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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision)
{
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 27;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void cs_cmd_flags(sourceinfo_t *si, int parc, char *parv[])
{
chanacs_t *ca;
mowgli_node_t *n;
char *channel = parv[0];
char *target = sstrdup(parv[1]);
char *flagstr = parv[2];
const char *str1;
unsigned int addflags, removeflags, restrictflags;
hook_channel_acl_req_t req;
mychan_t *mc;
if (parc < 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <channel> [target] [flags]"));
return;
}
mc = mychan_find(channel);
if (!mc)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("Channel \2%s\2 is not registered."), channel);
return;
}
if (metadata_find(mc, "private:close:closer") && (target || !has_priv(si, PRIV_CHAN_AUSPEX)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 is closed."), channel);
return;
}
if (!target || (target && target[0] == '+' && flagstr == NULL))
{
unsigned int flags = (target != NULL) ? flags_to_bitmask(target, 0) : 0;
do_list(si, mc, flags);
return;
}
/*
* following conditions are for compatibility with Anope just to avoid a whole clusterfuck
* of confused users caused by their 'innovation.' yeah, that's a word for it alright.
*
* anope 1.9's shiny new FLAGS command has:
*
* FLAGS #channel LIST
* FLAGS #channel MODIFY user flagspec
* FLAGS #channel CLEAR
*
* obviously they do not support the atheme syntax, because lets face it, they like to
* 'innovate.' this is, of course, hilarious for obvious reasons. never mind that we
* *invented* the FLAGS system for channel ACLs, so you would think they would find it
* worthwhile to be compatible here. i guess that would have been too obvious or something
* about their whole 'stealing our design' thing that they have been doing in 1.9 since the
* beginning... or do i mean 'innovating?'
*
* anyway we rewrite the commands as appropriate in the two if blocks below so that they
* are processed by the flags code as the user would intend. obviously, we're not really
* capable of handling the anope flag model (which makes honestly zero sense to me, and is
* extremely complex which kind of misses the entire point of the flags UI design...) so if
* some user tries passing anope flags, it will probably be hilarious. the good news is
* most of the anope flags tie up to atheme flags in some weird way anyway (probably because,
* i don't know, they copied the entire design and then fucked it up? yeah. probably that.)
*
* --nenolod
*/
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "LIST") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
do_list(si, mc, 0);
free(target);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "CLEAR") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (!chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, "You are not authorized to perform this operation.");
return;
}
mowgli_node_t *tn;
MOWGLI_ITER_FOREACH_SAFE(n, tn, mc->chanacs.head)
{
ca = n->data;
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER)
continue;
object_unref(ca);
}
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_DO, "CLEAR:FLAGS: \2%s\2", mc->name);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Cleared flags in \2%s\2."), mc->name);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "MODIFY") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (parc < 3)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <#channel> MODIFY [target] <flags>"));
return;
}
flagstr = strchr(parv[2], ' ');
if (flagstr)
*flagstr++ = '\0';
target = strdup(parv[2]);
}
{
myentity_t *mt;
if (!si->smu)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not logged in."));
return;
}
if (!flagstr)
{
if (!(mc->flags & MC_PUBACL) && !chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_ACLVIEW))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
if (validhostmask(target))
ca = chanacs_find_host_literal(mc, target, 0);
else
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_find_literal(mc, mt, 0);
}
if (ca != NULL)
{
str1 = bitmask_to_flags2(ca->level, 0);
command_success_string(si, str1, _("Flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2 are \2%s\2."),
target, channel,
str1);
}
else
command_success_string(si, "", _("No flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."),
target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_GET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", mc->name, target);
return;
}
/* founder may always set flags -- jilles */
restrictflags = chanacs_source_flags(mc, si);
if (restrictflags & CA_FOUNDER)
restrictflags = ca_all;
else
{
if (!(restrictflags & CA_FLAGS))
{
/* allow a user to remove their own access
* even without +f */
if (restrictflags & CA_AKICK ||
si->smu == NULL ||
irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name) ||
strcmp(flagstr, "-*"))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
}
if (irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name))
restrictflags = allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
else
restrictflags |= allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
}
if (*flagstr == '+' || *flagstr == '-' || *flagstr == '=')
{
flags_make_bitmasks(flagstr, &addflags, &removeflags);
if (addflags == 0 && removeflags == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("No valid flags given, use /%s%s HELP FLAGS for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp);
return;
}
}
else
{
addflags = get_template_flags(mc, flagstr);
if (addflags == 0)
{
/* Hack -- jilles */
if (*target == '+' || *target == '-' || *target == '=')
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Usage: FLAGS %s [target] [flags]"), mc->name);
else
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Invalid template name given, use /%s%s TEMPLATE %s for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp, mc->name);
return;
}
removeflags = ca_all & ~addflags;
}
if (!validhostmask(target))
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_open(mc, mt, NULL, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FLAGS && !(removeflags & CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove a founder's +f access."));
return;
}
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FOUNDER && mychan_num_founders(mc) == 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove the last founder."));
return;
}
if (!(ca->level & CA_FOUNDER) && addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
if (mychan_num_founders(mc) >= chansvs.maxfounders)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("Only %d founders allowed per channel."), chansvs.maxfounders);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_can_register_channel(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 has too many channels registered."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_allow_foundership(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 cannot take foundership of a channel."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
}
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
addflags |= CA_FLAGS, removeflags &= ~CA_FLAGS;
/* If NEVEROP is set, don't allow adding new entries
* except sole +b. Adding flags if the current level
* is +b counts as adding an entry.
* -- jilles */
/* XXX: not all entities are users */
if (isuser(mt) && (MU_NEVEROP & user(mt)->flags && addflags != CA_AKICK && addflags != 0 && (ca->level == 0 || ca->level == CA_AKICK)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 does not wish to be added to channel access lists (NEVEROP set)."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), mt->name, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
else
{
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("You may not set founder status on a hostmask."));
return;
}
ca = chanacs_open(mc, NULL, target, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), target, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
if ((addflags | removeflags) == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nochange, _("Channel access to \2%s\2 for \2%s\2 unchanged."), channel, target);
return;
}
flagstr = bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Flags \2%s\2 were set on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), flagstr, target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_SET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 \2%s\2 \2%s\2", mc->name, target, flagstr);
verbose(mc, "\2%s\2 set flags \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", get_source_name(si), flagstr, target);
}
free(target);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: modules/chanserv/flags.c in Atheme before 7.2.7 allows remote attackers to modify the Anope FLAGS behavior by registering and dropping the (1) LIST, (2) CLEAR, or (3) MODIFY keyword nicks.
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397 | Medium | 167,587 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | High | 166,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the xacct_add_tsk function in kernel/tsacct.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.19 allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a taskstats TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID command.
Commit Message: [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <[email protected]>
Cc: Balbir Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Jay Lan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPinCode(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& pincode) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPinCode: " << pincode;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PINCODE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPinCode(this, pincode);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CreateSymbolicLink(const FilePath& target, const FilePath& symlink) {
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::CreateSymbolicLink(target, symlink))
<< ": " << target.value() << ": " << symlink.value();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int store_icy(URLContext *h, int size)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
/* until next metadata packet */
int remaining = s->icy_metaint - s->icy_data_read;
if (remaining < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!remaining) {
/* The metadata packet is variable sized. It has a 1 byte header
* which sets the length of the packet (divided by 16). If it's 0,
* the metadata doesn't change. After the packet, icy_metaint bytes
* of normal data follows. */
uint8_t ch;
int len = http_read_stream_all(h, &ch, 1);
if (len < 0)
return len;
if (ch > 0) {
char data[255 * 16 + 1];
int ret;
len = ch * 16;
ret = http_read_stream_all(h, data, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
data[len + 1] = 0;
if ((ret = av_opt_set(s, "icy_metadata_packet", data, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
update_metadata(s, data);
}
s->icy_data_read = 0;
remaining = s->icy_metaint;
}
return FFMIN(size, remaining);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>. | High | 168,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ~ScopedRequest() {
if (requested_) {
owner_->delegate_->StopEnumerateDevices(request_id_);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | High | 171,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
return (png_ptr? 0L: 0L);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
IncludePrivacySensitiveFields include_privacy_sensitive_fields) {
if (!tab_strip)
ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index);
DictionaryValue* result = new DictionaryValue();
bool is_loading = contents->IsLoading();
result->SetInteger(keys::kIdKey, GetTabId(contents));
result->SetInteger(keys::kIndexKey, tab_index);
result->SetInteger(keys::kWindowIdKey, GetWindowIdOfTab(contents));
result->SetString(keys::kStatusKey, GetTabStatusText(is_loading));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kActiveKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kHighlightedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabSelected(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kIncognitoKey,
contents->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
if (include_privacy_sensitive_fields == INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS) {
result->SetString(keys::kUrlKey, contents->GetURL().spec());
result->SetString(keys::kTitleKey, contents->GetTitle());
if (!is_loading) {
NavigationEntry* entry = contents->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry && entry->GetFavicon().valid)
result->SetString(keys::kFaviconUrlKey, entry->GetFavicon().url.spec());
}
}
if (tab_strip) {
WebContents* opener = tab_strip->GetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (opener)
result->SetInteger(keys::kOpenerTabIdKey, GetTabId(opener));
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int i, j, v;
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
next_start_code_studio(gb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FFmpeg before commit 5aba5b89d0b1d73164d3b81764828bb8b20ff32a contains an out of array read vulnerability in ASF_F format demuxer that can result in heap memory reading. This attack appear to be exploitable via specially crafted ASF file that has to provided as input. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 5aba5b89d0b1d73164d3b81764828bb8b20ff32a and later.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: telnet_parse(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *sp, u_int length, int print)
{
int i, x;
u_int c;
const u_char *osp, *p;
#define FETCH(c, sp, length) \
do { \
if (length < 1) \
goto pktend; \
ND_TCHECK(*sp); \
c = *sp++; \
length--; \
} while (0)
osp = sp;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c != IAC)
goto pktend;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (c == IAC) { /* <IAC><IAC>! */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IAC IAC"));
goto done;
}
i = c - TELCMD_FIRST;
if (i < 0 || i > IAC - TELCMD_FIRST)
goto pktend;
switch (c) {
case DONT:
case DO:
case WONT:
case WILL:
case SB:
/* DONT/DO/WONT/WILL x */
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (x >= 0 && x < NTELOPTS) {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s", telcmds[i], telopts[x]));
} else {
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %#x", telcmds[i], x));
}
if (c != SB)
break;
/* IAC SB .... IAC SE */
p = sp;
while (length > (u_int)(p + 1 - sp)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
if (p[0] == IAC && p[1] == SE)
break;
p++;
}
if (*p != IAC)
goto pktend;
switch (x) {
case TELOPT_AUTHENTICATION:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authcmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, authtype)));
break;
case TELOPT_ENCRYPT:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enccmd)));
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, enctype)));
break;
default:
if (p <= sp)
break;
FETCH(c, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", STR_OR_ID(c, cmds)));
break;
}
while (p > sp) {
FETCH(x, sp, length);
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %#x", x));
}
/* terminating IAC SE */
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SE"));
sp += 2;
break;
default:
if (print)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", telcmds[i]));
goto done;
}
done:
return sp - osp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
pktend:
return -1;
#undef FETCH
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The telnet parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-telnet.c:telnet_parse().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12988/TELNET: Add a missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::makeBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
return (OMX::buffer_id)bufferHeader;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
| High | 173,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance,
unsigned int ioctl_cmd,
unsigned int buflen,
unsigned long arg
)
{
struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer *buffer;
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb;
struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd;
struct pmcraid_cmd *cancel_cmd;
unsigned long request_buffer;
unsigned long request_offset;
unsigned long lock_flags;
void *ioasa;
u32 ioasc;
int request_size;
int buffer_size;
u8 access, direction;
int rc = 0;
/* If IOA reset is in progress, wait 10 secs for reset to complete */
if (pinstance->ioa_reset_in_progress) {
rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(
pinstance->reset_wait_q,
!pinstance->ioa_reset_in_progress,
msecs_to_jiffies(10000));
if (!rc)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (rc < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
}
/* If adapter is not in operational state, return error */
if (pinstance->ioa_state != IOA_STATE_OPERATIONAL) {
pmcraid_err("IOA is not operational\n");
return -ENOTTY;
}
buffer_size = sizeof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer);
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
pmcraid_err("no memory for passthrough buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
request_offset =
offsetof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer, request_buffer);
request_buffer = arg + request_offset;
rc = __copy_from_user(buffer,
(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer *) arg,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer));
ioasa =
(void *)(arg +
offsetof(struct pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer, ioasa));
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("ioctl: can't copy passthrough buffer\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
request_size = buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length;
if (buffer->ioarcb.request_flags0 & TRANSFER_DIR_WRITE) {
access = VERIFY_READ;
direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
} else {
access = VERIFY_WRITE;
direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
}
if (request_size > 0) {
rc = access_ok(access, arg, request_offset + request_size);
if (!rc) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
} else if (request_size < 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
/* check if we have any additional command parameters */
if (buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length > PMCRAID_ADD_CMD_PARAM_LEN) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
cmd = pmcraid_get_free_cmd(pinstance);
if (!cmd) {
pmcraid_err("free command block is not available\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_buffer;
}
cmd->scsi_cmd = NULL;
ioarcb = &(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb);
/* Copy the user-provided IOARCB stuff field by field */
ioarcb->resource_handle = buffer->ioarcb.resource_handle;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length = buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length;
ioarcb->cmd_timeout = buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout;
ioarcb->request_type = buffer->ioarcb.request_type;
ioarcb->request_flags0 = buffer->ioarcb.request_flags0;
ioarcb->request_flags1 = buffer->ioarcb.request_flags1;
memcpy(ioarcb->cdb, buffer->ioarcb.cdb, PMCRAID_MAX_CDB_LEN);
if (buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length) {
ioarcb->add_cmd_param_length =
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length;
ioarcb->add_cmd_param_offset =
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_offset;
memcpy(ioarcb->add_data.u.add_cmd_params,
buffer->ioarcb.add_data.u.add_cmd_params,
buffer->ioarcb.add_cmd_param_length);
}
/* set hrrq number where the IOA should respond to. Note that all cmds
* generated internally uses hrrq_id 0, exception to this is the cmd
* block of scsi_cmd which is re-used (e.g. cancel/abort), which uses
* hrrq_id assigned here in queuecommand
*/
ioarcb->hrrq_id = atomic_add_return(1, &(pinstance->last_message_id)) %
pinstance->num_hrrq;
if (request_size) {
rc = pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls(cmd,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("couldn't build passthrough ioadls\n");
goto out_free_buffer;
}
}
/* If data is being written into the device, copy the data from user
* buffers
*/
if (direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE && request_size > 0) {
rc = pmcraid_copy_sglist(cmd->sglist,
request_buffer,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user buffer\n");
goto out_free_sglist;
}
}
/* passthrough ioctl is a blocking command so, put the user to sleep
* until timeout. Note that a timeout value of 0 means, do timeout.
*/
cmd->cmd_done = pmcraid_internal_done;
init_completion(&cmd->wait_for_completion);
cmd->completion_req = 1;
pmcraid_info("command(%d) (CDB[0] = %x) for %x\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle) >> 2,
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0],
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.resource_handle));
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
_pmcraid_fire_command(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
/* NOTE ! Remove the below line once abort_task is implemented
* in firmware. This line disables ioctl command timeout handling logic
* similar to IO command timeout handling, making ioctl commands to wait
* until the command completion regardless of timeout value specified in
* ioarcb
*/
buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout = 0;
/* If command timeout is specified put caller to wait till that time,
* otherwise it would be blocking wait. If command gets timed out, it
* will be aborted.
*/
if (buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout == 0) {
wait_for_completion(&cmd->wait_for_completion);
} else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(
&cmd->wait_for_completion,
msecs_to_jiffies(buffer->ioarcb.cmd_timeout * 1000))) {
pmcraid_info("aborting cmd %d (CDB[0] = %x) due to timeout\n",
le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.response_handle >> 2),
cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb.cdb[0]);
spin_lock_irqsave(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
cancel_cmd = pmcraid_abort_cmd(cmd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(pinstance->host->host_lock, lock_flags);
if (cancel_cmd) {
wait_for_completion(&cancel_cmd->wait_for_completion);
ioasc = cancel_cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc;
pmcraid_return_cmd(cancel_cmd);
/* if abort task couldn't find the command i.e it got
* completed prior to aborting, return good completion.
* if command got aborted successfully or there was IOA
* reset due to abort task itself getting timedout then
* return -ETIMEDOUT
*/
if (ioasc == PMCRAID_IOASC_IOA_WAS_RESET ||
PMCRAID_IOASC_SENSE_KEY(ioasc) == 0x00) {
if (ioasc != PMCRAID_IOASC_GC_IOARCB_NOTFOUND)
rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
goto out_handle_response;
}
}
/* no command block for abort task or abort task failed to abort
* the IOARCB, then wait for 150 more seconds and initiate reset
* sequence after timeout
*/
if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(
&cmd->wait_for_completion,
msecs_to_jiffies(150 * 1000))) {
pmcraid_reset_bringup(cmd->drv_inst);
rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
}
}
out_handle_response:
/* copy entire IOASA buffer and return IOCTL success.
* If copying IOASA to user-buffer fails, return
* EFAULT
*/
if (copy_to_user(ioasa, &cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_ioasa))) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy ioasa buffer to user\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
}
/* If the data transfer was from device, copy the data onto user
* buffers
*/
else if (direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE && request_size > 0) {
rc = pmcraid_copy_sglist(cmd->sglist,
request_buffer,
request_size,
direction);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user buffer\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
}
}
out_free_sglist:
pmcraid_release_passthrough_ioadls(cmd, request_size, direction);
pmcraid_return_cmd(cmd);
out_free_buffer:
kfree(buffer);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** Integer signedness error in the pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough function in drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 might allow local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or memory corruption) via a negative size value in an ioctl call. NOTE: this may be a vulnerability only in unusual environments that provide a privileged program for obtaining the required file descriptor.
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,846 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GPMF_ERR IsValidSize(GPMF_stream *ms, uint32_t size) // size is in longs not bytes.
{
if (ms)
{
int32_t nestsize = (int32_t)ms->nest_size[ms->nest_level];
if (nestsize == 0 && ms->nest_level == 0)
nestsize = ms->buffer_size_longs;
if (size + 2 <= nestsize) return GPMF_OK;
}
return GPMF_ERROR_BAD_STRUCTURE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader | Medium | 169,544 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sas_init_port(struct asd_sas_port *port,
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha, int i)
{
memset(port, 0, sizeof(*port));
port->id = i;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->dev_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->disco_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->destroy_list);
spin_lock_init(&port->phy_list_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->phy_list);
port->ha = sas_ha;
spin_lock_init(&port->dev_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 169,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool MultibufferDataSource::DidGetOpaqueResponseViaServiceWorker() const {
return url_data()->has_opaque_data();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | Medium | 172,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
AudioParameters* r) {
int format, channel_layout, sample_rate, bits_per_sample,
frames_per_buffer, channels;
if (!m->ReadInt(iter, &format) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &channel_layout) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &sample_rate) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &bits_per_sample) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &frames_per_buffer) ||
!m->ReadInt(iter, &channels))
return false;
r->Reset(static_cast<AudioParameters::Format>(format),
static_cast<ChannelLayout>(channel_layout),
sample_rate, bits_per_sample, frames_per_buffer);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,526 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char *print_string_ptr( const char *str )
{
const char *ptr;
char *ptr2, *out;
int len = 0;
unsigned char token;
if ( ! str )
return cJSON_strdup( "" );
ptr = str;
while ( ( token = *ptr ) && ++len ) {
if ( strchr( "\"\\\b\f\n\r\t", token ) )
++len;
else if ( token < 32 )
len += 5;
++ptr;
}
if ( ! ( out = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len + 3 ) ) )
return 0;
ptr2 = out;
ptr = str;
*ptr2++ = '\"';
while ( *ptr ) {
if ( (unsigned char) *ptr > 31 && *ptr != '\"' && *ptr != '\\' )
*ptr2++ = *ptr++;
else {
*ptr2++ = '\\';
switch ( token = *ptr++ ) {
case '\\': *ptr2++ = '\\'; break;
case '\"': *ptr2++ = '\"'; break;
case '\b': *ptr2++ = 'b'; break;
case '\f': *ptr2++ = 'f'; break;
case '\n': *ptr2++ = 'n'; break;
case '\r': *ptr2++ = 'r'; break;
case '\t': *ptr2++ = 't'; break;
default:
/* Escape and print. */
sprintf( ptr2, "u%04x", token );
ptr2 += 5;
break;
}
}
}
*ptr2++ = '\"';
*ptr2++ = 0;
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _WM_ParseNewMus(uint8_t *mus_data, uint32_t mus_size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint32_t mus_song_ofs = 0;
uint32_t mus_song_len = 0;
uint16_t mus_ch_cnt1 = 0;
uint16_t mus_ch_cnt2 = 0;
uint16_t mus_no_instr = 0;
uint32_t mus_data_ofs = 0;
uint16_t * mus_mid_instr = NULL;
uint16_t mus_instr_cnt = 0;
struct _mdi *mus_mdi;
uint32_t mus_divisions = 60;
float tempo_f = 0.0;
uint16_t mus_freq = 0;
float samples_per_tick_f = 0.0;
uint8_t mus_event[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
uint8_t mus_event_size = 0;
uint8_t mus_prev_vol[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t mus_ticks = 0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0.0;
float sample_remainder = 0.0;
uint16_t pitchbend_tmp = 0;
if (mus_size < 17) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, "File too short", 0);
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(mus_data, mus_hdr, 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
mus_song_len = (mus_data[5] << 8) | mus_data[4];
mus_song_ofs = (mus_data[7] << 8) | mus_data[6];
mus_ch_cnt1 = (mus_data[9] << 8) | mus_data[8];
mus_ch_cnt2 = (mus_data[11] << 8) | mus_data[10];
UNUSED(mus_ch_cnt1);
UNUSED(mus_ch_cnt2);
mus_no_instr = (mus_data[13] << 8) | mus_data[12];
mus_data_ofs = 16;
if (mus_size < (mus_data_ofs + (mus_no_instr << 1) + mus_song_len)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MUS, "File too short", 0);
return NULL;
}
mus_mid_instr = malloc(mus_no_instr * sizeof(uint16_t));
for (mus_instr_cnt = 0; mus_instr_cnt < mus_no_instr; mus_instr_cnt++) {
mus_mid_instr[mus_instr_cnt] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] << 8) | mus_data[mus_data_ofs];
mus_data_ofs += 2;
}
mus_data_ofs = mus_song_ofs;
mus_freq = _cvt_get_option(WM_CO_FREQUENCY);
if (mus_freq == 0) mus_freq = 140;
if ((_WM_MixerOptions & WM_MO_ROUNDTEMPO)) {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / mus_freq) + 0.5f;
} else {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / mus_freq);
}
samples_per_tick_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(mus_divisions, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
mus_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(mus_mdi, mus_divisions);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(mus_mdi, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
do {
_mus_build_event:
#if 1
MUS_EVENT_DEBUG("Before", mus_data[mus_data_ofs], 0);
if ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f) == 0x0f) {
mus_data[mus_data_ofs] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0xf0) | 0x09;
} else if ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f) == 0x09) {
mus_data[mus_data_ofs] = (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0xf0) | 0x0f;
}
MUS_EVENT_DEBUG("After", mus_data[mus_data_ofs], 0);
#endif
switch ((mus_data[mus_data_ofs] >> 4) & 0x07) {
case 0: // Note Off
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0x80 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1];
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 1: // Note On
if (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] & 0x80) {
mus_event_size = 3;
mus_event[0] = 0x90 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] & 0x7f;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
mus_prev_vol[mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f] = mus_event[2];
} else {
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0x90 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1];
mus_event[2] = mus_prev_vol[mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f];
mus_event[3] = 0;
}
break;
case 2: // Pitch Bend
mus_event_size = 2;
mus_event[0] = 0xe0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
pitchbend_tmp = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1] << 6;
mus_event[1] = pitchbend_tmp & 0x7f;
mus_event[2] = (pitchbend_tmp >> 7) & 0x7f;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 3:
mus_event_size = 2;
switch (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1]) {
case 10: // All Sounds Off
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 120;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 11: // All Notes Off
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 123;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 12: // Mono (Not supported by WildMIDI)
/*
**************************
FIXME: Add dummy mdi event
**************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 126;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 13: // Poly (Not supported by WildMIDI)
/*
**************************
FIXME: Add dummy mdi event
**************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 127;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 14: // Reset All Controllers
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 121;
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
default: // Unsupported
goto _mus_next_data;
}
break;
case 4:
mus_event_size = 3;
switch (mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 1]) {
case 0: // Patch
/*
*************************************************
FIXME: Check if setting is MIDI or MUS instrument
*************************************************
*/
mus_event[0] = 0xc0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[2] = 0;
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 1: // Bank Select
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 0;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 2: // Modulation (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 1;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 3: // Volume
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 7;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 4: // Pan
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 10;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 5: // Expression
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 11;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 6: // Reverb (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 91;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 7: // Chorus (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 93;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 8: // Sustain
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 64;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
case 9: // Soft Peddle (Not supported by WildMidi)
mus_event[0] = 0xb0 | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x0f);
mus_event[1] = 67;
mus_event[2] = mus_data[mus_data_ofs + 2];
mus_event[3] = 0;
break;
default: // Unsupported
goto _mus_next_data;
}
break;
case 5:
mus_event_size = 1;
goto _mus_next_data;
break;
case 6:
goto _mus_end_of_song;
break;
case 7:
mus_event_size = 1;
goto _mus_next_data;
break;
}
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mus_mdi, (uint8_t *)mus_event, 0);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _mus_end;
}
_mus_next_data:
if (!(mus_data[mus_data_ofs] & 0x80)) {
mus_data_ofs += mus_event_size;
goto _mus_build_event;
}
mus_data_ofs += mus_event_size;
mus_ticks = 0;
do {
mus_ticks = (mus_ticks << 7) | (mus_data[mus_data_ofs++] & 0x7f);
} while (mus_data[mus_data_ofs - 1] & 0x80);
sample_count_f = ((float)mus_ticks * samples_per_tick_f) + sample_remainder;
sample_count = (uint32_t)sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float)sample_count;
mus_mdi->events[mus_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next = sample_count;
mus_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
} while (mus_data_ofs < mus_size);
_mus_end_of_song:
if ((mus_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _mus_end;
}
_WM_midi_setup_endoftrack(mus_mdi);
mus_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
mus_mdi->current_event = &mus_mdi->events[0];
mus_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
mus_mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(mus_mdi);
_mus_end:
free(mus_mid_instr);
if (mus_mdi->reverb) return (mus_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(mus_mdi);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | Medium | 168,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
struct flowi6 fl6;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (!newsk)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(newsk, skb);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
if (np->opt)
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss &&
tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss < newtp->advmss)
newtp->advmss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newsk->sk_v6_daddr);
if (key) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
tcp_md5_do_add(newsk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&newsk->sk_v6_daddr,
AF_INET6, key->key, key->keylen,
sk_gfp_atomic(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
tcp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
if (*own_req) {
tcp_move_syn(newtp, req);
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts,
sk_gfp_atomic(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcessTCPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
ULONG tcpipDataAt;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(TCPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsTCP;
if (len >= tcpipDataAt)
{
TCPHeader *pTcpHeader = (TCPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
tcpipDataAt = ipHeaderSize + TCP_HEADER_LENGTH(pTcpHeader);
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = tcpipDataAt;
}
else
{
DPrintf(2, ("tcp: %d < min headers %d\n", len, tcpipDataAt));
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sctp_do_peeloff(struct sock *sk, sctp_assoc_t id, struct socket **sockp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, id);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct socket *sock;
int err = 0;
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
/* If there is a thread waiting on more sndbuf space for
* sending on this asoc, it cannot be peeled.
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait))
return -EBUSY;
/* An association cannot be branched off from an already peeled-off
* socket, nor is this supported for tcp style sockets.
*/
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Create a new socket. */
err = sock_create(sk->sk_family, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP, &sock);
if (err < 0)
return err;
sctp_copy_sock(sock->sk, sk, asoc);
/* Make peeled-off sockets more like 1-1 accepted sockets.
* Set the daddr and initialize id to something more random
*/
sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, sk);
/* Populate the fields of the newsk from the oldsk and migrate the
* asoc to the newsk.
*/
sctp_sock_migrate(sk, sock->sk, asoc, SCTP_SOCKET_UDP_HIGH_BANDWIDTH);
*sockp = sock;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The sctp_do_peeloff function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14 does not check whether the intended netns is used in a peel-off action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: Memory leak in the ReadPSDLayers function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.6-3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak. | High | 168,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ReshowBubble() {
is_reshow_ = true;
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
ShowBubble();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in credit card autofill in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux and Windows allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768} | Medium | 172,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8y, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0k, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1d does not properly perform signature verification for OCSP responses, which allows remote OCSP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an invalid key.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTrace(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback) {
auto adapter =
[](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr) { callback.Run(success, dump_guid); };
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, {},
true /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 172,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
DOMArrayBuffer* result = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
if (finished_loading_) {
array_buffer_result_ = result;
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Object lifetime issue in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.121 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251} | Medium | 173,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_set_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(that)
UNUSED(pp)
UNUSED(pi)
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess() : nullptr,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
if (frame_tree_node_ && !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
}
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: base::string16 GetRelyingPartyIdString(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
static constexpr char kRpIdUrlPrefix[] = "https://";
static constexpr int kDialogWidth = 300;
const auto& rp_id = dialog_model->relying_party_id();
DCHECK(!rp_id.empty());
GURL rp_id_url(kRpIdUrlPrefix + rp_id);
auto max_static_string_length = gfx::GetStringWidthF(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_GENERIC_TITLE), gfx::FontList(),
gfx::Typesetter::DEFAULT);
return url_formatter::ElideHost(rp_id_url, gfx::FontList(),
kDialogWidth - max_static_string_length);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: V8 in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly applied type rules, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114} | Medium | 172,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,") "));
} else if(ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | Medium | 167,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadOnePNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
/* Read one PNG image */
/* To do: Read the tEXt/Creation Time chunk into the date:create property */
Image
*image;
char
im_vers[32],
libpng_runv[32],
libpng_vers[32],
zlib_runv[32],
zlib_vers[32];
int
intent, /* "PNG Rendering intent", which is ICC intent + 1 */
num_raw_profiles,
num_text,
num_text_total,
num_passes,
number_colors,
pass,
ping_bit_depth,
ping_color_type,
ping_file_depth,
ping_interlace_method,
ping_compression_method,
ping_filter_method,
ping_num_trans,
unit_type;
double
file_gamma;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
ping_found_cHRM,
ping_found_gAMA,
ping_found_iCCP,
ping_found_sRGB,
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM,
ping_preserve_iCCP,
status;
MemoryInfo
*volatile pixel_info;
PixelInfo
transparent_color;
PNGErrorInfo
error_info;
png_bytep
ping_trans_alpha;
png_color_16p
ping_background,
ping_trans_color;
png_info
*end_info,
*ping_info;
png_struct
*ping;
png_textp
text;
png_uint_32
ping_height,
ping_width,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
ssize_t
ping_rowbytes,
y;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
size_t
length,
row_offset;
ssize_t
j;
unsigned char
*ping_pixels;
#ifdef PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
png_byte unused_chunks[]=
{
104, 73, 83, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* hIST */
105, 84, 88, 116, (png_byte) '\0', /* iTXt */
112, 67, 65, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* pCAL */
115, 67, 65, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* sCAL */
115, 80, 76, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* sPLT */
#if !defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
116, 73, 77, 69, (png_byte) '\0', /* tIME */
#endif
#ifdef PNG_APNG_SUPPORTED /* libpng was built with APNG patch; */
/* ignore the APNG chunks */
97, 99, 84, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* acTL */
102, 99, 84, 76, (png_byte) '\0', /* fcTL */
102, 100, 65, 84, (png_byte) '\0', /* fdAT */
#endif
};
#endif
/* Define these outside of the following "if logging()" block so they will
* show in debuggers.
*/
*im_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibVersionText,32);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibAddendum,32);
*libpng_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_vers,
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,32);
*libpng_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_runv,
png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),32);
*zlib_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_vers,
ZLIB_VERSION,32);
*zlib_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_runv,
zlib_version,32);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOnePNGImage()\n"
" IM version = %s\n"
" Libpng version = %s",
im_vers, libpng_vers);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (LocaleCompare(libpng_vers,libpng_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," running with %s",
libpng_runv);
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Zlib version = %s",
zlib_vers);
if (LocaleCompare(zlib_vers,zlib_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," running with %s",
zlib_runv);
}
}
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10200)
if (image_info->verbose)
printf("Your PNG library (libpng-%s) is rather old.\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING);
#endif
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10400)
# ifndef PNG_TRANSFORM_GRAY_TO_RGB /* Added at libpng-1.4.0beta67 */
if (image_info->verbose)
{
printf("Your PNG library (libpng-%s) is an old beta version.\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING);
printf("Please update it.\n");
}
# endif
#endif
quantum_info = (QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image=mng_info->image;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before reading:\n"
" image->alpha_trait=%d"
" image->rendering_intent=%d\n"
" image->colorspace=%d\n"
" image->gamma=%f",
(int) image->alpha_trait, (int) image->rendering_intent,
(int) image->colorspace, image->gamma);
}
intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(image->rendering_intent);
/* Set to an out-of-range color unless tRNS chunk is present */
transparent_color.red=65537;
transparent_color.green=65537;
transparent_color.blue=65537;
transparent_color.alpha=65537;
number_colors=0;
num_text = 0;
num_text_total = 0;
num_raw_profiles = 0;
ping_found_cHRM = MagickFalse;
ping_found_gAMA = MagickFalse;
ping_found_iCCP = MagickFalse;
ping_found_sRGB = MagickFalse;
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM = MagickFalse;
ping_preserve_iCCP = MagickFalse;
/*
Allocate the PNG structures
*/
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
error_info.image=image;
error_info.exception=exception;
ping=png_create_read_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler, NULL,
(png_malloc_ptr) Magick_png_malloc,(png_free_ptr) Magick_png_free);
#else
ping=png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler);
#endif
if (ping == (png_struct *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ping_info=png_create_info_struct(ping);
if (ping_info == (png_info *) NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,(png_info **) NULL,(png_info **) NULL);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
end_info=png_create_info_struct(ping);
if (end_info == (png_info *) NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,(png_info **) NULL);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(ping)))
{
/*
PNG image is corrupt.
*/
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage() with error.");
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/* { For navigation to end of SETJMP-protected block. Within this
* block, use png_error() instead of Throwing an Exception, to ensure
* that libpng is able to clean up, and that the semaphore is unlocked.
*/
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
LockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_BENIGN_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
/* Allow benign errors */
png_set_benign_errors(ping, 1);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
/* Reject images with too many rows or columns */
png_set_user_limits(ping,
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(WidthResource)),
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(HeightResource)));
#endif /* PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED */
/*
Prepare PNG for reading.
*/
mng_info->image_found++;
png_set_sig_bytes(ping,8);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
#if defined(PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED)
(void) png_permit_mng_features(ping,PNG_ALL_MNG_FEATURES);
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
#else
#if defined(PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED)
png_permit_empty_plte(ping,MagickTrue);
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
#else
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->bytes_in_read_buffer=0;
mng_info->found_empty_plte=MagickFalse;
mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index=MagickFalse;
png_set_read_fn(ping,mng_info,mng_get_data);
#endif
#endif
}
else
png_set_read_fn(ping,image,png_get_data);
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember("ICC",value) == MagickFalse)
{
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"png:preserve-iCCP");
if (value == NULL)
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"png:preserve-iCCP");
if (value != NULL)
ping_preserve_iCCP=MagickTrue;
#if defined(PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE) && defined(PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED)
/* Don't let libpng check for ICC/sRGB profile because we're going
* to do that anyway. This feature was added at libpng-1.6.12.
* If logging, go ahead and check and issue a warning as appropriate.
*/
if (logging == MagickFalse)
png_set_option(ping, PNG_SKIP_sRGB_CHECK_PROFILE, PNG_OPTION_ON);
#endif
}
#if defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
else
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, (png_bytep) mng_iCCP, 1);
}
#endif
}
#if defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
/* Ignore unused chunks and all unknown chunks except for eXIf,
caNv, and vpAg */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700 /* Avoid libpng16 warning */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, NULL, 0);
# else
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, NULL, 0);
# endif
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_eXIf, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_caNv, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 2, (png_bytep) mng_vpAg, 1);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(ping, 1, unused_chunks,
(int)sizeof(unused_chunks)/5);
/* Callback for other unknown chunks */
png_set_read_user_chunk_fn(ping, image, read_user_chunk_callback);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
# if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10400)
/* Limit the size of the chunk storage cache used for sPLT, text,
* and unknown chunks.
*/
png_set_chunk_cache_max(ping, 32767);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_CHECK_FOR_INVALID_INDEX_SUPPORTED
/* Disable new libpng-1.5.10 feature */
png_set_check_for_invalid_index (ping, 0);
#endif
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10400)
# if defined(PNG_USE_PNGGCCRD) && defined(PNG_ASSEMBLER_CODE_SUPPORTED) && \
(PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10200) && (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10220) && defined(__i386__)
/* Disable thread-unsafe features of pnggccrd */
if (png_access_version_number() >= 10200)
{
png_uint_32 mmx_disable_mask=0;
png_uint_32 asm_flags;
mmx_disable_mask |= ( PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_COMBINE_ROW \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_SUB \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_AVG \
| PNG_ASM_FLAG_MMX_READ_FILTER_PAETH );
asm_flags=png_get_asm_flags(ping);
png_set_asm_flags(ping, asm_flags & ~mmx_disable_mask);
}
# endif
#endif
png_read_info(ping,ping_info);
png_get_IHDR(ping,ping_info,&ping_width,&ping_height,
&ping_bit_depth,&ping_color_type,
&ping_interlace_method,&ping_compression_method,
&ping_filter_method);
ping_file_depth = ping_bit_depth;
/* Swap bytes if requested */
if (ping_file_depth == 16)
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"png:swap-bytes");
if (value == NULL)
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"png:swap-bytes");
if (value != NULL)
png_set_swap(ping);
}
/* Save bit-depth and color-type in case we later want to write a PNG00 */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_color_type);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.color-type-orig",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_bit_depth);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.bit-depth-orig",msg,exception);
}
(void) png_get_tRNS(ping, ping_info, &ping_trans_alpha, &ping_num_trans,
&ping_trans_color);
(void) png_get_bKGD(ping, ping_info, &ping_background);
if (ping_bit_depth < 8)
{
png_set_packing(ping);
ping_bit_depth = 8;
}
image->depth=ping_bit_depth;
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
image->interlace=ping_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace : NoInterlace;
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
image->rendering_intent=UndefinedIntent;
intent=Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(UndefinedIntent);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&image->chromaticity,0,
sizeof(image->chromaticity));
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG width: %.20g, height: %.20g\n"
" PNG color_type: %d, bit_depth: %d\n"
" PNG compression_method: %d\n"
" PNG interlace_method: %d, filter_method: %d",
(double) ping_width, (double) ping_height,
ping_color_type, ping_bit_depth,
ping_compression_method,
ping_interlace_method,ping_filter_method);
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info, PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
ping_found_iCCP=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG iCCP chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_gAMA))
{
ping_found_gAMA=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG gAMA chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
ping_found_cHRM=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG cHRM chunk.");
}
if (ping_found_iCCP != MagickTrue && png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,
PNG_INFO_sRGB))
{
ping_found_sRGB=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG sRGB chunk.");
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_iCCP_SUPPORTED
if (ping_found_iCCP !=MagickTrue &&
ping_found_sRGB != MagickTrue &&
png_get_valid(ping,ping_info, PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
ping_found_iCCP=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found PNG iCCP chunk.");
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_iCCP))
{
int
compression;
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500)
png_charp
info;
#else
png_bytep
info;
#endif
png_charp
name;
png_uint_32
profile_length;
(void) png_get_iCCP(ping,ping_info,&name,(int *) &compression,&info,
&profile_length);
if (profile_length != 0)
{
StringInfo
*profile;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG iCCP chunk.");
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,profile_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_warning(ping, "ICC profile is NULL");
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
else
{
if (ping_preserve_iCCP == MagickFalse)
{
int
icheck,
got_crc=0;
png_uint_32
length,
profile_crc=0;
unsigned char
*data;
length=(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(profile);
for (icheck=0; sRGB_info[icheck].len > 0; icheck++)
{
if (length == sRGB_info[icheck].len)
{
if (got_crc == 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got a %lu-byte ICC profile (potentially sRGB)",
(unsigned long) length);
data=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
profile_crc=crc32(0,data,length);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" with crc=%8x",(unsigned int) profile_crc);
got_crc++;
}
if (profile_crc == sRGB_info[icheck].crc)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" It is sRGB with rendering intent = %s",
Magick_RenderingIntentString_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent));
if (image->rendering_intent==UndefinedIntent)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (sRGB_info[icheck].len == 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got %lu-byte ICC profile not recognized as sRGB",
(unsigned long) length);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
}
else /* Preserve-iCCP */
{
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
}
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_READ_sRGB_SUPPORTED)
{
if (ping_found_iCCP==MagickFalse && png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,
PNG_INFO_sRGB))
{
if (png_get_sRGB(ping,ping_info,&intent))
{
if (image->rendering_intent == UndefinedIntent)
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent (intent);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG sRGB chunk: rendering_intent: %d",intent);
}
}
else if (mng_info->have_global_srgb)
{
if (image->rendering_intent == UndefinedIntent)
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent
(mng_info->global_srgb_intent);
}
}
#endif
{
if (!png_get_gAMA(ping,ping_info,&file_gamma))
if (mng_info->have_global_gama)
png_set_gAMA(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_gamma);
if (png_get_gAMA(ping,ping_info,&file_gamma))
{
image->gamma=(float) file_gamma;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG gAMA chunk: gamma: %f",file_gamma);
}
}
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
if (mng_info->have_global_chrm != MagickFalse)
{
(void) png_set_cHRM(ping,ping_info,
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y,
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x,
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y);
}
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_cHRM))
{
(void) png_get_cHRM(ping,ping_info,
&image->chromaticity.white_point.x,
&image->chromaticity.white_point.y,
&image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
&image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
&image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,
&image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y);
ping_found_cHRM=MagickTrue;
if (image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f)
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM=MagickTrue;
}
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
{
if (ping_found_sRGB != MagickTrue &&
(ping_found_gAMA != MagickTrue ||
(image->gamma > .45 && image->gamma < .46)) &&
(ping_found_cHRM != MagickTrue ||
ping_found_sRGB_cHRM != MagickFalse) &&
ping_found_iCCP != MagickTrue)
{
png_set_sRGB(ping,ping_info,
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent
(image->rendering_intent));
file_gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
ping_found_sRGB=MagickTrue;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting sRGB as if in input");
}
}
#if defined(PNG_oFFs_SUPPORTED)
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_oFFs))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) png_get_x_offset_pixels(ping, ping_info);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) png_get_y_offset_pixels(ping, ping_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
if (image->page.x || image->page.y)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG oFFs chunk: x: %.20g, y: %.20g.",(double)
image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_pHYs_SUPPORTED)
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
if (mng_info->have_global_phys)
{
png_set_pHYs(ping,ping_info,
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit,
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit,
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type);
}
}
x_resolution=0;
y_resolution=0;
unit_type=0;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
(void) png_get_pHYs(ping,ping_info,&x_resolution,&y_resolution,
&unit_type);
image->resolution.x=(double) x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=(double) y_resolution;
if (unit_type == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=(double) x_resolution/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) y_resolution/100.0;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG pHYs chunk: xres: %.20g, yres: %.20g, units: %d.",
(double) x_resolution,(double) y_resolution,unit_type);
}
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_PLTE))
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
if ((number_colors == 0) &&
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte_length)
{
png_set_PLTE(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_plte,
(int) mng_info->global_plte_length);
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
if (mng_info->global_trns_length)
{
png_warning(ping,
"global tRNS has more entries than global PLTE");
}
else
{
png_set_tRNS(ping,ping_info,mng_info->global_trns,
(int) mng_info->global_trns_length,NULL);
}
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED
if (
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index ||
#endif
png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
png_color_16
background;
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
if (mng_info->have_saved_bkgd_index)
background.index=mng_info->saved_bkgd_index;
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping, ping_info, PNG_INFO_bKGD))
background.index=ping_background->index;
background.red=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].red;
background.green=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].green;
background.blue=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].blue;
background.gray=(png_uint_16)
mng_info->global_plte[background.index].green;
png_set_bKGD(ping,ping_info,&background);
}
#endif
}
else
png_error(ping,"No global PLTE in file");
}
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED
if (mng_info->have_global_bkgd &&
(!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD)))
image->background_color=mng_info->mng_global_bkgd;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
unsigned int
bkgd_scale;
/* Set image background color.
* Scale background components to 16-bit, then scale
* to quantum depth
*/
bkgd_scale = 1;
if (ping_file_depth == 1)
bkgd_scale = 255;
else if (ping_file_depth == 2)
bkgd_scale = 85;
else if (ping_file_depth == 4)
bkgd_scale = 17;
if (ping_file_depth <= 8)
bkgd_scale *= 257;
ping_background->red *= bkgd_scale;
ping_background->green *= bkgd_scale;
ping_background->blue *= bkgd_scale;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG bKGD chunk, raw ping_background=(%d,%d,%d)\n"
" bkgd_scale=%d. ping_background=(%d,%d,%d)",
ping_background->red,ping_background->green,
ping_background->blue,
bkgd_scale,ping_background->red,
ping_background->green,ping_background->blue);
}
image->background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->red);
image->background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->green);
image->background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum(ping_background->blue);
image->background_color.alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->background_color=(%.20g,%.20g,%.20g).",
(double) image->background_color.red,
(double) image->background_color.green,
(double) image->background_color.blue);
}
#endif /* PNG_READ_bKGD_SUPPORTED */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
/*
Image has a tRNS chunk.
*/
int
max_sample;
size_t
one=1;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG tRNS chunk.");
max_sample = (int) ((one << ping_file_depth) - 1);
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY &&
(int)ping_trans_color->gray > max_sample) ||
(ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB &&
((int)ping_trans_color->red > max_sample ||
(int)ping_trans_color->green > max_sample ||
(int)ping_trans_color->blue > max_sample)))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Ignoring PNG tRNS chunk with out-of-range sample.");
png_free_data(ping, ping_info, PNG_FREE_TRNS, 0);
png_set_invalid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS);
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else
{
int
scale_to_short;
scale_to_short = 65535L/((1UL << ping_file_depth)-1);
/* Scale transparent_color to short */
transparent_color.red= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->red;
transparent_color.green= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->green;
transparent_color.blue= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->blue;
transparent_color.alpha= scale_to_short*ping_trans_color->gray;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Raw tRNS graylevel = %d, scaled graylevel = %d.",
(int) ping_trans_color->gray,(int) transparent_color.alpha);
}
transparent_color.red=transparent_color.alpha;
transparent_color.green=transparent_color.alpha;
transparent_color.blue=transparent_color.alpha;
}
}
}
#if defined(PNG_READ_sBIT_SUPPORTED)
if (mng_info->have_global_sbit)
{
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_sBIT))
png_set_sBIT(ping,ping_info,&mng_info->global_sbit);
}
#endif
num_passes=png_set_interlace_handling(ping);
png_read_update_info(ping,ping_info);
ping_rowbytes=png_get_rowbytes(ping,ping_info);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
mng_info->image_box.left=0;
mng_info->image_box.right=(ssize_t) ping_width;
mng_info->image_box.top=0;
mng_info->image_box.bottom=(ssize_t) ping_height;
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=ping_width;
mng_info->mng_height=ping_height;
mng_info->frame=mng_info->image_box;
mng_info->clip=mng_info->image_box;
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
image->compression=ZipCompression;
image->columns=ping_width;
image->rows=ping_height;
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
double
image_gamma = image->gamma;
(void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->gamma=%f",(float) image_gamma);
if (image_gamma > 0.75)
{
/* Set image->rendering_intent to Undefined,
* image->colorspace to GRAY, and reset image->chromaticity.
*/
image->intensity = Rec709LuminancePixelIntensityMethod;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
else
{
RenderingIntent
save_rendering_intent = image->rendering_intent;
ChromaticityInfo
save_chromaticity = image->chromaticity;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->rendering_intent = save_rendering_intent;
image->chromaticity = save_chromaticity;
}
image->gamma = image_gamma;
}
(void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colorspace=%d",(int) image->colorspace);
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ||
((int) ping_bit_depth < 16 &&
(int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
one=1;
image->colors=one << ping_file_depth;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8)
if (image->colors > 256)
image->colors=256;
#else
if (image->colors > 65536L)
image->colors=65536L;
#endif
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
image->colors=(size_t) number_colors;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG PLTE chunk: number_colors: %d.",number_colors);
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_colorp
palette;
(void) png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&palette,&number_colors);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(palette[i].blue);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=0;
image->colormap[i].green=0;
image->colormap[i].blue=0;
}
}
else
{
Quantum
scale;
scale = (Quantum) (65535.0/((1UL << ping_file_depth)-1.0));
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
scale = ScaleShortToQuantum(scale);
#endif
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) (i*scale);
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) (i*scale);
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) (i*scale);
}
}
}
/* Set some properties for reporting by "identify" */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
/* encode ping_width, ping_height, ping_file_depth, ping_color_type,
ping_interlace_method in value */
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d, %d",(int) ping_width, (int) ping_height);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.width,height",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) ping_file_depth);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.bit_depth",msg,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (%s)",
(int) ping_color_type,
Magick_ColorType_from_PNG_ColorType((int)ping_color_type));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.color_type",msg,exception);
if (ping_interlace_method == 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Not interlaced)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
else if (ping_interlace_method == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Adam7 method)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d (Unknown method)",
(int) ping_interlace_method);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:IHDR.interlace_method",
msg,exception);
if (number_colors != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%d",
(int) number_colors);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:PLTE.number_colors",msg,
exception);
}
}
#if defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
read_tIME_chunk(image,ping,ping_info,exception);
#endif
/*
Read image scanlines.
*/
if (image->delay != 0)
mng_info->scenes_found++;
if ((mng_info->mng_type == 0 && (image->ping != MagickFalse)) || (
(image_info->number_scenes != 0) && (mng_info->scenes_found > (ssize_t)
(image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))))
{
/* This happens later in non-ping decodes */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->alpha_trait=
(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping PNG image data for scene %.20g",(double)
mng_info->scenes_found-1);
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage().");
return(image);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG IDAT chunk(s)");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (num_passes > 1)
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,ping_rowbytes*
sizeof(*ping_pixels));
else
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(ping_rowbytes,sizeof(*ping_pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
ping_pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Converting PNG pixels to pixel packets");
/*
Convert PNG pixels to pixel packets.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Failed to allocate quantum_info");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
{
MagickBooleanType
found_transparent_pixel;
found_transparent_pixel=MagickFalse;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
image->alpha_trait=
(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (num_passes > 1)
row_offset=ping_rowbytes*y;
else
row_offset=0;
png_read_row(ping,ping_pixels+row_offset,NULL);
if (pass < num_passes-1)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayAlphaQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
RGBAQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
IndexQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
else /* ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB */
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
RGBQuantum,ping_pixels+row_offset,exception);
if (found_transparent_pixel == MagickFalse)
{
/* Is there a transparent pixel in the row? */
if (y== 0 && logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Looking for cheap transparent pixel");
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(image,q) != OpaqueAlpha))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ...got one.");
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
break;
}
if ((ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) &&
(ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.red &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.green &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.blue))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ...got one.");
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if (num_passes == 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y, image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (num_passes != 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,pass,num_passes);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else /* image->storage_class != DirectClass */
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
Quantum
*quantum_scanline;
register Quantum
*r;
/*
Convert grayscale image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Converting grayscale pixels to pixel packets");
image->alpha_trait=ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
quantum_scanline=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
(image->alpha_trait == BlendPixelTrait? 2 : 1)*
sizeof(*quantum_scanline));
if (quantum_scanline == (Quantum *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
Quantum
alpha;
if (num_passes > 1)
row_offset=ping_rowbytes*y;
else
row_offset=0;
png_read_row(ping,ping_pixels+row_offset,NULL);
if (pass < num_passes-1)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=ping_pixels+row_offset;
r=quantum_scanline;
switch (ping_bit_depth)
{
case 8:
{
if (ping_color_type == 4)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
*r++=*p++;
alpha=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*p++);
SetPixelAlpha(image,alpha,q);
if (alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
*r++=*p++;
break;
}
case 16:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH >= 16)
unsigned short
quantum;
if (image->colors > 256)
quantum=((*p++) << 8);
else
quantum=0;
quantum|=(*p++);
*r=ScaleShortToQuantum(quantum);
r++;
if (ping_color_type == 4)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
quantum=((*p++) << 8);
else
quantum=0;
quantum|=(*p++);
alpha=ScaleShortToQuantum(quantum);
SetPixelAlpha(image,alpha,q);
if (alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
#else /* MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8 */
*r++=(*p++);
p++; /* strip low byte */
if (ping_color_type == 4)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,*p++,q);
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) != OpaqueAlpha)
found_transparent_pixel = MagickTrue;
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
#endif
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/*
Transfer image scanline.
*/
r=quantum_scanline;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*r++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (num_passes == 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (num_passes != 1)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,pass,num_passes);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_scanline=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(quantum_scanline);
}
image->alpha_trait=found_transparent_pixel ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (found_transparent_pixel != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Found transparent pixel");
else
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No transparent pixel was found");
ping_color_type&=0x03;
}
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelTrait
alpha_trait;
alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
image->alpha_trait=alpha_trait;
}
png_read_end(ping,end_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->storage_class=%d\n",(int) image->storage_class);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0 && mng_info->scenes_found-1 <
(ssize_t) image_info->first_scene && image->delay != 0)
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage() early.");
return(image);
}
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
{
ClassType
storage_class;
/*
Image has a transparent background.
*/
storage_class=image->storage_class;
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
/* Balfour fix from imagemagick discourse server, 5 Feb 2010 */
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
for (x=0; x < ping_num_trans; x++)
{
image->colormap[x].alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
image->colormap[x].alpha =
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)ping_trans_alpha[x]);
}
}
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
for (x=0; x < (int) image->colors; x++)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[x].red) ==
transparent_color.alpha)
{
image->colormap[x].alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
image->colormap[x].alpha = (Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
}
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
#if 1 /* Should have already been done above, but glennrp problem P10
* needs this.
*/
else
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
image->storage_class=storage_class;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
/* Caution: on a Q8 build, this does not distinguish between
* 16-bit colors that differ only in the low byte
*/
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.red &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.green &&
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,q)) ==
transparent_color.blue)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,TransparentAlpha,q);
}
#if 0 /* I have not found a case where this is needed. */
else
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,q)=(Quantum) OpaqueAlpha;
}
#endif
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
}
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++)
{
if (j == 0)
status = png_get_text(ping,ping_info,&text,&num_text) != 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
else
status = png_get_text(ping,end_info,&text,&num_text) != 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) num_text; i++)
{
/* Check for a profile */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading PNG text chunk");
if (strlen(text[i].key) > 16 &&
memcmp(text[i].key, "Raw profile type ",17) == 0)
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember(text[i].key+17,value) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) Magick_png_read_raw_profile(ping,image,image_info,text,
(int) i,exception);
num_raw_profiles++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Read raw profile %s",text[i].key+17);
}
else
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping raw profile %s",text[i].key+17);
}
}
else
{
char
*value;
length=text[i].text_length;
value=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*value));
if (value == (char *) NULL)
{
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
break;
}
*value='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(value,text[i].text,length+2);
/* Don't save "density" or "units" property if we have a pHYs
* chunk
*/
if (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs) ||
(LocaleCompare(text[i].key,"density") != 0 &&
LocaleCompare(text[i].key,"units") != 0))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,text[i].key,value,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" length: %lu\n"
" Keyword: %s",
(unsigned long) length,
text[i].key);
}
value=DestroyString(value);
}
}
num_text_total += num_text;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/*
Store the object if necessary.
*/
if (object_id && !mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL)
{
/*
create a new object buffer.
*/
mng_info->ob[object_id]=(MngBuffer *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngBuffer));
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
{
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=(Image *) NULL;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->reference_count=1;
}
}
if ((mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL) ||
mng_info->ob[object_id]->frozen)
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id] == (MngBuffer *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation failed");
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->frozen)
png_error(ping,"Cannot overwrite frozen MNG object buffer");
}
else
{
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->image != (Image *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=DestroyImage
(mng_info->ob[object_id]->image);
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (mng_info->ob[object_id]->image != (Image *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[object_id]->image->file=(FILE *) NULL;
else
png_error(ping, "Cloning image for object buffer failed");
if (ping_width > 250000L || ping_height > 250000L)
png_error(ping,"PNG Image dimensions are too large.");
mng_info->ob[object_id]->width=ping_width;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->height=ping_height;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->color_type=ping_color_type;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->sample_depth=ping_bit_depth;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->interlace_method=ping_interlace_method;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->compression_method=
ping_compression_method;
mng_info->ob[object_id]->filter_method=ping_filter_method;
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_PLTE))
{
png_colorp
plte;
/*
Copy the PLTE to the object buffer.
*/
png_get_PLTE(ping,ping_info,&plte,&number_colors);
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte_length=number_colors;
for (i=0; i < number_colors; i++)
{
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte[i]=plte[i];
}
}
else
mng_info->ob[object_id]->plte_length=0;
}
}
#endif
/* Set image->alpha_trait to MagickTrue if the input colortype supports
* alpha or if a valid tRNS chunk is present, no matter whether there
* is actual transparency present.
*/
image->alpha_trait=(((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))) ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
#if 0 /* I'm not sure what's wrong here but it does not work. */
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleAlphaType,exception);
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteAlphaType,exception);
else
(void) SetImageType(image,TrueColorAlphaType,exception);
}
else
{
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType,exception);
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType,exception);
else
(void) SetImageType(image,TrueColorType,exception);
}
#endif
/* Set more properties for identify to retrieve */
{
char
msg[MagickPathExtent];
if (num_text_total != 0)
{
/* libpng doesn't tell us whether they were tEXt, zTXt, or iTXt */
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d tEXt/zTXt/iTXt chunks were found", num_text_total);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:text",msg,
exception);
}
if (num_raw_profiles != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"%d were found", num_raw_profiles);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:text-encoded profiles",msg,
exception);
}
/* cHRM chunk: */
if (ping_found_cHRM != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found (see Chromaticity, above)");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:cHRM",msg,
exception);
}
/* bKGD chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_bKGD))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found (see Background color, above)");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:bKGD",msg,
exception);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,"%s",
"chunk was found");
#if defined(PNG_iCCP_SUPPORTED)
/* iCCP chunk: */
if (ping_found_iCCP != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:iCCP",msg,
exception);
#endif
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_tRNS))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:tRNS",msg,
exception);
#if defined(PNG_sRGB_SUPPORTED)
/* sRGB chunk: */
if (ping_found_sRGB != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"intent=%d (%s)",
(int) intent,
Magick_RenderingIntentString_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(intent));
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:sRGB",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
/* gAMA chunk: */
if (ping_found_gAMA != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"gamma=%.8g (See Gamma, above)",
file_gamma);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:gAMA",msg,
exception);
}
#if defined(PNG_pHYs_SUPPORTED)
/* pHYs chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_pHYs))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"x_res=%.10g, y_res=%.10g, units=%d",
(double) x_resolution,(double) y_resolution, unit_type);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:pHYs",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_oFFs_SUPPORTED)
/* oFFs chunk: */
if (png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_oFFs))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"x_off=%.20g, y_off=%.20g",
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:oFFs",msg,
exception);
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
read_tIME_chunk(image,ping,end_info,exception);
#endif
/* caNv chunk: */
if ((image->page.width != 0 && image->page.width != image->columns) ||
(image->page.height != 0 && image->page.height != image->rows) ||
(image->page.x != 0 || image->page.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"width=%.20g, height=%.20g, x_offset=%.20g, y_offset=%.20g",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:caNv",msg,
exception);
}
/* vpAg chunk: */
if ((image->page.width != 0 && image->page.width != image->columns) ||
(image->page.height != 0 && image->page.height != image->rows))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(msg,MagickPathExtent,
"width=%.20g, height=%.20g",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"png:vpAg",msg,
exception);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
png_destroy_read_struct(&ping,&ping_info,&end_info);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOnePNGImage()");
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
/* } for navigation to beginning of SETJMP-protected block, revert to
* Throwing an Exception when an error occurs.
*/
return(image);
/* end of reading one PNG image */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The read_user_chunk_callback function in coderspng.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 Q16 2017-06-21 (beta) has memory leak vulnerabilities via crafted PNG files.
Commit Message: coders/png.c: Stop a memory leak in read_user_chunk_callback() (reference
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/517). | Medium | 168,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
static char *buf;
static u32 max_size;
static u32 uncopied_bytes;
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&table, user_buf,
sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)))
return -EFAULT;
uncopied_bytes = max_size = table.length;
buf = kzalloc(max_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (buf == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if ((*ppos > max_size) ||
(*ppos + count > max_size) ||
(*ppos + count < count) ||
(count > uncopied_bytes))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(buf + (*ppos), user_buf, count)) {
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
return -EFAULT;
}
uncopied_bytes -= count;
*ppos += count;
if (!uncopied_bytes) {
status = acpi_install_method(buf);
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
return -EINVAL;
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
}
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: drivers/acpi/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to modify arbitrary kernel memory locations by leveraging root privileges to write to the /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2010-4347.
Commit Message: ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <[email protected]> | Low | 165,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) jas_realloc function in base/jas_malloc.c and (2) mem_resize function in base/jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.22 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image, which triggers use after free vulnerabilities.
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior. | Medium | 168,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint(Platform::TouchPoint& point, unsigned modifiers)
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled();
bool shiftActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_SHIFT;
bool altActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_ALT;
bool ctrlActive = modifiers & KEYMOD_CTRL;
switch (point.m_state) {
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->clearDidSpellCheckState();
if (!m_lastFatFingersResult.isValid())
doFatFingers(point);
Element* elementUnderFatFinger = m_lastFatFingersResult.nodeAsElementIfApplicable();
if (m_lastFatFingersResult.isTextInput()) {
elementUnderFatFinger = m_lastFatFingersResult.nodeAsElementIfApplicable(FatFingersResult::ShadowContentNotAllowed, true /* shouldUseRootEditableElement */);
m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions = m_webPage->m_inputHandler->shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint(point.m_pos, elementUnderFatFinger, m_spellCheckOptionRequest);
}
handleFatFingerPressed(shiftActive, altActive, ctrlActive);
break;
}
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
{
if (!m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions)
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->processPendingKeyboardVisibilityChange();
if (m_webPage->m_inputHandler->isInputMode())
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->notifyClientOfKeyboardVisibilityChange(true);
m_webPage->m_tapHighlight->hide();
IntPoint adjustedPoint = m_webPage->mapFromContentsToViewport(m_lastFatFingersResult.adjustedPosition());
PlatformMouseEvent mouseEvent(adjustedPoint, m_lastScreenPoint, PlatformEvent::MouseReleased, 1, LeftButton, shiftActive, ctrlActive, altActive, TouchScreen);
m_webPage->handleMouseEvent(mouseEvent);
if (m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions) {
IntPoint pixelPositionRelativeToViewport = m_webPage->mapToTransformed(adjustedPoint);
IntSize screenOffset(m_lastScreenPoint - pixelPositionRelativeToViewport);
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->requestSpellingCheckingOptions(m_spellCheckOptionRequest, screenOffset);
m_shouldRequestSpellCheckOptions = false;
}
m_lastFatFingersResult.reset(); // Reset the fat finger result as its no longer valid when a user's finger is not on the screen.
break;
}
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
{
m_webPage->m_inputHandler->clearDidSpellCheckState();
PlatformMouseEvent mouseEvent(point.m_pos, m_lastScreenPoint, PlatformEvent::MouseMoved, 1, LeftButton, shiftActive, ctrlActive, altActive, TouchScreen);
m_lastScreenPoint = point.m_screenPos;
m_webPage->handleMouseEvent(mouseEvent);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InputDispatcher::enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(
const sp<Connection>& connection, EventEntry* eventEntry, const InputTarget* inputTarget,
int32_t dispatchMode) {
int32_t inputTargetFlags = inputTarget->flags;
if (!(inputTargetFlags & dispatchMode)) {
return;
}
inputTargetFlags = (inputTargetFlags & ~InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_MASK) | dispatchMode;
DispatchEntry* dispatchEntry = new DispatchEntry(eventEntry, // increments ref
inputTargetFlags, inputTarget->xOffset, inputTarget->yOffset,
inputTarget->scaleFactor);
switch (eventEntry->type) {
case EventEntry::TYPE_KEY: {
KeyEntry* keyEntry = static_cast<KeyEntry*>(eventEntry);
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = keyEntry->action;
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = keyEntry->flags;
if (!connection->inputState.trackKey(keyEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent key event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
case EventEntry::TYPE_MOTION: {
MotionEntry* motionEntry = static_cast<MotionEntry*>(eventEntry);
if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_OUTSIDE) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_OUTSIDE;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_EXIT;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_CANCEL;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_DOWN;
} else {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = motionEntry->action;
}
if (dispatchEntry->resolvedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_MOVE
&& !connection->inputState.isHovering(
motionEntry->deviceId, motionEntry->source, motionEntry->displayId)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: filling in missing hover enter event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
}
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = motionEntry->flags;
if (dispatchEntry->targetFlags & InputTarget::FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags |= AMOTION_EVENT_FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED;
}
if (!connection->inputState.trackMotion(motionEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent motion event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
}
if (dispatchEntry->hasForegroundTarget()) {
incrementPendingForegroundDispatchesLocked(eventEntry);
}
connection->outboundQueue.enqueueAtTail(dispatchEntry);
traceOutboundQueueLengthLocked(connection);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Framework UI permission-dialog implementation in Android 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to conduct tapjacking attacks and access arbitrary private-storage files by creating a partially overlapping window, aka internal bug 26677796.
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
| High | 174,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_pcomp_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rpcomp;
snprintf(rpcomp.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "pcomp");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rpcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 166,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.type = cpu_context;
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_cpu_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpuctx->rotation_list);
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19 mishandles counter grouping, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, related to the perf_pmu_register and perf_event_open functions.
Commit Message: perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | High | 168,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ShellSurface::OnSurfaceCommit() {
surface_->CheckIfSurfaceHierarchyNeedsCommitToNewSurfaces();
surface_->CommitSurfaceHierarchy();
if (enabled() && !widget_)
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
origin_ += pending_origin_offset_;
pending_origin_offset_ = gfx::Vector2d();
resize_component_ = pending_resize_component_;
if (widget_) {
geometry_ = pending_geometry_;
UpdateWidgetBounds();
gfx::Point surface_origin = GetSurfaceOrigin();
gfx::Rect hit_test_bounds =
surface_->GetHitTestBounds() + surface_origin.OffsetFromOrigin();
bool activatable = activatable_ && !hit_test_bounds.IsEmpty();
if (activatable != CanActivate()) {
set_can_activate(activatable);
aura::client::ActivationClient* activation_client =
ash::Shell::GetInstance()->activation_client();
if (activatable)
activation_client->ActivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
else if (widget_->IsActive())
activation_client->DeactivateWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
}
surface_->window()->SetBounds(
gfx::Rect(surface_origin, surface_->window()->layer()->size()));
if (pending_scale_ != scale_) {
gfx::Transform transform;
DCHECK_NE(pending_scale_, 0.0);
transform.Scale(1.0 / pending_scale_, 1.0 / pending_scale_);
surface_->window()->SetTransform(transform);
scale_ = pending_scale_;
}
if (pending_show_widget_) {
DCHECK(!widget_->IsClosed());
DCHECK(!widget_->IsVisible());
pending_show_widget_ = false;
widget_->Show();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Web Workers implementation in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115} | High | 171,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> | High | 169,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (!exec->argumentCount())
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Worker> worker = Worker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionScriptAndCaptureVisibleTest()
: http_url("http://www.google.com"),
http_url_with_path("http://www.google.com/index.html"),
https_url("https://www.google.com"),
example_com("https://example.com"),
test_example_com("https://test.example.com"),
sample_example_com("https://sample.example.com"),
file_url("file:///foo/bar"),
favicon_url("chrome://favicon/http://www.google.com"),
extension_url("chrome-extension://" +
crx_file::id_util::GenerateIdForPath(
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("foo")))),
settings_url("chrome://settings"),
about_url("about:flags") {
urls_.insert(http_url);
urls_.insert(http_url_with_path);
urls_.insert(https_url);
urls_.insert(example_com);
urls_.insert(test_example_com);
urls_.insert(sample_example_com);
urls_.insert(file_url);
urls_.insert(favicon_url);
urls_.insert(extension_url);
urls_.insert(settings_url);
urls_.insert(about_url);
PermissionsData::SetPolicyDelegate(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891} | Medium | 173,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels = 0, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 0 && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize <= eptr - cptr) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
if (numChannels < chansSpecified || numChannels < 1 || numChannels > 256) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
if (!config->num_channels) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff;
if (bytes_to_copy < 0 || bytes_to_copy > 4194304) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-824
Summary: WavpackSetConfiguration64 in pack_utils.c in libwavpack.a in WavPack through 5.1.0 has a *Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value* condition, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a DFF file that lacks valid sample-rate data.
Commit Message: issue #67: make sure sample rate is specified and non-zero in DFF files | Medium | 169,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadARTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
Image
*image;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=1;
image->endian=MSBEndian;
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) ReadBlobStream(image,(size_t) (-(ssize_t) length) & 0x01,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.0.5-5, the ReadARTImage function in coders/art.c allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory leak) via a crafted .art file.
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak reported in #456. | Medium | 168,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_variant)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_VARIANT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int ret, parent = 0;
struct mif6ctl vif;
struct mf6cctl mfc;
mifi_t mifi;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct mr6_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table ? : RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
if (optname != MRT6_INIT) {
if (sk != mrt->mroute6_sk && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
switch (optname) {
case MRT6_INIT:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
return ip6mr_sk_init(mrt, sk);
case MRT6_DONE:
return ip6mr_sk_done(sk);
case MRT6_ADD_MIF:
if (optlen < sizeof(vif))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&vif, optval, sizeof(vif)))
return -EFAULT;
if (vif.mif6c_mifi >= MAXMIFS)
return -ENFILE;
rtnl_lock();
ret = mif6_add(net, mrt, &vif, sk == mrt->mroute6_sk);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
case MRT6_DEL_MIF:
if (optlen < sizeof(mifi_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&mifi, optval, sizeof(mifi_t)))
return -EFAULT;
rtnl_lock();
ret = mif6_delete(mrt, mifi, NULL);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
/*
* Manipulate the forwarding caches. These live
* in a sort of kernel/user symbiosis.
*/
case MRT6_ADD_MFC:
case MRT6_DEL_MFC:
parent = -1;
case MRT6_ADD_MFC_PROXY:
case MRT6_DEL_MFC_PROXY:
if (optlen < sizeof(mfc))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&mfc, optval, sizeof(mfc)))
return -EFAULT;
if (parent == 0)
parent = mfc.mf6cc_parent;
rtnl_lock();
if (optname == MRT6_DEL_MFC || optname == MRT6_DEL_MFC_PROXY)
ret = ip6mr_mfc_delete(mrt, &mfc, parent);
else
ret = ip6mr_mfc_add(net, mrt, &mfc,
sk == mrt->mroute6_sk, parent);
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
/*
* Control PIM assert (to activate pim will activate assert)
*/
case MRT6_ASSERT:
{
int v;
if (optlen != sizeof(v))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
mrt->mroute_do_assert = v;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2
case MRT6_PIM:
{
int v;
if (optlen != sizeof(v))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
v = !!v;
rtnl_lock();
ret = 0;
if (v != mrt->mroute_do_pim) {
mrt->mroute_do_pim = v;
mrt->mroute_do_assert = v;
}
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
case MRT6_TABLE:
{
u32 v;
if (optlen != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(v, (u32 __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
/* "pim6reg%u" should not exceed 16 bytes (IFNAMSIZ) */
if (v != RT_TABLE_DEFAULT && v >= 100000000)
return -EINVAL;
if (sk == mrt->mroute6_sk)
return -EBUSY;
rtnl_lock();
ret = 0;
if (!ip6mr_new_table(net, v))
ret = -ENOMEM;
raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif
/*
* Spurious command, or MRT6_VERSION which you cannot
* set.
*/
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in net/ipv6/ip6mr.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11. By setting a specific socket option, an attacker can control a pointer in kernel land and cause an inet_csk_listen_stop general protection fault, or potentially execute arbitrary code under certain circumstances. The issue can be triggered as root (e.g., inside a default LXC container or with the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability) or after namespace unsharing. This occurs because sk_type and protocol are not checked in the appropriate part of the ip6_mroute_* functions. NOTE: this affects Linux distributions that use 4.9.x longterm kernels before 4.9.187.
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 169,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *fin, *fout;
FILE *fpin, *fpout;
uint8_t *inbuf, *outbuf;
uint8_t *inbuf_u, *outbuf_u;
uint8_t *inbuf_v, *outbuf_v;
int f, frames;
int width, height, target_width, target_height;
if (argc < 5) {
printf("Incorrect parameters:\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fin = argv[1];
fout = argv[4];
if (!parse_dim(argv[2], &width, &height)) {
printf("Incorrect parameters: %s\n", argv[2]);
usage(argv[0]);
return 1;
}
if (!parse_dim(argv[3], &target_width, &target_height)) {
printf("Incorrect parameters: %s\n", argv[3]);
usage(argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fpin = fopen(fin, "rb");
if (fpin == NULL) {
printf("Can't open file %s to read\n", fin);
usage(argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fpout = fopen(fout, "wb");
if (fpout == NULL) {
printf("Can't open file %s to write\n", fout);
usage(argv[0]);
return 1;
}
if (argc >= 6)
frames = atoi(argv[5]);
else
frames = INT_MAX;
printf("Input size: %dx%d\n",
width, height);
printf("Target size: %dx%d, Frames: ",
target_width, target_height);
if (frames == INT_MAX)
printf("All\n");
else
printf("%d\n", frames);
inbuf = (uint8_t*)malloc(width * height * 3 / 2);
outbuf = (uint8_t*)malloc(target_width * target_height * 3 / 2);
inbuf_u = inbuf + width * height;
inbuf_v = inbuf_u + width * height / 4;
outbuf_u = outbuf + target_width * target_height;
outbuf_v = outbuf_u + target_width * target_height / 4;
f = 0;
while (f < frames) {
if (fread(inbuf, width * height * 3 / 2, 1, fpin) != 1)
break;
vp9_resize_frame420(inbuf, width, inbuf_u, inbuf_v, width / 2,
height, width,
outbuf, target_width, outbuf_u, outbuf_v,
target_width / 2,
target_height, target_width);
fwrite(outbuf, target_width * target_height * 3 / 2, 1, fpout);
f++;
}
printf("%d frames processed\n", f);
fclose(fpin);
fclose(fpout);
free(inbuf);
free(outbuf);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,479 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto skip_error;
case -ECONNRESET:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ECONNRESET");
goto skip_error;
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ESHUTDOWN");
goto skip_error;
case -EPIPE:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -EPIPE\n");
break;
default:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"Unexpected error %d\n", status);
break;
}
}
desc->rerr = status;
desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
desc->length += desc->reslength;
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock(&desc->iuspin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static INT AirPDcapScanForKeys(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
const guint8 *data,
const guint mac_header_len,
const guint tot_len,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id
)
{
const UCHAR *addr;
guint bodyLength;
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sta_sa;
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
guint offset = 0;
const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
0x88, 0x8E /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
};
const guint8 bt_dot1x_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x19, 0x58, /* Org. code=Bluetooth SIG */
0x00, 0x03 /* Type: Bluetooth Security */
};
const guint8 tdls_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
0x89, 0x0D, /* Type: 802.11 - Fast Roaming Remote Request */
0x02, /* Payload Type: TDLS */
0X0C /* Action Category: TDLS */
};
const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey;
#ifdef _DEBUG
#define MSGBUF_LEN 255
CHAR msgbuf[MSGBUF_LEN];
#endif
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
/* cache offset in the packet data */
offset = mac_header_len;
/* check if the packet has an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0 || memcmp(data+offset, bt_dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* skip LLC header */
offset+=8;
/* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
bodyLength=pntoh16(data+offset+2);
if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) { /* Only check if frame is long enough for eapol header, ignore tailing garbage, see bug 9065 */
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
offset+=4;
pEAPKey = (const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *) (data+offset);
/* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
if (/*pEAPKey->type!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type (WPA2) */
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR) /* 254 = RSN_KEY_DESCRIPTOR - WPA, */
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* start with descriptor body */
offset+=1;
/* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and AP */
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "No SA for BSSID found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* It could be a Pairwise Key exchange, check */
if (AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, offset, tot_len) == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE)
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
if (mac_header_len + GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN_MIN > tot_len) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Message too short for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Verify the bitfields: Key = 0(groupwise) Mic = 1 Ack = 1 Secure = 1 */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=0 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])!=1 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset]) != 1 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset]) != 1){
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Key bitfields not correct for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* force STA address to be the broadcast MAC so we create an SA for the groupkey */
memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
/* get the Security Association structure for the broadcast MAC and AP */
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* Get the SA for the STA, since we need its pairwise key to decrpyt the group key */
/* get STA address */
if ( (addr=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
memcpy(id.sta, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
#endif
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
sta_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sta_sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* Try to extract the group key and install it in the SA */
return (AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sta_sa->wpa.ptk+16, sa, tot_len-offset+1));
} else if (memcmp(data+offset, tdls_header, 10) == 0) {
const guint8 *initiator, *responder;
guint8 action;
guint status, offset_rsne = 0, offset_fte = 0, offset_link = 0, offset_timeout = 0;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Authentication: TDLS Action Frame", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* skip LLC header */
offset+=10;
/* check if the packet is a TDLS response or confirm */
action = data[offset];
if (action!=1 && action!=2) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not Response nor confirm", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* check status */
offset++;
status=pntoh16(data+offset);
if (status!=0) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "TDLS setup not successfull", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* skip Token + capabilities */
offset+=5;
/* search for RSN, Fast BSS Transition, Link Identifier and Timeout Interval IEs */
while(offset < (tot_len - 2)) {
if (data[offset] == 48) {
offset_rsne = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 55) {
offset_fte = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 56) {
offset_timeout = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 101) {
offset_link = offset;
}
if (tot_len < offset + data[offset + 1] + 2) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
offset += data[offset + 1] + 2;
}
if (offset_rsne == 0 || offset_fte == 0 ||
offset_timeout == 0 || offset_link == 0)
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Cannot Find all necessary IEs", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Found RSNE/Fast BSS/Timeout Interval/Link IEs", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* Will create a Security Association between 2 STA. Need to get both MAC address */
initiator = &data[offset_link + 8];
responder = &data[offset_link + 14];
if (memcmp(initiator, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0) {
memcpy(id.sta, initiator, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id.bssid, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
} else {
memcpy(id.sta, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id.bssid, initiator, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
}
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
if (sa->validKey) {
if (memcmp(sa->wpa.nonce, data + offset_fte + 52, AIRPDCAP_WPA_NONCE_LEN) == 0) {
/* Already have valid key for this SA, no need to redo key derivation */
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
} else {
/* We are opening a new session with the same two STA, save previous sa */
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa = g_new(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION, 1);
memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
sa->next=tmp_sa;
sa->validKey = FALSE;
}
}
if (AirPDcapTDLSDeriveKey(sa, data, offset_rsne, offset_fte, offset_timeout, offset_link, action)
== AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Skipping: not an EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
}
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: epan/crypt/airpdcap.c in the IEEE 802.11 dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles the lack of an EAPOL_RSN_KEY, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Make sure EAPOL body is big enough for a EAPOL_RSN_KEY.
A pointer to a EAPOL_RSN_KEY is set on the packet presuming the
whole EAPOL_RSN_KEY is there. That's not always the case for
fuzzed/malicious captures.
Bug: 11585
Change-Id: Ib94b8aceef444c7820e43b969596efdb8dbecccd
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15540
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pcd_detect(void)
{
char id[18];
int k, unit;
struct pcd_unit *cd;
printk("%s: %s version %s, major %d, nice %d\n",
name, name, PCD_VERSION, major, nice);
par_drv = pi_register_driver(name);
if (!par_drv) {
pr_err("failed to register %s driver\n", name);
return -1;
}
k = 0;
if (pcd_drive_count == 0) { /* nothing spec'd - so autoprobe for 1 */
cd = pcd;
if (pi_init(cd->pi, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, pcd_buffer,
PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name)) {
if (!pcd_probe(cd, -1, id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
} else {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
int *conf = *drives[unit];
if (!conf[D_PRT])
continue;
if (!pi_init(cd->pi, 0, conf[D_PRT], conf[D_MOD],
conf[D_UNI], conf[D_PRO], conf[D_DLY],
pcd_buffer, PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name))
continue;
if (!pcd_probe(cd, conf[D_SLV], id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
}
if (k)
return 0;
printk("%s: No CD-ROM drive found\n", name);
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
blk_cleanup_queue(cd->disk->queue);
cd->disk->queue = NULL;
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&cd->tag_set);
put_disk(cd->disk);
}
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a cd data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int read_private_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
const sc_acl_entry_t *e;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
e = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (e == NULL || e->method == SC_AC_NEVER)
return 10;
bufsize = file->size;
sc_file_free(file);
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
bufsize = r;
do {
if (bufsize < 4)
return 3;
keysize = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (keysize == 0)
break;
if (keysize < 3)
return 3;
if (p[2] == opt_key_num)
break;
p += keysize;
bufsize -= keysize;
} while (1);
if (keysize == 0) {
printf("Key number %d not found.\n", opt_key_num);
return 2;
}
return parse_private_key(p, keysize, rsa);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: A double free when handling responses from an HSM Card in sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init in libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems. | Medium | 169,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int hpel_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest, uint8_t *src,
int src_x, int src_y,
op_pixels_func *pix_op,
int motion_x, int motion_y)
{
int dxy = 0;
int emu = 0;
src_x += motion_x >> 1;
src_y += motion_y >> 1;
/* WARNING: do no forget half pels */
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width); // FIXME unneeded for emu?
if (src_x != s->width)
dxy |= motion_x & 1;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y != s->height)
dxy |= (motion_y & 1) << 1;
src += src_y * s->linesize + src_x;
if (s->unrestricted_mv) {
if ((unsigned)src_x > FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - (motion_x & 1) - 8, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y > FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - (motion_y & 1) - 8, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, src,
s->linesize, s->linesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y, s->h_edge_pos,
s->v_edge_pos);
src = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
}
pix_op[dxy](dest, src, s->linesize, 8);
return emu;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The put_no_rnd_pixels8_xy2_mmx function in x86/rnd_template.c in libav 11.7 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted MP3 file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int __fsnotify_parent(const struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, __u32 mask)
{
struct dentry *parent;
struct inode *p_inode;
int ret = 0;
if (!dentry)
dentry = path->dentry;
if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_FSNOTIFY_PARENT_WATCHED))
return 0;
parent = dget_parent(dentry);
p_inode = parent->d_inode;
if (unlikely(!fsnotify_inode_watches_children(p_inode)))
__fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags(p_inode);
else if (p_inode->i_fsnotify_mask & mask) {
/* we are notifying a parent so come up with the new mask which
* specifies these are events which came from a child. */
mask |= FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
if (path)
ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH,
dentry->d_name.name, 0);
else
ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, dentry->d_inode, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE,
dentry->d_name.name, 0);
}
dput(parent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the fsnotify implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.12.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted application that leverages simultaneous execution of the inotify_handle_event and vfs_rename functions.
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetNetworkConditions(
network::mojom::NetworkConditionsPtr conditions) {
if (!process_)
return;
StoragePartition* partition = process_->GetStoragePartition();
network::mojom::NetworkContext* context = partition->GetNetworkContext();
context->SetNetworkConditions(host_id_, std::move(conditions));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestConfirmation(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Reverb_command(effect_handle_t self,
uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData){
android::ReverbContext * pContext = (android::ReverbContext *) self;
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
if (pContext == NULL){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command ERROR pContext == NULL");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode){
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_INIT: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = android::Reverb_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
android::Reverb_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
Reverb_setConfig(pContext, &pContext->config);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM:{
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(effect_param_t) < (size_t)p->psize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26347509");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize);
p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
p->status = android::Reverb_getParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM:{
if (pCmdData == NULL || (cmdSize < (sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(int32_t))) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\t4LVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR, psize is not sizeof(int32_t)");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = android::Reverb_setParameter(pContext,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->bEnabled == LVM_TRUE){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR-Effect is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
pContext->bEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE")
pContext->SamplesToExitCount =
(ActiveParams.T60 * pContext->config.inputCfg.samplingRate)/1000;
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_FLAT;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->bEnabled == LVM_FALSE){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR-Effect is not yet enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
pContext->bEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pReplyData != NULL) { // we have volume control
pContext->leftVolume = (LVM_INT16)((*(uint32_t *)pCmdData + (1 << 11)) >> 12);
pContext->rightVolume = (LVM_INT16)((*((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1) + (1 << 11)) >> 12);
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = (1 << 24);
*((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 1) = (1 << 24);
if (pContext->volumeMode == android::REVERB_VOLUME_OFF) {
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_FLAT;
}
} else { // we don't have volume control
pContext->leftVolume = REVERB_UNIT_VOLUME;
pContext->rightVolume = REVERB_UNIT_VOLUME;
pContext->volumeMode = android::REVERB_VOLUME_OFF;
}
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME left %d, right %d mode %d",
pContext->leftVolume, pContext->rightVolume, pContext->volumeMode);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_command cmdCode Case: "
"DEFAULT start %d ERROR",cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
} /* end Reverb_command */
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libeffects). Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63662938.
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking to Downmix and Reverb
Bug: 63662938
Bug: 63526567
Test: Added CTS tests
Change-Id: I8ed398cd62a9f461b0590e37f593daa3d8e4dbc4
(cherry picked from commit 804632afcdda6e80945bf27c384757bda50560cb)
| Medium | 173,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PaymentRequest::CanMakePayment() {
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnCanMakePaymentCalled();
if (!delegate_->GetPrefService()->GetBoolean(kCanMakePaymentEnabled) ||
!state_) {
CanMakePaymentCallback(/*can_make_payment=*/false);
} else {
state_->CanMakePayment(
base::BindOnce(&PaymentRequest::CanMakePaymentCallback,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822} | Medium | 173,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
*pmaskHash = NULL;
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!pss)
return NULL;
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
p = param->value.sequence->data;
plen = param->value.sequence->length;
*pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
}
}
return pss;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1q and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via an RSA PSS ASN.1 signature that lacks a mask generation function parameter.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor(ExecState* exec)
{
JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& str1(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& str2(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& str3(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsNullString).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsNullString).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
RefPtr<TestNamedConstructor> object = TestNamedConstructor::createForJSConstructor(castedThis->document(), str1, str2, str3, ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), object.get())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case */
if (!corkreq) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
goto release_dst;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
net_dbg_ratelimited("udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info *)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
release_dst:
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_script )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_SCRIPT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 167,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct rtable *icmp_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,
const struct iphdr *iph,
__be32 saddr, u8 tos,
int type, int code,
struct icmp_bxm *param)
{
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.daddr = (param->replyopts.srr ?
param->replyopts.faddr : iph->saddr),
.saddr = saddr,
.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(tos),
.flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP,
.fl4_icmp_type = type,
.fl4_icmp_code = code,
};
struct rtable *rt, *rt2;
int err;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return rt;
/* No need to clone since we're just using its address. */
rt2 = rt;
if (!fl4.saddr)
fl4.saddr = rt->rt_src;
rt = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
if (rt != rt2)
return rt;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt) == -EPERM) {
rt = NULL;
} else
return rt;
err = xfrm_decode_session_reverse(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), AF_INET);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
if (inet_addr_type(net, fl4.saddr) == RTN_LOCAL) {
rt2 = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt2))
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
} else {
struct flowi4 fl4_2 = {};
unsigned long orefdst;
fl4_2.daddr = fl4.saddr;
rt2 = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4_2);
if (IS_ERR(rt2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
/* Ugh! */
orefdst = skb_in->_skb_refdst; /* save old refdst */
err = ip_route_input(skb_in, fl4.daddr, fl4.saddr,
RT_TOS(tos), rt2->dst.dev);
dst_release(&rt2->dst);
rt2 = skb_rtable(skb_in);
skb_in->_skb_refdst = orefdst; /* restore old refdst */
}
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
rt2 = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt2->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL,
XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP);
if (!IS_ERR(rt2)) {
dst_release(&rt->dst);
rt = rt2;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt2) == -EPERM) {
if (rt)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return rt2;
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
return rt;
relookup_failed:
if (rt)
return rt;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline long decode_twos_comp(ulong c, int prec)
{
long result;
assert(prec >= 2);
jas_eprintf("warning: support for signed data is untested\n");
result = (c & ((1 << (prec - 1)) - 1)) - (c & (1 << (prec - 1)));
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
{
int i, j, val, n, r;
unsigned char bitlengths[MAX_SYMBOLS], zerocount, ppmd_flags;
unsigned int maxorder;
struct huffman_code precode;
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
struct rar_br *br = &(rar->br);
free_codes(a);
/* Skip to the next byte */
rar_br_consume_unalined_bits(br);
/* PPMd block flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if ((rar->is_ppmd_block = rar_br_bits(br, 1)) != 0)
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7))
goto truncated_data;
ppmd_flags = rar_br_bits(br, 7);
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
/* Memory is allocated in MB */
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->dictionary_size = (rar_br_bits(br, 8) + 1) << 20;
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
if (ppmd_flags & 0x40)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->ppmd_escape = rar->ppmd7_context.InitEsc = rar_br_bits(br, 8);
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
else
rar->ppmd_escape = 2;
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
maxorder = (ppmd_flags & 0x1F) + 1;
if(maxorder > 16)
maxorder = 16 + (maxorder - 16) * 3;
if (maxorder == 1)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make sure ppmd7_contest is freed before Ppmd7_Construct
* because reading a broken file cause this abnormal sequence. */
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context, &g_szalloc);
rar->bytein.a = a;
rar->bytein.Read = &ppmd_read;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_CreateVTable(&rar->range_dec);
rar->range_dec.Stream = &rar->bytein;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Construct(&rar->ppmd7_context);
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Alloc(&rar->ppmd7_context,
rar->dictionary_size, &g_szalloc))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Init(&rar->ppmd7_context, maxorder);
rar->ppmd_valid = 1;
}
else
{
if (!rar->ppmd_valid) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid PPMd sequence");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
}
else
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
/* Keep existing table flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if (!rar_br_bits(br, 1))
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
memset(&bitlengths, 0, sizeof(bitlengths));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYMBOLS;)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
bitlengths[i++] = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (bitlengths[i-1] == 0xF)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
zerocount = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (zerocount)
{
i--;
for (j = 0; j < zerocount + 2 && i < MAX_SYMBOLS; j++)
bitlengths[i++] = 0;
}
}
}
memset(&precode, 0, sizeof(precode));
r = create_code(a, &precode, bitlengths, MAX_SYMBOLS, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (r);
}
for (i = 0; i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE;)
{
if ((val = read_next_symbol(a, &precode)) < 0) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (val < 16)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = (rar->lengthtable[i] + val) & 0xF;
i++;
}
else if (val < 18)
{
if (i == 0)
{
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Internal error extracting RAR file.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if(val == 16) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for (j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = rar->lengthtable[i-1];
i++;
}
}
else
{
if(val == 18) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for(j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
rar->lengthtable[i++] = 0;
}
}
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
r = create_code(a, &rar->maincode, &rar->lengthtable[0], MAINCODE_SIZE,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->offsetcode, &rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE],
OFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE],
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lengthcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE +
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE], LENGTHCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
if (!rar->dictionary_size || !rar->lzss.window)
{
/* Seems as though dictionary sizes are not used. Even so, minimize
* memory usage as much as possible.
*/
void *new_window;
unsigned int new_size;
if (rar->unp_size >= DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE)
new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
else
new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
if (new_window == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->lzss.window = (unsigned char *)new_window;
rar->dictionary_size = new_size;
memset(rar->lzss.window, 0, rar->dictionary_size);
rar->lzss.mask = rar->dictionary_size - 1;
}
rar->start_new_table = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
truncated_data:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
rar->valid = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the parse_codes function in archive_read_support_format_rar.c in libarchive before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a RAR file with a zero-sized dictionary.
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this. | Medium | 167,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (quantum != (extent/image->columns)))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The quantum handling code in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error or out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105 | Medium | 168,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseStartTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *attname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int nbatts = 0;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int i;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
while ((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
attname = xmlParseAttribute(ctxt, &attvalue);
if ((attname != NULL) && (attvalue != NULL)) {
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 2) {
if (xmlStrEqual(atts[i], attname)) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
}
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if (atts == NULL) {
maxatts = 22; /* allow for 10 attrs by default */
atts = (const xmlChar **)
xmlMalloc(maxatts * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (atts == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
} else if (nbatts + 4 > maxatts) {
const xmlChar **n;
maxatts *= 2;
n = (const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc((void *) atts,
maxatts * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (n == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
atts = n;
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
atts[nbatts] = NULL;
atts[nbatts + 1] = NULL;
} else {
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
}
failed:
GROW
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
}
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbatts > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, NULL);
}
if (atts != NULL) {
/* Free only the content strings */
for (i = 1;i < nbatts;i+=2)
if (atts[i] != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BlockedPluginInfoBarDelegate::BlockedPluginInfoBarDelegate(
TabContents* tab_contents,
const string16& utf16_name)
: PluginInfoBarDelegate(tab_contents, utf16_name) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.Shown"));
std::string name = UTF16ToUTF8(utf16_name);
if (name == webkit::npapi::PluginGroup::kJavaGroupName)
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.Shown.Java"));
else if (name == webkit::npapi::PluginGroup::kQuickTimeGroupName)
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.Shown.QuickTime"));
else if (name == webkit::npapi::PluginGroup::kShockwaveGroupName)
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.Shown.Shockwave"));
else if (name == webkit::npapi::PluginGroup::kRealPlayerGroupName)
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.Shown.RealPlayer"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not require Infobar interaction before use of the Windows Media Player plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via crafted Flash content.
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long mem_seek(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, long offset, int origin)
{
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
long newpos;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_seek(%p, %ld, %d)\n", obj, offset, origin));
switch (origin) {
case SEEK_SET:
newpos = offset;
break;
case SEEK_END:
newpos = m->len_ - offset;
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
newpos = m->pos_ + offset;
break;
default:
abort();
break;
}
if (newpos < 0) {
return -1;
}
m->pos_ = newpos;
return m->pos_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) jas_realloc function in base/jas_malloc.c and (2) mem_resize function in base/jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.22 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image, which triggers use after free vulnerabilities.
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior. | Medium | 168,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ftp_loop_internal (struct url *u, struct fileinfo *f, ccon *con, char **local_file,
bool force_full_retrieve)
{
int count, orig_lp;
wgint restval, len = 0, qtyread = 0;
const char *tmrate = NULL;
uerr_t err;
struct_stat st;
/* Declare WARC variables. */
bool warc_enabled = (opt.warc_filename != NULL);
FILE *warc_tmp = NULL;
ip_address *warc_ip = NULL;
wgint last_expected_bytes = 0;
/* Get the target, and set the name for the message accordingly. */
if ((f == NULL) && (con->target))
{
/* Explicit file (like ".listing"). */
locf = con->target;
}
else
{
{
/* URL-derived file. Consider "-O file" name. */
xfree (con->target);
con->target = url_file_name (u, NULL);
if (!opt.output_document)
locf = con->target;
else
}
/* If the output_document was given, then this check was already done and
the file didn't exist. Hence the !opt.output_document */
/* If we receive .listing file it is necessary to determine system type of the ftp
server even if opn.noclobber is given. Thus we must ignore opt.noclobber in
order to establish connection with the server and get system type. */
if (opt.noclobber && !opt.output_document && file_exists_p (con->target)
&& !((con->cmd & DO_LIST) && !(con->cmd & DO_RETR)))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("File %s already there; not retrieving.\n"), quote (con->target));
/* If the file is there, we suppose it's retrieved OK. */
return RETROK;
}
/* Remove it if it's a link. */
remove_link (con->target);
count = 0;
if (con->st & ON_YOUR_OWN)
con->st = ON_YOUR_OWN;
orig_lp = con->cmd & LEAVE_PENDING ? 1 : 0;
/* THE loop. */
do
{
/* Increment the pass counter. */
++count;
sleep_between_retrievals (count);
if (con->st & ON_YOUR_OWN)
{
con->cmd = 0;
con->cmd |= (DO_RETR | LEAVE_PENDING);
if (con->csock != -1)
con->cmd &= ~ (DO_LOGIN | DO_CWD);
else
con->cmd |= (DO_LOGIN | DO_CWD);
}
else /* not on your own */
{
if (con->csock != -1)
con->cmd &= ~DO_LOGIN;
else
con->cmd |= DO_LOGIN;
if (con->st & DONE_CWD)
con->cmd &= ~DO_CWD;
else
con->cmd |= DO_CWD;
}
/* For file RETR requests, we can write a WARC record.
We record the file contents to a temporary file. */
if (warc_enabled && (con->cmd & DO_RETR) && warc_tmp == NULL)
{
warc_tmp = warc_tempfile ();
if (warc_tmp == NULL)
return WARC_TMP_FOPENERR;
if (!con->proxy && con->csock != -1)
{
warc_ip = (ip_address *) alloca (sizeof (ip_address));
socket_ip_address (con->csock, warc_ip, ENDPOINT_PEER);
}
}
/* Decide whether or not to restart. */
if (con->cmd & DO_LIST)
restval = 0;
else if (force_full_retrieve)
restval = 0;
else if (opt.start_pos >= 0)
restval = opt.start_pos;
else if (opt.always_rest
&& stat (locf, &st) == 0
&& S_ISREG (st.st_mode))
/* When -c is used, continue from on-disk size. (Can't use
hstat.len even if count>1 because we don't want a failed
first attempt to clobber existing data.) */
restval = st.st_size;
else if (count > 1)
restval = qtyread; /* start where the previous run left off */
else
restval = 0;
/* Get the current time string. */
tms = datetime_str (time (NULL));
/* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */
if (opt.verbose)
{
char *hurl = url_string (u, URL_AUTH_HIDE_PASSWD);
char tmp[256];
strcpy (tmp, " ");
if (count > 1)
sprintf (tmp, _("(try:%2d)"), count);
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "--%s-- %s\n %s => %s\n",
tms, hurl, tmp, quote (locf));
#ifdef WINDOWS
ws_changetitle (hurl);
#endif
xfree (hurl);
}
/* Send getftp the proper length, if fileinfo was provided. */
if (f && f->type != FT_SYMLINK)
len = f->size;
else
len = 0;
/* If we are working on a WARC record, getftp should also write
to the warc_tmp file. */
err = getftp (u, len, &qtyread, restval, con, count, &last_expected_bytes,
warc_tmp);
if (con->csock == -1)
con->st &= ~DONE_CWD;
con->st |= DONE_CWD;
switch (err)
{
case HOSTERR: case CONIMPOSSIBLE: case FWRITEERR: case FOPENERR:
case FTPNSFOD: case FTPLOGINC: case FTPNOPASV: case FTPNOAUTH: case FTPNOPBSZ: case FTPNOPROT:
case UNLINKERR: case WARC_TMP_FWRITEERR: case CONSSLERR: case CONTNOTSUPPORTED:
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (err == FTPNOAUTH)
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, "Server does not support AUTH TLS.\n");
if (opt.ftps_implicit)
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, "Server does not like implicit FTPS connections.\n");
#endif
/* Fatal errors, give up. */
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
return err;
case CONSOCKERR: case CONERROR: case FTPSRVERR: case FTPRERR:
case WRITEFAILED: case FTPUNKNOWNTYPE: case FTPSYSERR:
case FTPPORTERR: case FTPLOGREFUSED: case FTPINVPASV:
case FOPEN_EXCL_ERR:
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
/* non-fatal errors */
if (err == FOPEN_EXCL_ERR)
{
/* Re-determine the file name. */
xfree (con->target);
con->target = url_file_name (u, NULL);
locf = con->target;
}
continue;
case FTPRETRINT:
/* If the control connection was closed, the retrieval
will be considered OK if f->size == len. */
if (!f || qtyread != f->size)
{
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
}
break;
case RETRFINISHED:
/* Great! */
break;
default:
/* Not as great. */
abort ();
}
tms = datetime_str (time (NULL));
if (!opt.spider)
tmrate = retr_rate (qtyread - restval, con->dltime);
/* If we get out of the switch above without continue'ing, we've
successfully downloaded a file. Remember this fact. */
downloaded_file (FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, locf);
if (con->st & ON_YOUR_OWN)
{
fd_close (con->csock);
con->csock = -1;
}
if (!opt.spider)
{
bool write_to_stdout = (opt.output_document && HYPHENP (opt.output_document));
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
write_to_stdout
? _("%s (%s) - written to stdout %s[%s]\n\n")
: _("%s (%s) - %s saved [%s]\n\n"),
tms, tmrate,
write_to_stdout ? "" : quote (locf),
number_to_static_string (qtyread));
}
if (!opt.verbose && !opt.quiet)
{
/* Need to hide the password from the URL. The `if' is here
so that we don't do the needless allocation every
time. */
char *hurl = url_string (u, URL_AUTH_HIDE_PASSWD);
logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, "%s URL: %s [%s] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n",
tms, hurl, number_to_static_string (qtyread), locf, count);
xfree (hurl);
}
if (warc_enabled && (con->cmd & DO_RETR))
{
/* Create and store a WARC resource record for the retrieved file. */
bool warc_res;
warc_res = warc_write_resource_record (NULL, u->url, NULL, NULL,
warc_ip, NULL, warc_tmp, -1);
if (! warc_res)
return WARC_ERR;
/* warc_write_resource_record has also closed warc_tmp. */
warc_tmp = NULL;
}
if (con->cmd & DO_LIST)
/* This is a directory listing file. */
{
if (!opt.remove_listing)
/* --dont-remove-listing was specified, so do count this towards the
number of bytes and files downloaded. */
{
total_downloaded_bytes += qtyread;
numurls++;
}
/* Deletion of listing files is not controlled by --delete-after, but
by the more specific option --dont-remove-listing, and the code
to do this deletion is in another function. */
}
else if (!opt.spider)
/* This is not a directory listing file. */
{
/* Unlike directory listing files, don't pretend normal files weren't
downloaded if they're going to be deleted. People seeding proxies,
for instance, may want to know how many bytes and files they've
downloaded through it. */
total_downloaded_bytes += qtyread;
numurls++;
if (opt.delete_after && !input_file_url (opt.input_filename))
{
DEBUGP (("\
Removing file due to --delete-after in ftp_loop_internal():\n"));
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Removing %s.\n"), locf);
if (unlink (locf))
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "unlink: %s\n", strerror (errno));
}
}
/* Restore the original leave-pendingness. */
if (orig_lp)
con->cmd |= LEAVE_PENDING;
else
con->cmd &= ~LEAVE_PENDING;
if (local_file)
*local_file = xstrdup (locf);
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
return RETROK;
} while (!opt.ntry || (count < opt.ntry));
if (con->csock != -1 && (con->st & ON_YOUR_OWN))
{
fd_close (con->csock);
con->csock = -1;
}
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
fclose (warc_tmp);
return TRYLIMEXC;
}
/* Return the directory listing in a reusable format. The directory
/* Return the directory listing in a reusable format. The directory
is specifed in u->dir. */
static uerr_t
ftp_get_listing (struct url *u, ccon *con, struct fileinfo **f)
{
uerr_t err;
char *uf; /* url file name */
con->st &= ~ON_YOUR_OWN;
con->cmd |= (DO_LIST | LEAVE_PENDING);
con->cmd &= ~DO_RETR;
/* Find the listing file name. We do it by taking the file name of
the URL and replacing the last component with the listing file
name. */
uf = url_file_name (u, NULL);
lf = file_merge (uf, LIST_FILENAME);
xfree (uf);
DEBUGP ((_("Using %s as listing tmp file.\n"), quote (lf)));
con->target = xstrdup (lf);
con->target = xstrdup (lf);
xfree (lf);
err = ftp_loop_internal (u, NULL, con, NULL, false);
lf = xstrdup (con->target);
xfree (con->target);
con->target = old_target;
{
*f = ftp_parse_ls (lf, con->rs);
if (opt.remove_listing)
{
if (unlink (lf))
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "unlink: %s\n", strerror (errno));
else
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Removed %s.\n"), quote (lf));
}
}
else
*f = NULL;
xfree (lf);
con->cmd &= ~DO_LIST;
return err;
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: GNU wget before 1.18 allows remote servers to write to arbitrary files by redirecting a request from HTTP to a crafted FTP resource.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,015 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DoCanonicalizePathURL(const URLComponentSource<CHAR>& source,
const Parsed& parsed,
CanonOutput* output,
Parsed* new_parsed) {
bool success = CanonicalizeScheme(source.scheme, parsed.scheme,
output, &new_parsed->scheme);
new_parsed->username.reset();
new_parsed->password.reset();
new_parsed->host.reset();
new_parsed->port.reset();
success &= DoCanonicalizePathComponent<CHAR, UCHAR>(
source.path, parsed.path, '\0', output, &new_parsed->path);
success &= DoCanonicalizePathComponent<CHAR, UCHAR>(
source.query, parsed.query, '?', output, &new_parsed->query);
success &= DoCanonicalizePathComponent<CHAR, UCHAR>(
source.ref, parsed.ref, '#', output, &new_parsed->ref);
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Excessive data validation in URL parser in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to input a URL to bypass website URL validation via a crafted URL.
Commit Message: [url] Make path URL parsing more lax
Parsing the path component of a non-special URL like javascript or data
should not fail for invalid URL characters like \uFFFF. See this bit
in the spec:
https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#cannot-be-a-base-url-path-state
Note: some failing WPTs are added which are because url parsing
replaces invalid characters (e.g. \uFFFF) with the replacement char
\uFFFD, when that isn't in the spec.
Bug: 925614
Change-Id: I450495bfdfa68dc70334ebed16a3ecc0d5737e88
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1551917
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648155} | Medium | 173,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
char *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
int rc, xattr_len;
if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
return iint->evm_status;
/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
/* first need to know the sig type */
rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc <= 0) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
if (rc == -ENODATA) {
rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
if (rc > 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
else if (rc == 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
goto out;
}
xattr_len = rc;
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
sizeof(calc.digest));
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
* not immutable
*/
if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
!IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rc)
evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
out:
if (iint)
iint->evm_status = evm_status;
kfree(xattr_data);
return evm_status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The evm_verify_hmac function in security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not properly copy data, which makes it easier for local users to forge MAC values via a timing side-channel attack.
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | Low | 167,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int parse_video_info(AVIOContext *pb, AVStream *st)
{
uint16_t size_asf; // ASF-specific Format Data size
uint32_t size_bmp; // BMP_HEADER-specific Format Data size
unsigned int tag;
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 1); // skip reserved flags
size_asf = avio_rl16(pb);
tag = ff_get_bmp_header(pb, st, &size_bmp);
st->codecpar->codec_tag = tag;
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_codec_bmp_tags, tag);
size_bmp = FFMAX(size_asf, size_bmp);
if (size_bmp > BMP_HEADER_SIZE) {
int ret;
st->codecpar->extradata_size = size_bmp - BMP_HEADER_SIZE;
if (!(st->codecpar->extradata = av_malloc(st->codecpar->extradata_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE))) {
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memset(st->codecpar->extradata + st->codecpar->extradata_size , 0,
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if ((ret = avio_read(pb, st->codecpar->extradata,
st->codecpar->extradata_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FFmpeg before commit 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in asf_o format demuxer that can result in heap-buffer-overflow that may result in remote code execution. This attack appears to be exploitable via specially crafted ASF file that has to be provided as input to FFmpeg. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i, al, ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
size_t j;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/*
* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
*/
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
} else
p -= 2;
} else
n = i;
}
/*
* Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
* that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
* size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
* actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
* bound is sufficient to be safe.
*/
if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
/*
* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
*/
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len =
RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
* be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
*/
decrypt_good =
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
/*
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
* clients.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/*
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
* remain non-zero (0xff).
*/
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/*
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p,
sizeof
(rand_premaster_secret));
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
if (n > 1) {
n2s(p, i);
} else {
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
i = 0;
}
if (n && n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
p -= 2;
i = (int)n;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
if (idx >= 0) {
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
if ((skey == NULL) ||
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
if (n == 0L) {
/* Get pubkey from cert */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (clkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
}
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
} else
pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
if (pub == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
if (dh_clnt)
DH_free(dh_clnt);
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
if (dh_clnt)
return 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
int kerr = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
if (!kssl_ctx)
kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p, i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p, i);
authenticator.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p += authenticator.length;
n2s(p, i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_pms.length;
/*
* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
*/
if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/*
* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
* return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
&& (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
* the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
* the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
* ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
* bytes instead of the protocol version. If
* SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
* cipher)
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
pms, outl);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
len);
}
}
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
* but it caused problems for apache.
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
kclean:
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
if (kerr)
goto err;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
/* use the certificate */
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
} else {
/*
* use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
* ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
*/
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
} else {
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
if (n != 1 + i) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
* to the start
*/
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
/* Compute the master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
return (ret);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto psk_err;
}
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
goto psk_err;
}
/*
* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
*/
memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
psk_or_pre_ms,
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms,
pre_ms_len);
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
int param_len;
n2s(p, i);
param_len = i + 2;
if (param_len > n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
if (ASN1_get_object
((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
start = p;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
premaster_secret, 32);
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
ret = 2;
else
ret = 1;
gerr:
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
else
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: ssl/s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0t, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1p, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2d, when used for a multi-threaded client, writes the PSK identity hint to an incorrect data structure, which allows remote servers to cause a denial of service (race condition and double free) via a crafted ServerKeyExchange message.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise VRDisplay::exitPresent(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!is_presenting_) {
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "VRDisplay is not presenting.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
if (!display_) {
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "VRService is not available.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
display_->ExitPresent();
resolver->Resolve();
StopPresenting();
return promise;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167} | High | 172,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadYCBCRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.rgb[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod,
exception);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"YCbCrA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) NULL;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
count=0;
length=0;
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: YCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCrYCbCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
static QuantumType
quantum_types[4] =
{
RedQuantum,
GreenQuantum,
BlueQuantum,
OpacityQuantum
};
/*
Line interlacing: YYY...CbCbCb...CrCrCr...YYY...CbCbCb...CrCrCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
for (i=0; i < (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3); i++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
quantum_type=quantum_types[i];
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case RedQuantum:
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case GreenQuantum:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case BlueQuantum:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
case OpacityQuantum:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: YYYYYY...CbCbCbCbCbCb...CrCrCrCrCrCr...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: YYYYYY..., CbCbCbCbCbCb..., CrCrCrCrCrCr...
*/
AppendImageFormat("Y",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,RedQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Cb",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,GreenQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Cr",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,BlueQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,AlphaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(q == (Quantum *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(canvas_image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(canvas_image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(const unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,length,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick version 7.0.7-2 contains a memory leak in ReadYCBCRImage in coders/ycbcr.c.
Commit Message: fix memory leak in ReadYCBCRImage as SetImageExtent failure | High | 167,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fwrite)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *str;
int str_len;
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &str, &str_len, &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 1) {
str_len = MAX(0, MIN(length, str_len));
}
if (!str_len) {
RETURN_LONG(0);
}
RETURN_LONG(php_stream_write(intern->u.file.stream, str, str_len));
} /* }}} */
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::fstat()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bmdma_prepare_buf(IDEDMA *dma, int is_write)
{
BMDMAState *bm = DO_UPCAST(BMDMAState, dma, dma);
IDEState *s = bmdma_active_if(bm);
uint32_t size;
} prd;
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) BMDMA and (2) AHCI HBA interfaces in the IDE functionality in QEMU 1.0 through 2.1.3 have multiple interpretations of a function's return value, which allows guest OS users to cause a host OS denial of service (memory consumption or infinite loop, and system crash) via a PRDT with zero complete sectors, related to the bmdma_prepare_buf and ahci_dma_prepare_buf functions.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: stringprep (char *in,
size_t maxlen,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
int rc;
char *utf8 = NULL;
uint32_t *ucs4 = NULL;
size_t ucs4len, maxucs4len, adducs4len = 50;
do
{
uint32_t *newp;
free (ucs4);
ucs4 = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (in, -1, &ucs4len);
maxucs4len = ucs4len + adducs4len;
newp = realloc (ucs4, maxucs4len * sizeof (uint32_t));
if (!newp)
return STRINGPREP_MALLOC_ERROR;
}
ucs4 = newp;
rc = stringprep_4i (ucs4, &ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
adducs4len += 50;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 function in libin before 1.31, as used in jabberd2, allows context-dependent attackers to read system memory and possibly have other unspecified impact via invalid UTF-8 characters in a string, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: | High | 164,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long Block::GetTimeCode(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
if (pCluster == 0)
return m_timecode;
const long long tc0 = pCluster->GetTimeCode();
assert(tc0 >= 0);
const long long tc = tc0 + m_timecode;
return tc; //unscaled timecode units
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType EqualizeImage(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EqualizeImageTag "Equalize/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
double
black[CompositePixelChannel+1],
*equalize_map,
*histogram,
*map,
white[CompositePixelChannel+1];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize histogram arrays.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
if (AccelerateEqualizeImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
#endif
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
equalize_map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,
GetPixelChannels(image)*sizeof(*equalize_map));
histogram=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*map));
if ((equalize_map == (double *) NULL) || (histogram == (double *) NULL) ||
(map == (double *) NULL))
{
if (map != (double *) NULL)
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (histogram != (double *) NULL)
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (equalize_map != (double *) NULL)
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
/*
Form histogram.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
intensity=p[i];
if ((image->channel_mask & SyncChannels) != 0)
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(image,p);
histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*ScaleQuantumToMap(intensity)+i]++;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
/*
Integrate the histogram to get the equalization map.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
register ssize_t
j;
intensity=0.0;
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
{
intensity+=histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i];
map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=intensity;
}
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(equalize_map,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*equalize_map));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(black,0,sizeof(*black));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(white,0,sizeof(*white));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
black[i]=map[i];
white[i]=map[GetPixelChannels(image)*MaxMap+i];
if (black[i] != white[i])
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=(double)
ScaleMapToQuantum((double) ((MaxMap*(map[
GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]-black[i]))/(white[i]-black[i])));
}
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
j;
/*
Equalize colormap.
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,RedPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].red=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].red))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
GreenPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].green=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].green))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,BluePixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].blue=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].blue))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
AlphaPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].alpha=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].alpha))+
channel];
}
}
}
/*
Equalize image.
*/
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelWriteMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0) || (black[j] == white[j]))
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(q[j])+j]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_EqualizeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EqualizeImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in enhance.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655 | Medium | 167,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> anotherFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestCustomNamedGetter.anotherFunction");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestCustomNamedGetter* imp = V8TestCustomNamedGetter::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->anotherFunction(str);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
*flags |= os_style;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
struct NetBSD_elfcore_procinfo pi;
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
memcpy(&pi, nbuf + doff, descsz);
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s', pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u, nlwps=%u, lwp=%u (signal %u/code %u)",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
RCAST(char *, pi.cpi_name)),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_pid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_euid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_egid),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_nlwps),
elf_getu32(swap, (uint32_t)pi.cpi_siglwp),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_signo),
elf_getu32(swap, pi.cpi_sigcode)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
case OS_STYLE_FREEBSD:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t argoff, pidoff;
if (clazz == ELFCLASS32)
argoff = 4 + 4 + 17;
else
argoff = 4 + 4 + 8 + 17;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.80s'", nbuf + doff +
argoff) == -1)
return 1;
pidoff = argoff + 81 + 2;
if (doff + pidoff + 4 <= size) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", pid=%u",
elf_getu32(swap, *RCAST(uint32_t *, (nbuf +
doff + pidoff)))) == -1)
return 1;
}
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; cp < nbuf + size && *cp
&& isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: do_core_note in readelf.c in libmagic.a in file 5.35 has an out-of-bounds read because memcpy is misused.
Commit Message: Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso) | Medium | 169,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Paired";
if (!pairing_delegate_used_)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_NONE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
UnregisterAgent();
SetTrusted();
ConnectInternal(true, callback, error_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _WM_ParseNewMidi(uint8_t *midi_data, uint32_t midi_size) {
struct _mdi *mdi;
uint32_t tmp_val;
uint32_t midi_type;
uint32_t track_size;
uint8_t **tracks;
uint32_t end_of_tracks = 0;
uint32_t no_tracks;
uint32_t i;
uint32_t divisions = 96;
uint32_t tempo = 500000;
float samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0.0;
float sample_remainder = 0.0;
uint8_t *sysex_store = NULL;
uint32_t *track_delta;
uint8_t *track_end;
uint32_t smallest_delta = 0;
uint32_t subtract_delta = 0;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
if (midi_size < 14) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (!memcmp(midi_data, "RIFF", 4)) {
if (midi_size < 34) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_data += 20;
midi_size -= 20;
}
if (memcmp(midi_data, "MThd", 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MIDI, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_data += 4;
midi_size -= 4;
/*
* Get Midi Header Size - must always be 6
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 24;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++ << 16;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 4;
if (tmp_val != 6) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Get Midi Format - we only support 0, 1 & 2
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (tmp_val > 2) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_type = tmp_val;
/*
* Get No. of Tracks
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (tmp_val < 1) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(no tracks)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
no_tracks = tmp_val;
/*
* Check that type 0 midi file has only 1 track
*/
if ((midi_type == 0) && (no_tracks > 1)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, "(expected 1 track for type 0 midi file, found more)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Get Divisions
*/
divisions = *midi_data++ << 8;
divisions |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (divisions & 0x00008000) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(mdi,divisions);
tracks = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t *) * no_tracks);
track_delta = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * no_tracks);
track_end = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * no_tracks);
running_event = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * no_tracks);
smallest_delta = 0xffffffff;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
if (midi_size < 8) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if (memcmp(midi_data, "MTrk", 4) != 0) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing track header)", 0);
goto _end;
}
midi_data += 4;
midi_size -= 4;
track_size = *midi_data++ << 24;
track_size |= *midi_data++ << 16;
track_size |= *midi_data++ << 8;
track_size |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 4;
if (midi_size < track_size) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if (track_size < 3) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(bad track size)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if ((midi_data[track_size - 3] != 0xFF)
|| (midi_data[track_size - 2] != 0x2F)
|| (midi_data[track_size - 1] != 0x00)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing EOT)", 0);
goto _end;
}
tracks[i] = midi_data;
midi_data += track_size;
midi_size -= track_size;
track_end[i] = 0;
running_event[i] = 0;
track_delta[i] = 0;
while (*tracks[i] > 0x7F) {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
if (midi_type == 1 ) {
if (track_delta[i] < smallest_delta) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
} else {
/*
* Type 0 & 2 midi only needs delta from 1st track
* for initial sample calculations.
*/
if (i == 0) smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f = (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
/*
* Handle type 0 & 2 the same, but type 1 differently
*/
if (midi_type == 1) {
/* Type 1 */
while (end_of_tracks != no_tracks) {
smallest_delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
if (track_end[i])
continue;
if (track_delta[i]) {
track_delta[i] -= subtract_delta;
if (track_delta[i]) {
if ((!smallest_delta)
|| (smallest_delta > track_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
continue;
}
}
do {
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mdi, tracks[i], running_event[i]);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _end;
}
if (tracks[i][0] > 0x7f) {
if (tracks[i][0] < 0xf0) {
/* Events 0x80 - 0xef set running event */
running_event[i] = tracks[i][0];
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xf0) || (tracks[i][0] == 0xf7)) {
/* Sysex resets running event */
running_event[i] = 0;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x2f) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x00)) {
/* End of Track */
end_of_tracks++;
track_end[i] = 1;
tracks[i] += 3;
goto NEXT_TRACK;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x51) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x03)) {
/* Tempo */
tempo = (tracks[i][3] << 16) + (tracks[i][4] << 8)+ tracks[i][5];
if (!tempo)
tempo = 500000;
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
}
}
tracks[i] += setup_ret;
if (*tracks[i] > 0x7f) {
do {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (*tracks[i] > 0x7f);
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (!track_delta[i]);
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > track_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
NEXT_TRACK: continue;
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f = (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f)
+ sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
}
} else {
/* Type 0 & 2 */
if (midi_type == 2) {
mdi->is_type2 = 1;
}
sample_remainder = 0.0;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
running_event[i] = 0;
do {
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mdi, tracks[i], running_event[i]);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _end;
}
if (tracks[i][0] > 0x7f) {
if (tracks[i][0] < 0xf0) {
/* Events 0x80 - 0xef set running event */
running_event[i] = tracks[i][0];
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xf0) || (tracks[i][0] == 0xf7)) {
/* Sysex resets running event */
running_event[i] = 0;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x2f) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x00)) {
/* End of Track */
track_end[i] = 1;
goto NEXT_TRACK2;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x51) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x03)) {
/* Tempo */
tempo = (tracks[i][3] << 16) + (tracks[i][4] << 8)+ tracks[i][5];
if (!tempo)
tempo = 500000;
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
}
}
tracks[i] += setup_ret;
track_delta[i] = 0;
if (*tracks[i] > 0x7f) {
do {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (*tracks[i] > 0x7f);
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
sample_count_f = (((float) track_delta[i] * samples_per_delta_f)
+ sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
NEXT_TRACK2:
smallest_delta = track_delta[i]; /* Added just to keep Xcode happy */
UNUSED(smallest_delta); /* Added to just keep clang happy */
} while (track_end[i] == 0);
}
}
if ((mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width,
_WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy))
== NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _end;
}
mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
mdi->current_event = &mdi->events[0];
mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(mdi);
_end: free(sysex_store);
free(track_end);
free(track_delta);
free(running_event);
free(tracks);
if (mdi->reverb) return (mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(mdi);
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | Medium | 168,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check | Medium | 169,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
(void) ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
value);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->storage_class=
(viff_info.number_data_bands < 3 ? PseudoClass : DirectClass);
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
else
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(max_packets,
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)));
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].red);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(q);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].green);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].blue);
}
SetPixelOpacity(q,image->matte != MagickFalse ? QuantumRange-
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a crafted VIFF file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/99 | Medium | 168,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSFloat64Array::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSFloat64Array* castedThis = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSFloat64Array::s_info);
Float64Array* impl = static_cast<Float64Array*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Float32Array* array(toFloat32Array(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->foo(array)));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the gdImageWebPtr function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via large width and height values.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected].
CVE-2016-6912 | High | 168,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_get_uint_16(png_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_16 i = (png_uint_16)(((png_uint_16)(*buf) << 8) +
(png_uint_16)(*(buf + 1)));
return (i);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: nfs41_callback_svc(void *vrqstp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server;
struct rpc_rqst *req;
int error;
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
if (try_to_freeze())
continue;
prepare_to_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
if (!list_empty(&serv->sv_cb_list)) {
req = list_first_entry(&serv->sv_cb_list,
struct rpc_rqst, rq_bc_list);
list_del(&req->rq_bc_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
dprintk("Invoking bc_svc_process()\n");
error = bc_svc_process(serv, req, rqstp);
dprintk("bc_svc_process() returned w/ error code= %d\n",
error);
} else {
spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(&serv->sv_cb_waitq, &wq);
}
flush_signals(current);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len, last_len, prefix_len, suffix_len, path_len;
uintmax_t strip_len;
strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr, &varint_len);
last_len = strlen(last);
if (varint_len == 0 || last_len < strip_len)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the index.c:read_entry() function while decompressing a compressed prefix length in libgit2 before v0.26.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: error out on unreasonable prefix-compressed path lengths
When computing the complete path length from the encoded
prefix-compressed path, we end up just allocating the complete path
without ever checking what the encoded path length actually is. This can
easily lead to a denial of service by just encoding an unreasonable long
path name inside of the index. Git already enforces a maximum path
length of 4096 bytes. As we also have that enforcement ready in some
places, just make sure that the resulting path is smaller than
GIT_PATH_MAX.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
void *cookiefile;
int i, debug = 0;
const char* user;
struct passwd *tpwd = NULL;
uid_t unlinkuid, fsuid;
if (pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL) != PAM_SUCCESS)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's name");
else {
tpwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, user);
if (!tpwd)
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "error determining target user's UID");
else
unlinkuid = tpwd->pw_uid;
}
/* Parse arguments. We don't understand many, so no sense in breaking
* this into a separate function. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
debug = 1;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "xauthpath=", 10) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "systemuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (strncmp(argv[i], "targetuser=", 11) == 0) {
continue;
}
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option `%s'",
argv[i]);
}
/* Try to retrieve the name of a file we created when the session was
* opened. */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, DATANAME, (const void**) &cookiefile) == PAM_SUCCESS) {
/* We'll only try to remove the file once. */
if (strlen((char*)cookiefile) > 0) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "removing `%s'",
(char*)cookiefile);
}
/* NFS with root_squash requires non-root user */
if (tpwd)
fsuid = setfsuid(unlinkuid);
unlink((char*)cookiefile);
if (tpwd)
setfsuid(fsuid);
*((char*)cookiefile) = '\0';
}
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The pam_sm_close_session function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not properly handle a failure to determine a certain target uid, which might allow local users to delete unintended files by executing a program that relies on the pam_xauth PAM check.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::ensureDefaultStyleSheetsForElement(Element* element, bool& changedDefaultStyle)
{
if (simpleDefaultStyleSheet && !elementCanUseSimpleDefaultStyle(element)) {
loadFullDefaultStyle();
changedDefaultStyle = true;
}
if (element->isSVGElement() && !svgStyleSheet) {
svgStyleSheet = parseUASheet(svgUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(svgUserAgentStyleSheet));
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(svgStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultPrintStyle->addRulesFromSheet(svgStyleSheet, printEval());
changedDefaultStyle = true;
}
if (!mediaControlsStyleSheet && (isHTMLVideoElement(element) || element->hasTagName(audioTag))) {
String mediaRules = String(mediaControlsUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(mediaControlsUserAgentStyleSheet)) + RenderTheme::theme().extraMediaControlsStyleSheet();
mediaControlsStyleSheet = parseUASheet(mediaRules);
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(mediaControlsStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultPrintStyle->addRulesFromSheet(mediaControlsStyleSheet, printEval());
changedDefaultStyle = true;
}
if (!fullscreenStyleSheet && FullscreenElementStack::isFullScreen(&element->document())) {
String fullscreenRules = String(fullscreenUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(fullscreenUserAgentStyleSheet)) + RenderTheme::theme().extraFullScreenStyleSheet();
fullscreenStyleSheet = parseUASheet(fullscreenRules);
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(fullscreenStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultQuirksStyle->addRulesFromSheet(fullscreenStyleSheet, screenEval());
changedDefaultStyle = true;
}
ASSERT(defaultStyle->features().idsInRules.isEmpty());
ASSERT(defaultStyle->features().siblingRules.isEmpty());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,579 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
int tot;
unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
#endif
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
int i;
if (len < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
/*
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
* than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
* report the error in a way the user will notice
*/
if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (wb->left != 0) {
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
/*
* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
* jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
unsigned char aad[13];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
int packlen;
/* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
max_send_fragment -= 512;
if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
max_send_fragment, NULL);
if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
packlen *= 8;
else
packlen *= 4;
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
} else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
for (;;) {
if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
break;
}
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
}
if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
else
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
aad[8] = type;
aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
aad[11] = 0;
aad[12] = 0;
mb_param.out = NULL;
mb_param.inp = aad;
mb_param.len = nw;
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
break;
}
mb_param.out = wb->buf;
mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
mb_param.len = nw;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
return -1;
s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
int j = 6;
while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
}
wb->offset = 0;
wb->left = packlen;
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
if (i <= 0) {
if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
}
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if (i == (int)n) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
} else
#endif
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
/*
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
* 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
* processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
* explicit IVs
*/
maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
/*
* We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
* shouldn't get here
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (maxpipes == 0
|| s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
|| !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
|| !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
maxpipes = 1;
if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
|| split_send_fragment == 0) {
/*
* We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
* fragments so we shouldn't get here
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
for (;;) {
unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
unsigned int numpipes, j;
if (n == 0)
numpipes = 1;
else
numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
if (numpipes > maxpipes)
numpipes = maxpipes;
if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
/*
* We have enough data to completely fill all available
* pipelines
*/
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
}
} else {
/* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
remain = n % numpipes;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
if (j < remain)
pipelens[j]++;
}
}
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
/*
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
*/
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,421 |
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