);
if (type < DATA_TYPE_COMMAND || type > DATA_TYPE_SCO) {
LOG_ERROR("%s invalid data type: %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
--data;
uint8_t previous_byte = *data;
*(data) = type;
++length;
uint16_t transmitted_length = 0;
while (length > 0) {
ssize_t ret = write(uart_fd, data + transmitted_length, length);
switch (ret) {
case -1:
LOG_ERROR("In %s, error writing to the uart serial port: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto done;
case 0:
goto done;
default:
transmitted_length += ret;
length -= ret;
break;
}
}
done:;
*(data) = previous_byte;
if (transmitted_length > 0)
--transmitted_length;
return transmitted_length;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSObject* object = exec->argument(0).getObject();
if (!object) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor*>(exec->callee());
RefPtr<MutationCallback> callback = JSMutationCallback::create(object, jsConstructor->globalObject());
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), WebKitMutationObserver::create(callback.release()))));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
H264PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: off_t HFSForkReadStream::Seek(off_t offset, int whence) {
DCHECK_EQ(SEEK_SET, whence);
DCHECK_GE(offset, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<uint64_t>(offset), fork_.logicalSize);
size_t target_block = offset / hfs_->block_size();
size_t block_count = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(fork_.extents); ++i) {
const HFSPlusExtentDescriptor* extent = &fork_.extents[i];
if (extent->startBlock == 0 && extent->blockCount == 0)
break;
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> new_block_count(block_count);
new_block_count += extent->blockCount;
if (!new_block_count.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek offset block count overflows";
return false;
}
if (target_block < new_block_count.ValueOrDie()) {
if (current_extent_ != i) {
read_current_extent_ = false;
current_extent_ = i;
}
auto iterator_block_offset =
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t>(block_count) * hfs_->block_size();
if (!iterator_block_offset.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek block offset overflows";
return false;
}
fork_logical_offset_ = offset;
return offset;
}
block_count = new_block_count.ValueOrDie();
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876} | High | 171,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MojoResult Core::WrapPlatformSharedBufferHandle(
const MojoPlatformHandle* platform_handle,
size_t size,
const MojoSharedBufferGuid* guid,
MojoPlatformSharedBufferHandleFlags flags,
MojoHandle* mojo_handle) {
DCHECK(size);
ScopedPlatformHandle handle;
MojoResult result =
MojoPlatformHandleToScopedPlatformHandle(platform_handle, &handle);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
base::UnguessableToken token =
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(guid->high, guid->low);
bool read_only = flags & MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
scoped_refptr<PlatformSharedBuffer> platform_buffer =
PlatformSharedBuffer::CreateFromPlatformHandle(size, read_only, token,
std::move(handle));
if (!platform_buffer)
return MOJO_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
scoped_refptr<SharedBufferDispatcher> dispatcher;
result = SharedBufferDispatcher::CreateFromPlatformSharedBuffer(
platform_buffer, &dispatcher);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
MojoHandle h = AddDispatcher(dispatcher);
if (h == MOJO_HANDLE_INVALID) {
dispatcher->Close();
return MOJO_RESULT_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED;
}
*mojo_handle = h;
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Object(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::DictionaryValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Object> result(v8::Object::New(isolate));
for (base::DictionaryValue::Iterator iter(*val);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
const std::string& key = iter.key();
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, &iter.value());
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, key.c_str(), v8::String::kNormalString, key.length()),
child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for property " << key.c_str() << " threw an "
<< "exception.";
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ToV8Value function in content/child/v8_value_converter_impl.cc in the V8 bindings in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 does not properly restrict use of getters and setters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045} | Medium | 173,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *zap = NULL;
int ret;
/* check the quota and attach the new data */
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
key->expiry = prep->expiry;
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
zap = dereference_key_locked(key);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
if (zap)
call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_free_payload_rcu);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 167,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev1_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
#define USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1 1
const struct ikev1_pl_id *p;
struct ikev1_pl_id id;
static const char *idtypestr[] = {
"IPv4", "IPv4net", "IPv6", "IPv6net",
};
static const char *ipsecidtypestr[] = {
NULL, "IPv4", "FQDN", "user FQDN", "IPv4net", "IPv6",
"IPv6net", "IPv4range", "IPv6range", "ASN1 DN", "ASN1 GN",
"keyid",
};
int len;
const u_char *data;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
if (sizeof(*p) < item_len) {
data = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
len = item_len - sizeof(*p);
} else {
data = NULL;
len = 0;
}
#if 0 /*debug*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," [phase=%d doi=%d proto=%d]", phase, doi, proto));
#endif
switch (phase) {
#ifndef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(id.d.id_type, idtypestr)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi_data=%u",
(uint32_t)(ntohl(id.d.doi_data) & 0xffffff)));
break;
#ifdef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
case 2:
{
const struct ipsecdoi_id *doi_p;
struct ipsecdoi_id doi_id;
const char *p_name;
doi_p = (const struct ipsecdoi_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*doi_p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&doi_id, ext, sizeof(doi_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(doi_id.type, ipsecidtypestr)));
/* A protocol ID of 0 DOES NOT mean IPPROTO_IP! */
if (!ndo->ndo_nflag && doi_id.proto_id && (p_name = netdb_protoname(doi_id.proto_id)) != NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%s", p_name));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%u", doi_id.proto_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," port=%d", ntohs(doi_id.port)));
if (!len)
break;
if (data == NULL)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*data, len);
switch (doi_id.type) {
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
if (len < 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 4]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ipaddr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_FQDN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_USER_FQDN:
{
int i;
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d ", len));
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, data[i]);
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
mask = data + sizeof(struct in_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/%u.%u.%u.%u", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
if (len < 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 16]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ip6addr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 20)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 20]", len));
else {
mask = (const u_char *)(data + sizeof(struct in6_addr));
/*XXX*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3],
mask[4], mask[5], mask[6], mask[7],
mask[8], mask[9], mask[10], mask[11],
mask[12], mask[13], mask[14], mask[15]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
ipaddr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 32]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
ip6addr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_KEY_ID:
break;
}
break;
}
}
if (data && len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", len));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)data, len))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv1 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c:ikev1_id_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13689/IKEv1: Fix addr+subnet length check.
An IPv6 address plus subnet mask is 32 bytes, not 20 bytes.
16 bytes of IPv6 address, 16 bytes of subnet mask.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int br_multicast_add_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int err;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) ||
(port && port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED))
goto out;
mp = br_multicast_new_group(br, port, group);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto err;
if (!port) {
hlist_add_head(&mp->mglist, &br->mglist);
mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p->port == port)
goto found;
if ((unsigned long)p->port < (unsigned long)port)
break;
}
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_ATOMIC);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(!p))
goto err;
p->addr = *group;
p->port = port;
p->next = *pp;
hlist_add_head(&p->mglist, &port->mglist);
setup_timer(&p->timer, br_multicast_port_group_expired,
(unsigned long)p);
setup_timer(&p->query_timer, br_multicast_port_group_query_expired,
(unsigned long)p);
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p);
found:
mod_timer(&p->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
out:
err = 0;
err:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The br_multicast_add_group function in net/bridge/br_multicast.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38, when a certain Ethernet bridge configuration is used, allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) by sending IGMP packets to a local interface.
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the Linux kernel through 3.11.4 does not properly determine the need for UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) processing of small packets after the UFO queueing of a large packet, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via network traffic that triggers a large response packet.
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaControlTimelineElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingBegin"));
mediaControls().beginScrubbing();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingEnd"));
mediaControls().endScrubbing();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousemove)
return;
double time = value().toDouble();
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::input) {
if (mediaElement().seekable()->contain(time))
mediaElement().setCurrentTime(time);
}
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject()));
if (!slider.isNull() && slider.inDragMode())
mediaControls().updateCurrentTimeDisplay();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly handle certain out-of-memory conditions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document that triggers a large memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032} | Medium | 171,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: HeapObjectHeader* NormalPage::findHeaderFromAddress(Address address) {
if (address < payload())
return nullptr;
if (!m_objectStartBitMapComputed)
populateObjectStartBitMap();
size_t objectOffset = address - payload();
size_t objectStartNumber = objectOffset / allocationGranularity;
size_t mapIndex = objectStartNumber / 8;
ASSERT(mapIndex < objectStartBitMapSize);
size_t bit = objectStartNumber & 7;
uint8_t byte = m_objectStartBitMap[mapIndex] & ((1 << (bit + 1)) - 1);
while (!byte) {
ASSERT(mapIndex > 0);
byte = m_objectStartBitMap[--mapIndex];
}
int leadingZeroes = numberOfLeadingZeroes(byte);
objectStartNumber = (mapIndex * 8) + 7 - leadingZeroes;
objectOffset = objectStartNumber * allocationGranularity;
Address objectAddress = objectOffset + payload();
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(objectAddress);
if (header->isFree())
return nullptr;
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
return header;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489} | Medium | 172,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_init (MyObject *obj)
{
obj->val = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
rend_service_t *service;
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
(void) request;
(void) request_len;
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only supported one for now). */
const char *rend_pk_digest =
(char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on non-intro circuit.");
goto err;
}
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %u.",
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
/* We've just successfully established a intro circuit to one of our
* introduction point, account for it. */
intro = find_intro_point(circuit);
if (intro == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"Introduction circuit established without a rend_intro_point_t "
"object for service %s on circuit %u",
safe_str_client(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
goto err;
}
intro->circuit_established = 1;
/* We might not have every introduction point ready but at this point we
* know that the descriptor needs to be uploaded. */
service->desc_is_dirty = time(NULL);
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1,
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit %u for service %s",
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
/* Getting a valid INTRODUCE_ESTABLISHED means we've successfully
* used the circ */
pathbias_mark_use_success(circuit);
return 0;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-532
Summary: The rend_service_intro_established function in or/rendservice.c in Tor before 0.2.8.15, 0.2.9.x before 0.2.9.12, 0.3.0.x before 0.3.0.11, 0.3.1.x before 0.3.1.7, and 0.3.2.x before 0.3.2.1-alpha, when SafeLogging is disabled, allows attackers to obtain sensitive information by leveraging access to the log files of a hidden service, because uninitialized stack data is included in an error message about construction of an introduction point circuit.
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380 | Medium | 168,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBCursor::~IndexedDBCursor() {
Close();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in IndexedDB in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Android, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: [email protected]
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504} | Medium | 172,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool InitSkBitmapFromData(SkBitmap* bitmap,
const char* pixels,
size_t pixels_size) const {
if (!bitmap->tryAllocPixels(
SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, color_type, alpha_type)))
return false;
if (pixels_size != bitmap->computeByteSize())
return false;
memcpy(bitmap->getPixels(), pixels, pixels_size);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562} | Medium | 172,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::OnExperimentsChanged(
const browser_sync::Experiments& experiments) {
if (current_experiments.Matches(experiments))
return;
if (migrator_.get() &&
migrator_->state() != browser_sync::BackendMigrator::IDLE) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dropping OnExperimentsChanged due to migrator busy.";
return;
}
const syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_types = GetRegisteredDataTypes();
syncable::ModelTypeSet to_add;
if (experiments.sync_tabs)
to_add.Put(syncable::SESSIONS);
const syncable::ModelTypeSet to_register =
Difference(to_add, registered_types);
DVLOG(2) << "OnExperimentsChanged called with types: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_add);
DVLOG(2) << "Enabling types: " << syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::Iterator it = to_register.First();
it.Good(); it.Inc()) {
RegisterNewDataType(it.Get());
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::string experiment_name = GetExperimentNameForDataType(it.Get());
if (experiment_name.empty())
continue;
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
experiment_name,
true);
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
if (sync_prefs_.HasKeepEverythingSynced()) {
sync_prefs_.SetPreferredDataTypes(registered_types, registered_types);
if (!to_register.Empty() && HasSyncSetupCompleted() && migrator_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dynamically enabling new datatypes: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
OnMigrationNeededForTypes(to_register);
}
}
if (experiments.sync_tab_favicons) {
DVLOG(1) << "Enabling syncing of tab favicons.";
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
"sync-tab-favicons",
true);
}
current_experiments = experiments;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 does not properly maintain an fd data structure, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via crafted BPF instructions that reference an incorrect file descriptor.
Commit Message: bpf: fix double-fdput in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()
When bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...) was invoked with a BPF program whose bytecode
references a non-map file descriptor as a map file descriptor, the error
handling code called fdput() twice instead of once (in __bpf_map_get() and
in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()). If the file descriptor table of the
current task is shared, this causes f_count to be decremented too much,
allowing the struct file to be freed while it is still in use
(use-after-free). This can be exploited to gain root privileges by an
unprivileged user.
This bug was introduced in
commit 0246e64d9a5f ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn"), but is only
exploitable since
commit 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") because
previously, CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required to reach the vulnerable code.
(posted publicly according to request by maintainer)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NodeIterator::~NodeIterator()
{
root()->document().detachNodeIterator(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687} | High | 172,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
| High | 173,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static zend_bool add_post_var(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *var, zend_bool eof TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *ksep, *vsep, *val;
size_t klen, vlen;
/* FIXME: string-size_t */
unsigned int new_vlen;
if (var->ptr >= var->end) {
return 0;
}
vsep = memchr(var->ptr, '&', var->end - var->ptr);
if (!vsep) {
if (!eof) {
return 0;
} else {
vsep = var->end;
}
}
ksep = memchr(var->ptr, '=', vsep - var->ptr);
if (ksep) {
*ksep = '\0';
/* "foo=bar&" or "foo=&" */
klen = ksep - var->ptr;
vlen = vsep - ++ksep;
} else {
ksep = "";
/* "foo&" */
klen = vsep - var->ptr;
vlen = 0;
}
php_url_decode(var->ptr, klen);
val = estrndup(ksep, vlen);
if (vlen) {
vlen = php_url_decode(val, vlen);
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_POST, var->ptr, &val, vlen, &new_vlen TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_register_variable_safe(var->ptr, val, new_vlen, arr TSRMLS_CC);
}
efree(val);
var->ptr = vsep + (vsep != var->end);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.17, and 7.1.x before 7.1.3, remote attackers could cause a CPU consumption denial of service attack by injecting long form variables, related to main/php_variables.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807 | High | 168,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t php_stream_temp_read(php_stream *stream, char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t got;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return -1;
}
got = php_stream_read(ts->innerstream, buf, count);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return got;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
return 0;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1, (
"BMP header: magic 0x%x; siz %d; res1 %d; res2 %d; off %d\n",
hdr.magic, hdr.siz, hdr.reserved1, hdr.reserved2, hdr.off
));
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
return 0;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1,
("BMP information: len %d; width %d; height %d; numplanes %d; "
"depth %d; enctype %d; siz %d; hres %d; vres %d; numcolors %d; "
"mincolors %d\n", info->len, info->width, info->height, info->numplanes,
info->depth, info->enctype, info->siz, info->hres, info->vres,
info->numcolors, info->mincolors));
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
return 0;
}
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The bmp_getdata function in libjasper/bmp/bmp_dec.c in JasPer 1.900.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by calling the imginfo command with a crafted BMP image. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-8690.
Commit Message: Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder. | Medium | 168,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
source_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBlockSize));
reference_data_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kDataBufferSize));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,578 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
{
int ret = -ESRCH;
/*
* We take the read lock around doing both checks to close a
* possible race where someone else was tracing our child and
* detached between these two checks. After this locked check,
* we are sure that this is our traced child and that can only
* be changed by us so it's not changing right after this.
*/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if ((child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && child->parent == current) {
/*
* child->sighand can't be NULL, release_task()
* does ptrace_unlink() before __exit_signal().
*/
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(task_is_stopped(child));
if (ignore_state || (task_is_traced(child) &&
!(child->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING)))
ret = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (!ret && !ignore_state)
ret = wait_task_inactive(child, TASK_TRACED) ? 0 : -ESRCH;
/* All systems go.. */
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOverflowClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsOverflowClip(object_) && !CanOmitOverflowClip(object_)) {
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled() &&
object_.IsSVGForeignObject()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).FrameRect());
} else if (object_.IsBox()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset));
state.clip_rect_excluding_overlay_scrollbars =
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset,
kExcludeOverlayScrollbarSizeForHitTesting));
} else {
DCHECK(object_.IsSVGViewportContainer());
const auto& viewport_container = ToLayoutSVGViewportContainer(object_);
state.clip_rect = FloatRoundedRect(
viewport_container.LocalToSVGParentTransform().Inverse().MapRect(
viewport_container.Viewport()));
}
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* existing = properties_->OverflowClip();
bool equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects =
!!existing &&
existing->EqualIgnoringHitTestRects(context_.current.clip, state);
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateOverflowClip(context_.current.clip,
std::move(state)),
equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects);
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearOverflowClip());
}
}
if (auto* overflow_clip = properties_->OverflowClip())
context_.current.clip = overflow_clip;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
{
/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
* packet by another n bytes.
* The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
* by s->packet and s->packet_length.
* (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
* [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
*/
int i,len,left;
long align=0;
unsigned char *pkt;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
if (n <= 0) return n;
rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
if (rb->buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return -1;
left = rb->left;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
if (!extend)
{
/* start with empty packet ... */
if (left == 0)
rb->offset = align;
else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* check if next packet length is large
* enough to justify payload alignment... */
pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
{
/* Note that even if packet is corrupted
* and its length field is insane, we can
* only be led to wrong decision about
* whether memmove will occur or not.
* Header values has no effect on memmove
* arguments and therefore no buffer
* overrun can be triggered. */
memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
rb->offset = align;
}
}
s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
s->packet_length = 0;
/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
}
/* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
* because the read operation returns the whole packet
* at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if (left > 0 && n > left)
n = left;
}
/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
if (left >= n)
{
s->packet_length+=n;
rb->left=left-n;
rb->offset+=n;
return(n);
}
/* else we need to read more data */
len = s->packet_length;
pkt = rb->buf+align;
/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
* 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
* 'left' extra ones at the end */
if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
{
memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
s->packet = pkt;
rb->offset = len + align;
}
if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!s->read_ahead)
/* ignore max parameter */
max = n;
else
{
if (max < n)
max = n;
if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
max = rb->len - rb->offset;
}
while (left < n)
{
/* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
* and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
* len+max if possible) */
clear_sys_error();
if (s->rbio != NULL)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
i = -1;
}
if (i <= 0)
{
rb->left = left;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
if (len+left == 0)
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
return(i);
}
left+=i;
/* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
* the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
* to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if (n > left)
n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
}
}
/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
rb->offset += n;
rb->left = left - n;
s->packet_length += n;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(n);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DTLS message that is processed with a different read operation for the handshake header than for the handshake body, related to the dtls1_get_record function in d1_pkt.c and the ssl3_read_n function in s3_pkt.c.
Commit Message: Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(HasClient());
DCHECK(context_provider_.get());
surface_size_ = surface_size;
InvokeComposite(transform, viewport, clip, viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority, true);
return frame_holder_.Pass();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653} | High | 171,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (code < 256) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr. Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FoFiType1::parse function in fofi/FoFiType1.cc in the PDF parser in xpdf before 3.02pl5, poppler 0.8.7 and possibly other versions up to 0.15.1, kdegraphics, and possibly other products allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with a crafted PostScript Type1 font that contains a negative array index, which bypasses input validation and triggers memory corruption.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
ssize_t bytes_written;
int ret;
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
ret = __bsg_write(bd, buf, count, &bytes_written,
file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
*ppos = bytes_written;
/*
* return bytes written on non-fatal errors
*/
if (!bytes_written || err_block_err(ret))
bytes_written = ret;
dprintk("%s: returning %Zd\n", bd->name, bytes_written);
return bytes_written;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The sg implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.9 does not properly restrict write operations in situations where the KERNEL_DS option is set, which allows local users to read or write to arbitrary kernel memory locations or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging access to a /dev/sg device, related to block/bsg.c and drivers/scsi/sg.c. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-9576.
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowDCMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data); \
if (stream_info != (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL) \
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
explicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
implicit_vr[MaxTextExtent],
magick[MaxTextExtent],
photometric[MaxTextExtent];
DCMInfo
info;
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
sequence,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
colors,
height,
length,
number_scenes,
quantum,
status,
width;
ssize_t
count,
scene;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MaxTextExtent);
info.polarity=MagickFalse;
info.scale=(Quantum *) NULL;
info.bits_allocated=8;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
info.mask=0xffff;
info.max_value=255UL;
info.samples_per_pixel=1;
info.signed_data=(~0UL);
info.significant_bits=0;
info.rescale=MagickFalse;
info.rescale_intercept=0.0;
info.rescale_slope=1.0;
info.window_center=0.0;
info.window_width=0.0;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
number_scenes=1;
sequence=MagickFalse;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ||
(sequence != MagickFalse); )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) && (element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MaxTextExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MaxTextExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) != 0)
quantum=1;
else
quantum=8;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((sequence == MagickFalse) && (group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
else
if ((unsigned int) datum == 0xFFFFFFFFU)
{
sequence=MagickTrue;
continue;
}
if ((unsigned int) ((group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
sequence=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
if (sequence != MagickFalse)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
count,
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
info.samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MaxTextExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
info.polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
info.bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.bits_allocated;
if (info.depth > 32)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.bits_allocated)-1;
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
info.significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (info.significant_bits > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.significant_bits;
if (info.depth > 32)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.significant_bits)-1;
info.mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(info.significant_bits);
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
info.signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_center=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_width=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_intercept=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_slope=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/info.bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (info.bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
info.polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (info.signed_data == 0xffff)
info.signed_data=(size_t) (info.significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for ( ; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"jpeg:%s",
filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"j2k:%s",
filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property));
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (info.depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
size_t
length;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(info.depth)+1);
info.scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*info.scale));
if (info.scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
range=GetQuantumRange(info.depth);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) GetQuantumRange(info.depth); i++)
info.scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)+8;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
break;
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=info.depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
break;
}
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
if ((image->colormap == (PixelPacket *) NULL) &&
(info.samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
int
index;
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << info.depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,stream_info->offsets[0]+
stream_info->segments[0],SEEK_SET);
}
}
if ((info.samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) info.samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
info.window_width=0;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:window");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if (flags & RhoValue)
info.window_center=geometry_info.rho;
if (flags & SigmaValue)
info.window_width=geometry_info.sigma;
info.rescale=MagickTrue;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:rescale");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
info.rescale=IsStringTrue(option);
if ((info.window_center != 0) && (info.window_width == 0))
info.window_width=info.window_center;
status=ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickTrue,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (stream_info->segment_count > 1))
{
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,stream_info->offsets[0]+
stream_info->segments[1],SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickFalse,exception);
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a memory leak vulnerability in ReadDCMImage in codersdcm.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/551 | Medium | 167,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::useBuffer(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE **header,
OMX_U32 portIndex,
OMX_PTR appPrivate,
OMX_U32 size,
OMX_U8 *ptr) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
*header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
(*header)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nRevision = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nStep = 0;
(*header)->pBuffer = ptr;
(*header)->nAllocLen = size;
(*header)->nFilledLen = 0;
(*header)->nOffset = 0;
(*header)->pAppPrivate = appPrivate;
(*header)->pPlatformPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pInputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pOutputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->hMarkTargetComponent = NULL;
(*header)->pMarkData = NULL;
(*header)->nTickCount = 0;
(*header)->nTimeStamp = 0;
(*header)->nFlags = 0;
(*header)->nOutputPortIndex = portIndex;
(*header)->nInputPortIndex = portIndex;
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK(mState == OMX_StateLoaded || port->mDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE);
CHECK_LT(port->mBuffers.size(), port->mDef.nBufferCountActual);
port->mBuffers.push();
BufferInfo *buffer =
&port->mBuffers.editItemAt(port->mBuffers.size() - 1);
buffer->mHeader = *header;
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mBuffers.size() == port->mDef.nBufferCountActual) {
port->mDef.bPopulated = OMX_TRUE;
checkTransitions();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libstagefright). Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63522430.
Commit Message: Check buffer size in useBuffer in software components
Test: No more crash from oob read/write with running poc.
Bug: 63522430
Change-Id: I232d256eacdfaa9347902fe9b42650999f0d2d85
(cherry picked from commit 4e79910fdb303fd28a37a9401bed1b7fbccb1373)
| Medium | 173,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the movement of a media element between documents.
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::ShowOverflowMenu() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!delegate_)
return;
std::vector<LauncherItem> items;
GetOverflowItems(&items);
if (items.empty())
return;
MenuDelegateImpl menu_delegate;
ui::SimpleMenuModel menu_model(&menu_delegate);
for (size_t i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i)
menu_model.AddItem(static_cast<int>(i), delegate_->GetTitle(items[i]));
views::MenuModelAdapter menu_adapter(&menu_model);
overflow_menu_runner_.reset(new views::MenuRunner(menu_adapter.CreateMenu()));
gfx::Rect bounds(overflow_button_->size());
gfx::Point origin;
ConvertPointToScreen(overflow_button_, &origin);
if (overflow_menu_runner_->RunMenuAt(GetWidget(), NULL,
gfx::Rect(origin, size()), views::MenuItemView::TOPLEFT, 0) ==
views::MenuRunner::MENU_DELETED)
return;
Shell::GetInstance()->UpdateShelfVisibility();
if (menu_delegate.activated_command_id() == -1)
return;
LauncherID activated_id = items[menu_delegate.activated_command_id()].id;
LauncherItems::const_iterator window_iter = model_->ItemByID(activated_id);
if (window_iter == model_->items().end())
return; // Window was deleted while menu was up.
delegate_->ItemClicked(*window_iter, ui::EF_NONE);
#endif // !defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
__u32 ts_status;
bool is_drop_n_account = false;
/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
* We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
* userspace to call getsockopt(..., PACKET_HDRLEN, ...).
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h2)) != 32);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h3)) != 48);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto drop;
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto drop;
if (dev->header_ops) {
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING) {
/* Special case: outgoing packets have ll header at head */
skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
}
}
snaplen = skb->len;
res = run_filter(skb, sk, snaplen);
if (!res)
goto drop_n_restore;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
else if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_OUTGOING &&
(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ||
skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)))
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID;
if (snaplen > res)
snaplen = res;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
macoff = netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen) + 16 +
po->tp_reserve;
} else {
unsigned int maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
(maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
po->tp_reserve;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) < sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
copy_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
if (copy_skb)
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0)
snaplen = 0;
}
} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
u32 nval;
nval = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len - macoff;
pr_err_once("tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from %u to %u. macoff=%u\n",
snaplen, nval, macoff);
snaplen = nval;
if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
snaplen = 0;
macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
}
}
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
h.raw = packet_current_rx_frame(po, skb,
TP_STATUS_KERNEL, (macoff+snaplen));
if (!h.raw)
goto drop_n_account;
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
packet_increment_rx_head(po, &po->rx_ring);
/*
* LOSING will be reported till you read the stats,
* because it's COR - Clear On Read.
* Anyways, moving it for V1/V2 only as V3 doesn't need this
* at packet level.
*/
if (po->stats.stats1.tp_drops)
status |= TP_STATUS_LOSING;
}
po->stats.stats1.tp_packets++;
if (copy_skb) {
status |= TP_STATUS_COPY;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, copy_skb);
}
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff -
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr),
vio_le(), true)) {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
goto drop_n_account;
}
}
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, h.raw + macoff, snaplen);
if (!(ts_status = tpacket_get_timestamp(skb, &ts, po->tp_tstamp)))
getnstimeofday(&ts);
status |= ts_status;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
h.h1->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h1->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h1->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h1->tp_net = netoff;
h.h1->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h1->tp_usec = ts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC;
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h1);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
h.h2->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h2->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h2->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h2->tp_net = netoff;
h.h2->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h2->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb)) {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb);
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = ntohs(skb->vlan_proto);
status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID | TP_STATUS_VLAN_TPID_VALID;
} else {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = 0;
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = 0;
}
memset(h.h2->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h2->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h2);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
/* tp_nxt_offset,vlan are already populated above.
* So DONT clear those fields here
*/
h.h3->tp_status |= status;
h.h3->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h3->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h3->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h3->tp_net = netoff;
h.h3->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h3->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
memset(h.h3->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h3->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h3);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sll = h.raw + TPACKET_ALIGN(hdrlen);
sll->sll_halen = dev_parse_header(skb, sll->sll_addr);
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
sll->sll_protocol = skb->protocol;
sll->sll_pkttype = skb->pkt_type;
if (unlikely(po->origdev))
sll->sll_ifindex = orig_dev->ifindex;
else
sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
smp_mb();
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
u8 *start, *end;
end = (u8 *) PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long) h.raw +
macoff + snaplen);
for (start = h.raw; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(start));
}
smp_wmb();
#endif
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
__packet_set_status(po, h.raw, status);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
} else {
prb_clear_blk_fill_status(&po->rx_ring);
}
drop_n_restore:
if (skb_head != skb->data && skb_shared(skb)) {
skb->data = skb_head;
skb->len = skb_len;
}
drop:
if (!is_drop_n_account)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
drop_n_account:
is_drop_n_account = true;
po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
kfree_skb(copy_skb);
goto drop_n_restore;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The tpacket_rcv function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13 mishandles vnet headers, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow, and disk and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = vapic_enter(vcpu);
if (r) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
return r;
}
r = 1;
while (r > 0) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
else {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu)) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
}
if (r <= 0)
break;
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER, &vcpu->requests);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
}
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
}
if (need_resched()) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_resched(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
vapic_exit(vcpu);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8InjectedScriptHost::create(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, V8InspectorImpl* inspector)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = inspector->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> injectedScriptHost = v8::Object::New(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::External> debuggerExternal = v8::External::New(isolate, inspector);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "internalConstructorName", V8InjectedScriptHost::internalConstructorNameCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "formatAccessorsAsProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::formatAccessorsAsProperties, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "subtype", V8InjectedScriptHost::subtypeCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "getInternalProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::getInternalPropertiesCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "objectHasOwnProperty", V8InjectedScriptHost::objectHasOwnPropertyCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "bind", V8InjectedScriptHost::bindCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "proxyTargetValue", V8InjectedScriptHost::proxyTargetValueCallback, debuggerExternal);
return injectedScriptHost;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc = 0;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
if (rc == 0) {
xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
&xattr_data,
sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
}
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The evm_update_evmxattr function in security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5, when the Extended Verification Module (EVM) is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an attempted removexattr operation on an inode of a sockfs filesystem.
Commit Message: evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VerifyDailyContentLengthPrefLists(
const int64* original_values, size_t original_count,
const int64* received_values, size_t received_count,
const int64* original_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_values,
size_t original_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_count,
const int64* received_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_values,
size_t received_with_data_reduction_proxy_count,
const int64* original_via_data_reduction_proxy_values,
size_t original_via_data_reduction_proxy_count,
const int64* received_via_data_reduction_proxy_values,
size_t received_via_data_reduction_proxy_count) {
VerifyPrefList(prefs::kDailyHttpOriginalContentLength,
original_values, original_count);
VerifyPrefList(prefs::kDailyHttpReceivedContentLength,
received_values, received_count);
VerifyPrefList(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled,
original_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_values,
original_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_count);
VerifyPrefList(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled,
received_with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled_values,
received_with_data_reduction_proxy_count);
VerifyPrefList(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy,
original_via_data_reduction_proxy_values,
original_via_data_reduction_proxy_count);
VerifyPrefList(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy,
received_via_data_reduction_proxy_values,
received_via_data_reduction_proxy_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMTVImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
columns,
rows;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MTV image.
*/
(void) ReadBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(buffer,"%lu %lu\n",&columns,&rows);
if (count <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=columns;
image->rows=rows;
image->depth=8;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Convert MTV raster image to pixel packets.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) image->columns,
3UL*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*image->columns),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->columns))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*buffer='\0';
(void) ReadBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(buffer,"%lu %lu\n",&columns,&rows);
if (count > 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (count > 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize, clustersize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files, has_bigalloc;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err = 0;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_sb = sb;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
strreplace(sb->s_id, '/', '!');
/* -EINVAL is default */
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Warn if metadata_csum and gdt_csum are both set. */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb) &&
ext4_has_feature_gdt_csum(sb))
ext4_warning(sb, "metadata_csum and uninit_bg are "
"redundant flags; please run fsck.");
/* Check for a known checksum algorithm */
if (!ext4_verify_csum_type(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"unknown checksum algorithm.");
silent = 1;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Load the checksum driver */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb)) {
sbi->s_chksum_driver = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32c", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot load crc32c driver.");
ret = PTR_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
sbi->s_chksum_driver = NULL;
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/* Check superblock checksum */
if (!ext4_superblock_csum_verify(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"invalid superblock checksum. Run e2fsck?");
silent = 1;
ret = -EFSBADCRC;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Precompute checksum seed for all metadata */
if (ext4_has_feature_csum_seed(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = le32_to_cpu(es->s_checksum_seed);
else if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = ext4_chksum(sbi, ~0, es->s_uuid,
sizeof(es->s_uuid));
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS)
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
/* don't forget to enable journal_csum when metadata_csum is enabled. */
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
/* block_validity enabled by default; disable with noblock_validity */
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid));
sbi->s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid));
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) && !IS_EXT2_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
/*
* set default s_li_wait_mult for lazyinit, for the case there is
* no mount option specified.
*/
sbi->s_li_wait_mult = EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT;
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt = sbi->s_mount_opt;
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, 0))
goto failed_mount;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting "
"with data=journal disables delayed "
"allocation and O_DIRECT support!\n");
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and delalloc");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dioread_nolock");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DAX)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
} else {
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_CGROUPWB;
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(ext4_has_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_ro_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_incompat_features(sb)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (es->s_creator_os == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_HURD)) {
set_opt2(sb, HURD_COMPAT);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"The Hurd can't support 64-bit file systems");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT2_SB(sb)) {
if (ext2_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext2 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext2 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT3_SB(sb)) {
if (ext3_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext3 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext3 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DAX) {
if (blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: unsupported blocksize for dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (!sb->s_bdev->bd_disk->fops->direct_access) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: device does not support dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb) && es->s_encryption_level) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported encryption level %d",
es->s_encryption_level);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
if (ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) {
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
}
}
/* Handle clustersize */
clustersize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size);
has_bigalloc = ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb);
if (has_bigalloc) {
if (clustersize < blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"cluster size (%d) smaller than "
"block size (%d)", clustersize, blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_cluster_bits = le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
sbi->s_clusters_per_group =
le32_to_cpu(es->s_clusters_per_group);
if (sbi->s_clusters_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#clusters per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group !=
(sbi->s_clusters_per_group * (clustersize / blocksize))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "blocks per group (%lu) and "
"clusters per group (%lu) inconsistent",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group,
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else {
if (clustersize != blocksize) {
ext4_warning(sb, "fragment/cluster size (%d) != "
"block size (%d)", clustersize,
blocksize);
clustersize = blocksize;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_clusters_per_group = sbi->s_blocks_per_group;
sbi->s_cluster_bits = 0;
}
sbi->s_cluster_ratio = clustersize / blocksize;
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/* Do we have standard group size of clustersize * 8 blocks ? */
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group == clustersize << 3)
set_opt2(sb, STD_GROUP_SIZE);
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data "
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount;
}
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
setup_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, print_daily_error_info,
(unsigned long) sb);
/* Register extent status tree shrinker */
if (ext4_es_register_shrinker(sbi))
goto failed_mount3;
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb = 32;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
sb->s_qcop = &dquot_quotactl_sysfile_ops;
else
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->s_quota_types = QTYPE_MASK_USR | QTYPE_MASK_GRP | QTYPE_MASK_PRJ;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb));
if (ext4_has_feature_mmp(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
if (ext4_multi_mount_protect(sb, le64_to_cpu(es->s_mmp_block)))
goto failed_mount3a;
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && ext4_has_feature_journal(sb)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3a;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"commit=%lu, fs mounted w/o journal",
sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ);
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (EXT4_MOUNT_DATA_FLAGS &
(sbi->s_mount_opt ^ sbi->s_def_mount_opt)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (!set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set journal checksum "
"feature set");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
sbi->s_journal->j_commit_callback = ext4_journal_commit_callback;
no_journal:
if (ext4_mballoc_ready) {
sbi->s_mb_cache = ext4_xattr_create_cache(sb->s_id);
if (!sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to create an mb_cache");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
}
if ((DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) || ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) &&
(blocksize != PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported blocksize for fs encryption");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) {
ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
}
/*
* Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
* superblock if present.
*/
if (es->s_overhead_clusters)
sbi->s_overhead = le32_to_cpu(es->s_overhead_clusters);
else {
err = ext4_calculate_overhead(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-rsv-conversion", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create workqueue\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
iput(root);
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
ext4_set_resv_clusters(sb);
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4a;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount5;
}
block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, block));
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err) {
unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb);
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, 0,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount6;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount6;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount6;
err = ext4_register_sysfs(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount7;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Enable quota usage during mount. */
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
err = ext4_enable_quotas(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount8;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD)) {
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"mounting with \"discard\" option, but "
"the device does not support discard");
}
if (___ratelimit(&ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit, "EXT4-fs mount"))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
/* Enable message ratelimiting. Default is 10 messages per 5 secs. */
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_err_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_warning_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
failed_mount8:
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
#endif
failed_mount7:
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
failed_mount6:
ext4_mb_release(sb);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups)
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter);
failed_mount5:
ext4_ext_release(sb);
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
failed_mount4a:
dput(sb->s_root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
failed_mount4:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq)
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3a:
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
failed_mount3:
del_timer_sync(&sbi->s_err_report);
if (sbi->s_mmp_tsk)
kthread_stop(sbi->s_mmp_tsk);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kvfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void bond_setup(struct net_device *bond_dev)
{
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
/* initialize rwlocks */
rwlock_init(&bond->lock);
rwlock_init(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
bond->params = bonding_defaults;
/* Initialize pointers */
bond->dev = bond_dev;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bond->vlan_list);
/* Initialize the device entry points */
ether_setup(bond_dev);
bond_dev->netdev_ops = &bond_netdev_ops;
bond_dev->ethtool_ops = &bond_ethtool_ops;
bond_set_mode_ops(bond, bond->params.mode);
bond_dev->destructor = bond_destructor;
/* Initialize the device options */
bond_dev->tx_queue_len = 0;
bond_dev->flags |= IFF_MASTER|IFF_MULTICAST;
bond_dev->priv_flags |= IFF_BONDING;
bond_dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
/* At first, we block adding VLANs. That's the only way to
* prevent problems that occur when adding VLANs over an
* empty bond. The block will be removed once non-challenged
* slaves are enslaved.
*/
bond_dev->features |= NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED;
/* don't acquire bond device's netif_tx_lock when
* transmitting */
bond_dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX;
/* By default, we declare the bond to be fully
* VLAN hardware accelerated capable. Special
* care is taken in the various xmit functions
* when there are slaves that are not hw accel
* capable
*/
bond_dev->hw_features = BOND_VLAN_FEATURES |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_RX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_FILTER;
bond_dev->hw_features &= ~(NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM & ~NETIF_F_NO_CSUM);
bond_dev->features |= bond_dev->hw_features;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void shm_destroy(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
ns->shm_tot -= (shp->shm_segsz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
shm_rmid(ns, shp);
shm_unlock(shp);
if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file))
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
else if (shp->mlock_user)
user_shm_unlock(file_inode(shp->shm_file)->i_size,
shp->mlock_user);
fput (shp->shm_file);
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that uses shmctl IPC_RMID operations in conjunction with other shm system calls.
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SkippedMBMotionComp(
VideoDecData *video
)
{
Vop *prev = video->prevVop;
Vop *comp;
int ypos, xpos;
PIXEL *c_comp, *c_prev;
PIXEL *cu_comp, *cu_prev;
PIXEL *cv_comp, *cv_prev;
int width, width_uv;
int32 offset;
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON // 2/14/2001
int imv;
int32 size = (int32) video->nTotalMB << 8;
uint8 *pp_dec_y, *pp_dec_u;
uint8 *pp_prev1;
int mvwidth = video->nMBPerRow << 1;
#endif
width = video->width;
width_uv = width >> 1;
ypos = video->mbnum_row << 4 ;
xpos = video->mbnum_col << 4 ;
offset = (int32)ypos * width + xpos;
/* zero motion compensation for previous frame */
/*mby*width + mbx;*/
c_prev = prev->yChan + offset;
/*by*width_uv + bx;*/
cu_prev = prev->uChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
/*by*width_uv + bx;*/
cv_prev = prev->vChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
comp = video->currVop;
c_comp = comp->yChan + offset;
cu_comp = comp->uChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
cv_comp = comp->vChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
/* Copy previous reconstructed frame into the current frame */
PutSKIPPED_MB(c_comp, c_prev, width);
PutSKIPPED_B(cu_comp, cu_prev, width_uv);
PutSKIPPED_B(cv_comp, cv_prev, width_uv);
/* 10/24/2000 post_processing semaphore generation */
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON // 2/14/2001
if (video->postFilterType != PV_NO_POST_PROC)
{
imv = (offset >> 6) - (xpos >> 6) + (xpos >> 3);
/* Post-processing mode (copy previous MB) */
pp_prev1 = video->pstprcTypPrv + imv;
pp_dec_y = video->pstprcTypCur + imv;
*pp_dec_y = *pp_prev1;
*(pp_dec_y + 1) = *(pp_prev1 + 1);
*(pp_dec_y + mvwidth) = *(pp_prev1 + mvwidth);
*(pp_dec_y + mvwidth + 1) = *(pp_prev1 + mvwidth + 1);
/* chrominance */
/*4*MB_in_width*MB_in_height*/
pp_prev1 = video->pstprcTypPrv + (size >> 6) +
((imv + (xpos >> 3)) >> 2);
pp_dec_u = video->pstprcTypCur + (size >> 6) +
((imv + (xpos >> 3)) >> 2);
*pp_dec_u = *pp_prev1;
pp_dec_u[size>>8] = pp_prev1[size>>8];
}
#endif
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------
; Return nothing or data or data pointer
----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35269635.
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
| High | 174,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el) {
if (c->rbytes > 1024) {
/*
* We didn't have a '\n' in the first k. This _has_ to be a
* large multiget, if not we should just nuke the connection.
*/
char *ptr = c->rcurr;
while (*ptr == ' ') { /* ignore leading whitespaces */
++ptr;
}
if (strcmp(ptr, "get ") && strcmp(ptr, "gets ")) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: memcached.c in memcached before 1.4.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang or crash) via a long line that triggers excessive memory allocation. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets. | Medium | 165,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: generate_row(png_bytep row, size_t rowbytes, unsigned int y, int color_type,
int bit_depth, png_const_bytep gamma_table, double conv,
unsigned int *colors)
{
png_uint_32 size_max = image_size_of_type(color_type, bit_depth, colors)-1;
png_uint_32 depth_max = (1U << bit_depth)-1; /* up to 65536 */
if (colors[0] == 0) switch (channels_of_type(color_type))
{
/* 1 channel: a square image with a diamond, the least luminous colors are on
* the edge of the image, the most luminous in the center.
*/
case 1:
{
png_uint_32 x;
png_uint_32 base = 2*size_max - abs(2*y-size_max);
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
png_uint_32 luma = base - abs(2*x-size_max);
/* 'luma' is now in the range 0..2*size_max, we need
* 0..depth_max
*/
luma = (luma*depth_max + size_max) / (2*size_max);
set_value(row, rowbytes, x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
/* 2 channels: the color channel increases in luminosity from top to bottom,
* the alpha channel increases in opacity from left to right.
*/
case 2:
{
png_uint_32 alpha = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x, bit_depth,
(depth_max * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max), gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x+1, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
/* 3 channels: linear combinations of, from the top-left corner clockwise,
* black, green, white, red.
*/
case 3:
{
/* x0: the black->red scale (the value of the red component) at the
* start of the row (blue and green are 0).
* x1: the green->white scale (the value of the red and blue
* components at the end of the row; green is depth_max).
*/
png_uint_32 Y = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
/* Interpolate x/depth_max from start to end:
*
* start end difference
* red: Y Y 0
* green: 0 depth_max depth_max
* blue: 0 Y Y
*/
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+0, bit_depth, /* red */ Y,
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+1, bit_depth, /* green */
(depth_max * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+2, bit_depth, /* blue */
(Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
/* 4 channels: linear combinations of, from the top-left corner clockwise,
* transparent, red, green, blue.
*/
case 4:
{
/* x0: the transparent->blue scale (the value of the blue and alpha
* components) at the start of the row (red and green are 0).
* x1: the red->green scale (the value of the red and green
* components at the end of the row; blue is 0 and alpha is
* depth_max).
*/
png_uint_32 Y = (depth_max * y * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max);
png_uint_32 x;
/* Interpolate x/depth_max from start to end:
*
* start end difference
* red: 0 depth_max-Y depth_max-Y
* green: 0 Y Y
* blue: Y 0 -Y
* alpha: Y depth_max depth_max-Y
*/
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+0, bit_depth, /* red */
((depth_max-Y) * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+1, bit_depth, /* green */
(Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+2, bit_depth, /* blue */
Y - (Y * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+3, bit_depth, /* alpha */
Y + ((depth_max-Y) * x * 2 + size_max) / (2 * size_max),
gamma_table, conv);
}
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: internal bad channel count\n");
exit(2);
}
else if (color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_PALETTE)
{
/* Palette with fixed color: the image rows are all 0 and the image width
* is 16.
*/
memset(row, 0, rowbytes);
}
else if (colors[0] == channels_of_type(color_type))
switch (channels_of_type(color_type))
{
case 1:
{
const png_uint_32 luma = colors[1];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
set_value(row, rowbytes, x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table,
conv);
}
break;
case 2:
{
const png_uint_32 luma = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 alpha = colors[2];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x, bit_depth, luma, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 2*x+1, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
case 3:
{
const png_uint_32 red = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 green = colors[2];
const png_uint_32 blue = colors[3];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+0, bit_depth, red, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+1, bit_depth, green, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 3*x+2, bit_depth, blue, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
const png_uint_32 red = colors[1];
const png_uint_32 green = colors[2];
const png_uint_32 blue = colors[3];
const png_uint_32 alpha = colors[4];
png_uint_32 x;
for (x=0; x<=size_max; ++x)
{
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+0, bit_depth, red, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+1, bit_depth, green, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+2, bit_depth, blue, gamma_table,
conv);
set_value(row, rowbytes, 4*x+3, bit_depth, alpha, gamma_table,
conv);
}
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: internal bad channel count\n");
exit(2);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,
"makepng: --color: count(%u) does not match channels(%u)\n",
colors[0], channels_of_type(color_type));
exit(1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *nci_extract_rf_params_nfcb_passive_poll(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcb_poll *nfcb_poll,
__u8 *data)
{
nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("sensb_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len);
memcpy(nfcb_poll->sensb_res, data, nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len);
data += nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len;
return data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <[email protected]>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <[email protected]>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn,
files_struct *fsp,
int flags,
mode_t mode,
bool *file_created)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st);
*file_created = false;
* We're not creating the file, just pass through.
*/
return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: smbd in Samba before 4.4.10 and 4.5.x before 4.5.6 has a denial of service vulnerability (fd_open_atomic infinite loop with high CPU usage and memory consumption) due to wrongly handling dangling symlinks.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_sp_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_sp_opengl1_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
ri.Z_Malloc = Z_Malloc;
ri.Free = Z_Free;
ri.Hunk_Clear = Hunk_ClearToMark;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Com_Printf( "---- Renderer Initialization Complete ----\n" );
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | High | 170,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int base64decode_block(unsigned char *target, const char *data, size_t data_size)
{
int w1,w2,w3,w4;
int i;
size_t n;
if (!data || (data_size <= 0)) {
return 0;
}
n = 0;
i = 0;
while (n < data_size-3) {
w1 = base64_table[(int)data[n]];
w2 = base64_table[(int)data[n+1]];
w3 = base64_table[(int)data[n+2]];
w4 = base64_table[(int)data[n+3]];
if (w2 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w1*4 + (w2 >> 4)) & 255);
}
if (w3 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w2*16 + (w3 >> 2)) & 255);
}
if (w4 >= 0) {
target[i++] = (char)((w3*64 + w4) & 255);
}
n+=4;
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The base64decode function in base64.c in libimobiledevice libplist through 1.12 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via split encoded Apple Property List data.
Commit Message: base64: Rework base64decode to handle split encoded data correctly | Medium | 168,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::MediaElementAudioSourceHandler(
AudioNode& node,
HTMLMediaElement& media_element)
: AudioHandler(kNodeTypeMediaElementAudioSource,
node,
node.context()->sampleRate()),
media_element_(media_element),
source_number_of_channels_(0),
source_sample_rate_(0),
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_(
PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(media_element.currentSrc())),
maybe_print_cors_message_(!passes_current_src_cors_access_check_),
current_src_string_(media_element.currentSrc().GetString()) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
AddOutput(2);
if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
task_runner_ = Context()->GetExecutionContext()->GetTaskRunner(
TaskType::kMediaElementEvent);
}
Initialize();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313} | Medium | 173,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_list_int(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_attr_list_context *context)
{
struct attrlist_cursor_kern *cursor;
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
int retval;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf(context);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf);
cursor = context->cursor;
cursor->initted = 1;
/*
* Re-find our place in the leaf block if this is a new syscall.
*/
if (context->resynch) {
entry = &entries[0];
for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == cursor->hashval) {
if (cursor->offset == context->dupcnt) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
context->dupcnt++;
} else if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) >
cursor->hashval) {
context->dupcnt = 0;
break;
}
}
if (i == ichdr.count) {
trace_xfs_attr_list_notfound(context);
return 0;
}
} else {
entry = &entries[0];
i = 0;
}
context->resynch = 0;
/*
* We have found our place, start copying out the new attributes.
*/
retval = 0;
for (; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) != cursor->hashval) {
cursor->hashval = be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval);
cursor->offset = 0;
}
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)
continue; /* skip incomplete entries */
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, i);
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_loc->nameval,
(int)name_loc->namelen,
be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen),
&name_loc->nameval[name_loc->namelen]);
if (retval)
return retval;
} else {
xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote_t *name_rmt =
xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
int valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
if (context->put_value) {
xfs_da_args_t args;
memset((char *)&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.dp = context->dp;
args.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
args.valuelen = valuelen;
args.value = kmem_alloc(valuelen, KM_SLEEP | KM_NOFS);
args.rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args.rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(
args.dp->i_mount, valuelen);
retval = xfs_attr_rmtval_get(&args);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
args.value);
kmem_free(args.value);
} else {
retval = context->put_listent(context,
entry->flags,
name_rmt->name,
(int)name_rmt->namelen,
valuelen,
NULL);
}
if (retval)
return retval;
}
if (context->seen_enough)
break;
cursor->offset++;
}
trace_xfs_attr_list_leaf_end(context);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | High | 166,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXTableCell::isColumnHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "col") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "colgroup");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
int route_id,
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params validated_params(params);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(route_id, validated_params,
session_storage_namespace);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 does not validate URLs during the opening of new windows, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::computeAccessibilityIsIgnored(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
ASSERT(m_initialized);
#endif
if (isDescendantOfLeafNode()) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXAncestorIsLeafNode, leafNodeAncestor()));
return true;
}
AXObject* controlObject = correspondingControlForLabelElement();
if (controlObject && controlObject->isCheckboxOrRadio() &&
controlObject->nameFromLabelElement()) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
HTMLLabelElement* label = labelElementContainer();
if (label && label != getNode()) {
AXObject* labelAXObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(label);
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXLabelContainer, labelAXObject));
}
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXLabelFor, controlObject));
}
return true;
}
Element* element = getNode()->isElementNode() ? toElement(getNode())
: getNode()->parentElement();
if (!getLayoutObject() && (!element || !element->isInCanvasSubtree()) &&
!equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return true;
}
if (m_role == UnknownRole) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXUninteresting));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
return speech_synthesis_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,630 |
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