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stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 3
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int64 165k
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
interface_id_ = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id_);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the WebSocketDispatcherHost::SendOrDrop function in content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc in the Web Sockets implementation in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149 might allow remote attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism by leveraging an incorrect deletion in a certain failure case.
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354} | High | 171,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
format,
magick[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*value;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*pixels,
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MaxTextExtent);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,&image->exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MaxTextExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MaxTextExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",
type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsGrayPixel(p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 32)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p++;
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelOpacity(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo((const ImageInfo *) NULL,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of off-by-one errors.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612 | Medium | 169,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_desx_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc,"DESX");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc,"desx");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc,"DES");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc,"des");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc,"DES3");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc,"des3");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_40());
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc,"IDEA");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc,"idea");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc,"SEED");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc,"seed");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_64_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc,"RC2");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc,"rc2");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc,"BF");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc,"bf");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc,"blowfish");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc,"CAST");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc,"cast");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc,"CAST-cbc");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc,"cast-cbc");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc,"rc5");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc,"RC5");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ctr());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_xts());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc,"AES128");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc,"aes128");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ctr());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc,"AES192");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc,"aes192");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ctr());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_xts());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc,"AES256");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc,"aes256");
#if 0 /* Disabled because of timing side-channel leaks. */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ecb());
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc,"CAMELLIA128");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc,"camellia128");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc,"CAMELLIA192");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc,"camellia192");
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ecb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb8());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ofb());
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc,"CAMELLIA256");
EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc,"camellia256");
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c in the AES-NI functionality in the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via crafted CBC data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(char *value, int vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate("UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
XML_Parse(parser, value, vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
*return_value = *(ent->data);
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
retval = SUCCESS;
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid wddxPacket XML document that is mishandled in a wddx_deserialize call, as demonstrated by a stray element inside a boolean element, leading to incorrect pop processing.
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799 | Medium | 166,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: exsltFuncFunctionComp (xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
xmlChar *name, *prefix;
xmlNsPtr ns;
xmlHashTablePtr data;
exsltFuncFunctionData *func;
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
{
xmlChar *qname;
qname = xmlGetProp(inst, (const xmlChar *) "name");
name = xmlSplitQName2 (qname, &prefix);
xmlFree(qname);
}
if ((name == NULL) || (prefix == NULL)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: not a QName\n");
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
/* namespace lookup */
ns = xmlSearchNs (inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: undeclared prefix %s\n",
prefix);
xmlFree(name);
xmlFree(prefix);
return;
}
xmlFree(prefix);
xsltParseTemplateContent(style, inst);
/*
* Create function data
*/
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
func->content = inst->children;
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(func->content) &&
IS_XSLT_NAME(func->content, "param")) {
func->content = func->content->next;
func->nargs++;
}
/*
* Register the function data such that it can be retrieved
* by exslFuncFunctionFunction
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Ensure that the hash table will be stored in the *current*
* stylesheet level in order to correctly evaluate the
* import precedence.
*/
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleStylesheetLevelGetExtData(style,
EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#else
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleGetExtData (style, EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#endif
if (data == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: no stylesheet data\n");
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
if (xmlHashAddEntry2 (data, ns->href, name, func) < 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
style->errors++;
} else {
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: register {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
}
xmlFree(name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_range(char *str, size_t file_sz, int *nranges)
{
static struct range ranges[MAX_RANGES];
int i = 0;
char *p, *q;
/* Extract range unit */
if ((p = strchr(str, '=')) == NULL)
return (NULL);
*p++ = '\0';
/* Check if it's a bytes range spec */
if (strcmp(str, "bytes") != 0)
return (NULL);
while ((q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL) {
*q++ = '\0';
/* Extract start and end positions */
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) == 0)
continue;
i++;
if (i == MAX_RANGES)
return (NULL);
p = q;
}
if (parse_range_spec(p, file_sz, &ranges[i]) != 0)
i++;
*nranges = i;
return (i ? ranges : NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: httpd in OpenBSD allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a series of requests for a large file using an HTTP Range header.
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@ | High | 168,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
int idx, ret = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
return 0;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
BUG_ON(guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
continue;
/*
* VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
* interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
* for these kind of interrupts.
*
* For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
* those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
* configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
* irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
*
* We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
*/
kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu)) {
/*
* Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
* we don't handle it in posted mode.
*/
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
host_irq);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(vcpu->vcpu_id, host_irq, e->gsi,
vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
if (set)
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
else {
/* suppress notification event before unposting */
pi_set_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
pi_clear_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
}
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.13.3 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (assertion failure, and hypervisor hang or crash) via an out-of bounds guest_irq value, related to arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c and virt/kvm/eventfd.c.
Commit Message: KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
The value of the guest_irq argument to vmx_update_pi_irte() is
ultimately coming from a KVM_IRQFD API call. Do not BUG() in
vmx_update_pi_irte() if the value is out-of bounds. (Especially,
since KVM as a whole seems to hang after that.)
Instead, print a message only once if we find that we don't have a
route for a certain IRQ (which can be out-of-bounds or within the
array).
This fixes CVE-2017-1000252.
Fixes: efc644048ecde54 ("KVM: x86: Update IRTE for posted-interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 170,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int kwajd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys,
struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mskwajd_header *hdr)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
int i;
/* read in the header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], kwajh_SIZEOF) != kwajh_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check for "KWAJ" signature */
if (((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature1]) != 0x4A41574B) ||
((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature2]) != 0xD127F088))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* basic header fields */
hdr->comp_type = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_CompMethod]);
hdr->data_offset = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_DataOffset]);
hdr->headers = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_Flags]);
hdr->length = 0;
hdr->filename = NULL;
hdr->extra = NULL;
hdr->extra_length = 0;
/* optional headers */
/* 4 bytes: length of unpacked file */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASLENGTH) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->length = EndGetI32(&buf[0]);
}
/* 2 bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN1) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* 2 bytes: length of section, then [length] bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN2) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)i, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* filename and extension */
if (hdr->headers & (MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME | MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT)) {
off_t pos = sys->tell(fh);
char *fn = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) 13);
/* allocate memory for maximum length filename */
if (! fn) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
hdr->filename = fn;
/* copy filename if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 9) != 9) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 9) ? i+1 : 9;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* copy extension if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT) {
*fn++ = '.';
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 4) ? i+1 : 4;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
*fn = '\0';
}
/* 2 bytes: extra text length then [length] bytes of extra text data */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASEXTRATEXT) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
hdr->extra = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)i+1);
if (! hdr->extra) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
if (sys->read(fh, hdr->extra, i) != i) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->extra[i] = '\0';
hdr->extra_length = i;
}
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in kwajd_read_headers in mspack/kwajd.c in libmspack before 0.7alpha. Bad KWAJ file header extensions could cause a one or two byte overwrite.
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings | Medium | 169,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep :
JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep :
JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability was found in the jpc_pi_nextpcrl() function of jasper before 2.0.6 when processing crafted input.
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder. | Medium | 169,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetArrayItem( cJSON *array, int item )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && item > 0 ) {
--item;
c = c->next;
}
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static PrimitiveInfo *TraceStrokePolygon(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
typedef struct _LineSegment
{
double
p,
q;
} LineSegment;
LineSegment
dx,
dy,
inverse_slope,
slope,
theta;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
double
delta_theta,
dot_product,
mid,
miterlimit;
PointInfo
box_p[5],
box_q[5],
center,
offset,
*path_p,
*path_q;
PrimitiveInfo
*polygon_primitive,
*stroke_polygon;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments,
max_strokes,
number_vertices;
ssize_t
j,
n,
p,
q;
/*
Allocate paths.
*/
number_vertices=primitive_info->coordinates;
max_strokes=2*number_vertices+6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
number_vertices+2UL,sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL) ||
(polygon_primitive == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL))
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(polygon_primitive,primitive_info,(size_t)
number_vertices*sizeof(*polygon_primitive));
closed_path=
(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.x == primitive_info[0].point.x) &&
(primitive_info[number_vertices-1].point.y == primitive_info[0].point.y) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin) ||
((draw_info->linejoin == MiterJoin) && (closed_path != MagickFalse)))
{
polygon_primitive[number_vertices]=primitive_info[1];
number_vertices++;
}
polygon_primitive[number_vertices].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
/*
Compute the slope for the first line segment, p.
*/
dx.p=0.0;
dy.p=0.0;
for (n=1; n < (ssize_t) number_vertices; n++)
{
dx.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-polygon_primitive[0].point.x;
dy.p=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-polygon_primitive[0].point.y;
if ((fabs(dx.p) >= MagickEpsilon) || (fabs(dy.p) >= MagickEpsilon))
break;
}
if (n == (ssize_t) number_vertices)
n=(ssize_t) number_vertices-1L;
slope.p=DrawEpsilonReciprocal(dx.p)*dy.p;
inverse_slope.p=(-1.0*DrawEpsilonReciprocal(slope.p));
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*draw_info->stroke_width/2.0;
miterlimit=(double) (draw_info->miterlimit*draw_info->miterlimit*
mid*mid);
if ((draw_info->linecap == SquareCap) && (closed_path == MagickFalse))
TraceSquareLinecap(polygon_primitive,number_vertices,mid);
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.p*inverse_slope.p+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.p);
if ((dy.p*offset.x-dx.p*offset.y) > 0.0)
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.x*inverse_slope.p;
}
else
{
box_p[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[0].x=polygon_primitive[0].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[0].y=polygon_primitive[0].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[1].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[1].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
}
/*
Create strokes for the line join attribute: bevel, miter, round.
*/
p=0;
q=0;
path_q[p++]=box_q[0];
path_p[q++]=box_p[0];
for (i=(ssize_t) n+1; i < (ssize_t) number_vertices; i++)
{
/*
Compute the slope for this line segment, q.
*/
dx.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-polygon_primitive[n].point.x;
dy.q=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-polygon_primitive[n].point.y;
dot_product=dx.q*dx.q+dy.q*dy.q;
if (dot_product < 0.25)
continue;
slope.q=DrawEpsilonReciprocal(dx.q)*dy.q;
inverse_slope.q=(-1.0*DrawEpsilonReciprocal(slope.q));
offset.x=sqrt((double) (mid*mid/(inverse_slope.q*inverse_slope.q+1.0)));
offset.y=(double) (offset.x*inverse_slope.q);
dot_product=dy.q*offset.x-dx.q*offset.y;
if (dot_product > 0.0)
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
}
else
{
box_p[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y+offset.y;
box_p[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x+offset.x;
box_p[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y+offset.y;
box_q[2].x=polygon_primitive[n].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[2].y=polygon_primitive[n].point.y-offset.y;
box_q[3].x=polygon_primitive[i].point.x-offset.x;
box_q[3].y=polygon_primitive[i].point.y-offset.y;
}
if (fabs((double) (slope.p-slope.q)) < MagickEpsilon)
{
box_p[4]=box_p[1];
box_q[4]=box_q[1];
}
else
{
box_p[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_p[0].x-box_p[0].y-slope.q*box_p[3].x+
box_p[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_p[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_p[4].x-box_p[0].x)+box_p[0].y);
box_q[4].x=(double) ((slope.p*box_q[0].x-box_q[0].y-slope.q*box_q[3].x+
box_q[3].y)/(slope.p-slope.q));
box_q[4].y=(double) (slope.p*(box_q[4].x-box_q[0].x)+box_q[0].y);
}
if (q >= (ssize_t) (max_strokes-6*BezierQuantum-360))
{
max_strokes+=6*BezierQuantum+360;
path_p=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_p,(size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_p));
path_q=(PointInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(path_q,(size_t) max_strokes,
sizeof(*path_q));
if ((path_p == (PointInfo *) NULL) || (path_q == (PointInfo *) NULL))
{
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return((PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
}
}
dot_product=dx.q*dy.p-dx.p*dy.q;
if (dot_product <= 0.0)
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
else
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_q[1].y-center.y,box_q[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_q[2].y-center.y,box_q[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.q < theta.p)
theta.q+=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.q-theta.p)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_q[q].x=box_q[1].x;
path_q[q].y=box_q[1].y;
q++;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_q[q].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_q[q].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
q++;
}
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
else
switch (draw_info->linejoin)
{
case BevelJoin:
{
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
break;
}
case MiterJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
path_p[p++]=box_p[4];
}
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
}
break;
}
case RoundJoin:
{
dot_product=(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)*(box_q[4].x-box_p[4].x)+
(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y)*(box_q[4].y-box_p[4].y);
if (dot_product <= miterlimit)
path_q[q++]=box_q[4];
else
{
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[2];
}
center=polygon_primitive[n].point;
theta.p=atan2(box_p[1].y-center.y,box_p[1].x-center.x);
theta.q=atan2(box_p[2].y-center.y,box_p[2].x-center.x);
if (theta.p < theta.q)
theta.p+=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil((double) ((theta.p-theta.q)/
(2.0*sqrt((double) (1.0/mid)))));
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) arc_segments; j++)
{
delta_theta=(double) (j*(theta.q-theta.p)/arc_segments);
path_p[p].x=(double) (center.x+mid*cos(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
path_p[p].y=(double) (center.y+mid*sin(fmod((double)
(theta.p+delta_theta),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p++;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[2];
break;
}
default:
break;
}
slope.p=slope.q;
inverse_slope.p=inverse_slope.q;
box_p[0]=box_p[2];
box_p[1]=box_p[3];
box_q[0]=box_q[2];
box_q[1]=box_q[3];
dx.p=dx.q;
dy.p=dy.q;
n=i;
}
path_p[p++]=box_p[1];
path_q[q++]=box_q[1];
/*
Trace stroked polygon.
*/
stroke_polygon=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(p+q+2UL*closed_path+2UL),sizeof(*stroke_polygon));
if (stroke_polygon != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) p; i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_p[i];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (p+q+closed_path); i++)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=path_q[p+q+closed_path-(i+1)];
}
if (closed_path != MagickFalse)
{
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[p+closed_path].point;
i++;
}
stroke_polygon[i]=polygon_primitive[0];
stroke_polygon[i].point=stroke_polygon[0].point;
i++;
stroke_polygon[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
stroke_polygon[0].coordinates=(size_t) (p+q+2*closed_path+1);
}
path_p=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_p);
path_q=(PointInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_q);
polygon_primitive=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(polygon_primitive);
return(stroke_polygon);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c | High | 167,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fs/pnode.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.4 does not properly traverse a mount propagation tree in a certain case involving a slave mount, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted series of mount system calls.
Commit Message: propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: [email protected]
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int create_problem_dir(GHashTable *problem_info, unsigned pid)
{
/* Exit if free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
exit(1);
}
/* Create temp directory with the problem data.
* This directory is renamed to final directory name after
* all files have been stored into it.
*/
gchar *dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, "basename");
if (!dir_basename)
dir_basename = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_TYPE);
char *path = xasprintf("%s/%s-%s-%u.new",
g_settings_dump_location,
dir_basename,
iso_date_string(NULL),
pid);
/* This item is useless, don't save it */
g_hash_table_remove(problem_info, "basename");
/* No need to check the path length, as all variables used are limited,
* and dd_create() fails if the path is too long.
*/
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_create(path, client_uid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (!dd)
{
error_msg_and_die("Error creating problem directory '%s'", path);
}
dd_create_basic_files(dd, client_uid, NULL);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
gpointer gpkey = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_CMDLINE);
if (!gpkey)
{
/* Obtain and save the command line. */
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
if (cmdline)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline);
free(cmdline);
}
}
/* Store id of the user whose application crashed. */
char uid_str[sizeof(long) * 3 + 2];
sprintf(uid_str, "%lu", (long)client_uid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_UID, uid_str);
GHashTableIter iter;
gpointer gpvalue;
g_hash_table_iter_init(&iter, problem_info);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next(&iter, &gpkey, &gpvalue))
{
dd_save_text(dd, (gchar *) gpkey, (gchar *) gpvalue);
}
dd_close(dd);
/* Not needing it anymore */
g_hash_table_destroy(problem_info);
/* Move the completely created problem directory
* to final directory.
*/
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, strlen(path) - strlen(".new"));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log_notice("Saved problem directory of pid %u to '%s'", pid, path);
/* We let the peer know that problem dir was created successfully
* _before_ we run potentially long-running post-create.
*/
printf("HTTP/1.1 201 Created\r\n\r\n");
fflush(NULL);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
xdup2(STDERR_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); /* paranoia: don't leave stdout fd closed */
/* Trim old problem directories if necessary */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
run_post_create(path);
/* free(path); */
exit(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The event scripts in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) uses world-readable permission on a copy of sosreport file in problem directories, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from /var/log/messages via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> | Low | 170,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(unsigned char)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, HEX_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 2:
#line 106 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->root_node = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
}
#line 1330 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 3:
#line 115 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1338 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 4:
#line 119 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1351 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 5:
#line 128 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_NODE* new_concat;
RE_NODE* leftmost_concat = NULL;
RE_NODE* leftmost_node = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
(yyval.re_node) = NULL;
/*
Some portions of the code (i.e: yr_re_split_at_chaining_point)
expect a left-unbalanced tree where the right child of a concat node
can't be another concat node. A concat node must be always the left
child of its parent if the parent is also a concat. For this reason
the can't simply create two new concat nodes arranged like this:
concat
/ \
/ \
token's \
subtree concat
/ \
/ \
/ \
token_sequence's token's
subtree subtree
Instead we must insert the subtree for the first token as the
leftmost node of the token_sequence subtree.
*/
while (leftmost_node->type == RE_NODE_CONCAT)
{
leftmost_concat = leftmost_node;
leftmost_node = leftmost_node->left;
}
new_concat = yr_re_node_create(
RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), leftmost_node);
if (new_concat != NULL)
{
if (leftmost_concat != NULL)
{
leftmost_concat->left = new_concat;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
}
else
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, new_concat, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
}
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1413 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 6:
#line 190 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1421 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 7:
#line 194 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1434 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 8:
#line 207 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1442 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 211 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1451 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 220 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
lex_env->token_count++;
if (lex_env->token_count > MAX_HEX_STRING_TOKENS)
{
yr_re_node_destroy((yyvsp[0].re_node));
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "string too long");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1468 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 233 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
lex_env->inside_or++;
}
#line 1476 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 237 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
lex_env->inside_or--;
}
#line 1485 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 246 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].integer) <= 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid jump length");
YYABORT;
}
if (lex_env->inside_or && (yyvsp[-1].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "jumps over "
STR(STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
" now allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
}
#line 1512 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 269 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or &&
((yyvsp[-3].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD ||
(yyvsp[-1].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD) )
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "jumps over "
STR(STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
" now allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-3].integer) < 0 || (yyvsp[-1].integer) < 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid negative jump length");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-3].integer) > (yyvsp[-1].integer))
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid jump range");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-3].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
}
#line 1548 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 301 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env,
"unbounded jumps not allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-2].integer) < 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid negative jump length");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-2].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = INT_MAX;
}
#line 1574 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 16:
#line 323 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env,
"unbounded jumps not allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = INT_MAX;
}
#line 1594 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 343 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1602 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 347 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1617 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 361 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (int) (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 1629 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 369 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
uint8_t mask = (uint8_t) ((yyvsp[0].integer) >> 8);
if (mask == 0x00)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
else
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_MASKED_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (yyvsp[0].integer) & 0xFF;
(yyval.re_node)->mask = mask;
}
}
#line 1653 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 1657 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regexp module in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption) via a crafted rule (involving hex strings) that is mishandled in the _yr_re_emit function, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-9304.
Commit Message: Fix issue #674 for hex strings. | Medium | 168,101 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
tsample_t spp, uint16 bps)
{
int status = 1;
tsample_t sample = 0;
tsample_t count = spp;
uint32 row, col, trow;
uint32 nrow, ncol;
uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
shift_width = 0;
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Tile size or tile rowsize is zero");
exit(-1);
}
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != (tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
dst_rowsize = ((imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0);
if (tbytes < tilesize && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at row %lu col %lu, Read %lu bytes of %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)tbytes,
(unsigned long)tilesize);
status = 0;
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
row_offset = row * dst_rowsize;
col_offset = ((col * bps * spp) + 7)/ 8;
bufp = buf + row_offset + col_offset;
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
/* Each tile scanline will start on a byte boundary but it
* has to be merged into the scanline for the entire
* image buffer and the previous segment may not have
* ended on a byte boundary
*/
/* Optimization for common bit depths, all samples */
if (((bps % 8) == 0) && (count == spp))
{
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
_TIFFmemcpy (bufp, tilebuf + src_offset, (ncol * spp * bps) / 8);
bufp += (imagewidth * bps * spp) / 8;
}
}
else
{
/* Bit depths not a multiple of 8 and/or extract fewer than spp samples */
prev_trailing_bits = trailing_bits = 0;
trailing_bits = (ncol * bps * spp) % 8;
/* for (trow = 0; tl < nrow; trow++) */
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
src = tilebuf + src_offset;
dst_offset = (row + trow) * dst_rowsize;
dst = buf + dst_offset + col_offset;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 0: if (extractContigSamplesBytes (src, dst, ncol, sample,
spp, bps, count, 0, ncol))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 1: if (bps == 1)
{
if (extractContigSamplesShifted8bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
}
else
if (extractContigSamplesShifted16bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 2: if (extractContigSamplesShifted24bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 3:
case 4:
case 5: if (extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
default: TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth %d", bps);
return 1;
}
}
prev_trailing_bits += trailing_bits;
/* if (prev_trailing_bits > 7) */
/* prev_trailing_bits-= 8; */
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 has an out-of-bounds read in readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void hashtable_clear(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
size_t i;
hashtable_do_clear(hashtable);
for(i = 0; i < num_buckets(hashtable); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
list_init(&hashtable->list);
hashtable->size = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 166,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool V8DOMWindow::namedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, v8::Local<v8::Value> key, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = host->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8DOMWindow::GetTemplate(isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(isolate)));
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false; // the frame is gone.
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8DOMWindow::toNative(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
Frame* target = targetWindow->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader()->didAccessInitialDocument();
if (key->IsString()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, nameOfProtoProperty, ("__proto__", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
String name = toWebCoreString(key);
Frame* childFrame = target->tree()->scopedChild(name);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET && childFrame && !host->HasRealNamedProperty(key->ToString()) && name != nameOfProtoProperty)
return true;
}
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and trigger namespace pollution via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int DefragMfIpv6Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* For IPv6 the expected length is just the length of the payload
* of 2 fragments, so 16. */
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != 16) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bin_symbols(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, ut64 at, const char *name, bool exponly, const char *args) {
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RBinSymbol *symbol;
RBinAddr *entry;
RListIter *iter;
bool firstexp = true;
bool printHere = false;
int i = 0, lastfs = 's';
bool bin_demangle = r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.demangle");
if (!info) {
return 0;
}
if (args && *args == '.') {
printHere = true;
}
bool is_arm = info && info->arch && !strncmp (info->arch, "arm", 3);
const char *lang = bin_demangle ? r_config_get (r->config, "bin.lang") : NULL;
RList *symbols = r_bin_get_symbols (r->bin);
r_spaces_push (&r->anal->meta_spaces, "bin");
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, R_FLAGS_FS_SYMBOLS);
} else if (!at && exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs exports\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Exports]\n");
}
} else if (!at && !exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Symbols]\n");
}
}
if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("Num Paddr Vaddr Bind Type Size Name\n");
}
size_t count = 0;
r_list_foreach (symbols, iter, symbol) {
if (!symbol->name) {
continue;
}
char *r_symbol_name = r_str_escape_utf8 (symbol->name, false, true);
ut64 addr = compute_addr (r->bin, symbol->paddr, symbol->vaddr, va);
int len = symbol->size ? symbol->size : 32;
SymName sn = {0};
if (exponly && !isAnExport (symbol)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (name && strcmp (r_symbol_name, name)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (at && (!symbol->size || !is_in_range (at, addr, symbol->size))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if ((printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, symbol->paddr, len))
&& (printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, addr, len))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
count ++;
snInit (r, &sn, symbol, lang);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && (is_section_symbol (symbol) || is_file_symbol (symbol))) {
/*
* Skip section symbols because they will have their own flag.
* Skip also file symbols because not useful for now.
*/
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_special_symbol (r, symbol, va);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_symbol (r, symbol, info, va);
}
select_flag_space (r, symbol);
/* If that's a Classed symbol (method or so) */
if (sn.classname) {
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_get (r->flags, sn.methflag);
if (r->bin->prefix) {
char *prname = r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, sn.methflag);
r_name_filter (sn.methflag, -1);
free (sn.methflag);
sn.methflag = prname;
}
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, sn.methname);
if ((fi->offset - r->flags->base) == addr) {
r_flag_unset (r->flags, fi);
}
} else {
fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, sn.methflag, addr, symbol->size);
char *comment = fi->comment ? strdup (fi->comment) : NULL;
if (comment) {
r_flag_item_set_comment (fi, comment);
R_FREE (comment);
}
}
} else {
const char *n = sn.demname ? sn.demname : sn.name;
const char *fn = sn.demflag ? sn.demflag : sn.nameflag;
char *fnp = (r->bin->prefix) ?
r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, fn):
strdup (fn);
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, fnp, addr, symbol->size);
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, n);
fi->demangled = (bool)(size_t)sn.demname;
} else {
if (fn) {
eprintf ("[Warning] Can't find flag (%s)\n", fn);
}
}
free (fnp);
}
if (sn.demname) {
r_meta_add (r->anal, R_META_TYPE_COMMENT,
addr, symbol->size, sn.demname);
}
r_flag_space_pop (r->flags);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
char *str = r_str_escape_utf8_for_json (r_symbol_name, -1);
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"name\":\"%s\","
"\"demname\":\"%s\","
"\"flagname\":\"%s\","
"\"ordinal\":%d,"
"\"bind\":\"%s\","
"\"size\":%d,"
"\"type\":\"%s\","
"\"vaddr\":%"PFMT64d","
"\"paddr\":%"PFMT64d"}",
((exponly && firstexp) || printHere) ? "" : (iter->p ? "," : ""),
str,
sn.demname? sn.demname: "",
sn.nameflag,
symbol->ordinal,
symbol->bind,
(int)symbol->size,
symbol->type,
(ut64)addr, (ut64)symbol->paddr);
free (str);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" %d %s\n",
addr, (int)symbol->size, name);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLEST (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("%s\n", name);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
/* Skip special symbols because we do not flag them and
* they shouldn't be printed in the rad format either */
if (is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
goto next;
}
RBinFile *binfile;
RBinPlugin *plugin;
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
if (!name) {
goto next;
}
if (!strncmp (name, "imp.", 4)) {
if (lastfs != 'i') {
r_cons_printf ("fs imports\n");
}
lastfs = 'i';
} else {
if (lastfs != 's') {
const char *fs = exponly? "exports": "symbols";
r_cons_printf ("fs %s\n", fs);
}
lastfs = 's';
}
if (r->bin->prefix || *name) { // we don't want unnamed symbol flags
char *flagname = construct_symbol_flagname ("sym", name, MAXFLAG_LEN_DEFAULT);
if (!flagname) {
goto next;
}
r_cons_printf ("\"f %s%s%s %u 0x%08" PFMT64x "\"\n",
r->bin->prefix ? r->bin->prefix : "", r->bin->prefix ? "." : "",
flagname, symbol->size, addr);
free (flagname);
}
binfile = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (binfile);
if (plugin && plugin->name) {
if (r_str_startswith (plugin->name, "pe")) {
char *module = strdup (r_symbol_name);
char *p = strstr (module, ".dll_");
if (p && strstr (module, "imp.")) {
char *symname = __filterShell (p + 5);
char *m = __filterShell (module);
*p = 0;
if (r->bin->prefix) {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, r->bin->prefix, symname);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, symname);
}
free (symname);
free (m);
}
free (module);
}
}
} else {
const char *bind = symbol->bind? symbol->bind: "NONE";
const char *type = symbol->type? symbol->type: "NONE";
const char *name = r_str_get (sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name);
r_cons_printf ("%03u", symbol->ordinal);
if (symbol->paddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (" ----------");
} else {
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x, symbol->paddr);
}
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x" %6s %6s %4d%s%s\n",
addr, bind, type, symbol->size, *name? " ": "", name);
}
next:
snFini (&sn);
i++;
free (r_symbol_name);
if (exponly && firstexp) {
firstexp = false;
}
if (printHere) {
break;
}
}
if (count == 0 && IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
if (is_arm) {
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
handle_arm_entry (r, entry, info, va);
}
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
}
r_spaces_pop (&r->anal->meta_spaces);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: In radare2 before 3.9.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient fix for CVE-2019-14745 and improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745 | Medium | 170,186 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int attach_child_main(void* data)
{
struct attach_clone_payload* payload = (struct attach_clone_payload*)data;
int ipc_socket = payload->ipc_socket;
lxc_attach_options_t* options = payload->options;
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx = payload->init_ctx;
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
long new_personality;
#endif
int ret;
int status;
int expected;
long flags;
int fd;
uid_t new_uid;
gid_t new_gid;
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it's ready
* for us to start initializing
*/
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from initial process (0)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* A description of the purpose of this functionality is
* provided in the lxc-attach(1) manual page. We have to
* remount here and not in the parent process, otherwise
* /proc may not properly reflect the new pid namespace.
*/
if (!(options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_REMOUNT_PROC_SYS)) {
ret = lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc();
if (ret < 0) {
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* now perform additional attachments*/
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
if (options->personality < 0)
new_personality = init_ctx->personality;
else
new_personality = options->personality;
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_SET_PERSONALITY) {
ret = personality(new_personality);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not ensure correct architecture");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
#endif
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_DROP_CAPABILITIES) {
ret = lxc_attach_drop_privs(init_ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not drop privileges");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* always set the environment (specify (LXC_ATTACH_KEEP_ENV, NULL, NULL) if you want this to be a no-op) */
ret = lxc_attach_set_environment(options->env_policy, options->extra_env_vars, options->extra_keep_env);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not set initial environment for attached process");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* set user / group id */
new_uid = 0;
new_gid = 0;
/* ignore errors, we will fall back to root in that case
* (/proc was not mounted etc.)
*/
if (options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)
lxc_attach_get_init_uidgid(&new_uid, &new_gid);
if (options->uid != (uid_t)-1)
new_uid = options->uid;
if (options->gid != (gid_t)-1)
new_gid = options->gid;
/* setup the control tty */
if (options->stdin_fd && isatty(options->stdin_fd)) {
if (setsid() < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to setsid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
if (ioctl(options->stdin_fd, TIOCSCTTY, (char *)NULL) < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to TIOCSTTY");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* try to set the uid/gid combination */
if ((new_gid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)) {
if (setgid(new_gid) || setgroups(0, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container gid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
if ((new_uid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER) && setuid(new_uid)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container uid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell initial process it may now put us into the cgroups */
status = 1;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret != sizeof(status)) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify initial process for initialization (1)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it has done
* everything for us when it comes to cgroups etc.
*/
expected = 2;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive final notification from initial process (2)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_socket);
/* set new apparmor profile/selinux context */
if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM)) {
int on_exec;
int proc_mounted;
on_exec = options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM_EXEC ? 1 : 0;
proc_mounted = mount_proc_if_needed("/");
if (proc_mounted == -1) {
ERROR("Error mounting a sane /proc");
rexit(-1);
}
ret = lsm_process_label_set(init_ctx->lsm_label,
init_ctx->container->lxc_conf, 0, on_exec);
if (proc_mounted)
umount("/proc");
if (ret < 0) {
rexit(-1);
}
}
if (init_ctx->container && init_ctx->container->lxc_conf &&
lxc_seccomp_load(init_ctx->container->lxc_conf) != 0) {
ERROR("Loading seccomp policy");
rexit(-1);
}
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* The following is done after the communication socket is
* shut down. That way, all errors that might (though
* unlikely) occur up until this point will have their messages
* printed to the original stderr (if logging is so configured)
* and not the fd the user supplied, if any.
*/
/* fd handling for stdin, stdout and stderr;
* ignore errors here, user may want to make sure
* the fds are closed, for example */
if (options->stdin_fd >= 0 && options->stdin_fd != 0)
dup2(options->stdin_fd, 0);
if (options->stdout_fd >= 0 && options->stdout_fd != 1)
dup2(options->stdout_fd, 1);
if (options->stderr_fd >= 0 && options->stderr_fd != 2)
dup2(options->stderr_fd, 2);
/* close the old fds */
if (options->stdin_fd > 2)
close(options->stdin_fd);
if (options->stdout_fd > 2)
close(options->stdout_fd);
if (options->stderr_fd > 2)
close(options->stderr_fd);
/* try to remove CLOEXEC flag from stdin/stdout/stderr,
* but also here, ignore errors */
for (fd = 0; fd <= 2; fd++) {
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
continue;
if (flags & FD_CLOEXEC) {
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Unable to clear CLOEXEC from fd");
}
}
}
/* we're done, so we can now do whatever the user intended us to do */
rexit(payload->exec_function(payload->exec_payload));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: attach.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier uses the proc filesystem in a container, which allows local container users to escape AppArmor or SELinux confinement by mounting a proc filesystem with a crafted (1) AppArmor profile or (2) SELinux label.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double free when handling responses from an HSM Card in sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init in libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems. | Medium | 169,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to access host files outside the export path via a .. (dot dot) in an unspecified string.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int iwch_cxgb3_ofld_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int error = 0;
struct cxio_rdev *rdev;
rdev = (struct cxio_rdev *)tdev->ulp;
if (cxio_fatal_error(rdev)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
error = cxgb3_ofld_send(tdev, skb);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb3/iwch_cm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not properly identify error conditions, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> | High | 167,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment,
const byte *data, const size_t size,
bool GSMMR, uint32_t GSW, uint32_t GSH,
uint32_t GSBPP, bool GSUSESKIP, Jbig2Image *GSKIP, int GSTEMPLATE, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
uint8_t **GSVALS = NULL;
size_t consumed_bytes = 0;
int i, j, code, stride;
int x, y;
Jbig2Image **GSPLANES;
Jbig2GenericRegionParams rparams;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
/* allocate GSPLANES */
GSPLANES = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, GSBPP);
if (GSPLANES == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %d bytes for GSPLANES", GSBPP);
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < GSBPP; ++i) {
GSPLANES[i] = jbig2_image_new(ctx, GSW, GSH);
if (GSPLANES[i] == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %dx%d image for GSPLANES", GSW, GSH);
/* free already allocated */
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; --j) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, GSPLANES[j]);
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, GSPLANES);
return NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
GROW;
if (RAW != '&')
return(NULL);
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityRef: no name\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
/*
* Predefined entites override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL)
return(ent);
}
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
if ((ctxt->inSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->reference != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->reference(ctxt->userData, name);
}
}
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) && (ent->content != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<'))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n", name);
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
return(ent);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int HttpStreamParser::DoReadHeadersComplete(int result) {
if (result == 0)
result = ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
if (result < 0 && result != ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
return result;
}
if (result == ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED && read_buf_->offset() == 0 &&
connection_->is_reused()) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
return result;
}
if (read_buf_->offset() == 0 && result != ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED)
response_->response_time = base::Time::Now();
if (result == ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
return ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE;
} else {
int end_offset;
if (response_header_start_offset_ >= 0) {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_BODY_COMPLETE;
end_offset = read_buf_->offset();
} else {
io_state_ = STATE_BODY_PENDING;
end_offset = 0;
}
int rv = DoParseResponseHeaders(end_offset);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
return result;
}
}
read_buf_->set_offset(read_buf_->offset() + result);
DCHECK_LE(read_buf_->offset(), read_buf_->capacity());
DCHECK_GE(result, 0);
int end_of_header_offset = ParseResponseHeaders();
if (end_of_header_offset < -1)
return end_of_header_offset;
if (end_of_header_offset == -1) {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_HEADERS;
if (read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_ >= kMaxHeaderBufSize) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
return ERR_RESPONSE_HEADERS_TOO_BIG;
}
} else {
read_buf_unused_offset_ = end_of_header_offset;
if (response_->headers->response_code() / 100 == 1) {
io_state_ = STATE_REQUEST_SENT;
response_header_start_offset_ = -1;
} else {
io_state_ = STATE_BODY_PENDING;
CalculateResponseBodySize();
if (response_body_length_ == 0) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
int extra_bytes = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
if (extra_bytes) {
CHECK_GT(extra_bytes, 0);
memmove(read_buf_->StartOfBuffer(),
read_buf_->StartOfBuffer() + read_buf_unused_offset_,
extra_bytes);
}
read_buf_->SetCapacity(extra_bytes);
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
return OK;
}
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The HTTPS implementation in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not ensure that headers are terminated by rnrn (carriage return, newline, carriage return, newline), which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to have an unspecified impact via vectors that trigger header truncation.
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: horDiff8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
assert((cc%stride)==0);
if (cc > stride) {
cc -= stride;
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int r1, g1, b1;
unsigned int r2 = cp[0];
unsigned int g2 = cp[1];
unsigned int b2 = cp[2];
do {
r1 = cp[3]; cp[3] = (unsigned char)((r1-r2)&0xff); r2 = r1;
g1 = cp[4]; cp[4] = (unsigned char)((g1-g2)&0xff); g2 = g1;
b1 = cp[5]; cp[5] = (unsigned char)((b1-b2)&0xff); b2 = b1;
cp += 3;
} while ((cc -= 3) > 0);
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int r1, g1, b1, a1;
unsigned int r2 = cp[0];
unsigned int g2 = cp[1];
unsigned int b2 = cp[2];
unsigned int a2 = cp[3];
do {
r1 = cp[4]; cp[4] = (unsigned char)((r1-r2)&0xff); r2 = r1;
g1 = cp[5]; cp[5] = (unsigned char)((g1-g2)&0xff); g2 = g1;
b1 = cp[6]; cp[6] = (unsigned char)((b1-b2)&0xff); b2 = b1;
a1 = cp[7]; cp[7] = (unsigned char)((a1-a2)&0xff); a2 = a1;
cp += 4;
} while ((cc -= 4) > 0);
} else {
cp += cc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
} while ((cc -= stride) > 0);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
| High | 173,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jas_image_t *jp2_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
int found;
jas_image_t *image;
jp2_dec_t *dec;
bool samedtype;
int dtype;
unsigned int i;
jp2_cmap_t *cmapd;
jp2_pclr_t *pclrd;
jp2_cdef_t *cdefd;
unsigned int channo;
int newcmptno;
int_fast32_t *lutents;
#if 0
jp2_cdefchan_t *cdefent;
int cmptno;
#endif
jp2_cmapent_t *cmapent;
jas_icchdr_t icchdr;
jas_iccprof_t *iccprof;
dec = 0;
box = 0;
image = 0;
if (!(dec = jp2_dec_create())) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the first box. This should be a JP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot get box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_JP) {
jas_eprintf("error: expecting signature box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->data.jp.magic != JP2_JP_MAGIC) {
jas_eprintf("incorrect magic number\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get the second box. This should be a FTYP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_FTYP) {
jas_eprintf("expecting file type box\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get more boxes... */
found = 0;
while ((box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("box type %s\n", box->info->name);
}
switch (box->type) {
case JP2_BOX_JP2C:
found = 1;
break;
case JP2_BOX_IHDR:
if (!dec->ihdr) {
dec->ihdr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_BPCC:
if (!dec->bpcc) {
dec->bpcc = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CDEF:
if (!dec->cdef) {
dec->cdef = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_PCLR:
if (!dec->pclr) {
dec->pclr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CMAP:
if (!dec->cmap) {
dec->cmap = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_COLR:
if (!dec->colr) {
dec->colr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
}
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
}
if (found) {
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
jas_eprintf("error: no code stream found\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(dec->image = jpc_decode(in, optstr))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot decode code stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* An IHDR box must be present. */
if (!dec->ihdr) {
jas_eprintf("error: missing IHDR box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Does the number of components indicated in the IHDR box match
the value specified in the code stream? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* At least one component must be present. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
/* Determine if all components have the same data type. */
samedtype = true;
dtype = jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, 0);
for (i = 1; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) != dtype) {
samedtype = false;
break;
}
}
/* Is the component data type indicated in the IHDR box consistent
with the data in the code stream? */
if ((samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_DTYPETOBPC(dtype)) ||
(!samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_IHDR_BPCNULL)) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the compression type supported? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.comptype != JP2_IHDR_COMPTYPE) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported compression type\n");
goto error;
}
if (dec->bpcc) {
/* Is the number of components indicated in the BPCC box
consistent with the code stream data? */
if (dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(
dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the component data type information indicated in the BPCC
box consistent with the code stream data? */
if (!samedtype) {
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) !=
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.bpcs[i])) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
}
} else {
jas_eprintf("warning: superfluous BPCC box\n");
}
}
/* A COLR box must be present. */
if (!dec->colr) {
jas_eprintf("error: no COLR box\n");
goto error;
}
switch (dec->colr->data.colr.method) {
case JP2_COLR_ENUM:
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, jp2_getcs(&dec->colr->data.colr));
break;
case JP2_COLR_ICC:
iccprof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(dec->colr->data.colr.iccp,
dec->colr->data.colr.iccplen);
if (!iccprof) {
jas_eprintf("error: failed to parse ICC profile\n");
goto error;
}
jas_iccprof_gethdr(iccprof, &icchdr);
jas_eprintf("ICC Profile CS %08x\n", icchdr.colorspc);
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, fromiccpcs(icchdr.colorspc));
dec->image->cmprof_ = jas_cmprof_createfromiccprof(iccprof);
assert(dec->image->cmprof_);
jas_iccprof_destroy(iccprof);
break;
}
/* If a CMAP box is present, a PCLR box must also be present. */
if (dec->cmap && !dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing PCLR box or superfluous CMAP box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->cmap);
dec->cmap = 0;
}
/* If a CMAP box is not present, a PCLR box must not be present. */
if (!dec->cmap && dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing CMAP box or superfluous PCLR box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->pclr);
dec->pclr = 0;
}
/* Determine the number of channels (which is essentially the number
of components after any palette mappings have been applied). */
dec->numchans = dec->cmap ? dec->cmap->data.cmap.numchans :
JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the CMAP box if present. */
if (dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the component number reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].cmptno >= JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid component number in CMAP box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Is the LUT index reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].pcol >=
dec->pclr->data.pclr.numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid CMAP LUT index\n");
goto error;
}
}
}
/* Allocate space for the channel-number to component-number LUT. */
if (!(dec->chantocmptlut = jas_alloc2(dec->numchans,
sizeof(uint_fast16_t)))) {
jas_eprintf("error: no memory\n");
goto error;
}
if (!dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
dec->chantocmptlut[i] = i;
}
} else {
cmapd = &dec->cmap->data.cmap;
pclrd = &dec->pclr->data.pclr;
cdefd = &dec->cdef->data.cdef;
for (channo = 0; channo < cmapd->numchans; ++channo) {
cmapent = &cmapd->ents[channo];
if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_DIRECT) {
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = channo;
} else if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_PALETTE) {
lutents = jas_alloc2(pclrd->numlutents, sizeof(int_fast32_t));
for (i = 0; i < pclrd->numlutents; ++i) {
lutents[i] = pclrd->lutdata[cmapent->pcol + i * pclrd->numchans];
}
newcmptno = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image);
jas_image_depalettize(dec->image, cmapent->cmptno,
pclrd->numlutents, lutents,
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(pclrd->bpc[cmapent->pcol]), newcmptno);
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = newcmptno;
jas_free(lutents);
#if 0
if (dec->cdef) {
cdefent = jp2_cdef_lookup(cdefd, channo);
if (!cdefent) {
abort();
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), cdefent->type, cdefent->assoc));
} else {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, channo + 1));
}
#endif
}
}
}
/* Mark all components as being of unknown type. */
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, i, JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Determine the type of each component. */
if (dec->cdef) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the channel number reasonable? */
if (dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo >= dec->numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid channel number in CDEF box\n");
goto error;
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image,
dec->chantocmptlut[dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image),
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].type,
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].assoc));
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, dec->chantocmptlut[i],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, i + 1));
}
}
/* Delete any components that are not of interest. */
for (i = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image); i > 0; --i) {
if (jas_image_cmpttype(dec->image, i - 1) == JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN) {
jas_image_delcmpt(dec->image, i - 1);
}
}
/* Ensure that some components survived. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
#if 0
jas_eprintf("no of components is %d\n", jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
#endif
/* Prevent the image from being destroyed later. */
image = dec->image;
dec->image = 0;
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
return image;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (dec) {
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in libjasper/jp2/jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place. | Medium | 168,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, hex_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL;
xmlChar *bin = NULL, *hex = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* encrypt it */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlStrdup (str);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_ENCRYPT (ctxt, padkey, str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* encode it */
hex_len = str_len * 2 + 1;
hex = xmlMallocAtomic (hex_len);
if (hex == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
exsltCryptoBin2Hex (bin, str_len, hex, hex_len);
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, hex);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *cur;
int ret;
struct uffdio_range uffdio_unregister;
unsigned long new_flags;
bool found;
unsigned long start, end, vma_end;
const void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_unregister, buf, sizeof(uffdio_unregister)))
goto out;
ret = validate_range(mm, uffdio_unregister.start,
uffdio_unregister.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
start = uffdio_unregister.start;
end = start + uffdio_unregister.len;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, start, &prev);
if (!vma)
goto out_unlock;
/* check that there's at least one vma in the range */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_start >= end)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the first vma contains huge pages, make sure start address
* is aligned to huge page size.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(vma);
if (start & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Search for not compatible vmas.
*/
found = false;
ret = -EINVAL;
for (cur = vma; cur && cur->vm_start < end; cur = cur->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
/*
* Check not compatible vmas, not strictly required
* here as not compatible vmas cannot have an
* userfaultfd_ctx registered on them, but this
* provides for more strict behavior to notice
* unregistration errors.
*/
if (!vma_can_userfault(cur))
goto out_unlock;
found = true;
}
BUG_ON(!found);
if (vma->vm_start < start)
prev = vma;
ret = 0;
do {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma));
/*
* Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this
* userfaultfd and with the right tracking mode too.
*/
if (!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx)
goto skip;
WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
if (vma->vm_start > start)
start = vma->vm_start;
vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end);
if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) {
/*
* Wake any concurrent pending userfault while
* we unregister, so they will not hang
* permanently and it avoids userland to call
* UFFDIO_WAKE explicitly.
*/
struct userfaultfd_wake_range range;
range.start = start;
range.len = vma_end - start;
wake_userfault(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx, &range);
}
new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP);
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (prev) {
vma = prev;
goto next;
}
if (vma->vm_start < start) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (ret)
break;
}
next:
/*
* In the vma_merge() successful mprotect-like case 8:
* the next vma was merged into the current one and
* the current one has not been updated yet.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX;
skip:
prev = vma;
start = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.SVGLength.convertToSpecifiedUnits");
SVGPropertyTearOff<SVGLength>* wrapper = V8SVGLength::toNative(args.Holder());
if (wrapper->role() == AnimValRole) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
SVGLength& imp = wrapper->propertyReference();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, unitType, toUInt32(args[0]));
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(wrapper->contextElement());
imp.convertToSpecifiedUnits(unitType, lengthContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
else
wrapper->commitChange();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
addr &= PAGE_MASK;
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev);
if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr))
return vma;
if (!prev || expand_stack(prev, addr))
return NULL;
if (prev->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
populate_vma_page_range(prev, addr, prev->vm_end, NULL);
return prev;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The ssi_sd_transfer function in hw/sd/ssi-sd.c in QEMU before 1.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted arglen value in a savevm image.
Commit Message: | High | 165,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void hugetlb_vm_op_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct resv_map *reservations = vma_resv_map(vma);
struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_vma(vma);
unsigned long reserve;
unsigned long start;
unsigned long end;
if (reservations) {
start = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, vma->vm_start);
end = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, vma->vm_end);
reserve = (end - start) -
region_count(&reservations->regions, start, end);
kref_put(&reservations->refs, resv_map_release);
if (reserve) {
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -reserve);
hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, reserve);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in mm/hugetlb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via invalid MAP_HUGETLB mmap operations.
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes for the GSM and G711 codecs, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27793367.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
| High | 173,778 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ext2_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t value_len, int flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *here, *last;
size_t name_len, free, min_offs = sb->s_blocksize;
int not_found = 1, error;
char *end;
/*
* header -- Points either into bh, or to a temporarily
* allocated buffer.
* here -- The named entry found, or the place for inserting, within
* the block pointed to by header.
* last -- Points right after the last named entry within the block
* pointed to by header.
* min_offs -- The offset of the first value (values are aligned
* towards the end of the block).
* end -- Points right after the block pointed to by header.
*/
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, value=%p, value_len=%ld",
name_index, name, value, (long)value_len);
if (value == NULL)
value_len = 0;
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255 || value_len > sb->s_blocksize)
return -ERANGE;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl) {
/* The inode already has an extended attribute block. */
bh = sb_bread(sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)),
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
header = HDR(bh);
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (header->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
header->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(sb, "ext2_xattr_set",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Find the named attribute. */
here = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(here)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(here);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
not_found = name_index - here->e_name_index;
if (!not_found)
not_found = name_len - here->e_name_len;
if (!not_found)
not_found = memcmp(name, here->e_name,name_len);
if (not_found <= 0)
break;
here = next;
}
last = here;
/* We still need to compute min_offs and last. */
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!last->e_value_block && last->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
last = next;
}
/* Check whether we have enough space left. */
free = min_offs - ((char*)last - (char*)header) - sizeof(__u32);
} else {
/* We will use a new extended attribute block. */
free = sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct ext2_xattr_header) - sizeof(__u32);
here = last = NULL; /* avoid gcc uninitialized warning. */
}
if (not_found) {
/* Request to remove a nonexistent attribute? */
error = -ENODATA;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE)
goto cleanup;
error = 0;
if (value == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* Request to create an existing attribute? */
error = -EEXIST;
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto cleanup;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t size = le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size);
if (le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs) + size >
sb->s_blocksize || size > sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
free += EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(size);
}
free += EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
}
error = -ENOSPC;
if (free < EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len) + EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len))
goto cleanup;
/* Here we know that we can set the new attribute. */
if (header) {
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
/* assert(header == HDR(bh)); */
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev,
bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (header->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "modifying in-place");
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
/* keep the buffer locked while modifying it. */
} else {
int offset;
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ea_bdebug(bh, "cloning");
header = kmalloc(bh->b_size, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(header, HDR(bh), bh->b_size);
header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
offset = (char *)here - bh->b_data;
here = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
offset = (char *)last - bh->b_data;
last = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
}
} else {
/* Allocate a buffer where we construct the new block. */
header = kzalloc(sb->s_blocksize, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
end = (char *)header + sb->s_blocksize;
header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC);
header->h_blocks = header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
last = here = ENTRY(header+1);
}
/* Iff we are modifying the block in-place, bh is locked here. */
if (not_found) {
/* Insert the new name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
size_t rest = (char *)last - (char *)here;
memmove((char *)here + size, here, rest);
memset(here, 0, size);
here->e_name_index = name_index;
here->e_name_len = name_len;
memcpy(here->e_name, name, name_len);
} else {
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
char *first_val = (char *)header + min_offs;
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
char *val = (char *)header + offs;
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(
le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size));
if (size == EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len)) {
/* The old and the new value have the same
size. Just replace. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
goto skip_replace;
}
/* Remove the old value. */
memmove(first_val + size, first_val, val - first_val);
memset(first_val, 0, size);
here->e_value_offs = 0;
min_offs += size;
/* Adjust all value offsets. */
last = ENTRY(header+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
size_t o = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (!last->e_value_block && o < offs)
last->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16(o + size);
last = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
}
}
if (value == NULL) {
/* Remove the old name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
last = ENTRY((char *)last - size);
memmove(here, (char*)here + size,
(char*)last - (char*)here);
memset(last, 0, size);
}
}
if (value != NULL) {
/* Insert the new value. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
if (value_len) {
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len);
char *val = (char *)header + min_offs - size;
here->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16((char *)val - (char *)header);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear the pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
}
}
skip_replace:
if (IS_LAST_ENTRY(ENTRY(header+1))) {
/* This block is now empty. */
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, NULL);
} else {
ext2_xattr_rehash(header, here);
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, header);
}
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
if (!(bh && header == HDR(bh)))
kfree(header);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Add(int original_content_length, int received_content_length) {
AddInt64ToListPref(
kNumDaysInHistory - 1, original_content_length, original_update_.Get());
AddInt64ToListPref(
kNumDaysInHistory - 1, received_content_length, received_update_.Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710} | Medium | 172,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The dpcm_decode_frame function in dpcm.c in libavcodec in FFmpeg before 0.10 and in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.6, and 0.8.x before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted stereo stream in a media file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Prevent arithmetic overflow on bounds check | Medium | 170,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
try_again:
ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
else
ret = install_session_keyring(
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
}
rcu_read_lock();
key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
__key_get(key);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
key = rka->dest_keyring;
__key_get(key);
}
up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
default:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (id < 1)
goto error;
key = key_lookup(id);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* check to see if we possess the key */
ctx.index_key.type = key->type;
ctx.index_key.description = key->description;
ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description);
ctx.match_data.raw_data = key;
kdebug("check possessed");
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = skey_ref;
}
break;
}
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
ret = 0;
goto error;
}
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
switch (ret) {
case -ERESTARTSYS:
goto invalid_key;
default:
if (perm)
goto invalid_key;
case 0:
break;
}
} else if (perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
}
ret = -EIO;
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
error:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
* creds to be installed */
reget_creds:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 167,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx, int flags)
{
if ((ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME ||
ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM) &&
(flags & TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME) && (flags & TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET)) {
if (!ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = true;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_add_rcu(&ctx->clist, &cancel_list);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
} else if (ctx->might_cancel) {
timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in fs/timerfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.15 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (list corruption or use-after-free) via simultaneous file-descriptor operations that leverage improper might_cancel queueing.
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | High | 168,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy,
int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy,
t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading gd2 header info\n"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC (in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
};
id[i] = ch;
};
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Got file code: %s\n", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp (id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Not a valid gd2 file\n"));
goto fail1;
};
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord (vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Version: %d\n", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad version: %d\n", *vers));
goto fail1;
};
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord (sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get x-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord (sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get y-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Image is %dx%d\n", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord (cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("ChunkSize: %d\n", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad chunk size: %d\n", *cs));
goto fail1;
};
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord (fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Format: %d\n", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad data format: %d\n", *fmt));
goto fail1;
};
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord (ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks Wide\n", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord (ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks vertically\n", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading %d chunk index entries\n", nc));
if (overflow2(sizeof(t_chunk_info), nc)) {
goto fail1;
}
sidx = sizeof (t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc (sidx, 1);
if (cidx == NULL) {
goto fail1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0)
goto fail2;
};
*chunkIdx = cidx;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("gd2 header complete\n"));
return 1;
fail2:
gdFree(cidx);
fail1:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in gd_io.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving the number of horizontal and vertical chunks in an image.
Commit Message: Fix #354: Signed Integer Overflow gd_io.c
GD2 stores the number of horizontal and vertical chunks as words (i.e. 2
byte unsigned). These values are multiplied and assigned to an int when
reading the image, what can cause integer overflows. We have to avoid
that, and also make sure that either chunk count is actually greater
than zero. If illegal chunk counts are detected, we bail out from
reading the image. | Medium | 168,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_get_int_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_int_32 i = ((png_int_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_int_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,173 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, set_server_option)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * const conn, enum_mysqlnd_server_option option TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t this_func = STRUCT_OFFSET(struct st_mysqlnd_conn_data_methods, set_server_option);
zend_uchar buffer[2];
enum_func_status ret = FAIL;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::set_server_option");
if (PASS == conn->m->local_tx_start(conn, this_func TSRMLS_CC)) {
int2store(buffer, (unsigned int) option);
ret = conn->m->simple_command(conn, COM_SET_OPTION, buffer, sizeof(buffer), PROT_EOF_PACKET, FALSE, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
conn->m->local_tx_end(conn, this_func, ret TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: ext/mysqlnd/mysqlnd.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 uses a client SSL option to mean that SSL is optional, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers via a cleartext-downgrade attack, a related issue to CVE-2015-3152.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,274 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Automation::InitWithBrowserPath(const FilePath& browser_exe,
const CommandLine& options,
Error** error) {
if (!file_util::PathExists(browser_exe)) {
std::string message = base::StringPrintf(
"Could not find Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, message);
return;
}
CommandLine command(browser_exe);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableHangMonitor);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePromptOnRepost);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kFullMemoryCrashReport);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kHomePage, chrome::kAboutBlankURL);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoDefaultBrowserCheck);
command.AppendSwitch(switches::kNoFirstRun);
command.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kTestType, "webdriver");
command.AppendArguments(options, false);
launcher_.reset(new AnonymousProxyLauncher(false));
ProxyLauncher::LaunchState launch_props = {
false, // clear_profile
FilePath(), // template_user_data
ProxyLauncher::DEFAULT_THEME,
command,
true, // include_testing_id
true // show_window
};
std::string chrome_details = base::StringPrintf(
"Using Chrome binary at: %" PRFilePath,
browser_exe.value().c_str());
VLOG(1) << chrome_details;
if (!launcher_->LaunchBrowserAndServer(launch_props, true)) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"Unable to either launch or connect to Chrome. Please check that "
"ChromeDriver is up-to-date. " + chrome_details);
return;
}
launcher_->automation()->set_action_timeout_ms(base::kNoTimeout);
VLOG(1) << "Chrome launched successfully. Version: "
<< automation()->server_version();
bool has_automation_version = false;
*error = CompareVersion(730, 0, &has_automation_version);
if (*error)
return;
chrome_details += ", version (" + automation()->server_version() + ")";
if (has_automation_version) {
int version = 0;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGetChromeDriverAutomationVersion(
automation(), &version, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg + " " + chrome_details);
return;
}
if (version > automation::kChromeDriverAutomationVersion) {
*error = new Error(
kUnknownError,
"ChromeDriver is not compatible with this version of Chrome. " +
chrome_details);
return;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The XWD image (X Window System window dumping file) parsing component in ImageMagick 7.0.8-41 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (application crash resulting from an out-of-bounds Read) in ReadXWDImage in coders/xwd.c by crafting a corrupted XWD image file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-11472.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553 | Medium | 169,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *input_string = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
#ifdef NOT_USED
Oid typelem = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
#endif
int32 atttypmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
VarBit *result; /* The resulting bit string */
char *sp; /* pointer into the character string */
bits8 *r; /* pointer into the result */
int len, /* Length of the whole data structure */
bitlen, /* Number of bits in the bit string */
slen; /* Length of the input string */
bool bit_not_hex; /* false = hex string true = bit string */
int bc;
bits8 x = 0;
/* Check that the first character is a b or an x */
if (input_string[0] == 'b' || input_string[0] == 'B')
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else if (input_string[0] == 'x' || input_string[0] == 'X')
{
bit_not_hex = false;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else
{
/*
* Otherwise it's binary. This allows things like cast('1001' as bit)
* to work transparently.
*/
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string;
}
slen = strlen(sp);
/* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
bitlen = slen * 4;
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
* sure that the bitstring fits.
*/
if (atttypmod <= 0)
atttypmod = bitlen;
else if (bitlen != atttypmod)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
errmsg("bit string length %d does not match type bit(%d)",
bitlen, atttypmod)));
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(atttypmod);
/* set to 0 so that *r is always initialised and string is zero-padded */
result = (VarBit *) palloc0(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = atttypmod;
r = VARBITS(result);
if (bit_not_hex)
{
/* Parse the bit representation of the string */
/* We know it fits, as bitlen was compared to atttypmod */
x = HIGHBIT;
for (; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp == '1')
*r |= x;
else if (*sp != '0')
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid binary digit",
*sp)));
x >>= 1;
if (x == 0)
{
x = HIGHBIT;
r++;
}
}
}
else
{
/* Parse the hex representation of the string */
for (bc = 0; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9')
x = (bits8) (*sp - '0');
else if (*sp >= 'A' && *sp <= 'F')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'A') + 10;
else if (*sp >= 'a' && *sp <= 'f')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'a') + 10;
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid hexadecimal digit",
*sp)));
if (bc)
{
*r++ |= x;
bc = 0;
}
else
{
*r = x << 4;
bc = 1;
}
}
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int group_dead;
profile_task_exit(tsk);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->fs_excl));
if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
panic("Aiee, killing interrupt handler!");
if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
tracehook_report_exit(&code);
validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
*/
if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
printk(KERN_ALERT
"Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses
* this flag just to verify whether the pi state
* cleanup has been done or not. In the worst case it
* loops once more. We pretend that the cleanup was
* done as there is no way to return. Either the
* OWNER_DIED bit is set by now or we push the blocked
* task into the wait for ever nirwana as well.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
exit_irq_thread();
exit_signals(tsk); /* sets PF_EXITING */
/*
* tsk->flags are checked in the futex code to protect against
* an exiting task cleaning up the robust pi futexes.
*/
smp_mb();
spin_unlock_wait(&tsk->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(in_atomic()))
printk(KERN_INFO "note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
preempt_count());
acct_update_integrals(tsk);
group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live);
if (group_dead) {
hrtimer_cancel(&tsk->signal->real_timer);
exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
if (tsk->mm)
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, tsk->mm);
}
acct_collect(code, group_dead);
if (group_dead)
tty_audit_exit();
if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
audit_free(tsk);
tsk->exit_code = code;
taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
exit_mm(tsk);
if (group_dead)
acct_process();
trace_sched_process_exit(tsk);
exit_sem(tsk);
exit_files(tsk);
exit_fs(tsk);
check_stack_usage();
exit_thread();
cgroup_exit(tsk, 1);
if (group_dead && tsk->signal->leader)
disassociate_ctty(1);
module_put(task_thread_info(tsk)->exec_domain->module);
proc_exit_connector(tsk);
/*
* Flush inherited counters to the parent - before the parent
* gets woken up by child-exit notifications.
*/
perf_event_exit_task(tsk);
exit_notify(tsk, group_dead);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(tsk->mempolicy);
tsk->mempolicy = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(current->pi_state_cache))
kfree(current->pi_state_cache);
#endif
/*
* Make sure we are holding no locks:
*/
debug_check_no_locks_held(tsk);
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
* just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
* or not. In the worst case it loops once more.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context();
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
preempt_disable();
exit_rcu();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
schedule();
BUG();
/* Avoid "noreturn function does return". */
for (;;)
cpu_relax(); /* For when BUG is null */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The I/O implementation for block devices in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33 does not properly handle the CLONE_IO feature, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (I/O instability) by starting multiple processes that share an I/O context.
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(index=0x%x)", index);
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
flacParams->nCompressionLevel = mCompressionLevel;
flacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
flacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nPortIndex;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In for encoder free_buffer");
if (m_state == OMX_StateIdle &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" free buffer while Component in Loading pending");
} else if ((m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == PORT_INDEX_IN)||
(m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == PORT_INDEX_OUT)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u disabled", (unsigned int)port);
} else if (m_state == OMX_StateExecuting || m_state == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid state to free buffer,ports need to be disabled");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
return eRet;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid state to free buffer,port lost Buffers");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
if (port == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
nPortIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on i/p port - Port idx %u, actual cnt %u",
nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (nPortIndex < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
free_input_buffer (buffer);
m_sInPortDef.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
/*Free the Buffer Header*/
if (release_input_done()
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
input_use_buffer = false;
if (m_inp_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_inp_mem_ptr");
free (m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_pInput_pmem) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pInput_pmem");
free(m_pInput_pmem);
m_pInput_pmem = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (m_pInput_ion) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pInput_ion");
free(m_pInput_ion);
m_pInput_ion = NULL;
}
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_buffer ,Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
PORT_INDEX_IN,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else if (port == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
nPortIndex = buffer - (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*)m_out_mem_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on o/p port - Port idx %u, actual cnt %u",
nPortIndex, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (nPortIndex < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_out_bm_count,nPortIndex);
m_sOutPortDef.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
free_output_buffer (buffer);
if (release_output_done()) {
output_use_buffer = false;
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_out_mem_ptr");
free (m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_pOutput_pmem) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pOutput_pmem");
free(m_pOutput_pmem);
m_pOutput_pmem = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (m_pOutput_ion) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing m_pOutput_ion");
free(m_pOutput_ion);
m_pOutput_ion = NULL;
}
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_buffer , Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_output_done() ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer : If any Disable event pending,post it");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
PORT_INDEX_OUT,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if ((eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
if (release_done()) {
if (dev_stop() != 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_stop() FAILED");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateLoaded,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("in free buffer, release not done, need to free more buffers input %" PRIx64" output %" PRIx64,
m_out_bm_count, m_inp_bm_count);
}
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27662502.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
| High | 173,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t CameraService::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
if (checkCallingPermission(String16("android.permission.DUMP")) == false) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: "
"can't dump CameraService from pid=%d, uid=%d\n",
getCallingPid(),
getCallingUid());
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
} else {
bool locked = tryLock(mServiceLock);
if (!locked) {
result.append("CameraService may be deadlocked\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
bool hasClient = false;
if (!mModule) {
result = String8::format("No camera module available!\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
return NO_ERROR;
}
result = String8::format("Camera module HAL API version: 0x%x\n",
mModule->common.hal_api_version);
result.appendFormat("Camera module API version: 0x%x\n",
mModule->common.module_api_version);
result.appendFormat("Camera module name: %s\n",
mModule->common.name);
result.appendFormat("Camera module author: %s\n",
mModule->common.author);
result.appendFormat("Number of camera devices: %d\n\n", mNumberOfCameras);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
for (int i = 0; i < mNumberOfCameras; i++) {
result = String8::format("Camera %d static information:\n", i);
camera_info info;
status_t rc = mModule->get_camera_info(i, &info);
if (rc != OK) {
result.appendFormat(" Error reading static information!\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
} else {
result.appendFormat(" Facing: %s\n",
info.facing == CAMERA_FACING_BACK ? "BACK" : "FRONT");
result.appendFormat(" Orientation: %d\n", info.orientation);
int deviceVersion;
if (mModule->common.module_api_version <
CAMERA_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
deviceVersion = CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0;
} else {
deviceVersion = info.device_version;
}
result.appendFormat(" Device version: 0x%x\n", deviceVersion);
if (deviceVersion >= CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
result.appendFormat(" Device static metadata:\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
dump_indented_camera_metadata(info.static_camera_characteristics,
fd, 2, 4);
} else {
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
}
sp<BasicClient> client = mClient[i].promote();
if (client == 0) {
result = String8::format(" Device is closed, no client instance\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
continue;
}
hasClient = true;
result = String8::format(" Device is open. Client instance dump:\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
client->dump(fd, args);
}
if (!hasClient) {
result = String8::format("\nNo active camera clients yet.\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
if (locked) mServiceLock.unlock();
write(fd, "\n", 1);
camera3::CameraTraces::dump(fd, args);
int n = args.size();
for (int i = 0; i + 1 < n; i++) {
String16 verboseOption("-v");
if (args[i] == verboseOption) {
String8 levelStr(args[i+1]);
int level = atoi(levelStr.string());
result = String8::format("\nSetting log level to %d.\n", level);
setLogLevel(level);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403.
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
| High | 173,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, nonOpt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt, opt);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: svc_rdma_is_backchannel_reply(struct svc_xprt *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp)
{
__be32 *p = (__be32 *)rmsgp;
if (!xprt->xpt_bc_xprt)
return false;
if (rmsgp->rm_type != rdma_msg)
return false;
if (rmsgp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0] != xdr_zero)
return false;
if (rmsgp->rm_body.rm_chunks[1] != xdr_zero)
return false;
if (rmsgp->rm_body.rm_chunks[2] != xdr_zero)
return false;
/* sanity */
if (p[7] != rmsgp->rm_xid)
return false;
/* call direction */
if (p[8] == cpu_to_be32(RPC_CALL))
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void parse_input(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
size_t http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection = conn->super.ctx->globalconf->http2.max_concurrent_requests_per_connection;
int perform_early_exit = 0;
if (conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed != http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
perform_early_exit = 1;
/* handle the input */
while (conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING && conn->sock->input->size != 0) {
if (perform_early_exit == 1 &&
conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed == http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
goto EarlyExit;
/* process a frame */
const char *err_desc = NULL;
ssize_t ret = conn->_read_expect(conn, (uint8_t *)conn->sock->input->bytes, conn->sock->input->size, &err_desc);
if (ret == H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE) {
break;
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY) {
enqueue_goaway(conn, (int)ret,
err_desc != NULL ? (h2o_iovec_t){(char *)err_desc, strlen(err_desc)} : (h2o_iovec_t){});
}
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
/* advance to the next frame */
h2o_buffer_consume(&conn->sock->input, ret);
}
if (!h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_start(conn->sock, on_read);
return;
EarlyExit:
if (h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: lib/http2/connection.c in H2O before 1.7.3 and 2.x before 2.0.0-beta5 mishandles HTTP/2 disconnection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham. | Medium | 167,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DownloadManagerImpl::InterceptDownload(
const download::DownloadCreateInfo& info) {
WebContents* web_contents = WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(
info.render_process_id, info.render_frame_id);
if (info.is_new_download &&
info.result ==
download::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_SERVER_CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT) {
if (web_contents) {
std::vector<GURL> url_chain(info.url_chain);
GURL url = url_chain.back();
url_chain.pop_back();
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = info.has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = Referrer(
info.referrer_url, Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
info.referrer_policy));
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
if (info.request_handle)
info.request_handle->CancelRequest(false);
return true;
}
if (!delegate_ ||
!delegate_->InterceptDownloadIfApplicable(
info.url(), info.mime_type, info.request_origin, web_contents)) {
return false;
}
if (info.request_handle)
info.request_handle->CancelRequest(false);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547} | Medium | 173,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct compat_user *dummy32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
__u32 mask = PSW32_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW32_MASK_RI : 0;
/* Build a 64 bit psw mask from 31 bit mask. */
if ((tmp & ~mask) != PSW32_USER_BITS)
/* Invalid psw mask. */
return -EINVAL;
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_USER) |
(regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & mask) << 32;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
/* Build a 64 bit psw address from 31 bit address. */
regs->psw.addr = (__u64) tmp & PSW32_ADDR_INSN;
/* Transfer 31 bit amode bit to psw mask. */
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & PSW32_ADDR_AMODE);
} else {
/* gpr 0-15 */
*(__u32*)((addr_t) ®s->psw + addr*2 + 4) = tmp;
}
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writess of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
test_fp_ctl(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per_compat(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.8 on the s390 platform does not properly restrict address-space control operations in PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA requests, which allows local users to obtain read and write access to kernel memory locations, and consequently gain privileges, via a crafted application that makes a ptrace system call.
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> | High | 166,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WebRunnerContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
DCHECK(context_channel_);
return new WebRunnerBrowserMainParts(std::move(context_channel_));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155} | High | 172,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32], int stride) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 32; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 64.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012} | High | 171,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnSetTcmallocHeapProfiling(
bool profiling, const std::string& filename_prefix) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
if (profiling)
HeapProfilerStart(filename_prefix.c_str());
else
HeapProfilerStop();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in WebKit, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.94, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
[email protected]
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if ((int)shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
int vdaux = verdef->vd_aux;
if (vdaux < 1 || vstart + vdaux < vstart) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
vstart += vdaux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In radare 2.0.1, a pointer wraparound vulnerability exists in store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef() in libr/bin/format/elf/elf.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8764 a 3rd time since 2nd time is UB and can be optimized away | Medium | 170,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltAttributeComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemAttributePtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:attribute
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:attribute>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemAttributePtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style,
XSLT_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name",
NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"XSLT-attribute: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
return;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace",
NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(comp->name, BAD_CAST "xmlns")) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The attribute name 'xmlns' is not allowed.\n");
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (prefix != NULL) {
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the
* QName is expanded into an expanded-name using the
* namespace declarations in effect for the xsl:element
* element, including any default namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:attribute: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the "
"namespace was not specified by the instruction "
"itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCommittedFirstRealLoad() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
GetFrame()->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
GetFrame()->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Incorrect handling of timer information during navigation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross origin URLs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736} | Medium | 172,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element* element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (!shouldIgnoreElement(element))
MarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
result.appendLiteral("<meta charset=\"");
result.append(m_document->charset());
if (m_document->isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral("\" />");
else
result.appendLiteral("\">");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vivid_fb_ioctl function in drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-osd.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | Low | 166,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
{
uint32_t len;
int to_device;
len = s->dma_left;
if (s->do_cmd) {
trace_esp_do_dma(s->cmdlen, len);
s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
return;
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The esp_do_dma function in hw/scsi/esp.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with ESP/NCR53C9x controller emulation support, allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and QEMU process crash) or execute arbitrary code on the QEMU host via vectors involving DMA read into ESP command buffer.
Commit Message: | High | 164,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Boa through 0.94.14rc21 allows remote attackers to trigger a memory leak because of missing calls to the free function.
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix | Low | 169,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: poppler before 0.22.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger an "invalid memory access" in (1) splash/Splash.cc, (2) poppler/Function.cc, and (3) poppler/Stream.cc.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool tight_can_send_png_rect(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
if (vs->tight.type != VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG) {
return false;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestAuthorization(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp;
struct sk_buff *opt_skb = NULL;
/* Imagine: socket is IPv6. IPv4 packet arrives,
goes to IPv4 receive handler and backlogged.
From backlog it always goes here. Kerboom...
Fortunately, tcp_rcv_established and rcv_established
handle them correctly, but it is not case with
tcp_v6_hnd_req and tcp_v6_send_reset(). --ANK
*/
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
return tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard;
/*
* socket locking is here for SMP purposes as backlog rcv
* is currently called with bh processing disabled.
*/
/* Do Stevens' IPV6_PKTOPTIONS.
Yes, guys, it is the only place in our code, where we
may make it not affecting IPv4.
The rest of code is protocol independent,
and I do not like idea to uglify IPv4.
Actually, all the idea behind IPV6_PKTOPTIONS
looks not very well thought. For now we latch
options, received in the last packet, enqueued
by tcp. Feel free to propose better solution.
--ANK (980728)
*/
if (np->rxopt.all)
opt_skb = skb_clone(skb, sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) { /* Fast path */
struct dst_entry *dst = sk->sk_rx_dst;
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb);
if (dst) {
if (inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex != skb->skb_iif ||
dst->ops->check(dst, np->rx_dst_cookie) == NULL) {
dst_release(dst);
sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
}
}
tcp_rcv_established(sk, skb, tcp_hdr(skb), skb->len);
if (opt_skb)
goto ipv6_pktoptions;
return 0;
}
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_err;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
struct sock *nsk = tcp_v6_cookie_check(sk, skb);
if (!nsk)
goto discard;
if (nsk != sk) {
sock_rps_save_rxhash(nsk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(nsk, skb);
if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb))
goto reset;
if (opt_skb)
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
return 0;
}
} else
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
if (tcp_rcv_state_process(sk, skb))
goto reset;
if (opt_skb)
goto ipv6_pktoptions;
return 0;
reset:
tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
discard:
if (opt_skb)
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
csum_err:
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
goto discard;
ipv6_pktoptions:
/* Do you ask, what is it?
1. skb was enqueued by tcp.
2. skb is added to tail of read queue, rather than out of order.
3. socket is not in passive state.
4. Finally, it really contains options, which user wants to receive.
*/
tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(opt_skb)->end_seq == tp->rcv_nxt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN))) {
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo)
np->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(opt_skb);
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim)
np->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(opt_skb)->hop_limit;
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxflow || np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass)
np->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(opt_skb));
if (np->repflow)
np->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(opt_skb));
if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, opt_skb, &TCP_SKB_CB(opt_skb)->header.h6)) {
skb_set_owner_r(opt_skb, sk);
tcp_v6_restore_cb(opt_skb);
opt_skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, opt_skb);
} else {
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
opt_skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
}
}
kfree_skb(opt_skb);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.8.10 mishandles skb truncation, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application that makes sendto system calls, related to net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c and net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c.
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
if (dir_path) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
} else {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Quick Emulator (Qemu) built with the VirtFS, host directory sharing via Plan 9 File System (9pfs) support, is vulnerable to an improper access control issue. It could occur while accessing files on a shared host directory. A privileged user inside guest could use this flaw to access host file system beyond the shared folder and potentially escalating their privileges on a host.
Commit Message: | High | 165,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: irc_ctcp_dcc_filename_without_quotes (const char *filename)
{
int length;
length = strlen (filename);
if (length > 0)
{
if ((filename[0] == '\"') && (filename[length - 1] == '\"'))
return weechat_strndup (filename + 1, length - 2);
}
return strdup (filename);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WeeChat before 1.7.1 allows a remote crash by sending a filename via DCC to the IRC plugin. This occurs in the irc_ctcp_dcc_filename_without_quotes function during quote removal, with a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: irc: fix parsing of DCC filename | Medium | 168,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawClipPath(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const char *name,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*clip_mask;
const char
*value;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (const DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",name);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,filename);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
clip_mask=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clip_mask == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,
&clip_mask->background_color,exception);
clip_mask->background_color.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(clip_mask,exception);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"\nbegin clip-path %s",
draw_info->clip_mask);
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->primitive,value);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#ffffff",AllCompliance,&clone_info->fill,
exception);
clone_info->clip_mask=(char *) NULL;
status=NegateImage(clip_mask,MagickFalse,exception);
(void) SetImageMask(image,ReadPixelMask,clip_mask,exception);
clip_mask=DestroyImage(clip_mask);
status&=DrawImage(image,clone_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end clip-path");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c | High | 167,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
else
asn1_cb = 0;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
/*
* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
* because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
* isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
* template in the template itself.
*/
if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
it->templates, opt, ctx);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
goto err;
}
/* Check tag matches bit map */
if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
goto err;
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* Use new style d2i */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Allocate structure */
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
/* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
if (ret > 0)
break;
/* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
errtt = tt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
if (i == it->tcount) {
/* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
if (opt) {
/* Free and zero it */
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
return -1;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
/* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
&p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
}
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
}
/*
* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
* omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
* data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
* increases efficiency in some cases.
*/
if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
isopt = 0;
else
isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
/*
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1) {
/*
* OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
*/
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
continue;
}
/* Update length */
len -= p - q;
}
/* Check for EOC if expecting one */
if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
/* Check all data read */
if (!seq_nolen && len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
* may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
* and clear any that are.
*/
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
} else {
errtt = seqtt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The ASN1_item_ex_d2i function in crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not reinitialize CHOICE and ADB data structures, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid write operation and memory corruption) by leveraging an application that relies on ASN.1 structure reuse.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_name, "benchmark") &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, "whitelisted")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690} | High | 171,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
#ifdef AUTOKEY
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG_TIMING
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
#endif /* DEBUG_TIMING */
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ntp_openssl.m4 in ntpd in NTP before 4.2.7p112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a crafted statistics or filegen configuration command that is not enabled during compilation.
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL. | Medium | 168,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac::PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider)
: PlatformSensor(SensorType::AMBIENT_LIGHT, std::move(mapping), provider),
light_sensor_port_(nullptr),
current_lux_(0.0) {}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & open_flags) == open_flags) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: hstore_recv(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
int32 i;
int32 pcount;
StringInfo buf = (StringInfo) PG_GETARG_POINTER(0);
pcount = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
if (pcount == 0)
{
out = hstorePairs(NULL, 0, 0);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
pairs = palloc(pcount * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < pcount; ++i)
{
int rawlen = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
int len;
if (rawlen < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
pairs[i].key = pq_getmsgtext(buf, rawlen, &len);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(len);
pairs[i].needfree = true;
rawlen = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
if (rawlen < 0)
{
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].vallen = 0;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
}
else
{
pairs[i].val = pq_getmsgtext(buf, rawlen, &len);
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(len);
pairs[i].isnull = false;
}
}
pcount = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, pcount, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, pcount, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToObject( object, string, create_reference( item ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsSiteMuted(const TabStripModel& tab_strip, const int index) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_strip.GetWebContentsAt(index);
GURL url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme)) {
return web_contents->IsAudioMuted() &&
GetTabAudioMutedReason(web_contents) ==
TabMutedReason::CONTENT_SETTING_CHROME;
}
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
HostContentSettingsMap* settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
return settings->GetContentSetting(url, url, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND,
std::string()) == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825} | High | 171,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pkinit_server_return_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_pa_data * padata,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_kdc_rep * reply,
krb5_keyblock * encrypting_key,
krb5_pa_data ** send_pa,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data scratch = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey = NULL;
unsigned char *dh_pubkey = NULL, *server_key = NULL;
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_len = 0;
unsigned int server_key_len = 0, dh_pubkey_len = 0;
krb5_kdc_dh_key_info dhkey_info;
krb5_data *encoded_dhkey_info = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_rep *rep = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9 *rep9 = NULL;
krb5_data *out_data = NULL;
krb5_octet_data secret;
krb5_enctype enctype = -1;
krb5_reply_key_pack *key_pack = NULL;
krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9 *key_pack9 = NULL;
krb5_data *encoded_key_pack = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx;
int fixed_keypack = 0;
*send_pa = NULL;
if (padata->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX) {
return return_pkinit_kx(context, request, reply,
encrypting_key, send_pa);
}
if (padata->length <= 0 || padata->contents == NULL)
return 0;
if (modreq == NULL) {
pkiDebug("missing request context \n");
return EINVAL;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
pkiDebug("Unable to locate correct realm context\n");
return ENOENT;
}
pkiDebug("pkinit_return_padata: entered!\n");
reqctx = (pkinit_kdc_req_context)modreq;
if (encrypting_key->contents) {
free(encrypting_key->contents);
encrypting_key->length = 0;
encrypting_key->contents = NULL;
}
for(i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
enctype = request->ktype[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(enctype))
continue;
else {
pkiDebug("KDC picked etype = %d\n", enctype);
break;
}
}
if (i == request->nktypes) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
switch((int)reqctx->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
init_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(&rep);
if (rep == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* let's assume it's RSA. we'll reset it to DH if needed */
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
init_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(&rep9);
if (rep9 == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_encKeyPack;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
subjectPublicKey =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.data;
subjectPublicKey_len =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.length;
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo;
} else if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
subjectPublicKey =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.data;
subjectPublicKey_len =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.length;
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData;
}
/* if this DH, then process finish computing DH key */
if (rep != NULL && (rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo ||
rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData)) {
pkiDebug("received DH key delivery AS REQ\n");
retval = server_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, subjectPublicKey,
subjectPublicKey_len, &dh_pubkey, &dh_pubkey_len,
&server_key, &server_key_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to process/create dh paramters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
if ((rep9 != NULL &&
rep9->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData) ||
(rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo)) {
/*
* This is DH, so don't generate the key until after we
* encode the reply, because the encoded reply is needed
* to generate the key in some cases.
*/
dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.length = dh_pubkey_len;
dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.data = dh_pubkey;
dhkey_info.nonce = request->nonce;
dhkey_info.dhKeyExpiration = 0;
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&dhkey_info,
&encoded_dhkey_info);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
"/tmp/kdc_dh_key_info");
#endif
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER, 1,
(unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
&rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
&rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9, 1,
(unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
&rep9->u.dhSignedData.data,
&rep9->u.dhSignedData.length);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
} else {
pkiDebug("received RSA key delivery AS REQ\n");
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(context, enctype, encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to make a session key\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if PA_TYPE of 132 is present which means the client is
* requesting that a checksum is send back instead of the nonce
*/
for (i = 0; request->padata[i] != NULL; i++) {
pkiDebug("%s: Checking pa_type 0x%08x\n",
__FUNCTION__, request->padata[i]->pa_type);
if (request->padata[i]->pa_type == 132)
fixed_keypack = 1;
}
pkiDebug("%s: return checksum instead of nonce = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, fixed_keypack);
/* if this is an RFC reply or draft9 client requested a checksum
* in the reply instead of the nonce, create an RFC-style keypack
*/
if ((int)padata->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ || fixed_keypack) {
init_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
if (key_pack == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0,
encrypting_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size = %d\n", req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("checksum size = %d\n", key_pack->asChecksum.length);
print_buffer(key_pack->asChecksum.contents,
key_pack->asChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("encrypting key (%d)\n", encrypting_key->length);
print_buffer(encrypting_key->contents, encrypting_key->length);
#endif
krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, encrypting_key,
&key_pack->replyKey);
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_reply_key_pack(key_pack,
&encoded_key_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode reply_key_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
retval = cms_envelopeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, padata->pa_type, 1,
(unsigned char *)encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
&rep->u.encKeyPack.data, &rep->u.encKeyPack.length);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
/* if the request is from the broken draft9 client that
* expects back a nonce, create it now
*/
if (!fixed_keypack) {
init_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(&key_pack9);
if (key_pack9 == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
key_pack9->nonce = reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->pkAuthenticator.nonce;
krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, encrypting_key,
&key_pack9->replyKey);
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(key_pack9,
&encoded_key_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode reply_key_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_encKeyPack;
retval = cms_envelopeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, padata->pa_type, 1,
(unsigned char *)encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
&rep9->u.encKeyPack.data, &rep9->u.encKeyPack.length);
break;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 enveloped data: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
"/tmp/kdc_key_pack");
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
print_buffer_bin(rep->u.encKeyPack.data,
rep->u.encKeyPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_enc_key_pack");
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
print_buffer_bin(rep9->u.encKeyPack.data,
rep9->u.encKeyPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_enc_key_pack");
break;
}
#endif
}
if ((rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo) &&
((reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL))) {
/* If using the alg-agility KDF, put the algorithm in the reply
* before encoding it.
*/
if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL) {
retval = pkinit_pick_kdf_alg(context, reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs,
&(rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID));
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_pick_kdf_alg failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(rep, &out_data);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(rep9, &out_data);
break;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode AS_REP\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (out_data != NULL)
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)out_data->data, out_data->length,
"/tmp/kdc_as_rep");
#endif
/* If this is DH, we haven't computed the key yet, so do it now. */
if ((rep9 != NULL &&
rep9->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData) ||
(rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo)) {
/* If mutually supported KDFs were found, use the alg agility KDF */
if (rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
secret.data = server_key;
secret.length = server_key_len;
retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret,
rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
request->client, request->server,
enctype,
(krb5_octet_data *)req_pkt,
(krb5_octet_data *)out_data,
encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_alg_agility_kdf failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
/* Otherwise, use the older octetstring2key() function */
} else {
retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, enctype, server_key,
server_key_len, encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_octetstring2key failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
*send_pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (*send_pa == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
free(out_data->data);
free(out_data);
out_data = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
(*send_pa)->magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
(*send_pa)->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
(*send_pa)->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD;
break;
}
(*send_pa)->length = out_data->length;
(*send_pa)->contents = (krb5_octet *) out_data->data;
cleanup:
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free(scratch.data);
free(out_data);
if (encoded_dhkey_info != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_dhkey_info);
if (encoded_key_pack != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_key_pack);
free(dh_pubkey);
free(server_key);
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(&rep);
free_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(&rep9);
if (!fixed_keypack)
free_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(&key_pack9);
else
free_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
break;
}
if (retval)
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failure");
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The pkinit_server_return_padata function in plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c in the PKINIT implementation in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.4 attempts to find an agility KDF identifier in inappropriate circumstances, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a crafted Draft 9 request.
Commit Message: PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[[email protected]: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved | Medium | 166,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
/* now throw away the key memory */
if (key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the key_gc_unused_keys function in security/keys/gc.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption or panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact via keyctl commands that trigger access to a key structure member during garbage collection of a key.
Commit Message: KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing
When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before
the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's
respective tracking structures.
This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open
for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is
find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is
in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but
->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list).
This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory.
Fixes CVE-2014-9529.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | High | 166,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void setup_test_dir(char *tmp_dir, const char *files, ...) {
va_list ap;
assert_se(mkdtemp(tmp_dir) != NULL);
va_start(ap, files);
while (files != NULL) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = strappend(tmp_dir, files);
assert_se(touch_file(path, true, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0) == 0);
files = va_arg(ap, const char *);
}
va_end(ap);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: A flaw in systemd v228 in /src/basic/fs-util.c caused world writable suid files to be created when using the systemd timers features, allowing local attackers to escalate their privileges to root. This is fixed in v229.
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere | High | 170,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return receiving_widget;
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_decode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
BYTE shift = context->ColorLossLevel - 1; /* colorloss recovery + YCoCg shift */
BYTE* bmpdata = context->BitmapData;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
const BYTE* yplane;
const BYTE* coplane;
const BYTE* cgplane;
const BYTE* aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width; /* A */
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Co, supersampled */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + (y >> 1) * (rw >>
1); /* Cg, supersampled */
}
else
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * context->width; /* Y */
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * context->width; /* Co */
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * context->width; /* Cg */
}
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
INT16 y_val = (INT16) * yplane;
INT16 co_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*coplane << shift);
INT16 cg_val = (INT16)(INT8)(*cgplane << shift);
INT16 r_val = y_val + co_val - cg_val;
INT16 g_val = y_val + cg_val;
INT16 b_val = y_val - co_val - cg_val;
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(b_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(g_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = MINMAX(r_val, 0, 0xFF);
*bmpdata++ = *aplane;
yplane++;
coplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
cgplane += (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? x % 2 : 1);
aplane++;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | High | 169,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual bool IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const GURL& url) const {
return HasWebUIScheme(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length - 3);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr+3)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+3,"\n\t ", length-3);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12991/BGP: Add missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: __releases(kernel_lock)
__acquires(kernel_lock)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
char *cp;
const char *descr;
int ret = -EINVAL;
int blocksize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
return -ENOMEM;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_mount_opt = 0;
sbi->s_resuid = EXT4_DEF_RESUID;
sbi->s_resgid = EXT4_DEF_RESGID;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
sbi->s_sectors_written_start = part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part,
sectors[1]);
unlock_kernel();
/* Cleanup superblock name */
for (cp = sb->s_id; (cp = strchr(cp, '/'));)
*cp = '!';
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, "bsdgroups",
"2.6.38");
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
}
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NO_UID32);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
sbi->s_resuid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid);
sbi->s_resgid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid);
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DELALLOC);
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, NULL, 0))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
sb->s_dirt = 1;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
if ((ext4_blocks_count(es) >
(sector_t)(~0ULL) >> (sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9)) ||
(ext4_blocks_count(es) >
(pgoff_t)(~0ULL) >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - sb->s_blocksize_bits))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data"
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc(db_count * sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (ext4_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
#endif
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
}
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_max_writeback_mb_bump = 128;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
else
sb->s_op = &ext4_nojournal_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
mutex_init(&sbi->s_resize_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER));
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount4;
} else {
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DATA_FLAGS);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, WRITEBACK_DATA);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_blocks_count(es) > 0xffffffffULL &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0, 0);
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else {
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount4;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
no_journal:
if (test_opt(sb, NOBH)) {
if (!(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring nobh option - "
"its supported only with writeback mode");
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NOBH);
}
}
EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq = create_workqueue("ext4-dio-unwritten");
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create DIO workqueue\n");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
iput(root);
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_alloc_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
iput(root);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_EXTRA_ISIZE)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring delalloc option - "
"requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DELALLOC);
}
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)\n", err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb, needs_recovery);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initalize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
sbi->s_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &ext4_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err) {
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
goto failed_mount4;
};
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s", descr);
lock_kernel();
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount4:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3:
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(sbi->s_flex_groups))
vfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
else
kfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
lock_kernel();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int msg_cache_check(const char *id, struct BodyCache *bcache, void *data)
{
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
if (!ctx)
return -1;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
if (!pop_data)
return -1;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* keep hcache file if hcache == bcache */
if (strcmp(HC_FNAME "." HC_FEXT, id) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* if the id we get is known for a header: done (i.e. keep in cache) */
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->data && (mutt_str_strcmp(ctx->hdrs[i]->data, id) == 0))
return 0;
}
/* message not found in context -> remove it from cache
* return the result of bcache, so we stop upon its first error
*/
return mutt_bcache_del(bcache, id);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::PauseRequest(int child_id,
int request_id,
bool pause) {
GlobalRequestID global_id(child_id, request_id);
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(global_id);
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Pausing a request that wasn't found";
return;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info =
ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(i->second);
int pause_count = info->pause_count() + (pause ? 1 : -1);
if (pause_count < 0) {
NOTREACHED(); // Unbalanced call to pause.
return;
}
info->set_pause_count(pause_count);
VLOG(1) << "To pause (" << pause << "): " << i->second->url().spec();
if (info->pause_count() == 0) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResumeRequest,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
global_id));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,990 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int lxc_mount_auto_mounts(struct lxc_conf *conf, int flags, struct lxc_handler *handler)
{
int r;
size_t i;
static struct {
int match_mask;
int match_flag;
const char *source;
const char *destination;
const char *fstype;
unsigned long flags;
const char *options;
} default_mounts[] = {
/* Read-only bind-mounting... In older kernels, doing that required
* to do one MS_BIND mount and then MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY the same
* one. According to mount(2) manpage, MS_BIND honors MS_RDONLY from
* kernel 2.6.26 onwards. However, this apparently does not work on
* kernel 3.8. Unfortunately, on that very same kernel, doing the
* same trick as above doesn't seem to work either, there one needs
* to ALSO specify MS_BIND for the remount, otherwise the entire
* fs is remounted read-only or the mount fails because it's busy...
* MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY seems to work for kernels as low as
* 2.6.32...
*/
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys/net", "%r/proc/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys", "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/net", "%r/proc/sys/net", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_RW, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys", "%r/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net/devices/virtual/net", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC, NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }
};
for (i = 0; default_mounts[i].match_mask; i++) {
if ((flags & default_mounts[i].match_mask) == default_mounts[i].match_flag) {
char *source = NULL;
char *destination = NULL;
int saved_errno;
unsigned long mflags;
if (default_mounts[i].source) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
source = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].source);
if (!source) {
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
return -1;
}
}
if (default_mounts[i].destination) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
destination = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].destination);
if (!destination) {
saved_errno = errno;
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
free(source);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
mflags = add_required_remount_flags(source, destination,
default_mounts[i].flags);
r = mount(source, destination, default_mounts[i].fstype, mflags, default_mounts[i].options);
saved_errno = errno;
if (r < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
INFO("Mount source or target for %s on %s doesn't exist. Skipping.", source, destination);
r = 0;
}
else if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("error mounting %s on %s flags %lu", source, destination, mflags);
free(source);
free(destination);
if (r < 0) {
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
}
if (flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK) {
int cg_flags;
cg_flags = flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK;
/* If the type of cgroup mount was not specified, it depends on the
* container's capabilities as to what makes sense: if we have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the read-only part can be remounted read-write
* anyway, so we may as well default to read-write; then the admin
* will not be given a false sense of security. (And if they really
* want mixed r/o r/w, then they can explicitly specify :mixed.)
* OTOH, if the container lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN, do only default to
* :mixed, because then the container can't remount it read-write. */
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC || cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_NOSPEC) {
int has_sys_admin = 0;
if (!lxc_list_empty(&conf->keepcaps)) {
has_sys_admin = in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->keepcaps);
} else {
has_sys_admin = !in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->caps);
}
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC) {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED;
} else {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED;
}
}
if (!cgroup_mount(conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", handler, cg_flags)) {
SYSERROR("error mounting /sys/fs/cgroup");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 166,713 |
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