instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnManifestDataWriteComplete(int result) {
if (result > 0) {
AppCacheEntry entry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST,
manifest_response_writer_->response_id(),
manifest_response_writer_->amount_written());
if (!inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(manifest_url_, entry))
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(entry.response_id());
StoreGroupAndCache();
} else {
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Failed to write the manifest data to storage",
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR, GURL(),
0, false /*is_cross_origin*/),
DISKCACHE_ERROR, GURL());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)
{
if (!(priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE))
IWL_ERR(priv, "ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id %u "
"addr %pM\n",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
if (priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE) {
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv,
"STA id %u addr %pM already present in uCode "
"(according to driver)\n",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
} else {
priv->stations[sta_id].used |= IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE;
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Added STA id %u addr %pM to uCode\n",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 3.4, a buffer overflow occurs in drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-sta.c, which will cause at least memory corruption.
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> | High | 169,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mp_get_count function in drivers/staging/sb105x/sb_pci_mp.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a TIOCGICOUNT ioctl call.
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
| Medium | 173,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int make_http_soap_request(zval *this_ptr,
zend_string *buf,
char *location,
char *soapaction,
int soap_version,
zval *return_value)
{
zend_string *request;
smart_str soap_headers = {0};
smart_str soap_headers_z = {0};
int err;
php_url *phpurl = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
zval *trace, *tmp;
int use_proxy = 0;
int use_ssl;
zend_string *http_body;
char *content_type, *http_version, *cookie_itt;
int http_close;
zend_string *http_headers;
char *connection;
int http_1_1;
int http_status;
int content_type_xml = 0;
zend_long redirect_max = 20;
char *content_encoding;
char *http_msg = NULL;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
zend_bool has_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_proxy_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_cookies = 0;
if (this_ptr == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(this_ptr) != IS_OBJECT) {
return FALSE;
}
request = buf;
/* Compress request */
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "compression", sizeof("compression")-1)) != NULL && Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
int level = Z_LVAL_P(tmp) & 0x0f;
int kind = Z_LVAL_P(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE;
if (level > 9) {level = 9;}
if ((Z_LVAL_P(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_ACCEPT) != 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n");
}
if (level > 0) {
zval func;
zval retval;
zval params[3];
int n;
ZVAL_STR_COPY(¶ms[0], buf);
ZVAL_LONG(¶ms[1], level);
if (kind == SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE) {
n = 2;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzcompress");
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: deflate\r\n");
} else {
n = 3;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzencode");
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n");
ZVAL_LONG(¶ms[2], 0x1f);
}
if (call_user_function(CG(function_table), (zval*)NULL, &func, &retval, n, params) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
zval_ptr_dtor(¶ms[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&func);
request = Z_STR(retval);
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(¶ms[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&func);
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1)) != NULL) {
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream,tmp);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1)) != NULL && Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
use_proxy = Z_LVAL_P(tmp);
}
} else {
stream = NULL;
}
if (location != NULL && location[0] != '\000') {
phpurl = php_url_parse(location);
}
if (NULL != (tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr),
"_stream_context", sizeof("_stream_context")-1))) {
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(tmp, 0);
}
if (context &&
(tmp = php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "max_redirects")) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) != IS_STRING || !is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp), &redirect_max, NULL, 1)) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG)
redirect_max = Z_LVAL_P(tmp);
}
}
try_again:
if (phpurl == NULL || phpurl->host == NULL) {
if (phpurl != NULL) {php_url_free(phpurl);}
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unable to parse URL", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
use_ssl = 0;
if (phpurl->scheme != NULL && strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "https") == 0) {
use_ssl = 1;
} else if (phpurl->scheme == NULL || strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "http") != 0) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unknown protocol. Only http and https are allowed.", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
if (use_ssl && php_stream_locate_url_wrapper("https://", NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY) == NULL) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "SSL support is not available in this build", NULL, NULL);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (phpurl->port == 0) {
phpurl->port = use_ssl ? 443 : 80;
}
/* Check if request to the same host */
if (stream != NULL) {
php_url *orig;
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1)) != NULL &&
(orig = (php_url *) zend_fetch_resource_ex(tmp, "httpurl", le_url)) != NULL &&
((use_proxy && !use_ssl) ||
(((use_ssl && orig->scheme != NULL && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") == 0) ||
(!use_ssl && orig->scheme == NULL) ||
(!use_ssl && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") != 0)) &&
strcmp(orig->host, phpurl->host) == 0 &&
orig->port == phpurl->port))) {
} else {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
}
/* Check if keep-alive connection is still opened */
if (stream != NULL && php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
if (!stream) {
stream = http_connect(this_ptr, phpurl, use_ssl, context, &use_proxy);
if (stream) {
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpsocket", stream->res);
GC_REFCOUNT(stream->res)++;
add_property_long(this_ptr, "_use_proxy", use_proxy);
} else {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Could not connect to host", NULL, NULL);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (stream) {
zval *cookies, *login, *password;
zend_resource *ret = zend_register_resource(phpurl, le_url);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpurl", ret);
GC_REFCOUNT(ret)++;
/*zend_list_addref(ret);*/
if (context &&
(tmp = php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "protocol_version")) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_DOUBLE &&
Z_DVAL_P(tmp) == 1.0) {
http_1_1 = 0;
} else {
http_1_1 = 1;
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "POST ");
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->scheme);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "://");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if (http_1_1) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.1\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.0\r\n");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Host: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
if (phpurl->port != (use_ssl?443:80)) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (!http_1_1 ||
((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_keep_alive", sizeof("_keep_alive")-1)) != NULL &&
(Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_FALSE || (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG && Z_LVAL_P(tmp) == 0)))) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n"
"Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n");
}
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_user_agent", sizeof("_user_agent")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (context &&
(tmp = php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "user_agent")) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (FG(user_agent)) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, FG(user_agent));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: PHP-SOAP/"PHP_VERSION"\r\n");
}
smart_str_append_smart_str(&soap_headers, &soap_headers_z);
if (soap_version == SOAP_1_2) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"; action=\"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\"");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8\r\n");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "SOAPAction: \"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Length: ");
smart_str_append_long(&soap_headers, request->len);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
/* HTTP Authentication */
if ((login = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(login) == IS_STRING) {
zval *digest;
has_authorization = 1;
if ((digest = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1)) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(digest) == IS_ARRAY) {
char HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9];
PHP_MD5_CTX md5ctx;
unsigned char hash[16];
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), ZEND_LONG_FMT, php_rand());
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce));
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(cnonce, hash);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
Z_LVAL_P(tmp)++;
snprintf(nc, sizeof(nc), "%08ld", Z_LVAL_P(tmp));
} else {
add_assoc_long(digest, "nc", 1);
strcpy(nc, "00000001");
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(login), Z_STRLEN_P(login));
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if ((password = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(password) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(password), Z_STRLEN_P(password));
}
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) == sizeof("md5-sess")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), "md5-sess") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"POST:", sizeof("POST:")-1);
if (phpurl->path) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->path, strlen(phpurl->path));
} else {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"/", 1);
}
if (phpurl->query) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"?", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->query, strlen(phpurl->query));
}
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
/*
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) == sizeof("auth-int")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), "auth-int") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, ":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN);
}
*/
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA2, hash);
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)nc, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"auth", sizeof("auth")-1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA2, 32);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(response, hash);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Digest username=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(login), Z_STRLEN_P(login));
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", realm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", uri=\"");
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", qop=\"auth");
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nc=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, nc, 8);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", cnonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, cnonce, 8);
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", response=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, response, 32);
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "opaque", sizeof("opaque")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", opaque=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", algorithm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
} else {
zend_string *buf;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_P(login), Z_STRLEN_P(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if ((password = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(password) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_P(password), Z_STRLEN_P(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
buf = php_base64_encode((unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(auth.s), ZSTR_LEN(auth.s));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Basic ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, (char*)ZSTR_VAL(buf), ZSTR_LEN(buf));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
zend_string_release(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
}
}
/* Proxy HTTP Authentication */
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
has_proxy_authorization = proxy_authentication(this_ptr, &soap_headers);
}
/* Send cookies along with request */
if ((cookies = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(cookies) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval *data;
zend_string *key;
int i, n;
has_cookies = 1;
n = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies));
if (n > 0) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Cookie: ");
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
zend_ulong numindx;
int res = zend_hash_get_current_key(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies), &key, &numindx);
data = zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies));
if (res == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING && Z_TYPE_P(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval *value;
if ((value = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(data), 0)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(value) == IS_STRING) {
zval *tmp;
if (((tmp = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(data), 1)) == NULL ||
strncmp(phpurl->path?phpurl->path:"/",Z_STRVAL_P(tmp),Z_STRLEN_P(tmp)) == 0) &&
((tmp = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(data), 2)) == NULL ||
in_domain(phpurl->host,Z_STRVAL_P(tmp))) &&
(use_ssl || (tmp = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(data), 3)) == NULL)) {
smart_str_append(&soap_headers, key);
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ';');
}
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
}
http_context_headers(context, has_authorization, has_proxy_authorization, has_cookies, &soap_headers);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
if ((trace = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace")-1)) != NULL &&
(Z_TYPE_P(trace) == IS_TRUE || (Z_TYPE_P(trace) == IS_LONG && Z_LVAL_P(trace) != 0))) {
add_property_stringl(this_ptr, "__last_request_headers", ZSTR_VAL(soap_headers.s), ZSTR_LEN(soap_headers.s));
}
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, request->val, request->len);
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
err = php_stream_write(stream, ZSTR_VAL(soap_headers.s), ZSTR_LEN(soap_headers.s));
if (err != ZSTR_LEN(soap_headers.s)) {
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed Sending HTTP SOAP request", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers);
} else {
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed to create stream??", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (!return_value) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return TRUE;
}
do {
http_headers = get_http_headers(stream);
if (!http_headers) {
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Error Fetching http headers", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if ((trace = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace")-1)) != NULL &&
(Z_TYPE_P(trace) == IS_TRUE || (Z_TYPE_P(trace) == IS_LONG && Z_LVAL_P(trace) != 0))) {
add_property_str(this_ptr, "__last_response_headers", zend_string_copy(http_headers));
}
/* Check to see what HTTP status was sent */
http_1_1 = 0;
http_status = 0;
http_version = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "HTTP/");
if (http_version) {
char *tmp;
if (!strncmp(http_version,"1.1", 3)) {
http_1_1 = 1;
}
tmp = strstr(http_version," ");
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmp++;
http_status = atoi(tmp);
}
tmp = strstr(tmp," ");
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmp++;
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
http_msg = estrdup(tmp);
}
efree(http_version);
/* Try and get headers again */
if (http_status == 100) {
zend_string_release(http_headers);
}
}
} while (http_status == 100);
/* Grab and send back every cookie */
/* Not going to worry about Path: because
we shouldn't be changing urls so path dont
matter too much
*/
cookie_itt = strstr(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Set-Cookie: ");
while (cookie_itt) {
char *cookie;
char *eqpos, *sempos;
zval *cookies;
if ((cookies = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies")-1)) == NULL ||
Z_TYPE_P(cookies) != IS_ARRAY) {
zval tmp_cookies;
array_init(&tmp_cookies);
cookies = zend_hash_str_update(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies")-1, &tmp_cookies);
}
cookie = get_http_header_value(cookie_itt,"Set-Cookie: ");
eqpos = strstr(cookie, "=");
sempos = strstr(cookie, ";");
if (eqpos != NULL && (sempos == NULL || sempos > eqpos)) {
smart_str name = {0};
int cookie_len;
zval zcookie;
if (sempos != NULL) {
cookie_len = sempos-(eqpos+1);
} else {
cookie_len = strlen(cookie)-(eqpos-cookie)-1;
}
smart_str_appendl(&name, cookie, eqpos - cookie);
smart_str_0(&name);
array_init(&zcookie);
add_index_stringl(&zcookie, 0, eqpos + 1, cookie_len);
if (sempos != NULL) {
char *options = cookie + cookie_len+1;
while (*options) {
while (*options == ' ') {options++;}
sempos = strstr(options, ";");
if (strstr(options,"path=") == options) {
eqpos = options + sizeof("path=")-1;
add_index_stringl(&zcookie, 1, eqpos, sempos?(sempos-eqpos):strlen(eqpos));
} else if (strstr(options,"domain=") == options) {
eqpos = options + sizeof("domain=")-1;
add_index_stringl(&zcookie, 2, eqpos, sempos?(sempos-eqpos):strlen(eqpos));
} else if (strstr(options,"secure") == options) {
add_index_bool(&zcookie, 3, 1);
}
if (sempos != NULL) {
options = sempos+1;
} else {
break;
}
}
}
if (!zend_hash_index_exists(Z_ARRVAL(zcookie), 1)) {
char *t = phpurl->path?phpurl->path:"/";
char *c = strrchr(t, '/');
if (c) {
add_index_stringl(&zcookie, 1, t, c-t);
}
}
if (!zend_hash_index_exists(Z_ARRVAL(zcookie), 2)) {
add_index_string(&zcookie, 2, phpurl->host);
}
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(cookies), name.s, &zcookie);
smart_str_free(&name);
}
cookie_itt = strstr(cookie_itt + sizeof("Set-Cookie: "), "Set-Cookie: ");
efree(cookie);
}
/* See if the server requested a close */
if (http_1_1) {
http_close = FALSE;
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
connection = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Proxy-Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "close", sizeof("close")-1) == 0) {
http_close = TRUE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
if (http_close == FALSE) {
connection = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "close", sizeof("close")-1) == 0) {
http_close = TRUE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
} else {
http_close = TRUE;
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
connection = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Proxy-Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "Keep-Alive", sizeof("Keep-Alive")-1) == 0) {
http_close = FALSE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
if (http_close == TRUE) {
connection = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "Keep-Alive", sizeof("Keep-Alive")-1) == 0) {
http_close = FALSE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
}
http_body = get_http_body(stream, http_close, ZSTR_VAL(http_headers));
if (!http_body) {
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_string_release(http_headers);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Error Fetching http body, No Content-Length, connection closed or chunked data", NULL, NULL);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (request != buf) {
zend_string_release(request);
}
if (http_close) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1);
zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1);
stream = NULL;
}
/* Process HTTP status codes */
if (http_status >= 300 && http_status < 400) {
char *loc;
if ((loc = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Location: ")) != NULL) {
php_url *new_url = php_url_parse(loc);
if (new_url != NULL) {
zend_string_release(http_headers);
zend_string_release(http_body);
efree(loc);
if (new_url->scheme == NULL && new_url->path != NULL) {
new_url->scheme = phpurl->scheme ? estrdup(phpurl->scheme) : NULL;
new_url->host = phpurl->host ? estrdup(phpurl->host) : NULL;
new_url->port = phpurl->port;
if (new_url->path && new_url->path[0] != '/') {
if (phpurl->path) {
char *t = phpurl->path;
char *p = strrchr(t, '/');
if (p) {
char *s = emalloc((p - t) + strlen(new_url->path) + 2);
strncpy(s, t, (p - t) + 1);
s[(p - t) + 1] = 0;
strcat(s, new_url->path);
efree(new_url->path);
new_url->path = s;
}
} else {
char *s = emalloc(strlen(new_url->path) + 2);
s[0] = '/'; s[1] = 0;
strcat(s, new_url->path);
efree(new_url->path);
new_url->path = s;
}
}
}
phpurl = new_url;
if (--redirect_max < 1) {
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Redirection limit reached, aborting", NULL, NULL);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
goto try_again;
}
}
} else if (http_status == 401) {
/* Digest authentication */
zval *digest, *login, *password;
char *auth = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "WWW-Authenticate: ");
if (auth &&
strstr(auth, "Digest") == auth &&
((digest = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1)) == NULL ||
Z_TYPE_P(digest) != IS_ARRAY) &&
(login = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(login) == IS_STRING &&
(password = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password")-1)) != NULL &&
Z_TYPE_P(password) == IS_STRING) {
char *s;
zval digest;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&digest);
s = auth + sizeof("Digest")-1;
while (*s != '\0') {
char *name, *val;
while (*s == ' ') ++s;
name = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != '=') ++s;
if (*s == '=') {
*s = '\0';
++s;
if (*s == '"') {
++s;
val = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != '"') ++s;
} else {
val = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != ' ' && *s != ',') ++s;
}
if (*s != '\0') {
if (*s != ',') {
*s = '\0';
++s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != ',') ++s;
if (*s != '\0') ++s;
} else {
*s = '\0';
++s;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE(digest) == IS_UNDEF) {
array_init(&digest);
}
add_assoc_string(&digest, name, val);
}
}
if (Z_TYPE(digest) != IS_UNDEF) {
php_url *new_url = emalloc(sizeof(php_url));
Z_DELREF(digest);
add_property_zval_ex(this_ptr, "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1, &digest);
*new_url = *phpurl;
if (phpurl->scheme) phpurl->scheme = estrdup(phpurl->scheme);
if (phpurl->user) phpurl->user = estrdup(phpurl->user);
if (phpurl->pass) phpurl->pass = estrdup(phpurl->pass);
if (phpurl->host) phpurl->host = estrdup(phpurl->host);
if (phpurl->path) phpurl->path = estrdup(phpurl->path);
if (phpurl->query) phpurl->query = estrdup(phpurl->query);
if (phpurl->fragment) phpurl->fragment = estrdup(phpurl->fragment);
phpurl = new_url;
efree(auth);
zend_string_release(http_headers);
zend_string_release(http_body);
goto try_again;
}
}
if (auth) efree(auth);
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
/* Check and see if the server even sent a xml document */
content_type = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Content-Type: ");
if (content_type) {
char *pos = NULL;
int cmplen;
pos = strstr(content_type,";");
if (pos != NULL) {
cmplen = pos - content_type;
} else {
cmplen = strlen(content_type);
}
if (strncmp(content_type, "text/xml", cmplen) == 0 ||
strncmp(content_type, "application/soap+xml", cmplen) == 0) {
content_type_xml = 1;
/*
if (strncmp(http_body, "<?xml", 5)) {
zval *err;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(err);
ZVAL_STRINGL(err, http_body, http_body_size, 1);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Didn't receive an xml document", NULL, err);
efree(content_type);
zend_string_release(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
return FALSE;
}
*/
}
efree(content_type);
}
/* Decompress response */
content_encoding = get_http_header_value(ZSTR_VAL(http_headers), "Content-Encoding: ");
if (content_encoding) {
zval func;
zval retval;
zval params[1];
if ((strcmp(content_encoding,"gzip") == 0 ||
strcmp(content_encoding,"x-gzip") == 0) &&
zend_hash_str_exists(EG(function_table), "gzinflate", sizeof("gzinflate")-1)) {
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzinflate");
ZVAL_STRINGL(¶ms[0], http_body->val+10, http_body->len-10);
} else if (strcmp(content_encoding,"deflate") == 0 &&
zend_hash_str_exists(EG(function_table), "gzuncompress", sizeof("gzuncompress")-1)) {
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzuncompress");
ZVAL_STR_COPY(¶ms[0], http_body);
} else {
efree(content_encoding);
zend_string_release(http_headers);
zend_string_release(http_body);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unknown Content-Encoding", NULL, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
if (call_user_function(CG(function_table), (zval*)NULL, &func, &retval, 1, params) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
zval_ptr_dtor(¶ms[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&func);
zend_string_release(http_body);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(return_value, &retval);
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(¶ms[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&func);
efree(content_encoding);
zend_string_release(http_headers);
zend_string_release(http_body);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Can't uncompress compressed response", NULL, NULL);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
return FALSE;
}
efree(content_encoding);
} else {
ZVAL_STR(return_value, http_body);
}
zend_string_release(http_headers);
if (http_status >= 400) {
int error = 0;
if (Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) == 0) {
error = 1;
} else if (Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) > 0) {
if (!content_type_xml) {
char *s = Z_STRVAL_P(return_value);
while (*s != '\0' && *s < ' ') {
s++;
}
if (strncmp(s, "<?xml", 5)) {
error = 1;
}
}
}
if (error) {
zval_ptr_dtor(return_value);
ZVAL_UNDEF(return_value);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", http_msg, NULL, NULL);
efree(http_msg);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The make_http_soap_request function in ext/soap/php_http.c in PHP before 5.4.44, 5.5.x before 5.5.28, 5.6.x before 5.6.12, and 7.x before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (type confusion and application crash) via crafted serialized _cookies data, related to the SoapClient::__call method in ext/soap/soap.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderFrameHostVisibilityConsistent() {
if (render_frame_host_->GetView() &&
render_frame_host_->render_view_host()->GetWidget()->is_hidden() !=
delegate_->IsHidden()) {
if (delegate_->IsHidden()) {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Hide();
} else {
render_frame_host_->GetView()->Show();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
{
return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k does not enforce certain constraints on certificate data, which allows remote attackers to defeat a fingerprint-based certificate-blacklist protection mechanism by including crafted data within a certificate's unsigned portion, related to crypto/asn1/a_verify.c, crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c, crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c, and crypto/x509/x_all.c.
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->pos + count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FT_Stream_EnterFrame function in base/ftstream.c in FreeType before 2.4.2 does not properly validate certain position values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int f2fs_trim_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct fstrim_range *range)
{
__u64 start = F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->start);
__u64 end = start + F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->len) - 1;
unsigned int start_segno, end_segno;
struct cp_control cpc;
int err = 0;
if (start >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) || range->len < sbi->blocksize)
return -EINVAL;
cpc.trimmed = 0;
if (end <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))
goto out;
if (is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Found FS corruption, run fsck to fix.");
goto out;
}
/* start/end segment number in main_area */
start_segno = (start <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? 0 : GET_SEGNO(sbi, start);
end_segno = (end >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? MAIN_SEGS(sbi) - 1 :
GET_SEGNO(sbi, end);
cpc.reason = CP_DISCARD;
cpc.trim_minlen = max_t(__u64, 1, F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->minlen));
/* do checkpoint to issue discard commands safely */
for (; start_segno <= end_segno; start_segno = cpc.trim_end + 1) {
cpc.trim_start = start_segno;
if (sbi->discard_blks == 0)
break;
else if (sbi->discard_blks < BATCHED_TRIM_BLOCKS(sbi))
cpc.trim_end = end_segno;
else
cpc.trim_end = min_t(unsigned int,
rounddown(start_segno +
BATCHED_TRIM_SEGMENTS(sbi),
sbi->segs_per_sec) - 1, end_segno);
mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
err = write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
if (err)
break;
schedule();
}
/* It's time to issue all the filed discards */
mark_discard_range_all(sbi);
f2fs_wait_discard_bios(sbi);
out:
range->len = F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(cpc.trimmed);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The f2fs implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.14 mishandles reference counts associated with f2fs_wait_discard_bios calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG), as demonstrated by fstrim.
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const String& source,
Document* owner_document) {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!document_loader_ ||
document->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReplaceDocumentViaJavaScriptURL);
const KURL& url = document->Url();
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy =
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(url)
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew;
StopAllLoaders();
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(document);
frame_->DetachChildren();
if (!frame_->IsAttached() || document != frame_->GetDocument())
return;
frame_->GetDocument()->Shutdown();
Client()->TransitionToCommittedForNewPage();
document_loader_->ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy, source);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Object lifecycle issue in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663} | Medium | 173,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: decnet_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *ap, register u_int length,
register u_int caplen)
{
register const union routehdr *rhp;
register int mflags;
int dst, src, hops;
u_int nsplen, pktlen;
const u_char *nspp;
if (length < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*ap, sizeof(short));
pktlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(ap);
if (pktlen < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (pktlen > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
length = pktlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
if (mflags & RMF_PAD) {
/* pad bytes of some sort in front of message */
u_int padlen = mflags & RMF_PADMASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[pad:%d] ", padlen));
if (length < padlen + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(ap[sizeof(short)], padlen);
ap += padlen;
length -= padlen;
caplen -= padlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
}
if (mflags & RMF_FVER) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "future-version-decnet"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
/* is it a control message? */
if (mflags & RMF_CTLMSG) {
if (!print_decnet_ctlmsg(ndo, rhp, length, caplen))
goto trunc;
return;
}
switch (mflags & RMF_MASK) {
case RMF_LONG:
if (length < sizeof(struct longhdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_long);
dst =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_dst.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
src =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_src.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
hops = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_visits);
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct longhdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct longhdr);
break;
case RMF_SHORT:
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short);
dst = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_dst);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_src);
hops = (EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_visits) & VIS_MASK)+1;
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct shorthdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct shorthdr);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown message flags under mask"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %d ",
dnaddr_string(ndo, src), dnaddr_string(ndo, dst), pktlen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (mflags & RMF_RQR)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RQR "));
if (mflags & RMF_RTS)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RTS "));
if (mflags & RMF_IE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IE "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d hops ", hops));
}
if (!print_nsp(ndo, nspp, nsplen))
goto trunc;
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DECnet parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-decnet.c:decnet_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 170,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 169,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const {
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,813 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Drop( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
Long e1, e2, pxl;
PByte bits;
Byte f1;
/* During the horizontal sweep, we only take care of drop-outs */
/* e1 + <-- pixel center */
/* | */
/* x1 ---+--> <-- contour */
/* | */
/* | */
/* x2 <--+--- <-- contour */
/* | */
/* | */
/* e2 + <-- pixel center */
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
pxl = e1;
if ( e1 > e2 )
{
Int dropOutControl = left->flags & 7;
if ( e1 == e2 + ras.precision )
{
switch ( dropOutControl )
{
case 0: /* simple drop-outs including stubs */
pxl = e2;
break;
case 4: /* smart drop-outs including stubs */
pxl = FLOOR( ( x1 + x2 - 1 ) / 2 + ras.precision_half );
break;
case 1: /* simple drop-outs excluding stubs */
case 5: /* smart drop-outs excluding stubs */
/* see Vertical_Sweep_Drop for details */
/* rightmost stub test */
if ( left->next == right &&
left->height <= 0 &&
!( left->flags & Overshoot_Top &&
x2 - x1 >= ras.precision_half ) )
return;
/* leftmost stub test */
if ( right->next == left &&
left->start == y &&
!( left->flags & Overshoot_Bottom &&
x2 - x1 >= ras.precision_half ) )
return;
if ( dropOutControl == 1 )
pxl = e2;
else
pxl = FLOOR( ( x1 + x2 - 1 ) / 2 + ras.precision_half );
break;
default: /* modes 2, 3, 6, 7 */
return; /* no drop-out control */
}
/* undocumented but confirmed: If the drop-out would result in a */
/* pixel outside of the bounding box, use the pixel inside of the */
/* bounding box instead */
if ( pxl < 0 )
pxl = e1;
else if ( TRUNC( pxl ) >= ras.target.rows )
pxl = e2;
/* check that the other pixel isn't set */
e1 = pxl == e1 ? e2 : e1;
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
bits -= e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
bits += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
if ( e1 >= 0 &&
e1 < ras.target.rows &&
*bits & f1 )
return;
}
else
return;
}
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( pxl );
if ( e1 >= 0 && e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
bits -= e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
bits += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
bits[0] |= f1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message: | High | 164,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (send(client_socket_, data, length, 0) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void vapic_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
int idx;
if (!apic || !apic->vapic_addr)
return;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
kvm_release_page_dirty(apic->vapic_page);
mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, apic->vapic_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_hdr(void *pv_dec,impeg2d_video_decode_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_video_decode_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
dec_state_t *ps_dec;
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
ps_dec = (dec_state_t *)pv_dec;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
if (u4_size > MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE)
{
u4_size = MAX_BITSTREAM_BUFFER_SIZE;
}
memcpy(ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer, ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.pv_stream_buffer, u4_size);
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), ps_dec->pu1_input_buffer,
u4_size);
{
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = impeg2d_process_video_header(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code == 0)
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = e_error;
if (IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == e_error)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 0;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width;
}
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE);
return;
}
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_num_bits_read(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream);
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = u4_bits_read>> 3;
if(ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed > ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes)
{
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_ip->s_ivd_video_decode_ip_t.u4_num_Bytes;
}
ps_op->s_ivd_video_decode_op_t.u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* MOD */
ps_dec->u2_header_done = 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In impeg2_fmt_conv_yuv420p_to_yuv420sp_uv_av8 of impeg2_format_conv.s there is a possible out of bounds write due to missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-74078669
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
| High | 174,086 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | Medium | 167,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsSecondClickInsideManhattanSquare(
const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - last_tap_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - last_tap_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance < kMaximumTouchMoveInPixelsForClick;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly handle Tibetan text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int simulate_llsc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == LL) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return simulate_ll(regs, opcode);
}
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SC) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return simulate_sc(regs, opcode);
}
return -1; /* Must be something else ... */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: test_bson_validate (void)
{
char filename[64];
size_t offset;
bson_t *b;
int i;
bson_error_t error;
for (i = 1; i <= 38; i++) {
bson_snprintf (filename, sizeof filename, "test%u.bson", i);
b = get_bson (filename);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &offset));
bson_destroy (b);
}
b = get_bson ("codewscope.bson");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &offset));
bson_destroy (b);
b = get_bson ("empty_key.bson");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate (b,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE | BSON_VALIDATE_UTF8 |
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS |
BSON_VALIDATE_DOT_KEYS,
&offset));
bson_destroy (b);
#define VALIDATE_TEST(_filename, _flags, _offset, _flag, _msg) \
b = get_bson (_filename); \
BSON_ASSERT (!bson_validate (b, _flags, &offset)); \
ASSERT_CMPSIZE_T (offset, ==, (size_t) _offset); \
BSON_ASSERT (!bson_validate_with_error (b, _flags, &error)); \
ASSERT_ERROR_CONTAINS (error, BSON_ERROR_INVALID, _flag, _msg); \
bson_destroy (b)
VALIDATE_TEST ("overflow2.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
9,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("trailingnull.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
14,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("dollarquery.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS | BSON_VALIDATE_DOT_KEYS,
4,
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS,
"keys cannot begin with \"$\": \"$query\"");
VALIDATE_TEST ("dotquery.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS | BSON_VALIDATE_DOT_KEYS,
4,
BSON_VALIDATE_DOT_KEYS,
"keys cannot contain \".\": \"abc.def\"");
VALIDATE_TEST ("overflow3.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
9,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
/* same outcome as above, despite different flags */
VALIDATE_TEST ("overflow3.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_UTF8,
9,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("overflow4.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
9,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("empty_key.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_EMPTY_KEYS,
4,
BSON_VALIDATE_EMPTY_KEYS,
"empty key");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test40.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test41.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test42.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test43.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test44.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test45.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test46.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test47.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test48.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test49.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("test50.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
10,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt code-with-scope");
VALIDATE_TEST ("test51.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
10,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt code-with-scope");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test52.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 9, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST (
"test53.bson", BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, 6, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, "corrupt BSON");
VALIDATE_TEST ("test54.bson",
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
12,
BSON_VALIDATE_NONE,
"corrupt BSON");
/* DBRef validation */
b = BCON_NEW ("my_dbref",
"{",
"$ref",
BCON_UTF8 ("collection"),
"$id",
BCON_INT32 (1),
"}");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &error));
BSON_ASSERT (
bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS, &error));
bson_destroy (b);
/* needs "$ref" before "$id" */
b = BCON_NEW ("my_dbref", "{", "$id", BCON_INT32 (1), "}");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &error));
BSON_ASSERT (
!bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS, &error));
ASSERT_ERROR_CONTAINS (error,
BSON_ERROR_INVALID,
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS,
"keys cannot begin with \"$\": \"$id\"");
bson_destroy (b);
/* two $refs */
b = BCON_NEW ("my_dbref",
"{",
"$ref",
BCON_UTF8 ("collection"),
"$ref",
BCON_UTF8 ("collection"),
"}");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &error));
BSON_ASSERT (
!bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS, &error));
ASSERT_ERROR_CONTAINS (error,
BSON_ERROR_INVALID,
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS,
"keys cannot begin with \"$\": \"$ref\"");
bson_destroy (b);
/* must not contain invalid key like "extra" */
b = BCON_NEW ("my_dbref",
"{",
"$ref",
BCON_UTF8 ("collection"),
"extra",
BCON_INT32 (2),
"$id",
BCON_INT32 (1),
"}");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_NONE, &error));
BSON_ASSERT (
!bson_validate_with_error (b, BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS, &error));
ASSERT_ERROR_CONTAINS (error,
BSON_ERROR_INVALID,
BSON_VALIDATE_DOLLAR_KEYS,
"invalid key within DBRef subdocument: \"extra\"");
bson_destroy (b);
#undef VALIDATE_TEST
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: _bson_iter_next_internal in bson-iter.c in libbson 1.12.0, as used in MongoDB mongo-c-driver and other products, has a heap-based buffer over-read via a crafted bson buffer.
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example. | Medium | 169,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXCodec::allocateBuffersOnPort(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mNativeWindow != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
return allocateOutputBuffersFromNativeWindow();
}
if ((mFlags & kEnableGrallocUsageProtected) && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
ALOGE("protected output buffers must be stent to an ANativeWindow");
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
status_t err = OK;
if ((mFlags & kStoreMetaDataInVideoBuffers)
&& portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
err = mOMX->storeMetaDataInBuffers(mNode, kPortIndexInput, OMX_TRUE);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("Storing meta data in video buffers is not supported");
return err;
}
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGV("allocating %u buffers of size %u on %s port",
def.nBufferCountActual, def.nBufferSize,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
if (def.nBufferSize != 0 && def.nBufferCountActual > SIZE_MAX / def.nBufferSize) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t totalSize = def.nBufferCountActual * def.nBufferSize;
mDealer[portIndex] = new MemoryDealer(totalSize, "OMXCodec");
for (OMX_U32 i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
sp<IMemory> mem = mDealer[portIndex]->allocate(def.nBufferSize);
CHECK(mem.get() != NULL);
BufferInfo info;
info.mData = NULL;
info.mSize = def.nBufferSize;
IOMX::buffer_id buffer;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput
&& ((mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnInputPorts)
|| (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers))) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else {
err = mOMX->useBuffer(mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("allocate_buffer_with_backup failed");
return err;
}
if (mem != NULL) {
info.mData = mem->pointer();
}
info.mBuffer = buffer;
info.mStatus = OWNED_BY_US;
info.mMem = mem;
info.mMediaBuffer = NULL;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF((mOMXLivesLocally
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)
&& (mQuirks & kDefersOutputBufferAllocation)),
"allocateBuffersOnPort cannot defer buffer allocation");
info.mMediaBuffer = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
info.mMediaBuffer->setObserver(this);
}
mPortBuffers[portIndex].push(info);
CODEC_LOGV("allocated buffer %u on %s port", buffer,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
sp<MetaData> meta = mSource->getFormat();
int32_t delay = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, &delay)) {
delay = 0;
}
int32_t padding = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, &padding)) {
padding = 0;
}
int32_t numchannels = 0;
if (delay + padding) {
if (mOutputFormat->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numchannels)) {
size_t frameSize = numchannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mSkipCutBuffer != NULL) {
size_t prevbuffersize = mSkipCutBuffer->size();
if (prevbuffersize != 0) {
ALOGW("Replacing SkipCutBuffer holding %zu bytes", prevbuffersize);
}
}
mSkipCutBuffer = new SkipCutBuffer(delay * frameSize, padding * frameSize);
}
}
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput && (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers)) {
Vector<MediaBuffer *> buffers;
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
const BufferInfo &info = mPortBuffers[kPortIndexInput].itemAt(i);
MediaBuffer *mbuf = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
buffers.push(mbuf);
}
status_t err = mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
if (err != OK) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
buffers.editItemAt(i)->release();
}
buffers.clear();
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec requested to use secure input buffers but "
"upstream source didn't support that.");
return err;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: OMXCodec.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 does not validate a certain pointer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29421811.
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
| High | 173,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void parse_sec_attr_44(sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
/* OpenSc Operation values for each command operation-type */
const int df_idx[8] = { /* byte 1 = OpenSC type of AC Bit0, byte 2 = OpenSC type of AC Bit1 ...*/
SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_OP_LOCK, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, -1};
const int ef_idx[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_WRITE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
const int efi_idx[8] = { /* internal EF used for RSA keys */
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
u8 bValue;
int i;
int iKeyRef = 0;
int iMethod;
int iPinCount;
int iOffset = 0;
int iOperation;
const int* p_idx;
/* Check all sub-AC definitions within the total AC */
while (len > 1) { /* minimum length = 2 */
int iACLen = buf[iOffset] & 0x0F;
iPinCount = -1; /* default no pin required */
iMethod = SC_AC_NONE; /* default no authentication required */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0X80) { /* AC in adaptive coding */
/* Evaluates only the command-byte, not the optional P1/P2/Option bytes */
int iParmLen = 1; /* command-byte is always present */
int iKeyLen = 0; /* Encryption key is optional */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) iKeyLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x40) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x20) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x10) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x08) iParmLen++;
/* Get KeyNumber if available */
if(iKeyLen) {
int iSC = buf[iOffset+iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ){
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
}
/* Get PinNumber if available */
if (iACLen > (1+iParmLen+iKeyLen)) { /* check via total length if pin is present */
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset+1+1+iParmLen]; /* PTL + AM-header + parameter-bytes */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Convert SETCOS command to OpenSC command group */
switch(buf[iOffset+2]){
case 0x2A: /* crypto operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO;
break;
case 0x46: /* key-generation operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_UPDATE;
break;
default:
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_SELECT;
break;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, iOperation, iMethod, iKeyRef);
}
else { /* AC in simple coding */
/* Initial AC is treated as an operational AC */
/* Get specific Cmd groups for specified file-type */
switch (file->type) {
case SC_FILE_TYPE_DF: /* DF */
p_idx = df_idx;
break;
case SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF: /* EF for RSA keys */
p_idx = efi_idx;
break;
default: /* EF */
p_idx = ef_idx;
break;
}
/* Encryption key present ? */
iPinCount = iACLen - 1;
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) {
int iSC = buf[iOffset + iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ) {
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
iPinCount--; /* one byte used for keyReference */
}
/* Pin present ? */
if ( iPinCount > 0 ) {
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset + 2]; /* pin ref */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Add AC for each command-operationType into OpenSc structure */
bValue = buf[iOffset + 1];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if((bValue & 1) && (p_idx[i] >= 0))
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, p_idx[i], iMethod, iKeyRef);
bValue >>= 1;
}
}
/* Current field treated, get next AC sub-field */
iOffset += iACLen +1; /* AC + PTL-byte */
len -= iACLen +1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 169,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBTransaction::IndexedDBTransaction(
int64_t id,
IndexedDBConnection* connection,
const std::set<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode,
IndexedDBBackingStore::Transaction* backing_store_transaction)
: id_(id),
object_store_ids_(object_store_ids),
mode_(mode),
connection_(connection),
transaction_(backing_store_transaction),
ptr_factory_(this) {
IDB_ASYNC_TRACE_BEGIN("IndexedDBTransaction::lifetime", this);
callbacks_ = connection_->callbacks();
database_ = connection_->database();
diagnostics_.tasks_scheduled = 0;
diagnostics_.tasks_completed = 0;
diagnostics_.creation_time = base::Time::Now();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Early free of object in use in IndexDB in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383} | Low | 173,220 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_open)
{
long options = MAGIC_NONE;
char *file = NULL;
int file_len = 0;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|lp", &options, &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
struct finfo_object *finfo_obj = (struct finfo_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (finfo_obj->ptr) {
magic_close(finfo_obj->ptr->magic);
efree(finfo_obj->ptr);
finfo_obj->ptr = NULL;
}
}
if (file_len == 0) {
file = NULL;
} else if (file && *file) { /* user specified file, perform open_basedir checks */
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if ((PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(file, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) || php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#else
if (php_check_open_basedir(file TSRMLS_CC)) {
#endif
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!expand_filepath_with_mode(file, resolved_path, NULL, 0, CWD_EXPAND TSRMLS_CC)) {
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
file = resolved_path;
}
finfo = emalloc(sizeof(struct php_fileinfo));
finfo->options = options;
finfo->magic = magic_open(options);
if (finfo->magic == NULL) {
efree(finfo);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid mode '%ld'.", options);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (magic_load(finfo->magic, file) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database at '%s'.", file);
magic_close(finfo->magic);
efree(finfo);
FILEINFO_DESTROY_OBJECT(object);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (object) {
FILEINFO_REGISTER_OBJECT(object, finfo);
} else {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, finfo, le_fileinfo);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto resource finfo_close(resource finfo)
Close fileinfo resource. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_close)
{
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zfinfo) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
zend_list_delete(Z_RESVAL_P(zfinfo));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool finfo_set_flags(resource finfo, int options)
Set libmagic configuration options. */
PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_set_flags)
{
long options;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &zfinfo, &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
}
FINFO_SET_OPTION(finfo->magic, options)
finfo->options = options;
RETURN_TRUE;
}
/* }}} */
#define FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER 0
#define FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM 1
#define FILEINFO_MODE_FILE 2
static void _php_finfo_get_type(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode, int mimetype_emu) /* {{{ */
{
long options = 0;
char *ret_val = NULL, *buffer = NULL;
int buffer_len;
struct php_fileinfo *finfo = NULL;
zval *zfinfo, *zcontext = NULL;
zval *what;
char mime_directory[] = "directory";
struct magic_set *magic = NULL;
FILEINFO_DECLARE_INIT_OBJECT(object)
if (mimetype_emu) {
/* mime_content_type(..) emulation */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &what) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(what)) {
case IS_STRING:
buffer = Z_STRVAL_P(what);
buffer_len = Z_STRLEN_P(what);
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_FILE;
break;
case IS_RESOURCE:
mode = FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
magic = magic_open(MAGIC_MIME_TYPE);
if (magic_load(magic, NULL) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to load magic database.");
goto common;
}
} else if (object) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|lr", &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
FILEINFO_FROM_OBJECT(finfo, object);
magic = finfo->magic;
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|lr", &zfinfo, &buffer, &buffer_len, &options, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
magic = finfo->magic;
}
/* Set options for the current file/buffer. */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, options)
}
switch (mode) {
case FILEINFO_MODE_BUFFER:
{
ret_val = (char *) magic_buffer(magic, buffer, buffer_len);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_STREAM:
{
php_stream *stream;
off_t streampos;
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream, &what);
if (!stream) {
goto common;
}
streampos = php_stream_tell(stream); /* remember stream position for restoration */
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_SET);
ret_val = (char *) magic_stream(magic, stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, streampos, SEEK_SET);
break;
}
case FILEINFO_MODE_FILE:
{
/* determine if the file is a local file or remote URL */
char *tmp2;
php_stream_wrapper *wrap;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (buffer == NULL || !*buffer) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty filename or path");
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
wrap = php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(buffer, &tmp2, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_stat_path_ex(buffer, 0, &ssb, context) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
goto common;
}
}
#endif
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", ENFORCE_SAFE_MODE | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#else
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(buffer, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
#endif
if (!stream) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean;
}
if (php_stream_stat(stream, &ssb) == SUCCESS) {
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
ret_val = mime_directory;
} else {
ret_val = (char *)magic_stream(magic, stream);
}
}
php_stream_close(stream);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Can only process string or stream arguments");
}
common:
if (ret_val) {
RETVAL_STRING(ret_val, 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed identify data %d:%s", magic_errno(magic), magic_error(magic));
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean:
if (mimetype_emu) {
magic_close(magic);
}
/* Restore options */
if (options) {
FINFO_SET_OPTION(magic, finfo->options)
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jpg_dec_parseopts(char *optstr, jpg_dec_importopts_t *opts)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
opts->max_size = 0;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(optstr ? optstr : ""))) {
return -1;
}
while (!jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(decopts,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case OPT_MAXSIZE:
opts->max_size = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring invalid option %s\n",
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp));
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,721 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int NaClIPCAdapter::TakeClientFileDescriptor() {
return io_thread_data_.channel_->TakeClientFileDescriptor();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_init_video_state(dec_state_t *ps_dec, e_video_type_t e_video_type)
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-1 <ISO/IEC 11172-2> standard */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(e_video_type == MPEG_1_VIDEO)
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 0;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* force MPEG-1 parameters for proper decoder behavior */
/* see ISO/IEC 13818-2 section D.9.14 */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_progressive_sequence = 1;
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = 0;
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = FRAME_PICTURE;
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = 1;
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = 0;
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = 0;
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = 0;
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = 0;
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d = 0;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Setting of parameters other than those mentioned in MPEG2 standard*/
/* but used in decoding process. */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-2 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
else
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 1;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg2;
}
impeg2d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
/* Set the frame Width and frame Height */
ps_dec->u2_frame_height = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
ps_dec->u2_frame_width = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size);
ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb = (ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size + 15) >> 4;
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height || ps_dec->u2_frame_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
{
return IMPEG2D_PIC_SIZE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded = 0;
/* Calculate the frame period */
{
UWORD32 numer;
UWORD32 denom;
numer = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][1] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d + 1);
denom = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][0] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n + 1);
ps_dec->u2_framePeriod = (numer * 1000 * 100) / denom;
}
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libmpeg2). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-64550583.
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
| High | 174,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The rose_recvmsg function in net/rose/af_rose.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing_size(void *user_data, int *size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
*size = 0;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (ioctl(slot->fd, FIONREAD, size) == 0) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to determine bytes remaining to be read on fd %d: %s", __func__, slot->fd, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int ret;
/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
return -ENODEV;
/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed, so we hard-coded it.
* Additionally, generic NCM devices are assumed to accept arbitrarily
* placed NDP.
*/
ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM, 0);
/*
* We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
* "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
* (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
* start IPv6 negotiation and more.
*/
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Double free vulnerability in drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device with an invalid USB descriptor.
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunScrollbarButtonLatencyTest() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
blink::WebFloatPoint scrollbar_forward_button(795, 595);
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_event = SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown, scrollbar_forward_button.x,
scrollbar_forward_button.y, 0);
mouse_event.button = blink::WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
mouse_event.SetTimeStamp(base::TimeTicks::Now());
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
mouse_event.SetType(blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseUp);
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
RunUntilInputProcessed(GetWidgetHost());
FetchHistogramsFromChildProcesses();
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.TimeToScrollUpdateSwapBegin4"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.RendererSwapToBrowserNotified2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.BrowserNotifiedToBeforeGpuSwap2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.GpuSwap2"));
std::string thread_name =
DoesScrollbarScrollOnMainThread() ? "Main" : "Impl";
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.TimeToHandled2_" + thread_name));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.HandledToRendererSwap2_" +
thread_name));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-281
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to local scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page, related to the unsafe-inline keyword.
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150} | Medium | 172,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
image = 0;
info = 0;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
goto error;
JAS_DBGLOG(1, (
"BMP header: magic 0x%x; siz %d; res1 %d; res2 %d; off %d\n",
hdr.magic, hdr.siz, hdr.reserved1, hdr.reserved2, hdr.off
));
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1,
("BMP information: len %ld; width %ld; height %ld; numplanes %d; "
"depth %d; enctype %ld; siz %ld; hres %ld; vres %ld; numcolors %ld; "
"mincolors %ld\n", JAS_CAST(long, info->len),
JAS_CAST(long, info->width), JAS_CAST(long, info->height),
JAS_CAST(long, info->numplanes), JAS_CAST(long, info->depth),
JAS_CAST(long, info->enctype), JAS_CAST(long, info->siz),
JAS_CAST(long, info->hres), JAS_CAST(long, info->vres),
JAS_CAST(long, info->numcolors), JAS_CAST(long, info->mincolors)));
if (info->width < 0 || info->height < 0 || info->numplanes < 0 ||
info->depth < 0 || info->siz < 0 || info->hres < 0 || info->vres < 0) {
jas_eprintf("corrupt bit stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
goto error;
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
error:
if (info) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
}
if (image) {
jas_image_destroy(image);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,713 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PropertyTreeManager::EmitClipMaskLayer() {
int clip_id = EnsureCompositorClipNode(current_clip_);
CompositorElementId mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id;
cc::Layer* mask_layer = client_.CreateOrReuseSynthesizedClipLayer(
current_clip_, mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id);
cc::EffectNode& mask_isolation = *GetEffectTree().Node(current_effect_id_);
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<uint64_t>(cc::EffectNode::INVALID_STABLE_ID),
mask_isolation.stable_id);
mask_isolation.stable_id = mask_isolation_id.ToInternalValue();
cc::EffectNode& mask_effect = *GetEffectTree().Node(
GetEffectTree().Insert(cc::EffectNode(), current_effect_id_));
mask_effect.stable_id = mask_effect_id.ToInternalValue();
mask_effect.clip_id = clip_id;
mask_effect.has_render_surface = true;
mask_effect.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
const TransformPaintPropertyNode* clip_space =
current_clip_->LocalTransformSpace();
root_layer_->AddChild(mask_layer);
mask_layer->set_property_tree_sequence_number(sequence_number_);
mask_layer->SetTransformTreeIndex(EnsureCompositorTransformNode(clip_space));
int scroll_id =
EnsureCompositorScrollNode(&clip_space->NearestScrollTranslationNode());
mask_layer->SetScrollTreeIndex(scroll_id);
mask_layer->SetClipTreeIndex(clip_id);
mask_layer->SetEffectTreeIndex(mask_effect.id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
struct svc_export *exp,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 *bmval,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp, int ignore_crossmnt)
{
u32 bmval0 = bmval[0];
u32 bmval1 = bmval[1];
u32 bmval2 = bmval[2];
struct kstat stat;
struct svc_fh *tempfh = NULL;
struct kstatfs statfs;
__be32 *p;
int starting_len = xdr->buf->len;
int attrlen_offset;
__be32 attrlen;
u32 dummy;
u64 dummy64;
u32 rdattr_err = 0;
__be32 status;
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
struct path path = {
.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
BUG_ON(bmval1 & NFSD_WRITEONLY_ATTRS_WORD1);
BUG_ON(!nfsd_attrs_supported(minorversion, bmval));
if (exp->ex_fslocs.migrated) {
status = fattr_handle_absent_fs(&bmval0, &bmval1, &bmval2, &rdattr_err);
if (status)
goto out;
}
err = vfs_getattr(&path, &stat, STATX_BASIC_STATS, AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
if (err)
goto out_nfserr;
if ((bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_AVAIL | FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE |
FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_TOTAL | FATTR4_WORD0_MAXNAME)) ||
(bmval1 & (FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_AVAIL | FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_FREE |
FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_TOTAL))) {
err = vfs_statfs(&path, &statfs);
if (err)
goto out_nfserr;
}
if ((bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILEHANDLE | FATTR4_WORD0_FSID)) && !fhp) {
tempfh = kmalloc(sizeof(struct svc_fh), GFP_KERNEL);
status = nfserr_jukebox;
if (!tempfh)
goto out;
fh_init(tempfh, NFS4_FHSIZE);
status = fh_compose(tempfh, exp, dentry, NULL);
if (status)
goto out;
fhp = tempfh;
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL) {
err = nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(rqstp, dentry, &acl);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
bmval0 &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_ACL;
else if (err == -EINVAL) {
status = nfserr_attrnotsupp;
goto out;
} else if (err != 0)
goto out_nfserr;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if ((bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) ||
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
&context, &contextlen);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
bmval2 &= ~FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
else if (err)
goto out_nfserr;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr, bmval0, bmval1, bmval2);
if (status)
goto out;
attrlen_offset = xdr->buf->len;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p++; /* to be backfilled later */
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
u32 supp[3];
memcpy(supp, nfsd_suppattrs[minorversion], sizeof(supp));
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dentry->d_inode))
supp[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_ACL;
if (!contextsupport)
supp[2] &= ~FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
if (!supp[2]) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 12);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(2);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(supp[0]);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(supp[1]);
} else {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 16);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(3);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(supp[0]);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(supp[1]);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(supp[2]);
}
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_TYPE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
dummy = nfs4_file_type(stat.mode);
if (dummy == NF4BAD) {
status = nfserr_serverfault;
goto out;
}
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(dummy);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FH_EXPIRE_TYPE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK)
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_FH_PERSISTENT);
else
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_FH_PERSISTENT|
NFS4_FH_VOL_RENAME);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_CHANGE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = encode_change(p, &stat, d_inode(dentry), exp);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, stat.size);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_LINK_SUPPORT) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SYMLINK_SUPPORT) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_NAMED_ATTR) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FSID) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 16);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
if (exp->ex_fslocs.migrated) {
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, NFS4_REFERRAL_FSID_MAJOR);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, NFS4_REFERRAL_FSID_MINOR);
} else switch(fsid_source(fhp)) {
case FSIDSOURCE_FSID:
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64)exp->ex_fsid);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64)0);
break;
case FSIDSOURCE_DEV:
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(MAJOR(stat.dev));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(MINOR(stat.dev));
break;
case FSIDSOURCE_UUID:
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, exp->ex_uuid,
EX_UUID_LEN);
break;
}
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_UNIQUE_HANDLES) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_LEASE_TIME) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(nn->nfsd4_lease);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_RDATTR_ERROR) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(rdattr_err);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL) {
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
if (acl == NULL) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
goto out_acl;
}
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(acl->naces);
for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4*3);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ace->type);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ace->flag);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ace->access_mask &
NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL);
status = nfsd4_encode_aclname(xdr, rqstp, ace);
if (status)
goto out;
}
}
out_acl:
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_ACLSUPPORT) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(IS_POSIXACL(dentry->d_inode) ?
ACL4_SUPPORT_ALLOW_ACL|ACL4_SUPPORT_DENY_ACL : 0);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_CANSETTIME) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_CASE_INSENSITIVE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_CASE_PRESERVING) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_CHOWN_RESTRICTED) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FILEHANDLE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, fhp->fh_handle.fh_size + 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, &fhp->fh_handle.fh_base,
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, stat.ino);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_AVAIL) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) statfs.f_ffree);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) statfs.f_ffree);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_TOTAL) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) statfs.f_files);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS) {
status = nfsd4_encode_fs_locations(xdr, rqstp, exp);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_HOMOGENEOUS) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXFILESIZE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, exp->ex_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_maxbytes);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXLINK) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(255);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXNAME) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(statfs.f_namelen);
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXREAD) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) svc_max_payload(rqstp));
}
if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXWRITE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (u64) svc_max_payload(rqstp));
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_MODE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.mode & S_IALLUGO);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_NO_TRUNC) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_NUMLINKS) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.nlink);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER) {
status = nfsd4_encode_user(xdr, rqstp, stat.uid);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP) {
status = nfsd4_encode_group(xdr, rqstp, stat.gid);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_RAWDEV) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32((u32) MAJOR(stat.rdev));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32((u32) MINOR(stat.rdev));
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_AVAIL) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
dummy64 = (u64)statfs.f_bavail * (u64)statfs.f_bsize;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, dummy64);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_FREE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
dummy64 = (u64)statfs.f_bfree * (u64)statfs.f_bsize;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, dummy64);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_TOTAL) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
dummy64 = (u64)statfs.f_blocks * (u64)statfs.f_bsize;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, dummy64);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
dummy64 = (u64)stat.blocks << 9;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, dummy64);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 12);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (s64)stat.atime.tv_sec);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.atime.tv_nsec);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_DELTA) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 12);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_METADATA) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 12);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (s64)stat.ctime.tv_sec);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.ctime.tv_nsec);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 12);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, (s64)stat.mtime.tv_sec);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.mtime.tv_nsec);
}
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID) {
struct kstat parent_stat;
u64 ino = stat.ino;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
/*
* Get parent's attributes if not ignoring crossmount
* and this is the root of a cross-mounted filesystem.
*/
if (ignore_crossmnt == 0 &&
dentry == exp->ex_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
err = get_parent_attributes(exp, &parent_stat);
if (err)
goto out_nfserr;
ino = parent_stat.ino;
}
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, ino);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS
if (bmval1 & FATTR4_WORD1_FS_LAYOUT_TYPES) {
status = nfsd4_encode_layout_types(xdr, exp->ex_layout_types);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_LAYOUT_TYPES) {
status = nfsd4_encode_layout_types(xdr, exp->ex_layout_types);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_LAYOUT_BLKSIZE) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(stat.blksize);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS */
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT) {
status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr, NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD0,
NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD1,
NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD2);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
contextlen);
if (status)
goto out;
}
attrlen = htonl(xdr->buf->len - attrlen_offset - 4);
write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, attrlen_offset, &attrlen, 4);
status = nfs_ok;
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (context)
security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
fh_put(tempfh);
kfree(tempfh);
}
if (status)
xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len);
return status;
out_nfserr:
status = nfserrno(err);
goto out;
out_resource:
status = nfserr_resource;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltCopyOf(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemCopyOfPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL;
int i;
xmlDocPtr oldXPContextDoc;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:copy-of : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "The xsl:copy-of element can be used to insert a result tree
* fragment into the result tree, without first converting it to
* a string as xsl:value-of does (see [7.6.1 Generating Text with
* xsl:value-of]). The required select attribute contains an
* expression. When the result of evaluating the expression is a
* result tree fragment, the complete fragment is copied into the
* result tree. When the result is a node-set, all the nodes in the
* set are copied in document order into the result tree; copying
* an element node copies the attribute nodes, namespace nodes and
* children of the element node as well as the element node itself;
* a root node is copied by copying its children. When the result
* is neither a node-set nor a result tree fragment, the result is
* converted to a string and then inserted into the result tree,
* as with xsl:value-of.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Evaluate the "select" expression.
*/
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
xpctxt->node = node;
if (comp != NULL) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, xpctxt);
xpctxt->doc = oldXPContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
/*
* Node-set
* --------
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a node set\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if (list != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* The list is already sorted in document order by XPath.
* Append everything in this order under ctxt->insert.
*/
for (i = 0;i < list->nodeNr;i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
if (cur == NULL)
continue;
if ((cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
cur->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
} else if (cur->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) {
xsltShallowCopyAttr(ctxt, inst,
ctxt->insert, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
} else {
xsltCopyTreeInternal(ctxt, inst,
cur, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
}
}
} else if (res->type == XPATH_XSLT_TREE) {
/*
* Result tree fragment
* --------------------
* E.g. via <xsl:variable ...><foo/></xsl:variable>
* Note that the root node of such trees is an xmlDocPtr in Libxslt.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result is a result tree fragment\n"));
#endif
list = res->nodesetval;
if ((list != NULL) && (list->nodeTab != NULL) &&
(list->nodeTab[0] != NULL) &&
(IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(list->nodeTab[0])))
{
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, inst,
list->nodeTab[0]->children, ctxt->insert, 0, 0);
}
} else {
xmlChar *value = NULL;
/*
* Convert to a string.
*/
value = xmlXPathCastToString(res);
if (value == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltCopyOf(): "
"failed to cast an XPath object to string.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
} else {
if (value[0] != 0) {
/*
* Append content as text node.
*/
xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, ctxt->insert, value, 0);
}
xmlFree(value);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_OF,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyOf: result %s\n", res->stringval));
#endif
}
}
} else {
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
}
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,322 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pf_detect(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf = units;
int k, unit;
printk("%s: %s version %s, major %d, cluster %d, nice %d\n",
name, name, PF_VERSION, major, cluster, nice);
par_drv = pi_register_driver(name);
if (!par_drv) {
pr_err("failed to register %s driver\n", name);
return -1;
}
k = 0;
if (pf_drive_count == 0) {
if (pi_init(pf->pi, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, pf_scratch, PI_PF,
verbose, pf->name)) {
if (!pf_probe(pf) && pf->disk) {
pf->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
} else
for (unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; unit++, pf++) {
int *conf = *drives[unit];
if (!conf[D_PRT])
continue;
if (pi_init(pf->pi, 0, conf[D_PRT], conf[D_MOD],
conf[D_UNI], conf[D_PRO], conf[D_DLY],
pf_scratch, PI_PF, verbose, pf->name)) {
if (pf->disk && !pf_probe(pf)) {
pf->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
}
if (k)
return 0;
printk("%s: No ATAPI disk detected\n", name);
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
blk_cleanup_queue(pf->disk->queue);
pf->disk->queue = NULL;
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&pf->tag_set);
put_disk(pf->disk);
}
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Segment::DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(m_pos < 0);
assert(m_pUnknownSize);
#if 0
assert(m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize() < 0); //TODO: verify this
const long long element_start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
pos = -m_pos;
assert(pos > element_start);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long element_size = -1;
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
element_size = total - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
element_size = segment_stop - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster ID or Cues ID
{
element_size = pos - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
#endif
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
assert(element_size >= 0);
m_pos = element_start + element_size;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#else
const long status = m_pUnknownSize->Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status == 0) //parsed a block
return 2; //continue parsing
assert(status > 0); //nothing left to parse of this cluster
const long long start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
const long long size = m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize();
assert(size >= 0);
pos = start + size;
m_pos = pos;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NavigateParams::NavigateParams(Browser* a_browser,
TabContentsWrapper* a_target_contents)
: target_contents(a_target_contents),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The view-source feature in Google Chrome before 16.0.912.63 allows remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static grub_err_t read_foo (struct grub_disk *disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, grub_size_t size, char *buf) {
if (disk != NULL) {
const int blocksize = 512; // unhardcode 512
int ret;
RIOBind *iob = disk->data;
if (bio) iob = bio;
ret = iob->read_at (iob->io, delta+(blocksize*sector),
(ut8*)buf, size*blocksize);
if (ret == -1)
return 1;
} else eprintf ("oops. no disk\n");
return 0; // 0 is ok
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack | Medium | 168,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vrrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len,
register const u_char *bp2, int ttl)
{
int version, type, auth_type = VRRP_AUTH_NONE; /* keep compiler happy */
const char *type_s;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
version = (bp[0] & 0xf0) >> 4;
type = bp[0] & 0x0f;
type_s = tok2str(type2str, "unknown type (%u)", type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VRRPv%u, %s", version, type_s));
if (ttl != 255)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (ttl %u)", ttl));
if (version < 2 || version > 3 || type != VRRP_TYPE_ADVERTISEMENT)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", vrid %u, prio %u", bp[1], bp[2]));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
if (version == 2) {
auth_type = bp[4];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", authtype %s", tok2str(auth2str, NULL, auth_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %us, length %u", bp[5], len));
} else { /* version == 3 */
uint16_t intvl = (bp[4] & 0x0f) << 8 | bp[5];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %ucs, length %u", intvl, len));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
int naddrs = bp[3];
int i;
char c;
if (version == 2 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
vec[0].ptr = bp;
vec[0].len = len;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
if (version == 3 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t cksum = nextproto4_cksum(ndo, (const struct ip *)bp2, bp,
len, len, IPPROTO_VRRP);
if (cksum)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", addrs"));
if (naddrs > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%d)", naddrs));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
c = ' ';
bp += 8;
for (i = 0; i < naddrs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
c = ',';
bp += 4;
}
if (version == 2 && auth_type == VRRP_AUTH_SIMPLE) { /* simple text password */
ND_TCHECK(bp[7]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auth \""));
if (fn_printn(ndo, bp, 8, ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vrrp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VRRP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-vrrp.c:vrrp_print().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14463/VRRP: Add a missing bounds check
In vrrp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 169,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: psf_close (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ uint32_t k ;
int error = 0 ;
if (psf->codec_close)
{ error = psf->codec_close (psf) ;
/* To prevent it being called in psf->container_close(). */
psf->codec_close = NULL ;
} ;
if (psf->container_close)
error = psf->container_close (psf) ;
error = psf_fclose (psf) ;
psf_close_rsrc (psf) ;
/* For an ISO C compliant implementation it is ok to free a NULL pointer. */
free (psf->container_data) ;
free (psf->codec_data) ;
free (psf->interleave) ;
free (psf->dither) ;
free (psf->peak_info) ;
free (psf->broadcast_16k) ;
free (psf->loop_info) ;
free (psf->instrument) ;
free (psf->cues) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
free (psf->format_desc) ;
free (psf->strings.storage) ;
if (psf->wchunks.chunks)
for (k = 0 ; k < psf->wchunks.used ; k++)
free (psf->wchunks.chunks [k].data) ;
free (psf->rchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->wchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->iterator) ;
free (psf->cart_16k) ;
memset (psf, 0, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE)) ;
free (psf) ;
return error ;
} /* psf_close */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. | Medium | 170,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(const int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplChromeOs::Speak(
const std::string& utterance,
const std::string& locale,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
chromeos::CrosLibrary* cros_library = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get();
if (!cros_library->EnsureLoaded()) {
set_error(kCrosLibraryNotLoadedError);
return false;
}
std::string options;
if (!locale.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyLocale,
locale,
&options);
}
if (!gender.empty()) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyGender,
gender,
&options);
}
if (rate >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyRate,
DoubleToString(rate * 5),
&options);
}
if (pitch >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyPitch,
DoubleToString(pitch * 2),
&options);
}
if (volume >= 0.0) {
AppendSpeakOption(
chromeos::SpeechSynthesisLibrary::kSpeechPropertyVolume,
DoubleToString(volume * 5),
&options);
}
if (!options.empty()) {
cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->SetSpeakProperties(
options.c_str());
}
return cros_library->GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary()->Speak(utterance.c_str());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The move_uploaded_file implementation in ext/standard/basic_functions.c in PHP before 5.4.39, 5.5.x before 5.5.23, and 5.6.x before 5.6.7 truncates a pathname upon encountering a \x00 character, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended extension restrictions and create files with unexpected names via a crafted second argument. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2006-7243.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hns_xgmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_xgmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.12, Hisilicon Network Subsystem (HNS) does not consider the ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS case when retrieving sset_count data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact, as demonstrated by incompatibility between hns_get_sset_count and ethtool_get_strings.
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int request_id,
bool* cancel) {
int current_id = -1;
if (!g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Get(preview_ui_addr, ¤t_id)) {
*cancel = true;
return;
}
*cancel = (request_id != current_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info,exception);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging an improper cast, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347. | High | 168,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsLoading() const {
return frame_tree_.IsLoading() &&
!(ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool config_save(const config_t *config, const char *filename) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(filename != NULL);
assert(*filename != '\0');
char *temp_filename = osi_calloc(strlen(filename) + 5);
if (!temp_filename) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for filename.", __func__);
return false;
}
strcpy(temp_filename, filename);
strcat(temp_filename, ".new");
FILE *fp = fopen(temp_filename, "wt");
if (!fp) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
for (const list_node_t *node = list_begin(config->sections); node != list_end(config->sections); node = list_next(node)) {
const section_t *section = (const section_t *)list_node(node);
fprintf(fp, "[%s]\n", section->name);
for (const list_node_t *enode = list_begin(section->entries); enode != list_end(section->entries); enode = list_next(enode)) {
const entry_t *entry = (const entry_t *)list_node(enode);
fprintf(fp, "%s = %s\n", entry->key, entry->value);
}
if (list_next(node) != list_end(config->sections))
fputc('\n', fp);
}
fflush(fp);
fclose(fp);
if (chmod(temp_filename, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to change file permissions '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
if (rename(temp_filename, filename) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to commit file '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
osi_free(temp_filename);
return true;
error:;
unlink(temp_filename);
osi_free(temp_filename);
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,479 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: media::mojom::VideoFrameDataPtr MakeVideoFrameData(
const scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame>& input) {
if (input->metadata()->IsTrue(media::VideoFrameMetadata::END_OF_STREAM)) {
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewEosData(
media::mojom::EosVideoFrameData::New());
}
if (input->storage_type() == media::VideoFrame::STORAGE_MOJO_SHARED_BUFFER) {
media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame* mojo_frame =
static_cast<media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame*>(input.get());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle dup = mojo_frame->Handle().Clone(
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::AccessMode::READ_ONLY);
DCHECK(dup.is_valid());
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewSharedBufferData(
media::mojom::SharedBufferVideoFrameData::New(
std::move(dup), mojo_frame->MappedSize(),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane)));
}
if (input->HasTextures()) {
std::vector<gpu::MailboxHolder> mailbox_holder(
media::VideoFrame::kMaxPlanes);
size_t num_planes = media::VideoFrame::NumPlanes(input->format());
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; i++)
mailbox_holder[i] = input->mailbox_holder(i);
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewMailboxData(
media::mojom::MailboxVideoFrameData::New(std::move(mailbox_holder)));
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported VideoFrame conversion";
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
return perf_read_hw(event, buf, count);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char* problem_data_save(problem_data_t *pd)
{
load_abrt_conf();
struct dump_dir *dd = create_dump_dir_from_problem_data(pd, g_settings_dump_location);
char *problem_id = NULL;
if (dd)
{
problem_id = xstrdup(dd->dd_dirname);
dd_close(dd);
}
log_info("problem id: '%s'", problem_id);
return problem_id;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | Low | 170,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
switch (csum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message: | High | 164,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mem_resize(jas_stream_memobj_t *m, int bufsize)
{
unsigned char *buf;
assert(bufsize >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_resize(%p, %d)\n", m, bufsize));
if (!(buf = jas_realloc2(m->buf_, bufsize, sizeof(unsigned char))) &&
bufsize) {
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_resize realloc failed\n"));
return -1;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_resize realloc succeeded\n"));
m->buf_ = buf;
m->bufsize_ = bufsize;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) jas_realloc function in base/jas_malloc.c and (2) mem_resize function in base/jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.22 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image, which triggers use after free vulnerabilities.
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior. | Medium | 168,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int OmniboxViewWin::OnPerformDropImpl(const views::DropTargetEvent& event,
bool in_drag) {
const ui::OSExchangeData& data = event.data();
if (data.HasURL()) {
GURL url;
string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(&url, &title)) {
string16 text(StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
SetUserText(text);
if (url.spec().length() == text.length())
model()->AcceptInput(CURRENT_TAB, true);
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
int string_drop_position = drop_highlight_position();
string16 text;
if ((string_drop_position != -1 || !in_drag) && data.GetString(&text)) {
DCHECK(string_drop_position == -1 ||
((string_drop_position >= 0) &&
(string_drop_position <= GetTextLength())));
if (in_drag) {
if (event.source_operations()== ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE)
MoveSelectedText(string_drop_position);
else
InsertText(string_drop_position, text);
} else {
PasteAndGo(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly implement the drag-and-drop feature, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void dex_parse_debug_item(RBinFile *binfile, RBinDexObj *bin,
RBinDexClass *c, int MI, int MA, int paddr, int ins_size,
int insns_size, char *class_name, int regsz,
int debug_info_off) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = binfile->rbin;
const ut8 *p4 = r_buf_get_at (binfile->buf, debug_info_off, NULL);
const ut8 *p4_end = p4 + binfile->buf->length - debug_info_off;
ut64 line_start;
ut64 parameters_size;
ut64 param_type_idx;
ut16 argReg = regsz - ins_size;
ut64 source_file_idx = c->source_file;
RList *params, *debug_positions, *emitted_debug_locals = NULL;
bool keep = true;
if (argReg > regsz) {
return; // this return breaks tests
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &line_start);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶meters_size);
ut32 address = 0;
ut32 line = line_start;
if (!(debug_positions = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return;
}
if (!(emitted_debug_locals = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
return;
}
struct dex_debug_local_t debug_locals[regsz];
memset (debug_locals, 0, sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t) * regsz);
if (!(MA & 0x0008)) {
debug_locals[argReg].name = "this";
debug_locals[argReg].descriptor = r_str_newf("%s;", class_name);
debug_locals[argReg].startAddress = 0;
debug_locals[argReg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[argReg].live = true;
argReg++;
}
if (!(params = dex_method_signature2 (bin, MI))) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
RListIter *iter = r_list_iterator (params);
char *name;
char *type;
int reg;
r_list_foreach (params, iter, type) {
if ((argReg >= regsz) || !type || parameters_size <= 0) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
return;
}
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ¶m_type_idx); // read uleb128p1
param_type_idx -= 1;
name = getstr (bin, param_type_idx);
reg = argReg;
switch (type[0]) {
case 'D':
case 'J':
argReg += 2;
break;
default:
argReg += 1;
break;
}
if (name) {
debug_locals[reg].name = name;
debug_locals[reg].descriptor = type;
debug_locals[reg].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[reg].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[reg].live = true;
}
--parameters_size;
}
ut8 opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
while (keep) {
switch (opcode) {
case 0x0: // DBG_END_SEQUENCE
keep = false;
break;
case 0x1: // DBG_ADVANCE_PC
{
ut64 addr_diff;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &addr_diff);
address += addr_diff;
}
break;
case 0x2: // DBG_ADVANCE_LINE
{
st64 line_diff = r_sleb128 (&p4, p4_end);
line += line_diff;
}
break;
case 0x3: // DBG_START_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = NULL;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x4: //DBG_START_LOCAL_EXTENDED
{
ut64 register_num;
ut64 name_idx;
ut64 type_idx;
ut64 sig_idx;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &name_idx);
name_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &type_idx);
type_idx -= 1;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &sig_idx);
sig_idx -= 1;
if (register_num >= regsz) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].name = getstr (bin, name_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].descriptor = dex_type_descriptor (bin, type_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].signature = getstr (bin, sig_idx);
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
break;
case 0x5: // DBG_END_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (debug_locals[register_num].live) {
struct dex_debug_local_t *local = malloc (
sizeof (struct dex_debug_local_t));
if (!local) {
keep = false;
break;
}
local->name = debug_locals[register_num].name;
local->descriptor = debug_locals[register_num].descriptor;
local->startAddress = debug_locals[register_num].startAddress;
local->signature = debug_locals[register_num].signature;
local->live = true;
local->reg = register_num;
local->endAddress = address;
r_list_append (emitted_debug_locals, local);
}
debug_locals[register_num].live = false;
}
break;
case 0x6: // DBG_RESTART_LOCAL
{
ut64 register_num;
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, ®ister_num);
if (!debug_locals[register_num].live) {
debug_locals[register_num].startAddress = address;
debug_locals[register_num].live = true;
}
}
break;
case 0x7: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_END
break;
case 0x8: //DBG_SET_PROLOGUE_BEGIN
break;
case 0x9:
{
p4 = r_uleb128 (p4, p4_end - p4, &source_file_idx);
source_file_idx--;
}
break;
default:
{
int adjusted_opcode = opcode - 0x0a;
address += (adjusted_opcode / 15);
line += -4 + (adjusted_opcode % 15);
struct dex_debug_position_t *position =
malloc (sizeof (struct dex_debug_position_t));
if (!position) {
keep = false;
break;
}
position->source_file_idx = source_file_idx;
position->address = address;
position->line = line;
r_list_append (debug_positions, position);
}
break;
}
opcode = *(p4++) & 0xff;
}
if (!binfile->sdb_addrinfo) {
binfile->sdb_addrinfo = sdb_new0 ();
}
char *fileline;
char offset[64];
char *offset_ptr;
RListIter *iter1;
struct dex_debug_position_t *pos;
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter1, pos) {
fileline = r_str_newf ("%s|%"PFMT64d, getstr (bin, pos->source_file_idx), pos->line);
offset_ptr = sdb_itoa (pos->address + paddr, offset, 16);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, offset_ptr, fileline, 0);
sdb_set (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, fileline, offset_ptr, 0);
}
if (!dexdump) {
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
return;
}
RListIter *iter2;
struct dex_debug_position_t *position;
rbin->cb_printf (" positions :\n");
r_list_foreach (debug_positions, iter2, position) {
rbin->cb_printf (" 0x%04llx line=%llu\n",
position->address, position->line);
}
rbin->cb_printf (" locals :\n");
RListIter *iter3;
struct dex_debug_local_t *local;
r_list_foreach (emitted_debug_locals, iter3, local) {
if (local->signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor,
local->signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s\n",
local->startAddress, local->endAddress,
local->reg, local->name, local->descriptor);
}
}
for (reg = 0; reg < regsz; reg++) {
if (debug_locals[reg].live) {
if (debug_locals[reg].signature) {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s "
"%s\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor,
debug_locals[reg].signature);
} else {
rbin->cb_printf (
" 0x%04x - 0x%04x reg=%d %s %s"
"\n",
debug_locals[reg].startAddress,
insns_size, reg, debug_locals[reg].name,
debug_locals[reg].descriptor);
}
}
}
r_list_free (debug_positions);
r_list_free (emitted_debug_locals);
r_list_free (params);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The dex_parse_debug_item function in libr/bin/p/bin_dex.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: fix #6872 | Medium | 168,340 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
if (vdev->queue_sel >= VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
return -1;
}
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
supported_features = k->get_features(qbus->parent);
error_report("Features 0x%x unsupported. Allowed features: 0x%x",
features, supported_features);
features, supported_features);
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the virtio_load function in hw/virtio/virtio.c in QEMU before 1.7.2 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted config length in a savevm image.
Commit Message: | High | 165,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int set_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
{
return usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_SET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_WRITE,
indx, 0, data, size, 500);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.11 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
static char buff[16384];
struct cpio _cpio; /* Allocated on stack. */
struct cpio *cpio;
const char *errmsg;
int uid, gid;
int opt;
cpio = &_cpio;
memset(cpio, 0, sizeof(*cpio));
cpio->buff = buff;
cpio->buff_size = sizeof(buff);
#if defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(SIGPIPE)
{ /* Ignore SIGPIPE signals. */
struct sigaction sa;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
}
#endif
/* Set lafe_progname before calling lafe_warnc. */
lafe_setprogname(*argv, "bsdcpio");
#if HAVE_SETLOCALE
if (setlocale(LC_ALL, "") == NULL)
lafe_warnc(0, "Failed to set default locale");
#endif
cpio->uid_override = -1;
cpio->gid_override = -1;
cpio->argv = argv;
cpio->argc = argc;
cpio->mode = '\0';
cpio->verbose = 0;
cpio->compress = '\0';
cpio->extract_flags = ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_AUTODIR;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
#if !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
if (geteuid() == 0)
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
#endif
cpio->bytes_per_block = 512;
cpio->filename = NULL;
cpio->matching = archive_match_new();
if (cpio->matching == NULL)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Out of memory");
while ((opt = cpio_getopt(cpio)) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '0': /* GNU convention: --null, -0 */
cpio->option_null = 1;
break;
case 'A': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->option_append = 1;
break;
case 'a': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_atime_restore = 1;
break;
case 'B': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->bytes_per_block = 5120;
break;
case OPTION_B64ENCODE:
cpio->add_filter = opt;
break;
case 'C': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->bytes_per_block = atoi(cpio->argument);
if (cpio->bytes_per_block <= 0)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Invalid blocksize %s", cpio->argument);
break;
case 'c': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->format = "odc";
break;
case 'd': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_AUTODIR;
break;
case 'E': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
if (archive_match_include_pattern_from_file(
cpio->matching, cpio->argument,
cpio->option_null) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
break;
case 'F': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD/GNU cpio */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'f': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (archive_match_exclude_pattern(cpio->matching,
cpio->argument) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
break;
case OPTION_GRZIP:
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'H': /* GNU cpio (also --format) */
cpio->format = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'h':
long_help();
break;
case 'I': /* NetBSD/OpenBSD */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'i': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -i and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
break;
case 'J': /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'j': /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case OPTION_INSECURE:
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
break;
case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
break;
case 'l': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_link = 1;
break;
case OPTION_LRZIP:
case OPTION_LZ4:
case OPTION_LZMA: /* GNU tar, others */
case OPTION_LZOP: /* GNU tar, others */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'm': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_TIME;
break;
case 'n': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->option_numeric_uid_gid = 1;
break;
case OPTION_NO_PRESERVE_OWNER: /* GNU cpio */
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
break;
case 'O': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->filename = cpio->argument;
break;
case 'o': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -o and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
break;
case 'p': /* POSIX 1997 */
if (cpio->mode != '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Cannot use both -p and -%c", cpio->mode);
cpio->mode = opt;
cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
break;
case OPTION_PASSPHRASE:
cpio->passphrase = cpio->argument;
break;
case OPTION_PRESERVE_OWNER:
cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
break;
case OPTION_QUIET: /* GNU cpio */
cpio->quiet = 1;
break;
case 'R': /* GNU cpio, also --owner */
/* TODO: owner_parse should return uname/gname
* also; use that to set [ug]name_override. */
errmsg = owner_parse(cpio->argument, &uid, &gid);
if (errmsg) {
lafe_warnc(-1, "%s", errmsg);
usage();
}
if (uid != -1) {
cpio->uid_override = uid;
cpio->uname_override = NULL;
}
if (gid != -1) {
cpio->gid_override = gid;
cpio->gname_override = NULL;
}
break;
case 'r': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_rename = 1;
break;
case 't': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->option_list = 1;
break;
case 'u': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->extract_flags
&= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
break;
case OPTION_UUENCODE:
cpio->add_filter = opt;
break;
case 'v': /* POSIX 1997 */
cpio->verbose++;
break;
case 'V': /* GNU cpio */
cpio->dot++;
break;
case OPTION_VERSION: /* GNU convention */
version();
break;
#if 0
/*
* cpio_getopt() handles -W specially, so it's not
* available here.
*/
case 'W': /* Obscure, but useful GNU convention. */
break;
#endif
case 'y': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'Z': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
case 'z': /* tar convention */
cpio->compress = opt;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
/*
* Sanity-check args, error out on nonsensical combinations.
*/
/* -t implies -i if no mode was specified. */
if (cpio->option_list && cpio->mode == '\0')
cpio->mode = 'i';
/* -t requires -i */
if (cpio->option_list && cpio->mode != 'i')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -t requires -i");
/* -n requires -it */
if (cpio->option_numeric_uid_gid && !cpio->option_list)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -n requires -it");
/* Can only specify format when writing */
if (cpio->format != NULL && cpio->mode != 'o')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option --format requires -o");
/* -l requires -p */
if (cpio->option_link && cpio->mode != 'p')
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Option -l requires -p");
/* -v overrides -V */
if (cpio->dot && cpio->verbose)
cpio->dot = 0;
/* TODO: Flag other nonsensical combinations. */
switch (cpio->mode) {
case 'o':
/* TODO: Implement old binary format in libarchive,
use that here. */
if (cpio->format == NULL)
cpio->format = "odc"; /* Default format */
mode_out(cpio);
break;
case 'i':
while (*cpio->argv != NULL) {
if (archive_match_include_pattern(cpio->matching,
*cpio->argv) != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Error : %s",
archive_error_string(cpio->matching));
--cpio->argc;
++cpio->argv;
}
if (cpio->option_list)
mode_list(cpio);
else
mode_in(cpio);
break;
case 'p':
if (*cpio->argv == NULL || **cpio->argv == '\0')
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"-p mode requires a target directory");
mode_pass(cpio, *cpio->argv);
break;
default:
lafe_errc(1, 0,
"Must specify at least one of -i, -o, or -p");
}
archive_match_free(cpio->matching);
free_cache(cpio->gname_cache);
free_cache(cpio->uname_cache);
free(cpio->destdir);
passphrase_free(cpio->ppbuff);
return (cpio->return_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Absolute path traversal vulnerability in bsdcpio in libarchive 3.1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a full pathname in an archive.
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool. | Medium | 166,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MojoVideoEncodeAccelerator::Encode(const scoped_refptr<VideoFrame>& frame,
bool force_keyframe) {
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << " tstamp=" << frame->timestamp();
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK_EQ(PIXEL_FORMAT_I420, frame->format());
DCHECK_EQ(VideoFrame::STORAGE_SHMEM, frame->storage_type());
DCHECK(frame->shared_memory_handle().IsValid());
const size_t allocation_size = frame->shared_memory_handle().GetSize();
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(frame->shared_memory_handle().Duplicate(),
allocation_size, true /* read_only */);
const size_t y_offset = frame->shared_memory_offset();
const size_t u_offset = y_offset + frame->data(VideoFrame::kUPlane) -
frame->data(VideoFrame::kYPlane);
const size_t v_offset = y_offset + frame->data(VideoFrame::kVPlane) -
frame->data(VideoFrame::kYPlane);
scoped_refptr<MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame> mojo_frame =
MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame::Create(
frame->format(), frame->coded_size(), frame->visible_rect(),
frame->natural_size(), std::move(handle), allocation_size, y_offset,
u_offset, v_offset, frame->stride(VideoFrame::kYPlane),
frame->stride(VideoFrame::kUPlane),
frame->stride(VideoFrame::kVPlane), frame->timestamp());
DCHECK(vea_.is_bound());
vea_->Encode(mojo_frame, force_keyframe,
base::Bind(&KeepVideoFrameAlive, frame));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void TreeNodesRemoved(TreeModel* model, TreeModelNode* parent,
int start, int count) {
removed_count_++;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle Skia paths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual uint8_t* GetReference(int block_idx) {
return reference_data_ + block_idx * kDataBlockSize;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const char *type,
const char *description,
const void *payload,
size_t plen,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
.description = description,
};
struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
goto error;
}
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
(!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
goto error_put_type;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
goto error_put_type;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
if (!index_key.description)
index_key.description = prep.description;
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.description)
goto error_free_prep;
}
index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
goto error_free_prep;
flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
* key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
* update that instead if possible
*/
if (index_key.type->update) {
key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
if (key_ref)
goto found_matching_key;
}
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (index_key.type->read)
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
index_key.type->update)
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
}
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
error_link_end:
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
error_free_prep:
if (index_key.type->preparse)
index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
error_put_type:
key_type_put(index_key.type);
error:
return key_ref;
found_matching_key:
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
goto error_free_prep;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | High | 168,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltTestCompMatch(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltCompMatchPtr comp,
xmlNodePtr node, const xmlChar *mode,
const xmlChar *modeURI) {
int i;
xsltStepOpPtr step, sel = NULL;
xsltStepStates states = {0, 0, NULL}; /* // may require backtrack */
if ((comp == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (ctxt == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltTestCompMatch: null arg\n");
return(-1);
}
if (mode != NULL) {
if (comp->mode == NULL)
return(0);
/*
* both mode strings must be interned on the stylesheet dictionary
*/
if (comp->mode != mode)
return(0);
} else {
if (comp->mode != NULL)
return(0);
}
if (modeURI != NULL) {
if (comp->modeURI == NULL)
return(0);
/*
* both modeURI strings must be interned on the stylesheet dictionary
*/
if (comp->modeURI != modeURI)
return(0);
} else {
if (comp->modeURI != NULL)
return(0);
}
i = 0;
restart:
for (;i < comp->nbStep;i++) {
step = &comp->steps[i];
if (step->op != XSLT_OP_PREDICATE)
sel = step;
switch (step->op) {
case XSLT_OP_END:
goto found;
case XSLT_OP_ROOT:
if ((node->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(node->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(node->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
continue;
if ((node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) && (node->name[0] == ' '))
continue;
goto rollback;
case XSLT_OP_ELEM:
if (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
goto rollback;
if (step->value == NULL)
continue;
if (step->value[0] != node->name[0])
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->name))
goto rollback;
/* Namespace test */
if (node->ns == NULL) {
if (step->value2 != NULL)
goto rollback;
} else if (node->ns->href != NULL) {
if (step->value2 == NULL)
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value2, node->ns->href))
goto rollback;
}
continue;
case XSLT_OP_ATTR:
if (node->type != XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)
goto rollback;
if (step->value != NULL) {
if (step->value[0] != node->name[0])
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->name))
goto rollback;
}
/* Namespace test */
if (node->ns == NULL) {
if (step->value2 != NULL)
goto rollback;
} else if (step->value2 != NULL) {
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value2, node->ns->href))
goto rollback;
}
continue;
case XSLT_OP_PARENT:
if ((node->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(node->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(node->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL))
goto rollback;
node = node->parent;
if (node == NULL)
goto rollback;
if (step->value == NULL)
continue;
if (step->value[0] != node->name[0])
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->name))
goto rollback;
/* Namespace test */
if (node->ns == NULL) {
if (step->value2 != NULL)
goto rollback;
} else if (node->ns->href != NULL) {
if (step->value2 == NULL)
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value2, node->ns->href))
goto rollback;
}
continue;
case XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR:
/* TODO: implement coalescing of ANCESTOR/NODE ops */
if (step->value == NULL) {
step = &comp->steps[i+1];
if (step->op == XSLT_OP_ROOT)
goto found;
/* added NS, ID and KEY as a result of bug 168208 */
if ((step->op != XSLT_OP_ELEM) &&
(step->op != XSLT_OP_ALL) &&
(step->op != XSLT_OP_NS) &&
(step->op != XSLT_OP_ID) &&
(step->op != XSLT_OP_KEY))
goto rollback;
}
if (node == NULL)
goto rollback;
if ((node->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
(node->type == XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
#endif
(node->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL))
goto rollback;
node = node->parent;
if ((step->op != XSLT_OP_ELEM) && step->op != XSLT_OP_ALL) {
xsltPatPushState(ctxt, &states, i, node);
continue;
}
i++;
if (step->value == NULL) {
xsltPatPushState(ctxt, &states, i - 1, node);
continue;
}
while (node != NULL) {
if ((node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(step->value[0] == node->name[0]) &&
(xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->name))) {
/* Namespace test */
if (node->ns == NULL) {
if (step->value2 == NULL)
break;
} else if (node->ns->href != NULL) {
if ((step->value2 != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(step->value2, node->ns->href)))
break;
}
}
node = node->parent;
}
if (node == NULL)
goto rollback;
xsltPatPushState(ctxt, &states, i - 1, node);
continue;
case XSLT_OP_ID: {
/* TODO Handle IDs decently, must be done differently */
xmlAttrPtr id;
if (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
goto rollback;
id = xmlGetID(node->doc, step->value);
if ((id == NULL) || (id->parent != node))
goto rollback;
break;
}
case XSLT_OP_KEY: {
xmlNodeSetPtr list;
int indx;
list = xsltGetKey(ctxt, step->value,
step->value3, step->value2);
if (list == NULL)
goto rollback;
for (indx = 0;indx < list->nodeNr;indx++)
if (list->nodeTab[indx] == node)
break;
if (indx >= list->nodeNr)
goto rollback;
break;
}
case XSLT_OP_NS:
if (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
goto rollback;
if (node->ns == NULL) {
if (step->value != NULL)
goto rollback;
} else if (node->ns->href != NULL) {
if (step->value == NULL)
goto rollback;
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->ns->href))
goto rollback;
}
break;
case XSLT_OP_ALL:
if (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
goto rollback;
break;
case XSLT_OP_PREDICATE: {
xmlNodePtr oldNode;
xmlDocPtr doc;
int oldCS, oldCP;
int pos = 0, len = 0;
int isRVT;
/*
* when there is cascading XSLT_OP_PREDICATE, then use a
* direct computation approach. It's not done directly
* at the beginning of the routine to filter out as much
* as possible this costly computation.
*/
if (comp->direct) {
if (states.states != NULL) {
/* Free the rollback states */
xmlFree(states.states);
}
return(xsltTestCompMatchDirect(ctxt, comp, node,
comp->nsList, comp->nsNr));
}
doc = node->doc;
if (XSLT_IS_RES_TREE_FRAG(doc))
isRVT = 1;
else
isRVT = 0;
/*
* Depending on the last selection, one may need to
* recompute contextSize and proximityPosition.
*/
oldCS = ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize;
oldCP = ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition;
if ((sel != NULL) &&
(sel->op == XSLT_OP_ELEM) &&
(sel->value != NULL) &&
(node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(node->parent != NULL)) {
xmlNodePtr previous;
int nocache = 0;
previous = (xmlNodePtr)
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr);
if ((previous != NULL) &&
(previous->parent == node->parent)) {
/*
* just walk back to adjust the index
*/
int indx = 0;
xmlNodePtr sibling = node;
while (sibling != NULL) {
if (sibling == previous)
break;
if ((sibling->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(previous->name != NULL) &&
(sibling->name != NULL) &&
(previous->name[0] == sibling->name[0]) &&
(xmlStrEqual(previous->name, sibling->name)))
{
if ((sel->value2 == NULL) ||
((sibling->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(sel->value2,
sibling->ns->href))))
indx++;
}
sibling = sibling->prev;
}
if (sibling == NULL) {
/* hum going backward in document order ... */
indx = 0;
sibling = node;
while (sibling != NULL) {
if (sibling == previous)
break;
if ((sibling->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(previous->name != NULL) &&
(sibling->name != NULL) &&
(previous->name[0] == sibling->name[0]) &&
(xmlStrEqual(previous->name, sibling->name)))
{
if ((sel->value2 == NULL) ||
((sibling->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(sel->value2,
sibling->ns->href))))
{
indx--;
}
}
sibling = sibling->next;
}
}
if (sibling != NULL) {
pos = XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->indexExtra, ival) + indx;
/*
* If the node is in a Value Tree we need to
* save len, but cannot cache the node!
* (bugs 153137 and 158840)
*/
if (node->doc != NULL) {
len = XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->lenExtra, ival);
if (!isRVT) {
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->previousExtra, ptr) = node;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->indexExtra, ival) = pos;
}
}
} else
pos = 0;
} else {
/*
* recompute the index
*/
xmlNodePtr parent = node->parent;
xmlNodePtr siblings = NULL;
if (parent) siblings = parent->children;
while (siblings != NULL) {
if (siblings->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
if (siblings == node) {
len++;
pos = len;
} else if ((node->name != NULL) &&
(siblings->name != NULL) &&
(node->name[0] == siblings->name[0]) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->name, siblings->name))) {
if ((sel->value2 == NULL) ||
((siblings->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(sel->value2,
siblings->ns->href))))
len++;
}
}
siblings = siblings->next;
}
if ((parent == NULL) || (node->doc == NULL))
nocache = 1;
else {
while (parent->parent != NULL)
parent = parent->parent;
if (((parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
(parent->type != XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) ||
(parent != (xmlNodePtr) node->doc))
nocache = 1;
}
}
if (pos != 0) {
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = len;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = pos;
/*
* If the node is in a Value Tree we cannot
* cache it !
*/
if ((!isRVT) && (node->doc != NULL) &&
(nocache == 0)) {
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr) =
node;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->indexExtra, ival) =
pos;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->lenExtra, ival) =
len;
}
}
} else if ((sel != NULL) && (sel->op == XSLT_OP_ALL) &&
(node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)) {
xmlNodePtr previous;
int nocache = 0;
previous = (xmlNodePtr)
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr);
if ((previous != NULL) &&
(previous->parent == node->parent)) {
/*
* just walk back to adjust the index
*/
int indx = 0;
xmlNodePtr sibling = node;
while (sibling != NULL) {
if (sibling == previous)
break;
if (sibling->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
indx++;
sibling = sibling->prev;
}
if (sibling == NULL) {
/* hum going backward in document order ... */
indx = 0;
sibling = node;
while (sibling != NULL) {
if (sibling == previous)
break;
if (sibling->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
indx--;
sibling = sibling->next;
}
}
if (sibling != NULL) {
pos = XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->indexExtra, ival) + indx;
/*
* If the node is in a Value Tree we cannot
* cache it !
*/
if ((node->doc != NULL) && !isRVT) {
len = XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->lenExtra, ival);
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->previousExtra, ptr) = node;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt,
sel->indexExtra, ival) = pos;
}
} else
pos = 0;
} else {
/*
* recompute the index
*/
xmlNodePtr parent = node->parent;
xmlNodePtr siblings = NULL;
if (parent) siblings = parent->children;
while (siblings != NULL) {
if (siblings->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
len++;
if (siblings == node) {
pos = len;
}
}
siblings = siblings->next;
}
if ((parent == NULL) || (node->doc == NULL))
nocache = 1;
else {
while (parent->parent != NULL)
parent = parent->parent;
if (((parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
(parent->type != XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) ||
(parent != (xmlNodePtr) node->doc))
nocache = 1;
}
}
if (pos != 0) {
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = len;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = pos;
/*
* If the node is in a Value Tree we cannot
* cache it !
*/
if ((node->doc != NULL) && (nocache == 0) && !isRVT) {
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr) =
node;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->indexExtra, ival) =
pos;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->lenExtra, ival) =
len;
}
}
}
oldNode = ctxt->node;
ctxt->node = node;
if (step->value == NULL)
goto wrong_index;
if (step->comp == NULL)
goto wrong_index;
if (!xsltEvalXPathPredicate(ctxt, step->comp, comp->nsList,
comp->nsNr))
goto wrong_index;
if (pos != 0) {
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = oldCS;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = oldCP;
}
ctxt->node = oldNode;
break;
wrong_index:
if (pos != 0) {
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = oldCS;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = oldCP;
}
ctxt->node = oldNode;
goto rollback;
}
case XSLT_OP_PI:
if (node->type != XML_PI_NODE)
goto rollback;
if (step->value != NULL) {
if (!xmlStrEqual(step->value, node->name))
goto rollback;
}
break;
case XSLT_OP_COMMENT:
if (node->type != XML_COMMENT_NODE)
goto rollback;
break;
case XSLT_OP_TEXT:
if ((node->type != XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(node->type != XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
goto rollback;
break;
case XSLT_OP_NODE:
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
break;
default:
goto rollback;
}
break;
}
}
found:
if (states.states != NULL) {
/* Free the rollback states */
xmlFree(states.states);
}
return(1);
rollback:
/* got an error try to rollback */
if (states.states == NULL)
return(0);
if (states.nbstates <= 0) {
xmlFree(states.states);
return(0);
}
states.nbstates--;
i = states.states[states.nbstates].step;
node = states.states[states.nbstates].node;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Pop: %d, %s\n", i, node->name);
#endif
goto restart;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov | High | 166,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ext2_put_super (struct super_block * sb)
{
int db_count;
int i;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
dquot_disable(sb, -1, DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED | DQUOT_LIMITS_ENABLED);
ext2_xattr_put_super(sb);
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
struct ext2_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
spin_lock(&sbi->s_lock);
es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state);
spin_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
ext2_sync_super(sb, es, 1);
}
db_count = sbi->s_gdb_count;
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
if (sbi->s_group_desc[i])
brelse (sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
kfree(sbi->s_debts);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
brelse (sbi->s_sbh);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,974 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mem_resize(jas_stream_memobj_t *m, int bufsize)
{
unsigned char *buf;
assert(m->buf_);
assert(bufsize >= 0);
if (!(buf = jas_realloc2(m->buf_, bufsize, sizeof(unsigned char)))) {
return -1;
}
m->buf_ = buf;
m->bufsize_ = bufsize;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the mem_close function in jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted BMP image to the imginfo command.
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day. | Medium | 168,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void readpng2_end_callback(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr;
/* retrieve the pointer to our special-purpose struct */
mainprog_ptr = png_get_progressive_ptr(png_ptr);
/* let the main program know that it should flush any buffered image
* data to the display now and set a "done" flag or whatever, but note
* that it SHOULD NOT DESTROY THE PNG STRUCTS YET--in other words, do
* NOT call readpng2_cleanup() either here or in the finish_display()
* routine; wait until control returns to the main program via
* readpng2_decode_data() */
(*mainprog_ptr->mainprog_finish_display)();
/* all done */
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
int prefix_len = 0;
int eivlen;
size_t align = 0;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int totlen = 0;
unsigned int j;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
totlen += pipelens[j];
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return (i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
return -1;
if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
mac_size = 0;
} else {
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
/*
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
*/
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
/*
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
/*
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
* 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
* payload)
*/
unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
if (prefix_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (prefix_len >
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
/* insufficient space */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}
if (create_empty_fragment) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
/*
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
* payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
*/
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
} else if (prefix_len) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
+ prefix_len;
} else {
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
}
}
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
} else
eivlen = 0;
totlen = 0;
/* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
/* write the header */
*(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
*(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
/*
* Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
&& !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
*(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
else
*(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
/* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen[j] = outbuf[j];
outbuf[j] += 2;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
totlen += pipelens[j];
/*
* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
}
/*
* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
* wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
* wb->buf
*/
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
&(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
1) < 0)
goto err;
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
if (eivlen) {
/*
* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
*/
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
}
}
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
goto err;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
goto err;
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
}
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
/*
* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
* debugging */
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (create_empty_fragment) {
/*
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
* out anything here
*/
if (j > 0) {
/* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
}
/* now let's set up wb */
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
}
/*
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
* retries later
*/
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
err:
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SensorCreated(scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor) {
if (!result_callback_) {
return;
}
if (!sensor) {
std::move(result_callback_).Run(nullptr);
return;
}
mojom::SensorType type = sensor->GetType();
sources_map_[type] = std::move(sensor);
if (sources_map_.size() == fusion_algorithm_->source_types().size()) {
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> fusion_sensor(new PlatformSensorFusion(
std::move(mapping_), provider_, std::move(fusion_algorithm_),
std::move(sources_map_)));
std::move(result_callback_).Run(fusion_sensor);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __init xfrm6_tunnel_spi_init(void)
{
xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem = kmem_cache_create("xfrm6_tunnel_spi",
sizeof(struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static zval *_xml_xmlchar_zval(const XML_Char *s, int len, const XML_Char *encoding)
{
zval *ret;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (s == NULL) {
ZVAL_FALSE(ret);
return ret;
}
if (len == 0) {
len = _xml_xmlcharlen(s);
}
Z_TYPE_P(ret) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ret) = xml_utf8_decode(s, len, &Z_STRLEN_P(ret), encoding);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message: | High | 165,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int do_mathemu(struct pt_regs *regs, struct fpustate *f)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned long tstate = regs->tstate;
u32 insn = 0;
int type = 0;
/* ftt tells which ftt it may happen in, r is rd, b is rs2 and a is rs1. The *u arg tells
whether the argument should be packed/unpacked (0 - do not unpack/pack, 1 - unpack/pack)
non-u args tells the size of the argument (0 - no argument, 1 - single, 2 - double, 3 - quad */
#define TYPE(ftt, r, ru, b, bu, a, au) type = (au << 2) | (a << 0) | (bu << 5) | (b << 3) | (ru << 8) | (r << 6) | (ftt << 9)
int freg;
static u64 zero[2] = { 0L, 0L };
int flags;
FP_DECL_EX;
FP_DECL_S(SA); FP_DECL_S(SB); FP_DECL_S(SR);
FP_DECL_D(DA); FP_DECL_D(DB); FP_DECL_D(DR);
FP_DECL_Q(QA); FP_DECL_Q(QB); FP_DECL_Q(QR);
int IR;
long XR, xfsr;
if (tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
die_if_kernel("unfinished/unimplemented FPop from kernel", regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc) != -EFAULT) {
if ((insn & 0xc1f80000) == 0x81a00000) /* FPOP1 */ {
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
/* QUAD - ftt == 3 */
case FMOVQ:
case FNEGQ:
case FABSQ: TYPE(3,3,0,3,0,0,0); break;
case FSQRTQ: TYPE(3,3,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FADDQ:
case FSUBQ:
case FMULQ:
case FDIVQ: TYPE(3,3,1,3,1,3,1); break;
case FDMULQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,1,2,1); break;
case FQTOX: TYPE(3,2,0,3,1,0,0); break;
case FXTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,0,0,0); break;
case FQTOS: TYPE(3,1,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FQTOD: TYPE(3,2,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FITOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,1,0,0,0); break;
case FSTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,1,0,0); break;
case FQTOI: TYPE(3,1,0,3,1,0,0); break;
/* We can get either unimplemented or unfinished
* for these cases. Pre-Niagara systems generate
* unfinished fpop for SUBNORMAL cases, and Niagara
* always gives unimplemented fpop for fsqrt{s,d}.
*/
case FSQRTS: {
unsigned long x = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
x = (x >> 14) & 0xf;
TYPE(x,1,1,1,1,0,0);
break;
}
case FSQRTD: {
unsigned long x = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
x = (x >> 14) & 0xf;
TYPE(x,2,1,2,1,0,0);
break;
}
/* SUBNORMAL - ftt == 2 */
case FADDD:
case FSUBD:
case FMULD:
case FDIVD: TYPE(2,2,1,2,1,2,1); break;
case FADDS:
case FSUBS:
case FMULS:
case FDIVS: TYPE(2,1,1,1,1,1,1); break;
case FSMULD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,1,1,1); break;
case FSTOX: TYPE(2,2,0,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOX: TYPE(2,2,0,2,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOS: TYPE(2,1,1,2,1,0,0); break;
case FSTOD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,1,0,0); break;
case FSTOI: TYPE(2,1,0,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOI: TYPE(2,1,0,2,1,0,0); break;
/* Only Ultra-III generates these */
case FXTOS: TYPE(2,1,1,2,0,0,0); break;
case FXTOD: TYPE(2,2,1,2,0,0,0); break;
#if 0 /* Optimized inline in sparc64/kernel/entry.S */
case FITOS: TYPE(2,1,1,1,0,0,0); break;
#endif
case FITOD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,0,0,0); break;
}
}
else if ((insn & 0xc1f80000) == 0x81a80000) /* FPOP2 */ {
IR = 2;
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
case FCMPQ: TYPE(3,0,0,3,1,3,1); break;
case FCMPEQ: TYPE(3,0,0,3,1,3,1); break;
/* Now the conditional fmovq support */
case FMOVQ0:
case FMOVQ1:
case FMOVQ2:
case FMOVQ3:
/* fmovq %fccX, %fY, %fZ */
if (!((insn >> 11) & 3))
XR = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> 10;
else
XR = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> (30 + ((insn >> 10) & 0x6));
XR &= 3;
IR = 0;
switch ((insn >> 14) & 0x7) {
/* case 0: IR = 0; break; */ /* Never */
case 1: if (XR) IR = 1; break; /* Not Equal */
case 2: if (XR == 1 || XR == 2) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Greater */
case 3: if (XR & 1) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered or Less */
case 4: if (XR == 1) IR = 1; break; /* Less */
case 5: if (XR & 2) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered or Greater */
case 6: if (XR == 2) IR = 1; break; /* Greater */
case 7: if (XR == 3) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered */
}
if ((insn >> 14) & 8)
IR ^= 1;
break;
case FMOVQI:
case FMOVQX:
/* fmovq %[ix]cc, %fY, %fZ */
XR = regs->tstate >> 32;
if ((insn >> 5) & 0x80)
XR >>= 4;
XR &= 0xf;
IR = 0;
freg = ((XR >> 2) ^ XR) & 2;
switch ((insn >> 14) & 0x7) {
/* case 0: IR = 0; break; */ /* Never */
case 1: if (XR & 4) IR = 1; break; /* Equal */
case 2: if ((XR & 4) || freg) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Equal */
case 3: if (freg) IR = 1; break; /* Less */
case 4: if (XR & 5) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Equal Unsigned */
case 5: if (XR & 1) IR = 1; break; /* Carry Set */
case 6: if (XR & 8) IR = 1; break; /* Negative */
case 7: if (XR & 2) IR = 1; break; /* Overflow Set */
}
if ((insn >> 14) & 8)
IR ^= 1;
break;
case FMOVQZ:
case FMOVQLE:
case FMOVQLZ:
case FMOVQNZ:
case FMOVQGZ:
case FMOVQGE:
freg = (insn >> 14) & 0x1f;
if (!freg)
XR = 0;
else if (freg < 16)
XR = regs->u_regs[freg];
else if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
flushw_user ();
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
get_user(XR, &win32->locals[freg - 16]);
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
flushw_user ();
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
get_user(XR, &win->locals[freg - 16]);
}
IR = 0;
switch ((insn >> 10) & 3) {
case 1: if (!XR) IR = 1; break; /* Register Zero */
case 2: if (XR <= 0) IR = 1; break; /* Register Less Than or Equal to Zero */
case 3: if (XR < 0) IR = 1; break; /* Register Less Than Zero */
}
if ((insn >> 10) & 4)
IR ^= 1;
break;
}
if (IR == 0) {
/* The fmov test was false. Do a nop instead */
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~(FSR_CEXC_MASK);
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
return 1;
} else if (IR == 1) {
/* Change the instruction into plain fmovq */
insn = (insn & 0x3e00001f) | 0x81a00060;
TYPE(3,3,0,3,0,0,0);
}
}
}
if (type) {
argp rs1 = NULL, rs2 = NULL, rd = NULL;
freg = (current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> 14) & 0xf;
if (freg != (type >> 9))
goto err;
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
freg = ((insn >> 14) & 0x1f);
switch (type & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rs1 = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags))
rs1 = (argp)&zero;
break;
}
switch (type & 0x7) {
case 7: FP_UNPACK_QP (QA, rs1); break;
case 6: FP_UNPACK_DP (DA, rs1); break;
case 5: FP_UNPACK_SP (SA, rs1); break;
}
freg = (insn & 0x1f);
switch ((type >> 3) & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rs2 = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags))
rs2 = (argp)&zero;
break;
}
switch ((type >> 3) & 0x7) {
case 7: FP_UNPACK_QP (QB, rs2); break;
case 6: FP_UNPACK_DP (DB, rs2); break;
case 5: FP_UNPACK_SP (SB, rs2); break;
}
freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
switch ((type >> 6) & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rd = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flags;
break;
}
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
/* + */
case FADDS: FP_ADD_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FADDD: FP_ADD_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FADDQ: FP_ADD_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* - */
case FSUBS: FP_SUB_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FSUBD: FP_SUB_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FSUBQ: FP_SUB_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* * */
case FMULS: FP_MUL_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FSMULD: FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DA, SA);
FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DB, SB);
case FMULD: FP_MUL_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FDMULQ: FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QA, DA);
FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QB, DB);
case FMULQ: FP_MUL_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* / */
case FDIVS: FP_DIV_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FDIVD: FP_DIV_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FDIVQ: FP_DIV_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* sqrt */
case FSQRTS: FP_SQRT_S (SR, SB); break;
case FSQRTD: FP_SQRT_D (DR, DB); break;
case FSQRTQ: FP_SQRT_Q (QR, QB); break;
/* mov */
case FMOVQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0]; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
case FABSQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0] & 0x7fffffffffffffffUL; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
case FNEGQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0] ^ 0x8000000000000000UL; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
/* float to int */
case FSTOI: FP_TO_INT_S (IR, SB, 32, 1); break;
case FDTOI: FP_TO_INT_D (IR, DB, 32, 1); break;
case FQTOI: FP_TO_INT_Q (IR, QB, 32, 1); break;
case FSTOX: FP_TO_INT_S (XR, SB, 64, 1); break;
case FDTOX: FP_TO_INT_D (XR, DB, 64, 1); break;
case FQTOX: FP_TO_INT_Q (XR, QB, 64, 1); break;
/* int to float */
case FITOQ: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_Q (QR, IR, 32, int); break;
case FXTOQ: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_Q (QR, XR, 64, long); break;
/* Only Ultra-III generates these */
case FXTOS: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_S (SR, XR, 64, long); break;
case FXTOD: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_D (DR, XR, 64, long); break;
#if 0 /* Optimized inline in sparc64/kernel/entry.S */
case FITOS: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_S (SR, IR, 32, int); break;
#endif
case FITOD: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_D (DR, IR, 32, int); break;
/* float to float */
case FSTOD: FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DR, SB); break;
case FSTOQ: FP_CONV (Q, S, 2, 1, QR, SB); break;
case FDTOQ: FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QR, DB); break;
case FDTOS: FP_CONV (S, D, 1, 1, SR, DB); break;
case FQTOS: FP_CONV (S, Q, 1, 2, SR, QB); break;
case FQTOD: FP_CONV (D, Q, 1, 2, DR, QB); break;
/* comparison */
case FCMPQ:
case FCMPEQ:
FP_CMP_Q(XR, QB, QA, 3);
if (XR == 3 &&
(((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) == FCMPEQ ||
FP_ISSIGNAN_Q(QA) ||
FP_ISSIGNAN_Q(QB)))
FP_SET_EXCEPTION (FP_EX_INVALID);
}
if (!FP_INHIBIT_RESULTS) {
switch ((type >> 6) & 0x7) {
case 0: xfsr = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
if (XR == -1) XR = 2;
switch (freg & 3) {
/* fcc0, 1, 2, 3 */
case 0: xfsr &= ~0xc00; xfsr |= (XR << 10); break;
case 1: xfsr &= ~0x300000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 32); break;
case 2: xfsr &= ~0xc00000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 34); break;
case 3: xfsr &= ~0x3000000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 36); break;
}
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] = xfsr;
break;
case 1: rd->s = IR; break;
case 2: rd->d = XR; break;
case 5: FP_PACK_SP (rd, SR); break;
case 6: FP_PACK_DP (rd, DR); break;
case 7: FP_PACK_QP (rd, QR); break;
}
}
if(_fex != 0)
return record_exception(regs, _fex);
/* Success and no exceptions detected. */
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~(FSR_CEXC_MASK);
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
return 1;
}
err: return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hi3660_stub_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct resource *res;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
/* Use mailbox client without blocking */
stub_clk_chan.cl.dev = dev;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_done = NULL;
stub_clk_chan.cl.tx_block = false;
stub_clk_chan.cl.knows_txdone = false;
/* Allocate mailbox channel */
stub_clk_chan.mbox = mbox_request_channel(&stub_clk_chan.cl, 0);
if (IS_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox))
return PTR_ERR(stub_clk_chan.mbox);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
freq_reg = devm_ioremap(dev, res->start, resource_size(res));
if (!freq_reg)
return -ENOMEM;
freq_reg += HI3660_STUB_CLOCK_DATA;
for (i = 0; i < HI3660_CLK_STUB_NUM; i++) {
ret = devm_clk_hw_register(&pdev->dev, &hi3660_stub_clks[i].hw);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider(&pdev->dev, hi3660_stub_clk_hw_get,
hi3660_stub_clks);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The hi3660_stub_clk_probe function in drivers/clk/hisilicon/clk-hi3660-stub.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by triggering a failure of resource retrieval.
Commit Message: clk: hisilicon: hi3660：Fix potential NULL dereference in hi3660_stub_clk_probe()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to
avoid potential NULL dereferencing.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Fixes: 4f16f7ff3bc0 ("clk: hisilicon: Add support for Hi3660 stub clocks")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FrameImpl::~FrameImpl() {
window_tree_host_->Hide();
window_tree_host_->compositor()->SetVisible(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155} | High | 172,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ldp_pdu_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr)
{
const struct ldp_common_header *ldp_com_header;
const struct ldp_msg_header *ldp_msg_header;
const u_char *tptr,*msg_tptr;
u_short tlen;
u_short pdu_len,msg_len,msg_type,msg_tlen;
int hexdump,processed;
ldp_com_header = (const struct ldp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version) != LDP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP version %u packet not supported",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version)));
return 0;
}
pdu_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->pdu_length);
if (pdu_len < sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, pdu-length: %u (too short, < %u)",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
pdu_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* print the LSR-ID, label-space & length */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, Label-Space-ID: %s:%u, pdu-length: %u",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ldp_com_header->lsr_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->label_space),
pdu_len));
/* bail out if non-verbose */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
return 0;
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tptr = pptr + sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header);
tlen = pdu_len - (sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the msg header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header));
ldp_msg_header = (const struct ldp_msg_header *)tptr;
msg_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->length);
msg_type=LDP_MASK_MSG_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->type));
if (msg_len < sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u (too short, < %u)",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u, Message ID: 0x%08x, Flags: [%s if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ldp_msg_header->id),
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_msg_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore"));
msg_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header);
msg_tlen=msg_len-(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the message ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, msg_len);
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(msg_type) {
case LDP_MSG_NOTIF:
case LDP_MSG_HELLO:
case LDP_MSG_INIT:
case LDP_MSG_KEEPALIVE:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_MAPPING:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS_WITHDRAW:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_WITHDRAW:
while(msg_tlen >= 4) {
processed = ldp_tlv_print(ndo, msg_tptr, msg_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
msg_tlen-=processed;
msg_tptr+=processed;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined messages that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_REQUEST:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_RELEASE:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_ABORT_REQUEST:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, msg_tptr, "\n\t ", msg_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump==TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header), "\n\t ",
msg_len);
tptr += msg_len+4;
tlen -= msg_len+4;
}
return pdu_len+4;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-ldp.c:ldp_tlv_print().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment. | High | 169,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL) {
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (!(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
continue;
}
mReceivedEOS = true;
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
} else if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx);
DUMP_TO_FILE(mInFile, s_dec_ip.pv_stream_buffer, s_dec_ip.u4_num_Bytes);
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool unsupportedResolution =
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
/* Check for unsupported dimensions */
if (unsupportedResolution) {
ALOGE("Unsupported resolution : %dx%d", mWidth, mHeight);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool allocationFailed = (IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
if (allocationFailed) {
ALOGE("Allocation failure in decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
PRINT_TIME("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
| High | 174,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void utee_param_to_param(struct tee_ta_param *p, struct utee_params *up)
{
size_t n;
uint32_t types = up->types;
p->types = types;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
uintptr_t a = up->vals[n * 2];
size_t b = up->vals[n * 2 + 1];
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
p->u[n].mem.mobj = &mobj_virt;
p->u[n].mem.offs = a;
p->u[n].mem.size = b;
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT:
p->u[n].val.a = a;
p->u[n].val.b = b;
break;
default:
memset(&p->u[n], 0, sizeof(p->u[n]));
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Memory corruption and disclosure of memory content. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]> | High | 169,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_call(spl_filesystem_object *intern, zend_function *func_ptr, int pass_num_args, zval *return_value, zval *arg2 TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcic;
zval z_fname;
zval * zresource_ptr = &intern->u.file.zresource, *retval;
int result;
int num_args = pass_num_args + (arg2 ? 2 : 1);
zval ***params = (zval***)safe_emalloc(num_args, sizeof(zval**), 0);
params[0] = &zresource_ptr;
if (arg2) {
params[1] = &arg2;
}
zend_get_parameters_array_ex(pass_num_args, params+(arg2 ? 2 : 1));
ZVAL_STRING(&z_fname, func_ptr->common.function_name, 0);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.object_ptr = NULL;
fci.function_name = &z_fname;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = num_args;
fci.params = params;
fci.no_separation = 1;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fcic.initialized = 1;
fcic.function_handler = func_ptr;
fcic.calling_scope = NULL;
fcic.called_scope = NULL;
fcic.object_ptr = NULL;
result = zend_call_function(&fci, &fcic TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
} else {
ZVAL_ZVAL(return_value, retval, 1, 1);
}
efree(params);
return result;
} /* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc (exsltFuncFunctionData *data,
exsltFuncImportRegData *ch,
const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *name,
ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED const xmlChar *ignored) {
exsltFuncFunctionData *func=NULL;
if ((data == NULL) || (ch == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return;
if (ch->ctxt == NULL || ch->hash == NULL)
return;
/* Check if already present */
func = (exsltFuncFunctionData*)xmlHashLookup2(ch->hash, URI, name);
if (func == NULL) { /* Not yet present - copy it in */
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
memcpy(func, data, sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
if (xmlHashAddEntry2(ch->hash, URI, name, func) < 0) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
} else { /* Do the registration */
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncRegisterImportFunc: register {%s}%s\n",
URI, name);
xsltRegisterExtFunction(ch->ctxt, name, URI,
exsltFuncFunctionFunction);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak referrer information via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
[email protected]
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211} | Medium | 172,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asn1_get_octet_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *str_len)
{
int len_len;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
/* if(str==NULL) return ASN1_SUCCESS; */
*str_len = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len);
if (*str_len < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = *str_len + len_len;
if (str_size >= *str_len)
memcpy (str, der + len_len, *str_len);
else
{
return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The asn1_get_bit_der function in GNU Libtasn1 before 3.6 does not properly report an error when a negative bit length is identified, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause out-of-bounds access via crafted ASN.1 data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(factory_);
visitor->Trace(resolver_);
visitor->Trace(options_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Incorrect object lifecycle management in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342} | Medium | 173,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int hfsplus_set_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl,
int type)
{
int err;
char *xattr_name;
size_t size = 0;
char *value = NULL;
hfs_dbg(ACL_MOD, "[%s]: ino %lu\n", __func__, inode->i_ino);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
err = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
err = 0;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
if (unlikely(size > HFSPLUS_MAX_INLINE_DATA_SIZE))
return -ENOMEM;
value = (char *)hfsplus_alloc_attr_entry();
if (unlikely(!value))
return -ENOMEM;
err = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto end_set_acl;
}
err = __hfsplus_setxattr(inode, xattr_name, value, size, 0);
end_set_acl:
hfsplus_destroy_attr_entry((hfsplus_attr_entry *)value);
if (!err)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.8.2 preserves the setgid bit during a setxattr call, which allows local users to gain group privileges by leveraging the existence of a setgid program with restrictions on execute permissions.
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> | Low | 166,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
int vnet_hdr_len = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
goto out;
#if 0
/* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */
if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0)
return -ENODEV;
#endif
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
err = packet_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
goto out;
}
/*
* Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts
* of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it
* in the protocol layers.
*
* Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down,
* but then it will block.
*/
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
/*
* An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram()
* handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking
* retries.
*/
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) {
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
err = -EINVAL;
vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr);
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto out_free;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
/* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb);
vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size;
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE)
goto out_free;
else
BUG();
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
} else
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} /* else everything is zero */
err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr,
vnet_hdr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill
* it in now.
*/
sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll;
if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET)
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt);
else
msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr);
/*
* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a
* user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway.
*/
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (msg->msg_name)
memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa,
msg->msg_namelen);
if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) {
struct tpacket_auxdata aux;
aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen;
aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len;
aux.tp_mac = 0;
aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb);
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb);
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID;
} else {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0;
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux);
}
/*
* Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this
* hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us.
*/
err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3 does not properly restrict user-space access to certain packet data structures associated with VLAN Tag Control Information, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information via a crafted application.
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,847 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
int chunk_size;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length) {
while (!sg.resid) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
assert(data_length > 0);
chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The pvscsi_convert_sglist function in hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) by leveraging an incorrect cast.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GF_Err tenc_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackEncryptionBox *ptr = (GF_TrackEncryptionBox*) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackEncryptionBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "isEncrypted=\"%d\"", ptr->isProtected);
if (ptr->Per_Sample_IV_Size)
fprintf(trace, " IV_size=\"%d\" KID=\"", ptr->Per_Sample_IV_Size);
else {
fprintf(trace, " constant_IV_size=\"%d\" constant_IV=\"", ptr->constant_IV_size);
dump_data_hex(trace, (char *) ptr->constant_IV, ptr->constant_IV_size);
fprintf(trace, "\" KID=\"");
}
dump_data_hex(trace, (char *) ptr->KID, 16);
if (ptr->version)
fprintf(trace, "\" crypt_byte_block=\"%d\" skip_byte_block=\"%d", ptr->crypt_byte_block, ptr->skip_byte_block);
fprintf(trace, "\">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackEncryptionBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in MP4Box in GPAC 0.7.1. There is a heap-based buffer over-read in the isomedia/box_dump.c function hdlr_dump.
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) | High | 169,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int misaligned_fpu_store(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_paired_load)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int srcreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
/* Initialise these to NaNs. */
__u32 buflo=0xffffffffUL, bufhi=0xffffffffUL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
/* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so
context switch the registers into memory so they can be
indexed by register number. */
if (last_task_used_math == current) {
enable_fpu();
save_fpu(current);
disable_fpu();
last_task_used_math = NULL;
regs->sr |= SR_FD;
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 2:
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
break;
case 3:
if (do_paired_load) {
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
} else {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#else
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#endif
}
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_store, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
*(__u32*) &buffer = buflo;
*(1 + (__u32*) &buffer) = bufhi;
if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
return 0;
} else {
die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0);
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadGRAYImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(size_t) image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.gray[100x100+10+20]).
*/
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
scene=0;
count=0;
length=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,image->columns,
1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) ALIGN16(u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
return SET_IVD_FATAL_ERROR(e_error);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libmpeg2 in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-34093952.
Commit Message: Check for Valid Frame Rate in Header
Bug: 34093952
Change-Id: I9f009edda84555e8d14b138684a38114fb888bf8
(cherry picked from commit 3f068a4e66cc972cf798c79a196099bd7d3bfceb)
| Medium | 174,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line,
size_t lineno, int action)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
static uint32_t last_cont_level = 0;
#endif
size_t i;
struct magic *m;
const char *l = line;
char *t;
int op;
uint32_t cont_level;
int32_t diff;
cont_level = 0;
/*
* Parse the offset.
*/
while (*l == '>') {
++l; /* step over */
cont_level++;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
if (cont_level == 0 || cont_level > last_cont_level)
if (file_check_mem(ms, cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
last_cont_level = cont_level;
#endif
if (cont_level != 0) {
if (me->mp == NULL) {
file_magerror(ms, "No current entry for continuation");
return -1;
}
if (me->cont_count == 0) {
file_magerror(ms, "Continuations present with 0 count");
return -1;
}
m = &me->mp[me->cont_count - 1];
diff = (int32_t)cont_level - (int32_t)m->cont_level;
if (diff > 1)
file_magwarn(ms, "New continuation level %u is more "
"than one larger than current level %u", cont_level,
m->cont_level);
if (me->cont_count == me->max_count) {
struct magic *nm;
size_t cnt = me->max_count + ALLOC_CHUNK;
if ((nm = CAST(struct magic *, realloc(me->mp,
sizeof(*nm) * cnt))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*nm) * cnt);
return -1;
}
me->mp = m = nm;
me->max_count = CAST(uint32_t, cnt);
}
m = &me->mp[me->cont_count++];
(void)memset(m, 0, sizeof(*m));
m->cont_level = cont_level;
} else {
static const size_t len = sizeof(*m) * ALLOC_CHUNK;
if (me->mp != NULL)
return 1;
if ((m = CAST(struct magic *, malloc(len))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
me->mp = m;
me->max_count = ALLOC_CHUNK;
(void)memset(m, 0, sizeof(*m));
m->factor_op = FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE;
m->cont_level = 0;
me->cont_count = 1;
}
m->lineno = CAST(uint32_t, lineno);
if (*l == '&') { /* m->cont_level == 0 checked below. */
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= OFFADD;
}
if (*l == '(') {
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= INDIR;
if (m->flag & OFFADD)
m->flag = (m->flag & ~OFFADD) | INDIROFFADD;
if (*l == '&') { /* m->cont_level == 0 checked below */
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= OFFADD;
}
}
/* Indirect offsets are not valid at level 0. */
if (m->cont_level == 0 && (m->flag & (OFFADD | INDIROFFADD)))
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "relative offset at level 0");
/* get offset, then skip over it */
m->offset = (uint32_t)strtoul(l, &t, 0);
if (l == t)
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "offset `%s' invalid", l);
l = t;
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
m->in_type = FILE_LONG;
m->in_offset = 0;
/*
* read [.lbs][+-]nnnnn)
*/
if (*l == '.') {
l++;
switch (*l) {
case 'l':
m->in_type = FILE_LELONG;
break;
case 'L':
m->in_type = FILE_BELONG;
break;
case 'm':
m->in_type = FILE_MELONG;
break;
case 'h':
case 's':
m->in_type = FILE_LESHORT;
break;
case 'H':
case 'S':
m->in_type = FILE_BESHORT;
break;
case 'c':
case 'b':
case 'C':
case 'B':
m->in_type = FILE_BYTE;
break;
case 'e':
case 'f':
case 'g':
m->in_type = FILE_LEDOUBLE;
break;
case 'E':
case 'F':
case 'G':
m->in_type = FILE_BEDOUBLE;
break;
case 'i':
m->in_type = FILE_LEID3;
break;
case 'I':
m->in_type = FILE_BEID3;
break;
default:
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"indirect offset type `%c' invalid",
*l);
break;
}
l++;
}
m->in_op = 0;
if (*l == '~') {
m->in_op |= FILE_OPINVERSE;
l++;
}
if ((op = get_op(*l)) != -1) {
m->in_op |= op;
l++;
}
if (*l == '(') {
m->in_op |= FILE_OPINDIRECT;
l++;
}
if (isdigit((unsigned char)*l) || *l == '-') {
m->in_offset = (int32_t)strtol(l, &t, 0);
if (l == t)
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"in_offset `%s' invalid", l);
l = t;
}
if (*l++ != ')' ||
((m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) && *l++ != ')'))
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"missing ')' in indirect offset");
}
EATAB;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
m->cond = get_cond(l, &l);
if (check_cond(ms, m->cond, cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
EATAB;
#endif
/*
* Parse the type.
*/
if (*l == 'u') {
/*
* Try it as a keyword type prefixed by "u"; match what
* follows the "u". If that fails, try it as an SUS
* integer type.
*/
m->type = get_type(type_tbl, l + 1, &l);
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/*
* Not a keyword type; parse it as an SUS type,
* 'u' possibly followed by a number or C/S/L.
*/
m->type = get_standard_integer_type(l, &l);
}
/* It's unsigned. */
if (m->type != FILE_INVALID)
m->flag |= UNSIGNED;
} else {
/*
* Try it as a keyword type. If that fails, try it as
* an SUS integer type if it begins with "d" or as an
* SUS string type if it begins with "s". In any case,
* it's not unsigned.
*/
m->type = get_type(type_tbl, l, &l);
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/*
* Not a keyword type; parse it as an SUS type,
* either 'd' possibly followed by a number or
* C/S/L, or just 's'.
*/
if (*l == 'd')
m->type = get_standard_integer_type(l, &l);
else if (*l == 's' && !isalpha((unsigned char)l[1])) {
m->type = FILE_STRING;
++l;
}
}
}
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/* Not found - try it as a special keyword. */
m->type = get_type(special_tbl, l, &l);
}
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "type `%s' invalid", l);
return -1;
}
/* New-style anding: "0 byte&0x80 =0x80 dynamically linked" */
/* New and improved: ~ & | ^ + - * / % -- exciting, isn't it? */
m->mask_op = 0;
if (*l == '~') {
if (!IS_STRING(m->type))
m->mask_op |= FILE_OPINVERSE;
else if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "'~' invalid for string types");
++l;
}
m->str_range = 0;
m->str_flags = m->type == FILE_PSTRING ? PSTRING_1_LE : 0;
if ((op = get_op(*l)) != -1) {
if (!IS_STRING(m->type)) {
uint64_t val;
++l;
m->mask_op |= op;
val = (uint64_t)strtoull(l, &t, 0);
l = t;
m->num_mask = file_signextend(ms, m, val);
eatsize(&l);
}
else if (op == FILE_OPDIVIDE) {
int have_range = 0;
while (!isspace((unsigned char)*++l)) {
switch (*l) {
case '0': case '1': case '2':
case '3': case '4': case '5':
case '6': case '7': case '8':
case '9':
if (have_range &&
(ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK))
file_magwarn(ms,
"multiple ranges");
have_range = 1;
m->str_range = CAST(uint32_t,
strtoul(l, &t, 0));
if (m->str_range == 0)
file_magwarn(ms,
"zero range");
l = t - 1;
break;
case CHAR_COMPACT_WHITESPACE:
m->str_flags |=
STRING_COMPACT_WHITESPACE;
break;
case CHAR_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE:
m->str_flags |=
STRING_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE;
break;
case CHAR_IGNORE_LOWERCASE:
m->str_flags |= STRING_IGNORE_LOWERCASE;
break;
case CHAR_IGNORE_UPPERCASE:
m->str_flags |= STRING_IGNORE_UPPERCASE;
break;
case CHAR_REGEX_OFFSET_START:
m->str_flags |= REGEX_OFFSET_START;
break;
case CHAR_BINTEST:
m->str_flags |= STRING_BINTEST;
break;
case CHAR_TEXTTEST:
m->str_flags |= STRING_TEXTTEST;
break;
case CHAR_TRIM:
m->str_flags |= STRING_TRIM;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_1_LE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_1_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_2_BE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_2_BE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_2_LE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_2_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_4_BE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_4_BE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_4_LE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_4_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_LENGTH_INCLUDES_ITSELF:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags |= PSTRING_LENGTH_INCLUDES_ITSELF;
break;
default:
bad:
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"string extension `%c' "
"invalid", *l);
return -1;
}
/* allow multiple '/' for readability */
if (l[1] == '/' &&
!isspace((unsigned char)l[2]))
l++;
}
if (string_modifier_check(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
}
else {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "invalid string op: %c", *t);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* We used to set mask to all 1's here, instead let's just not do
* anything if mask = 0 (unless you have a better idea)
*/
EATAB;
switch (*l) {
case '>':
case '<':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
if (*l == '=') {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) {
file_magwarn(ms, "%c= not supported",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
++l;
}
break;
/* Old-style anding: "0 byte &0x80 dynamically linked" */
case '&':
case '^':
case '=':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
if (*l == '=') {
/* HP compat: ignore &= etc. */
++l;
}
break;
case '!':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
break;
default:
m->reln = '='; /* the default relation */
if (*l == 'x' && ((isascii((unsigned char)l[1]) &&
isspace((unsigned char)l[1])) || !l[1])) {
m->reln = *l;
++l;
}
break;
}
/*
* Grab the value part, except for an 'x' reln.
*/
if (m->reln != 'x' && getvalue(ms, m, &l, action))
return -1;
/*
* TODO finish this macro and start using it!
* #define offsetcheck {if (offset > HOWMANY-1)
* magwarn("offset too big"); }
*/
/*
* Now get last part - the description
*/
EATAB;
if (l[0] == '\b') {
++l;
m->flag |= NOSPACE;
} else if ((l[0] == '\\') && (l[1] == 'b')) {
++l;
++l;
m->flag |= NOSPACE;
}
for (i = 0; (m->desc[i++] = *l++) != '\0' && i < sizeof(m->desc); )
continue;
if (i == sizeof(m->desc)) {
m->desc[sizeof(m->desc) - 1] = '\0';
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "description `%s' truncated", m->desc);
}
/*
* We only do this check while compiling, or if any of the magic
* files were not compiled.
*/
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) {
if (check_format(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
}
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
if (action == FILE_CHECK) {
file_mdump(m);
}
#endif
m->mimetype[0] = '\0'; /* initialise MIME type to none */
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345.
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible. | Medium | 166,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix | Medium | 168,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousemove)
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.VolumeChangeBegin"));
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.VolumeChangeEnd"));
double volume = value().toDouble();
mediaElement().setVolume(volume);
mediaElement().setMuted(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly handle certain out-of-memory conditions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document that triggers a large memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032} | Medium | 171,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::Load(long long& pos, long& len) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
if (m_timecode >= 0) // at least partially loaded
return 0;
assert(m_pos == m_element_start);
assert(m_element_size < 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
const int status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
assert((total < 0) || (m_pos <= total)); // TODO: verify this
pos = m_pos;
long long cluster_size = -1;
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error or underflow
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id_ < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id_);
if (id_ != 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(cluster_size);
if (size == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: verify this
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
}
#if 0
len = static_cast<long>(size_);
if (cluster_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
long long timecode = -1;
long long new_pos = -1;
bool bBlock = false;
long long cluster_stop = (cluster_size < 0) ? -1 : pos + cluster_size;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x67) { // TimeCode ID
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (timecode < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(timecode);
new_pos = pos + size;
if (bBlock)
break;
} else if (id == 0x20) { // BlockGroup ID
bBlock = true;
break;
} else if (id == 0x23) { // SimpleBlock ID
bBlock = true;
break;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
if (timecode < 0) // no timecode found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (!bBlock)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pos = new_pos; // designates position just beyond timecode payload
m_timecode = timecode; // m_timecode >= 0 means we're partially loaded
if (cluster_size >= 0)
m_element_size = cluster_stop - m_element_start;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setStrokeStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedStrokeColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().StrokeStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (OriginClean() && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean()) {
SetOriginTainted();
ClearResolvedFilters();
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetStrokeStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Displacement map filters being applied to cross-origin images in Blink SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274} | Medium | 172,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> flipSkImageVertically(SkImage* input,
AlphaDisposition alphaOp) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
size_t height = static_cast<size_t>(input->height());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32(input->width(), input->height(),
(alphaOp == PremultiplyAlpha)
? kPremul_SkAlphaType
: kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
size_t imageRowBytes = width * info.bytesPerPixel();
RefPtr<Uint8Array> imagePixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!imagePixels)
return nullptr;
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topFirstElement = i * imageRowBytes;
size_t topLastElement = (i + 1) * imageRowBytes;
size_t bottomFirstElement = (height - 1 - i) * imageRowBytes;
std::swap_ranges(imagePixels->data() + topFirstElement,
imagePixels->data() + topLastElement,
imagePixels->data() + bottomFirstElement);
}
return newSkImageFromRaster(info, std::move(imagePixels), imageRowBytes);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 172,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!entriesValue->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Array> entries = entriesValue.As<v8::Array>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, entries, V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!entries->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return entries;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int serdes_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct phy_provider *provider;
struct serdes_ctrl *ctrl;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
ctrl = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrl)
return -ENOMEM;
ctrl->dev = &pdev->dev;
ctrl->regs = syscon_node_to_regmap(pdev->dev.parent->of_node);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->regs))
return PTR_ERR(ctrl->regs);
for (i = 0; i <= SERDES_MAX; i++) {
ret = serdes_phy_create(ctrl, i, &ctrl->phys[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, ctrl);
provider = devm_of_phy_provider_register(ctrl->dev,
serdes_simple_xlate);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(provider);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.20. drivers/phy/mscc/phy-ocelot-serdes.c has an off-by-one error with a resultant ctrl->phys out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,764 |
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