instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BufferMeta(size_t size)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator(PageSerializer* serializer, Document* document, Vector<Node*>* nodes, LinkLocalPathMap* links, String directoryName)
: SerializerMarkupAccumulator(serializer, document, nodes)
, m_replaceLinks(links)
, m_directoryName(directoryName)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
int uninitialized;
int split_flag1, flags1;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
uninitialized = ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex);
if (map->m_lblk + map->m_len < ee_block + ee_len) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT ?
EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
flags1 = flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO;
if (uninitialized)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, path,
map->m_lblk + map->m_len, split_flag1, flags1);
if (err)
goto out;
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, path);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
if (map->m_lblk >= ee_block) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT ?
EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
if (uninitialized)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1;
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, path,
map->m_lblk, split_flag1, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
}
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
out:
return err ? err : map->m_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Low | 165,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui16le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return b[0] | (b[1]<<8);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener before 1.3.1 has *left shift cannot be represented in type int* undefined behavior issues, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c and imagew-util.c.
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16 | Medium | 168,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> descriptor)
{
if (m_successCallback) {
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> sessionDescription = RTCSessionDescription::create(descriptor);
m_successCallback->handleEvent(sessionDescription.get());
}
clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RejectPairing() {
RunPairingCallbacks(REJECTED);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetLast() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count <= 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
const size_t index = count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#else
const long index = m_count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pCP;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_slice_header(H264Context *h, H264Context *h0)
{
unsigned int first_mb_in_slice;
unsigned int pps_id;
int ret;
unsigned int slice_type, tmp, i, j;
int last_pic_structure, last_pic_droppable;
int must_reinit;
int needs_reinit = 0;
int field_pic_flag, bottom_field_flag;
h->me.qpel_put = h->h264qpel.put_h264_qpel_pixels_tab;
h->me.qpel_avg = h->h264qpel.avg_h264_qpel_pixels_tab;
first_mb_in_slice = get_ue_golomb_long(&h->gb);
if (first_mb_in_slice == 0) { // FIXME better field boundary detection
if (h0->current_slice && FIELD_PICTURE(h)) {
field_end(h, 1);
}
h0->current_slice = 0;
if (!h0->first_field) {
if (h->cur_pic_ptr && !h->droppable) {
ff_thread_report_progress(&h->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX,
h->picture_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD);
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
}
}
slice_type = get_ue_golomb_31(&h->gb);
if (slice_type > 9) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"slice type too large (%d) at %d %d\n",
slice_type, h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (slice_type > 4) {
slice_type -= 5;
h->slice_type_fixed = 1;
} else
h->slice_type_fixed = 0;
slice_type = golomb_to_pict_type[slice_type];
h->slice_type = slice_type;
h->slice_type_nos = slice_type & 3;
h->pict_type = h->slice_type;
pps_id = get_ue_golomb(&h->gb);
if (pps_id >= MAX_PPS_COUNT) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "pps_id %d out of range\n", pps_id);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!h0->pps_buffers[pps_id]) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"non-existing PPS %u referenced\n",
pps_id);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
h->pps = *h0->pps_buffers[pps_id];
if (!h0->sps_buffers[h->pps.sps_id]) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"non-existing SPS %u referenced\n",
h->pps.sps_id);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (h->pps.sps_id != h->current_sps_id ||
h0->sps_buffers[h->pps.sps_id]->new) {
h0->sps_buffers[h->pps.sps_id]->new = 0;
h->current_sps_id = h->pps.sps_id;
h->sps = *h0->sps_buffers[h->pps.sps_id];
if (h->mb_width != h->sps.mb_width ||
h->mb_height != h->sps.mb_height * (2 - h->sps.frame_mbs_only_flag) ||
h->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != h->sps.bit_depth_luma ||
h->cur_chroma_format_idc != h->sps.chroma_format_idc
)
needs_reinit = 1;
if (h->bit_depth_luma != h->sps.bit_depth_luma ||
h->chroma_format_idc != h->sps.chroma_format_idc) {
h->bit_depth_luma = h->sps.bit_depth_luma;
h->chroma_format_idc = h->sps.chroma_format_idc;
needs_reinit = 1;
}
if ((ret = h264_set_parameter_from_sps(h)) < 0)
return ret;
}
h->avctx->profile = ff_h264_get_profile(&h->sps);
h->avctx->level = h->sps.level_idc;
h->avctx->refs = h->sps.ref_frame_count;
must_reinit = (h->context_initialized &&
( 16*h->sps.mb_width != h->avctx->coded_width
|| 16*h->sps.mb_height * (2 - h->sps.frame_mbs_only_flag) != h->avctx->coded_height
|| h->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != h->sps.bit_depth_luma
|| h->cur_chroma_format_idc != h->sps.chroma_format_idc
|| av_cmp_q(h->sps.sar, h->avctx->sample_aspect_ratio)
|| h->mb_width != h->sps.mb_width
|| h->mb_height != h->sps.mb_height * (2 - h->sps.frame_mbs_only_flag)
));
if (h0->avctx->pix_fmt != get_pixel_format(h0, 0))
must_reinit = 1;
h->mb_width = h->sps.mb_width;
h->mb_height = h->sps.mb_height * (2 - h->sps.frame_mbs_only_flag);
h->mb_num = h->mb_width * h->mb_height;
h->mb_stride = h->mb_width + 1;
h->b_stride = h->mb_width * 4;
h->chroma_y_shift = h->sps.chroma_format_idc <= 1; // 400 uses yuv420p
h->width = 16 * h->mb_width;
h->height = 16 * h->mb_height;
ret = init_dimensions(h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (h->sps.video_signal_type_present_flag) {
h->avctx->color_range = h->sps.full_range>0 ? AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG
: AVCOL_RANGE_MPEG;
if (h->sps.colour_description_present_flag) {
if (h->avctx->colorspace != h->sps.colorspace)
needs_reinit = 1;
h->avctx->color_primaries = h->sps.color_primaries;
h->avctx->color_trc = h->sps.color_trc;
h->avctx->colorspace = h->sps.colorspace;
}
}
if (h->context_initialized &&
(h->width != h->avctx->coded_width ||
h->height != h->avctx->coded_height ||
must_reinit ||
needs_reinit)) {
if (h != h0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "changing width/height on "
"slice %d\n", h0->current_slice + 1);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
flush_change(h);
if ((ret = get_pixel_format(h, 1)) < 0)
return ret;
h->avctx->pix_fmt = ret;
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "Reinit context to %dx%d, "
"pix_fmt: %s\n", h->width, h->height, av_get_pix_fmt_name(h->avctx->pix_fmt));
if ((ret = h264_slice_header_init(h, 1)) < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"h264_slice_header_init() failed\n");
return ret;
}
}
if (!h->context_initialized) {
if (h != h0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Cannot (re-)initialize context during parallel decoding.\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = get_pixel_format(h, 1)) < 0)
return ret;
h->avctx->pix_fmt = ret;
if ((ret = h264_slice_header_init(h, 0)) < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"h264_slice_header_init() failed\n");
return ret;
}
}
if (h == h0 && h->dequant_coeff_pps != pps_id) {
h->dequant_coeff_pps = pps_id;
init_dequant_tables(h);
}
h->frame_num = get_bits(&h->gb, h->sps.log2_max_frame_num);
h->mb_mbaff = 0;
h->mb_aff_frame = 0;
last_pic_structure = h0->picture_structure;
last_pic_droppable = h0->droppable;
h->droppable = h->nal_ref_idc == 0;
if (h->sps.frame_mbs_only_flag) {
h->picture_structure = PICT_FRAME;
} else {
if (!h->sps.direct_8x8_inference_flag && slice_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This stream was generated by a broken encoder, invalid 8x8 inference\n");
return -1;
}
field_pic_flag = get_bits1(&h->gb);
if (field_pic_flag) {
bottom_field_flag = get_bits1(&h->gb);
h->picture_structure = PICT_TOP_FIELD + bottom_field_flag;
} else {
h->picture_structure = PICT_FRAME;
h->mb_aff_frame = h->sps.mb_aff;
}
}
h->mb_field_decoding_flag = h->picture_structure != PICT_FRAME;
if (h0->current_slice != 0) {
if (last_pic_structure != h->picture_structure ||
last_pic_droppable != h->droppable) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Changing field mode (%d -> %d) between slices is not allowed\n",
last_pic_structure, h->picture_structure);
h->picture_structure = last_pic_structure;
h->droppable = last_pic_droppable;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (!h0->cur_pic_ptr) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"unset cur_pic_ptr on %d. slice\n",
h0->current_slice + 1);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else {
/* Shorten frame num gaps so we don't have to allocate reference
* frames just to throw them away */
if (h->frame_num != h->prev_frame_num && h->prev_frame_num >= 0) {
int unwrap_prev_frame_num = h->prev_frame_num;
int max_frame_num = 1 << h->sps.log2_max_frame_num;
if (unwrap_prev_frame_num > h->frame_num)
unwrap_prev_frame_num -= max_frame_num;
if ((h->frame_num - unwrap_prev_frame_num) > h->sps.ref_frame_count) {
unwrap_prev_frame_num = (h->frame_num - h->sps.ref_frame_count) - 1;
if (unwrap_prev_frame_num < 0)
unwrap_prev_frame_num += max_frame_num;
h->prev_frame_num = unwrap_prev_frame_num;
}
}
/* See if we have a decoded first field looking for a pair...
* Here, we're using that to see if we should mark previously
* decode frames as "finished".
* We have to do that before the "dummy" in-between frame allocation,
* since that can modify h->cur_pic_ptr. */
if (h0->first_field) {
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr);
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr->f.data[0]);
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr->reference != DELAYED_PIC_REF);
/* Mark old field/frame as completed */
if (!last_pic_droppable && h0->cur_pic_ptr->tf.owner == h0->avctx) {
ff_thread_report_progress(&h0->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX,
last_pic_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD);
}
/* figure out if we have a complementary field pair */
if (!FIELD_PICTURE(h) || h->picture_structure == last_pic_structure) {
/* Previous field is unmatched. Don't display it, but let it
* remain for reference if marked as such. */
if (!last_pic_droppable && last_pic_structure != PICT_FRAME) {
ff_thread_report_progress(&h0->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX,
last_pic_structure == PICT_TOP_FIELD);
}
} else {
if (h0->cur_pic_ptr->frame_num != h->frame_num) {
/* This and previous field were reference, but had
* different frame_nums. Consider this field first in
* pair. Throw away previous field except for reference
* purposes. */
if (!last_pic_droppable && last_pic_structure != PICT_FRAME) {
ff_thread_report_progress(&h0->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX,
last_pic_structure == PICT_TOP_FIELD);
}
} else {
/* Second field in complementary pair */
if (!((last_pic_structure == PICT_TOP_FIELD &&
h->picture_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD) ||
(last_pic_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD &&
h->picture_structure == PICT_TOP_FIELD))) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid field mode combination %d/%d\n",
last_pic_structure, h->picture_structure);
h->picture_structure = last_pic_structure;
h->droppable = last_pic_droppable;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (last_pic_droppable != h->droppable) {
avpriv_request_sample(h->avctx,
"Found reference and non-reference fields in the same frame, which");
h->picture_structure = last_pic_structure;
h->droppable = last_pic_droppable;
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
}
}
}
while (h->frame_num != h->prev_frame_num && h->prev_frame_num >= 0 && !h0->first_field &&
h->frame_num != (h->prev_frame_num + 1) % (1 << h->sps.log2_max_frame_num)) {
Picture *prev = h->short_ref_count ? h->short_ref[0] : NULL;
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Frame num gap %d %d\n",
h->frame_num, h->prev_frame_num);
if (!h->sps.gaps_in_frame_num_allowed_flag)
for(i=0; i<FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(h->last_pocs); i++)
h->last_pocs[i] = INT_MIN;
ret = h264_frame_start(h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
h->prev_frame_num++;
h->prev_frame_num %= 1 << h->sps.log2_max_frame_num;
h->cur_pic_ptr->frame_num = h->prev_frame_num;
ff_thread_report_progress(&h->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX, 0);
ff_thread_report_progress(&h->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX, 1);
ret = ff_generate_sliding_window_mmcos(h, 1);
if (ret < 0 && (h->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE))
return ret;
ret = ff_h264_execute_ref_pic_marking(h, h->mmco, h->mmco_index);
if (ret < 0 && (h->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE))
return ret;
/* Error concealment: If a ref is missing, copy the previous ref
* in its place.
* FIXME: Avoiding a memcpy would be nice, but ref handling makes
* many assumptions about there being no actual duplicates.
* FIXME: This does not copy padding for out-of-frame motion
* vectors. Given we are concealing a lost frame, this probably
* is not noticeable by comparison, but it should be fixed. */
if (h->short_ref_count) {
if (prev) {
av_image_copy(h->short_ref[0]->f.data,
h->short_ref[0]->f.linesize,
(const uint8_t **)prev->f.data,
prev->f.linesize,
h->avctx->pix_fmt,
h->mb_width * 16,
h->mb_height * 16);
h->short_ref[0]->poc = prev->poc + 2;
}
h->short_ref[0]->frame_num = h->prev_frame_num;
}
}
/* See if we have a decoded first field looking for a pair...
* We're using that to see whether to continue decoding in that
* frame, or to allocate a new one. */
if (h0->first_field) {
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr);
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr->f.data[0]);
assert(h0->cur_pic_ptr->reference != DELAYED_PIC_REF);
/* figure out if we have a complementary field pair */
if (!FIELD_PICTURE(h) || h->picture_structure == last_pic_structure) {
/* Previous field is unmatched. Don't display it, but let it
* remain for reference if marked as such. */
h0->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
h0->first_field = FIELD_PICTURE(h);
} else {
if (h0->cur_pic_ptr->frame_num != h->frame_num) {
ff_thread_report_progress(&h0->cur_pic_ptr->tf, INT_MAX,
h0->picture_structure==PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD);
/* This and the previous field had different frame_nums.
* Consider this field first in pair. Throw away previous
* one except for reference purposes. */
h0->first_field = 1;
h0->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
} else {
/* Second field in complementary pair */
h0->first_field = 0;
}
}
} else {
/* Frame or first field in a potentially complementary pair */
h0->first_field = FIELD_PICTURE(h);
}
if (!FIELD_PICTURE(h) || h0->first_field) {
if (h264_frame_start(h) < 0) {
h0->first_field = 0;
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else {
release_unused_pictures(h, 0);
}
/* Some macroblocks can be accessed before they're available in case
* of lost slices, MBAFF or threading. */
if (FIELD_PICTURE(h)) {
for(i = (h->picture_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD); i<h->mb_height; i++)
memset(h->slice_table + i*h->mb_stride, -1, (h->mb_stride - (i+1==h->mb_height)) * sizeof(*h->slice_table));
} else {
memset(h->slice_table, -1,
(h->mb_height * h->mb_stride - 1) * sizeof(*h->slice_table));
}
h0->last_slice_type = -1;
}
if (h != h0 && (ret = clone_slice(h, h0)) < 0)
return ret;
/* can't be in alloc_tables because linesize isn't known there.
* FIXME: redo bipred weight to not require extra buffer? */
for (i = 0; i < h->slice_context_count; i++)
if (h->thread_context[i]) {
ret = alloc_scratch_buffers(h->thread_context[i], h->linesize);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr->frame_num = h->frame_num; // FIXME frame_num cleanup
av_assert1(h->mb_num == h->mb_width * h->mb_height);
if (first_mb_in_slice << FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h) >= h->mb_num ||
first_mb_in_slice >= h->mb_num) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "first_mb_in_slice overflow\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
h->resync_mb_x = h->mb_x = first_mb_in_slice % h->mb_width;
h->resync_mb_y = h->mb_y = (first_mb_in_slice / h->mb_width) <<
FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h);
if (h->picture_structure == PICT_BOTTOM_FIELD)
h->resync_mb_y = h->mb_y = h->mb_y + 1;
av_assert1(h->mb_y < h->mb_height);
if (h->picture_structure == PICT_FRAME) {
h->curr_pic_num = h->frame_num;
h->max_pic_num = 1 << h->sps.log2_max_frame_num;
} else {
h->curr_pic_num = 2 * h->frame_num + 1;
h->max_pic_num = 1 << (h->sps.log2_max_frame_num + 1);
}
if (h->nal_unit_type == NAL_IDR_SLICE)
get_ue_golomb(&h->gb); /* idr_pic_id */
if (h->sps.poc_type == 0) {
h->poc_lsb = get_bits(&h->gb, h->sps.log2_max_poc_lsb);
if (h->pps.pic_order_present == 1 && h->picture_structure == PICT_FRAME)
h->delta_poc_bottom = get_se_golomb(&h->gb);
}
if (h->sps.poc_type == 1 && !h->sps.delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag) {
h->delta_poc[0] = get_se_golomb(&h->gb);
if (h->pps.pic_order_present == 1 && h->picture_structure == PICT_FRAME)
h->delta_poc[1] = get_se_golomb(&h->gb);
}
ff_init_poc(h, h->cur_pic_ptr->field_poc, &h->cur_pic_ptr->poc);
if (h->pps.redundant_pic_cnt_present)
h->redundant_pic_count = get_ue_golomb(&h->gb);
ret = ff_set_ref_count(h);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (slice_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I &&
(h0->current_slice == 0 ||
slice_type != h0->last_slice_type ||
memcmp(h0->last_ref_count, h0->ref_count, sizeof(h0->ref_count)))) {
ff_h264_fill_default_ref_list(h);
}
if (h->slice_type_nos != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
ret = ff_h264_decode_ref_pic_list_reordering(h);
if (ret < 0) {
h->ref_count[1] = h->ref_count[0] = 0;
return ret;
}
}
if ((h->pps.weighted_pred && h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P) ||
(h->pps.weighted_bipred_idc == 1 &&
h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B))
ff_pred_weight_table(h);
else if (h->pps.weighted_bipred_idc == 2 &&
h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
implicit_weight_table(h, -1);
} else {
h->use_weight = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
h->luma_weight_flag[i] = 0;
h->chroma_weight_flag[i] = 0;
}
}
if (h->nal_ref_idc) {
ret = ff_h264_decode_ref_pic_marking(h0, &h->gb,
!(h->avctx->active_thread_type & FF_THREAD_FRAME) ||
h0->current_slice == 0);
if (ret < 0 && (h->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (FRAME_MBAFF(h)) {
ff_h264_fill_mbaff_ref_list(h);
if (h->pps.weighted_bipred_idc == 2 && h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) {
implicit_weight_table(h, 0);
implicit_weight_table(h, 1);
}
}
if (h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B && !h->direct_spatial_mv_pred)
ff_h264_direct_dist_scale_factor(h);
ff_h264_direct_ref_list_init(h);
if (h->slice_type_nos != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I && h->pps.cabac) {
tmp = get_ue_golomb_31(&h->gb);
if (tmp > 2) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cabac_init_idc overflow\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
h->cabac_init_idc = tmp;
}
h->last_qscale_diff = 0;
tmp = h->pps.init_qp + get_se_golomb(&h->gb);
if (tmp > 51 + 6 * (h->sps.bit_depth_luma - 8)) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "QP %u out of range\n", tmp);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
h->qscale = tmp;
h->chroma_qp[0] = get_chroma_qp(h, 0, h->qscale);
h->chroma_qp[1] = get_chroma_qp(h, 1, h->qscale);
if (h->slice_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_SP)
get_bits1(&h->gb); /* sp_for_switch_flag */
if (h->slice_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_SP ||
h->slice_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_SI)
get_se_golomb(&h->gb); /* slice_qs_delta */
h->deblocking_filter = 1;
h->slice_alpha_c0_offset = 52;
h->slice_beta_offset = 52;
if (h->pps.deblocking_filter_parameters_present) {
tmp = get_ue_golomb_31(&h->gb);
if (tmp > 2) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"deblocking_filter_idc %u out of range\n", tmp);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
h->deblocking_filter = tmp;
if (h->deblocking_filter < 2)
h->deblocking_filter ^= 1; // 1<->0
if (h->deblocking_filter) {
h->slice_alpha_c0_offset += get_se_golomb(&h->gb) << 1;
h->slice_beta_offset += get_se_golomb(&h->gb) << 1;
if (h->slice_alpha_c0_offset > 104U ||
h->slice_beta_offset > 104U) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"deblocking filter parameters %d %d out of range\n",
h->slice_alpha_c0_offset, h->slice_beta_offset);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
if (h->avctx->skip_loop_filter >= AVDISCARD_ALL ||
(h->avctx->skip_loop_filter >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY &&
h->slice_type_nos != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) ||
(h->avctx->skip_loop_filter >= AVDISCARD_BIDIR &&
h->slice_type_nos == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) ||
(h->avctx->skip_loop_filter >= AVDISCARD_NONREF &&
h->nal_ref_idc == 0))
h->deblocking_filter = 0;
if (h->deblocking_filter == 1 && h0->max_contexts > 1) {
if (h->avctx->flags2 & CODEC_FLAG2_FAST) {
/* Cheat slightly for speed:
* Do not bother to deblock across slices. */
h->deblocking_filter = 2;
} else {
h0->max_contexts = 1;
if (!h0->single_decode_warning) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"Cannot parallelize deblocking type 1, decoding such frames in sequential order\n");
h0->single_decode_warning = 1;
}
if (h != h0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Deblocking switched inside frame.\n");
return 1;
}
}
}
h->qp_thresh = 15 + 52 -
FFMIN(h->slice_alpha_c0_offset, h->slice_beta_offset) -
FFMAX3(0,
h->pps.chroma_qp_index_offset[0],
h->pps.chroma_qp_index_offset[1]) +
6 * (h->sps.bit_depth_luma - 8);
h0->last_slice_type = slice_type;
memcpy(h0->last_ref_count, h0->ref_count, sizeof(h0->last_ref_count));
h->slice_num = ++h0->current_slice;
if (h->slice_num)
h0->slice_row[(h->slice_num-1)&(MAX_SLICES-1)]= h->resync_mb_y;
if ( h0->slice_row[h->slice_num&(MAX_SLICES-1)] + 3 >= h->resync_mb_y
&& h0->slice_row[h->slice_num&(MAX_SLICES-1)] <= h->resync_mb_y
&& h->slice_num >= MAX_SLICES) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Possibly too many slices (%d >= %d), increase MAX_SLICES and recompile if there are artifacts\n", h->slice_num, MAX_SLICES);
}
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
int id_list[16];
int *ref2frm = h->ref2frm[h->slice_num & (MAX_SLICES - 1)][j];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
id_list[i] = 60;
if (j < h->list_count && i < h->ref_count[j] &&
h->ref_list[j][i].f.buf[0]) {
int k;
AVBuffer *buf = h->ref_list[j][i].f.buf[0]->buffer;
for (k = 0; k < h->short_ref_count; k++)
if (h->short_ref[k]->f.buf[0]->buffer == buf) {
id_list[i] = k;
break;
}
for (k = 0; k < h->long_ref_count; k++)
if (h->long_ref[k] && h->long_ref[k]->f.buf[0]->buffer == buf) {
id_list[i] = h->short_ref_count + k;
break;
}
}
}
ref2frm[0] =
ref2frm[1] = -1;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
ref2frm[i + 2] = 4 * id_list[i] + (h->ref_list[j][i].reference & 3);
ref2frm[18 + 0] =
ref2frm[18 + 1] = -1;
for (i = 16; i < 48; i++)
ref2frm[i + 4] = 4 * id_list[(i - 16) >> 1] +
(h->ref_list[j][i].reference & 3);
}
if (h->ref_count[0]) h->er.last_pic = &h->ref_list[0][0];
if (h->ref_count[1]) h->er.next_pic = &h->ref_list[1][0];
h->er.ref_count = h->ref_count[0];
if (h->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_PICT_INFO) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"slice:%d %s mb:%d %c%s%s pps:%u frame:%d poc:%d/%d ref:%d/%d qp:%d loop:%d:%d:%d weight:%d%s %s\n",
h->slice_num,
(h->picture_structure == PICT_FRAME ? "F" : h->picture_structure == PICT_TOP_FIELD ? "T" : "B"),
first_mb_in_slice,
av_get_picture_type_char(h->slice_type),
h->slice_type_fixed ? " fix" : "",
h->nal_unit_type == NAL_IDR_SLICE ? " IDR" : "",
pps_id, h->frame_num,
h->cur_pic_ptr->field_poc[0],
h->cur_pic_ptr->field_poc[1],
h->ref_count[0], h->ref_count[1],
h->qscale,
h->deblocking_filter,
h->slice_alpha_c0_offset / 2 - 26, h->slice_beta_offset / 2 - 26,
h->use_weight,
h->use_weight == 1 && h->use_weight_chroma ? "c" : "",
h->slice_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B ? (h->direct_spatial_mv_pred ? "SPAT" : "TEMP") : "");
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The decode_slice_header function in libavcodec/h264.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 incorrectly relies on a certain droppable field, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (deadlock) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted H.264 data.
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int handle_ldf_stq(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
int freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
int flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
save_and_clear_fpu();
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
if (freg & 3) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
do_fpother(regs);
return 0;
}
if (insn & 0x200000) {
/* STQ */
u64 first = 0, second = 0;
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag) {
first = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
second = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg+2];
}
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
}
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
{
/* Need to convert endians */
u64 tmp = __swab64p(&first);
first = __swab64p(&second);
second = tmp;
break;
}
default:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (put_user (first >> 32, (u32 __user *)addr) ||
__put_user ((u32)first, (u32 __user *)(addr + 4)) ||
__put_user (second >> 32, (u32 __user *)(addr + 8)) ||
__put_user ((u32)second, (u32 __user *)(addr + 12))) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
} else {
/* LDF, LDDF, LDQF */
u32 data[4] __attribute__ ((aligned(8)));
int size, i;
int err;
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
} else if (asi > ASI_SNFL) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
switch (insn & 0x180000) {
case 0x000000: size = 1; break;
case 0x100000: size = 4; break;
default: size = 2; break;
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
data[i] = 0;
err = get_user (data[0], (u32 __user *) addr);
if (!err) {
for (i = 1; i < size; i++)
err |= __get_user (data[i], (u32 __user *)(addr + 4*i));
}
if (err && !(asi & 0x2 /* NF */)) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (asi & 0x8) /* Little */ {
u64 tmp;
switch (size) {
case 1: data[0] = le32_to_cpup(data + 0); break;
default:*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
break;
case 4: tmp = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 2));
*(u64 *)(data + 2) = tmp;
break;
}
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
memcpy(f->regs + freg, data, size * 4);
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flag;
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in codecs/mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29422022.
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I96a9c437eec53a285ac96794cc1ad0c8954b27e0
| High | 174,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::NavigateGuest(const std::string& src,
bool force_navigation) {
GURL url = extension_url_.Resolve(src);
bool url_not_allowed = (url != GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL)) &&
(url.GetOrigin() != extension_url_.GetOrigin());
if (!url.is_valid() || url_not_allowed)
return NavigateGuest(url::kAboutBlankURL, true /* force_navigation */);
if (!force_navigation && (url_ == url))
return false;
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->FilterURL(false, &url);
web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(url, content::Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL,
std::string());
url_ = url;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 incorrectly relies on GetOrigin method calls for origin comparisons, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381} | Medium | 172,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParsePEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData,
name);
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else if (ctxt->input->free != deallocblankswrapper) {
input = xmlNewBlanksWrapperInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
} else {
/*
* TODO !!!
* handle the extra spaces added before and after
* c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
*/
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo ==
XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing
* right here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return;
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
u_int tlen, pdu_type, pdu_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = len;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
return;
}
while (tlen >= sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu));
pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
/* infinite loop check */
if (!pdu_type || !pdu_len) {
break;
}
if (tlen < pdu_len) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print the PDU.
*/
if (rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr, 8))
goto trunc;
tlen -= pdu_len;
tptr += pdu_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The RPKI-Router parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-rpki-rtr.c:rpki_rtr_pdu_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13050/RPKI-Router: fix a few bugs
The decoder didn't properly check that the PDU length stored in the PDU
header is correct. The only check in place was in rpki_rtr_print() and it
tested whether the length is zero but that is not sufficient. Make all
necessary length and bounds checks, both generic and type-specific, in
rpki_rtr_pdu_print() and reduce rpki_rtr_print() to a simple loop.
This also fixes a minor bug and PDU type 0 (Serial Notify from RFC 6810
Section 5.2) is valid again.
In rpki_rtr_pdu_print() any protocol version was considered version 0,
fix it to skip the rest of input if the PDU protocol version is unknown.
Ibid, the PDU type 10 (Error Report from RFC 6810 Section 5.10) case
block didn't consider the "Length of Error Text" data element mandatory,
put it right.
Ibid, when printing an encapsulated PDU, give itself (via recursion)
respective buffer length to make it possible to tell whether the
encapsulated PDU fits. Do not recurse deeper than 2nd level.
Update prior RPKI-Router test cases that now stop to decode earlier
because of the stricter checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return -1L << 16;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return ((long)(state->back) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The inflateMark function in inflate.c in zlib 1.2.8 might allow context-dependent attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving left shifts of negative integers.
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result. | Medium | 168,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::setLocalDescription(const WebRTCVoidRequest& request, const WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor& localDescription)
{
if (!localDescription.isNull() && localDescription.type() == "offer") {
m_localDescription = localDescription;
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, true));
} else
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,362 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << message
<< "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Information leak in media engine in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312} | Medium | 173,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::~ContentCompression() {
delete [] settings;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
char buf[20];
int ret;
uid_t uid;
user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
cred = current_cred();
user = cred->user;
uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
if (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {
kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
return 0;
}
mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
ret = 0;
if (!user->uid_keyring) {
/* get the UID-specific keyring
* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
* may have been destroyed by setuid */
sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
}
}
/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
* already) */
sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
}
/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
* the user keyring */
ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_release_both;
}
/* install the keyrings */
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
}
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
error_release_both:
key_put(session_keyring);
error_release:
key_put(uid_keyring);
error:
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <[email protected]> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | Low | 169,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const
{
long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const long long cluster_stop =
(m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop))
return 1; //nothing else to do
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_pos;
for (;;)
{
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster or Cues ID
{
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (cluster_stop >= 0)
{
if (block_stop > cluster_stop)
{
if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos = cluster_stop;
break;
}
}
else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total))
{
m_element_size = total - m_element_start;
pos = total;
break;
}
else if (block_stop > avail)
{
len = static_cast<long>(size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this);
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup
return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len);
if (id == 0x23) //SimpleBlock
return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert(m_element_size > 0);
m_pos = pos;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= cluster_stop));
if (m_entries_count > 0)
{
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long start = pBlock->m_start;
if ((total >= 0) && (start > total))
return -1; //defend against trucated stream
const long long size = pBlock->m_size;
const long long stop = start + size;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop));
if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total))
return -1; //defend against trucated stream
}
return 1; //no more entries
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int mk_vhost_fdt_close(struct session_request *sr)
{
int id;
unsigned int hash;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht = NULL;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
id = sr->vhost_fdt_id;
hash = sr->vhost_fdt_hash;
ht = mk_vhost_fdt_table_lookup(id, sr->host_conf);
if (mk_unlikely(!ht)) {
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
/* We got the hash table, now look around the chains array */
hc = mk_vhost_fdt_chain_lookup(hash, ht);
if (hc) {
/* Increment the readers and check if we should close */
hc->readers--;
if (hc->readers == 0) {
hc->fd = -1;
hc->hash = 0;
ht->av_slots++;
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
return close(sr->fd_file);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Monkey HTTP Server before 1.5.3, when the File Descriptor Table (FDT) is enabled and custom error messages are set, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (file descriptor consumption) via an HTTP request that triggers an error message.
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <[email protected]> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::localDescription()
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return 0;
return m_webHandler->localDescription();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (av) related to id3 unsynchronization. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-63100526.
Commit Message: Fix edge case when applying id3 unsynchronization
Bug: 63100526
Test: opened poc, other files
Change-Id: I0a51a2a11d0ea84ede0c075de650a7118f0e00c5
(cherry picked from commit 3e70296461c5f260988ab21854a6f43fdafea764)
| Medium | 174,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
s->s_flags = flags;
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
iput(inode);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower(s->s_root, path.dentry);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower_mnt(s->s_root, path.mnt);
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Race condition in the ecryptfs_mount function in fs/ecryptfs/main.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to bypass intended file permissions via a mount.ecryptfs_private mount with a mismatched uid.
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]> | Low | 165,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RilSapSocket::sendDisconnect() {
size_t encoded_size = 0;
uint32_t written_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
pb_ostream_t ostream;
bool success = false;
RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ disconnectReq;
if ((success = pb_get_encoded_size(&encoded_size, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields,
&disconnectReq)) && encoded_size <= INT32_MAX) {
buffer_size = encoded_size + sizeof(uint32_t);
uint8_t buffer[buffer_size];
written_size = htonl((uint32_t) encoded_size);
ostream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(buffer, buffer_size);
pb_write(&ostream, (uint8_t *)&written_size, sizeof(written_size));
success = pb_encode(&ostream, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields, buffer);
if(success) {
pb_bytes_array_t *payload = (pb_bytes_array_t *)calloc(1,
sizeof(pb_bytes_array_t) + written_size);
if (!payload) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
return;
}
memcpy(payload->bytes, buffer, written_size);
payload->size = written_size;
MsgHeader *hdr = (MsgHeader *)malloc(sizeof(MsgHeader));
if (!hdr) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
free(payload);
return;
}
hdr->payload = payload;
hdr->type = MsgType_REQUEST;
hdr->id = MsgId_RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT;
hdr->error = Error_RIL_E_SUCCESS;
dispatchDisconnect(hdr);
}
else {
RLOGE("Encode failed in send disconnect!");
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libril/RilSapSocket.cpp in Telephony in Android 6.x before 2016-10-01 and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 relies on variable-length arrays, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30202619.
Commit Message: Replace variable-length arrays on stack with malloc.
Bug: 30202619
Change-Id: Ib95e08a1c009d88a4b4fd8d8fdba0641c6129008
(cherry picked from commit 943905bb9f99e3caa856b42c531e2be752da8834)
| Medium | 173,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::ExpectingConfirmation() const {
return !confirmation_callback_.is_null();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_part_table_device_file (struct udev_device *given_device,
const gchar *given_device_file,
gchar **out_partition_table_syspath,
guint64 *out_offset,
guint64 *out_alignment_offset,
guint *out_partition_number)
{
gchar *ret;
guint64 offset;
guint partition_number;
const gchar *devpath;
gchar *partition_table_syspath;
guint64 alignment_offset;
devpath = NULL;
offset = 0;
ret = NULL;
partition_table_syspath = NULL;
alignment_offset = 0;
devpath = udev_device_get_syspath (given_device);
if (devpath == NULL)
goto out;
partition_number = sysfs_get_int (devpath, "partition");
/* find device file for partition table device */
if (partition_number > 0)
{
struct udev_device *device;
guint n;
/* partition */
partition_table_syspath = g_strdup (devpath);
for (n = strlen (partition_table_syspath) - 1; partition_table_syspath[n] != '/'; n--)
partition_table_syspath[n] = '\0';
partition_table_syspath[n] = '\0';
device = udev_device_new_from_syspath (udev_device_get_udev (given_device), partition_table_syspath);
if (device == NULL)
{
g_printerr ("Error getting udev device for syspath %s: %m\n", partition_table_syspath);
goto out;
}
ret = g_strdup (udev_device_get_devnode (device));
udev_device_unref (device);
if (ret == NULL)
{
/* This Should Not Happen™, but was reported in a distribution upgrade
scenario, so handle it gracefully */
g_printerr ("Error getting devnode from udev device path %s: %m\n", partition_table_syspath);
goto out;
}
offset = sysfs_get_uint64 (devpath, "start") * 512;
alignment_offset = sysfs_get_uint64 (devpath, "alignment_offset");
}
else
{
const char *targets_type;
const char *encoded_targets_params;
targets_type = g_getenv ("UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
if (targets_type == NULL)
targets_type = udev_device_get_property_value (given_device, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
encoded_targets_params = g_getenv ("UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS");
if (encoded_targets_params == NULL)
encoded_targets_params = udev_device_get_property_value (given_device, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS");
if (g_strcmp0 (targets_type, "linear") == 0)
{
gint partition_slave_major;
gchar *targets_params;
targets_params = decode_udev_encoded_string (encoded_targets_params);
if (targets_params == NULL || sscanf (targets_params,
"%d:%d\x20%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
&partition_slave_major,
&partition_slave_minor,
&offset_sectors) != 3)
{
g_printerr ("Error decoding UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS=`%s'\n", targets_params);
}
else
{
struct udev_device *mp_device;
mp_device = udev_device_new_from_devnum (udev_device_get_udev (given_device),
'b', makedev (partition_slave_major,
partition_slave_minor));
if (mp_device != NULL)
{
const char *dm_name;
gint n;
/* now figure out the partition number... we infer this from DM_NAME */
partition_number = 0;
dm_name = g_getenv ("DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
dm_name = udev_device_get_property_value (given_device, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL || strlen (dm_name) == 0)
{
g_printerr ("DM_NAME not available\n");
goto out;
}
for (n = strlen (dm_name) - 1; n >= 0; n--)
{
if (!isdigit (dm_name[n]))
break;
}
if (n < 0 || dm_name[n] != 'p')
{
g_printerr ("DM_NAME=`%s' is malformed (expected <name>p<number>)\n", dm_name);
goto out;
}
partition_number = atoi (dm_name + n + 1);
if (partition_number < 1)
{
g_printerr ("Error determining partition number from DM_NAME=`%s'\n", dm_name);
goto out;
}
ret = g_strdup (udev_device_get_devnode (mp_device));
offset = offset_sectors * 512;
partition_table_syspath = g_strdup (udev_device_get_syspath (mp_device));
udev_device_unref (mp_device);
g_free (targets_params);
/* TODO: set alignment_offset */
goto out;
}
}
g_free (targets_params);
}
/* not a kernel partition */
partition_table_syspath = g_strdup (devpath);
ret = g_strdup (given_device_file);
partition_number = 0;
}
out:
if (out_offset != NULL)
*out_offset = offset;
if (out_partition_number != NULL)
*out_partition_number = partition_number;
if (out_partition_table_syspath != NULL)
*out_partition_table_syspath = partition_table_syspath;
else
g_free (partition_table_syspath);
if (out_alignment_offset != NULL)
*out_alignment_offset = alignment_offset;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: probers/udisks-dm-export.c in udisks before 1.0.1 exports UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS information to udev even for a crypt UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE, which allows local users to discover encryption keys by (1) running a certain udevadm command or (2) reading a certain file under /dev/.udev/db/.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: JsVar *jswrap_graphics_createArrayBuffer(int width, int height, int bpp, JsVar *options) {
if (width<=0 || height<=0 || width>32767 || height>32767) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid Size");
return 0;
}
if (!isValidBPP(bpp)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid BPP");
return 0;
}
JsVar *parent = jspNewObject(0, "Graphics");
if (!parent) return 0; // low memory
JsGraphics gfx;
graphicsStructInit(&gfx);
gfx.data.type = JSGRAPHICSTYPE_ARRAYBUFFER;
gfx.data.flags = JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_NONE;
gfx.graphicsVar = parent;
gfx.data.width = (unsigned short)width;
gfx.data.height = (unsigned short)height;
gfx.data.bpp = (unsigned char)bpp;
if (jsvIsObject(options)) {
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "zigzag", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_ZIGZAG);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "msb", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_MSB);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "vertical_byte", 0))) {
if (gfx.data.bpp==1)
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_VERTICAL_BYTE);
else
jsWarn("vertical_byte only works for 1bpp ArrayBuffers\n");
}
JsVar *colorv = jsvObjectGetChild(options, "color_order", 0);
if (colorv) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rgb")) ; // The default
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "brg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BRG);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "bgr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BGR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "gbr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GBR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "grb"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GRB);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rbg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_RBG);
else
jsWarn("color_order must be 3 characters");
jsvUnLock(colorv);
}
}
lcdInit_ArrayBuffer(&gfx);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
return parent;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.98 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via an Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing in which certain height validation is missing in libs/graphics/jswrap_graphics.c.
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421) | Medium | 169,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebRtcAudioRenderer::Initialize(WebRtcAudioRendererSource* source) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
DCHECK_EQ(state_, UNINITIALIZED);
DCHECK(source);
DCHECK(!sink_);
DCHECK(!source_);
sink_ = AudioDeviceFactory::NewOutputDevice();
DCHECK(sink_);
int sample_rate = GetAudioOutputSampleRate();
DVLOG(1) << "Audio output hardware sample rate: " << sample_rate;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputSampleRate",
sample_rate, media::kUnexpectedAudioSampleRate);
if (std::find(&kValidOutputRates[0],
&kValidOutputRates[0] + arraysize(kValidOutputRates),
sample_rate) ==
&kValidOutputRates[arraysize(kValidOutputRates)]) {
DLOG(ERROR) << sample_rate << " is not a supported output rate.";
return false;
}
media::ChannelLayout channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
int buffer_size = 0;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
if (sample_rate == 96000 || sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = (sample_rate / 100);
} else {
buffer_size = 2 * 440;
}
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
buffer_size = 3 * buffer_size;
DLOG(WARNING) << "Extending the output buffer size by a factor of three "
<< "since Windows XP has been detected.";
}
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
if (sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = 480;
} else {
buffer_size = 440;
}
#elif defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_OPENBSD)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
buffer_size = 480;
#else
DLOG(ERROR) << "Unsupported platform";
return false;
#endif
params_.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY, channel_layout,
sample_rate, 16, buffer_size);
buffer_.reset(new int16[params_.frames_per_buffer() * params_.channels()]);
source_ = source;
source->SetRenderFormat(params_);
sink_->Initialize(params_, this);
sink_->SetSourceRenderView(source_render_view_id_);
sink_->Start();
state_ = PAUSED;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputChannelLayout",
channel_layout, media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputFramesPerBuffer",
buffer_size, kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize);
AddHistogramFramesPerBuffer(buffer_size);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: content/renderer/media/webrtc_audio_renderer.cc in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 on Mac OS X does not use an appropriate buffer size for the 96 kHz sampling rate, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a web site that provides WebRTC audio.
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void commit_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *shadows)
{
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct mount *m;
LIST_HEAD(head);
struct mnt_namespace *n = parent->mnt_ns;
BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
list_add_tail(&head, &mnt->mnt_list);
list_for_each_entry(m, &head, mnt_list)
m->mnt_ns = n;
list_splice(&head, n->list.prev);
attach_shadowed(mnt, parent, shadows);
touch_mnt_namespace(n);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bin_entry(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, bool inifin) {
char str[R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE];
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RListIter *iter;
RBinAddr *entry = NULL;
int i = 0;
ut64 baddr = r_bin_get_baddr (r->bin);
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
if (inifin) {
r_cons_printf ("[Constructors]\n");
} else {
r_cons_printf ("[Entrypoints]\n");
}
}
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
ut64 paddr = entry->paddr;
ut64 haddr = UT64_MAX;
if (mode != R_CORE_BIN_SET) {
if (inifin) {
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PROGRAM) {
continue;
}
} else {
if (entry->type != R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PROGRAM) {
continue;
}
}
}
switch (entry->type) {
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT:
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI:
case R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT:
if (r->io->va && entry->paddr == entry->vaddr) {
RIOMap *map = r_io_map_get (r->io, entry->vaddr);
if (map) {
paddr = entry->vaddr - map->itv.addr + map->delta;
}
}
}
if (entry->haddr) {
haddr = entry->haddr;
}
ut64 at = rva (r->bin, paddr, entry->vaddr, va);
const char *type = r_bin_entry_type_string (entry->type);
if (!type) {
type = "unknown";
}
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, "symbols");
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.init", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.fini", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT) {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i.preinit", i);
} else {
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "entry%i", i);
}
r_flag_set (r->flags, str, at, 1);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", at);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"vaddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"paddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"baddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"laddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"haddr\":%" PFMT64d ","
"\"type\":\"%s\"}",
iter->p ? "," : "", at, paddr, baddr, laddr, haddr, type);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
char *name = NULL;
if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.init", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.fini", i);
} else if (entry->type == R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT) {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i.preinit", i);
} else {
name = r_str_newf ("entry%i", i);
}
r_cons_printf ("f %s 1 @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", name, at);
r_cons_printf ("f %s_haddr 1 @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", name, haddr);
r_cons_printf ("s %s\n", name);
free (name);
} else {
r_cons_printf (
"vaddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" paddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" baddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" laddr=0x%08"PFMT64x,
at, paddr, baddr, laddr);
if (haddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (
" haddr=%"PFMT64d
" type=%s\n",
haddr, type);
} else {
r_cons_printf (
" haddr=0x%08"PFMT64x
" type=%s\n",
haddr, type);
}
}
i++;
}
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (entry) {
ut64 at = rva (r->bin, entry->paddr, entry->vaddr, va);
r_core_seek (r, at, 0);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
r_cons_newline ();
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("\n%i entrypoints\n", i);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The r_read_le32() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923) | Medium | 169,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *bus, struct module *owner)
{
struct mdio_device *mdiodev;
int i, err;
struct gpio_desc *gpiod;
if (NULL == bus || NULL == bus->name ||
NULL == bus->read || NULL == bus->write)
return -EINVAL;
BUG_ON(bus->state != MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED &&
bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED);
bus->owner = owner;
bus->dev.parent = bus->parent;
bus->dev.class = &mdio_bus_class;
bus->dev.groups = NULL;
dev_set_name(&bus->dev, "%s", bus->id);
err = device_register(&bus->dev);
if (err) {
pr_err("mii_bus %s failed to register\n", bus->id);
put_device(&bus->dev);
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_init(&bus->mdio_lock);
/* de-assert bus level PHY GPIO reset */
gpiod = devm_gpiod_get_optional(&bus->dev, "reset", GPIOD_OUT_LOW);
if (IS_ERR(gpiod)) {
dev_err(&bus->dev, "mii_bus %s couldn't get reset GPIO\n",
bus->id);
device_del(&bus->dev);
return PTR_ERR(gpiod);
} else if (gpiod) {
bus->reset_gpiod = gpiod;
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(gpiod, 1);
udelay(bus->reset_delay_us);
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(gpiod, 0);
}
if (bus->reset)
bus->reset(bus);
for (i = 0; i < PHY_MAX_ADDR; i++) {
if ((bus->phy_mask & (1 << i)) == 0) {
struct phy_device *phydev;
phydev = mdiobus_scan(bus, i);
if (IS_ERR(phydev) && (PTR_ERR(phydev) != -ENODEV)) {
err = PTR_ERR(phydev);
goto error;
}
}
}
mdiobus_setup_mdiodev_from_board_info(bus, mdiobus_create_device);
bus->state = MDIOBUS_REGISTERED;
pr_info("%s: probed\n", bus->name);
return 0;
error:
while (--i >= 0) {
mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[i];
if (!mdiodev)
continue;
mdiodev->device_remove(mdiodev);
mdiodev->device_free(mdiodev);
}
/* Put PHYs in RESET to save power */
if (bus->reset_gpiod)
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(bus->reset_gpiod, 1);
device_del(&bus->dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0. The function __mdiobus_register() in drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c calls put_device(), which will trigger a fixed_mdio_bus_init use-after-free. This will cause a denial of service.
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 169,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease_Params& params) {
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
view->AcceleratedSurfaceRelease(params.identifier);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
int noblock;
struct vmci_datagram *dg;
size_t payload_len;
struct sk_buff *skb;
noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
if (flags & MSG_OOB || flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/* Retrieve the head sk_buff from the socket's receive queue. */
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(&vsk->sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (err)
return err;
if (!skb)
return -EAGAIN;
dg = (struct vmci_datagram *)skb->data;
if (!dg)
/* err is 0, meaning we read zero bytes. */
goto out;
payload_len = dg->payload_size;
/* Ensure the sk_buff matches the payload size claimed in the packet. */
if (payload_len != skb->len - sizeof(*dg)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (payload_len > len) {
payload_len = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
/* Place the datagram payload in the user's iovec. */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(*dg), msg->msg_iov,
payload_len);
if (err)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_vm *vm_addr;
/* Provide the address of the sender. */
vm_addr = (struct sockaddr_vm *)msg->msg_name;
vsock_addr_init(vm_addr, dg->src.context, dg->src.resource);
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*vm_addr);
}
err = payload_len;
out:
skb_free_datagram(&vsk->sk, skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Edition::Edition()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::DataReductionProxySettings()
: unreachable_(false),
deferred_initialization_(false),
prefs_(nullptr),
config_(nullptr),
clock_(base::DefaultClock::GetInstance()) {}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948} | Medium | 172,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ceph_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int ret = 0, size = 0;
const char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
struct iattr newattrs;
umode_t new_mode = inode->i_mode, old_mode = inode->i_mode;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &new_mode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
ret = acl ? -EINVAL : 0;
goto out;
}
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (acl) {
size = posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count);
value = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!value) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
}
ret = __ceph_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
if (ret) {
if (new_mode != old_mode) {
newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode;
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
__ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs);
}
goto out_free;
}
ceph_set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
out_free:
kfree(value);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.8.2 preserves the setgid bit during a setxattr call, which allows local users to gain group privileges by leveraging the existence of a setgid program with restrictions on execute permissions.
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> | Low | 166,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: __imlib_Ellipse_DrawToData(int xc, int yc, int a, int b, DATA32 color,
DATA32 * dst, int dstw, int clx, int cly, int clw,
int clh, ImlibOp op, char dst_alpha, char blend)
{
ImlibPointDrawFunction pfunc;
int xx, yy, x, y, prev_x, prev_y, ty, by, lx, rx;
DATA32 a2, b2, *tp, *bp;
DATA64 dx, dy;
if (A_VAL(&color) == 0xff)
blend = 0;
pfunc = __imlib_GetPointDrawFunction(op, dst_alpha, blend);
if (!pfunc)
return;
xc -= clx;
yc -= cly;
dst += (dstw * cly) + clx;
a2 = a * a;
b2 = b * b;
yy = b << 16;
prev_y = b;
dx = a2 * b;
dy = 0;
ty = yc - b - 1;
by = yc + b;
lx = xc - 1;
rx = xc;
tp = dst + (dstw * ty) + lx;
bp = dst + (dstw * by) + lx;
while (dy < dx)
{
int len;
y = yy >> 16;
y += ((yy - (y << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_y != y)
{
prev_y = y;
dx -= a2;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dy += b2;
yy -= ((dy << 16) / dx);
lx--;
if ((lx < 0) && (rx > clw))
return;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
xx = yy;
prev_x = xx >> 16;
dx = dy;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
while (ty < yc)
{
int len;
x = xx >> 16;
x += ((xx - (x << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_x != x)
{
prev_x = x;
dy += b2;
lx--;
rx++;
tp--;
bp--;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dx -= a2;
xx += ((dx << 16) / dy);
ty++;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) by drawing a 2x1 ellipse.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Span( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
FT_UNUSED( left );
FT_UNUSED( right );
if ( x2 - x1 < ras.precision )
{
Long e1, e2;
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
if ( e1 == e2 )
{
Byte f1;
PByte bits;
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
if ( e1 >= 0 && e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
PByte p;
p = bits - e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
p += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
p[0] |= f1;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message: | High | 164,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer(const WebRTCSessionDescriptionRequest& request, const WebMediaConstraints& constraints)
{
WebString shouldSucceed;
if (constraints.getMandatoryConstraintValue("succeed", shouldSucceed) && shouldSucceed == "true") {
WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor sessionDescription;
sessionDescription.initialize("offer", "Some SDP here");
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestSuccededTask(this, request, sessionDescription));
} else
postTask(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestFailedTask(this, request));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *detail = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *desc = NULL;
unsigned int elength;
int cnt = 0;
memset(hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header));
hdr->phonet_magic_present = false;
while (buflen > 0) {
elength = buffer[0];
if (!elength) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage byte\n");
elength = 1;
goto next_desc;
}
if (buffer[1] != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage\n");
goto next_desc;
}
switch (buffer[2]) {
case USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE: /* we've found it */
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_union_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (union_header) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "More than one union descriptor, skipping ...\n");
goto next_desc;
}
union_header = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_country_functional_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_header_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (header)
return -EINVAL;
header = (struct usb_cdc_header_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_acm_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ether_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (ether)
return -EINVAL;
ether = (struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_DMM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_dmm_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (desc)
return -EINVAL;
desc = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_DETAIL_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (detail)
return -EINVAL;
detail = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_NCM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ncm_desc = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_desc = (struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_EXTENDED_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc))
break;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc *)buffer;
break;
case CDC_PHONET_MAGIC_NUMBER:
hdr->phonet_magic_present = true;
break;
default:
/*
* there are LOTS more CDC descriptors that
* could legitimately be found here.
*/
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Ignoring descriptor: type %02x, length %ud\n",
buffer[2], elength);
goto next_desc;
}
cnt++;
next_desc:
buflen -= elength;
buffer += elength;
}
hdr->usb_cdc_union_desc = union_header;
hdr->usb_cdc_header_desc = header;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc = detail;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_desc = desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ether_desc = ether;
return cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdc_parse_cdc_header function in drivers/usb/core/message.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 167,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SecurityHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
if (enabled_ && host_)
AttachToRenderFrameHost();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct ffs_io_data *io_data = container_of(work, struct ffs_io_data,
work);
int ret = io_data->req->status ? io_data->req->status :
io_data->req->actual;
if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
use_mm(io_data->mm);
ret = copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
if (iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
ret = -EFAULT;
unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
}
io_data->kiocb->ki_complete(io_data->kiocb, ret, ret);
if (io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd &&
!(io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD))
eventfd_signal(io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd, 1);
usb_ep_free_request(io_data->ep, io_data->req);
io_data->kiocb->private = NULL;
if (io_data->read)
kfree(io_data->to_free);
kfree(io_data->buf);
kfree(io_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the ffs_user_copy_worker function in drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 allows local users to gain privileges by accessing an I/O data structure after a certain callback call.
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> | High | 166,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() const {
return Textfield::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() &&
!model()->is_caret_visible() && !model()->is_keyword_selected();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to read local files via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279} | Medium | 172,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tiffcp(TIFF* in, TIFF* out)
{
uint16 bitspersample, samplesperpixel;
uint16 input_compression, input_photometric;
copyFunc cf;
uint32 width, length;
struct cpTag* p;
CopyField(TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, width);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, length);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, bitspersample);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, samplesperpixel);
if (compression != (uint16)-1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &input_compression);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &input_photometric);
if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
/* Force conversion to RGB */
TIFFSetField(in, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else if (input_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
/* Otherwise, can't handle subsampled input */
uint16 subsamplinghor,subsamplingver;
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&subsamplinghor, &subsamplingver);
if (subsamplinghor!=1 || subsamplingver!=1) {
fprintf(stderr, "tiffcp: %s: Can't copy/convert subsampled image.\n",
TIFFFileName(in));
return FALSE;
}
}
if (compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
if (input_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB &&
jpegcolormode == JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, input_photometric);
}
else if (compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG
|| compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,
samplesperpixel == 1 ?
PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL : PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV);
else if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG &&
samplesperpixel == 3 ) {
/* RGB conversion was forced above
hence the output will be of the same type */
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_RGB);
}
else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, 1, TIFF_SHORT);
if (fillorder != 0)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, fillorder);
else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, 1, TIFF_SHORT);
/*
* Will copy `Orientation' tag from input image
*/
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, &orientation);
switch (orientation) {
case ORIENTATION_BOTRIGHT:
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTBOT: /* XXX */
TIFFWarning(TIFFFileName(in), "using bottom-left orientation");
orientation = ORIENTATION_BOTLEFT;
/* fall thru... */
case ORIENTATION_LEFTBOT: /* XXX */
case ORIENTATION_BOTLEFT:
break;
case ORIENTATION_TOPRIGHT:
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTTOP: /* XXX */
default:
TIFFWarning(TIFFFileName(in), "using top-left orientation");
orientation = ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT;
/* fall thru... */
case ORIENTATION_LEFTTOP: /* XXX */
case ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT:
break;
}
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, orientation);
/*
* Choose tiles/strip for the output image according to
* the command line arguments (-tiles, -strips) and the
* structure of the input image.
*/
if (outtiled == -1)
outtiled = TIFFIsTiled(in);
if (outtiled) {
/*
* Setup output file's tile width&height. If either
* is not specified, use either the value from the
* input image or, if nothing is defined, use the
* library default.
*/
if (tilewidth == (uint32) -1)
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tilewidth);
if (tilelength == (uint32) -1)
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tilelength);
TIFFDefaultTileSize(out, &tilewidth, &tilelength);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, tilewidth);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, tilelength);
} else {
/*
* RowsPerStrip is left unspecified: use either the
* value from the input image or, if nothing is defined,
* use the library default.
*/
if (rowsperstrip == (uint32) 0) {
if (!TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
&rowsperstrip)) {
rowsperstrip =
TIFFDefaultStripSize(out, rowsperstrip);
}
if (rowsperstrip > length && rowsperstrip != (uint32)-1)
rowsperstrip = length;
}
else if (rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1)
rowsperstrip = length;
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
}
if (config != (uint16) -1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, config);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, config);
if (samplesperpixel <= 4)
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_TRANSFERFUNCTION, 4, TIFF_SHORT);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_COLORMAP, 4, TIFF_SHORT);
/* SMinSampleValue & SMaxSampleValue */
switch (compression) {
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY, quality);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, jpegcolormode);
break;
case COMPRESSION_JBIG:
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXDCS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
break;
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE:
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
if (predictor != (uint16)-1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR, predictor);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR, predictor);
if (preset != -1) {
if (compression == COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE
|| compression == COMPRESSION_DEFLATE)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY, preset);
else if (compression == COMPRESSION_LZMA)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_LZMAPRESET, preset);
}
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
if (compression == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3) {
if (g3opts != (uint32) -1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS,
g3opts);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS, g3opts);
} else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_GROUP4OPTIONS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_BADFAXLINES, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_CLEANFAXDATA, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_CONSECUTIVEBADFAXLINES, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
break;
}
{
uint32 len32;
void** data;
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE, &len32, &data))
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE, len32, data);
}
{
uint16 ninks;
const char* inknames;
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, &ninks)) {
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, ninks);
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, &inknames)) {
int inknameslen = strlen(inknames) + 1;
const char* cp = inknames;
while (ninks > 1) {
cp = strchr(cp, '\0');
cp++;
inknameslen += (strlen(cp) + 1);
ninks--;
}
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, inknameslen, inknames);
}
}
}
{
unsigned short pg0, pg1;
if (pageInSeq == 1) {
if (pageNum < 0) /* only one input file */ {
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pg0, &pg1))
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pg0, pg1);
} else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pageNum++, 0);
} else {
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pg0, &pg1)) {
if (pageNum < 0) /* only one input file */
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pg0, pg1);
else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pageNum++, 0);
}
}
}
for (p = tags; p < &tags[NTAGS]; p++)
CopyTag(p->tag, p->count, p->type);
cf = pickCopyFunc(in, out, bitspersample, samplesperpixel);
return (cf ? (*cf)(in, out, length, width, samplesperpixel) : FALSE);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 reads an undefined buffer in readContigStripsIntoBuffer() because of a uint16 integer overflow. Reported as MSVR 35100.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,865 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ParseRiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int is_rf64 = !strncmp (fourcc, "RF64", 4), got_ds64 = 0;
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
RiffChunkHeader riff_chunk_header;
ChunkHeader chunk_header;
WaveHeader WaveHeader;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
uint32_t bcount;
CLEAR (WaveHeader);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
if (!is_rf64 && infilesize >= 4294967296LL && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH)) {
error_line ("can't handle .WAV files larger than 4 GB (non-standard)!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
memcpy (&riff_chunk_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &riff_chunk_header) + 4, sizeof (RiffChunkHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (RiffChunkHeader) - 4 || strncmp (riff_chunk_header.formType, "WAVE", 4))) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &riff_chunk_header, sizeof (RiffChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &chunk_header, sizeof (ChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (ChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &chunk_header, sizeof (ChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&chunk_header, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "ds64", 4)) {
if (chunk_header.ckSize < sizeof (DS64Chunk) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (DS64Chunk), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DS64Chunk)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (DS64Chunk))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
got_ds64 = 1;
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("DS64: riffSize = %lld, dataSize = %lld, sampleCount = %lld, table_length = %d",
(long long) ds64_chunk.riffSize64, (long long) ds64_chunk.dataSize64,
(long long) ds64_chunk.sampleCount64, ds64_chunk.tableLength);
if (ds64_chunk.tableLength * sizeof (CS64Chunk) != chunk_header.ckSize - sizeof (DS64Chunk)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (ds64_chunk.tableLength--) {
CS64Chunk cs64_chunk;
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &cs64_chunk, sizeof (CS64Chunk), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CS64Chunk) ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &cs64_chunk, sizeof (CS64Chunk)))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
}
else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "fmt ", 4)) { // if it's the format chunk, we want to get some info out of there and
int supported = TRUE, format; // make sure it's a .wav file we can handle
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 16 || chunk_header.ckSize > sizeof (WaveHeader) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &WaveHeader, chunk_header.ckSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != chunk_header.ckSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &WaveHeader, chunk_header.ckSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&WaveHeader, WaveHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("format tag size = %d", chunk_header.ckSize);
error_line ("FormatTag = %x, NumChannels = %d, BitsPerSample = %d",
WaveHeader.FormatTag, WaveHeader.NumChannels, WaveHeader.BitsPerSample);
error_line ("BlockAlign = %d, SampleRate = %d, BytesPerSecond = %d",
WaveHeader.BlockAlign, WaveHeader.SampleRate, WaveHeader.BytesPerSecond);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16)
error_line ("cbSize = %d, ValidBitsPerSample = %d", WaveHeader.cbSize,
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 20)
error_line ("ChannelMask = %x, SubFormat = %d",
WaveHeader.ChannelMask, WaveHeader.SubFormat);
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16 && WaveHeader.cbSize == 2)
config->qmode |= QMODE_ADOBE_MODE;
format = (WaveHeader.FormatTag == 0xfffe && chunk_header.ckSize == 40) ?
WaveHeader.SubFormat : WaveHeader.FormatTag;
config->bits_per_sample = (chunk_header.ckSize == 40 && WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample) ?
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample : WaveHeader.BitsPerSample;
if (format != 1 && format != 3)
supported = FALSE;
if (format == 3 && config->bits_per_sample != 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels || WaveHeader.NumChannels > 256 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels < (config->bits_per_sample + 7) / 8 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels > 4 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign % WaveHeader.NumChannels)
supported = FALSE;
if (config->bits_per_sample < 1 || config->bits_per_sample > 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .WAV format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 40) {
if (!config->channel_mask && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 2)
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - WaveHeader.NumChannels;
else if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 18)
config->channel_mask = (1 << WaveHeader.NumChannels) - 1;
else
config->channel_mask = 0x3ffff;
}
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this WAV file already has channel order information!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask)
config->channel_mask = WaveHeader.ChannelMask;
if (format == 3)
config->float_norm_exp = 127;
else if ((config->qmode & QMODE_ADOBE_MODE) &&
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels == 4) {
if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 24)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 23;
else if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 32)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 15;
}
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: normalized 32-bit floating point");
else if (config->float_norm_exp)
error_line ("data format: 32-bit floating point (Audition %d:%d float type 1)",
config->float_norm_exp - 126, 150 - config->float_norm_exp);
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels);
}
}
else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "data", 4)) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
int64_t data_chunk_size = (got_ds64 && chunk_header.ckSize == (uint32_t) -1) ?
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 : chunk_header.ckSize;
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels || (is_rf64 && !got_ds64)) { // make sure we saw "fmt" and "ds64" chunks (if required)
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) && infilesize - data_chunk_size > 16777216) {
error_line ("this .WAV file has over 16 MB of extra RIFF data, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) {
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
total_samples = data_chunk_size / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
if (got_ds64 && total_samples != ds64_chunk.sampleCount64) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .WAV file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
config->bytes_per_sample = WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->num_channels = WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->sample_rate = WaveHeader.SampleRate;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (chunk_header.ckSize + 1) & ~1L;
char *buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
chunk_header.ckID [0], chunk_header.ckID [1], chunk_header.ckID [2],
chunk_header.ckID [3], chunk_header.ckSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in WavPack 5.1.0 and earlier for W64 input. Out-of-bounds writes can occur because ParseWave64HeaderConfig in wave64.c does not validate the sizes of unknown chunks before attempting memory allocation, related to a lack of integer-overflow protection within a bytes_to_copy calculation and subsequent malloc call, leading to insufficient memory allocation.
Commit Message: issue #33, sanitize size of unknown chunks before malloc() | Medium | 169,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int try_to_unmap_cluster(unsigned long cursor, unsigned int *mapcount,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *check_page)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
pte_t pteval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
unsigned long address;
unsigned long mmun_start; /* For mmu_notifiers */
unsigned long mmun_end; /* For mmu_notifiers */
unsigned long end;
int ret = SWAP_AGAIN;
int locked_vma = 0;
address = (vma->vm_start + cursor) & CLUSTER_MASK;
end = address + CLUSTER_SIZE;
if (address < vma->vm_start)
address = vma->vm_start;
if (end > vma->vm_end)
end = vma->vm_end;
pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
if (!pmd)
return ret;
mmun_start = address;
mmun_end = end;
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/*
* If we can acquire the mmap_sem for read, and vma is VM_LOCKED,
* keep the sem while scanning the cluster for mlocking pages.
*/
if (down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem)) {
locked_vma = (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED);
if (!locked_vma)
up_read(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem); /* don't need it */
}
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
/* Update high watermark before we lower rss */
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
for (; address < end; pte++, address += PAGE_SIZE) {
if (!pte_present(*pte))
continue;
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, *pte);
BUG_ON(!page || PageAnon(page));
if (locked_vma) {
mlock_vma_page(page); /* no-op if already mlocked */
if (page == check_page)
ret = SWAP_MLOCK;
continue; /* don't unmap */
}
if (ptep_clear_flush_young_notify(vma, address, pte))
continue;
/* Nuke the page table entry. */
flush_cache_page(vma, address, pte_pfn(*pte));
pteval = ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pte);
/* If nonlinear, store the file page offset in the pte. */
if (page->index != linear_page_index(vma, address)) {
pte_t ptfile = pgoff_to_pte(page->index);
if (pte_soft_dirty(pteval))
pte_file_mksoft_dirty(ptfile);
set_pte_at(mm, address, pte, ptfile);
}
/* Move the dirty bit to the physical page now the pte is gone. */
if (pte_dirty(pteval))
set_page_dirty(page);
page_remove_rmap(page);
page_cache_release(page);
dec_mm_counter(mm, MM_FILEPAGES);
(*mapcount)--;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
if (locked_vma)
up_read(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The try_to_unmap_cluster function in mm/rmap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.14.3 does not properly consider which pages must be locked, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by triggering a memory-usage pattern that requires removal of page-table mappings.
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string utf16ToUtf8(const StringPiece16& utf16) {
ssize_t utf8Length = utf16_to_utf8_length(utf16.data(), utf16.length());
if (utf8Length <= 0) {
return {};
}
std::string utf8;
utf8.resize(utf8Length);
utf16_to_utf8(utf16.data(), utf16.length(), &*utf8.begin());
return utf8;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: LibUtils in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 mishandles conversions between Unicode character encodings with different encoding widths, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 29250543.
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
| High | 174,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int WriteRiffHeader (FILE *outfile, WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t total_samples, int qmode)
{
int do_rf64 = 0, write_junk = 1;
ChunkHeader ds64hdr, datahdr, fmthdr;
RiffChunkHeader riffhdr;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
JunkChunk junkchunk;
WaveHeader wavhdr;
uint32_t bcount;
int64_t total_data_bytes, total_riff_bytes;
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
int32_t channel_mask = WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int32_t sample_rate = WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int bytes_per_sample = WavpackGetBytesPerSample (wpc);
int bits_per_sample = WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc);
int format = WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) ? 3 : 1;
int wavhdrsize = 16;
if (format == 3 && WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) != 127) {
error_line ("can't create valid RIFF wav header for non-normalized floating data!");
return FALSE;
}
if (total_samples == -1)
total_samples = 0x7ffff000 / (bytes_per_sample * num_channels);
total_data_bytes = total_samples * bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
if (total_data_bytes > 0xff000000) {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so rf64", total_data_bytes);
write_junk = 0;
do_rf64 = 1;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so riff", total_data_bytes);
CLEAR (wavhdr);
wavhdr.FormatTag = format;
wavhdr.NumChannels = num_channels;
wavhdr.SampleRate = sample_rate;
wavhdr.BytesPerSecond = sample_rate * num_channels * bytes_per_sample;
wavhdr.BlockAlign = bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
if (num_channels > 2 || channel_mask != 0x5 - num_channels) {
wavhdrsize = sizeof (wavhdr);
wavhdr.cbSize = 22;
wavhdr.ValidBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
wavhdr.SubFormat = format;
wavhdr.ChannelMask = channel_mask;
wavhdr.FormatTag = 0xfffe;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bytes_per_sample * 8;
wavhdr.GUID [4] = 0x10;
wavhdr.GUID [6] = 0x80;
wavhdr.GUID [9] = 0xaa;
wavhdr.GUID [11] = 0x38;
wavhdr.GUID [12] = 0x9b;
wavhdr.GUID [13] = 0x71;
}
strncpy (riffhdr.ckID, do_rf64 ? "RF64" : "RIFF", sizeof (riffhdr.ckID));
strncpy (riffhdr.formType, "WAVE", sizeof (riffhdr.formType));
total_riff_bytes = sizeof (riffhdr) + wavhdrsize + sizeof (datahdr) + ((total_data_bytes + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
if (do_rf64) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (ds64hdr) + sizeof (ds64_chunk);
if (write_junk) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (junkchunk);
strncpy (fmthdr.ckID, "fmt ", sizeof (fmthdr.ckID));
strncpy (datahdr.ckID, "data", sizeof (datahdr.ckID));
fmthdr.ckSize = wavhdrsize;
if (write_junk) {
CLEAR (junkchunk);
strncpy (junkchunk.ckID, "junk", sizeof (junkchunk.ckID));
junkchunk.ckSize = sizeof (junkchunk) - 8;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&junkchunk, ChunkHeaderFormat);
}
if (do_rf64) {
strncpy (ds64hdr.ckID, "ds64", sizeof (ds64hdr.ckID));
ds64hdr.ckSize = sizeof (ds64_chunk);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
ds64_chunk.riffSize64 = total_riff_bytes;
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 = total_data_bytes;
ds64_chunk.sampleCount64 = total_samples;
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64hdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
}
else {
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_riff_bytes;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_data_bytes;
}
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&riffhdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&fmthdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&wavhdr, WaveHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&datahdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &riffhdr, sizeof (riffhdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (riffhdr) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64hdr, sizeof (ds64hdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64hdr))) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (ds64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64_chunk))) ||
(write_junk && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &junkchunk, sizeof (junkchunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (junkchunk))) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &fmthdr, sizeof (fmthdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (fmthdr) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &wavhdr, wavhdrsize, &bcount) || bcount != wavhdrsize ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &datahdr, sizeof (datahdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (datahdr)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack-based buffer over-read in the ParseRiffHeaderConfig function of cli/riff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service attack or possibly have unspecified other impact via a maliciously crafted RF64 file.
Commit Message: issue #27, do not overwrite stack on corrupt RF64 file | Medium | 169,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShowingInterstitialPage() const {
return GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page() != NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t first_block, stop_block;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
loff_t first_block_offset, last_block_offset;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
int ret = 0;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, length, 0);
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + length - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* No need to punch hole beyond i_size */
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If the hole extends beyond i_size, set the hole
* to end after the page that contains i_size
*/
if (offset + length > inode->i_size) {
length = inode->i_size +
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - (inode->i_size & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1)) -
offset;
}
if (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1) ||
(offset + length) & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
/*
* Attach jinode to inode for jbd2 if we do any zeroing of
* partial block
*/
ret = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mutex;
}
first_block_offset = round_up(offset, sb->s_blocksize);
last_block_offset = round_down((offset + length), sb->s_blocksize) - 1;
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
else
credits = ext4_blocks_for_truncate(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset,
length);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
first_block = (offset + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
stop_block = (offset + length) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* If there are no blocks to remove, return now */
if (first_block >= stop_block)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, first_block,
stop_block - first_block);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, first_block,
stop_block - 1);
else
ret = ext4_ind_remove_space(handle, inode, first_block,
stop_block);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
/* Now release the pages again to reduce race window */
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 167,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SyncType GetSyncType(const Extension* extension) {
if (!IsSyncable(extension)) {
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
if (!ManifestURL::GetUpdateURL(extension).is_empty() &&
!ManifestURL::UpdatesFromGallery(extension)) {
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
if (PluginInfo::HasPlugins(extension))
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
switch (extension->GetType()) {
case Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION:
return SYNC_TYPE_EXTENSION;
case Manifest::TYPE_USER_SCRIPT:
if (ManifestURL::UpdatesFromGallery(extension))
return SYNC_TYPE_EXTENSION;
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
case Manifest::TYPE_HOSTED_APP:
case Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP:
case Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
return SYNC_TYPE_APP;
case Manifest::TYPE_UNKNOWN:
case Manifest::TYPE_THEME:
case Manifest::TYPE_SHARED_MODULE:
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
NOTREACHED();
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: common/extensions/sync_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 proceeds with sync operations for NPAPI extensions without checking for a certain plugin permission setting, which might allow remote attackers to trigger unwanted extension changes via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix syncing of NPAPI plugins.
This fix adds a check for |plugin| permission
while syncing NPAPI plugins.
BUG=252034
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16816024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207830 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 169,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
uint32_t parent_flags = 0;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
mbedtls_x509_crt *grandparent;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
/* Counting intermediate self signed certificates */
if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
self_cnt++;
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA */
if( 1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
if( md_info == NULL )
{
/*
* Cannot check 'unknown' hash
*/
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
else
{
mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
#endif
/* Look for a grandparent in trusted CAs */
for( grandparent = trust_ca;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, grandparent, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
/* Look for a grandparent upwards the chain */
for( grandparent = parent->next;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
/* +2 because the current step is not yet accounted for
* and because max_pathlen is one higher than it should be.
* Also self signed certificates do not count to the limit. */
if( grandparent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
grandparent->max_pathlen < 2 + path_cnt - self_cnt )
{
continue;
}
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
/* Is our parent part of the chain or at the top? */
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( parent, grandparent, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
/* child is verified to be a child of the parent, call verify callback */
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= parent_flags;
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 1.3.21 and 2.x before 2.1.9, if optional authentication is configured, allows remote attackers to bypass peer authentication via an X.509 certificate chain with many intermediates. NOTE: although mbed TLS was formerly known as PolarSSL, the releases shipped with the PolarSSL name are not affected.
Commit Message: Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point
Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback. | Medium | 170,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const
{
return m_info.number;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void serialize(const char* url)
{
WebURLRequest urlRequest;
urlRequest.initialize();
urlRequest.setURL(KURL(m_baseUrl, url));
m_webViewImpl->mainFrame()->loadRequest(urlRequest);
Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->serveAsynchronousMockedRequests();
runPendingTasks();
Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->serveAsynchronousMockedRequests();
PageSerializer serializer(&m_resources,
m_rewriteURLs.isEmpty() ? 0: &m_rewriteURLs, m_rewriteFolder);
serializer.serialize(m_webViewImpl->mainFrameImpl()->frame()->page());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
char* name = argv[0];
bool applyColorCorrection = false;
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
if (argc >= 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--color-correct") == 0)
applyColorCorrection = (--argc, ++argv, true);
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [--color-correct] file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#else
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#endif
size_t iterations = 1;
if (argc >= 3) {
char* end = 0;
iterations = strtol(argv[2], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0' || !iterations) {
fprintf(stderr, "Second argument should be number of iterations. "
"The default is 1. You supplied %s\n", argv[2]);
exit(1);
}
}
size_t packetSize = 0;
if (argc >= 4) {
char* end = 0;
packetSize = strtol(argv[3], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Third argument should be packet size. Default is "
"0, meaning to decode the entire image in one packet. You "
"supplied %s\n", argv[3]);
exit(1);
}
}
class WebPlatform : public blink::Platform {
public:
const unsigned char* getTraceCategoryEnabledFlag(const char*) override
{
return reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("nope-none-nada");
}
void cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char*, size_t) override
{
}
void screenColorProfile(WebVector<char>* profile) override
{
getScreenColorProfile(profile); // Returns a whacked color profile.
}
};
blink::initializeWithoutV8(new WebPlatform());
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
ImageDecoder::qcmsOutputDeviceProfile(); // Initialize screen colorProfile.
#endif
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data = readFile(argv[1]);
if (!data.get() || !data->size()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading image data from [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(2);
}
data->data();
double totalTime = 0.0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
double startTime = getCurrentTime();
bool decoded = decodeImageData(data.get(), applyColorCorrection, packetSize);
double elapsedTime = getCurrentTime() - startTime;
totalTime += elapsedTime;
if (!decoded) {
fprintf(stderr, "Image decode failed [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(3);
}
}
double averageTime = totalTime / static_cast<double>(iterations);
printf("%f %f\n", totalTime, averageTime);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure that a proper cryptographicallyRandomValues random number generator is used, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229} | Medium | 172,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnCopyDocumentCompleted(
const FilePath& dir_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<DocumentEntry> doc_entry(DocumentEntry::ExtractAndParse(*data));
if (!doc_entry.get()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
return;
}
GDataEntry* entry = GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(
NULL, doc_entry.get(), directory_service_.get());
if (!entry) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
return;
}
directory_service_->root()->AddEntry(entry);
MoveEntryFromRootDirectory(dir_path,
callback,
GDATA_FILE_OK,
entry->GetFilePath());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Location::SetLocation(const String& url,
LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
ExceptionState* exception_state,
SetLocationPolicy set_location_policy) {
if (!IsAttached())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame())
return;
Document* entered_document = entered_window->document();
if (!entered_document)
return;
KURL completed_url = entered_document->CompleteURL(url);
if (completed_url.IsNull())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*dom_window_->GetFrame(),
completed_url)) {
if (exception_state) {
exception_state->ThrowSecurityError(
"The current window does not have permission to navigate the target "
"frame to '" +
url + "'.");
}
return;
}
if (exception_state && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
exception_state->ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kSyntaxError,
"'" + url + "' is not a valid URL.");
return;
}
if (dom_window_->IsInsecureScriptAccess(*current_window, completed_url))
return;
V8DOMActivityLogger* activity_logger =
V8DOMActivityLogger::CurrentActivityLoggerIfIsolatedWorld();
if (activity_logger) {
Vector<String> argv;
argv.push_back("LocalDOMWindow");
argv.push_back("url");
argv.push_back(entered_document->Url());
argv.push_back(completed_url);
activity_logger->LogEvent("blinkSetAttribute", argv.size(), argv.data());
}
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
if (set_location_policy == SetLocationPolicy::kReplaceThisFrame)
frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
dom_window_->GetFrame()->ScheduleNavigation(*current_window->document(),
completed_url, frame_load_type,
UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Content Security Policy in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451} | Medium | 173,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: size_t mptsas_config_ioc_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
PCIDeviceClass *pcic = PCI_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(s);
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x01,
"*l*lwwb*b*b*blww",
pcic->vendor_id, pcic->device_id, pcic->revision,
pcic->subsystem_vendor_id,
pcic->subsystem_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) mptsas_config_manufacturing_1 and (2) mptsas_config_ioc_0 functions in hw/scsi/mptconfig.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allow local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (QEMU process crash) via vectors involving MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: armv6pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num,
void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmcr = armv6_pmcr_read();
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
if (!armv6_pmcr_has_overflowed(pmcr))
return IRQ_NONE;
regs = get_irq_regs();
/*
* The interrupts are cleared by writing the overflow flags back to
* the control register. All of the other bits don't have any effect
* if they are rewritten, so write the whole value back.
*/
armv6_pmcr_write(pmcr);
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv6_pmcr_counter_has_overflowed(pmcr, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DebuggerAttachFunction::RunAsync() {
std::unique_ptr<Attach::Params> params(Attach::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, params->target);
if (!InitAgentHost())
return false;
if (!DevToolsAgentHost::IsSupportedProtocolVersion(
params->required_version)) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kProtocolVersionNotSupportedError,
params->required_version);
return false;
}
if (FindClientHost()) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kAlreadyAttachedError);
return false;
}
new ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(GetProfile(), agent_host_.get(),
extension()->id(), extension()->name(),
debuggee_);
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,239 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::ReplyToRenderer(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> handles_for_renderer;
for (size_t i = 0; i < internal_->sockets_for_renderer.size(); i++) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE handle_in_renderer;
if (!DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(
internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i]),
chrome_render_message_filter_->peer_handle(),
&handle_in_renderer,
0, // Unused given DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS.
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "DuplicateHandle() failed";
return false;
}
handles_for_renderer.push_back(
reinterpret_cast<nacl::FileDescriptor>(handle_in_renderer));
#else
nacl::FileDescriptor imc_handle;
imc_handle.fd = internal_->sockets_for_renderer[i];
imc_handle.auto_close = true;
handles_for_renderer.push_back(imc_handle);
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
if (!content::BrokerAddTargetPeer(process_->GetData().handle)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add NaCl process PID";
return false;
}
}
#endif
ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg_, handles_for_renderer, channel_handle);
chrome_render_message_filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
chrome_render_message_filter_ = NULL;
reply_msg_ = NULL;
internal_->sockets_for_renderer.clear();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) uaddr;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int ret;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->l2tp_family != AF_INET)
return -EINVAL;
ret = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip_bind_lookup(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
goto out;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr);
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr)
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
l2tp_ip_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
ret = 0;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the L2TPv3 IP Encapsulation feature in the Linux kernel before 4.8.14 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by making multiple bind system calls without properly ascertaining whether a socket has the SOCK_ZAPPED status, related to net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c and net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void IOHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_host_ = process_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::hold(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Hold: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!holdJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
true, // Always notify the shadow of the hold
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false, // Do not email admin about this action
false // This is not a system related (internal) hold
)) {
text = "Failed to hold job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __init ipip_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(banner);
if (xfrm4_tunnel_register(&ipip_handler, AF_INET)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipip init: can't register tunnel\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ipip_net_ops);
if (err)
xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&ipip_handler, AF_INET);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user | Medium | 170,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int get_tp_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
int reg = (instr >> 12) & 15;
if (reg == 15)
return 1;
regs->uregs[reg] = current_thread_info()->tp_value;
regs->ARM_pc += 4;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.11 on ARM platforms, as used in Android before 2016-08-05 on Nexus 5 and 7 (2013) devices, does not properly consider user-space access to the TPIDRURW register, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28749743 and Qualcomm internal bug CR561044.
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> | High | 167,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
if (!ci)
return;
key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in fs/crypto/ in the Linux kernel before 4.10.7 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly gain privileges by revoking keyring keys being used for ext4, f2fs, or ubifs encryption, causing cryptographic transform objects to be freed prematurely.
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]> | High | 168,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void *__dma_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t flags,
struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
if (dev == NULL) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "Use an actual device structure for DMA allocation\n");
return NULL;
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) &&
dev->coherent_dma_mask <= DMA_BIT_MASK(32))
flags |= GFP_DMA;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMA_CMA) && (flags & __GFP_WAIT)) {
struct page *page;
void *addr;
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, size >> PAGE_SHIFT,
get_order(size));
if (!page)
return NULL;
*dma_handle = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
addr = page_address(page);
if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
memset(addr, 0, size);
return addr;
} else {
return swiotlb_alloc_coherent(dev, size, dma_handle, flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.3, as used in the ION subsystem in Android and other products, does not initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by triggering a dma_mmap call.
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,471 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void RegisterPropertiesCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
IBusPropList* prop_list,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
struct perf_event_attr __user *, attr_uptr,
pid_t, pid, int, cpu, int, group_fd, unsigned long, flags)
{
struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL;
struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct file *event_file = NULL;
struct fd group = {NULL, 0};
struct task_struct *task = NULL;
struct pmu *pmu;
int event_fd;
int move_group = 0;
int err;
int f_flags = O_RDWR;
/* for future expandability... */
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
if (err)
return err;
if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
if (attr.freq) {
if (attr.sample_freq > sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (attr.sample_period & (1ULL << 63))
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* In cgroup mode, the pid argument is used to pass the fd
* opened to the cgroup directory in cgroupfs. The cpu argument
* designates the cpu on which to monitor threads from that
* cgroup.
*/
if ((flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) && (pid == -1 || cpu == -1))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC)
f_flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
event_fd = get_unused_fd_flags(f_flags);
if (event_fd < 0)
return event_fd;
if (group_fd != -1) {
err = perf_fget_light(group_fd, &group);
if (err)
goto err_fd;
group_leader = group.file->private_data;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT)
output_event = group_leader;
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP)
group_leader = NULL;
}
if (pid != -1 && !(flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)) {
task = find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
err = PTR_ERR(task);
goto err_group_fd;
}
}
if (task && group_leader &&
group_leader->attr.inherit != attr.inherit) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_task;
}
get_online_cpus();
event = perf_event_alloc(&attr, cpu, task, group_leader, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err_cpus;
}
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) {
err = perf_cgroup_connect(pid, event, &attr, group_leader);
if (err) {
__free_event(event);
goto err_cpus;
}
}
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto err_alloc;
}
}
account_event(event);
/*
* Special case software events and allow them to be part of
* any hardware group.
*/
pmu = event->pmu;
if (group_leader &&
(is_software_event(event) != is_software_event(group_leader))) {
if (is_software_event(event)) {
/*
* If event and group_leader are not both a software
* event, and event is, then group leader is not.
*
* Allow the addition of software events to !software
* groups, this is safe because software events never
* fail to schedule.
*/
pmu = group_leader->pmu;
} else if (is_software_event(group_leader) &&
(group_leader->group_flags & PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE)) {
/*
* In case the group is a pure software group, and we
* try to add a hardware event, move the whole group to
* the hardware context.
*/
move_group = 1;
}
}
/*
* Get the target context (task or percpu):
*/
ctx = find_get_context(pmu, task, event->cpu);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto err_alloc;
}
if (task) {
put_task_struct(task);
task = NULL;
}
/*
* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
*/
if (group_leader) {
err = -EINVAL;
/*
* Do not allow a recursive hierarchy (this new sibling
* becoming part of another group-sibling):
*/
if (group_leader->group_leader != group_leader)
goto err_context;
/*
* Do not allow to attach to a group in a different
* task or CPU context:
*/
if (move_group) {
/*
* Make sure we're both on the same task, or both
* per-cpu events.
*/
if (group_leader->ctx->task != ctx->task)
goto err_context;
/*
* Make sure we're both events for the same CPU;
* grouping events for different CPUs is broken; since
* you can never concurrently schedule them anyhow.
*/
if (group_leader->cpu != event->cpu)
goto err_context;
} else {
if (group_leader->ctx != ctx)
goto err_context;
}
/*
* Only a group leader can be exclusive or pinned
*/
if (attr.exclusive || attr.pinned)
goto err_context;
}
if (output_event) {
err = perf_event_set_output(event, output_event);
if (err)
goto err_context;
}
event_file = anon_inode_getfile("[perf_event]", &perf_fops, event,
f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(event_file)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event_file);
goto err_context;
}
if (move_group) {
struct perf_event_context *gctx = group_leader->ctx;
mutex_lock(&gctx->mutex);
perf_remove_from_context(group_leader, false);
/*
* Removing from the context ends up with disabled
* event. What we want here is event in the initial
* startup state, ready to be add into new context.
*/
perf_event__state_init(group_leader);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
group_entry) {
perf_remove_from_context(sibling, false);
perf_event__state_init(sibling);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
if (move_group) {
synchronize_rcu();
perf_install_in_context(ctx, group_leader, group_leader->cpu);
get_ctx(ctx);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
group_entry) {
perf_install_in_context(ctx, sibling, sibling->cpu);
get_ctx(ctx);
}
}
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, event->cpu);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
put_online_cpus();
event->owner = current;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_add_tail(&event->owner_entry, ¤t->perf_event_list);
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
/*
* Precalculate sample_data sizes
*/
perf_event__header_size(event);
perf_event__id_header_size(event);
/*
* Drop the reference on the group_event after placing the
* new event on the sibling_list. This ensures destruction
* of the group leader will find the pointer to itself in
* perf_group_detach().
*/
fdput(group);
fd_install(event_fd, event_file);
return event_fd;
err_context:
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
put_ctx(ctx);
err_alloc:
free_event(event);
err_cpus:
put_online_cpus();
err_task:
if (task)
put_task_struct(task);
err_group_fd:
fdput(group);
err_fd:
put_unused_fd(event_fd);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EBMLHeader::EBMLHeader() :
m_docType(NULL)
{
Init();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didTimeout()
{
RefPtr<XMLHttpRequest> protect(this);
internalAbort();
clearResponse();
clearRequest();
m_error = true;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
if (!m_async) {
m_state = DONE;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
return;
}
changeState(DONE);
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PerformanceNavigationTiming::PerformanceNavigationTiming(
LocalFrame* frame,
ResourceTimingInfo* info,
TimeTicks time_origin,
const WebVector<WebServerTimingInfo>& server_timing)
: PerformanceResourceTiming(info ? info->InitialURL().GetString() : "",
"navigation",
time_origin,
server_timing),
ContextClient(frame),
resource_timing_info_(info) {
DCHECK(frame);
DCHECK(info);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Information leak in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to bypass no-referrer policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773} | Medium | 173,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: forward_search_range(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end, UChar* s,
UChar* range, UChar** low, UChar** high, UChar** low_prev)
{
UChar *p, *pprev = (UChar* )NULL;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_SEARCH
fprintf(stderr, "forward_search_range: str: %d, end: %d, s: %d, range: %d\n",
(int )str, (int )end, (int )s, (int )range);
#endif
p = s;
if (reg->dmin > 0) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_SINGLEBYTE(reg->enc)) {
p += reg->dmin;
}
else {
UChar *q = p + reg->dmin;
while (p < q) p += enclen(reg->enc, p);
}
}
retry:
switch (reg->optimize) {
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT:
p = slow_search(reg->enc, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_IC:
p = slow_search_ic(reg->enc, reg->case_fold_flag,
reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM:
p = bm_search(reg, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM_NOT_REV:
p = bm_search_notrev(reg, reg->exact, reg->exact_end, p, end, range);
break;
case ONIG_OPTIMIZE_MAP:
p = map_search(reg->enc, reg->map, p, range);
break;
}
if (p && p < range) {
if (p - reg->dmin < s) {
retry_gate:
pprev = p;
p += enclen(reg->enc, p);
goto retry;
}
if (reg->sub_anchor) {
UChar* prev;
switch (reg->sub_anchor) {
case ANCHOR_BEGIN_LINE:
if (!ON_STR_BEGIN(p)) {
prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
if (!ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, prev, end))
goto retry_gate;
}
break;
case ANCHOR_END_LINE:
if (ON_STR_END(p)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
prev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
if (prev && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, prev, end))
goto retry_gate;
#endif
}
else if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(reg->enc, p, end)
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
&& ! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(reg->enc, p, end)
#endif
)
goto retry_gate;
break;
}
}
if (reg->dmax == 0) {
*low = p;
if (low_prev) {
if (*low > s)
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc, s, p);
else
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), p);
}
}
else {
if (reg->dmax != ONIG_INFINITE_DISTANCE) {
*low = p - reg->dmax;
if (*low > s) {
*low = onigenc_get_right_adjust_char_head_with_prev(reg->enc, s,
*low, (const UChar** )low_prev);
if (low_prev && IS_NULL(*low_prev))
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : s), *low);
}
else {
if (low_prev)
*low_prev = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(reg->enc,
(pprev ? pprev : str), *low);
}
}
}
/* no needs to adjust *high, *high is used as range check only */
*high = p - reg->dmin;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_SEARCH
fprintf(stderr,
"forward_search_range success: low: %d, high: %d, dmin: %d, dmax: %d\n",
(int )(*low - str), (int )(*high - str), reg->dmin, reg->dmax);
#endif
return 1; /* success */
}
return 0; /* fail */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A stack out-of-bounds read occurs in mbc_enc_len() during regular expression searching. Invalid handling of reg->dmin in forward_search_range() could result in an invalid pointer dereference, as an out-of-bounds read from a stack buffer.
Commit Message: fix #58 : access to invalid address by reg->dmin value | High | 168,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bochs_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVBochsState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t i;
struct bochs_header bochs;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1; // no write support yet
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &bochs, sizeof(bochs));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (strcmp(bochs.magic, HEADER_MAGIC) ||
strcmp(bochs.type, REDOLOG_TYPE) ||
strcmp(bochs.subtype, GROWING_TYPE) ||
((le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_VERSION) &&
(le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_V1))) {
error_setg(errp, "Image not in Bochs format");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) == HEADER_V1) {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog_v1.disk) / 512;
} else {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog.disk) / 512;
}
s->catalog_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.catalog);
s->catalog_bitmap = g_malloc(s->catalog_size * 4);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, le32_to_cpu(bochs.header), s->catalog_bitmap,
s->data_offset = le32_to_cpu(bochs.header) + (s->catalog_size * 4);
s->bitmap_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.bitmap) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
extent_index = offset / s->extent_size;
extent_offset = (offset % s->extent_size) / 512;
if (s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] == 0xffffffff) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
bitmap_offset = s->data_offset + (512 * s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] *
(s->extent_blocks + s->bitmap_blocks));
/* read in bitmap for current extent */
if (bdrv_pread(bs->file, bitmap_offset + (extent_offset / 8),
&bitmap_entry, 1) != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (!((bitmap_entry >> (extent_offset % 8)) & 1)) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
return bitmap_offset + (512 * (s->bitmap_blocks + extent_offset));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::FinishCurrentUtterance() {
if (current_utterance_) {
current_utterance_->FinishAndDestroy();
current_utterance_ = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OmniboxPopupViewGtk::~OmniboxPopupViewGtk() {
model_.reset();
g_object_unref(layout_);
gtk_widget_destroy(window_);
for (ImageMap::iterator it = images_.begin(); it != images_.end(); ++it)
delete it->second;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 on Linux allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging an error in the GTK implementation of the omnibox.
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Bool PVDecodeVopBody(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, int32 buffer_size[])
{
PV_STATUS status = PV_FAIL;
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
int target_layer = video->currLayer;
Vol *currVol = video->vol[target_layer];
Vop *currVop = video->currVop;
Vop *prevVop = video->prevVop;
Vop *tempVopPtr;
int bytes_consumed = 0; /* Record how many bits we used in the buffer. 04/24/2001 */
int idx;
if (currVop->vopCoded == 0) /* 07/03/2001 */
{
PV_BitstreamByteAlign(currVol->bitstream);
/* We should always clear up bitstream buffer. 10/10/2000 */
bytes_consumed = (getPointer(currVol->bitstream) + 7) >> 3;
if (bytes_consumed > currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos)
{
bytes_consumed = currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos;
}
if (bytes_consumed < buffer_size[target_layer])
{
/* If we only consume part of the bits in the buffer, take those */
/* out. 04/24/2001 */
/* oscl_memcpy(buffer[target_layer], buffer[target_layer]+bytes_consumed,
(buffer_size[target_layer]-=bytes_consumed)); */
buffer_size[target_layer] -= bytes_consumed;
}
else
{
buffer_size[target_layer] = 0;
}
#ifdef PV_MEMORY_POOL
if (target_layer)
{
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp > video->prevVop->timeStamp)
{
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
}
}
oscl_memcpy(currVop->yChan, video->prevVop->yChan, (decCtrl->size*3) / 2);
video->prevVop = prevVop;
video->concealFrame = currVop->yChan; /* 07/07/2001 */
video->vop_coding_type = currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
decCtrl->outputFrame = currVop->yChan;
/* Swap VOP pointers. No enhc. frame oscl_memcpy() anymore! 04/24/2001 */
if (target_layer)
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevEnhcVop;
video->prevEnhcVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
else
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevVop;
video->prevVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
#else
if (target_layer) /* this is necessary to avoid flashback problems 06/21/2002*/
{
video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp = currVop->timeStamp;
}
else
{
video->prevVop->timeStamp = currVop->timeStamp;
}
#endif
video->vop_coding_type = currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
/* the following is necessary to avoid displaying an notCoded I-VOP at the beginning of a session
or after random positioning 07/03/02*/
if (currVop->predictionType == I_VOP)
{
video->vop_coding_type = P_VOP;
}
return PV_TRUE;
}
/* ======================================================= */
/* Decode vop body (if there is no error in the header!) */
/* ======================================================= */
/* first, we need to select a reference frame */
if (decCtrl->nLayers > 1)
{
if (currVop->predictionType == I_VOP)
{
/* do nothing here */
}
else if (currVop->predictionType == P_VOP)
{
switch (currVop->refSelectCode)
{
case 0 : /* most recently decoded enhancement vop */
/* Setup video->prevVop before we call PV_DecodeVop(). 04/24/2001 */
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp >= video->prevVop->timeStamp)
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
break;
case 1 : /* most recently displayed base-layer vop */
if (target_layer)
{
if (video->prevEnhcVop->timeStamp > video->prevVop->timeStamp)
video->prevVop = video->prevEnhcVop;
}
break;
case 2 : /* next base-layer vop in display order */
break;
case 3 : /* temporally coincident base-layer vop (no MV's) */
break;
}
}
else /* we have a B-Vop */
{
mp4dec_log("DecodeVideoFrame(): B-VOP not supported.\n");
}
}
/* This is for the calculation of the frame rate and bitrate. */
idx = ++video->frame_idx % BITRATE_AVERAGE_WINDOW;
/* Calculate bitrate for this layer. 08/23/2000 */
status = PV_DecodeVop(video);
video->nBitsPerVop[idx] = getPointer(currVol->bitstream);
video->prevTimestamp[idx] = currVop->timeStamp;
/* restore video->prevVop after PV_DecodeVop(). 04/24/2001 */
video->prevVop = prevVop;
/* Estimate the frame rate. 08/23/2000 */
video->duration = video->prevTimestamp[idx];
video->duration -= video->prevTimestamp[(++idx)%BITRATE_AVERAGE_WINDOW];
if (video->duration > 0)
{ /* Only update framerate when the timestamp is right */
video->frameRate = (int)(FRAMERATE_SCALE) / video->duration;
}
/* We should always clear up bitstream buffer. 10/10/2000 */
bytes_consumed = (getPointer(currVol->bitstream) + 7) >> 3; /* 11/4/03 */
if (bytes_consumed > currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos)
{
bytes_consumed = currVol->bitstream->data_end_pos;
}
if (bytes_consumed < buffer_size[target_layer])
{
/* If we only consume part of the bits in the buffer, take those */
/* out. 04/24/2001 */
/* oscl_memcpy(buffer[target_layer], buffer[target_layer]+bytes_consumed,
(buffer_size[target_layer]-=bytes_consumed)); */
buffer_size[target_layer] -= bytes_consumed;
}
else
{
buffer_size[target_layer] = 0;
}
switch (status)
{
case PV_FAIL :
return PV_FALSE; /* this will take care of concealment if we lose whole frame */
case PV_END_OF_VOP :
/* we may want to differenciate PV_END_OF_VOP and PV_SUCCESS */
/* in the future. 05/10/2000 */
case PV_SUCCESS :
/* Nohting is wrong :). */
video->concealFrame = video->currVop->yChan; /* 07/07/2001 */
video->vop_coding_type = video->currVop->predictionType; /* 07/09/01 */
decCtrl->outputFrame = video->currVop->yChan;
/* Swap VOP pointers. No enhc. frame oscl_memcpy() anymore! 04/24/2001 */
if (target_layer)
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevEnhcVop;
video->prevEnhcVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
else
{
tempVopPtr = video->prevVop;
video->prevVop = video->currVop;
video->currVop = tempVopPtr;
}
break;
default :
/* This will never happen */
break;
}
return PV_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35269635.
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
| High | 174,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::bindVertexArray(
WebGLVertexArrayObject* vertex_array) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (vertex_array &&
(vertex_array->IsDeleted() || !vertex_array->Validate(nullptr, this))) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindVertexArray",
"invalid vertexArray");
return;
}
if (vertex_array && !vertex_array->IsDefaultObject() &&
vertex_array->Object()) {
ContextGL()->BindVertexArrayOES(ObjectOrZero(vertex_array));
vertex_array->SetHasEverBeenBound();
SetBoundVertexArrayObject(vertex_array);
} else {
ContextGL()->BindVertexArrayOES(0);
SetBoundVertexArrayObject(nullptr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return 0;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return 0;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return 0;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return 0;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
return entry_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Incorrect returning of an error code in the index.c:read_entry() function leads to a double free in libgit2 before v0.26.2, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point() | Medium | 169,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
edge_connection_t *conn,
crypt_path_t *layer_hint)
{
static int num_seen=0;
relay_header_t rh;
unsigned domain = layer_hint?LD_APP:LD_EXIT;
int reason;
int optimistic_data = 0; /* Set to 1 if we receive data on a stream
* that's in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING
* or EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING states. */
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(circ);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
num_seen++;
log_debug(domain, "Now seen %d relay cells here (command %d, stream %d).",
num_seen, rh.command, rh.stream_id);
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Relay cell length field too long. Closing circuit.");
return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
if (rh.stream_id == 0) {
switch (rh.command) {
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN:
case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA:
case RELAY_COMMAND_END:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR:
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay command %d with zero "
"stream_id. Dropping.", (int)rh.command);
return 0;
default:
;
}
}
/* either conn is NULL, in which case we've got a control cell, or else
* conn points to the recognized stream. */
if (conn && !connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) {
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT &&
(conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING ||
conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) &&
rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) {
/* Allow DATA cells to be delivered to an exit node in state
* EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING or EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING.
* This speeds up HTTP, for example. */
optimistic_data = 1;
} else {
return connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(
&rh, cell, circ, conn, layer_hint);
}
}
switch (rh.command) {
case RELAY_COMMAND_DROP:
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN:
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR:
if (layer_hint &&
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Relay begin request unsupported at AP. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED &&
layer_hint != TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->prev) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Relay begin request to Hidden Service "
"from intermediary node. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"Begin cell for known stream. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
/* Assign this circuit and its app-ward OR connection a unique ID,
* so that we can measure download times. The local edge and dir
* connection will be assigned the same ID when they are created
* and linked. */
static uint64_t next_id = 0;
circ->dirreq_id = ++next_id;
TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id;
}
return connection_exit_begin_conn(cell, circ);
case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA:
++stats_n_data_cells_received;
if (( layer_hint && --layer_hint->deliver_window < 0) ||
(!layer_hint && --circ->deliver_window < 0)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"(relay data) circ deliver_window below 0. Killing.");
if (conn) {
/* XXXX Do we actually need to do this? Will killing the circuit
* not send an END and mark the stream for close as appropriate? */
connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
}
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_debug(domain,"circ deliver_window now %d.", layer_hint ?
layer_hint->deliver_window : circ->deliver_window);
circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circ, layer_hint);
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"data cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).",
rh.stream_id);
return 0;
}
if (--conn->deliver_window < 0) { /* is it below 0 after decrement? */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"(relay data) conn deliver_window below 0. Killing.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length;
connection_write_to_buf((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE),
rh.length, TO_CONN(conn));
if (!optimistic_data) {
/* Only send a SENDME if we're not getting optimistic data; otherwise
* a SENDME could arrive before the CONNECTED.
*/
connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_END:
reason = rh.length > 0 ?
get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"end cell (%s) dropped, unknown stream.",
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason));
return 0;
}
/* XXX add to this log_fn the exit node's nickname? */
log_info(domain,TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": end cell (%s) for stream %d. "
"Removing stream.",
conn->base_.s,
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason),
conn->stream_id);
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
if (entry_conn->socks_request &&
!entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished)
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"open stream hasn't sent socks answer yet? Closing.");
}
/* We just *got* an end; no reason to send one. */
conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
if (!conn->end_reason)
conn->end_reason = reason | END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
/* only mark it if not already marked. it's possible to
* get the 'end' right around when the client hangs up on us. */
connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn));
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND:
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: {
static uint64_t total_n_extend=0, total_nonearly=0;
total_n_extend++;
if (rh.stream_id) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"'extend' cell received for non-zero stream. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (cell->command != CELL_RELAY_EARLY &&
!networkstatus_get_param(NULL,"AllowNonearlyExtend",0,0,1)) {
#define EARLY_WARNING_INTERVAL 3600
static ratelim_t early_warning_limit =
RATELIM_INIT(EARLY_WARNING_INTERVAL);
char *m;
if (cell->command == CELL_RELAY) {
++total_nonearly;
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&early_warning_limit, approx_time()))) {
double percentage = ((double)total_nonearly)/total_n_extend;
percentage *= 100;
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain, "EXTEND cell received, "
"but not via RELAY_EARLY. Dropping.%s", m);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain, " (We have dropped %.02f%% of "
"all EXTEND cells for this reason)", percentage);
tor_free(m);
}
} else {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain,
"EXTEND cell received, in a cell with type %d! Dropping.",
cell->command);
}
return 0;
}
return circuit_extend(cell, circ);
}
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2:
if (!layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"'extended' unsupported at non-origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
log_debug(domain,"Got an extended cell! Yay.");
{
extended_cell_t extended_cell;
if (extended_cell_parse(&extended_cell, rh.command,
(const uint8_t*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
rh.length)<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Can't parse EXTENDED cell; killing circuit.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
if ((reason = circuit_finish_handshake(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
&extended_cell.created_cell)) < 0) {
log_warn(domain,"circuit_finish_handshake failed.");
return reason;
}
}
if ((reason=circuit_send_next_onion_skin(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)))<0) {
log_info(domain,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin() failed.");
return reason;
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE:
if (layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"'truncate' unsupported at origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (circ->n_hop) {
if (circ->n_chan)
log_warn(LD_BUG, "n_chan and n_hop set on the same circuit!");
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
circ->n_hop = NULL;
tor_free(circ->n_chan_create_cell);
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
}
if (circ->n_chan) {
uint8_t trunc_reason = get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_chan);
channel_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_chan,
trunc_reason);
circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL);
}
log_debug(LD_EXIT, "Processed 'truncate', replying.");
{
char payload[1];
payload[0] = (char)END_CIRC_REASON_REQUESTED;
relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED,
payload, sizeof(payload), NULL);
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED:
if (!layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_EXIT,
"'truncated' unsupported at non-origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
circuit_truncated(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), layer_hint,
get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED:
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"'connected' unsupported while open. Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_info(domain,
"'connected' received, no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.");
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME:
if (!rh.stream_id) {
if (layer_hint) {
if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. "
"Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.",
layer_hint->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
} else {
if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected sendme cell from client. "
"Closing circ (window %d).",
circ->package_window);
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,
"circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.",
circ->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
}
return 0;
}
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"sendme cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).",
rh.stream_id);
return 0;
}
conn->package_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(domain,"stream-level sendme, packagewindow now %d.",
conn->package_window);
if (circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circ)) {
/* Still waiting for queue to flush; don't touch conn */
return 0;
}
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
/* handle whatever might still be on the inbuf */
if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, 1, NULL) < 0) {
/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE:
if (layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"resolve request unsupported at AP; dropping.");
return 0;
} else if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"resolve request for known stream; dropping.");
return 0;
} else if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"resolve request on circ with purpose %d; dropping",
circ->purpose);
return 0;
}
connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell, TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ));
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED:
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"'resolved' unsupported while open. Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_info(domain,
"'resolved' received, no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.");
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED:
rend_process_relay_cell(circ, layer_hint,
rh.command, rh.length,
cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received unknown relay command %d. Perhaps the other side is using "
"a newer version of Tor? Dropping.",
rh.command);
return 0; /* for forward compatibility, don't kill the circuit */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: The hidden-service feature in Tor before 0.3.0.8 allows a denial of service (assertion failure and daemon exit) in the connection_edge_process_relay_cell function via a BEGIN_DIR cell on a rendezvous circuit.
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-120
Summary: There is heap-based buffer overflow in kernel, all versions up to, excluding 5.3, in the marvell wifi chip driver in Linux kernel, that allows local users to cause a denial of service(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> | High | 169,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: string16 ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::GetDialogTitle(
const Extension* extension) const {
if (type_ == INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(extension->is_app() ?
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_APP_PROMPT_TITLE :
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_EXTENSION_PROMPT_TITLE);
} else if (type_ == INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
kTitleIds[type_], l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
} else {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kTitleIds[type_]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sas_unregister_devs_sas_addr(struct domain_device *parent,
int phy_id, bool last)
{
struct expander_device *ex_dev = &parent->ex_dev;
struct ex_phy *phy = &ex_dev->ex_phy[phy_id];
struct domain_device *child, *n, *found = NULL;
if (last) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(child, n,
&ex_dev->children, siblings) {
if (SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr) ==
SAS_ADDR(phy->attached_sas_addr)) {
set_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &child->state);
if (child->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
child->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE)
sas_unregister_ex_tree(parent->port, child);
else
sas_unregister_dev(parent->port, child);
found = child;
break;
}
}
sas_disable_routing(parent, phy->attached_sas_addr);
}
memset(phy->attached_sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
if (phy->port) {
sas_port_delete_phy(phy->port, phy->phy);
sas_device_set_phy(found, phy->port);
if (phy->port->num_phys == 0)
sas_port_delete(phy->port);
phy->port = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 169,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PluginServiceImpl::GetPluginInfo(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
ResourceContext* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& page_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
bool allow_wildcard,
bool* is_stale,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* info,
std::string* actual_mime_type) {
std::vector<webkit::WebPluginInfo> plugins;
std::vector<std::string> mime_types;
bool stale = GetPluginInfoArray(
url, mime_type, allow_wildcard, &plugins, &mime_types);
if (is_stale)
*is_stale = stale;
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!filter_ || filter_->IsPluginEnabled(render_process_id,
render_view_id,
context,
url,
page_url,
&plugins[i])) {
*info = plugins[i];
if (actual_mime_type)
*actual_mime_type = mime_types[i];
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage the interaction between the browser process and renderer processes during authorization of the loading of a plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via vectors involving a blocked plug-in.
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int newary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
int id;
int retval;
struct sem_array *sma;
int size;
key_t key = params->key;
int nsems = params->u.nsems;
int semflg = params->flg;
int i;
if (!nsems)
return -EINVAL;
if (ns->used_sems + nsems > ns->sc_semmns)
return -ENOSPC;
size = sizeof (*sma) + nsems * sizeof (struct sem);
sma = ipc_rcu_alloc(size);
if (!sma) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset (sma, 0, size);
sma->sem_perm.mode = (semflg & S_IRWXUGO);
sma->sem_perm.key = key;
sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
retval = security_sem_alloc(sma);
if (retval) {
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return retval;
}
id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids(ns), &sma->sem_perm, ns->sc_semmni);
if (id < 0) {
security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return id;
}
ns->used_sems += nsems;
sma->sem_base = (struct sem *) &sma[1];
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_base[i].sem_pending);
sma->complex_count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_pending);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->list_id);
sma->sem_nsems = nsems;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
sem_unlock(sma);
return sma->sem_perm.id;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isRenderbuffer(
WebGLRenderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
if (!renderbuffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!renderbuffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (renderbuffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cifs_mount(struct super_block *sb, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
char *mount_data_global, const char *devname)
{
int rc;
int xid;
struct smb_vol *volume_info;
struct cifsSesInfo *pSesInfo;
struct cifsTconInfo *tcon;
struct TCP_Server_Info *srvTcp;
char *full_path;
char *mount_data = mount_data_global;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
struct dfs_info3_param *referrals = NULL;
unsigned int num_referrals = 0;
int referral_walks_count = 0;
try_mount_again:
#endif
rc = 0;
tcon = NULL;
pSesInfo = NULL;
srvTcp = NULL;
full_path = NULL;
tlink = NULL;
xid = GetXid();
volume_info = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smb_vol), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!volume_info) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (cifs_parse_mount_options(mount_data, devname, volume_info)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (volume_info->nullauth) {
cFYI(1, "null user");
volume_info->username = "";
} else if (volume_info->username) {
/* BB fixme parse for domain name here */
cFYI(1, "Username: %s", volume_info->username);
} else {
cifserror("No username specified");
/* In userspace mount helper we can get user name from alternate
locations such as env variables and files on disk */
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* this is needed for ASCII cp to Unicode converts */
if (volume_info->iocharset == NULL) {
/* load_nls_default cannot return null */
volume_info->local_nls = load_nls_default();
} else {
volume_info->local_nls = load_nls(volume_info->iocharset);
if (volume_info->local_nls == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "CIFS mount error: iocharset %s not found",
volume_info->iocharset);
rc = -ELIBACC;
goto out;
}
}
cifs_sb->local_nls = volume_info->local_nls;
/* get a reference to a tcp session */
srvTcp = cifs_get_tcp_session(volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(srvTcp)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(srvTcp);
goto out;
}
/* get a reference to a SMB session */
pSesInfo = cifs_get_smb_ses(srvTcp, volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(pSesInfo)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(pSesInfo);
pSesInfo = NULL;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
setup_cifs_sb(volume_info, cifs_sb);
if (pSesInfo->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_FILES)
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
else
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
/* BB FIXME fix time_gran to be larger for LANMAN sessions */
sb->s_time_gran = 100;
/* search for existing tcon to this server share */
tcon = cifs_get_tcon(pSesInfo, volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(tcon)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcon);
tcon = NULL;
goto remote_path_check;
}
/* do not care if following two calls succeed - informational */
if (!tcon->ipc) {
CIFSSMBQFSDeviceInfo(xid, tcon);
CIFSSMBQFSAttributeInfo(xid, tcon);
}
/* tell server which Unix caps we support */
if (tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
/* reset of caps checks mount to see if unix extensions
disabled for just this mount */
reset_cifs_unix_caps(xid, tcon, sb, volume_info);
else
tcon->unix_ext = 0; /* server does not support them */
/* convert forward to back slashes in prepath here if needed */
if ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS) == 0)
convert_delimiter(cifs_sb->prepath, CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
if ((tcon->unix_ext == 0) && (cifs_sb->rsize > (1024 * 127))) {
cifs_sb->rsize = 1024 * 127;
cFYI(DBG2, "no very large read support, rsize now 127K");
}
if (!(tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X))
cifs_sb->wsize = min(cifs_sb->wsize,
(tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE));
if (!(tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_READ_X))
cifs_sb->rsize = min(cifs_sb->rsize,
(tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE));
remote_path_check:
/* check if a whole path (including prepath) is not remote */
if (!rc && cifs_sb->prepathlen && tcon) {
/* build_path_to_root works only when we have a valid tcon */
full_path = cifs_build_path_to_root(cifs_sb, tcon);
if (full_path == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
rc = is_path_accessible(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, full_path);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EREMOTE) {
kfree(full_path);
goto mount_fail_check;
}
kfree(full_path);
}
/* get referral if needed */
if (rc == -EREMOTE) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
if (referral_walks_count > MAX_NESTED_LINKS) {
/*
* BB: when we implement proper loop detection,
* we will remove this check. But now we need it
* to prevent an indefinite loop if 'DFS tree' is
* misconfigured (i.e. has loops).
*/
rc = -ELOOP;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
/* convert forward to back slashes in prepath here if needed */
if ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS) == 0)
convert_delimiter(cifs_sb->prepath,
CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
full_path = build_unc_path_to_root(volume_info, cifs_sb);
if (IS_ERR(full_path)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(full_path);
goto mount_fail_check;
}
cFYI(1, "Getting referral for: %s", full_path);
rc = get_dfs_path(xid, pSesInfo , full_path + 1,
cifs_sb->local_nls, &num_referrals, &referrals,
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_MAP_SPECIAL_CHR);
if (!rc && num_referrals > 0) {
char *fake_devname = NULL;
if (mount_data != mount_data_global)
kfree(mount_data);
mount_data = cifs_compose_mount_options(
cifs_sb->mountdata, full_path + 1,
referrals, &fake_devname);
free_dfs_info_array(referrals, num_referrals);
kfree(fake_devname);
kfree(full_path);
if (IS_ERR(mount_data)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(mount_data);
mount_data = NULL;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
if (tcon)
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
else if (pSesInfo)
cifs_put_smb_ses(pSesInfo);
cleanup_volume_info(&volume_info);
referral_walks_count++;
FreeXid(xid);
goto try_mount_again;
}
#else /* No DFS support, return error on mount */
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
if (rc)
goto mount_fail_check;
/* now, hang the tcon off of the superblock */
tlink = kzalloc(sizeof *tlink, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tlink == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
tlink->tl_uid = pSesInfo->linux_uid;
tlink->tl_tcon = tcon;
tlink->tl_time = jiffies;
set_bit(TCON_LINK_MASTER, &tlink->tl_flags);
set_bit(TCON_LINK_IN_TREE, &tlink->tl_flags);
cifs_sb->master_tlink = tlink;
spin_lock(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree_lock);
tlink_rb_insert(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree, tlink);
spin_unlock(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree_lock);
queue_delayed_work(system_nrt_wq, &cifs_sb->prune_tlinks,
TLINK_IDLE_EXPIRE);
mount_fail_check:
/* on error free sesinfo and tcon struct if needed */
if (rc) {
if (mount_data != mount_data_global)
kfree(mount_data);
/* If find_unc succeeded then rc == 0 so we can not end */
/* up accidentally freeing someone elses tcon struct */
if (tcon)
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
else if (pSesInfo)
cifs_put_smb_ses(pSesInfo);
else
cifs_put_tcp_session(srvTcp);
goto out;
}
/* volume_info->password is freed above when existing session found
(in which case it is not needed anymore) but when new sesion is created
the password ptr is put in the new session structure (in which case the
password will be freed at unmount time) */
out:
/* zero out password before freeing */
cleanup_volume_info(&volume_info);
FreeXid(xid);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The setup_cifs_sb function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly handle DFS referrals, which allows remote CIFS servers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by placing a referral at the root of a share.
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
portIndex == kPortIndexOutput /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,141 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InProcessBrowserTest::InProcessBrowserTest()
: browser_(NULL),
exit_when_last_browser_closes_(true),
multi_desktop_test_(false)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
, autorelease_pool_(NULL)
#endif // OS_MACOSX
{
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::FilePath chrome_path;
CHECK(PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &chrome_path));
chrome_path = chrome_path.DirName();
chrome_path = chrome_path.Append(chrome::kBrowserProcessExecutablePath);
CHECK(PathService::Override(base::FILE_EXE, chrome_path));
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
CreateTestServer(base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("chrome/test/data")));
base::FilePath src_dir;
CHECK(PathService::Get(base::DIR_SOURCE_ROOT, &src_dir));
base::FilePath test_data_dir = src_dir.AppendASCII("chrome/test/data");
embedded_test_server()->ServeFilesFromDirectory(test_data_dir);
CHECK(PathService::Override(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, test_data_dir));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging the use of tree order, rather than transitive dependency order, for layout.
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode image_clamping_mode,
ImageDecodingMode decode_mode) {
auto paint_image = PaintImageForCurrentFrame();
if (!paint_image)
return;
auto paint_image_decoding_mode = ToPaintImageDecodingMode(decode_mode);
if (paint_image.decoding_mode() != paint_image_decoding_mode) {
paint_image = PaintImageBuilder::WithCopy(std::move(paint_image))
.set_decoding_mode(paint_image_decoding_mode)
.TakePaintImage();
}
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect,
image_clamping_mode, paint_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rndis_set_response(USBNetState *s,
rndis_set_msg_type *buf, unsigned int length)
{
rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp =
rndis_queue_response(s, sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type));
uint32_t bufoffs, buflen;
int ret;
if (!resp)
return USB_RET_STALL;
bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
return USB_RET_STALL;
ret = ndis_set(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen);
resp->MessageLength = cpu_to_le32(sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type));
if (ret < 0) {
/* OID not supported */
resp->Status = cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
resp->Status = cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the USB Net device emulator (hw/usb/dev-network.c) in QEMU before 2.5.1 allow local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (QEMU process crash) or obtain sensitive host memory information via a remote NDIS control message packet that is mishandled in the (1) rndis_query_response, (2) rndis_set_response, or (3) usb_net_handle_dataout function.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,186 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::vector<GetLengthType> CSoundFile::GetLength(enmGetLengthResetMode adjustMode, GetLengthTarget target)
{
std::vector<GetLengthType> results;
GetLengthType retval;
retval.startOrder = target.startOrder;
retval.startRow = target.startRow;
const bool hasSearchTarget = target.mode != GetLengthTarget::NoTarget;
const bool adjustSamplePos = (adjustMode & eAdjustSamplePositions) == eAdjustSamplePositions;
SEQUENCEINDEX sequence = target.sequence;
if(sequence >= Order.GetNumSequences()) sequence = Order.GetCurrentSequenceIndex();
const ModSequence &orderList = Order(sequence);
GetLengthMemory memory(*this);
CSoundFile::PlayState &playState = *memory.state;
RowVisitor visitedRows(*this, sequence);
playState.m_nNextRow = playState.m_nRow = target.startRow;
playState.m_nNextOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder = target.startOrder;
std::bitset<MAX_EFFECTS> forbiddenCommands;
std::bitset<MAX_VOLCMDS> forbiddenVolCommands;
if(adjustSamplePos)
{
forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_ARPEGGIO); forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_PORTAMENTOUP);
forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_PORTAMENTODOWN); forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_XFINEPORTAUPDOWN);
forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_NOTESLIDEUP); forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_NOTESLIDEUPRETRIG);
forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_NOTESLIDEDOWN); forbiddenCommands.set(CMD_NOTESLIDEDOWNRETRIG);
forbiddenVolCommands.set(VOLCMD_PORTAUP); forbiddenVolCommands.set(VOLCMD_PORTADOWN);
for(CHANNELINDEX i = 0; i < GetNumChannels(); i++)
{
if(ChnSettings[i].dwFlags[CHN_MUTE]) memory.chnSettings[i].ticksToRender = GetLengthMemory::IGNORE_CHANNEL;
}
if(target.mode == GetLengthTarget::SeekPosition && target.pos.order < orderList.size())
{
const PATTERNINDEX seekPat = orderList[target.pos.order];
if(Patterns.IsValidPat(seekPat) && Patterns[seekPat].IsValidRow(target.pos.row))
{
const ModCommand *m = Patterns[seekPat].GetRow(target.pos.row);
for(CHANNELINDEX i = 0; i < GetNumChannels(); i++, m++)
{
if(m->note == NOTE_NOTECUT || m->note == NOTE_KEYOFF || (m->note == NOTE_FADE && GetNumInstruments())
|| (m->IsNote() && !m->IsPortamento()))
{
memory.chnSettings[i].ticksToRender = GetLengthMemory::IGNORE_CHANNEL;
}
}
}
}
}
uint32 oldTickDuration = 0;
for (;;)
{
if(target.mode == GetLengthTarget::SeekSeconds && memory.elapsedTime >= target.time)
{
retval.targetReached = true;
break;
}
uint32 rowDelay = 0, tickDelay = 0;
playState.m_nRow = playState.m_nNextRow;
playState.m_nCurrentOrder = playState.m_nNextOrder;
if(orderList.IsValidPat(playState.m_nCurrentOrder) && playState.m_nRow >= Patterns[orderList[playState.m_nCurrentOrder]].GetNumRows())
{
playState.m_nRow = 0;
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2LoopE60Restart])
{
playState.m_nRow = playState.m_nNextPatStartRow;
playState.m_nNextPatStartRow = 0;
}
playState.m_nCurrentOrder = ++playState.m_nNextOrder;
}
playState.m_nPattern = playState.m_nCurrentOrder < orderList.size() ? orderList[playState.m_nCurrentOrder] : orderList.GetInvalidPatIndex();
bool positionJumpOnThisRow = false;
bool patternBreakOnThisRow = false;
bool patternLoopEndedOnThisRow = false, patternLoopStartedOnThisRow = false;
if(!Patterns.IsValidPat(playState.m_nPattern) && playState.m_nPattern != orderList.GetInvalidPatIndex() && target.mode == GetLengthTarget::SeekPosition && playState.m_nCurrentOrder == target.pos.order)
{
retval.targetReached = true;
break;
}
while(playState.m_nPattern >= Patterns.Size())
{
if((playState.m_nPattern == orderList.GetInvalidPatIndex()) || (playState.m_nCurrentOrder >= orderList.size()))
{
if(playState.m_nCurrentOrder == orderList.GetRestartPos())
break;
else
playState.m_nCurrentOrder = orderList.GetRestartPos();
} else
{
playState.m_nCurrentOrder++;
}
playState.m_nPattern = (playState.m_nCurrentOrder < orderList.size()) ? orderList[playState.m_nCurrentOrder] : orderList.GetInvalidPatIndex();
playState.m_nNextOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder;
if((!Patterns.IsValidPat(playState.m_nPattern)) && visitedRows.IsVisited(playState.m_nCurrentOrder, 0, true))
{
if(!hasSearchTarget || !visitedRows.GetFirstUnvisitedRow(playState.m_nNextOrder, playState.m_nRow, true))
{
break;
} else
{
retval.duration = memory.elapsedTime;
results.push_back(retval);
retval.startRow = playState.m_nRow;
retval.startOrder = playState.m_nNextOrder;
memory.Reset();
playState.m_nCurrentOrder = playState.m_nNextOrder;
playState.m_nPattern = orderList[playState.m_nCurrentOrder];
playState.m_nNextRow = playState.m_nRow;
break;
}
}
}
if(playState.m_nNextOrder == ORDERINDEX_INVALID)
{
break;
}
if(!Patterns.IsValidPat(playState.m_nPattern))
{
if(playState.m_nCurrentOrder == orderList.GetRestartPos())
{
if(!hasSearchTarget || !visitedRows.GetFirstUnvisitedRow(playState.m_nNextOrder, playState.m_nRow, true))
{
break;
} else
{
retval.duration = memory.elapsedTime;
results.push_back(retval);
retval.startRow = playState.m_nRow;
retval.startOrder = playState.m_nNextOrder;
memory.Reset();
playState.m_nNextRow = playState.m_nRow;
continue;
}
}
playState.m_nNextOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder + 1;
continue;
}
if(playState.m_nRow >= Patterns[playState.m_nPattern].GetNumRows())
playState.m_nRow = 0;
if(target.mode == GetLengthTarget::SeekPosition && playState.m_nCurrentOrder == target.pos.order && playState.m_nRow == target.pos.row)
{
retval.targetReached = true;
break;
}
if(visitedRows.IsVisited(playState.m_nCurrentOrder, playState.m_nRow, true))
{
if(!hasSearchTarget || !visitedRows.GetFirstUnvisitedRow(playState.m_nNextOrder, playState.m_nRow, true))
{
break;
} else
{
retval.duration = memory.elapsedTime;
results.push_back(retval);
retval.startRow = playState.m_nRow;
retval.startOrder = playState.m_nNextOrder;
memory.Reset();
playState.m_nNextRow = playState.m_nRow;
continue;
}
}
retval.endOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder;
retval.endRow = playState.m_nRow;
playState.m_nNextRow = playState.m_nRow + 1;
if(playState.m_nRow >= Patterns[playState.m_nPattern].GetNumRows())
{
playState.m_nRow = 0;
}
if(!playState.m_nRow)
{
for(CHANNELINDEX chn = 0; chn < GetNumChannels(); chn++)
{
memory.chnSettings[chn].patLoop = memory.elapsedTime;
memory.chnSettings[chn].patLoopSmp = playState.m_lTotalSampleCount;
}
}
ModChannel *pChn = playState.Chn;
const ModCommand *p = Patterns[playState.m_nPattern].GetpModCommand(playState.m_nRow, 0);
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); nChn++, p++)
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kST3NoMutedChannels] && ChnSettings[nChn].dwFlags[CHN_MUTE]) // not even effects are processed on muted S3M channels
continue;
if(p->IsPcNote())
{
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
if((adjustMode & eAdjust) && p->instr > 0 && p->instr <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS)
{
memory.plugParams[std::make_pair(p->instr, p->GetValueVolCol())] = p->GetValueEffectCol();
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
pChn[nChn].rowCommand.Clear();
continue;
}
pChn[nChn].rowCommand = *p;
switch(p->command)
{
case CMD_SPEED:
SetSpeed(playState, p->param);
break;
case CMD_TEMPO:
if(m_playBehaviour[kMODVBlankTiming])
{
if(p->param != 0) SetSpeed(playState, p->param);
}
break;
case CMD_S3MCMDEX:
if((p->param & 0xF0) == 0x60)
{
tickDelay += (p->param & 0x0F);
} else if((p->param & 0xF0) == 0xE0 && !rowDelay)
{
if(!(GetType() & MOD_TYPE_S3M) || (p->param & 0x0F) != 0)
{
rowDelay = 1 + (p->param & 0x0F);
}
}
break;
case CMD_MODCMDEX:
if((p->param & 0xF0) == 0xE0)
{
rowDelay = 1 + (p->param & 0x0F);
}
break;
}
}
if(rowDelay == 0) rowDelay = 1;
const uint32 numTicks = (playState.m_nMusicSpeed + tickDelay) * rowDelay;
const uint32 nonRowTicks = numTicks - rowDelay;
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); pChn++, nChn++) if(!pChn->rowCommand.IsEmpty())
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kST3NoMutedChannels] && ChnSettings[nChn].dwFlags[CHN_MUTE]) // not even effects are processed on muted S3M channels
continue;
ModCommand::COMMAND command = pChn->rowCommand.command;
ModCommand::PARAM param = pChn->rowCommand.param;
ModCommand::NOTE note = pChn->rowCommand.note;
if (pChn->rowCommand.instr)
{
pChn->nNewIns = pChn->rowCommand.instr;
pChn->nLastNote = NOTE_NONE;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].vol = 0xFF;
}
if (pChn->rowCommand.IsNote()) pChn->nLastNote = note;
if(pChn->rowCommand.IsNote() || pChn->rowCommand.instr)
{
SAMPLEINDEX smp = 0;
if(GetNumInstruments())
{
ModInstrument *pIns;
if(pChn->nNewIns <= GetNumInstruments() && (pIns = Instruments[pChn->nNewIns]) != nullptr)
{
if(pIns->dwFlags[INS_SETPANNING])
pChn->nPan = pIns->nPan;
if(ModCommand::IsNote(note))
smp = pIns->Keyboard[note - NOTE_MIN];
}
} else
{
smp = pChn->nNewIns;
}
if(smp > 0 && smp <= GetNumSamples() && Samples[smp].uFlags[CHN_PANNING])
{
pChn->nPan = Samples[smp].nPan;
}
}
switch(pChn->rowCommand.volcmd)
{
case VOLCMD_VOLUME:
memory.chnSettings[nChn].vol = pChn->rowCommand.vol;
break;
case VOLCMD_VOLSLIDEUP:
case VOLCMD_VOLSLIDEDOWN:
if(pChn->rowCommand.vol != 0)
pChn->nOldVolParam = pChn->rowCommand.vol;
break;
}
switch(command)
{
case CMD_POSITIONJUMP:
positionJumpOnThisRow = true;
playState.m_nNextOrder = static_cast<ORDERINDEX>(CalculateXParam(playState.m_nPattern, playState.m_nRow, nChn));
playState.m_nNextPatStartRow = 0; // FT2 E60 bug
if(!patternBreakOnThisRow || (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_MOD | MOD_TYPE_XM)))
playState.m_nNextRow = 0;
if (adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
pChn->nPatternLoopCount = 0;
pChn->nPatternLoop = 0;
}
break;
case CMD_PATTERNBREAK:
{
ROWINDEX row = PatternBreak(playState, nChn, param);
if(row != ROWINDEX_INVALID)
{
patternBreakOnThisRow = true;
playState.m_nNextRow = row;
if(!positionJumpOnThisRow)
{
playState.m_nNextOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder + 1;
}
if(adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
pChn->nPatternLoopCount = 0;
pChn->nPatternLoop = 0;
}
}
}
break;
case CMD_TEMPO:
if(!m_playBehaviour[kMODVBlankTiming])
{
TEMPO tempo(CalculateXParam(playState.m_nPattern, playState.m_nRow, nChn), 0);
if ((adjustMode & eAdjust) && (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M | MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT)))
{
if (tempo.GetInt()) pChn->nOldTempo = static_cast<uint8>(tempo.GetInt()); else tempo.Set(pChn->nOldTempo);
}
if (tempo.GetInt() >= 0x20) playState.m_nMusicTempo = tempo;
else
{
TEMPO tempoDiff((tempo.GetInt() & 0x0F) * nonRowTicks, 0);
if ((tempo.GetInt() & 0xF0) == 0x10)
{
playState.m_nMusicTempo += tempoDiff;
} else
{
if(tempoDiff < playState.m_nMusicTempo)
playState.m_nMusicTempo -= tempoDiff;
else
playState.m_nMusicTempo.Set(0);
}
}
TEMPO tempoMin = GetModSpecifications().GetTempoMin(), tempoMax = GetModSpecifications().GetTempoMax();
if(m_playBehaviour[kTempoClamp]) // clamp tempo correctly in compatible mode
{
tempoMax.Set(255);
}
Limit(playState.m_nMusicTempo, tempoMin, tempoMax);
}
break;
case CMD_S3MCMDEX:
switch(param & 0xF0)
{
case 0x90:
if(param <= 0x91)
{
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_SURROUND, param == 0x91);
}
break;
case 0xA0:
pChn->nOldHiOffset = param & 0x0F;
break;
case 0xB0:
if (param & 0x0F)
{
patternLoopEndedOnThisRow = true;
} else
{
CHANNELINDEX firstChn = nChn, lastChn = nChn;
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
firstChn = 0;
lastChn = GetNumChannels() - 1;
}
for(CHANNELINDEX c = firstChn; c <= lastChn; c++)
{
memory.chnSettings[c].patLoop = memory.elapsedTime;
memory.chnSettings[c].patLoopSmp = playState.m_lTotalSampleCount;
memory.chnSettings[c].patLoopStart = playState.m_nRow;
}
patternLoopStartedOnThisRow = true;
}
break;
case 0xF0:
pChn->nActiveMacro = param & 0x0F;
break;
}
break;
case CMD_MODCMDEX:
switch(param & 0xF0)
{
case 0x60:
if (param & 0x0F)
{
playState.m_nNextPatStartRow = memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopStart; // FT2 E60 bug
patternLoopEndedOnThisRow = true;
} else
{
patternLoopStartedOnThisRow = true;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoop = memory.elapsedTime;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopSmp = playState.m_lTotalSampleCount;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopStart = playState.m_nRow;
}
break;
case 0xF0:
pChn->nActiveMacro = param & 0x0F;
break;
}
break;
case CMD_XFINEPORTAUPDOWN:
if(((param & 0xF0) == 0xA0) && !m_playBehaviour[kFT2RestrictXCommand]) pChn->nOldHiOffset = param & 0x0F;
break;
}
if (!(adjustMode & eAdjust)) continue;
switch(command)
{
case CMD_PORTAMENTOUP:
if(param)
{
if(!m_playBehaviour[kFT2PortaUpDownMemory])
pChn->nOldPortaDown = param;
pChn->nOldPortaUp = param;
}
break;
case CMD_PORTAMENTODOWN:
if(param)
{
if(!m_playBehaviour[kFT2PortaUpDownMemory])
pChn->nOldPortaUp = param;
pChn->nOldPortaDown = param;
}
break;
case CMD_TONEPORTAMENTO:
if (param) pChn->nPortamentoSlide = param << 2;
break;
case CMD_OFFSET:
if (param) pChn->oldOffset = param << 8;
break;
case CMD_VOLUMESLIDE:
case CMD_TONEPORTAVOL:
if (param) pChn->nOldVolumeSlide = param;
break;
case CMD_VOLUME:
memory.chnSettings[nChn].vol = param;
break;
case CMD_GLOBALVOLUME:
if(!(GetType() & GLOBALVOL_7BIT_FORMATS) && param < 128) param *= 2;
if(param <= 128)
{
playState.m_nGlobalVolume = param * 2;
} else if(!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT | MOD_TYPE_S3M)))
{
playState.m_nGlobalVolume = 256;
}
break;
case CMD_GLOBALVOLSLIDE:
if(m_playBehaviour[kPerChannelGlobalVolSlide])
{
if (param) pChn->nOldGlobalVolSlide = param; else param = pChn->nOldGlobalVolSlide;
} else
{
if (param) playState.Chn[0].nOldGlobalVolSlide = param; else param = playState.Chn[0].nOldGlobalVolSlide;
}
if (((param & 0x0F) == 0x0F) && (param & 0xF0))
{
param >>= 4;
if (!(GetType() & GLOBALVOL_7BIT_FORMATS)) param <<= 1;
playState.m_nGlobalVolume += param << 1;
} else if (((param & 0xF0) == 0xF0) && (param & 0x0F))
{
param = (param & 0x0F) << 1;
if (!(GetType() & GLOBALVOL_7BIT_FORMATS)) param <<= 1;
playState.m_nGlobalVolume -= param;
} else if (param & 0xF0)
{
param >>= 4;
param <<= 1;
if (!(GetType() & GLOBALVOL_7BIT_FORMATS)) param <<= 1;
playState.m_nGlobalVolume += param * nonRowTicks;
} else
{
param = (param & 0x0F) << 1;
if (!(GetType() & GLOBALVOL_7BIT_FORMATS)) param <<= 1;
playState.m_nGlobalVolume -= param * nonRowTicks;
}
Limit(playState.m_nGlobalVolume, 0, 256);
break;
case CMD_CHANNELVOLUME:
if (param <= 64) pChn->nGlobalVol = param;
break;
case CMD_CHANNELVOLSLIDE:
{
if (param) pChn->nOldChnVolSlide = param; else param = pChn->nOldChnVolSlide;
int32 volume = pChn->nGlobalVol;
if((param & 0x0F) == 0x0F && (param & 0xF0))
volume += (param >> 4); // Fine Up
else if((param & 0xF0) == 0xF0 && (param & 0x0F))
volume -= (param & 0x0F); // Fine Down
else if(param & 0x0F) // Down
volume -= (param & 0x0F) * nonRowTicks;
else // Up
volume += ((param & 0xF0) >> 4) * nonRowTicks;
Limit(volume, 0, 64);
pChn->nGlobalVol = volume;
}
break;
case CMD_PANNING8:
Panning(pChn, param, Pan8bit);
break;
case CMD_MODCMDEX:
if(param < 0x10)
{
for(CHANNELINDEX chn = 0; chn < GetNumChannels(); chn++)
{
playState.Chn[chn].dwFlags.set(CHN_AMIGAFILTER, !(param & 1));
}
}
MPT_FALLTHROUGH;
case CMD_S3MCMDEX:
if((param & 0xF0) == 0x80)
{
Panning(pChn, (param & 0x0F), Pan4bit);
}
break;
case CMD_VIBRATOVOL:
if (param) pChn->nOldVolumeSlide = param;
param = 0;
MPT_FALLTHROUGH;
case CMD_VIBRATO:
Vibrato(pChn, param);
break;
case CMD_FINEVIBRATO:
FineVibrato(pChn, param);
break;
case CMD_TREMOLO:
Tremolo(pChn, param);
break;
case CMD_PANBRELLO:
Panbrello(pChn, param);
break;
}
switch(pChn->rowCommand.volcmd)
{
case VOLCMD_PANNING:
Panning(pChn, pChn->rowCommand.vol, Pan6bit);
break;
case VOLCMD_VIBRATOSPEED:
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2VolColVibrato])
pChn->nVibratoSpeed = pChn->rowCommand.vol & 0x0F;
else
Vibrato(pChn, pChn->rowCommand.vol << 4);
break;
case VOLCMD_VIBRATODEPTH:
Vibrato(pChn, pChn->rowCommand.vol);
break;
}
switch(pChn->rowCommand.command)
{
case CMD_VIBRATO:
case CMD_FINEVIBRATO:
case CMD_VIBRATOVOL:
if(adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
uint32 vibTicks = ((GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT)) && !m_SongFlags[SONG_ITOLDEFFECTS]) ? numTicks : nonRowTicks;
uint32 inc = pChn->nVibratoSpeed * vibTicks;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
inc *= 4;
pChn->nVibratoPos += static_cast<uint8>(inc);
}
break;
case CMD_TREMOLO:
if(adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
uint32 tremTicks = ((GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT)) && !m_SongFlags[SONG_ITOLDEFFECTS]) ? numTicks : nonRowTicks;
uint32 inc = pChn->nTremoloSpeed * tremTicks;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
inc *= 4;
pChn->nTremoloPos += static_cast<uint8>(inc);
}
break;
case CMD_PANBRELLO:
if(adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
pChn->nPanbrelloPos += static_cast<uint8>(pChn->nPanbrelloSpeed * (numTicks - 1));
ProcessPanbrello(pChn);
}
break;
}
}
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_XM && playState.m_nMusicSpeed == uint16_max)
{
break;
}
playState.m_nCurrentRowsPerBeat = m_nDefaultRowsPerBeat;
if(Patterns[playState.m_nPattern].GetOverrideSignature())
{
playState.m_nCurrentRowsPerBeat = Patterns[playState.m_nPattern].GetRowsPerBeat();
}
const uint32 tickDuration = GetTickDuration(playState);
const uint32 rowDuration = tickDuration * numTicks;
memory.elapsedTime += static_cast<double>(rowDuration) / static_cast<double>(m_MixerSettings.gdwMixingFreq);
playState.m_lTotalSampleCount += rowDuration;
if(adjustSamplePos)
{
pChn = playState.Chn;
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); pChn++, nChn++)
{
if(memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender == GetLengthMemory::IGNORE_CHANNEL)
continue;
uint32 startTick = 0;
const ModCommand &m = pChn->rowCommand;
uint32 paramHi = m.param >> 4, paramLo = m.param & 0x0F;
bool porta = m.command == CMD_TONEPORTAMENTO || m.command == CMD_TONEPORTAVOL || m.volcmd == VOLCMD_TONEPORTAMENTO;
bool stopNote = patternLoopStartedOnThisRow; // It's too much trouble to keep those pattern loops in sync...
if(m.instr) pChn->proTrackerOffset = 0;
if(m.IsNote())
{
if(porta && memory.chnSettings[nChn].incChanged)
{
pChn->increment = GetChannelIncrement(pChn, pChn->nPeriod, 0);
}
int32 setPan = pChn->nPan;
pChn->nNewNote = pChn->nLastNote;
if(pChn->nNewIns != 0) InstrumentChange(pChn, pChn->nNewIns, porta);
NoteChange(pChn, m.note, porta);
memory.chnSettings[nChn].incChanged = true;
if((m.command == CMD_MODCMDEX || m.command == CMD_S3MCMDEX) && (m.param & 0xF0) == 0xD0 && paramLo < numTicks)
{
startTick = paramLo;
} else if(m.command == CMD_DELAYCUT && paramHi < numTicks)
{
startTick = paramHi;
}
if(rowDelay > 1 && startTick != 0 && (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M | MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT)))
{
startTick += (playState.m_nMusicSpeed + tickDelay) * (rowDelay - 1);
}
if(!porta) memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender = 0;
if(m.command == CMD_PANNING8
|| ((m.command == CMD_MODCMDEX || m.command == CMD_S3MCMDEX) && paramHi == 0x8)
|| m.volcmd == VOLCMD_PANNING)
{
pChn->nPan = setPan;
}
if(m.command == CMD_OFFSET)
{
bool isExtended = false;
SmpLength offset = CalculateXParam(playState.m_nPattern, playState.m_nRow, nChn, &isExtended);
if(!isExtended)
{
offset <<= 8;
if(offset == 0) offset = pChn->oldOffset;
offset += static_cast<SmpLength>(pChn->nOldHiOffset) << 16;
}
SampleOffset(*pChn, offset);
} else if(m.command == CMD_OFFSETPERCENTAGE)
{
SampleOffset(*pChn, Util::muldiv_unsigned(pChn->nLength, m.param, 255));
} else if(m.command == CMD_REVERSEOFFSET && pChn->pModSample != nullptr)
{
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, oldTickDuration); // Re-sync what we've got so far
ReverseSampleOffset(*pChn, m.param);
startTick = playState.m_nMusicSpeed - 1;
} else if(m.volcmd == VOLCMD_OFFSET)
{
if(m.vol <= CountOf(pChn->pModSample->cues) && pChn->pModSample != nullptr)
{
SmpLength offset;
if(m.vol == 0)
offset = pChn->oldOffset;
else
offset = pChn->oldOffset = pChn->pModSample->cues[m.vol - 1];
SampleOffset(*pChn, offset);
}
}
}
if(m.note == NOTE_KEYOFF || m.note == NOTE_NOTECUT || (m.note == NOTE_FADE && GetNumInstruments())
|| ((m.command == CMD_MODCMDEX || m.command == CMD_S3MCMDEX) && (m.param & 0xF0) == 0xC0 && paramLo < numTicks)
|| (m.command == CMD_DELAYCUT && paramLo != 0 && startTick + paramLo < numTicks))
{
stopNote = true;
}
if(m.command == CMD_VOLUME)
{
pChn->nVolume = m.param * 4;
} else if(m.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME)
{
pChn->nVolume = m.vol * 4;
}
if(pChn->pModSample && !stopNote)
{
if(m.command < MAX_EFFECTS)
{
if(forbiddenCommands[m.command])
{
stopNote = true;
} else if(m.command == CMD_MODCMDEX)
{
switch(m.param & 0xF0)
{
case 0x10:
case 0x20:
stopNote = true;
}
}
}
if(m.volcmd < forbiddenVolCommands.size() && forbiddenVolCommands[m.volcmd])
{
stopNote = true;
}
}
if(stopNote)
{
pChn->Stop();
memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender = 0;
} else
{
if(oldTickDuration != tickDuration && oldTickDuration != 0)
{
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, oldTickDuration); // Re-sync what we've got so far
}
switch(m.command)
{
case CMD_TONEPORTAVOL:
case CMD_VOLUMESLIDE:
case CMD_VIBRATOVOL:
if(m.param || (GetType() != MOD_TYPE_MOD))
{
for(uint32 i = 0; i < numTicks; i++)
{
pChn->isFirstTick = (i == 0);
VolumeSlide(pChn, m.param);
}
}
break;
case CMD_MODCMDEX:
if((m.param & 0x0F) || (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_MT2)))
{
pChn->isFirstTick = true;
switch(m.param & 0xF0)
{
case 0xA0: FineVolumeUp(pChn, m.param & 0x0F, false); break;
case 0xB0: FineVolumeDown(pChn, m.param & 0x0F, false); break;
}
}
break;
case CMD_S3MCMDEX:
if(m.param == 0x9E)
{
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, oldTickDuration); // Re-sync what we've got so far
pChn->dwFlags.reset(CHN_PINGPONGFLAG);
} else if(m.param == 0x9F)
{
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, oldTickDuration); // Re-sync what we've got so far
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_PINGPONGFLAG);
if(!pChn->position.GetInt() && pChn->nLength && (m.IsNote() || !pChn->dwFlags[CHN_LOOP]))
{
pChn->position.Set(pChn->nLength - 1, SamplePosition::fractMax);
}
} else if((m.param & 0xF0) == 0x70)
{
}
break;
}
pChn->isFirstTick = true;
switch(m.volcmd)
{
case VOLCMD_FINEVOLUP: FineVolumeUp(pChn, m.vol, m_playBehaviour[kITVolColMemory]); break;
case VOLCMD_FINEVOLDOWN: FineVolumeDown(pChn, m.vol, m_playBehaviour[kITVolColMemory]); break;
case VOLCMD_VOLSLIDEUP:
case VOLCMD_VOLSLIDEDOWN:
{
ModCommand::VOL vol = m.vol;
if(vol == 0 && m_playBehaviour[kITVolColMemory])
{
vol = pChn->nOldVolParam;
if(vol == 0)
break;
}
if(m.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLSLIDEUP)
vol <<= 4;
for(uint32 i = 0; i < numTicks; i++)
{
pChn->isFirstTick = (i == 0);
VolumeSlide(pChn, vol);
}
}
break;
}
if(porta)
{
uint32 portaTick = memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender + startTick + 1;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender += numTicks;
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, tickDuration, portaTick);
} else
{
memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender += (numTicks - startTick);
}
}
}
}
oldTickDuration = tickDuration;
if(patternLoopEndedOnThisRow
&& (!m_playBehaviour[kFT2PatternLoopWithJumps] || !(positionJumpOnThisRow || patternBreakOnThisRow))
&& (!m_playBehaviour[kITPatternLoopWithJumps] || !positionJumpOnThisRow))
{
std::map<double, int> startTimes;
pChn = playState.Chn;
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); nChn++, pChn++)
{
ModCommand::COMMAND command = pChn->rowCommand.command;
ModCommand::PARAM param = pChn->rowCommand.param;
if((command == CMD_S3MCMDEX && param >= 0xB1 && param <= 0xBF)
|| (command == CMD_MODCMDEX && param >= 0x61 && param <= 0x6F))
{
const double start = memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoop;
if(!startTimes[start]) startTimes[start] = 1;
startTimes[start] = mpt::lcm(startTimes[start], 1 + (param & 0x0F));
}
}
for(const auto &i : startTimes)
{
memory.elapsedTime += (memory.elapsedTime - i.first) * (double)(i.second - 1);
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); nChn++, pChn++)
{
if(memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoop == i.first)
{
playState.m_lTotalSampleCount += (playState.m_lTotalSampleCount - memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopSmp) * (i.second - 1);
if(m_playBehaviour[kITPatternLoopTargetReset] || (GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M))
{
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoop = memory.elapsedTime;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopSmp = playState.m_lTotalSampleCount;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopStart = playState.m_nRow + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_IT)
{
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); nChn++)
{
if((pChn->rowCommand.command == CMD_S3MCMDEX && pChn->rowCommand.param >= 0xB1 && pChn->rowCommand.param <= 0xBF))
{
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoop = memory.elapsedTime;
memory.chnSettings[nChn].patLoopSmp = playState.m_lTotalSampleCount;
}
}
}
}
}
if(adjustSamplePos)
{
for(CHANNELINDEX nChn = 0; nChn < GetNumChannels(); nChn++)
{
if(memory.chnSettings[nChn].ticksToRender != GetLengthMemory::IGNORE_CHANNEL)
{
memory.RenderChannel(nChn, oldTickDuration);
}
}
}
if(retval.targetReached || target.mode == GetLengthTarget::NoTarget)
{
retval.lastOrder = playState.m_nCurrentOrder;
retval.lastRow = playState.m_nRow;
}
retval.duration = memory.elapsedTime;
results.push_back(retval);
if(adjustMode & eAdjust)
{
if(retval.targetReached || target.mode == GetLengthTarget::NoTarget)
{
m_PlayState = std::move(playState);
m_PlayState.m_nNextRow = m_PlayState.m_nRow;
m_PlayState.m_nFrameDelay = m_PlayState.m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_PlayState.m_nTickCount = Util::MaxValueOfType(m_PlayState.m_nTickCount) - 1;
m_PlayState.m_bPositionChanged = true;
for(CHANNELINDEX n = 0; n < GetNumChannels(); n++)
{
if(m_PlayState.Chn[n].nLastNote != NOTE_NONE)
{
m_PlayState.Chn[n].nNewNote = m_PlayState.Chn[n].nLastNote;
}
if(memory.chnSettings[n].vol != 0xFF && !adjustSamplePos)
{
m_PlayState.Chn[n].nVolume = std::min(memory.chnSettings[n].vol, uint8(64)) * 4;
}
}
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
std::bitset<MAX_MIXPLUGINS> plugSetProgram;
for(const auto ¶m : memory.plugParams)
{
PLUGINDEX plug = param.first.first - 1;
IMixPlugin *plugin = m_MixPlugins[plug].pMixPlugin;
if(plugin != nullptr)
{
if(!plugSetProgram[plug])
{
plugSetProgram.set(plug);
plugin->BeginSetProgram();
}
plugin->SetParameter(param.first.second, param.second / PlugParamValue(ModCommand::maxColumnValue));
}
}
if(plugSetProgram.any())
{
for(PLUGINDEX i = 0; i < MAX_MIXPLUGINS; i++)
{
if(plugSetProgram[i])
{
m_MixPlugins[i].pMixPlugin->EndSetProgram();
}
}
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
} else if(adjustMode != eAdjustOnSuccess)
{
m_PlayState.m_nMusicSpeed = m_nDefaultSpeed;
m_PlayState.m_nMusicTempo = m_nDefaultTempo;
m_PlayState.m_nGlobalVolume = m_nDefaultGlobalVolume;
}
if(sequence != Order.GetCurrentSequenceIndex())
{
Order.SetSequence(sequence);
}
visitedSongRows.Set(visitedRows);
}
return results;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: soundlib/Snd_fx.cpp in OpenMPT before 1.27.07.00 and libopenmpt before 0.3.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via an IT or MO3 file with many nested pattern loops.
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27 | Medium | 169,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
uint16 entered) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPasskey: " << passkey
<< " (" << entered << " entered)";
if (entered == 0)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
if (entered == 0)
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_->KeysEntered(this, entered);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mrb_class_real(struct RClass* cl)
{
if (cl == 0)
return NULL;
while ((cl->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS) || (cl->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS)) {
cl = cl->super;
}
return cl;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in mruby 1.4.1. There is a NULL pointer dereference in mrb_class_real because *class BasicObject* is not properly supported in class.c.
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037 | Medium | 169,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SProcXFixesSelectCursorInput(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesSelectCursorInputReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,441 |
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