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stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 306
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int64 165k
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int validation_gamma(int argc, char **argv)
{
double gamma[9] = { 2.2, 1.8, 1.52, 1.45, 1., 1/1.45, 1/1.52, 1/1.8, 1/2.2 };
double maxerr;
int i, silent=0, onlygamma=0;
/* Silence the output with -s, just test the gamma functions with -g: */
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-s") == 0)
silent = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-g") == 0)
onlygamma = 1;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
if (!onlygamma)
{
/* First validate the log functions: */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<256; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/255.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log8bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log8bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log8bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f\n",
i, png_log8bit(i), correct);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<65536; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/65535.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log16bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log16bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log16bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
if (error > .68) /* By experiment error is less than .68 */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_log16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
/* Now exponentiations. */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * (65536. * 65536);
double error = png_exp(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1883) /* By experiment. */
{
fprintf(stderr, "32 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 32 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 255;
double error = png_exp8bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .50002) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp8bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 65535;
double error = png_exp16bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .524) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
} /* !onlygamma */
/* Test the overall gamma correction. */
for (i=0; i<9; ++i)
{
unsigned j;
double g = gamma[i];
png_fixed_point gfp = floor(g * PNG_FP_1 + .5);
if (!silent)
printf("Test gamma %f\n", g);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<256; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/255., g) * 255;
png_byte out = png_gamma_8bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (out != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 8 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<65536; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/65535., g) * 65535;
png_uint_16 out = png_gamma_16bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1.62)
{
fprintf(stderr, "16bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 16 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,720 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: services/audioflinger/Effects.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the reply size for an AudioFlinger effect command, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29251553.
Commit Message: Check effect command reply size in AudioFlinger
Bug: 29251553
Change-Id: I1bcc1281f1f0542bb645f6358ce31631f2a8ffbf
| Medium | 173,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long madvise_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
loff_t offset;
int error;
*prev = NULL; /* tell sys_madvise we drop mmap_sem */
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKED|VM_NONLINEAR|VM_HUGETLB))
return -EINVAL;
if (!vma->vm_file || !vma->vm_file->f_mapping
|| !vma->vm_file->f_mapping->host) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE)) != (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
offset = (loff_t)(start - vma->vm_start)
+ ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
/* filesystem's fallocate may need to take i_mutex */
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
error = do_fallocate(vma->vm_file,
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
offset, end - start);
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the madvise_remove function in mm/madvise.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via vectors involving a (1) munmap or (2) close system call.
Commit Message: mm: Hold a file reference in madvise_remove
Otherwise the code races with munmap (causing a use-after-free
of the vma) or with close (causing a use-after-free of the struct
file).
The bug was introduced by commit 90ed52ebe481 ("[PATCH] holepunch: fix
mmap_sem i_mutex deadlock")
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: Badari Pulavarty <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_pin_reply( const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint8_t accept,
uint8_t pin_len, bt_pin_code_t *pin_code)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
if (pin_code == NULL)
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
int i;
UINT32 passkey = 0;
int multi[] = {100000, 10000, 1000, 100, 10,1};
BD_ADDR remote_bd_addr;
bdcpy(remote_bd_addr, bd_addr->address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
passkey += (multi[i] * (pin_code->pin[i] - '0'));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_pin_reply: passkey: %d", passkey);
BTA_DmBlePasskeyReply(remote_bd_addr, accept, passkey);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
}
#else
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in btif/src/btif_dm.c in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long PIN value, aka internal bug 27411268.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Check size of pin before replying
If a malicious client set a pin that was too long it would overflow
the pin code memory.
Bug: 27411268
Change-Id: I9197ac6fdaa92a4799dacb6364e04671a39450cc
| Medium | 173,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int svc_rdma_bc_sendto(struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma,
struct rpc_rqst *rqst)
{
struct xdr_buf *sndbuf = &rqst->rq_snd_buf;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec;
struct ib_send_wr send_wr;
int ret;
vec = svc_rdma_get_req_map(rdma);
ret = svc_rdma_map_xdr(rdma, sndbuf, vec, false);
if (ret)
goto out_err;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(rdma, GFP_NOIO);
if (ret)
goto out_err;
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(rdma);
ctxt->pages[0] = virt_to_page(rqst->rq_buffer);
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = rdma->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = sndbuf->len;
ctxt->sge[0].addr =
ib_dma_map_page(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->pages[0], 0,
sndbuf->len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(rdma->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out_unmap;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(rdma, ctxt);
memset(&send_wr, 0, sizeof(send_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
send_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
send_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
send_wr.num_sge = 1;
send_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
ret = svc_rdma_send(rdma, &send_wr);
if (ret) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out_unmap;
}
out_err:
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
dprintk("svcrdma: %s returns %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
out_unmap:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
goto out_err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
struct sk_buff *skb, int hdrlen,
int frag_threshold)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = tx->local;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
int per_fragm = frag_threshold - hdrlen - FCS_LEN;
int pos = hdrlen + per_fragm;
int rem = skb->len - hdrlen - per_fragm;
if (WARN_ON(rem < 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* first fragment was already added to queue by caller */
while (rem) {
int fraglen = per_fragm;
if (fraglen > rem)
fraglen = rem;
rem -= fraglen;
tmp = dev_alloc_skb(local->tx_headroom +
frag_threshold +
tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom +
IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM);
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
__skb_queue_tail(&tx->skbs, tmp);
skb_reserve(tmp,
local->tx_headroom + tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom);
/* copy control information */
memcpy(tmp->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(tmp->cb));
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tmp);
info->flags &= ~(IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT |
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_FIRST_FRAGMENT);
if (rem)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_MORE_FRAMES;
skb_copy_queue_mapping(tmp, skb);
tmp->priority = skb->priority;
tmp->dev = skb->dev;
/* copy header and data */
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, hdrlen), skb->data, hdrlen);
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, fraglen), skb->data + pos, fraglen);
pos += fraglen;
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The ieee80211_fragment function in net/mac80211/tx.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.5 does not properly maintain a certain tail pointer, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive cleartext information by reading packets.
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,242 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int uvesafb_setcmap(struct fb_cmap *cmap, struct fb_info *info)
{
struct uvesafb_pal_entry *entries;
int shift = 16 - dac_width;
int i, err = 0;
if (info->var.bits_per_pixel == 8) {
if (cmap->start + cmap->len > info->cmap.start +
info->cmap.len || cmap->start < info->cmap.start)
return -EINVAL;
entries = kmalloc(sizeof(*entries) * cmap->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entries)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < cmap->len; i++) {
entries[i].red = cmap->red[i] >> shift;
entries[i].green = cmap->green[i] >> shift;
entries[i].blue = cmap->blue[i] >> shift;
entries[i].pad = 0;
}
err = uvesafb_setpalette(entries, cmap->len, cmap->start, info);
kfree(entries);
} else {
/*
* For modes with bpp > 8, we only set the pseudo palette in
* the fb_info struct. We rely on uvesafb_setcolreg to do all
* sanity checking.
*/
for (i = 0; i < cmap->len; i++) {
err |= uvesafb_setcolreg(cmap->start + i, cmap->red[i],
cmap->green[i], cmap->blue[i],
0, info);
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An integer overflow in the uvesafb_setcmap function in drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.17.4 could result in local attackers being able to crash the kernel or potentially elevate privileges because kmalloc_array is not used.
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> | High | 169,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GDataDirectory::GDataDirectory(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: GDataEntry(parent, directory_service) {
file_info_.is_directory = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int msg_parse_fetch(struct ImapHeader *h, char *s)
{
char tmp[SHORT_STRING];
char *ptmp = NULL;
if (!s)
return -1;
while (*s)
{
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FLAGS", s, 5) == 0)
{
s = msg_parse_flags(h, s);
if (!s)
return -1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("UID", s, 3) == 0)
{
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_atoui(s, &h->data->uid) < 0)
return -1;
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("INTERNALDATE", s, 12) == 0)
{
s += 12;
SKIPWS(s);
if (*s != '\"')
{
mutt_debug(1, "bogus INTERNALDATE entry: %s\n", s);
return -1;
}
s++;
ptmp = tmp;
while (*s && *s != '\"')
*ptmp++ = *s++;
if (*s != '\"')
return -1;
s++; /* skip past the trailing " */
*ptmp = '\0';
h->received = mutt_date_parse_imap(tmp);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.SIZE", s, 11) == 0)
{
s += 11;
SKIPWS(s);
ptmp = tmp;
while (isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
*ptmp++ = *s++;
*ptmp = '\0';
if (mutt_str_atol(tmp, &h->content_length) < 0)
return -1;
}
else if ((mutt_str_strncasecmp("BODY", s, 4) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.HEADER", s, 13) == 0))
{
/* handle above, in msg_fetch_header */
return -2;
}
else if (*s == ')')
s++; /* end of request */
else if (*s)
{
/* got something i don't understand */
imap_error("msg_parse_fetch", s);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. imap/message.c has a stack-based buffer overflow for a FETCH response with a long RFC822.SIZE field.
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch | High | 169,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static BOOLEAN flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(l2cap_socket *sock)
{
uint8_t *buf;
uint32_t len;
while (packet_get_head_l(sock, &buf, &len)) {
int sent = send(sock->our_fd, buf, len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == (signed)len)
osi_free(buf);
else if (sent >= 0) {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf + sent, len - sent);
osi_free(buf);
if (!sent) /* special case if other end not keeping up */
return TRUE;
}
else {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf, len);
osi_free(buf);
return errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
ops->destroy(dev);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return ret;
}
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the kvm_ioctl_create_device function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.13 allows host OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges via crafted ioctl calls on the /dev/kvm device.
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> | High | 168,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RenderProcessHost* SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetProcess() {
return worker_host_ ? RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_host_->process_id())
: nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int udpv6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP));
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked) {
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (is_udp4) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin6->sin6_addr);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
} else {
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
}
}
if (is_udp4) {
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
} else {
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
if (is_udp4) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
} else {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
if (noblock)
return -EAGAIN;
/* starting over for a new packet */
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static JSValueRef updateTouchPointCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
if (argumentCount < 3)
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
int index = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[0], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int x = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[1], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int y = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[2], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
if (index < 0 || index >= (int)touches.size())
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint& touch = touches[index];
IntPoint pos(x, y);
touch.m_pos = pos;
touch.m_screenPos = pos;
touch.m_state = BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved;
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: php_stream *php_stream_zip_open(char *filename, char *path, char *mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
int err = 0;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
struct zip *stream_za;
if (strncmp(mode,"r", strlen("r")) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (filename) {
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(filename)) {
return NULL;
}
/* duplicate to make the stream za independent (esp. for MSHUTDOWN) */
stream_za = zip_open(filename, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (!stream_za) {
return NULL;
}
zf = zip_fopen(stream_za, path, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = stream_za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
stream->orig_path = estrdup(path);
} else {
zip_close(stream_za);
}
}
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_stream_zip_opener function in ext/zip/zip_stream.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted zip:// URL.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zc, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0o, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1j does not properly enforce the no-ssl3 build option, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via an SSL 3.0 handshake, related to s23_clnt.c and s23_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 167,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetHistogram(
Reference ref) {
PersistentHistogramData* data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsObject<PersistentHistogramData>(ref);
const size_t length = memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(ref);
if (!data || data->name[0] == '\0' ||
reinterpret_cast<char*>(data)[length - 1] != '\0' ||
data->samples_metadata.id == 0 || data->logged_metadata.id == 0 ||
(data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id &&
data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id + 1) ||
HashMetricName(data->name) != data->samples_metadata.id) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_METADATA);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
return CreateHistogram(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986} | Medium | 172,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if ((vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG)) {
shift[0] = vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void mark_commit(struct commit *c, void *data)
{
mark_object(&c->object, NULL, NULL, data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags,
int *addr_len)
{
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *saddr;
saddr = (struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *)msg->msg_name;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* FIXME: skip headers if necessary ?! */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (saddr) {
saddr->family = AF_IEEE802154;
saddr->addr = mac_cb(skb)->sa;
}
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*saddr);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
if (err)
return err;
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int compat_get_timex(struct timex *txc, const struct compat_timex __user *utp)
{
struct compat_timex tx32;
if (copy_from_user(&tx32, utp, sizeof(struct compat_timex)))
return -EFAULT;
txc->modes = tx32.modes;
txc->offset = tx32.offset;
txc->freq = tx32.freq;
txc->maxerror = tx32.maxerror;
txc->esterror = tx32.esterror;
txc->status = tx32.status;
txc->constant = tx32.constant;
txc->precision = tx32.precision;
txc->tolerance = tx32.tolerance;
txc->time.tv_sec = tx32.time.tv_sec;
txc->time.tv_usec = tx32.time.tv_usec;
txc->tick = tx32.tick;
txc->ppsfreq = tx32.ppsfreq;
txc->jitter = tx32.jitter;
txc->shift = tx32.shift;
txc->stabil = tx32.stabil;
txc->jitcnt = tx32.jitcnt;
txc->calcnt = tx32.calcnt;
txc->errcnt = tx32.errcnt;
txc->stbcnt = tx32.stbcnt;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The compat_get_timex function in kernel/compat.c in the Linux kernel before 4.16.9 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via adjtimex.
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in libjasper/jp2/jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place. | Medium | 168,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(*sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::ClearUtteranceQueue() {
while (!utterance_queue_.empty()) {
Utterance* utterance = utterance_queue_.front();
utterance_queue_.pop();
utterance->set_error(kSpeechRemovedFromQueueError);
utterance->FinishAndDestroy();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char *str, char **ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = g_ascii_strup (str, -1);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
m_totalWidth = 0;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 172,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_locale_set_default)
{
char* locale_name = NULL;
int len=0;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&locale_name ,&len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_set_default: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(len == 0) {
locale_name = (char *)uloc_getDefault() ;
len = strlen(locale_name);
}
zend_alter_ini_entry(LOCALE_INI_NAME, sizeof(LOCALE_INI_NAME), locale_name, len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgetcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sss", &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 3:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 0:
break;
}
spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(intern, delimiter, enclosure, escape, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSSharedWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSSharedWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
UString name;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 1)
name = exec->argument(1).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<SharedWorker> worker = SharedWorker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ustringToString(name), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init(
struct ieee80211_radiotap_iterator *iterator,
struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *radiotap_header,
int max_length, const struct ieee80211_radiotap_vendor_namespaces *vns)
{
/* Linux only supports version 0 radiotap format */
if (radiotap_header->it_version)
return -EINVAL;
/* sanity check for allowed length and radiotap length field */
if (max_length < get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len))
return -EINVAL;
iterator->_rtheader = radiotap_header;
iterator->_max_length = get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len);
iterator->_arg_index = 0;
iterator->_bitmap_shifter = get_unaligned_le32(&radiotap_header->it_present);
iterator->_arg = (uint8_t *)radiotap_header + sizeof(*radiotap_header);
iterator->_reset_on_ext = 0;
iterator->_next_bitmap = &radiotap_header->it_present;
iterator->_next_bitmap++;
iterator->_vns = vns;
iterator->current_namespace = &radiotap_ns;
iterator->is_radiotap_ns = 1;
/* find payload start allowing for extended bitmap(s) */
if (iterator->_bitmap_shifter & (1<<IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
while (get_unaligned_le32(iterator->_arg) &
(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* check for insanity where the present bitmaps
* keep claiming to extend up to or even beyond the
* stated radiotap header length
*/
if ((unsigned long)iterator->_arg -
(unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader >
(unsigned long)iterator->_max_length)
return -EINVAL;
}
iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* no need to check again for blowing past stated radiotap
* header length, because ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_next
* checks it before it is dereferenced
*/
}
iterator->this_arg = iterator->_arg;
/* we are all initialized happily */
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init function in net/wireless/radiotap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.7 does not check whether a frame contains any data outside of the header, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via a crafted header.
Commit Message: wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.
Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char *pool_strdup(const char *s)
{
char *r = pool_alloc(strlen(s) + 1);
strcpy(r, s);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: revision.c in git before 2.7.4 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_opengl1_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
ri.Z_MallocDebug = CL_RefMallocDebug;
#else
ri.Z_Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
#endif
ri.Free = Z_Free;
ri.Tag_Free = CL_RefTagFree;
ri.Hunk_Clear = Hunk_ClearToMark;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Com_Printf( "---- Renderer Initialization Complete ----\n" );
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | High | 170,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el)
return 0;
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: memcached.c in memcached before 1.4.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang or crash) via a long line that triggers excessive memory allocation. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it | Medium | 169,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int llcp_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int copied, rlen;
struct sk_buff *skb, *cskb;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%p %zu\n", sk, len);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CLOSED &&
skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
pr_err("Recv datagram failed state %d %d %d",
sk->sk_state, err, sock_error(sk));
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
rlen = skb->len; /* real length of skb */
copied = min_t(unsigned int, rlen, len);
cskb = skb;
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(cskb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied)) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM && msg->msg_name) {
struct nfc_llcp_ui_cb *ui_cb = nfc_llcp_ui_skb_cb(skb);
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *) msg->msg_name;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp);
pr_debug("Datagram socket %d %d\n", ui_cb->dsap, ui_cb->ssap);
memset(sockaddr, 0, sizeof(*sockaddr));
sockaddr->sa_family = AF_NFC;
sockaddr->nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP;
sockaddr->dsap = ui_cb->dsap;
sockaddr->ssap = ui_cb->ssap;
}
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* SOCK_STREAM: re-queue skb if it contains unreceived data */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
skb_pull(skb, copied);
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
goto done;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* XXX Queue backlogged skbs */
done:
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: return real length if MSG_TRUNC is set */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && (flags & MSG_TRUNC))
copied = rlen;
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::HandleBlurEvent() {
input_type_->DisableSecureTextInput();
input_type_view_->HandleBlurEvent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | High | 171,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void l2tp_eth_dev_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &l2tp_eth_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OneClickSigninSyncStarter::OneClickSigninSyncStarter(
Profile* profile,
Browser* browser,
const std::string& session_index,
const std::string& email,
const std::string& password,
StartSyncMode start_mode,
bool force_same_tab_navigation,
ConfirmationRequired confirmation_required)
: start_mode_(start_mode),
force_same_tab_navigation_(force_same_tab_navigation),
confirmation_required_(confirmation_required),
weak_pointer_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(profile);
BrowserList::AddObserver(this);
Initialize(profile, browser);
SigninManager* manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
SigninManager::OAuthTokenFetchedCallback callback;
callback = base::Bind(&OneClickSigninSyncStarter::ConfirmSignin,
weak_pointer_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
manager->StartSignInWithCredentials(session_index, email, password, callback);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly determine the circumstances in which a renderer process can be considered a trusted process for sign-in and subsequent sync operations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct phishing attacks via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tt_face_load_kern( TT_Face face,
FT_Stream stream )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_ULong table_size;
FT_Byte* p;
FT_Byte* p_limit;
FT_UInt nn, num_tables;
FT_UInt32 avail = 0, ordered = 0;
/* the kern table is optional; exit silently if it is missing */
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_kern, stream, &table_size );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( table_size < 4 ) /* the case of a malformed table */
{
FT_ERROR(( "tt_face_load_kern:"
" kerning table is too small - ignored\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Table_Missing );
goto Exit;
}
if ( FT_FRAME_EXTRACT( table_size, face->kern_table ) )
{
FT_ERROR(( "tt_face_load_kern:"
" could not extract kerning table\n" ));
goto Exit;
}
face->kern_table_size = table_size;
p = face->kern_table;
p_limit = p + table_size;
p += 2; /* skip version */
num_tables = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( num_tables > 32 ) /* we only support up to 32 sub-tables */
num_tables = 32;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_tables; nn++ )
{
FT_UInt num_pairs, length, coverage;
FT_Byte* p_next;
FT_UInt32 mask = (FT_UInt32)1UL << nn;
if ( p + 6 > p_limit )
break;
p_next = p;
p += 2; /* skip version */
length = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
coverage = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( length <= 6 )
break;
p_next += length;
if ( p_next > p_limit ) /* handle broken table */
p_next = p_limit;
/* only use horizontal kerning tables */
if ( ( coverage & ~8 ) != 0x0001 ||
p + 8 > p_limit )
goto NextTable;
num_pairs = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
p += 6;
if ( ( p_next - p ) < 6 * (int)num_pairs ) /* handle broken count */
num_pairs = (FT_UInt)( ( p_next - p ) / 6 );
avail |= mask;
/*
* Now check whether the pairs in this table are ordered.
* We then can use binary search.
*/
if ( num_pairs > 0 )
{
FT_ULong count;
FT_ULong old_pair;
old_pair = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 2;
for ( count = num_pairs - 1; count > 0; count-- )
{
FT_UInt32 cur_pair;
cur_pair = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( cur_pair <= old_pair )
break;
p += 2;
old_pair = cur_pair;
}
if ( count == 0 )
ordered |= mask;
}
NextTable:
p = p_next;
}
face->num_kern_tables = nn;
face->kern_avail_bits = avail;
face->kern_order_bits = ordered;
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The tt_face_load_kern function in sfnt/ttkern.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 enforces an incorrect minimum table length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TrueType font.
Commit Message: | High | 164,865 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_tsquery(char *buf,
PushFunction pushval,
Datum opaque,
bool isplain)
{
struct TSQueryParserStateData state;
int i;
TSQuery query;
int commonlen;
QueryItem *ptr;
ListCell *cell;
/* init state */
state.buffer = buf;
state.buf = buf;
state.state = (isplain) ? WAITSINGLEOPERAND : WAITFIRSTOPERAND;
state.count = 0;
state.polstr = NIL;
/* init value parser's state */
state.valstate = init_tsvector_parser(state.buffer, true, true);
/* init list of operand */
state.sumlen = 0;
state.lenop = 64;
state.curop = state.op = (char *) palloc(state.lenop);
*(state.curop) = '\0';
/* parse query & make polish notation (postfix, but in reverse order) */
makepol(&state, pushval, opaque);
close_tsvector_parser(state.valstate);
if (list_length(state.polstr) == 0)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("text-search query doesn't contain lexemes: \"%s\"",
state.buffer)));
query = (TSQuery) palloc(HDRSIZETQ);
SET_VARSIZE(query, HDRSIZETQ);
query->size = 0;
return query;
}
/* Pack the QueryItems in the final TSQuery struct to return to caller */
commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(list_length(state.polstr), state.sumlen);
query = (TSQuery) palloc0(commonlen);
SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen);
query->size = list_length(state.polstr);
ptr = GETQUERY(query);
/* Copy QueryItems to TSQuery */
i = 0;
foreach(cell, state.polstr)
{
QueryItem *item = (QueryItem *) lfirst(cell);
switch (item->type)
{
case QI_VAL:
memcpy(&ptr[i], item, sizeof(QueryOperand));
break;
case QI_VALSTOP:
ptr[i].type = QI_VALSTOP;
break;
case QI_OPR:
memcpy(&ptr[i], item, sizeof(QueryOperator));
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized QueryItem type: %d", item->type);
}
i++;
}
/* Copy all the operand strings to TSQuery */
memcpy((void *) GETOPERAND(query), (void *) state.op, state.sumlen);
pfree(state.op);
/* Set left operand pointers for every operator. */
findoprnd(ptr, query->size);
return query;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void vrend_set_framebuffer_state(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t nr_cbufs, uint32_t surf_handle[8],
uint32_t zsurf_handle)
{
struct vrend_surface *surf, *zsurf;
int i;
int old_num;
GLenum status;
GLint new_height = -1;
bool new_ibf = false;
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
if (zsurf_handle) {
zsurf = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, zsurf_handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SURFACE);
if (!zsurf) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SURFACE, zsurf_handle);
return;
}
} else
zsurf = NULL;
if (ctx->sub->zsurf != zsurf) {
vrend_surface_reference(&ctx->sub->zsurf, zsurf);
vrend_hw_set_zsurf_texture(ctx);
}
old_num = ctx->sub->nr_cbufs;
ctx->sub->nr_cbufs = nr_cbufs;
ctx->sub->old_nr_cbufs = old_num;
for (i = 0; i < nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (surf_handle[i] != 0) {
surf = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, surf_handle[i], VIRGL_OBJECT_SURFACE);
if (!surf) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SURFACE, surf_handle[i]);
return;
}
} else
surf = NULL;
if (ctx->sub->surf[i] != surf) {
vrend_surface_reference(&ctx->sub->surf[i], surf);
vrend_hw_set_color_surface(ctx, i);
}
}
if (old_num > ctx->sub->nr_cbufs) {
for (i = ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i < old_num; i++) {
vrend_surface_reference(&ctx->sub->surf[i], NULL);
vrend_hw_set_color_surface(ctx, i);
}
}
/* find a buffer to set fb_height from */
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs == 0 && !ctx->sub->zsurf) {
new_height = 0;
new_ibf = false;
} else if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs == 0) {
new_height = u_minify(ctx->sub->zsurf->texture->base.height0, ctx->sub->zsurf->val0);
new_ibf = ctx->sub->zsurf->texture->y_0_top ? true : false;
}
else {
surf = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i]) {
surf = ctx->sub->surf[i];
break;
}
}
if (surf == NULL) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SURFACE, i);
return;
}
new_height = u_minify(surf->texture->base.height0, surf->val0);
new_ibf = surf->texture->y_0_top ? true : false;
}
if (new_height != -1) {
if (ctx->sub->fb_height != new_height || ctx->sub->inverted_fbo_content != new_ibf) {
ctx->sub->fb_height = new_height;
ctx->sub->inverted_fbo_content = new_ibf;
ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty = (1 << 0);
ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty = (1 << 0);
}
}
vrend_hw_emit_framebuffer_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs > 0 || ctx->sub->zsurf) {
status = glCheckFramebufferStatus(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (status != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE)
fprintf(stderr,"failed to complete framebuffer 0x%x %s\n", status, ctx->debug_name);
}
ctx->sub->shader_dirty = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The util_format_is_pure_uint function in vrend_renderer.c in Virgil 3d project (aka virglrenderer) 0.6.0 and earlier allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted VIRGL_CCMD_CLEAR command.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The scm_check_creds function in net/core/scm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11 performs a capability check in an incorrect namespace, which allows local users to gain privileges via PID spoofing.
Commit Message: net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int uhid_event(btif_hh_device_t *p_dev)
{
struct uhid_event ev;
ssize_t ret;
memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
if(!p_dev)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Device not found",__FUNCTION__)
return -1;
}
ret = read(p_dev->fd, &ev, sizeof(ev));
if (ret == 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Read HUP on uhid-cdev %s", __FUNCTION__,
strerror(errno));
return -EFAULT;
} else if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot read uhid-cdev: %s", __FUNCTION__,
strerror(errno));
return -errno;
} else if ((ev.type == UHID_OUTPUT) || (ev.type==UHID_OUTPUT_EV)) {
if (ret < (ssize_t)sizeof(ev)) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid size read from uhid-dev: %ld != %lu",
__FUNCTION__, ret, sizeof(ev.type));
return -EFAULT;
}
}
switch (ev.type) {
case UHID_START:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_START from uhid-dev\n");
p_dev->ready_for_data = TRUE;
break;
case UHID_STOP:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_STOP from uhid-dev\n");
p_dev->ready_for_data = FALSE;
break;
case UHID_OPEN:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_OPEN from uhid-dev\n");
break;
case UHID_CLOSE:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_CLOSE from uhid-dev\n");
p_dev->ready_for_data = FALSE;
break;
case UHID_OUTPUT:
if (ret < (ssize_t)(sizeof(ev.type) + sizeof(ev.u.output))) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid size read from uhid-dev: %zd < %zu",
__FUNCTION__, ret,
sizeof(ev.type) + sizeof(ev.u.output));
return -EFAULT;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_OUTPUT: Report type = %d, report_size = %d"
,ev.u.output.rtype, ev.u.output.size);
if(ev.u.output.rtype == UHID_FEATURE_REPORT)
btif_hh_setreport(p_dev, BTHH_FEATURE_REPORT,
ev.u.output.size, ev.u.output.data);
else if(ev.u.output.rtype == UHID_OUTPUT_REPORT)
btif_hh_setreport(p_dev, BTHH_OUTPUT_REPORT,
ev.u.output.size, ev.u.output.data);
else
btif_hh_setreport(p_dev, BTHH_INPUT_REPORT,
ev.u.output.size, ev.u.output.data);
break;
case UHID_OUTPUT_EV:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_OUTPUT_EV from uhid-dev\n");
break;
case UHID_FEATURE:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_FEATURE from uhid-dev\n");
break;
case UHID_FEATURE_ANSWER:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("UHID_FEATURE_ANSWER from uhid-dev\n");
break;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("Invalid event from uhid-dev: %u\n", ev.type);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
if (reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_SAFE &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_DOWNLOAD_UNCOMMON &&
reason != DownloadCheckResultReason::REASON_VERDICT_UNKNOWN)
return false;
content::BrowserContext* browser_context =
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
if (!browser_context)
return false;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return false;
int send_files_for_malware_check = profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kSafeBrowsingSendFilesForMalwareCheck);
if (send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_DOWNLOADS &&
send_files_for_malware_check !=
SendFilesForMalwareCheckValues::SEND_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
return !policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 172,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DetachInterstitialPage() {
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
bool interstitial_pausing_throbber =
ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage())
GetRenderManager()->remove_interstitial_page();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidDetachInterstitialPage();
if (interstitial_pausing_throbber && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: string_modifier_check(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) == 0)
return 0;
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING && (m->str_flags & PSTRING_LEN) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/BHhLl' modifiers are only allowed for pascal strings\n");
return -1;
}
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->str_flags != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"no modifiers allowed for 16-bit strings\n");
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"'/%c' only allowed on regex and search\n",
CHAR_REGEX_OFFSET_START);
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (m->str_range == 0) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"missing range; defaulting to %d\n",
STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE);
m->str_range = STRING_DEFAULT_RANGE;
return -1;
}
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
if ((m->str_flags & STRING_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE) != 0) {
file_magwarn(ms, "'/%c' not allowed on regex\n",
CHAR_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
file_magwarn(ms, "coding error: m->type=%d\n",
m->type);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: file before 5.19 does not properly restrict the amount of data read during a regex search, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted file that triggers backtracking during processing of an awk rule. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2013-7345.
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible. | Medium | 166,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", pdev->driver_override);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The driver_override implementation in drivers/base/platform.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.1 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging a race condition between a read operation and a store operation that involve different overrides.
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* LIBPNG BUG: this always forces palette images to RGB. */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
/* This effectively does an 'expand' only if there is some transparency to
* convert to an alpha channel.
*/
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
/* LIBPNG BUG: otherwise libpng still expands to 8 bits! */
else
{
if (that->bit_depth < 8)
that->bit_depth =8;
if (that->sample_depth < 8)
that->sample_depth = 8;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: epass2003_sm_unwrap_apdu(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *sm, struct sc_apdu *plain)
{
int r;
size_t len = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = sc_check_sw(card, sm->sw1, sm->sw2);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
if (exdata->sm) {
if (0 != decrypt_response(card, sm->resp, plain->resp, &len))
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
}
else {
memcpy(plain->resp, sm->resp, sm->resplen);
len = sm->resplen;
}
}
plain->resplen = len;
plain->sw1 = sm->sw1;
plain->sw2 = sm->sw2;
sc_log(card->ctx,
"unwrapped APDU: resplen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, SW %02X%02X",
plain->resplen, plain->sw1, plain->sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 169,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DataReductionProxyConfig::ShouldAddDefaultProxyBypassRules() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Lack of special casing of localhost in WPAD files in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to proxy resources on localhost via a crafted WPAD file.
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112} | Low | 172,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned bs = crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(
&ctx->req));
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned long iovlen;
struct iovec *iov;
int err = -EAGAIN;
int used;
long copied = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
iovlen--, iov++) {
unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
while (seglen) {
sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
sg = sgl->sg;
while (!sg->length)
sg++;
used = ctx->used;
if (!used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
used = min_t(unsigned long, used, seglen);
used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, from, used, 1);
err = used;
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
used -= used % bs;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!used)
goto free;
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg,
ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
ctx->iv);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
ctx->enc ?
crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
if (err)
goto unlock;
copied += used;
from += used;
seglen -= used;
skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used);
}
}
err = 0;
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The crypto API in the Linux kernel through 3.9-rc8 does not initialize certain length variables, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call, related to the hash_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_hash.c and the skcipher_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_skcipher.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <[email protected]> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
const gfx::GLSurfaceHandle& handle) {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return;
}
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[0]);
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[1]);
context_->finish();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: perform_gamma_threshold_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
/* Don't test more than one instance of each palette - it's pointless, in
* fact this test is somewhat excessive since libpng doesn't make this
* decision based on colour type or bit depth!
*/
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 1/*gamma*/))
if (palette_number == 0)
{
double test_gamma = 1.0;
while (test_gamma >= .4)
{
/* There's little point testing the interlacing vs non-interlacing,
* but this can be set from the command line.
*/
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
test_gamma, 1/test_gamma);
test_gamma *= .95;
}
/* And a special test for sRGB */
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
.45455, 2.2);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateFilter() {
DCHECK(properties_);
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsFilter(object_)) {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
state.paint_offset = FloatPoint(context_.current.paint_offset);
auto* layer = ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object_).Layer();
if (layer) {
if (properties_->Filter())
state.filter = properties_->Filter()->Filter();
if (object_.IsLayoutImage() &&
ToLayoutImage(object_).ShouldInvertColor())
state.filter.AppendInvertFilter(1.0f);
layer->UpdateCompositorFilterOperationsForFilter(state.filter);
layer->ClearFilterOnEffectNodeDirty();
} else {
DCHECK(object_.IsLayoutImage() &&
ToLayoutImage(object_).ShouldInvertColor());
state.filter = CompositorFilterOperations();
state.filter.AppendInvertFilter(1.0f);
}
state.output_clip = context_.current.clip;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReasonFinder::RequiresCompositingForFilterAnimation(
style)
? CompositingReason::kActiveFilterAnimation
: CompositingReason::kNone;
DCHECK(!style.HasCurrentFilterAnimation() ||
state.direct_compositing_reasons != CompositingReason::kNone);
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectFilter);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateFilter(context_.current_effect, std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearFilter());
}
}
if (properties_->Filter()) {
context_.current_effect = properties_->Filter();
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* input_clip =
properties_->Filter()->OutputClip();
context_.current.clip = context_.absolute_position.clip =
context_.fixed_position.clip = input_clip;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltElementComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:element
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }
* use-attribute-sets = qnames>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:element>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name", NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
goto error;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace", NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the namespace was "
"not specified by the instruction itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
if ((prefix != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrncasecmp(prefix, (xmlChar *)"xml", 3)))
{
/*
* Mark is to be skipped.
*/
comp->has_name = 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Attribute "use-attribute-sets",
*/
comp->use = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL, &comp->has_use);
error:
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_split)
{
char *arg_pattern;
int arg_pattern_len;
php_mb_regex_t *re;
OnigRegion *regs = NULL;
char *string;
OnigUChar *pos, *chunk_pos;
int string_len;
int n, err;
long count = -1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &string, &string_len, &count) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (count > 0) {
count--;
}
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((re = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, MBREX(regex_default_options), MBREX(current_mbctype), MBREX(regex_default_syntax) TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string;
err = 0;
regs = onig_region_new();
/* churn through str, generating array entries as we go */
while (count != 0 && (pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < string_len) {
int beg, end;
err = onig_search(re, (OnigUChar *)string, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), pos, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), regs, 0);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
beg = regs->beg[0], end = regs->end[0];
/* add it to the array */
if ((pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < end) {
if (beg < string_len && beg >= (chunk_pos - (OnigUChar *)string)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, ((OnigUChar *)(string + beg) - chunk_pos), 1);
--count;
} else {
err = -2;
break;
}
/* point at our new starting point */
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string + end;
} else {
pos++;
}
onig_region_free(regs, 0);
}
onig_region_free(regs, 1);
/* see if we encountered an error */
if (err <= -2) {
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex search failure in mbsplit(): %s", err_str);
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* otherwise we just have one last element to add to the array */
n = ((OnigUChar *)(string + string_len) - chunk_pos);
if (n > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, n, 1);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "", 0, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free | High | 167,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch(s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server=0;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
{
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
#endif
}
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
s->hit = 1;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
}
#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
/* or PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* at this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server */
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
{
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back */
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
* We need to skip the certificate verify
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
* inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth=0;
else
s->session->compress_meth=
s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
{
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
}
}
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
* remove the buffering now */
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
s->init_num=0;
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret=1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted TLS handshake, aka the "CCS Injection" vulnerability.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int event_id = event->attr.config;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (event_id) {
case PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK:
case PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK:
return -ENOENT;
default:
break;
}
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
err = swevent_hlist_get(event);
if (err)
return err;
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
event->destroy = sw_perf_event_destroy;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The perf_swevent_init function in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted perf_event_open system call.
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | High | 166,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Initialized(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_buffer,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket_handle) {
ASSERT_TRUE(shared_buffer.is_valid());
ASSERT_TRUE(socket_handle.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile fd;
mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket_handle), &fd);
socket_ = std::make_unique<base::CancelableSyncSocket>(fd);
EXPECT_NE(socket_->handle(), base::CancelableSyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
size_t memory_length;
base::SharedMemoryHandle shmem_handle;
bool read_only;
EXPECT_EQ(
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_buffer), &shmem_handle,
&memory_length, &read_only),
MOJO_RESULT_OK);
EXPECT_FALSE(read_only);
buffer_ = std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(shmem_handle, read_only);
GotNotification();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ext4_xattr_destroy_cache(struct mb_cache *cache)
{
if (cache)
mb_cache_destroy(cache);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Utterance::Utterance(Profile* profile,
const std::string& text,
DictionaryValue* options,
Task* completion_task)
: profile_(profile),
id_(next_utterance_id_++),
text_(text),
rate_(-1.0),
pitch_(-1.0),
volume_(-1.0),
can_enqueue_(false),
completion_task_(completion_task) {
if (!options) {
options_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
return;
}
options_.reset(options->DeepCopy());
if (options->HasKey(util::kVoiceNameKey))
options->GetString(util::kVoiceNameKey, &voice_name_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kLocaleKey))
options->GetString(util::kLocaleKey, &locale_);
if (options->HasKey(util::kGenderKey))
options->GetString(util::kGenderKey, &gender_);
if (options->GetDouble(util::kRateKey, &rate_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(rate_) || rate_ < 0.0 || rate_ > 1.0)
rate_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kPitchKey, &pitch_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(pitch_) || pitch_ < 0.0 || pitch_ > 1.0)
pitch_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->GetDouble(util::kVolumeKey, &volume_)) {
if (!base::IsFinite(volume_) || volume_ < 0.0 || volume_ > 1.0)
volume_ = -1.0;
}
if (options->HasKey(util::kEnqueueKey))
options->GetBoolean(util::kEnqueueKey, &can_enqueue_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int btrfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(old_dir)->root;
struct btrfs_root *dest = BTRFS_I(new_dir)->root;
struct inode *new_inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *old_inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct timespec ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
u64 index = 0;
u64 root_objectid;
int ret;
u64 old_ino = btrfs_ino(old_inode);
if (btrfs_ino(new_dir) == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)
return -EPERM;
/* we only allow rename subvolume link between subvolumes */
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID && root != dest)
return -EXDEV;
if (old_ino == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID ||
(new_inode && btrfs_ino(new_inode) == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (S_ISDIR(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode &&
new_inode->i_size > BTRFS_EMPTY_DIR_SIZE)
return -ENOTEMPTY;
/*
* we're using rename to replace one file with another.
* and the replacement file is large. Start IO on it now so
* we don't add too much work to the end of the transaction
*/
if (new_inode && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode->i_size &&
old_inode->i_size > BTRFS_ORDERED_OPERATIONS_FLUSH_LIMIT)
filemap_flush(old_inode->i_mapping);
/* close the racy window with snapshot create/destroy ioctl */
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
down_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
/*
* We want to reserve the absolute worst case amount of items. So if
* both inodes are subvols and we need to unlink them then that would
* require 4 item modifications, but if they are both normal inodes it
* would require 5 item modifications, so we'll assume their normal
* inodes. So 5 * 2 is 10, plus 1 for the new link, so 11 total items
* should cover the worst case number of items we'll modify.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 20);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out_notrans;
}
if (dest != root)
btrfs_record_root_in_trans(trans, dest);
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index(new_dir, &index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
/* force full log commit if subvolume involved. */
root->fs_info->last_trans_log_full_commit = trans->transid;
} else {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, dest,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len,
old_ino,
btrfs_ino(new_dir), index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
/*
* this is an ugly little race, but the rename is required
* to make sure that if we crash, the inode is either at the
* old name or the new one. pinning the log transaction lets
* us make sure we don't allow a log commit to come in after
* we unlink the name but before we add the new name back in.
*/
btrfs_pin_log_trans(root);
}
/*
* make sure the inode gets flushed if it is replacing
* something.
*/
if (new_inode && new_inode->i_size && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode))
btrfs_add_ordered_operation(trans, root, old_inode);
inode_inc_iversion(old_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(new_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(old_inode);
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
old_inode->i_ctime = ctime;
if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dentry->d_parent)
btrfs_record_unlink_dir(trans, old_dir, old_inode, 1);
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(old_inode)->root->root_key.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, root, old_dir, root_objectid,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
} else {
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, old_dir,
old_dentry->d_inode,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
if (!ret)
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, old_inode);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (new_inode) {
inode_inc_iversion(new_inode);
new_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
if (unlikely(btrfs_ino(new_inode) ==
BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(new_inode)->location.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, dest, new_dir,
root_objectid,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
BUG_ON(new_inode->i_nlink == 0);
} else {
ret = btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, dest, new_dir,
new_dentry->d_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
}
if (!ret && new_inode->i_nlink == 0) {
ret = btrfs_orphan_add(trans, new_dentry->d_inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
}
fixup_inode_flags(new_dir, old_inode);
ret = btrfs_add_link(trans, new_dir, old_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len, 0, index);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID) {
struct dentry *parent = new_dentry->d_parent;
btrfs_log_new_name(trans, old_inode, old_dir, parent);
btrfs_end_log_trans(root);
}
out_fail:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
out_notrans:
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
up_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The CRC32C feature in the Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation) by leveraging the ability to write to a directory important to the victim, and creating a file with a crafted name that is associated with a specific CRC32C hash value.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManager::StartLoadAndSetDefaultWallpaper(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out) {
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, path, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), path, layout,
base::Unretained(result_out),
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | Medium | 171,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const
{
return m_pInfo;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassOwnPtr<GraphicsContext> UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer(ShareableSurface::Handle& handle, const WebCore::IntSize& size, IntPoint& offset)
{
buildLayoutIfNeeded();
IntRect rect = m_areaAllocator->allocate(size);
if (rect.isEmpty())
return PassOwnPtr<GraphicsContext>();
if (!m_surface->createHandle(handle))
return PassOwnPtr<WebCore::GraphicsContext>();
offset = rect.location();
OwnPtr<GraphicsContext> graphicsContext = m_surface->createGraphicsContext(rect);
if (flags() & ShareableBitmap::SupportsAlpha) {
graphicsContext->setCompositeOperation(CompositeCopy);
graphicsContext->fillRect(IntRect(IntPoint::zero(), size), Color::transparent, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB);
graphicsContext->setCompositeOperation(CompositeSourceOver);
}
return graphicsContext.release();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to *stale font.*
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DefragVlanQinQTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(1, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(1, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
/* With no VLAN IDs set, packets should re-assemble. */
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) == NULL)
goto end;
SCFree(r);
/* With mismatched VLANs, packets should not re-assemble. */
p1->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p1->vlan_id[1] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[1] = 2;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
/* Pass. */
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
int page_number = params.page_number;
if (page_number < FIRST_PAGE_INDEX || !params.data_size)
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data_bytes =
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size);
DCHECK(data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(page_number,
std::move(data_bytes));
print_preview_ui->OnDidPreviewPage(page_number, params.preview_request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616} | Medium | 171,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator(
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* vaapi_dec,
VaapiWrapper* vaapi_wrapper)
: vaapi_wrapper_(vaapi_wrapper), vaapi_dec_(vaapi_dec) {
DCHECK(vaapi_wrapper_);
DCHECK(vaapi_dec_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPreconnectStats(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
const GURL& main_frame_url = stats->url;
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(main_frame_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second,
std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>());
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
preconnect_stats_.emplace(main_frame_url, std::move(stats));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void nbd_recv_coroutines_enter_all(NBDClientSession *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NBD_REQUESTS; i++) {
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: add_job(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
cupsd_printer_t *printer, /* I - Destination printer */
mime_type_t *filetype) /* I - First print file type, if any */
{
http_status_t status; /* Policy status */
ipp_attribute_t *attr, /* Current attribute */
*auth_info; /* auth-info attribute */
const char *mandatory; /* Current mandatory job attribute */
const char *val; /* Default option value */
int priority; /* Job priority */
cupsd_job_t *job; /* Current job */
char job_uri[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Job URI */
int kbytes; /* Size of print file */
int i; /* Looping var */
int lowerpagerange; /* Page range bound */
int exact; /* Did we have an exact match? */
ipp_attribute_t *media_col, /* media-col attribute */
*media_margin; /* media-*-margin attribute */
ipp_t *unsup_col; /* media-col in unsupported response */
static const char * const readonly[] =/* List of read-only attributes */
{
"date-time-at-completed",
"date-time-at-creation",
"date-time-at-processing",
"job-detailed-status-messages",
"job-document-access-errors",
"job-id",
"job-impressions-completed",
"job-k-octets-completed",
"job-media-sheets-completed",
"job-pages-completed",
"job-printer-up-time",
"job-printer-uri",
"job-state",
"job-state-message",
"job-state-reasons",
"job-uri",
"number-of-documents",
"number-of-intervening-jobs",
"output-device-assigned",
"time-at-completed",
"time-at-creation",
"time-at-processing"
};
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "add_job(%p[%d], %p(%s), %p(%s/%s))",
con, con->number, printer, printer->name,
filetype, filetype ? filetype->super : "none",
filetype ? filetype->type : "none");
/*
* Check remote printing to non-shared printer...
*/
if (!printer->shared &&
_cups_strcasecmp(con->http->hostname, "localhost") &&
_cups_strcasecmp(con->http->hostname, ServerName))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_AUTHORIZED,
_("The printer or class is not shared."));
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Check policy...
*/
auth_info = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "auth-info", IPP_TAG_TEXT);
if ((status = cupsdCheckPolicy(printer->op_policy_ptr, con, NULL)) != HTTP_OK)
{
send_http_error(con, status, printer);
return (NULL);
}
else if (printer->num_auth_info_required == 1 &&
!strcmp(printer->auth_info_required[0], "negotiate") &&
!con->username[0])
{
send_http_error(con, HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, printer);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (auth_info && !con->http->tls &&
!httpAddrLocalhost(con->http->hostaddr))
{
/*
* Require encryption of auth-info over non-local connections...
*/
send_http_error(con, HTTP_UPGRADE_REQUIRED, printer);
return (NULL);
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
/*
* See if the printer is accepting jobs...
*/
if (!printer->accepting)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_ACCEPTING,
_("Destination \"%s\" is not accepting jobs."),
printer->name);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Validate job template attributes; for now just document-format,
* copies, job-sheets, number-up, page-ranges, mandatory attributes, and
* media...
*/
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(readonly) / sizeof(readonly[0])); i ++)
{
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, readonly[i], IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
ippDeleteAttribute(con->request, attr);
if (StrictConformance)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("The '%s' Job Status attribute cannot be supplied in a job creation request."), readonly[i]);
return (NULL);
}
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Unexpected '%s' Job Status attribute in a job creation request.", readonly[i]);
}
}
if (printer->pc)
{
for (mandatory = (char *)cupsArrayFirst(printer->pc->mandatory);
mandatory;
mandatory = (char *)cupsArrayNext(printer->pc->mandatory))
{
if (!ippFindAttribute(con->request, mandatory, IPP_TAG_ZERO))
{
/*
* Missing a required attribute...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_CONFLICT,
_("The \"%s\" attribute is required for print jobs."),
mandatory);
return (NULL);
}
}
}
if (filetype && printer->filetypes &&
!cupsArrayFind(printer->filetypes, filetype))
{
char mimetype[MIME_MAX_SUPER + MIME_MAX_TYPE + 2];
/* MIME media type string */
snprintf(mimetype, sizeof(mimetype), "%s/%s", filetype->super,
filetype->type);
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_DOCUMENT_FORMAT,
_("Unsupported format \"%s\"."), mimetype);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_MIMETYPE,
"document-format", NULL, mimetype);
return (NULL);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "copies",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->values[0].integer < 1 || attr->values[0].integer > MaxCopies)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad copies value %d."),
attr->values[0].integer);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"copies", attr->values[0].integer);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_KEYWORD &&
attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-sheets value type."));
return (NULL);
}
if (attr->num_values > 2)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Too many job-sheets values (%d > 2)."),
attr->num_values);
return (NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < attr->num_values; i ++)
if (strcmp(attr->values[i].string.text, "none") &&
!cupsdFindBanner(attr->values[i].string.text))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-sheets value \"%s\"."),
attr->values[i].string.text);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "number-up",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->values[0].integer != 1 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 2 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 4 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 6 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 9 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 16)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad number-up value %d."),
attr->values[0].integer);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"number-up", attr->values[0].integer);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "page-ranges",
IPP_TAG_RANGE)) != NULL)
{
for (i = 0, lowerpagerange = 1; i < attr->num_values; i ++)
{
if (attr->values[i].range.lower < lowerpagerange ||
attr->values[i].range.lower > attr->values[i].range.upper)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Bad page-ranges values %d-%d."),
attr->values[i].range.lower,
attr->values[i].range.upper);
return (NULL);
}
lowerpagerange = attr->values[i].range.upper + 1;
}
}
/*
* Do media selection as needed...
*/
if (!ippFindAttribute(con->request, "PageRegion", IPP_TAG_ZERO) &&
!ippFindAttribute(con->request, "PageSize", IPP_TAG_ZERO) &&
_ppdCacheGetPageSize(printer->pc, con->request, NULL, &exact))
{
if (!exact &&
(media_col = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "media-col",
IPP_TAG_BEGIN_COLLECTION)) != NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_OK_SUBST, _("Unsupported margins."));
unsup_col = ippNew();
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-bottom-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-bottom-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-left-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-left-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-right-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-right-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-top-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-top-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
ippAddCollection(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, "media-col",
unsup_col);
ippDelete(unsup_col);
}
}
/*
* Make sure we aren't over our limit...
*/
if (MaxJobs && cupsArrayCount(Jobs) >= MaxJobs)
cupsdCleanJobs();
if (MaxJobs && cupsArrayCount(Jobs) >= MaxJobs)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("Too many active jobs."));
return (NULL);
}
if ((i = check_quotas(con, printer)) < 0)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("Quota limit reached."));
return (NULL);
}
else if (i == 0)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_AUTHORIZED, _("Not allowed to print."));
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Create the job and set things up...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-priority",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
priority = attr->values[0].integer;
else
{
if ((val = cupsGetOption("job-priority", printer->num_options,
printer->options)) != NULL)
priority = atoi(val);
else
priority = 50;
ippAddInteger(con->request, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-priority",
priority);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-name", IPP_TAG_ZERO)) == NULL)
ippAddString(con->request, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-name", NULL, "Untitled");
else if ((attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME &&
attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAMELANG) ||
attr->num_values != 1)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES,
_("Bad job-name value: Wrong type or count."));
if ((attr = ippCopyAttribute(con->response, attr, 0)) != NULL)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP;
return (NULL);
}
else if (!ippValidateAttribute(attr))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad job-name value: %s"),
cupsLastErrorString());
if ((attr = ippCopyAttribute(con->response, attr, 0)) != NULL)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP;
return (NULL);
}
if ((job = cupsdAddJob(priority, printer->name)) == NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Unable to add job for destination \"%s\"."),
printer->name);
return (NULL);
}
job->dtype = printer->type & (CUPS_PRINTER_CLASS | CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE);
job->attrs = con->request;
job->dirty = 1;
con->request = ippNewRequest(job->attrs->request.op.operation_id);
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_JOBS);
add_job_uuid(job);
apply_printer_defaults(printer, job);
attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "requesting-user-name", IPP_TAG_NAME);
if (con->username[0])
{
cupsdSetString(&job->username, con->username);
if (attr)
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, con->username);
}
else if (attr)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"add_job: requesting-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text);
cupsdSetString(&job->username, attr->values[0].string.text);
}
else
cupsdSetString(&job->username, "anonymous");
if (!attr)
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME,
"job-originating-user-name", NULL, job->username);
else
{
ippSetGroupTag(job->attrs, &attr, IPP_TAG_JOB);
ippSetName(job->attrs, &attr, "job-originating-user-name");
}
if (con->username[0] || auth_info)
{
save_auth_info(con, job, auth_info);
/*
* Remove the auth-info attribute from the attribute data...
*/
if (auth_info)
ippDeleteAttribute(job->attrs, auth_info);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-name", IPP_TAG_NAME)) != NULL)
cupsdSetString(&(job->name), attr->values[0].string.text);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-originating-host-name",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
/*
* Request contains a job-originating-host-name attribute; validate it...
*/
if (attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME ||
attr->num_values != 1 ||
strcmp(con->http->hostname, "localhost"))
{
/*
* Can't override the value if we aren't connected via localhost.
* Also, we can only have 1 value and it must be a name value.
*/
ippDeleteAttribute(job->attrs, attr);
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-originating-host-name", NULL, con->http->hostname);
}
else
ippSetGroupTag(job->attrs, &attr, IPP_TAG_JOB);
}
else
{
/*
* No job-originating-host-name attribute, so use the hostname from
* the connection...
*/
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME,
"job-originating-host-name", NULL, con->http->hostname);
}
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "date-time-at-completed");
ippAddDate(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, "date-time-at-creation", ippTimeToDate(time(NULL)));
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "date-time-at-processing");
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "time-at-completed");
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "time-at-creation", time(NULL));
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "time-at-processing");
/*
* Add remaining job attributes...
*/
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-id", job->id);
job->state = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"job-state", IPP_JOB_STOPPED);
job->state_value = (ipp_jstate_t)job->state->values[0].integer;
job->reasons = ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"job-state-reasons", NULL, "job-incoming");
job->impressions = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-impressions-completed", 0);
job->sheets = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"job-media-sheets-completed", 0);
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_URI, "job-printer-uri", NULL,
printer->uri);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-k-octets", IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
attr->values[0].integer = 0;
else
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-k-octets", 0);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until",
IPP_TAG_KEYWORD)) == NULL)
attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until", IPP_TAG_NAME);
if (!attr)
{
if ((val = cupsGetOption("job-hold-until", printer->num_options,
printer->options)) == NULL)
val = "no-hold";
attr = ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"job-hold-until", NULL, val);
}
if (printer->holding_new_jobs)
{
/*
* Hold all new jobs on this printer...
*/
if (attr && strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "no-hold"))
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, ippGetString(attr, 0, NULL), 0);
else
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, "indefinite", 0);
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "job-held-on-create");
}
else if (attr && strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "no-hold"))
{
/*
* Hold job until specified time...
*/
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, attr->values[0].string.text, 0);
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "job-hold-until-specified");
}
else if (job->attrs->request.op.operation_id == IPP_CREATE_JOB)
{
job->hold_until = time(NULL) + MultipleOperationTimeout;
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
}
else
{
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "none");
}
if (!(printer->type & CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE) || Classification)
{
/*
* Add job sheets options...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) == NULL)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Adding default job-sheets values \"%s,%s\"...",
printer->job_sheets[0], printer->job_sheets[1]);
attr = ippAddStrings(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-sheets",
2, NULL, NULL);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, printer->job_sheets[0]);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, printer->job_sheets[1]);
}
job->job_sheets = attr;
/*
* Enforce classification level if set...
*/
if (Classification)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO,
"Classification=\"%s\", ClassifyOverride=%d",
Classification ? Classification : "(null)",
ClassifyOverride);
if (ClassifyOverride)
{
if (!strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
!strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none")))
{
/*
* Force the leading banner to have the classification on it...
*/
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE, "CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,none\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
Classification, job->username);
}
else if (attr->num_values == 2 &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text) &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))
{
/*
* Can't put two different security markings on the same document!
*/
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, attr->values[0].string.text);
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE, "CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
}
else if (strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, Classification) &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
(strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, Classification) &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))))
{
if (attr->num_values == 1)
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION OVERRIDDEN "
"job-sheets=\"%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text, job->username);
else
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION OVERRIDDEN "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\",fffff "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
}
}
else if (strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, Classification) &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, Classification)))
{
/*
* Force the banner to have the classification on it...
*/
if (attr->num_values > 1 &&
!strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, attr->values[1].string.text))
{
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, Classification);
}
else
{
if (attr->num_values == 1 ||
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none"))
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
if (attr->num_values > 1 &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, Classification);
}
if (attr->num_values > 1)
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
else
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
Classification, job->username);
}
}
/*
* See if we need to add the starting sheet...
*/
if (!(printer->type & CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE))
{
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Adding start banner page \"%s\".",
attr->values[0].string.text);
if ((kbytes = copy_banner(con, job, attr->values[0].string.text)) < 0)
{
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_ABORTED, CUPSD_JOB_PURGE,
"Aborting job because the start banner could not be "
"copied.");
return (NULL);
}
cupsdUpdateQuota(printer, job->username, 0, kbytes);
}
}
else if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
job->job_sheets = attr;
/*
* Fill in the response info...
*/
httpAssembleURIf(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, job_uri, sizeof(job_uri), "ipp", NULL,
con->clientname, con->clientport, "/jobs/%d", job->id);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_URI, "job-uri", NULL,
job_uri);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-id", job->id);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_ENUM, "job-state",
job->state_value);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_TEXT, "job-state-message", NULL, "");
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD, "job-state-reasons",
NULL, job->reasons->values[0].string.text);
con->response->request.status.status_code = IPP_OK;
/*
* Add any job subscriptions...
*/
add_job_subscriptions(con, job);
/*
* Set all but the first two attributes to the job attributes group...
*/
for (attr = job->attrs->attrs->next->next; attr; attr = attr->next)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_JOB;
/*
* Fire the "job created" event...
*/
cupsdAddEvent(CUPSD_EVENT_JOB_CREATED, printer, job, "Job created.");
/*
* Return the new job...
*/
return (job);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The add_job function in scheduler/ipp.c in CUPS before 2.2.6, when D-Bus support is enabled, can be crashed by remote attackers by sending print jobs with an invalid username, related to a D-Bus notification.
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8. | Low | 169,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader *reader,
int byte_order,
dbus_bool_t walk_reader_to_end,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char **new_p)
{
int current_type;
while ((current_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (reader)) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
{
const unsigned char *a;
case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE:
++p;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_DOUBLE:
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (current_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
if (a >= end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order,
p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
}
p += alignment;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRING:
case DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4);
if (a + 4 > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
claimed_len = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
p += 4;
/* p may now be == end */
_dbus_assert (p <= end);
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY)
{
int array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
if (!_dbus_type_is_valid (array_elem_type))
{
return DBUS_INVALID_UNKNOWN_TYPECODE;
}
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
/* a may now be == end */
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
}
if (claimed_len > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PATH;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_STRING)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_string_validate_utf8 (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_UTF8_IN_STRING;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY && claimed_len > 0)
{
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
const unsigned char *array_end;
int array_elem_type;
if (claimed_len > DBUS_MAXIMUM_ARRAY_LENGTH)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_EXCEEDS_MAXIMUM;
/* Remember that the reader is types only, so we can't
* use it to iterate over elements. It stays the same
* for all elements.
*/
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
array_end = p + claimed_len;
array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
/* avoid recursive call to validate_body_helper if this is an array
* of fixed-size elements
*/
if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type))
{
/* bools need to be handled differently, because they can
* have an invalid value
*/
if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v;
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
while (p < array_end)
{
v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
p += alignment;
}
}
else
{
p = array_end;
}
}
else
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
if (p != array_end)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT;
}
/* check nul termination */
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString str;
DBusValidity validity;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* 1 is for nul termination */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
validity =
_dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str));
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
p += claimed_len;
_dbus_assert (p < end);
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
_dbus_verbose ("p = %p end = %p claimed_len %u\n", p, end, claimed_len);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT:
{
/* 1 byte sig len, sig typecodes, align to
* contained-type-boundary, values.
*/
/* In addition to normal signature validation, we need to be sure
* the signature contains only a single (possibly container) type.
*/
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString sig;
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
int contained_alignment;
int contained_type;
DBusValidity reason;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* + 1 for nul */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&sig, p, claimed_len);
reason = _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&sig, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&sig));
if (!(reason == DBUS_VALID))
{
if (reason == DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR)
return reason;
else
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_BAD;
}
p += claimed_len;
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
contained_type = _dbus_first_type_in_signature (&sig, 0);
if (contained_type == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_EMPTY;
contained_alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (contained_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, contained_alignment);
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_init_types_only (&sub, &sig, 0);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (_dbus_type_reader_next (&sub))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIES_MULTIPLE_VALUES;
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_DICT_ENTRY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT:
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, TRUE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
break;
default:
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature");
break;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Stack consumption vulnerability in D-Bus (aka DBus) before 1.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a message containing many nested variants.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BTM_PINCodeReply (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 res, UINT8 pin_len, UINT8 *p_pin, UINT32 trusted_mask[])
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
BTM_TRACE_API ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): PairState: %s PairFlags: 0x%02x PinLen:%d Result:%d",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state), btm_cb.pairing_flags, pin_len, res);
/* If timeout already expired or has been canceled, ignore the reply */
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_LOCAL_PIN)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong State: %d", btm_cb.pairing_state);
return;
}
if (memcmp (bd_addr, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - Wrong BD Addr");
return;
}
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) == NULL)
{
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_PINCodeReply() - no dev CB");
return;
}
if ( (pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN) || (pin_len == 0) || (p_pin == NULL) )
res = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
if (res != BTM_SUCCESS)
{
/* if peer started dd OR we started dd and pre-fetch pin was not used send negative reply */
if ((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PEER_STARTED_DD) ||
((btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) &&
(btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_DISC_WHEN_DONE)) )
{
/* use BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE to report authentication failed event */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_ERR_HOST_REJECT_SECURITY;
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (bd_addr);
}
else
{
p_dev_rec->security_required = BTM_SEC_NONE;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
}
return;
}
if (trusted_mask)
BTM_SEC_COPY_TRUSTED_DEVICE(trusted_mask, p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if ( (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)
&& (p_dev_rec->hci_handle == BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)
&& (btm_cb.security_mode_changed == FALSE) )
{
/* This is start of the dedicated bonding if local device is 2.0 */
btm_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.security_mode_changed = TRUE;
#ifdef APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION
if(!(APPL_AUTH_WRITE_EXCEPTION)(p_dev_rec->bd_addr))
#endif
btsnd_hcic_write_auth_enable (TRUE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = 0xff ;
/* if we rejected incoming connection request, we have to wait HCI_Connection_Complete event */
/* before originating */
if (btm_cb.pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_REJECTED_CONNECT)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): waiting HCI_Connection_Complete after rejected incoming connection");
/* we change state little bit early so btm_sec_connected() will originate connection */
/* when existing ACL link is down completely */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
/* if we already accepted incoming connection from pairing device */
else if (p_dev_rec->sm4 & BTM_SM4_CONN_PEND)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("BTM_PINCodeReply(): link is connecting so wait pin code request from peer");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ);
}
else if (btm_sec_dd_create_conn(p_dev_rec) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED;
if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, HCI_ERR_AUTH_FAILURE);
}
return;
}
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btm_cb.acl_disc_reason = HCI_SUCCESS;
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
BTM_TRACE_EVENT("BTM_PINCodeReply(): Saving pin_len: %d btm_cb.pin_code_len: %d", pin_len, btm_cb.pin_code_len);
/* if this was not pre-fetched, save the PIN */
if (btm_cb.pin_code_len == 0)
memcpy (btm_cb.pin_code, p_pin, pin_len);
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = pin_len;
#endif
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (bd_addr, pin_len, p_pin);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT feature in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to bypass intended pairing restrictions via a crafted device, aka internal bug 26551752.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
| Medium | 173,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = 0;
size_t n;
if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Receive client pre-shared key identity name
*/
if( *p + 2 > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
else
{
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
}
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY );
}
*p += n;
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: In ARM mbed TLS before 2.7.0, there is a bounds-check bypass through an integer overflow in PSK identity parsing in the ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() function in library/ssl_srv.c.
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version. | High | 169,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: make_error(png_store* volatile psIn, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, int interlace_type, int test, png_const_charp name)
{
png_store * volatile ps = psIn;
context(ps, fault);
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, transform_width(pp, colour_type, bit_depth),
transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth), bit_depth, colour_type,
interlace_type, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
/* Time for a few errors; these are in various optional chunks, the
* standard tests test the standard chunks pretty well.
*/
# define exception__prev exception_prev_1
# define exception__env exception_env_1
Try
{
/* Expect this to throw: */
ps->expect_error = !error_test[test].warning;
ps->expect_warning = error_test[test].warning;
ps->saw_warning = 0;
error_test[test].fn(pp, pi);
/* Normally the error is only detected here: */
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* And handle the case where it was only a warning: */
if (ps->expect_warning && ps->saw_warning)
Throw ps;
/* If we get here there is a problem, we have success - no error or
* no warning - when we shouldn't have success. Log an error.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, error_test[test].msg, 1 /*error*/);
}
Catch (fault)
ps = fault; /* expected exit, make sure ps is not clobbered */
#undef exception__prev
#undef exception__env
/* And clear these flags */
ps->expect_error = 0;
ps->expect_warning = 0;
/* Now write the whole image, just to make sure that the detected, or
* undetected, errro has not created problems inside libpng.
*/
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) !=
transform_rowsize(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
png_uint_32 h = transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
int npasses = png_set_interlace_handling(pp);
int pass;
if (npasses != npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_byte buffer[TRANSFORM_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, buffer, colour_type, bit_depth, y);
png_write_row(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* The following deletes the file that was just written. */
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user;
struct key *key;
int ret;
kenter("");
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0) {
kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
}
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
goto couldnt_alloc_key;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
couldnt_alloc_key:
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-862
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.14.6 omitted an access-control check when adding a key to the current task's *default request-key keyring* via the request_key() system call, allowing a local user to use a sequence of crafted system calls to add keys to a keyring with only Search permission (not Write permission) to that keyring, related to construct_get_dest_keyring() in security/keys/request_key.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | Low | 167,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DefragTimeoutTest(void)
{
int i;
int ret = 0;
/* Setup a small numberr of trackers. */
if (ConfSet("defrag.trackers", "16") != 1) {
printf("ConfSet failed: ");
goto end;
}
DefragInit();
/* Load in 16 packets. */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(i, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
SCFree(p);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
}
/* Build a new packet but push the timestamp out by our timeout.
* This should force our previous fragments to be timed out. */
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(99, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
p->ts.tv_sec += (defrag_context->timeout + 1);
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
DefragTracker *tracker = DefragLookupTrackerFromHash(p);
if (tracker == NULL)
goto end;
if (tracker->id != 99)
goto end;
SCFree(p);
ret = 1;
end:
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TracingControllerImpl::TracingControllerImpl()
: delegate_(GetContentClient()->browser()->GetTracingDelegate()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(!g_tracing_controller);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
base::FileTracing::SetProvider(new FileTracingProviderImpl);
AddAgents();
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->AddAsyncEnabledStateObserver(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
g_tracing_controller = this;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The Web Animations implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, improperly relies on list iteration, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-destruction) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
[email protected]
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052} | Medium | 172,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sample(png_const_bytep row, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth,
png_uint_32 x, unsigned int sample_index)
{
png_uint_32 bit_index, result;
/* Find a sample index for the desired sample: */
x *= bit_depth;
bit_index = x;
if ((colour_type & 1) == 0) /* !palette */
{
if (colour_type & 2)
bit_index *= 3;
if (colour_type & 4)
bit_index += x; /* Alpha channel */
/* Multiple channels; select one: */
if (colour_type & (2+4))
bit_index += sample_index * bit_depth;
}
/* Return the sample from the row as an integer. */
row += bit_index >> 3;
result = *row;
if (bit_depth == 8)
return result;
else if (bit_depth > 8)
return (result << 8) + *++row;
/* Less than 8 bits per sample. */
bit_index &= 7;
return (result >> (8-bit_index-bit_depth)) & ((1U<<bit_depth)-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb)
{
kiocb->ki_iovec = &kiocb->ki_inline_vec;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_base = kiocb->ki_buf;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = kiocb->ki_left;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = 1;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec.
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 167,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Cues::Init() const
{
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) //CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MojoResult UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* memory_handle,
size_t* size,
bool* read_only) {
if (!handle.is_valid())
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
MojoPlatformHandle platform_handle;
platform_handle.struct_size = sizeof(MojoPlatformHandle);
MojoPlatformSharedBufferHandleFlags flags;
size_t num_bytes;
MojoSharedBufferGuid mojo_guid;
MojoResult result = MojoUnwrapPlatformSharedBufferHandle(
handle.release().value(), &platform_handle, &num_bytes, &mojo_guid,
&flags);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
if (size)
*size = num_bytes;
if (read_only)
*read_only = flags & MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
base::UnguessableToken guid =
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(mojo_guid.high, mojo_guid.low);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_MACH_PORT);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
static_cast<mach_port_t>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_FUCHSIA)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FUCHSIA_HANDLE);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
static_cast<zx_handle_t>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FILE_DESCRIPTOR);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
base::FileDescriptor(static_cast<int>(platform_handle.value), false),
num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_WINDOWS_HANDLE);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#endif
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi before 2.4.3. The VPXChunk class in XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/WEBP_Support.cpp does not ensure nonzero widths and heights, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted .webp file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_const_principal client_princ,
krb5_const_principal header_srv_princ,
krb5_boolean issuing_referral,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
krb5_db_entry **princ_ptr,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_boolean is_local_tgt;
krb5_pa_data *pa_data;
int flags;
krb5_db_entry *princ;
*princ_ptr = NULL;
pa_data = krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context,
request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER);
if (pa_data != NULL) {
code = kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context,
request,
pa_data,
tgs_subkey,
tgs_session,
s4u_x509_user,
status);
if (code != 0)
return code;
} else {
pa_data = krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context,
request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
if (pa_data != NULL) {
code = kdc_process_for_user(kdc_active_realm,
pa_data,
tgs_session,
s4u_x509_user,
status);
if (code != 0)
return code;
} else
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to compare the client name in the TGT with the requested
* server name. Supporting server name aliases without assuming a
* global name service makes this difficult to do.
*
* The comparison below handles the following cases (note that the
* term "principal name" below excludes the realm).
*
* (1) The requested service is a host-based service with two name
* components, in which case we assume the principal name to
* contain sufficient qualifying information. The realm is
* ignored for the purpose of comparison.
*
* (2) The requested service name is an enterprise principal name:
* the service principal name is compared with the unparsed
* form of the client name (including its realm).
*
* (3) The requested service is some other name type: an exact
* match is required.
*
* An alternative would be to look up the server once again with
* FLAG_CANONICALIZE | FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY set, do an exact
* match between the returned name and client_princ. However, this
* assumes that the client set FLAG_CANONICALIZE when requesting
* the TGT and that we have a global name service.
*/
flags = 0;
switch (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server)) {
case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST: /* (1) */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2)
flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_IGNORE_REALM;
break;
case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL: /* (2) */
flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE;
break;
default: /* (3) */
break;
}
if (!krb5_principal_compare_flags(kdc_context,
request->server,
client_princ,
flags)) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error code */
}
/*
* Protocol transition is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc
* as well as user-to-user and constrained delegation. This check
* is also made in validate_as_request().
*
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/*
* Valid S4U2Self requests can occur in the following combinations:
*
* (1) local TGT, local user, local server
* (2) cross TGT, local user, issuing referral
* (3) cross TGT, non-local user, issuing referral
* (4) cross TGT, non-local user, local server
*
* The first case is for a single-realm S4U2Self scenario; the second,
* third, and fourth cases are for the initial, intermediate (if any), and
* final cross-realm requests in a multi-realm scenario.
*/
is_local_tgt = !is_cross_tgs_principal(header_srv_princ);
if (is_local_tgt && issuing_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
/*
* Do not attempt to lookup principals in foreign realms.
*/
if (is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm,
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user)) {
krb5_db_entry no_server;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
if (!is_local_tgt && !issuing_referral) {
/* A local server should not need a cross-realm TGT to impersonate
* a local principal. */
*status = "NOT_CROSS_REALM_REQUEST";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error */
}
code = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context,
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC, &princ);
if (code == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
*status = "UNKNOWN_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
} else if (code) {
*status = "LOOKING_UP_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
return code; /* caller can free for_user */
}
memset(&no_server, 0, sizeof(no_server));
code = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm, request, *princ,
no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);
if (code) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, princ);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return code;
}
*princ_ptr = princ;
} else if (is_local_tgt) {
/*
* The server is asking to impersonate a principal from another realm,
* using a local TGT. It should instead ask that principal's realm and
* follow referrals back to us.
*/
*status = "S4U2SELF_CLIENT_NOT_OURS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* match Windows error */
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: A Reachable Assertion issue was discovered in the KDC in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.17. If an attacker can obtain a krbtgt ticket using an older encryption type (single-DES, triple-DES, or RC4), the attacker can crash the KDC by making an S4U2Self request.
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[[email protected]: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17 | Low | 168,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip;
if (max_offset.x()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_x((scroll_offset.x() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) /
max_offset.x());
}
if (max_offset.y()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_y((scroll_offset.y() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) /
max_offset.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.x());
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.y());
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.x() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() ||
scroll_offset_dip.x() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.x() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.x();
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.y() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() ||
scroll_offset_dip.y() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.y() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.y();
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"x",
scroll_offset_dip.x(),
"y",
scroll_offset_dip.y());
if (compositor_) {
compositor_->DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::ScrollOffset(scroll_offset_dip_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653} | High | 171,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pimv2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
int advance;
enum checksum_status cksum_status;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
if (ep > bp + len)
ep = bp + len;
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
pimv2_addr_len = pim->pim_rsv;
if (pimv2_addr_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RFC2117-encoding"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cksum 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum) == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
} else {
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) == PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER) {
/*
* The checksum only covers the packet header,
* not the encapsulated packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, 8);
if (cksum_status == INCORRECT) {
/*
* To quote RFC 4601, "For interoperability
* reasons, a message carrying a checksum
* calculated over the entire PIM Register
* message should also be accepted."
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
} else {
/*
* The checksum covers the entire packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
switch (cksum_status) {
case CORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
break;
case INCORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect)"));
break;
case UNVERIFIED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
break;
}
}
switch (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)) {
case PIMV2_TYPE_HELLO:
{
uint16_t otype, olen;
bp += 4;
while (bp < ep) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
otype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
olen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 + olen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (%u), length %u, Value: ",
tok2str(pimv2_hello_option_values, "Unknown", otype),
otype,
olen));
bp += 4;
switch (otype) {
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_HOLDTIME:
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_LANPRUNEDELAY:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
char t_bit;
uint16_t lan_delay, override_interval;
lan_delay = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
override_interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2);
t_bit = (lan_delay & 0x8000)? 1 : 0;
lan_delay &= ~0x8000;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T-bit=%d, LAN delay %dms, Override interval %dms",
t_bit, lan_delay, override_interval));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY:
switch (olen) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bi-Directional Capability (Old)"));
break;
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
break;
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_GENID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_REFRESH_CAP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "v%d", *bp));
if (*(bp+1) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", interval "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, *(bp+1));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?0x%04x?", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2)));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_BIDIR_CAP:
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const u_char *ptr = bp;
while (ptr < (bp+olen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, ptr, pimv2_unicast, 0);
if (advance < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
ptr += advance;
}
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
bp += olen;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER:
{
const struct ip *ip;
ND_TCHECK2(*(bp + 4), PIMV2_REGISTER_FLAG_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [ %s ]\n\t",
tok2str(pimv2_register_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(bp+4))));
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/* encapsulated multicast packet */
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 0: /* Null header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP-Null-header %s > %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
break;
case 4: /* IPv4 */
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case 6: /* IPv6 */
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP ver %d", IP_V(ip)));
break;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " source="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
/*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |PIM Ver| Type | Addr length | Checksum |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Unicast-Upstream Neighbor Address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Reserved | Num groups | Holdtime |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Joined Sources | Number of Pruned Sources |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
{
uint8_t ngroup;
uint16_t holdtime;
uint16_t njoin;
uint16_t nprune;
int i, j;
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", upstream-neighbor: "));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
if (bp + 4 > ep)
break;
ngroup = bp[1];
holdtime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u group(s)", ngroup));
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holdtime: "));
if (holdtime == 0xffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "infinite"));
else
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, holdtime);
}
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < ngroup; i++) {
if (bp >= ep)
goto jp_done;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t group #%u: ", i+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 4 > ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", joined sources: %u, pruned sources: %u", njoin, nprune));
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (j = 0; j < njoin; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t joined source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
for (j = 0; j < nprune; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t pruned source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
}
jp_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_BOOTSTRAP:
{
int i, j, frpcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Fragment Tag, Hash Mask len, and BSR-priority */
if (bp + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag=%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hashmlen=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSRprio=%d", bp[1]));
bp += 2;
/* Encoded-Unicast-BSR-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSR="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
for (i = 0; bp < ep; i++) {
/* Encoded-Group Address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (group%d: ", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
/* RP-Count, Frag RP-Cnt, and rsvd */
if (bp >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPcnt=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRPcnt=%d", frpcnt = bp[1]));
bp += 4;
for (j = 0; j < frpcnt && bp < ep; j++) {
/* each RP info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP%d=", j));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp,
pimv2_unicast,
0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
if (bp + 2 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",prio=%d", bp[2]));
bp += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
bs_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_ASSERT:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 8 > ep)
break;
if (bp[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPT"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pref=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[0]) & 0x7fffffff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4])));
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_CANDIDATE_RP:
{
int i, pfxcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Prefix-Cnt, Priority, and Holdtime */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prefix-cnt=%d", bp[0]));
pfxcnt = bp[0];
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prio=%d", bp[1]));
if (bp + 3 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
bp += 4;
/* Encoded-Unicast-RP-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
/* Encoded-Group Addresses */
for (i = 0; i < pfxcnt && bp < ep; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Group%d=", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_PRUNE_REFRESH:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " grp="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forwarder="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TUNR "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [type %d]", PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIMv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c:pimv2_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12996/PIMv2: Make sure PIM TLVs have the right length.
We do bounds checks based on the TLV length, so if the TLV's length is
too short, and we don't check for that, we could end up fetching data
past the end of the TLV - including past the length of the captured data
in the packet.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FileStream::FileStream(base::File file,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& task_runner)
: context_(base::MakeUnique<Context>(std::move(file), task_runner)) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in ChromeVox in Google Chrome OS prior to 62.0.3202.74 allowed a remote attacker in a privileged network position to observe or tamper with certain cleartext HTTP requests by leveraging that position.
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123} | Medium | 173,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FileTransfer::DoUpload(filesize_t *total_bytes, ReliSock *s)
{
int rc;
MyString fullname;
filesize_t bytes;
bool is_the_executable;
bool upload_success = false;
bool do_download_ack = false;
bool do_upload_ack = false;
bool try_again = false;
int hold_code = 0;
int hold_subcode = 0;
MyString error_desc;
bool I_go_ahead_always = false;
bool peer_goes_ahead_always = false;
DCTransferQueue xfer_queue(m_xfer_queue_contact_info);
CondorError errstack;
bool first_failed_file_transfer_happened = false;
bool first_failed_upload_success = false;
bool first_failed_try_again = false;
int first_failed_hold_code = 0;
int first_failed_hold_subcode = 0;
MyString first_failed_error_desc;
int first_failed_line_number;
*total_bytes = 0;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"entering FileTransfer::DoUpload\n");
priv_state saved_priv = PRIV_UNKNOWN;
if( want_priv_change ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
s->encode();
if( !s->code(m_final_transfer_flag) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
bool socket_default_crypto = s->get_encryption();
if( want_priv_change && saved_priv == PRIV_UNKNOWN ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
FileTransferList filelist;
ExpandFileTransferList( FilesToSend, filelist );
FileTransferList::iterator filelist_it;
for( filelist_it = filelist.begin();
filelist_it != filelist.end();
filelist_it++ )
{
char const *filename = filelist_it->srcName();
char const *dest_dir = filelist_it->destDir();
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s to %s%c\n",filename,dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
else {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: sending file %s\n",filename);
}
bool is_url;
is_url = false;
if( param_boolean("ENABLE_URL_TRANSFERS", true) && IsUrl(filename) ) {
is_url = true;
fullname = filename;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sending %s as URL.\n", filename);
} else if( filename[0] != '/' && filename[0] != '\\' && filename[1] != ':' ){
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",Iwd,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,filename);
} else {
fullname = filename;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if( !is_url && perm_obj && !is_the_executable &&
(perm_obj->read_access(fullname.Value()) != 1) ) {
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error reading from %s: permission denied",fullname.Value());
do_upload_ack = true; // tell receiver that we failed
do_download_ack = true;
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = EPERM;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
#endif
if (is_the_executable) {} // Done to get rid of the compiler set-but-not-used warnings.
int file_command = 1;
int file_subcommand = 0;
if ( DontEncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 3;
}
if ( EncryptFiles->file_contains_withwildcard(filename) ) {
file_command = 2;
}
if ( X509UserProxy && file_strcmp( filename, X509UserProxy ) == 0 &&
DelegateX509Credentials ) {
file_command = 4;
}
if ( is_url ) {
file_command = 5;
}
if ( m_final_transfer_flag && OutputDestination ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: Using command 999:7 for OutputDestionation: %s\n",
OutputDestination);
file_command = 999;
file_subcommand = 7;
}
bool fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = false;
bool fail_because_symlink_not_supported = false;
if( filelist_it->is_directory ) {
if( filelist_it->is_symlink ) {
fail_because_symlink_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer symlink %s which points to a directory. This is not supported.\n",filename);
}
else if( PeerUnderstandsMkdir ) {
file_command = 6;
}
else {
fail_because_mkdir_not_supported = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: attempting to transfer directory %s, but the version of Condor we are talking to is too old to support that!\n",
filename);
}
}
dprintf ( D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: outgoing file_command is %i for %s\n",
file_command, filename );
if( !s->snd_int(file_command,FALSE) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if (file_command == 2) {
s->set_crypto_mode(true);
} else if (file_command == 3) {
s->set_crypto_mode(false);
}
else {
s->set_crypto_mode(socket_default_crypto);
}
MyString dest_filename;
if ( ExecFile && !simple_init && (file_strcmp(ExecFile,filename)==0 )) {
is_the_executable = true;
dest_filename = CONDOR_EXEC;
} else {
is_the_executable = false;
if( dest_dir && *dest_dir ) {
dest_filename.sprintf("%s%c",dest_dir,DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
dest_filename.sprintf_cat( condor_basename(filename) );
}
if( !s->put(dest_filename.Value()) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( PeerDoesGoAhead ) {
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed on eom before GoAhead; exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !peer_goes_ahead_always ) {
if( !ReceiveTransferGoAhead(s,fullname.Value(),false,peer_goes_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
if( !I_go_ahead_always ) {
if( !ObtainAndSendTransferGoAhead(xfer_queue,false,s,fullname.Value(),I_go_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
s->encode();
}
if ( file_command == 999) {
ClassAd file_info;
file_info.Assign("ProtocolVersion", 1);
file_info.Assign("Command", file_command);
file_info.Assign("SubCommand", file_subcommand);
if(file_subcommand == 7) {
MyString source_filename;
source_filename = Iwd;
source_filename += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
source_filename += filename;
MyString URL;
URL = OutputDestination;
URL += DIR_DELIM_CHAR;
URL += filename;
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: calling IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\"\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "LocalProxyName: %s\n", LocalProxyName.Value());
rc = InvokeFileTransferPlugin(errstack, source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), LocalProxyName.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: IFTP(fn,U): fn\"%s\", U\"%s\" returns %i\n", source_filename.Value(), URL.Value(), rc);
file_info.Assign("Filename", source_filename);
file_info.Assign("OutputDestination", URL);
file_info.Assign("Result", rc);
if (rc) {
file_info.Assign("ErrorString", errstack.getFullText());
}
if(!file_info.put(*s)) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
MyString junkbuf;
file_info.sPrint(junkbuf);
bytes = junkbuf.Length();
} else {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "DoUpload: invalid subcommand %i, skipping %s.",
file_subcommand, filename);
bytes = 0;
rc = 0;
}
} else if ( file_command == 4 ) {
if ( (PeerDoesGoAhead || s->end_of_message()) ) {
time_t expiration_time = GetDesiredDelegatedJobCredentialExpiration(&jobAd);
rc = s->put_x509_delegation( &bytes, fullname.Value(), expiration_time, NULL );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG,
"DoUpload: put_x509_delegation() returned %d\n",
rc );
} else {
rc = -1;
}
} else if (file_command == 5) {
if(!s->code(fullname)) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: failed to send fullname: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = -1;
} else {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoUpload: sent fullname and NO eom: %s\n", fullname.Value());
rc = 0;
}
bytes = fullname.Length();
} else if( file_command == 6 ) { // mkdir
bytes = sizeof( filelist_it->file_mode );
if( !s->put( filelist_it->file_mode ) ) {
rc = -1;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoUpload: failed to send mkdir mode\n");
}
else {
rc = 0;
}
} else if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported || fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
if( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, NULL_FILE );
}
if( rc == 0 ) {
rc = PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED;
errno = EISDIR;
}
} else if ( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->put_file_with_permissions( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
} else {
rc = s->put_file( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
}
if( rc < 0 ) {
int the_error = errno;
upload_success = false;
error_desc.sprintf("error sending %s",fullname.Value());
if((rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) || (rc == PUT_FILE_PLUGIN_FAILED)) {
if (rc == PUT_FILE_OPEN_FAILED) {
error_desc.replaceString("sending","reading from");
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": (errno %d) %s",the_error,strerror(the_error));
if( fail_because_mkdir_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Remote condor version is too old to transfer directories.");
}
if( fail_because_symlink_not_supported ) {
error_desc.sprintf_cat("; Transfer of symlinks to directories is not supported.");
}
} else {
error_desc.sprintf_cat(": %s", errstack.getFullText());
}
try_again = false; // put job on hold
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_UploadFileError;
hold_subcode = the_error;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == false) {
first_failed_file_transfer_happened = true;
first_failed_upload_success = false;
first_failed_try_again = false;
first_failed_hold_code = hold_code;
first_failed_hold_subcode = the_error;
first_failed_error_desc = error_desc;
first_failed_line_number = __LINE__;
}
}
else {
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = false;
try_again = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,
socket_default_crypto,upload_success,
do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,
error_desc.Value(),__LINE__);
}
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoUpload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
*total_bytes += bytes;
if( dest_filename.FindChar(DIR_DELIM_CHAR) < 0 &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStdoutFile.Value()) &&
dest_filename != condor_basename(JobStderrFile.Value()) )
{
Info.addSpooledFile( dest_filename.Value() );
}
}
do_download_ack = true;
do_upload_ack = true;
if (first_failed_file_transfer_happened == true) {
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
first_failed_upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
first_failed_try_again,first_failed_hold_code,
first_failed_hold_subcode,first_failed_error_desc.Value(),
first_failed_line_number);
}
upload_success = true;
return ExitDoUpload(total_bytes,s,saved_priv,socket_default_crypto,
upload_success,do_upload_ack,do_download_ack,
try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,NULL,__LINE__);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
if (cmd & 0x01) off = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x02) off |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x04) off |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (cmd & 0x08) off |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) len = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x20) len |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x40) len |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A flaw was found in libgit2 before version 0.27.3. A missing check in git_delta_apply function in delta.c file, may lead to an out-of-bound read while reading a binary delta file. An attacker may use this flaw to cause a Denial of Service.
Commit Message: delta: fix out-of-bounds read of delta
When computing the offset and length of the delta base, we repeatedly
increment the `delta` pointer without checking whether we have advanced
past its end already, which can thus result in an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by repeatedly checking whether we have reached the end. Add a
test which would cause Valgrind to produce an error.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <[email protected]>
Test-provided-by: Riccardo Schirone <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,244 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionBrowserTest::OpenWindow(content::WebContents* contents,
const GURL& url,
bool newtab_process_should_equal_opener,
content::WebContents** newtab_result) {
content::WebContentsAddedObserver tab_added_observer;
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(contents,
"window.open('" + url.spec() + "');"));
content::WebContents* newtab = tab_added_observer.GetWebContents();
ASSERT_TRUE(newtab);
WaitForLoadStop(newtab);
EXPECT_EQ(url, newtab->GetLastCommittedURL());
if (newtab_process_should_equal_opener) {
EXPECT_EQ(contents->GetMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
newtab->GetMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
} else {
EXPECT_NE(contents->GetMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance(),
newtab->GetMainFrame()->GetSiteInstance());
}
if (newtab_result)
*newtab_result = newtab;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to access Extension pages without authorisation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779} | Medium | 172,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DTLS message that is processed with a different read operation for the handshake header than for the handshake body, related to the dtls1_get_record function in d1_pkt.c and the ssl3_read_n function in s3_pkt.c.
Commit Message: Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Cluster::GetEntry(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const
{
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0)
{
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;)
{
if (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
{
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc)
{
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long CuePoint::GetTimeCode() const
{
return m_timecode;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not generate Fragment Identification values separately for each destination, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static TPM_RC StartAuthSession(TSS2_SYS_CONTEXT *sapi_context, SESSION *session )
{
TPM_RC rval;
TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET key;
char label[] = "ATH";
UINT16 bytes;
int i;
key.t.size = 0;
if( session->nonceOlder.t.size == 0 )
{
/* this is an internal routine to TSS and should be removed */
session->nonceOlder.t.size = GetDigestSize( TPM_ALG_SHA1 );
for( i = 0; i < session->nonceOlder.t.size; i++ )
session->nonceOlder.t.buffer[i] = 0;
}
session->nonceNewer.t.size = session->nonceOlder.t.size;
rval = Tss2_Sys_StartAuthSession( sapi_context, session->tpmKey, session->bind, 0,
&( session->nonceOlder ), &( session->encryptedSalt ), session->sessionType,
&( session->symmetric ), session->authHash, &( session->sessionHandle ),
&( session->nonceNewer ), 0 );
if( rval == TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
if( session->tpmKey == TPM_RH_NULL )
session->salt.t.size = 0;
if( session->bind == TPM_RH_NULL )
session->authValueBind.t.size = 0;
if( session->tpmKey == TPM_RH_NULL && session->bind == TPM_RH_NULL )
{
session->sessionKey.b.size = 0;
}
else
{
bool result = string_bytes_concat_buffer( (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&key, &( session->authValueBind.b ) );
if (!result)
{
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
result = string_bytes_concat_buffer( (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&key, &( session->salt.b ) );
if (!result)
{
return TSS2_SYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
}
bytes = GetDigestSize( session->authHash );
if( key.t.size == 0 )
{
session->sessionKey.t.size = 0;
}
else
{
rval = tpm_kdfa(sapi_context, session->authHash, &(key.b), label, &( session->nonceNewer.b ),
&( session->nonceOlder.b ), bytes * 8, (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&( session->sessionKey ) );
}
if( rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS )
{
return( TSS2_APP_RC_CREATE_SESSION_KEY_FAILED );
}
}
session->nonceTpmDecrypt.b.size = 0;
session->nonceTpmEncrypt.b.size = 0;
session->nvNameChanged = 0;
}
return rval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-522
Summary: tpm2-tools versions before 1.1.1 are vulnerable to a password leak due to transmitting password in plaintext from client to server when generating HMAC.
Commit Message: kdfa: use openssl for hmac not tpm
While not reachable in the current code base tools, a potential
security bug lurked in tpm_kdfa().
If using that routine for an hmac authorization, the hmac was
calculated using the tpm. A user of an object wishing to
authenticate via hmac, would expect that the password is never
sent to the tpm. However, since the hmac calculation relies on
password, and is performed by the tpm, the password ends up
being sent in plain text to the tpm.
The fix is to use openssl to generate the hmac on the host.
Fixes: CVE-2017-7524
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int is_integer(char *string)
{
if (isdigit(string[0]) || string[0] == '-' || string[0] == '+') {
while (*++string && isdigit(*string))
; /* deliberately empty */
if (!*string)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the set_cs_start function in t1disasm.c in t1utils before 1.39 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char. | High | 166,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
{
void *buf = n->nm_nlh;
size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
size_t tlen;
tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len += tlen;
if (tlen > len)
memset(buf + len, 0, tlen - len);
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Reserved %zu (%zu) bytes, pad=%d, nlmsg_len=%d\n",
n, tlen, len, pad, n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len);
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.
Commit Message: | High | 165,218 |
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