instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int on_header_cb(nghttp2_session *ngh2, const nghttp2_frame *frame,
const uint8_t *name, size_t namelen,
const uint8_t *value, size_t valuelen,
uint8_t flags,
void *userp)
{
h2_session *session = (h2_session *)userp;
h2_stream * stream;
apr_status_t status;
(void)flags;
stream = get_stream(session, frame->hd.stream_id);
if (!stream) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, session->c,
APLOGNO(02920)
"h2_session: stream(%ld-%d): on_header unknown stream",
session->id, (int)frame->hd.stream_id);
return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
}
status = h2_stream_add_header(stream, (const char *)name, namelen,
(const char *)value, valuelen);
if (status != APR_SUCCESS && !h2_stream_is_ready(stream)) {
return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mod_http2 module in the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.17 through 2.4.23, when the Protocols configuration includes h2 or h2c, does not restrict request-header length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via crafted CONTINUATION frames in an HTTP/2 request.
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
{
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct path path;
struct sock *skpair;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int state;
unix_remove_socket(sk);
/* Clear state */
unix_state_lock(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
path = u->path;
u->path.dentry = NULL;
u->path.mnt = NULL;
state = sk->sk_state;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
wake_up_interruptible_all(&u->peer_wait);
skpair = unix_peer(sk);
if (skpair != NULL) {
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
unix_state_lock(skpair);
/* No more writes */
skpair->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) || embrion)
skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
unix_state_unlock(skpair);
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
/* Try to flush out this socket. Throw out buffers at least */
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL) {
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
unix_release_sock(skb->sk, 1);
/* passed fds are erased in the kfree_skb hook */
UNIXCB(skb).consumed = skb->len;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
if (path.dentry)
path_put(&path);
sock_put(sk);
/* ---- Socket is dead now and most probably destroyed ---- */
/*
* Fixme: BSD difference: In BSD all sockets connected to us get
* ECONNRESET and we die on the spot. In Linux we behave
* like files and pipes do and wait for the last
* dereference.
*
* Can't we simply set sock->err?
*
* What the above comment does talk about? --ANK(980817)
*/
if (unix_tot_inflight)
unix_gc(); /* Garbage collect fds */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage3D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
MaybeShared<DOMArrayBufferView> pixels,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage3D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
kTexImage3D, target, level, internalformat, width, height, depth, border,
format, type, 0, 0, 0, pixels.View(), kNullNotReachable, src_offset);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003} | Medium | 172,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_decode(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
void *user_priv,
long deadline)
{
vpx_codec_err_t res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
unsigned int resolution_change = 0;
unsigned int w, h;
if (!ctx->fragments.enabled && (data == NULL && data_sz == 0))
{
return 0;
}
/* Update the input fragment data */
if(update_fragments(ctx, data, data_sz, &res) <= 0)
return res;
/* Determine the stream parameters. Note that we rely on peek_si to
* validate that we have a buffer that does not wrap around the top
* of the heap.
*/
w = ctx->si.w;
h = ctx->si.h;
res = vp8_peek_si_internal(ctx->fragments.ptrs[0], ctx->fragments.sizes[0],
&ctx->si, ctx->decrypt_cb, ctx->decrypt_state);
if((res == VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM) && !ctx->si.is_kf)
{
/* the peek function returns an error for non keyframes, however for
* this case, it is not an error */
res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if(!ctx->decoder_init && !ctx->si.is_kf)
res = VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((ctx->si.h != h) || (ctx->si.w != w))
resolution_change = 1;
/* Initialize the decoder instance on the first frame*/
if (!res && !ctx->decoder_init)
{
VP8D_CONFIG oxcf;
oxcf.Width = ctx->si.w;
oxcf.Height = ctx->si.h;
oxcf.Version = 9;
oxcf.postprocess = 0;
oxcf.max_threads = ctx->cfg.threads;
oxcf.error_concealment =
(ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_ERROR_CONCEALMENT);
/* If postprocessing was enabled by the application and a
* configuration has not been provided, default it.
*/
if (!ctx->postproc_cfg_set
&& (ctx->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_POSTPROC)) {
ctx->postproc_cfg.post_proc_flag =
VP8_DEBLOCK | VP8_DEMACROBLOCK | VP8_MFQE;
ctx->postproc_cfg.deblocking_level = 4;
ctx->postproc_cfg.noise_level = 0;
}
res = vp8_create_decoder_instances(&ctx->yv12_frame_buffers, &oxcf);
ctx->decoder_init = 1;
}
/* Set these even if already initialized. The caller may have changed the
* decrypt config between frames.
*/
if (ctx->decoder_init) {
ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0]->decrypt_cb = ctx->decrypt_cb;
ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0]->decrypt_state = ctx->decrypt_state;
}
if (!res)
{
VP8D_COMP *pbi = ctx->yv12_frame_buffers.pbi[0];
if (resolution_change)
{
VP8_COMMON *const pc = & pbi->common;
MACROBLOCKD *const xd = & pbi->mb;
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
int i;
#endif
pc->Width = ctx->si.w;
pc->Height = ctx->si.h;
{
int prev_mb_rows = pc->mb_rows;
if (setjmp(pbi->common.error.jmp))
{
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 0;
vp8_clear_system_state();
/* same return value as used in vp8dx_receive_compressed_data */
return -1;
}
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 1;
if (pc->Width <= 0)
{
pc->Width = w;
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_CORRUPT_FRAME,
"Invalid frame width");
}
if (pc->Height <= 0)
{
pc->Height = h;
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_CORRUPT_FRAME,
"Invalid frame height");
}
if (vp8_alloc_frame_buffers(pc, pc->Width, pc->Height))
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate frame buffers");
xd->pre = pc->yv12_fb[pc->lst_fb_idx];
xd->dst = pc->yv12_fb[pc->new_fb_idx];
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
pbi->mb_row_di[i].mbd.dst = pc->yv12_fb[pc->new_fb_idx];
vp8_build_block_doffsets(&pbi->mb_row_di[i].mbd);
}
#endif
vp8_build_block_doffsets(&pbi->mb);
/* allocate memory for last frame MODE_INFO array */
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if (pbi->ec_enabled)
{
/* old prev_mip was released by vp8_de_alloc_frame_buffers()
* called in vp8_alloc_frame_buffers() */
pc->prev_mip = vpx_calloc(
(pc->mb_cols + 1) * (pc->mb_rows + 1),
sizeof(MODE_INFO));
if (!pc->prev_mip)
{
vp8_de_alloc_frame_buffers(pc);
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate"
"last frame MODE_INFO array");
}
pc->prev_mi = pc->prev_mip + pc->mode_info_stride + 1;
if (vp8_alloc_overlap_lists(pbi))
vpx_internal_error(&pc->error, VPX_CODEC_MEM_ERROR,
"Failed to allocate overlap lists "
"for error concealment");
}
#endif
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd)
vp8mt_alloc_temp_buffers(pbi, pc->Width, prev_mb_rows);
#else
(void)prev_mb_rows;
#endif
}
pbi->common.error.setjmp = 0;
/* required to get past the first get_free_fb() call */
pbi->common.fb_idx_ref_cnt[0] = 0;
}
/* update the pbi fragment data */
pbi->fragments = ctx->fragments;
ctx->user_priv = user_priv;
if (vp8dx_receive_compressed_data(pbi, data_sz, data, deadline))
{
res = update_error_state(ctx, &pbi->common.error);
}
/* get ready for the next series of fragments */
ctx->fragments.count = 0;
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libvpx in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-11-01 could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Android ID: A-30593765.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
| High | 173,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::StopStreamDevice(const std::string& device_id,
int32_t session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
media_stream_manager_->StopStreamDevice(render_process_id_, render_frame_id_,
device_id, session_id);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderBlock::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBox::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
RenderStyle* newStyle = style();
if (!isAnonymousBlock()) {
for (RenderBlock* currCont = blockElementContinuation(); currCont; currCont = currCont->blockElementContinuation()) {
RenderBoxModelObject* nextCont = currCont->continuation();
currCont->setContinuation(0);
currCont->setStyle(newStyle);
currCont->setContinuation(nextCont);
}
}
if (FastTextAutosizer* textAutosizer = document().fastTextAutosizer())
textAutosizer->record(this);
propagateStyleToAnonymousChildren(true);
invalidateLineHeight();
m_hasBorderOrPaddingLogicalWidthChanged = oldStyle && diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && needsLayout() && borderOrPaddingLogicalWidthChanged(oldStyle, newStyle);
Vector<ImageResource*> images;
appendImagesFromStyle(images, *newStyle);
if (images.isEmpty())
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::resourceLoadPriorityOptimizer()->removeRenderObject(this);
else
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::resourceLoadPriorityOptimizer()->addRenderObject(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UWORD32 ihevcd_cabac_decode_bypass_bins_egk(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 k)
{
UWORD32 u4_sym;
WORD32 numones;
WORD32 bin;
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT((k >= 0));
numones = k;
bin = 1;
u4_sym = 0;
while(bin)
{
IHEVCD_CABAC_DECODE_BYPASS_BIN(bin, ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm);
u4_sym += bin << numones++;
}
numones -= 1;
numones = CLIP3(numones, 0, 16);
if(numones)
{
UWORD32 u4_suffix;
IHEVCD_CABAC_DECODE_BYPASS_BINS(u4_suffix, ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, numones);
u4_sym += u4_suffix;
}
return (u4_sym);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33966031.
Commit Message: Fix in handling wrong cu_qp_delta
cu_qp_delta is now checked for the range as specified in the spec
Bug: 33966031
Change-Id: I00420bf68081af92e9f2be9af7ce58d0683094ca
| High | 174,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( item->string )
cJSON_free( item->string );
item->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_AddItemToArray( object, item );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CoordinatorImpl::CoordinatorImpl(service_manager::Connector* connector)
: next_dump_id_(0),
client_process_timeout_(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(15)) {
process_map_ = std::make_unique<ProcessMap>(connector);
DCHECK(!g_coordinator_impl);
g_coordinator_impl = this;
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->set_tracing_process_id(
mojom::kServiceTracingProcessId);
tracing_observer_ = std::make_unique<TracingObserver>(
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance(), nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528} | Medium | 173,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Part::slotOpenExtractedEntry(KJob *job)
{
if (!job->error()) {
OpenJob *openJob = qobject_cast<OpenJob*>(job);
Q_ASSERT(openJob);
m_tmpExtractDirList << openJob->tempDir();
const QString fullName = openJob->validatedFilePath();
bool isWritable = m_model->archive() && !m_model->archive()->isReadOnly();
if (!isWritable) {
QFile::setPermissions(fullName, QFileDevice::ReadOwner | QFileDevice::ReadGroup | QFileDevice::ReadOther);
}
if (isWritable) {
m_fileWatcher = new QFileSystemWatcher;
connect(m_fileWatcher, &QFileSystemWatcher::fileChanged, this, &Part::slotWatchedFileModified);
m_fileWatcher->addPath(fullName);
}
if (qobject_cast<OpenWithJob*>(job)) {
const QList<QUrl> urls = {QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile)};
KRun::displayOpenWithDialog(urls, widget());
} else {
KRun::runUrl(QUrl::fromUserInput(fullName, QString(), QUrl::AssumeLocalFile),
QMimeDatabase().mimeTypeForFile(fullName).name(),
widget());
}
} else if (job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(), job->errorString());
}
setReadyGui();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: ark before 16.12.1 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via an executable in an archive, related to associated applications.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc,
char **argv)
{
int i, gn;
int test = 0;
char *action = NULL, *cmd;
char *output = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_EEZE_MOUNT
Eina_Bool mnt = EINA_FALSE;
const char *act;
#endif
gid_t gid, gl[65536], egid;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
{
if ((!strcmp(argv[i], "-h")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "-help")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "--help")))
{
printf(
"This is an internal tool for Enlightenment.\n"
"do not use it.\n"
);
exit(0);
}
}
if (argc >= 3)
{
if ((argc == 3) && (!strcmp(argv[1], "-t")))
{
test = 1;
action = argv[2];
}
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "l2ping"))
{
action = argv[1];
output = argv[2];
}
#ifdef HAVE_EEZE_MOUNT
else
{
const char *s;
s = strrchr(argv[1], '/');
if ((!s) || (!s[1])) exit(1); /* eeze always uses complete path */
s++;
if (strcmp(s, "mount") && strcmp(s, "umount") && strcmp(s, "eject")) exit(1);
mnt = EINA_TRUE;
act = s;
action = argv[1];
}
#endif
}
else if (argc == 2)
{
action = argv[1];
}
else
{
exit(1);
}
if (!action) exit(1);
fprintf(stderr, "action %s %i\n", action, argc);
uid = getuid();
gid = getgid();
egid = getegid();
gn = getgroups(65536, gl);
if (gn < 0)
{
printf("ERROR: MEMBER OF MORE THAN 65536 GROUPS\n");
exit(3);
}
if (setuid(0) != 0)
{
printf("ERROR: UNABLE TO ASSUME ROOT PRIVILEGES\n");
exit(5);
}
if (setgid(0) != 0)
{
printf("ERROR: UNABLE TO ASSUME ROOT GROUP PRIVILEGES\n");
exit(7);
}
eina_init();
if (!auth_action_ok(action, gid, gl, gn, egid))
{
printf("ERROR: ACTION NOT ALLOWED: %s\n", action);
exit(10);
}
/* we can add more levels of auth here */
/* when mounting, this will match the exact path to the exe,
* as required in sysactions.conf
* this is intentionally pedantic for security
*/
cmd = eina_hash_find(actions, action);
if (!cmd)
{
printf("ERROR: UNDEFINED ACTION: %s\n", action);
exit(20);
}
if (!test && !strcmp(action, "l2ping"))
{
char tmp[128];
double latency;
latency = e_sys_l2ping(output);
eina_convert_dtoa(latency, tmp);
fputs(tmp, stdout);
return (latency < 0) ? 1 : 0;
}
/* sanitize environment */
#ifdef HAVE_UNSETENV
# define NOENV(x) unsetenv(x)
#else
# define NOENV(x)
#endif
NOENV("IFS");
/* sanitize environment */
#ifdef HAVE_UNSETENV
# define NOENV(x) unsetenv(x)
#else
# define NOENV(x)
#endif
NOENV("IFS");
NOENV("LD_PRELOAD");
NOENV("PYTHONPATH");
NOENV("LD_LIBRARY_PATH");
#ifdef HAVE_CLEARENV
clearenv();
#endif
/* set path and ifs to minimal defaults */
putenv("PATH=/bin:/usr/bin");
putenv("IFS= \t\n");
const char *p;
char *end;
unsigned long muid;
Eina_Bool nosuid, nodev, noexec, nuid;
nosuid = nodev = noexec = nuid = EINA_FALSE;
/* these are the only possible options which can be present here; check them strictly */
if (eina_strlcpy(buf, opts, sizeof(buf)) >= sizeof(buf)) return EINA_FALSE;
for (p = buf; p && p[1]; p = strchr(p + 1, ','))
{
if (p[0] == ',') p++;
#define CMP(OPT) \
if (!strncmp(p, OPT, sizeof(OPT) - 1))
CMP("nosuid,")
{
nosuid = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("nodev,")
{
nodev = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("noexec,")
{
noexec = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("utf8,") continue;
CMP("utf8=0,") continue;
CMP("utf8=1,") continue;
CMP("iocharset=utf8,") continue;
CMP("uid=")
{
p += 4;
errno = 0;
muid = strtoul(p, &end, 10);
if (muid == ULONG_MAX) return EINA_FALSE;
if (errno) return EINA_FALSE;
if (end[0] != ',') return EINA_FALSE;
if (muid != uid) return EINA_FALSE;
nuid = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
return EINA_FALSE;
}
if ((!nosuid) || (!nodev) || (!noexec) || (!nuid)) return EINA_FALSE;
return EINA_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: An unspecified setuid root helper in Enlightenment before 0.17.6 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging failure to properly sanitize the environment.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: init_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dest, mrb_value obj)
{
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_remove(mrb, dest, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__"));
break;
case MRB_TT_OBJECT:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_HASH:
case MRB_TT_DATA:
case MRB_TT_EXCEPTION:
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
break;
case MRB_TT_ISTRUCT:
mrb_istruct_copy(dest, obj);
break;
default:
break;
}
mrb_funcall(mrb, dest, "initialize_copy", 1, obj);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-824
Summary: The init_copy function in kernel.c in mruby 1.4.1 makes initialize_copy calls for TT_ICLASS objects, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (mrb_hash_keys uninitialized pointer and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: Should not call `initialize_copy` for `TT_ICLASS`; fix #4027
Since `TT_ICLASS` is a internal object that should never be revealed
to Ruby world. | High | 169,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int propagate_one(struct mount *m)
{
struct mount *child;
int type;
/* skip ones added by this propagate_mnt() */
if (IS_MNT_NEW(m))
return 0;
/* skip if mountpoint isn't covered by it */
if (!is_subdir(mp->m_dentry, m->mnt.mnt_root))
return 0;
if (peers(m, last_dest)) {
type = CL_MAKE_SHARED;
} else {
struct mount *n, *p;
bool done;
for (n = m; ; n = p) {
p = n->mnt_master;
if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
break;
}
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
if (last_source == first_source)
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);
type = CL_SLAVE;
/* beginning of peer group among the slaves? */
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(m))
type |= CL_MAKE_SHARED;
}
/* Notice when we are propagating across user namespaces */
if (m->mnt_ns->user_ns != user_ns)
type |= CL_UNPRIVILEGED;
child = copy_tree(last_source, last_source->mnt.mnt_root, type);
if (IS_ERR(child))
return PTR_ERR(child);
child->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
mnt_set_mountpoint(m, mp, child);
last_dest = m;
last_source = child;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_master) {
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
SET_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
}
hlist_add_head(&child->mnt_hash, list);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport Image *ComplexImages(const Image *images,const ComplexOperator op,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ComplexImageTag "Complex/Image"
CacheView
*Ai_view,
*Ar_view,
*Bi_view,
*Br_view,
*Ci_view,
*Cr_view;
const char
*artifact;
const Image
*Ai_image,
*Ar_image,
*Bi_image,
*Br_image;
double
snr;
Image
*Ci_image,
*complex_images,
*Cr_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->next == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageError,
"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",images->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(image);
}
image->depth=32UL;
complex_images=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
/*
Apply complex mathematics to image pixels.
*/
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"complex:snr");
snr=0.0;
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
snr=StringToDouble(artifact,(char **) NULL);
Ar_image=images;
Ai_image=images->next;
Br_image=images;
Bi_image=images->next;
if ((images->next->next != (Image *) NULL) &&
(images->next->next->next != (Image *) NULL))
{
Br_image=images->next->next;
Bi_image=images->next->next->next;
}
Cr_image=complex_images;
Ci_image=complex_images->next;
Ar_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ar_image,exception);
Ai_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ai_image,exception);
Br_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Br_image,exception);
Bi_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Bi_image,exception);
Cr_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Cr_image,exception);
Ci_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Ci_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(images,complex_images,images->rows,1L)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) images->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict Ai,
*magick_restrict Ar,
*magick_restrict Bi,
*magick_restrict Br;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict Ci,
*magick_restrict Cr;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
Ar=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ar_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Ar_image->columns,Cr_image->columns),1,exception);
Ai=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ai_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Ai_image->columns,Ci_image->columns),1,exception);
Br=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Br_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Br_image->columns,Cr_image->columns),1,exception);
Bi=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Bi_view,0,y,
MagickMax(Bi_image->columns,Ci_image->columns),1,exception);
Cr=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Ci=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,0,y,Ci_image->columns,1,exception);
if ((Ar == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(Ai == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(Br == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(Bi == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(Cr == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (Ci == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) images->columns; x++)
{
switch (op)
{
case AddComplexOperator:
{
Cr->red=Ar->red+Br->red;
Ci->red=Ai->red+Bi->red;
Cr->green=Ar->green+Br->green;
Ci->green=Ai->green+Bi->green;
Cr->blue=Ar->blue+Br->blue;
Ci->blue=Ai->blue+Bi->blue;
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=Ar->opacity+Br->opacity;
Ci->opacity=Ai->opacity+Bi->opacity;
}
break;
}
case ConjugateComplexOperator:
default:
{
Cr->red=Ar->red;
Ci->red=(-Bi->red);
Cr->green=Ar->green;
Ci->green=(-Bi->green);
Cr->blue=Ar->blue;
Ci->blue=(-Bi->blue);
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=Ar->opacity;
Ci->opacity=(-Bi->opacity);
}
break;
}
case DivideComplexOperator:
{
double
gamma;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br->red*Br->red+Bi->red*Bi->red+snr);
Cr->red=gamma*(Ar->red*Br->red+Ai->red*Bi->red);
Ci->red=gamma*(Ai->red*Br->red-Ar->red*Bi->red);
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br->green*Br->green+Bi->green*Bi->green+
snr);
Cr->green=gamma*(Ar->green*Br->green+Ai->green*Bi->green);
Ci->green=gamma*(Ai->green*Br->green-Ar->green*Bi->green);
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br->blue*Br->blue+Bi->blue*Bi->blue+snr);
Cr->blue=gamma*(Ar->blue*Br->blue+Ai->blue*Bi->blue);
Ci->blue=gamma*(Ai->blue*Br->blue-Ar->blue*Bi->blue);
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br->opacity*Br->opacity+Bi->opacity*
Bi->opacity+snr);
Cr->opacity=gamma*(Ar->opacity*Br->opacity+Ai->opacity*
Bi->opacity);
Ci->opacity=gamma*(Ai->opacity*Br->opacity-Ar->opacity*
Bi->opacity);
}
break;
}
case MagnitudePhaseComplexOperator:
{
Cr->red=sqrt(Ar->red*Ar->red+Ai->red*Ai->red);
Ci->red=atan2(Ai->red,Ar->red)/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
Cr->green=sqrt(Ar->green*Ar->green+Ai->green*Ai->green);
Ci->green=atan2(Ai->green,Ar->green)/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
Cr->blue=sqrt(Ar->blue*Ar->blue+Ai->blue*Ai->blue);
Ci->blue=atan2(Ai->blue,Ar->blue)/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=sqrt(Ar->opacity*Ar->opacity+Ai->opacity*Ai->opacity);
Ci->opacity=atan2(Ai->opacity,Ar->opacity)/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
}
break;
}
case MultiplyComplexOperator:
{
Cr->red=QuantumScale*(Ar->red*Br->red-Ai->red*Bi->red);
Ci->red=QuantumScale*(Ai->red*Br->red+Ar->red*Bi->red);
Cr->green=QuantumScale*(Ar->green*Br->green-Ai->green*Bi->green);
Ci->green=QuantumScale*(Ai->green*Br->green+Ar->green*Bi->green);
Cr->blue=QuantumScale*(Ar->blue*Br->blue-Ai->blue*Bi->blue);
Ci->blue=QuantumScale*(Ai->blue*Br->blue+Ar->blue*Bi->blue);
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=QuantumScale*(Ar->opacity*Br->opacity-Ai->opacity*
Bi->opacity);
Ci->opacity=QuantumScale*(Ai->opacity*Br->opacity+Ar->opacity*
Bi->opacity);
}
break;
}
case RealImaginaryComplexOperator:
{
Cr->red=Ar->red*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->red-0.5));
Ci->red=Ar->red*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->red-0.5));
Cr->green=Ar->green*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->green-0.5));
Ci->green=Ar->green*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->green-0.5));
Cr->blue=Ar->blue*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->blue-0.5));
Ci->blue=Ar->blue*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->blue-0.5));
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=Ar->opacity*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->opacity-0.5));
Ci->opacity=Ar->opacity*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai->opacity-0.5));
}
break;
}
case SubtractComplexOperator:
{
Cr->red=Ar->red-Br->red;
Ci->red=Ai->red-Bi->red;
Cr->green=Ar->green-Br->green;
Ci->green=Ai->green-Bi->green;
Cr->blue=Ar->blue-Br->blue;
Ci->blue=Ai->blue-Bi->blue;
if (images->matte != MagickFalse)
{
Cr->opacity=Ar->opacity-Br->opacity;
Ci->opacity=Ai->opacity-Bi->opacity;
}
break;
}
}
Ar++;
Ai++;
Br++;
Bi++;
Cr++;
Ci++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (images->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(images,ComplexImageTag,progress,images->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
Cr_view=DestroyCacheView(Cr_view);
Ci_view=DestroyCacheView(Ci_view);
Br_view=DestroyCacheView(Br_view);
Bi_view=DestroyCacheView(Bi_view);
Ar_view=DestroyCacheView(Ar_view);
Ai_view=DestroyCacheView(Ai_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImage.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595 | Medium | 169,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void vmxnet3_process_tx_queue(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc txd;
uint32_t txd_idx;
uint32_t data_len;
hwaddr data_pa;
for (;;) {
if (!vmxnet3_pop_next_tx_descr(s, qidx, &txd, &txd_idx)) {
break;
}
vmxnet3_dump_tx_descr(&txd);
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
data_len = (txd.len > 0) ? txd.len : VMXNET3_MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE;
data_pa = le64_to_cpu(txd.addr);
if (!vmxnet_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(s->tx_pkt,
data_pa,
data_len)) {
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = true;
}
}
if (s->tx_sop) {
vmxnet3_tx_retrieve_metadata(s, &txd);
s->tx_sop = false;
}
if (txd.eop) {
if (!s->skip_current_tx_pkt) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse(s->tx_pkt);
if (s->needs_vlan) {
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet_tx_pkt_setup_vlan_header(s->tx_pkt, s->tci);
}
vmxnet3_send_packet(s, qidx);
} else {
vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(s, qidx,
VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR);
}
vmxnet3_complete_packet(s, qidx, txd_idx);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It occurs when a guest sends a Layer-2 packet smaller than 22 bytes. A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
return network_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SyncTest::AddOptionalTypesToCommandLine(CommandLine* cl) {
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTabs))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTabs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Write(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 169,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> setValueAndClosePopupCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
DOMWindow* imp = V8DOMWindow::toNative(args.Data()->ToObject());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intValue, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, stringValue, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
DOMWindowPagePopup::setValueAndClosePopup(imp, intValue, stringValue);
return v8::Undefined();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tt_sbit_decoder_load_image( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
FT_UInt glyph_index,
FT_Int x_pos,
FT_Int y_pos )
{
/*
* First, we find the correct strike range that applies to this
* glyph index.
*/
FT_Byte* p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array;
FT_Byte* p_limit = decoder->eblc_limit;
FT_ULong num_ranges = decoder->strike_index_count;
FT_UInt start, end, index_format, image_format;
FT_ULong image_start = 0, image_end = 0, image_offset;
for ( ; num_ranges > 0; num_ranges-- )
{
start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( glyph_index >= start && glyph_index <= end )
goto FoundRange;
p += 4; /* ignore index offset */
}
goto NoBitmap;
FoundRange:
image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check */
p = decoder->eblc_base + decoder->strike_index_array;
if ( image_offset > (FT_ULong)( p_limit - p ) )
goto Failure;
p += image_offset;
if ( p + 8 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
/* now find the glyph's location and extend within the ebdt table */
index_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_format = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_offset = FT_NEXT_ULONG ( p );
switch ( index_format )
{
case 1: /* 4-byte offsets relative to `image_offset' */
p += 4 * ( glyph_index - start );
if ( p + 8 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
image_end = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */
goto NoBitmap;
break;
case 2: /* big metrics, constant image size */
{
FT_ULong image_size;
if ( p + 12 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = image_size * ( glyph_index - start );
image_end = image_start + image_size;
}
break;
case 3: /* 2-byte offsets relative to 'image_offset' */
p += 2 * ( glyph_index - start );
if ( p + 4 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
image_end = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( image_start == image_end ) /* missing glyph */
goto NoBitmap;
break;
case 4: /* sparse glyph array with (glyph,offset) pairs */
{
FT_ULong mm, num_glyphs;
if ( p + 4 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check for p + ( num_glyphs + 1 ) * 4 */
if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( ( p_limit - p ) >> 2 ) - 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ )
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex == glyph_index )
{
image_start = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
p += 2;
image_end = FT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
break;
}
p += 2;
}
if ( mm >= num_glyphs )
goto NoBitmap;
}
break;
case 5: /* constant metrics with sparse glyph codes */
case 19:
{
FT_ULong image_size, mm, num_glyphs;
if ( p + 16 > p_limit )
goto NoBitmap;
image_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( tt_sbit_decoder_load_metrics( decoder, &p, p_limit, 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
num_glyphs = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
/* overflow check for p + 2 * num_glyphs */
if ( num_glyphs > (FT_ULong)( ( p_limit - p ) >> 1 ) )
goto NoBitmap;
for ( mm = 0; mm < num_glyphs; mm++ )
{
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex == glyph_index )
break;
}
if ( mm >= num_glyphs )
goto NoBitmap;
image_start = image_size * mm;
image_end = image_start + image_size;
}
break;
default:
goto NoBitmap;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The tt_sbit_decoder_load_image function in sfnt/ttsbit.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not properly check for an integer overflow, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted OpenType font.
Commit Message: | High | 164,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ConversionContext::Convert(const PaintChunkSubset& paint_chunks,
const DisplayItemList& display_items) {
for (const auto& chunk : paint_chunks) {
const auto& chunk_state = chunk.properties;
bool switched_to_chunk_state = false;
for (const auto& item : display_items.ItemsInPaintChunk(chunk)) {
DCHECK(item.IsDrawing());
auto record =
static_cast<const DrawingDisplayItem&>(item).GetPaintRecord();
if ((!record || record->size() == 0) &&
chunk_state.Effect() == EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root()) {
continue;
}
TranslateForLayerOffsetOnce();
if (!switched_to_chunk_state) {
SwitchToChunkState(chunk);
switched_to_chunk_state = true;
}
cc_list_.StartPaint();
if (record && record->size() != 0)
cc_list_.push<cc::DrawRecordOp>(std::move(record));
cc_list_.EndPaintOfUnpaired(
chunk_to_layer_mapper_.MapVisualRect(item.VisualRect()));
}
UpdateEffectBounds(chunk.bounds, chunk_state.Transform());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void emulate_load_store_insn(struct pt_regs *regs,
void __user *addr, unsigned int __user *pc)
{
union mips_instruction insn;
unsigned long value;
unsigned int res;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
/*
* This load never faults.
*/
__get_user(insn.word, pc);
switch (insn.i_format.opcode) {
/*
* These are instructions that a compiler doesn't generate. We
* can assume therefore that the code is MIPS-aware and
* really buggy. Emulating these instructions would break the
* semantics anyway.
*/
case ll_op:
case lld_op:
case sc_op:
case scd_op:
/*
* For these instructions the only way to create an address
* error is an attempted access to kernel/supervisor address
* space.
*/
case ldl_op:
case ldr_op:
case lwl_op:
case lwr_op:
case sdl_op:
case sdr_op:
case swl_op:
case swr_op:
case lb_op:
case lbu_op:
case sb_op:
goto sigbus;
/*
* The remaining opcodes are the ones that are really of interest.
*/
case lh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lhu_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lwu_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"dsll\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"dsrl\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case ld_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case sh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 1(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1, %1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 0(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1,%1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sd_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case lwc1_op:
case ldc1_op:
case swc1_op:
case sdc1_op:
/*
* I herewith declare: this does not happen. So send SIGBUS.
*/
goto sigbus;
/*
* COP2 is available to implementor for application specific use.
* It's up to applications to register a notifier chain and do
* whatever they have to do, including possible sending of signals.
*/
case lwc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case ldc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LDC2_OP, regs);
break;
case swc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case sdc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SDC2_OP, regs);
break;
default:
/*
* Pheeee... We encountered an yet unknown instruction or
* cache coherence problem. Die sucker, die ...
*/
goto sigill;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
unaligned_instructions++;
#endif
return;
fault:
/* Did we have an exception handler installed? */
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return;
sigbus:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
return;
sigill:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access or invalid instruction", regs);
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void * gdImageGifPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx (2048, NULL);
gdImageGifCtx (im, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData (out, size);
out->gd_free (out);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | High | 169,734 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PreresolveJob::PreresolveJob(PreconnectRequest preconnect_request,
PreresolveInfo* info)
: url(std::move(preconnect_request.origin)),
num_sockets(preconnect_request.num_sockets),
allow_credentials(preconnect_request.allow_credentials),
network_isolation_key(
std::move(preconnect_request.network_isolation_key)),
info(info) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gdImageScaleTwoPass(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width,
const unsigned int new_height)
{
const unsigned int src_width = src->sx;
const unsigned int src_height = src->sy;
gdImagePtr tmp_im = NULL;
gdImagePtr dst = NULL;
/* First, handle the trivial case. */
if (src_width == new_width && src_height == new_height) {
return gdImageClone(src);
}/* if */
/* Convert to truecolor if it isn't; this code requires it. */
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}/* if */
/* Scale horizontally unless sizes are the same. */
if (src_width == new_width) {
tmp_im = src;
} else {
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScalePass(src, src_width, tmp_im, new_width, src_height, HORIZONTAL);
}/* if .. else*/
/* If vertical sizes match, we're done. */
if (src_height == new_height) {
assert(tmp_im != src);
return tmp_im;
}/* if */
/* Otherwise, we need to scale vertically. */
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst != NULL) {
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(dst, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScalePass(tmp_im, src_height, dst, new_height, new_width, VERTICAL);
}/* if */
if (src != tmp_im) {
gdFree(tmp_im);
}/* if */
return dst;
}/* gdImageScaleTwoPass*/
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The gdImageScaleTwoPass function in gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.0, as used in PHP before 5.6.12, uses inconsistent allocate and free approaches, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted call, as demonstrated by a call to the PHP imagescale function.
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173. | Medium | 167,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33641588.
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
| High | 174,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free | High | 167,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Early free of object in use in IndexDB in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383} | Low | 173,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, event) >= 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The validate_event function in arch/arm/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10.8 on the ARM platform allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by adding a hardware event to an event group led by a software event.
Commit Message: ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders
It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.
Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.
This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InputMethodLibraryImpl()
: input_method_status_connection_(NULL),
should_launch_ime_(false),
ime_connected_(false),
defer_ime_startup_(false),
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_(true),
ibus_daemon_process_handle_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
initialized_successfully_(false),
candidate_window_controller_(NULL) {
#else
initialized_successfully_(false) {
#endif
notification_registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING,
NotificationService::AllSources());
}
bool Init() {
DCHECK(!initialized_successfully_) << "Already initialized";
if (!CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
return false;
input_method_status_connection_ = chromeos::MonitorInputMethodStatus(
this,
&InputMethodChangedHandler,
&RegisterPropertiesHandler,
&UpdatePropertyHandler,
&ConnectionChangeHandler);
if (!input_method_status_connection_)
return false;
initialized_successfully_ = true;
return true;
}
virtual ~InputMethodLibraryImpl() {
}
virtual void AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
if (!observers_.size()) {
observer->FirstObserverIsAdded(this);
}
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
if (!initialized_successfully_) {
InputMethodDescriptors* result = new InputMethodDescriptors;
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return result;
}
return chromeos::GetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors();
}
virtual void ChangeInputMethod(const std::string& input_method_id) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = input_method_id;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ == base::kNullProcessHandle &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(input_method_id)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(input_method_id);
} else {
StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(input_method_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed to change the input method to " << input_method_id
<< " (deferring)";
}
}
}
virtual void SetImePropertyActivated(const std::string& key,
bool activated) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
DCHECK(!key.empty());
chromeos::SetImePropertyActivated(
input_method_status_connection_, key.c_str(), activated);
}
virtual bool InputMethodIsActivated(const std::string& input_method_id) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> active_input_method_descriptors(
GetActiveInputMethods());
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_descriptors->size(); ++i) {
if (active_input_method_descriptors->at(i).id == input_method_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) {
active_input_method_ids_ = value.string_list_value;
}
MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
const ConfigKeyType key = std::make_pair(section, config_name);
current_config_values_[key] = value;
if (ime_connected_) {
pending_config_requests_[key] = value;
FlushImeConfig();
}
MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(section, config_name, value);
return pending_config_requests_.empty();
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
if (previous_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return previous_input_method_;
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
virtual const ImePropertyList& current_ime_properties() const {
return current_ime_properties_;
}
virtual std::string GetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return "";
return chromeos::GetKeyboardOverlayId(input_method_id);
}
virtual void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::SendHandwritingStroke(input_method_status_connection_, stroke);
}
virtual void CancelHandwritingStrokes(int stroke_count) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::CancelHandwriting(input_method_status_connection_, stroke_count);
}
private:
bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
value.string_list_value.size() == 1 &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(
value.string_list_value[0]));
}
void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(value.string_list_value[0]);
}
}
bool ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
std::string input_method_id_to_switch = input_method_id;
if (!InputMethodIsActivated(input_method_id)) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
DCHECK(!input_methods->empty());
if (!input_methods->empty()) {
input_method_id_to_switch = input_methods->at(0).id;
LOG(INFO) << "Can't change the current input method to "
<< input_method_id << " since the engine is not preloaded. "
<< "Switch to " << input_method_id_to_switch << " instead.";
}
}
if (chromeos::ChangeInputMethod(input_method_status_connection_,
input_method_id_to_switch.c_str())) {
return true;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't switch input method to " << input_method_id_to_switch;
return false;
}
void FlushImeConfig() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
bool active_input_methods_are_changed = false;
InputMethodConfigRequests::iterator iter =
pending_config_requests_.begin();
while (iter != pending_config_requests_.end()) {
const std::string& section = iter->first.first;
const std::string& config_name = iter->first.second;
ImeConfigValue& value = iter->second;
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
!tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string>::iterator engine_iter = std::find(
value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_);
if (engine_iter != value.string_list_value.end()) {
std::rotate(value.string_list_value.begin(),
engine_iter, // this becomes the new first element
value.string_list_value.end());
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << tentative_current_input_method_id_
<< " is not in preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
tentative_current_input_method_id_.erase();
}
if (chromeos::SetImeConfig(input_method_status_connection_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
value)) {
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName) {
active_input_methods_are_changed = true;
VLOG(1) << "Updated preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
pending_config_requests_.erase(iter++);
} else {
break;
}
}
if (active_input_methods_are_changed) {
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
ActiveInputMethodsChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
}
static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
static void UpdatePropertyHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->UpdateProperty(prop_list);
}
static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
void ChangeCurrentInputMethod(const InputMethodDescriptor& new_input_method) {
if (current_input_method_.id != new_input_method.id) {
previous_input_method_ = current_input_method_;
current_input_method_ = new_input_method;
if (!input_method::SetCurrentKeyboardLayoutByName(
current_input_method_.keyboard_layout)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to change keyboard layout to "
<< current_input_method_.keyboard_layout;
}
ObserverListBase<Observer>::Iterator it(observers_);
Observer* first_observer = it.GetNext();
if (first_observer) {
first_observer->PreferenceUpdateNeeded(this,
previous_input_method_,
current_input_method_);
}
}
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
InputMethodChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
bool StartInputMethodDaemon() {
should_launch_ime_ = true;
return MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon();
}
void UpdateProperty(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < prop_list.size(); ++i) {
FindAndUpdateProperty(prop_list[i], ¤t_ime_properties_);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
bool LaunchInputMethodProcess(const std::string& command_line,
base::ProcessHandle* process_handle) {
std::vector<std::string> argv;
base::file_handle_mapping_vector fds_to_remap;
base::ProcessHandle handle = base::kNullProcessHandle;
base::SplitString(command_line, ' ', &argv);
const bool result = base::LaunchApp(argv,
fds_to_remap, // no remapping
false, // wait
&handle);
if (!result) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not launch: " << command_line;
return false;
}
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(handle);
g_child_watch_add(pid,
reinterpret_cast<GChildWatchFunc>(OnImeShutdown),
this);
*process_handle = handle;
VLOG(1) << command_line << " (PID=" << pid << ") is started";
return true;
}
bool MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
if (!should_launch_ime_) {
return false;
}
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
if (!candidate_window_controller_.get()) {
candidate_window_controller_.reset(new CandidateWindowController);
if (!candidate_window_controller_->Init()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to initialize the candidate window controller";
}
}
#endif
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
return false; // ibus-daemon is already running.
}
const std::string ibus_daemon_command_line =
StringPrintf("%s --panel=disable --cache=none --restart --replace",
kIBusDaemonPath);
if (!LaunchInputMethodProcess(
ibus_daemon_command_line, &ibus_daemon_process_handle_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch " << ibus_daemon_command_line;
return false;
}
return true;
}
static void OnImeShutdown(GPid pid,
gint status,
InputMethodLibraryImpl* library) {
if (library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle &&
base::GetProcId(library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_) == pid) {
library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
library->MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon();
}
void StopInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
should_launch_ime_ = false;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(ibus_daemon_process_handle_);
if (!chromeos::StopInputMethodProcess(input_method_status_connection_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StopInputMethodProcess IPC failed. Sending SIGTERM to "
<< "PID " << pid;
base::KillProcess(ibus_daemon_process_handle_, -1, false /* wait */);
}
VLOG(1) << "ibus-daemon (PID=" << pid << ") is terminated";
ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
}
void SetDeferImeStartup(bool defer) {
VLOG(1) << "Setting DeferImeStartup to " << defer;
defer_ime_startup_ = defer;
}
void SetEnableAutoImeShutdown(bool enable) {
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_ = enable;
}
void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type.value == NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING) {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
StopInputMethodDaemon();
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
candidate_window_controller_.reset(NULL);
#endif
}
}
InputMethodStatusConnection* input_method_status_connection_;
ObserverList<Observer> observers_;
InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method_;
InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method_;
ImePropertyList current_ime_properties_;
typedef std::pair<std::string, std::string> ConfigKeyType;
typedef std::map<ConfigKeyType, ImeConfigValue> InputMethodConfigRequests;
InputMethodConfigRequests pending_config_requests_;
InputMethodConfigRequests current_config_values_;
NotificationRegistrar notification_registrar_;
bool should_launch_ime_;
bool ime_connected_;
bool defer_ime_startup_;
bool enable_auto_ime_shutdown_;
std::string tentative_current_input_method_id_;
base::ProcessHandle ibus_daemon_process_handle_;
bool initialized_successfully_;
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
scoped_ptr<CandidateWindowController> candidate_window_controller_;
#endif
std::vector<std::string> active_input_method_ids_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(InputMethodLibraryImpl);
};
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int atalk_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_at *sat = (struct sockaddr_at *)msg->msg_name;
struct ddpehdr *ddp;
int copied = 0;
int offset = 0;
int err = 0;
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!skb)
goto out;
/* FIXME: use skb->cb to be able to use shared skbs */
ddp = ddp_hdr(skb);
copied = ntohs(ddp->deh_len_hops) & 1023;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) {
offset = sizeof(*ddp);
copied -= offset;
}
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (!err) {
if (sat) {
sat->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK;
sat->sat_port = ddp->deh_sport;
sat->sat_addr.s_node = ddp->deh_snode;
sat->sat_addr.s_net = ddp->deh_snet;
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sat);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); /* Free the datagram. */
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err ? : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: qedi_dbg_err(struct qedi_dbg_ctx *qedi, const char *func, u32 line,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
struct va_format vaf;
char nfunc[32];
memset(nfunc, 0, sizeof(nfunc));
memcpy(nfunc, func, sizeof(nfunc) - 1);
va_start(va, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &va;
if (likely(qedi) && likely(qedi->pdev))
pr_err("[%s]:[%s:%d]:%d: %pV", dev_name(&qedi->pdev->dev),
nfunc, line, qedi->host_no, &vaf);
else
pr_err("[0000:00:00.0]:[%s:%d]: %pV", nfunc, line, &vaf);
va_end(va);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_dbg.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.12. In the qedi_dbg_* family of functions, there is an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: scsi: qedi: remove memset/memcpy to nfunc and use func instead
KASAN reports this:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
Read of size 31 at addr ffffffffc12b0ae0 by task syz-executor.0/2429
CPU: 0 PID: 2429 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x1c4/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
qedi_init+0x118/0x1000 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2d57e55c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f2d57e55c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2d57e566bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
__func__.67584+0x0/0xffffffffffffd520 [qedi]
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffc12b0980: fa fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa
ffffffffc12b0a00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa
> ffffffffc12b0a80: fa fa fa fa 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa
^
ffffffffc12b0b00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 03 fa
ffffffffc12b0b80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa
Currently the qedi_dbg_* family of functions can overrun the end of the
source string if it is less than the destination buffer length because of
the use of a fixed sized memcpy. Remove the memset/memcpy calls to nfunc
and just use func instead as it is always a null terminated string.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: ace7f46ba5fd ("scsi: qedi: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload iSCSI driver framework.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static uint64_t ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64_t value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Uninitialized data in media in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by [email protected].
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889} | Medium | 173,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
assert((cc%(bps*stride))==0);
if (!tmp)
return;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *M_fs_path_tmpdir(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
char *d = NULL;
char *out = NULL;
M_fs_error_t res;
#ifdef _WIN32
size_t len = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS)+1;
d = M_malloc_zero(len);
/* Return is length without NULL. */
if (GetTempPath((DWORD)len, d) >= len) {
M_free(d);
d = NULL;
}
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
d = M_fs_path_mac_tmpdir();
#else
const char *const_temp;
/* Try Unix env var. */
# ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
const_temp = secure_getenv("TMPDIR");
# else
const_temp = getenv("TMPDIR");
# endif
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
/* Fallback to some "standard" system paths. */
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/var/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
#endif
if (d != NULL) {
res = M_fs_path_norm(&out, d, M_FS_PATH_NORM_ABSOLUTE, sys_type);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
out = NULL;
}
}
M_free(d);
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: mstdlib (aka the M Standard Library for C) 1.2.0 has incorrect file access control in situations where M_fs_perms_can_access attempts to delete an existing file (that lacks public read/write access) during a copy operation, related to fs/m_fs.c and fs/m_fs_path.c. An attacker could create the file and then would have access to the data.
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data. | High | 169,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_encrypt)
{
zend_bool raw_output = 0;
char *data, *method, *password, *iv = "";
int data_len, method_len, password_len, iv_len = 0, max_iv_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
int i, outlen, keylen;
unsigned char *outbuf, *key;
zend_bool free_iv;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sss|bs", &data, &data_len, &method, &method_len, &password, &password_len, &raw_output, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
cipher_type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher_type) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher_type);
if (keylen > password_len) {
key = emalloc(keylen);
memset(key, 0, keylen);
memcpy(key, password, password_len);
} else {
key = (unsigned char*)password;
}
max_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher_type);
if (iv_len <= 0 && max_iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Using an empty Initialization Vector (iv) is potentially insecure and not recommended");
}
free_iv = php_openssl_validate_iv(&iv, &iv_len, max_iv_len TSRMLS_CC);
outlen = data_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher_type);
outbuf = emalloc(outlen + 1);
EVP_EncryptInit(&cipher_ctx, cipher_type, NULL, NULL);
if (password_len > keylen) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx, password_len);
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (unsigned char *)iv);
if (data_len > 0) {
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, outbuf, &i, (unsigned char *)data, data_len);
}
outlen = i;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(&cipher_ctx, (unsigned char *)outbuf + i, &i)) {
outlen += i;
if (raw_output) {
outbuf[outlen] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)outbuf, outlen, 0);
} else {
int base64_str_len;
char *base64_str;
base64_str = (char*)php_base64_encode(outbuf, outlen, &base64_str_len);
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_STRINGL(base64_str, base64_str_len, 0);
}
} else {
efree(outbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (key != (unsigned char*)password) {
efree(key);
}
if (free_iv) {
efree(iv);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The openssl_encrypt function in ext/openssl/openssl.c in PHP 5.3.9 through 5.3.13 does not initialize a certain variable, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by providing zero bytes of input data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void alpha_perf_event_irq_handler(unsigned long la_ptr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
int idx, j;
__get_cpu_var(irq_pmi_count)++;
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/* Completely counting through the PMC's period to trigger a new PMC
* overflow interrupt while in this interrupt routine is utterly
* disastrous! The EV6 and EV67 counters are sufficiently large to
* prevent this but to be really sure disable the PMCs.
*/
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_DISABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
/* la_ptr is the counter that overflowed. */
if (unlikely(la_ptr >= alpha_pmu->num_pmcs)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: silly index %ld\n", la_ptr);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
idx = la_ptr;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
for (j = 0; j < cpuc->n_events; j++) {
if (cpuc->current_idx[j] == idx)
break;
}
if (unlikely(j == cpuc->n_events)) {
/* This can occur if the event is disabled right on a PMC overflow. */
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
event = cpuc->event[j];
if (unlikely(!event)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: No event at index %d!\n", idx);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
hwc = &event->hw;
alpha_perf_event_update(event, hwc, idx, alpha_pmu->pmc_max_period[idx]+1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (alpha_perf_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx)) {
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs)) {
/* Interrupts coming too quickly; "throttle" the
* counter, i.e., disable it for a little while.
*/
alpha_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheGroup::RemoveCache(AppCache* cache) {
DCHECK(cache->associated_hosts().empty());
if (cache == newest_complete_cache_) {
CancelUpdate();
AppCache* tmp_cache = newest_complete_cache_;
newest_complete_cache_ = nullptr;
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause this group to be deleted
} else {
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> protect(this);
Caches::iterator it =
std::find(old_caches_.begin(), old_caches_.end(), cache);
if (it != old_caches_.end()) {
AppCache* tmp_cache = *it;
old_caches_.erase(it);
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause group to be released
}
if (!is_obsolete() && old_caches_.empty() &&
!newly_deletable_response_ids_.empty()) {
storage_->DeleteResponses(manifest_url_, newly_deletable_response_ids_);
newly_deletable_response_ids_.clear();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect refcounting in AppCache in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475} | Medium | 172,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mschm_decompressor *chmd;
struct mschmd_header *chm;
struct mschmd_file *file, **f;
unsigned int numf, i;
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
user_umask = umask(0); umask(user_umask);
MSPACK_SYS_SELFTEST(i);
if (i) return 0;
if ((chmd = mspack_create_chm_decompressor(NULL))) {
for (argv++; *argv; argv++) {
printf("%s\n", *argv);
if ((chm = chmd->open(chmd, *argv))) {
/* build an ordered list of files for maximum extraction speed */
for (numf=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) numf++;
if ((f = (struct mschmd_file **) calloc(numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *)))) {
for (i=0, file=chm->files; file; file = file->next) f[i++] = file;
qsort(f, numf, sizeof(struct mschmd_file *), &sortfunc);
for (i = 0; i < numf; i++) {
char *outname = create_output_name((unsigned char *)f[i]->filename,NULL,0,1,0);
printf("Extracting %s\n", outname);
ensure_filepath(outname);
if (chmd->extract(chmd, f[i], outname)) {
printf("%s: extract error on \"%s\": %s\n",
*argv, f[i]->filename, ERROR(chmd));
}
free(outname);
}
free(f);
}
chmd->close(chmd, chm);
}
else {
printf("%s: can't open -- %s\n", *argv, ERROR(chmd));
}
}
mspack_destroy_chm_decompressor(chmd);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** chmextract.c in the chmextract sample program, as distributed with libmspack before 0.8alpha, does not protect against absolute/relative pathnames in CHM files, leading to Directory Traversal. NOTE: the vendor disputes that this is a libmspack vulnerability, because chmextract.c was only intended as a source-code example, not a supported application.
Commit Message: add anti "../" and leading slash protection to chmextract | Medium | 169,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
if (previous_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return previous_input_method_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetType() const
{
return m_info.type;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=arab}][\u064b-\u0655\u0670]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=hebr}]\u05b4)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: IDN display: Block U+0307 after i or U+0131
U+0307 (dot above) after i, j, l, or U+0131 (dotless i) would be
very hard to see if possible at all. This is not blocked
by the 'repeated diacritic' check because i is not decomposed
into dotless-i + U+0307. So, it has to be blocked separately.
Also, change the indentation in the output of
idn_test_case_generator.py .
This change blocks 80+ domains out of a million IDNs in .com TLD.
BUG=750239
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I4950aeb7aa080f92e38a2b5dea46ef4e5c25b65b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/607907
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#502987} | Medium | 172,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
if (!initialized_successfully_) {
InputMethodDescriptors* result = new InputMethodDescriptors;
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return result;
}
return chromeos::GetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_populate_message_header(NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header, UINT32 MessageType)
{
CopyMemory(header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
header->MessageType = MessageType;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 169,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
char *driver_override, *old = pdev->driver_override, *cp;
if (count > PATH_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
driver_override = kstrndup(buf, count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver_override)
return -ENOMEM;
cp = strchr(driver_override, '\n');
if (cp)
*cp = '\0';
if (strlen(driver_override)) {
pdev->driver_override = driver_override;
} else {
kfree(driver_override);
pdev->driver_override = NULL;
}
kfree(old);
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The driver_override implementation in drivers/base/platform.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.1 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging a race condition between a read operation and a store operation that involve different overrides.
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cp2112_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev;
u8 buf[3];
struct cp2112_smbus_config_report config;
int ret;
dev = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->in_out_buffer = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, CP2112_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->in_out_buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&dev->lock);
ret = hid_parse(hdev);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "parse failed\n");
return ret;
}
ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "hw start failed\n");
return ret;
}
ret = hid_hw_open(hdev);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "hw open failed\n");
goto err_hid_stop;
}
ret = hid_hw_power(hdev, PM_HINT_FULLON);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "power management error: %d\n", ret);
goto err_hid_close;
}
ret = cp2112_hid_get(hdev, CP2112_GET_VERSION_INFO, buf, sizeof(buf),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT);
if (ret != sizeof(buf)) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting version\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -EIO;
goto err_power_normal;
}
hid_info(hdev, "Part Number: 0x%02X Device Version: 0x%02X\n",
buf[1], buf[2]);
ret = cp2112_hid_get(hdev, CP2112_SMBUS_CONFIG, (u8 *)&config,
sizeof(config), HID_FEATURE_REPORT);
if (ret != sizeof(config)) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting SMBus config\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -EIO;
goto err_power_normal;
}
config.retry_time = cpu_to_be16(1);
ret = cp2112_hid_output(hdev, (u8 *)&config, sizeof(config),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT);
if (ret != sizeof(config)) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting SMBus config\n");
if (ret >= 0)
ret = -EIO;
goto err_power_normal;
}
hid_set_drvdata(hdev, (void *)dev);
dev->hdev = hdev;
dev->adap.owner = THIS_MODULE;
dev->adap.class = I2C_CLASS_HWMON;
dev->adap.algo = &smbus_algorithm;
dev->adap.algo_data = dev;
dev->adap.dev.parent = &hdev->dev;
snprintf(dev->adap.name, sizeof(dev->adap.name),
"CP2112 SMBus Bridge on hiddev%d", hdev->minor);
dev->hwversion = buf[2];
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->wait);
hid_device_io_start(hdev);
ret = i2c_add_adapter(&dev->adap);
hid_device_io_stop(hdev);
if (ret) {
hid_err(hdev, "error registering i2c adapter\n");
goto err_power_normal;
}
hid_dbg(hdev, "adapter registered\n");
dev->gc.label = "cp2112_gpio";
dev->gc.direction_input = cp2112_gpio_direction_input;
dev->gc.direction_output = cp2112_gpio_direction_output;
dev->gc.set = cp2112_gpio_set;
dev->gc.get = cp2112_gpio_get;
dev->gc.base = -1;
dev->gc.ngpio = 8;
dev->gc.can_sleep = 1;
dev->gc.parent = &hdev->dev;
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&dev->gc, dev);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error registering gpio chip\n");
goto err_free_i2c;
}
ret = sysfs_create_group(&hdev->dev.kobj, &cp2112_attr_group);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error creating sysfs attrs\n");
goto err_gpiochip_remove;
}
chmod_sysfs_attrs(hdev);
hid_hw_power(hdev, PM_HINT_NORMAL);
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&dev->gc, &cp2112_gpio_irqchip, 0,
handle_simple_irq, IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "failed to add IRQ chip\n");
goto err_sysfs_remove;
}
return ret;
err_sysfs_remove:
sysfs_remove_group(&hdev->dev.kobj, &cp2112_attr_group);
err_gpiochip_remove:
gpiochip_remove(&dev->gc);
err_free_i2c:
i2c_del_adapter(&dev->adap);
err_power_normal:
hid_hw_power(hdev, PM_HINT_NORMAL);
err_hid_close:
hid_hw_close(hdev);
err_hid_stop:
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 uses a spinlock without considering that sleeping is possible in a USB HID request callback, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Low | 168,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (lsa) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (lsa->l2tp_family && lsa->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = &lsa->l2tp_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = lsa->l2tp_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
lsa->l2tp_scope_id &&
ipv6_addr_type(daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = lsa->l2tp_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg,
ulen, transhdrlen, hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = l2tp_ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& renderer_instance_data) {
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) == instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance] =
base::MakeUnique<InstanceData>(renderer_instance_data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696} | Medium | 172,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintWebViewHelper, message)
#if defined(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPages, OnPrintPages)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForSystemDialog, OnPrintForSystemDialog)
#endif // ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_InitiatePrintPreview, OnInitiatePrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPreview, OnPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForPrintPreview, OnPrintForPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintingDone, OnPrintingDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_SetScriptedPrintingBlocked,
SetScriptedPrintBlocked)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100} | High | 171,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcount */
len = args->len = ntohl(*p++);
/*
* The protocol specifies a maximum of 8192 bytes.
*/
if (len > NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2)
return 0;
/*
* Check to make sure that we got the right number of
* bytes.
*/
hdr = (void*)p - head->iov_base;
dlen = head->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len - hdr;
/*
* Round the length of the data which was specified up to
* the next multiple of XDR units and then compare that
* against the length which was actually received.
* Note that when RPCSEC/GSS (for example) is used, the
* data buffer can be padded so dlen might be larger
* than required. It must never be smaller.
*/
if (dlen < XDR_QUADLEN(len)*4)
return 0;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_base = (void*)p;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_len = head->iov_len - hdr;
v = 0;
while (len > rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len) {
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[v]);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = len;
args->vlen = v + 1;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The NFSv2 and NFSv3 server implementations in the Linux kernel through 4.10.13 lack certain checks for the end of a buffer, which allows remote attackers to trigger pointer-arithmetic errors or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted requests, related to fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c and fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c.
Commit Message: nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops
The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add
checks to catch these.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> | High | 168,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: build_config(char *prefix, struct server *server)
{
char *path = NULL;
int path_size = strlen(prefix) + strlen(server->port) + 20;
path = ss_malloc(path_size);
snprintf(path, path_size, "%s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf", prefix, server->port);
FILE *f = fopen(path, "w+");
if (f == NULL) {
if (verbose) {
LOGE("unable to open config file");
}
ss_free(path);
return;
}
fprintf(f, "{\n");
fprintf(f, "\"server_port\":%d,\n", atoi(server->port));
fprintf(f, "\"password\":\"%s\"", server->password);
if (server->fast_open[0]) fprintf(f, ",\n\"fast_open\": %s", server->fast_open);
if (server->mode) fprintf(f, ",\n\"mode\":\"%s\"", server->mode);
if (server->method) fprintf(f, ",\n\"method\":\"%s\"", server->method);
if (server->plugin) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin\":\"%s\"", server->plugin);
if (server->plugin_opts) fprintf(f, ",\n\"plugin_opts\":\"%s\"", server->plugin_opts);
fprintf(f, "\n}\n");
fclose(f);
ss_free(path);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: In manager.c in ss-manager in shadowsocks-libev 3.1.0, improper parsing allows command injection via shell metacharacters in a JSON configuration request received via 127.0.0.1 UDP traffic, related to the add_server, build_config, and construct_command_line functions.
Commit Message: Fix #1734 | High | 167,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void *__alloc_from_pool(size_t size, struct page **ret_page, gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned long val;
void *ptr = NULL;
if (!atomic_pool) {
WARN(1, "coherent pool not initialised!\n");
return NULL;
}
val = gen_pool_alloc(atomic_pool, size);
if (val) {
phys_addr_t phys = gen_pool_virt_to_phys(atomic_pool, val);
*ret_page = phys_to_page(phys);
ptr = (void *)val;
if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
memset(ptr, 0, size);
}
return ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.3, as used in the ION subsystem in Android and other products, does not initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by triggering a dma_mmap call.
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& str(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
float a(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toFloat(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (exec->argumentCount() > 2 && !exec->argument(2).isUndefinedOrNull() && !exec->argument(2).inherits(&JSint::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
int* b(toint(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec)));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(const sp<IStreamSource> &source)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource");
status_t err = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(source))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
| High | 173,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::isAutoplayAllowedPerSettings() const {
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return false;
FrameLoaderClient* frameLoaderClient = frame->loader().client();
return frameLoaderClient && frameLoaderClient->allowAutoplay(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SkBitmap::ReadRawPixels function in core/SkBitmap.cpp in the filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423} | High | 172,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
else
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rose_parse_ccitt function in net/rose/rose_subr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not validate the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP fields, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (integer underflow, heap memory corruption, and panic) via a small length value in data sent to a ROSE socket, or (2) conduct stack-based buffer overflow attacks via a large length value in data sent to a ROSE socket.
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zc, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0o, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1j does not properly enforce the no-ssl3 build option, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via an SSL 3.0 handshake, related to s23_clnt.c and s23_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BluetoothDeviceChooserController::~BluetoothDeviceChooserController() {
if (scanning_start_time_) {
RecordScanningDuration(base::TimeTicks::Now() -
scanning_start_time_.value());
}
if (chooser_) {
DCHECK(!error_callback_.is_null());
error_callback_.Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in filter processing in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987} | Medium | 172,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNext(
const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const
{
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
for (int i = 0; ; )
{
while (pNextEntry)
{
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL)
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS())
{
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing())
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); //so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *scsi_io,
hwaddr addr)
{
MPTSASRequest *req;
MPIMsgSCSIIOReply reply;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
int status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(scsi_io);
trace_mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->DataLength);
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
goto bad;
}
req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
req->dev = s;
status = mptsas_build_sgl(s, req, addr);
if (status) {
goto free_bad;
}
if (req->qsg.size < scsi_io->DataLength) {
trace_mptsas_sgl_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, scsi_io->DataLength,
req->qsg.size);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_SGL;
goto free_bad;
}
req->sreq = scsi_req_new(sdev, scsi_io->MsgContext,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->CDB, req);
if (req->sreq->cmd.xfer > scsi_io->DataLength) {
goto overrun;
}
switch (scsi_io->Control & MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_DATADIRECTION_MASK) {
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_NODATATRANSFER:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_NONE) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_WRITE:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_READ:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_FROM_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
}
if (scsi_req_enqueue(req->sreq)) {
scsi_req_continue(req->sreq);
}
return 0;
overrun:
trace_mptsas_scsi_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, req->sreq->cmd.xfer,
scsi_io->DataLength);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_DATA_OVERRUN;
free_bad:
mptsas_free_request(req);
bad:
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = scsi_io->TargetID;
reply.Bus = scsi_io->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = scsi_io->Function;
reply.CDBLength = scsi_io->CDBLength;
reply.SenseBufferLength = scsi_io->SenseBufferLength;
reply.MsgContext = scsi_io->MsgContext;
reply.SCSIState = MPI_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS;
reply.IOCStatus = status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The mptsas_process_scsi_io_request function in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulation support, allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and QEMU process crash) via vectors involving MPTSASRequest objects.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandDisplaysArray())
return -1;
Display& d = m_displays[m_displays_count++];
d.Init();
return d.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: zsetdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
os_ptr op = osp;
int code = 0;
check_write_type(*op, t_device);
if (dev->LockSafetyParams) { /* do additional checking if locked */
if(op->value.pdevice != dev) /* don't allow a different device */
return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
}
dev->ShowpageCount = 0;
code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(igs, op->value.pdevice);
if (code < 0)
return code;
make_bool(op, code != 0); /* erase page if 1 */
invalidate_stack_devices(i_ctx_p);
clear_pagedevice(istate);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.26. LockSafetyParams is not checked correctly if another device is used.
Commit Message: | High | 164,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GaiaCookieManagerService::ExternalCcResultFetcher::CreateFetcher(
const GURL& url) {
std::unique_ptr<net::URLFetcher> fetcher =
net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
fetcher->SetRequestContext(helper_->request_context());
fetcher->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES);
fetcher->SetAutomaticallyRetryOnNetworkChanges(1);
return fetcher;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SkAutoSTArray implementation in include/core/SkTemplates.h in the filters implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a reset action with a large count value, leading to an out-of-bounds write operation.
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810} | High | 172,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: write_header( FT_Error error_code )
{
FT_Face face;
const char* basename;
error = FTC_Manager_LookupFace( handle->cache_manager,
handle->scaler.face_id, &face );
if ( error )
PanicZ( "can't access font file" );
if ( !status.header )
{
basename = ft_basename( handle->current_font->filepathname );
switch ( error_code )
{
case FT_Err_Ok:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "%s %s (file `%s')", face->family_name,
face->style_name, basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid pixel size (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_PPem:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid ppem value (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
default:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "File `%s': error 0x%04x", basename,
(FT_UShort)error_code );
break;
}
status.header = status.header_buffer;
}
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, 0,
status.header, display->fore_color );
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "at %g points, angle = %d",
status.ptsize/64.0, status.angle );
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, CELLSTRING_HEIGHT,
status.header_buffer, display->fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in demo programs in FreeType before 2.4.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
/*
* Because the kvm_regs structure is a mix of 32, 64 and
* 128bit fields, we index it as if it was a 32bit
* array. Hence below, nr_regs is the number of entries, and
* off the index in the "array".
*/
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
u32 off;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, ((u32 *)regs) + off, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c in KVM in the Linux kernel before 4.18.12 on the arm64 platform mishandles the KVM_SET_ON_REG ioctl. This is exploitable by attackers who can create virtual machines. An attacker can arbitrarily redirect the hypervisor flow of control (with full register control). An attacker can also cause a denial of service (hypervisor panic) via an illegal exception return. This occurs because of insufficient restrictions on userspace access to the core register file, and because PSTATE.M validation does not prevent unintended execution modes.
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> | Low | 169,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
: account_id(account_id) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224} | High | 172,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagesetstyle)
{
zval *IM, *styles;
gdImagePtr im;
int * stylearr;
int index;
HashPosition pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra", &IM, &styles) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
/* copy the style values in the stylearr */
stylearr = safe_emalloc(sizeof(int), zend_hash_num_elements(HASH_OF(styles)), 0);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(styles), &pos);
for (index = 0;; zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(styles), &pos)) {
zval ** item;
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(styles), (void **) &item, &pos) == FAILURE) {
break;
}
convert_to_long_ex(item);
stylearr[index++] = Z_LVAL_PP(item);
}
gdImageSetStyle(im, stylearr, index);
efree(stylearr);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: ext/gd/gd.c in PHP 5.5.x before 5.5.9 does not check data types, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by using a (1) string or (2) array data type in place of a numeric data type, as demonstrated by an imagecrop function call with a string for the x dimension value, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-7226.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls | Medium | 166,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsValidSymbolicLink(const FilePath& file_path,
GDataCache::CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type,
const std::vector<FilePath>& cache_paths,
std::string* reason) {
DCHECK(sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED ||
sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING);
FilePath destination;
if (!file_util::ReadSymbolicLink(file_path, &destination)) {
*reason = "failed to read the symlink (maybe not a symlink)";
return false;
}
if (!file_util::PathExists(destination)) {
*reason = "pointing to a non-existent file";
return false;
}
if (sub_dir_type == GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PINNED &&
destination == FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(util::kSymLinkToDevNull)) {
return true;
}
if (!cache_paths[GDataCache::CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT].IsParent(destination)) {
*reason = "pointing to a file outside of persistent directory";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int pgx_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[PGX_MAGICLEN];
uint_fast32_t magic;
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= PGX_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, PGX_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < PGX_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Compute the signature value. */
magic = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
/* Ensure that the signature is correct for this format. */
if (magic != PGX_MAGIC) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDump(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const std::vector<std::string>& allocator_dump_names,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback) {
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, allocator_dump_names,
false /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 172,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, next)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index++;
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
intern->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GahpServer::Reaper(Service *,int pid,int status)
{
/* This should be much better.... for now, if our Gahp Server
goes away for any reason, we EXCEPT. */
GahpServer *dead_server = NULL;
GahpServer *next_server = NULL;
GahpServersById.startIterations();
while ( GahpServersById.iterate( next_server ) != 0 ) {
if ( pid == next_server->m_gahp_pid ) {
dead_server = next_server;
break;
}
}
std::string buf;
sprintf( buf, "Gahp Server (pid=%d) ", pid );
if( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, "died due to %s",
daemonCore->GetExceptionString(status) );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status) );
}
if ( dead_server ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, " unexpectedly" );
EXCEPT( buf.c_str() );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "\n" );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, buf.c_str() );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseDocTypeDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
xmlChar *ExternalID = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL;
/*
* We know that '<!DOCTYPE' has been detected.
*/
SKIP(9);
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Parse the DOCTYPE name.
*/
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseDocTypeDecl : no DOCTYPE name !\n");
}
ctxt->intSubName = name;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Check for SystemID and ExternalID
*/
URI = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &ExternalID, 1);
if ((URI != NULL) || (ExternalID != NULL)) {
ctxt->hasExternalSubset = 1;
}
ctxt->extSubURI = URI;
ctxt->extSubSystem = ExternalID;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Create and update the internal subset.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->internalSubset != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->internalSubset(ctxt->userData, name, ExternalID, URI);
/*
* Is there any internal subset declarations ?
* they are handled separately in xmlParseInternalSubset()
*/
if (RAW == '[')
return;
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading gd2 header info"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
}
id[i] = ch;
}
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Got file code: %s", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp(id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Not a valid gd2 file"));
goto fail1;
}
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord(vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Version: %d", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad version: %d", *vers));
goto fail1;
}
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord(sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get x-size"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord(sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get y-size"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image is %dx%d", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord(cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("ChunkSize: %d", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad chunk size: %d", *cs));
goto fail1;
}
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord(fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Format: %d", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad data format: %d", *fmt));
goto fail1;
}
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord(ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks Wide", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord(ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks vertically", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
}
*chunkIdx = cidx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("gd2 header complete"));
return 1;
fail1:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the _gd2GetHeader function in gd_gd2.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.3, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted chunk dimensions in an image.
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow | Medium | 167,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS) // OS_WIN
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#elif defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
gfx::GLContextGLX* glx_context =
static_cast<gfx::GLContextGLX*>(stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext());
GLXContext glx_context_handle =
static_cast<GLXContext>(glx_context->GetHandle());
video_decoder->SetGlxState(glx_context->display(), glx_context_handle);
#endif // ARCH_CPU_ARMEL
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || defined(OS_WIN)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92, does not properly render text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
int alloc_min_size;
int alloc_size;
mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (!nlk->cb_running) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto errout_skb;
}
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
goto errout_skb;
/* NLMSG_GOODSIZE is small to avoid high order allocations being
* required, but it makes sense to _attempt_ a 16K bytes allocation
* to reduce number of system calls on dump operations, if user
* ever provided a big enough buffer.
*/
cb = &nlk->cb;
alloc_min_size = max_t(int, cb->min_dump_alloc, NLMSG_GOODSIZE);
if (alloc_min_size < nlk->max_recvmsg_len) {
alloc_size = nlk->max_recvmsg_len;
skb = alloc_skb(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL |
__GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
}
if (!skb) {
alloc_size = alloc_min_size;
skb = alloc_skb(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!skb)
goto errout_skb;
/* Trim skb to allocated size. User is expected to provide buffer as
* large as max(min_dump_alloc, 16KiB (mac_recvmsg_len capped at
* netlink_recvmsg())). dump will pack as many smaller messages as
* could fit within the allocated skb. skb is typically allocated
* with larger space than required (could be as much as near 2x the
* requested size with align to next power of 2 approach). Allowing
* dump to use the excess space makes it difficult for a user to have a
* reasonable static buffer based on the expected largest dump of a
* single netdev. The outcome is MSG_TRUNC error.
*/
skb_reserve(skb, skb_tailroom(skb) - alloc_size);
netlink_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
len = cb->dump(skb, cb);
if (len > 0) {
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
return 0;
}
nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE, sizeof(len), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (!nlh)
goto errout_skb;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlh);
memcpy(nlmsg_data(nlh), &len, sizeof(len));
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
if (cb->done)
cb->done(cb);
nlk->cb_running = false;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
module_put(cb->module);
consume_skb(cb->skb);
return 0;
errout_skb:
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Race condition in the netlink_dump function in net/netlink/af_netlink.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (double free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that makes sendmsg system calls, leading to a free operation associated with a new dump that started earlier than anticipated.
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int mount_entry_on_systemfs(struct mntent *mntent)
{
return mount_entry_on_generic(mntent, mntent->mnt_dir);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 166,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadJavaScriptURL(const KURL& url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
Document* owner_document = GetFrame()->GetDocument();
if (!owner_document || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsNotAllowingJavascriptURLs(
owner_document->Url().Protocol()))
return;
String script = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(
url.GetString().Substring(strlen("javascript:")));
UserGestureIndicator gesture_indicator(
UserGestureToken::Create(owner_document, UserGestureToken::kNewGesture));
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(ToIsolate(GetFrame()));
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(script));
if (result.IsEmpty() || !result->IsString())
return;
String script_result = ToCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(result));
if (!GetFrame()->GetNavigationScheduler().LocationChangePending()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
script_result, owner_document);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 61.0.3163.81 for Android, failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to javascript scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333} | Medium | 172,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_object_store_ctor_failed(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
zend_object_store_bucket *obj_bucket = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle];
obj_bucket->bucket.obj.handlers = Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject);;
obj_bucket->destructor_called = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.26 mishandles object-deserialization failures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an unserialize call that references a partially constructed object.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction | High | 166,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sk_buff *sock_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk, unsigned long header_len,
unsigned long data_len, int noblock,
int *errcode)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
long timeo;
int err;
gfp_mask = sk->sk_allocation;
if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
gfp_mask |= __GFP_REPEAT;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
while (1) {
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err != 0)
goto failure;
err = -EPIPE;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
goto failure;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) < sk->sk_sndbuf) {
skb = alloc_skb(header_len, gfp_mask);
if (skb) {
int npages;
int i;
/* No pages, we're done... */
if (!data_len)
break;
npages = (data_len + (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
skb->truesize += data_len;
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = npages;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
struct page *page;
page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
if (!page) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = i;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto failure;
}
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i,
page, 0,
(data_len >= PAGE_SIZE ?
PAGE_SIZE :
data_len));
data_len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
/* Full success... */
break;
}
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto failure;
}
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto failure;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto interrupted;
timeo = sock_wait_for_wmem(sk, timeo);
}
skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
return skb;
interrupted:
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
failure:
*errcode = err;
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sock_alloc_send_pskb function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 does not properly validate a certain length value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging access to a TUN/TAP device.
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l(c,c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper(c));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 170,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void frag_kfree_skb(struct netns_frags *nf, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
atomic_sub(skb->truesize, &nf->mem);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The ip6_frag_queue function in net/ipv6/reassembly.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 allows remote attackers to bypass intended network restrictions via overlapping IPv6 fragments.
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DevToolsClient::DevToolsClient(
RenderFrame* main_render_frame,
const std::string& compatibility_script)
: RenderFrameObserver(main_render_frame),
compatibility_script_(compatibility_script),
web_tools_frontend_(
WebDevToolsFrontend::create(main_render_frame->GetWebFrame(), this)) {
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker to read local files via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814} | Medium | 172,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
kvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn - slot->base_gfn);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The kvm_iommu_map_pages function in virt/kvm/iommu.c in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 miscalculates the number of pages during the handling of a mapping failure, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS page unpinning) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging guest OS privileges. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2014-3601.
Commit Message: kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_pages() takes a number of pages, so fix the problem
by matching the two.
This was introduced by commit 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter
of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)"), which fixes the lack of
un-pinning for pages intended to be un-pinned (i.e. memory leak) but
unfortunately potentially aggravated the number of pages we un-pin that
should have stayed pinned. As far as I understand though, the same
practical mitigations apply.
This issue was found during review of Red Hat 6.6 patches to prepare
Ksplice rebootless updates.
Thanks to Vegard for his time on a late Friday evening to help me in
understanding this code.
Fixes: 350b8bd ("kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of... (CVE-2014-3601)")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,244 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, iov_size, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
return -EFAULT;
/* do not move before msg_sys is valid */
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
err = -ENOMEM;
iov_size = msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
iov = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, iov, iov_size);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The __sys_sendmsg function in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via crafted use of the sendmmsg system call, leading to an incorrect pointer dereference.
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
CC: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CC: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void on_page_prepare(GtkNotebook *assistant, GtkWidget *page, gpointer user_data)
{
/* This suppresses [Last] button: assistant thinks that
* we never have this page ready unless we are on it
* -> therefore there is at least one non-ready page
* -> therefore it won't show [Last]
*/
/* If processing is finished and if it was terminated because of an error
* the event progress page is selected. So, it does not make sense to show
* the next step button and we MUST NOT clear warnings.
*/
if (!is_processing_finished())
{
/* some pages hide it, so restore it to it's default */
show_next_step_button();
clear_warnings();
}
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_detail);
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_onfail);
if (!g_expert_mode)
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_repeat);
/* Save text fields if changed */
/* Must be called before any GUI operation because the following two
* functions causes recreating of the text items tabs, thus all updates to
* these tabs will be lost */
save_items_from_notepad();
save_text_from_text_view(g_tv_comment, FILENAME_COMMENT);
if (pages[PAGENO_SUMMARY].page_widget == page)
{
if (!g_expert_mode)
{
/* Skip intro screen */
int n = select_next_page_no(pages[PAGENO_SUMMARY].page_no, NULL);
log_info("switching to page_no:%d", n);
gtk_notebook_set_current_page(assistant, n);
return;
}
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EDIT_ELEMENTS].page_widget == page)
{
if (highlight_forbidden())
{
add_sensitive_data_warning();
show_warnings();
gtk_expander_set_expanded(g_exp_search, TRUE);
}
else
gtk_toggle_button_set_active(GTK_TOGGLE_BUTTON(g_rb_custom_search), TRUE);
show_warnings();
}
if (pages[PAGENO_REVIEW_DATA].page_widget == page)
{
update_ls_details_checkboxes(g_event_selected);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, gtk_toggle_button_get_active(g_tb_approve_bt));
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EDIT_COMMENT].page_widget == page)
{
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_detail);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, false);
on_comment_changed(gtk_text_view_get_buffer(g_tv_comment), NULL);
}
if (pages[PAGENO_EVENT_PROGRESS].page_widget == page)
{
log_info("g_event_selected:'%s'", g_event_selected);
if (g_event_selected
&& g_event_selected[0]
) {
clear_warnings();
start_event_run(g_event_selected);
}
}
if(pages[PAGENO_EVENT_SELECTOR].page_widget == page)
{
if (!g_expert_mode && !g_auto_event_list)
hide_next_step_button();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: libreport 2.0.7 before 2.6.3 only saves changes to the first file when editing a crash report, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors related to the (1) backtrace, (2) cmdline, (3) environ, (4) open_fds, (5) maps, (6) smaps, (7) hostname, (8) remote, (9) ks.cfg, or (10) anaconda-tb file attachment included in a Red Hat Bugzilla bug report.
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::CancelAllRequests(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto request_it = requests_.begin();
while (request_it != requests_.end()) {
if (request_it->second->requesting_process_id != render_process_id ||
request_it->second->requesting_frame_id != render_frame_id) {
++request_it;
continue;
}
const std::string label = request_it->first;
++request_it;
CancelRequest(label);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
if (!sctp_is_ep_boundall(sk) && val)
return -EINVAL;
if ((val && sp->do_auto_asconf) || (!val && !sp->do_auto_asconf))
return 0;
if (val == 0 && sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
} else if (val && !sp->do_auto_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&sock_net(sk)->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (list corruption and panic) via a rapid series of system calls related to sockets, as demonstrated by setsockopt calls.
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_IN,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_read(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AccessibilityOrientation AXNodeObject::orientation() const {
const AtomicString& ariaOrientation =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kOrientation);
AccessibilityOrientation orientation = AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "horizontal"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "vertical"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
switch (roleValue()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case ScrollBarRole:
case TreeRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
return orientation;
case MenuBarRole:
case SliderRole:
case SplitterRole:
case TabListRole:
case ToolbarRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
return orientation;
case RadioGroupRole:
case TreeGridRole:
case TableRole:
return orientation;
default:
return AXObject::orientation();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isMultiSelectable() const {
const AtomicString& ariaMultiSelectable =
getAttribute(aria_multiselectableAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaMultiSelectable, "false"))
return false;
return isHTMLSelectElement(getNode()) &&
toHTMLSelectElement(*getNode()).isMultiple();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach()
{
GRefPtr<GtkWidget> inspectorView = m_inspectorView;
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(m_inspectorWindow), m_inspectorView);
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
if (m_client.attach(this))
return;
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(m_page->viewWidget()), m_inspectorView);
gtk_widget_show(m_inspectorView);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a malformed name for the font encoding.
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_ecb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "ecb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void snd_timer_check_master(struct snd_timer_instance *master)
{
struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp;
/* check all pending slaves */
list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &snd_timer_slave_list, open_list) {
if (slave->slave_class == master->slave_class &&
slave->slave_id == master->slave_id) {
list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &master->slave_list_head);
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
slave->master = master;
slave->timer = master->timer;
if (slave->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING)
list_add_tail(&slave->active_list,
&master->slave_active_head);
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 retains certain linked lists after a close or stop action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call, related to the (1) snd_timer_close and (2) _snd_timer_stop functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
long long size_) {
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; // default
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(role, "columnheader");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML(const String& markup, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = createFragmentFromSource(markup, host(), ec);
if (fragment)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; //too few bytes available
//// TODO(vigneshv): This function assumes that unsigned values never have their
//// high bit set.
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) //we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m))
{
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not check whether memory allocation succeeds, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28471206.
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
| High | 173,548 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.