instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
int r, i;
char *pdata;
char *p;
char *p0;
char *p1;
char *p2;
struct debug_data *d = f->private_data;
pdata = kmalloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pdata == NULL)
return 0;
if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) {
lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n");
kfree(pdata);
return 0;
}
p0 = pdata;
for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) {
do {
p = strstr(p0, d[i].name);
if (p == NULL)
break;
p1 = strchr(p, '\n');
if (p1 == NULL)
break;
p0 = p1++;
p2 = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p2)
break;
p2++;
r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0);
if (d[i].size == 1)
*((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r;
else if (d[i].size == 2)
*((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r;
else if (d[i].size == 4)
*((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r;
else if (d[i].size == 8)
*((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r;
break;
} while (1);
}
kfree(pdata);
return (ssize_t)cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The lbs_debugfs_write function in drivers/net/wireless/libertas/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by leveraging root privileges for a zero-length write operation.
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("PostScript");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/ps.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSImage() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *extent* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715 | High | 167,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: poly_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *str = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
POLYGON *poly;
int npts;
int size;
int isopen;
char *s;
if ((npts = pair_count(str, ',')) <= 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type polygon: \"%s\"", str)));
size = offsetof(POLYGON, p[0]) +sizeof(poly->p[0]) * npts;
poly = (POLYGON *) palloc0(size); /* zero any holes */
SET_VARSIZE(poly, size);
poly->npts = npts;
if ((!path_decode(FALSE, npts, str, &isopen, &s, &(poly->p[0])))
|| (*s != '\0'))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type polygon: \"%s\"", str)));
make_bound_box(poly);
PG_RETURN_POLYGON_P(poly);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | Medium | 166,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dissect_spoolss_keybuffer(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 size;
int end_offset;
if (di->conformant_run)
return offset;
/* Dissect size and data */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_keybuffer_size, &size);
end_offset = offset + (size*2);
if (end_offset < offset) {
/*
* Overflow - make the end offset one past the end of
* the packet data, so we throw an exception (as the
* size is almost certainly too big).
*/
end_offset = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
}
while (offset < end_offset)
offset = dissect_spoolss_uint16uni(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, drep, NULL, hf_keybuffer);
return offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-dcerpc-spoolss.c in the SPOOLS component in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles unexpected offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr function in hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) by leveraging failure to limit process IO loop to the ring size.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t FLACParser::init()
{
mDecoder = FLAC__stream_decoder_new();
if (mDecoder == NULL) {
ALOGE("new failed");
return NO_INIT;
}
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_md5_checking(mDecoder, false);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_ignore_all(mDecoder);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_PICTURE);
FLAC__stream_decoder_set_metadata_respond(
mDecoder, FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_VORBIS_COMMENT);
FLAC__StreamDecoderInitStatus initStatus;
initStatus = FLAC__stream_decoder_init_stream(
mDecoder,
read_callback, seek_callback, tell_callback,
length_callback, eof_callback, write_callback,
metadata_callback, error_callback, (void *) this);
if (initStatus != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_OK) {
ALOGE("init_stream failed %d", initStatus);
return NO_INIT;
}
if (!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_until_end_of_metadata(mDecoder)) {
ALOGE("end_of_metadata failed");
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStreamInfoValid) {
if (getChannels() == 0 || getChannels() > 8) {
ALOGE("unsupported channel count %u", getChannels());
return NO_INIT;
}
switch (getBitsPerSample()) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 24:
break;
default:
ALOGE("unsupported bits per sample %u", getBitsPerSample());
return NO_INIT;
}
switch (getSampleRate()) {
case 8000:
case 11025:
case 12000:
case 16000:
case 22050:
case 24000:
case 32000:
case 44100:
case 48000:
case 88200:
case 96000:
break;
default:
ALOGE("unsupported sample rate %u", getSampleRate());
return NO_INIT;
}
static const struct {
unsigned mChannels;
unsigned mBitsPerSample;
void (*mCopy)(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels);
} table[] = {
{ 1, 8, copyMono8 },
{ 2, 8, copyStereo8 },
{ 8, 8, copyMultiCh8 },
{ 1, 16, copyMono16 },
{ 2, 16, copyStereo16 },
{ 8, 16, copyMultiCh16 },
{ 1, 24, copyMono24 },
{ 2, 24, copyStereo24 },
{ 8, 24, copyMultiCh24 },
};
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(table)/sizeof(table[0]); ++i) {
if (table[i].mChannels >= getChannels() &&
table[i].mBitsPerSample == getBitsPerSample()) {
mCopy = table[i].mCopy;
break;
}
}
if (mTrackMetadata != 0) {
mTrackMetadata->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_RAW);
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, getChannels());
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, getSampleRate());
mTrackMetadata->setInt32(kKeyPcmEncoding, kAudioEncodingPcm16bit);
mTrackMetadata->setInt64(kKeyDuration,
(getTotalSamples() * 1000000LL) / getSampleRate());
}
} else {
ALOGE("missing STREAMINFO");
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mFileMetadata != 0) {
mFileMetadata->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_FLAC);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 174,025 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 2:
#line 105 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->root_node = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1340 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 4:
#line 114 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1348 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 5:
#line 118 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1363 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 6:
#line 129 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_NODE* node;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
node = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_EMPTY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF(node == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), node);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1382 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 7:
#line 147 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1390 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 8:
#line 151 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1402 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 162 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_STAR, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1420 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 176 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_STAR, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1440 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 192 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_PLUS, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1458 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 206 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_PLUS, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1478 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 222 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-1].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = 1;
}
#line 1505 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 245 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-2].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = 1;
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1533 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 269 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-1].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (yyvsp[0].range) & 0xFFFF;;
(yyval.re_node)->end = (yyvsp[0].range) >> 16;;
}
#line 1559 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 16:
#line 291 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-2].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (yyvsp[-1].range) & 0xFFFF;;
(yyval.re_node)->end = (yyvsp[-1].range) >> 16;;
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1586 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 314 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1594 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 318 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_WORD_BOUNDARY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1604 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 324 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_WORD_BOUNDARY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1614 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 330 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANCHOR_START, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1624 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 21:
#line 336 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANCHOR_END, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1634 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 22:
#line 345 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
}
#line 1642 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 23:
#line 349 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1652 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 24:
#line 355 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 1664 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 25:
#line 363 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_WORD_CHAR, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1674 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 26:
#line 369 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_WORD_CHAR, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1684 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 27:
#line 375 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_SPACE, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1694 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 28:
#line 381 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_SPACE, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1704 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 29:
#line 387 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_DIGIT, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1714 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 30:
#line 393 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_DIGIT, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1724 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 31:
#line 399 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CLASS, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->class_vector = (yyvsp[0].class_vector);
}
#line 1736 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 1740 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regexp module in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack consumption) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the _yr_re_emit function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h. | Medium | 168,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_parse_header(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, struct juniper_l2info_t *l2info)
{
const struct juniper_cookie_table_t *lp = juniper_cookie_table;
u_int idx, jnx_ext_len, jnx_header_len = 0;
uint8_t tlv_type,tlv_len;
uint32_t control_word;
int tlv_value;
const u_char *tptr;
l2info->header_len = 0;
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
l2info->proto = 0;
l2info->length = h->len;
l2info->caplen = h->caplen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
l2info->flags = p[3];
l2info->direction = p[3]&JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN;
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) != JUNIPER_MGC_NUMBER) { /* magic number found ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no magic-number found!"));
return 0;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) /* print direction */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%3s ", tok2str(juniper_direction_values, "---", l2info->direction)));
/* magic number + flags */
jnx_header_len = 4;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tJuniper PCAP Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(jnx_flag_values, "none", l2info->flags)));
/* extensions present ? - calculate how much bytes to skip */
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) == JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) {
tptr = p+jnx_header_len;
/* ok to read extension length ? */
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
jnx_ext_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
jnx_header_len += 2;
tptr +=2;
/* nail up the total length -
* just in case something goes wrong
* with TLV parsing */
jnx_header_len += jnx_ext_len;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PCAP Extension(s) total length %u", jnx_ext_len));
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], jnx_ext_len);
while (jnx_ext_len > JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD) {
tlv_type = *(tptr++);
tlv_len = *(tptr++);
tlv_value = 0;
/* sanity checks */
if (tlv_type == 0 || tlv_len == 0)
break;
if (tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD > jnx_ext_len)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Extension TLV #%u, length %u, value ",
tok2str(jnx_ext_tlv_values,"Unknown",tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
tlv_value = juniper_read_tlv_value(tptr, tlv_type, tlv_len);
switch (tlv_type) {
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_NAME:
/* FIXME */
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifmt_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_ENCAPS:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFL_ENCAPS:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifle_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_IDX: /* fall through */
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_UNIT:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_IDX:
default:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", tlv_value));
}
break;
}
tptr+=tlv_len;
jnx_ext_len -= tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
}
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) == JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no-L2-hdr, "));
/* there is no link-layer present -
* perform the v4/v6 heuristics
* to figure out what it is
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[jnx_header_len + 4], 1);
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p + jnx_header_len + 4,
l2info->length - (jnx_header_len + 4)) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no IP-hdr found!"));
l2info->header_len=jnx_header_len+4;
return 0; /* stop parsing the output further */
}
l2info->header_len = jnx_header_len;
p+=l2info->header_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->header_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->header_len;
/* search through the cookie table and copy values matching for our PIC type */
while (lp->s != NULL) {
if (lp->pictype == l2info->pictype) {
l2info->cookie_len += lp->cookie_len;
switch (p[0]) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = LS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len += 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = AS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len = 8;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
/* MFR child links don't carry cookies */
if (l2info->pictype == DLT_JUNIPER_MFR &&
(p[0] & MFR_BE_MASK) == MFR_BE_MASK) {
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
}
#endif
l2info->header_len += l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->cookie_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-PIC, cookie-len %u",
lp->s,
l2info->cookie_len));
if (l2info->cookie_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], l2info->cookie_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cookie 0x"));
for (idx = 0; idx < l2info->cookie_len; idx++) {
l2info->cookie[idx] = p[idx]; /* copy cookie data */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", p[idx]));
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* print demarc b/w L2/L3*/
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+l2info->cookie_len);
break;
}
++lp;
}
p+=l2info->cookie_len;
/* DLT_ specific parsing */
switch(l2info->pictype) {
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
/* ATM cell relay control word present ? */
if (l2info->cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) {
control_word = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
/* some control word heuristics */
switch(control_word) {
case 0: /* zero control word */
case 0x08000000: /* < JUNOS 7.4 control-word */
case 0x08380000: /* cntl word plus cell length (56) >= JUNOS 7.4*/
l2info->header_len += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "control-word 0x%08x ", control_word));
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN
case DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_PPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_PPP:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC
case DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER
case DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY
case DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY:
break;
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unknown Juniper DLT_ type %u: ", l2info->pictype));
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlen %u, proto 0x%04x, ", l2info->header_len, l2info->proto));
return 1; /* everything went ok so far. continue parsing */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_hdr], length %u", h->len));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105) | High | 169,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct xt_action_param *par,
unsigned int family,
unsigned int tcphoff,
unsigned int minlen)
{
const struct xt_tcpmss_info *info = par->targinfo;
struct tcphdr *tcph;
int len, tcp_hdrlen;
unsigned int i;
__be16 oldval;
u16 newmss;
u8 *opt;
/* This is a fragment, no TCP header is available */
if (par->fragoff != 0)
return 0;
if (!skb_make_writable(skb, skb->len))
return -1;
len = skb->len - tcphoff;
if (len < (int)sizeof(struct tcphdr))
return -1;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
tcp_hdrlen = tcph->doff * 4;
if (len < tcp_hdrlen)
return -1;
if (info->mss == XT_TCPMSS_CLAMP_PMTU) {
struct net *net = xt_net(par);
unsigned int in_mtu = tcpmss_reverse_mtu(net, skb, family);
unsigned int min_mtu = min(dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb)), in_mtu);
if (min_mtu <= minlen) {
net_err_ratelimited("unknown or invalid path-MTU (%u)\n",
min_mtu);
return -1;
}
newmss = min_mtu - minlen;
} else
newmss = info->mss;
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph;
for (i = sizeof(struct tcphdr); i <= tcp_hdrlen - TCPOLEN_MSS; i += optlen(opt, i)) {
if (opt[i] == TCPOPT_MSS && opt[i+1] == TCPOLEN_MSS) {
u_int16_t oldmss;
oldmss = (opt[i+2] << 8) | opt[i+3];
/* Never increase MSS, even when setting it, as
* doing so results in problems for hosts that rely
* on MSS being set correctly.
*/
if (oldmss <= newmss)
return 0;
opt[i+2] = (newmss & 0xff00) >> 8;
opt[i+3] = newmss & 0x00ff;
inet_proto_csum_replace2(&tcph->check, skb,
htons(oldmss), htons(newmss),
false);
return 0;
}
}
/* There is data after the header so the option can't be added
* without moving it, and doing so may make the SYN packet
* itself too large. Accept the packet unmodified instead.
*/
if (len > tcp_hdrlen)
return 0;
/*
* MSS Option not found ?! add it..
*/
if (skb_tailroom(skb) < TCPOLEN_MSS) {
if (pskb_expand_head(skb, 0,
TCPOLEN_MSS - skb_tailroom(skb),
GFP_ATOMIC))
return -1;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + tcphoff);
}
skb_put(skb, TCPOLEN_MSS);
/*
* IPv4: RFC 1122 states "If an MSS option is not received at
* connection setup, TCP MUST assume a default send MSS of 536".
* IPv6: RFC 2460 states IPv6 has a minimum MTU of 1280 and a minimum
* length IPv6 header of 60, ergo the default MSS value is 1220
* Since no MSS was provided, we must use the default values
*/
if (xt_family(par) == NFPROTO_IPV4)
newmss = min(newmss, (u16)536);
else
newmss = min(newmss, (u16)1220);
opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
memmove(opt + TCPOLEN_MSS, opt, len - sizeof(struct tcphdr));
inet_proto_csum_replace2(&tcph->check, skb,
htons(len), htons(len + TCPOLEN_MSS), true);
opt[0] = TCPOPT_MSS;
opt[1] = TCPOLEN_MSS;
opt[2] = (newmss & 0xff00) >> 8;
opt[3] = newmss & 0x00ff;
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&tcph->check, skb, 0, *((__be32 *)opt), false);
oldval = ((__be16 *)tcph)[6];
tcph->doff += TCPOLEN_MSS/4;
inet_proto_csum_replace2(&tcph->check, skb,
oldval, ((__be16 *)tcph)[6], false);
return TCPOLEN_MSS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The tcpmss_mangle_packet function in net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11, and 4.9.x before 4.9.36, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the presence of xt_TCPMSS in an iptables action.
Commit Message: netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 169,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool BitReaderCore::ReadBitsInternal(int num_bits, uint64_t* out) {
DCHECK_GE(num_bits, 0);
if (num_bits == 0) {
*out = 0;
return true;
}
if (num_bits > nbits_ && !Refill(num_bits)) {
nbits_ = 0;
reg_ = 0;
return false;
}
bits_read_ += num_bits;
if (num_bits == kRegWidthInBits) {
*out = reg_;
reg_ = 0;
nbits_ = 0;
return true;
}
*out = reg_ >> (kRegWidthInBits - num_bits);
reg_ <<= num_bits;
nbits_ -= num_bits;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Uninitialized data in media in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by [email protected].
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889} | Medium | 173,017 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBTransaction* IndexedDBConnection::CreateTransaction(
int64_t id,
const std::set<int64_t>& scope,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode,
IndexedDBBackingStore::Transaction* backing_store_transaction) {
DCHECK_EQ(GetTransaction(id), nullptr) << "Duplicate transaction id." << id;
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBTransaction> transaction =
IndexedDBClassFactory::Get()->CreateIndexedDBTransaction(
id, this, scope, mode, backing_store_transaction);
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction_ptr = transaction.get();
transactions_[id] = std::move(transaction);
return transaction_ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 59.0.3071.117 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page, aka an IndexedDB sandbox escape.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952} | Medium | 172,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool GIFImageReader::parseData(size_t dataPosition, size_t len, GIFImageDecoder::GIFParseQuery query)
{
if (!len) {
return true;
}
if (len < m_bytesToConsume)
return true;
while (len >= m_bytesToConsume) {
const size_t currentComponentPosition = dataPosition;
const unsigned char* currentComponent = data(dataPosition);
dataPosition += m_bytesToConsume;
len -= m_bytesToConsume;
switch (m_state) {
case GIFLZW:
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->addLzwBlock(currentComponentPosition, m_bytesToConsume);
GETN(1, GIFSubBlock);
break;
case GIFLZWStart: {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->setDataSize(*currentComponent);
GETN(1, GIFSubBlock);
break;
}
case GIFType: {
if (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "GIF89a", 6))
m_version = 89;
else if (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "GIF87a", 6))
m_version = 87;
else
return false;
GETN(7, GIFGlobalHeader);
break;
}
case GIFGlobalHeader: {
m_screenWidth = GETINT16(currentComponent);
m_screenHeight = GETINT16(currentComponent + 2);
if (m_client && !m_client->setSize(m_screenWidth, m_screenHeight))
return false;
const size_t globalColorMapColors = 2 << (currentComponent[4] & 0x07);
if ((currentComponent[4] & 0x80) && globalColorMapColors > 0) { /* global map */
m_globalColorMap.setTablePositionAndSize(dataPosition, globalColorMapColors);
GETN(BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY * globalColorMapColors, GIFGlobalColormap);
break;
}
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFGlobalColormap: {
m_globalColorMap.setDefined();
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFImageStart: {
if (*currentComponent == '!') { // extension.
GETN(2, GIFExtension);
break;
}
if (*currentComponent == ',') { // image separator.
GETN(9, GIFImageHeader);
break;
}
GETN(0, GIFDone);
break;
}
case GIFExtension: {
size_t bytesInBlock = currentComponent[1];
GIFState exceptionState = GIFSkipBlock;
switch (*currentComponent) {
case 0xf9:
exceptionState = GIFControlExtension;
bytesInBlock = std::max(bytesInBlock, static_cast<size_t>(4));
break;
case 0x01:
break;
case 0xff:
exceptionState = GIFApplicationExtension;
break;
case 0xfe:
exceptionState = GIFConsumeComment;
break;
}
if (bytesInBlock)
GETN(bytesInBlock, exceptionState);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeBlock: {
if (!*currentComponent)
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
else
GETN(*currentComponent, GIFSkipBlock);
break;
}
case GIFSkipBlock: {
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFControlExtension: {
addFrameIfNecessary();
GIFFrameContext* currentFrame = m_frames.last().get();
if (*currentComponent & 0x1)
currentFrame->setTransparentPixel(currentComponent[3]);
int disposalMethod = ((*currentComponent) >> 2) & 0x7;
if (disposalMethod < 4) {
currentFrame->setDisposalMethod(static_cast<blink::ImageFrame::DisposalMethod>(disposalMethod));
} else if (disposalMethod == 4) {
currentFrame->setDisposalMethod(blink::ImageFrame::DisposeOverwritePrevious);
}
currentFrame->setDelayTime(GETINT16(currentComponent + 1) * 10);
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFCommentExtension: {
if (*currentComponent)
GETN(*currentComponent, GIFConsumeComment);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeComment: {
GETN(1, GIFCommentExtension);
break;
}
case GIFApplicationExtension: {
if (m_bytesToConsume == 11
&& (!strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "NETSCAPE2.0", 11) || !strncmp((char*)currentComponent, "ANIMEXTS1.0", 11)))
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
else
GETN(1, GIFConsumeBlock);
break;
}
case GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock: {
if (*currentComponent)
GETN(std::max(3, static_cast<int>(*currentComponent)), GIFConsumeNetscapeExtension);
else
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
break;
}
case GIFConsumeNetscapeExtension: {
int netscapeExtension = currentComponent[0] & 7;
if (netscapeExtension == 1) {
m_loopCount = GETINT16(currentComponent + 1);
if (!m_loopCount)
m_loopCount = blink::cAnimationLoopInfinite;
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
} else if (netscapeExtension == 2) {
GETN(1, GIFNetscapeExtensionBlock);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
}
case GIFImageHeader: {
unsigned height, width, xOffset, yOffset;
/* Get image offsets, with respect to the screen origin */
xOffset = GETINT16(currentComponent);
yOffset = GETINT16(currentComponent + 2);
/* Get image width and height. */
width = GETINT16(currentComponent + 4);
height = GETINT16(currentComponent + 6);
/* Work around broken GIF files where the logical screen
* size has weird width or height. We assume that GIF87a
* files don't contain animations.
*/
if (currentFrameIsFirstFrame()
&& ((m_screenHeight < height) || (m_screenWidth < width) || (m_version == 87))) {
m_screenHeight = height;
m_screenWidth = width;
xOffset = 0;
yOffset = 0;
if (m_client && !m_client->setSize(m_screenWidth, m_screenHeight))
return false;
}
if (!height || !width) {
height = m_screenHeight;
width = m_screenWidth;
if (!height || !width)
return false;
}
if (query == GIFImageDecoder::GIFSizeQuery) {
setRemainingBytes(len + 9);
GETN(9, GIFImageHeader);
return true;
}
addFrameIfNecessary();
GIFFrameContext* currentFrame = m_frames.last().get();
currentFrame->setHeaderDefined();
currentFrame->setRect(xOffset, yOffset, width, height);
m_screenWidth = std::max(m_screenWidth, width);
m_screenHeight = std::max(m_screenHeight, height);
currentFrame->setInterlaced(currentComponent[8] & 0x40);
currentFrame->setProgressiveDisplay(currentFrameIsFirstFrame());
const bool isLocalColormapDefined = currentComponent[8] & 0x80;
if (isLocalColormapDefined) {
const size_t numColors = 2 << (currentComponent[8] & 0x7);
currentFrame->localColorMap().setTablePositionAndSize(dataPosition, numColors);
GETN(BYTES_PER_COLORMAP_ENTRY * numColors, GIFImageColormap);
break;
}
GETN(1, GIFLZWStart);
break;
}
case GIFImageColormap: {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->localColorMap().setDefined();
GETN(1, GIFLZWStart);
break;
}
case GIFSubBlock: {
const size_t bytesInBlock = *currentComponent;
if (bytesInBlock)
GETN(bytesInBlock, GIFLZW);
else {
ASSERT(!m_frames.isEmpty());
m_frames.last()->setComplete();
GETN(1, GIFImageStart);
}
break;
}
case GIFDone: {
m_parseCompleted = true;
return true;
}
default:
return false;
break;
}
}
setRemainingBytes(len);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GIFImageReader::parseData function in platform/image-decoders/gif/GIFImageReader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted frame size in a GIF image.
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 172,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator(
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* vaapi_dec,
VaapiWrapper* vaapi_wrapper)
: vaapi_wrapper_(vaapi_wrapper), vaapi_dec_(vaapi_dec) {
DCHECK(vaapi_wrapper_);
DCHECK(vaapi_dec_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,816 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = timr->it_sigev_notify == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += (int)kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] | Low | 169,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void set_roi_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
unsigned int i;
vpx_roi_map_t roi = {0};
roi.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
roi.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
roi.delta_q[0] = 0;
roi.delta_q[1] = -2;
roi.delta_q[2] = -4;
roi.delta_q[3] = -6;
roi.delta_lf[0] = 0;
roi.delta_lf[1] = 1;
roi.delta_lf[2] = 2;
roi.delta_lf[3] = 3;
roi.static_threshold[0] = 1500;
roi.static_threshold[1] = 1000;
roi.static_threshold[2] = 500;
roi.static_threshold[3] = 0;
roi.roi_map = (uint8_t *)malloc(roi.rows * roi.cols);
for (i = 0; i < roi.rows * roi.cols; ++i)
roi.roi_map[i] = i % 4;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ROI_MAP, &roi))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set ROI map");
free(roi.roi_map);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8 && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdxl_decode_frame function in libavcodec/cdxl.c in FFmpeg 2.8.x before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 does not exclude the CHUNKY format, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format for BGR24
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1427/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5020737339392000
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_revision(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
unsigned char buffer[3];
int ret;
/* Get a couple of the ATMega Firmware values */
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_ID, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
buffer, 3, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
atusb->fw_ver_maj = buffer[0];
atusb->fw_ver_min = buffer[1];
atusb->fw_hw_type = buffer[2];
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware: major: %u, minor: %u, hardware type: %u\n",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min, atusb->fw_hw_type);
}
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 2) {
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware version (%u.%u) predates our first public release.",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min);
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Please update to version 0.2 or newer");
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 168,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void kernel_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir = decode_direction(insn);
int size = decode_access_size(insn);
if(!ok_for_kernel(insn) || dir == both) {
printk("Unsupported unaligned load/store trap for kernel at <%08lx>.\n",
regs->pc);
unaligned_panic("Wheee. Kernel does fpu/atomic unaligned load/store.");
} else {
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
int err;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch (dir) {
case load:
err = do_int_load(fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f),
regs),
size, (unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn));
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs);
break;
default:
panic("Impossible kernel unaligned trap.");
/* Not reached... */
}
if (err)
kernel_mna_trap_fault(regs, insn);
else
advance(regs);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
p2p_stream_->Finish();
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766} | Medium | 172,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: start_input_bmp(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
U_CHAR bmpfileheader[14];
U_CHAR bmpinfoheader[64];
#define GET_2B(array, offset) \
((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8))
#define GET_4B(array, offset) \
((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 2])) << 16) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 3])) << 24))
unsigned int bfOffBits;
unsigned int headerSize;
int biWidth;
int biHeight;
unsigned short biPlanes;
unsigned int biCompression;
int biXPelsPerMeter, biYPelsPerMeter;
unsigned int biClrUsed = 0;
int mapentrysize = 0; /* 0 indicates no colormap */
int bPad;
JDIMENSION row_width = 0;
/* Read and verify the bitmap file header */
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpfileheader, 14))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
if (GET_2B(bmpfileheader, 0) != 0x4D42) /* 'BM' */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_NOT);
bfOffBits = GET_4B(bmpfileheader, 10);
/* We ignore the remaining fileheader fields */
/* The infoheader might be 12 bytes (OS/2 1.x), 40 bytes (Windows),
* or 64 bytes (OS/2 2.x). Check the first 4 bytes to find out which.
*/
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader, 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
headerSize = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 0);
if (headerSize < 12 || headerSize > 64)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader + 4, headerSize - 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
switch (headerSize) {
case 12:
/* Decode OS/2 1.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPCOREHEADER) */
biWidth = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 6);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 10);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 3; /* OS/2 uses RGBTRIPLE colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
break;
case 40:
case 64:
/* Decode Windows 3.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPINFOHEADER) */
/* or OS/2 2.x header, which has additional fields that we ignore */
biWidth = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 12);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 14);
biCompression = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 16);
biXPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 24);
biYPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 28);
biClrUsed = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 32);
/* biSizeImage, biClrImportant fields are ignored */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 4; /* Windows uses RGBQUAD colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 32: /* RGB image + Alpha channel */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
if (biCompression != 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_COMPRESSED);
if (biXPelsPerMeter > 0 && biYPelsPerMeter > 0) {
/* Set JFIF density parameters from the BMP data */
cinfo->X_density = (UINT16)(biXPelsPerMeter / 100); /* 100 cm per meter */
cinfo->Y_density = (UINT16)(biYPelsPerMeter / 100);
cinfo->density_unit = 2; /* dots/cm */
}
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
return;
}
if (biWidth <= 0 || biHeight <= 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_EMPTY);
if (biPlanes != 1)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADPLANES);
/* Compute distance to bitmap data --- will adjust for colormap below */
bPad = bfOffBits - (headerSize + 14);
/* Read the colormap, if any */
if (mapentrysize > 0) {
if (biClrUsed <= 0)
biClrUsed = 256; /* assume it's 256 */
else if (biClrUsed > 256)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADCMAP);
/* Allocate space to store the colormap */
source->colormap = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, (JDIMENSION)biClrUsed, (JDIMENSION)3);
/* and read it from the file */
read_colormap(source, (int)biClrUsed, mapentrysize);
/* account for size of colormap */
bPad -= biClrUsed * mapentrysize;
}
/* Skip any remaining pad bytes */
if (bPad < 0) /* incorrect bfOffBits value? */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
while (--bPad >= 0) {
(void)read_byte(source);
}
/* Compute row width in file, including padding to 4-byte boundary */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGB;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
cinfo->input_components = 1;
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
break;
case 24:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGR;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 3);
break;
case 32:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGRA;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 4);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
while ((row_width & 3) != 0) row_width++;
source->row_width = row_width;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Allocate space for inversion array, prepare for preload pass */
source->whole_image = (*cinfo->mem->request_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, FALSE,
row_width, (JDIMENSION)biHeight, (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = preload_image;
if (cinfo->progress != NULL) {
cd_progress_ptr progress = (cd_progress_ptr)cinfo->progress;
progress->total_extra_passes++; /* count file input as separate pass */
}
} else {
source->iobuffer = (U_CHAR *)
(*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, row_width);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_8bit_row;
break;
case 24:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_24bit_row;
break;
case 32:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_32bit_row;
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
}
/* Ensure that biWidth * cinfo->input_components doesn't exceed the maximum
value of the JDIMENSION type. This is only a danger with BMP files, since
their width and height fields are 32-bit integers. */
if ((unsigned long long)biWidth *
(unsigned long long)cinfo->input_components > 0xFFFFFFFFULL)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_WIDTH_OVERFLOW);
/* Allocate one-row buffer for returned data */
source->pub.buffer = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
(JDIMENSION)(biWidth * cinfo->input_components), (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.buffer_height = 1;
cinfo->data_precision = 8;
cinfo->image_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
cinfo->image_height = (JDIMENSION)biHeight;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: get_8bit_row in rdbmp.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.5.90 and MozJPEG through 3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted 8-bit BMP in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the number of palette entries.
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258 | Medium | 169,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI;
int ret;
if (!is_irq_none(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
vdev->ctx = kzalloc(nvec * sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev->ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* return the number of supported vectors if we can't get all: */
ret = pci_alloc_irq_vectors(pdev, 1, nvec, flag);
if (ret < nvec) {
if (ret > 0)
pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
kfree(vdev->ctx);
return ret;
}
vdev->num_ctx = nvec;
vdev->irq_type = msix ? VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX :
VFIO_PCI_MSI_IRQ_INDEX;
if (!msix) {
/*
* Compute the virtual hardware field for max msi vectors -
* it is the log base 2 of the number of vectors.
*/
vdev->msi_qmax = fls(nvec * 2 - 1) - 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.11 misuses the kzalloc function, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow) or have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a vfio PCI device file.
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static uint32_t readU32(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset) {
return data[offset] << 24 | data[offset + 1] << 16 | data[offset + 2] << 8 | data[offset + 3];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Integer overflow in the getCoverageFormat12 function in CmapCoverage.cpp in the Minikin library in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G and 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (continuous rebooting) via an application that triggers loading of a crafted TTF font, aka internal bug 25645298.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in parsing fonts
A malformed TTF can cause size calculations to overflow. This patch
checks the maximum reasonable value so that the total size fits in 32
bits. It also adds some explicit casting to avoid possible technical
undefined behavior when parsing sized unsigned values.
Bug: 25645298
Change-Id: Id4716132041a6f4f1fbb73ec4e445391cf7d9616
(cherry picked from commit 183c9ec2800baa2ce099ee260c6cbc6121cf1274)
| Medium | 173,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: perf_event_read_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct perf_read_event read_event = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_READ,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(read_event) + event->read_size,
},
.pid = perf_event_pid(event, task),
.tid = perf_event_tid(event, task),
};
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&read_event.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event, read_event.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, read_event);
perf_output_read(&handle, event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,834 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
if (!process_host) {
ClearForceUpdate();
context_ = nullptr;
return;
}
StoragePartition* partition = process_host->GetStoragePartition();
DCHECK(partition);
context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
partition->GetServiceWorkerContext());
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void *atomic_thread_inc_dec(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
usleep(1);
atomic_dec_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Track::GetEOS() const
{
return &m_eos;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
* We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
* ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
* is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
* the protocol specification:
* Byte Content
* 0 type \
* 1/2 version > record header
* 3/4 length /
* 5 msg_type \
* 6-8 length > Client Hello message
* 9/10 client_version /
*/
char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
int n=0,j;
int type=0;
int v[2];
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
p=s->packet;
memcpy(buf,p,n);
if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
{
/*
* SSLv2 header
*/
if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv2 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
{
type=1;
}
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
}
else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
*/
v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
* to get the correct minor version.
* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
* so we simply reject such connections to avoid
* protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
else
{
/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
* but this will send an appropriate alert */
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
}
else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
(strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
}
/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
* (other cases skip this state) */
type=2;
p=s->packet;
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. It's format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length
* 2 msg_type
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (n < 9)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
* j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
* packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
p=s->packet;
p+=5;
n2s(p,csl);
n2s(p,sil);
n2s(p,cl);
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
* Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
* '>' otherweise */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* record header: msg_type ... */
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
d_len = d;
d += 3;
/* client_version */
*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
*(d++) = v[1];
/* lets populate the random area */
/* get the challenge_length */
i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* no session-id reuse */
*(d++)=0;
/* ciphers */
j=0;
dd=d;
d+=2;
for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
{
if (p[i] != 0) continue;
*(d++)=p[i+1];
*(d++)=p[i+2];
j+=2;
}
s2n(j,dd);
/* COMPRESSION */
*(d++)=1;
*(d++)=0;
#if 0
/* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
p = p+csl+sil+cl;
while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
{
*(d++)=*(p++);
}
#endif
i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
l2n3((long)i, d_len);
/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
}
/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
if (type == 1)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
#else
/* we are talking sslv2 */
/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
* sslv2 stuff. */
if (s->s2 == NULL)
{
if (!ssl2_new(s))
goto err;
}
else
ssl2_clear(s);
if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
goto err;
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
* (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
* the sslv2 buffer */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
#endif
}
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
s->packet_length=n;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
goto err;
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
else
{
s->packet_length=0;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
else
s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zc, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0o, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1j does not properly enforce the no-ssl3 build option, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via an SSL 3.0 handshake, related to s23_clnt.c and s23_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: transform_info_imp(transform_display *dp, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
/* Reuse the standard stuff as appropriate. */
standard_info_part1(&dp->this, pp, pi);
/* Now set the list of transforms. */
dp->transform_list->set(dp->transform_list, dp, pp, pi);
/* Update the info structure for these transforms: */
{
int i = dp->this.use_update_info;
/* Always do one call, even if use_update_info is 0. */
do
png_read_update_info(pp, pi);
while (--i > 0);
}
/* And get the output information into the standard_display */
standard_info_part2(&dp->this, pp, pi, 1/*images*/);
/* Plus the extra stuff we need for the transform tests: */
dp->output_colour_type = png_get_color_type(pp, pi);
dp->output_bit_depth = png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi);
/* Validate the combination of colour type and bit depth that we are getting
* out of libpng; the semantics of something not in the PNG spec are, at
* best, unclear.
*/
switch (dp->output_colour_type)
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
if (dp->output_bit_depth > 8) goto error;
/*FALL THROUGH*/
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
if (dp->output_bit_depth == 1 || dp->output_bit_depth == 2 ||
dp->output_bit_depth == 4)
break;
/*FALL THROUGH*/
default:
if (dp->output_bit_depth == 8 || dp->output_bit_depth == 16)
break;
/*FALL THROUGH*/
error:
{
char message[128];
size_t pos;
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0,
"invalid final bit depth: colour type(");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, dp->output_colour_type);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ") with bit depth: ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, dp->output_bit_depth);
png_error(pp, message);
}
}
/* Use a test pixel to check that the output agrees with what we expect -
* this avoids running the whole test if the output is unexpected.
*/
{
image_pixel test_pixel;
memset(&test_pixel, 0, sizeof test_pixel);
test_pixel.colour_type = dp->this.colour_type; /* input */
test_pixel.bit_depth = dp->this.bit_depth;
if (test_pixel.colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
test_pixel.sample_depth = 8;
else
test_pixel.sample_depth = test_pixel.bit_depth;
/* Don't need sBIT here, but it must be set to non-zero to avoid
* arithmetic overflows.
*/
test_pixel.have_tRNS = dp->this.is_transparent;
test_pixel.red_sBIT = test_pixel.green_sBIT = test_pixel.blue_sBIT =
test_pixel.alpha_sBIT = test_pixel.sample_depth;
dp->transform_list->mod(dp->transform_list, &test_pixel, pp, dp);
if (test_pixel.colour_type != dp->output_colour_type)
{
char message[128];
size_t pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0, "colour type ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, dp->output_colour_type);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, test_pixel.colour_type);
png_error(pp, message);
}
if (test_pixel.bit_depth != dp->output_bit_depth)
{
char message[128];
size_t pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0, "bit depth ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, dp->output_bit_depth);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, test_pixel.bit_depth);
png_error(pp, message);
}
/* If both bit depth and colour type are correct check the sample depth.
* I believe these are both internal errors.
*/
if (test_pixel.colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (test_pixel.sample_depth != 8) /* oops - internal error! */
png_error(pp, "pngvalid: internal: palette sample depth not 8");
}
else if (test_pixel.sample_depth != dp->output_bit_depth)
{
char message[128];
size_t pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0,
"internal: sample depth ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, dp->output_bit_depth);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, test_pixel.sample_depth);
png_error(pp, message);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString ustr_host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(ustr_host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) ==
ustr_host.length())
transliterator_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString ustr_skeleton;
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, ustr_host, ustr_skeleton,
&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status))
return false;
std::string skeleton;
ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton);
return LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect security UI in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add a few more confusable map entries
1. Map Malaylam U+0D1F to 's'.
2. Map 'small-cap-like' Cyrillic letters to "look-alike" Latin lowercase
letters.
The characters in new confusable map entries are replaced by their Latin
"look-alike" characters before the skeleton is calculated to compare with
top domain names.
Bug: 784761,773930
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: Ib26664e21ac5eb290e4a2993b01cbf0edaade0ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/805214
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#521648} | Medium | 172,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNext(const BlockEntry* pCurrEntry,
const BlockEntry*& pNextEntry) const {
assert(pCurrEntry);
assert(!pCurrEntry->EOS()); //?
const Block* const pCurrBlock = pCurrEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pCurrBlock && pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pCurrBlock || pCurrBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return -1;
const Cluster* pCluster = pCurrEntry->GetCluster();
assert(pCluster);
assert(!pCluster->EOS());
long status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
for (int i = 0;;) {
while (pNextEntry) {
const Block* const pNextBlock = pNextEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pNextBlock);
if (pNextBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number)
return 0;
pCurrEntry = pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pCurrEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pNextEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pNextEntry = NULL;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = pCluster->GetFirst(pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
continue;
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
}
pNextEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: views::ImageButton* close_button() const {
return media_controls_view_->close_button_;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey;
int r;
if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
ssh->state->receive_context;
if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
memset(&l2info, 0, sizeof(l2info));
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* child-link ? */
if (l2info.cookie_len == 0) {
mfr_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* first try the LSQ protos */
if (l2info.cookie_len == AS_PIC_COOKIE_LEN) {
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLCSAP_ISONS<<8 | LLCSAP_ISONS):
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FillRandom(uint8_t *data, int stride) {
for (int h = 0; h < height_; ++h) {
for (int w = 0; w < width_; ++w) {
data[h * stride + w] = rnd_.Rand8();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: parse_asntime_into_isotime (unsigned char const **buf, size_t *len,
ksba_isotime_t isotime)
{
struct tag_info ti;
gpg_error_t err;
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (buf, len, &ti);
if (err)
;
else if ( !(ti.class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL
&& (ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME || ti.tag == TYPE_GENERALIZED_TIME)
&& !ti.is_constructed) )
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
else if (!(err = _ksba_asntime_to_iso (*buf, ti.length,
ti.tag == TYPE_UTC_TIME, isotime)))
parse_skip (buf, len, &ti);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Libksba before 1.3.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and crash) via unspecified vectors, related to the "returned length of the object from _ksba_ber_parse_tl."
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Segment::DoLoadCluster(long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; // offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; // size of cluster payload
for (;;) {
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; // no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; // no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; // consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) { // weird
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 // we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop)) {
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 // commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) { // Cues ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL) {
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this, pos, size, idpos, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; // consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) { // Cluster ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; // consume payload
continue;
}
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; // relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); // have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) { // error, or underflow
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0) {
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) { // preloaded already
if (status == 0) // no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else {
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; // move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; // consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; // success
}
}
if (status == 0) { // no entries found
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) {
m_pos = total;
return 1; // no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop)) {
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; // no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; // try again
}
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, idx, cluster_off);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0) {
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; // partial success, since we have a new cluster
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) { //unknown size
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) { //determine cluster size
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_sd_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_symbols)
{
Jbig2SymbolDict *new = NULL;
if (n_symbols < 0) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "Negative number of symbols in symbol dict: %d", n_symbols);
return NULL;
}
new = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict, 1);
if (new != NULL) {
new->glyphs = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, n_symbols);
new->n_symbols = n_symbols;
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate new empty symbol dict");
return NULL;
}
if (new->glyphs != NULL) {
memset(new->glyphs, 0, n_symbols * sizeof(Jbig2Image *));
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "unable to allocate glyphs for new empty symbol dict");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new);
return NULL;
}
return new;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
blink::initialize(blink_platform_impl_.Get());
content_client_.reset(CreateContentClient());
content_browser_client_.reset(CreateContentBrowserClient());
content_renderer_client_.reset(CreateContentRendererClient());
SetContentClient(content_client_.get());
SetBrowserClientForTesting(content_browser_client_.get());
SetRendererClientForTesting(content_renderer_client_.get());
if (!render_thread_)
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
render_thread_->set_new_window_routing_id(kNewWindowRouteId);
render_thread_->set_new_frame_routing_id(kNewFrameRouteId);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
autorelease_pool_.reset(new base::mac::ScopedNSAutoreleasePool());
#endif
command_line_.reset(new base::CommandLine(base::CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
std::string flags("--expose-gc");
v8::V8::SetFlagsFromString(flags.c_str(), static_cast<int>(flags.size()));
RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes();
if (!ui::ResourceBundle::HasSharedInstance())
ui::ResourceBundle::InitSharedInstanceWithLocale(
"en-US", NULL, ui::ResourceBundle::DO_NOT_LOAD_COMMON_RESOURCES);
compositor_deps_.reset(new FakeCompositorDependencies);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
ViewMsg_New_Params view_params;
view_params.opener_frame_route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
view_params.window_was_created_with_opener = false;
view_params.renderer_preferences = RendererPreferences();
view_params.web_preferences = WebPreferences();
view_params.view_id = kRouteId;
view_params.main_frame_routing_id = kMainFrameRouteId;
view_params.surface_id = kSurfaceId;
view_params.session_storage_namespace_id = kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId;
view_params.swapped_out = false;
view_params.replicated_frame_state = FrameReplicationState();
view_params.proxy_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
view_params.hidden = false;
view_params.never_visible = false;
view_params.next_page_id = 1;
view_params.initial_size = *InitialSizeParams();
view_params.enable_auto_resize = false;
view_params.min_size = gfx::Size();
view_params.max_size = gfx::Size();
RenderViewImpl* view =
RenderViewImpl::Create(compositor_deps_.get(), view_params, false);
view_ = view;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in modules/speech/SpeechSynthesis.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of a certain utterance data structure.
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881} | High | 171,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int yposY,int xposY,int sub)
{
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int split_flag = 0;
if (yposY >= height || xposY >= width)
return;
int decode_this_size = (yposY + size <= height) && (xposY + size <= width);
int decode_rectangular_size = !decode_this_size && frame_type != I_FRAME;
int bit_start = stream->bitcnt;
int mode = MODE_SKIP;
block_context_t block_context;
TEMPLATE(find_block_contexts)(yposY, xposY, height, width, size, decoder_info->deblock_data, &block_context, decoder_info->use_block_contexts);
decoder_info->block_context = &block_context;
split_flag = decode_super_mode(decoder_info,size,decode_this_size);
mode = decoder_info->mode;
/* Read delta_qp and set block-level qp */
if (size == (1<<decoder_info->log2_sb_size) && (split_flag || mode != MODE_SKIP) && decoder_info->max_delta_qp > 0) {
/* Read delta_qp */
int delta_qp = read_delta_qp(stream);
int prev_qp;
if (yposY == 0 && xposY == 0)
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qp;
else
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
decoder_info->frame_info.qpb = prev_qp + delta_qp;
}
decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);
if (split_flag){
int new_size = size/2;
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
}
else if (decode_this_size || decode_rectangular_size){
decode_block(decoder_info,size,yposY,xposY,sub);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the Cisco Thor decoder before commit 18de8f9f0762c3a542b1122589edb8af859d9813 allows local users to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) and execute arbitrary code via a crafted non-conformant Thor bitstream.
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code. | Medium | 169,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer, DocumentClassFlags documentClasses)
: ContainerNode(0, CreateDocument)
, TreeScope(this)
, m_styleResolverThrowawayTimer(this, &Document::styleResolverThrowawayTimerFired)
, m_styleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_lastStyleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_didCalculateStyleResolver(false)
, m_ignorePendingStylesheets(false)
, m_evaluateMediaQueriesOnStyleRecalc(false)
, m_needsNotifyRemoveAllPendingStylesheet(false)
, m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle(false)
, m_pendingSheetLayout(NoLayoutWithPendingSheets)
, m_frame(initializer.frame())
, m_domWindow(0)
, m_import(initializer.import())
, m_activeParserCount(0)
, m_contextFeatures(ContextFeatures::defaultSwitch())
, m_wellFormed(false)
, m_printing(false)
, m_paginatedForScreen(false)
, m_compatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode)
, m_compatibilityModeLocked(false)
, m_didPostCheckFocusedElementTask(false)
, m_domTreeVersion(++s_globalTreeVersion)
, m_listenerTypes(0)
, m_mutationObserverTypes(0)
, m_styleEngine(StyleEngine::create(*this))
, m_visitedLinkState(VisitedLinkState::create(*this))
, m_visuallyOrdered(false)
, m_readyState(Complete)
, m_bParsing(false)
, m_styleRecalcTimer(this, &Document::styleRecalcTimerFired)
, m_inStyleRecalc(false)
, m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad(false)
, m_containsValidityStyleRules(false)
, m_updateFocusAppearanceRestoresSelection(false)
, m_ignoreDestructiveWriteCount(0)
, m_titleSetExplicitly(false)
, m_markers(adoptPtr(new DocumentMarkerController))
, m_updateFocusAppearanceTimer(this, &Document::updateFocusAppearanceTimerFired)
, m_cssTarget(0)
, m_loadEventProgress(LoadEventNotRun)
, m_startTime(currentTime())
, m_overMinimumLayoutThreshold(false)
, m_scriptRunner(ScriptRunner::create(this))
, m_xmlVersion("1.0")
, m_xmlStandalone(StandaloneUnspecified)
, m_hasXMLDeclaration(0)
, m_designMode(inherit)
, m_hasAnnotatedRegions(false)
, m_annotatedRegionsDirty(false)
, m_useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false)
, m_documentClasses(documentClasses)
, m_isViewSource(false)
, m_sawElementsInKnownNamespaces(false)
, m_isSrcdocDocument(false)
, m_isMobileDocument(false)
, m_renderer(0)
, m_eventQueue(DocumentEventQueue::create(this))
, m_weakFactory(this)
, m_contextDocument(initializer.contextDocument())
, m_idAttributeName(idAttr)
, m_hasFullscreenElementStack(false)
, m_loadEventDelayCount(0)
, m_loadEventDelayTimer(this, &Document::loadEventDelayTimerFired)
, m_referrerPolicy(ReferrerPolicyDefault)
, m_directionSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_writingModeSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_didAllowNavigationViaBeforeUnloadConfirmationPanel(false)
, m_writeRecursionIsTooDeep(false)
, m_writeRecursionDepth(0)
, m_lastHandledUserGestureTimestamp(0)
, m_textAutosizer(TextAutosizer::create(this))
, m_registrationContext(initializer.registrationContext(this))
, m_pendingTasksTimer(this, &Document::pendingTasksTimerFired)
, m_scheduledTasksAreSuspended(false)
, m_sharedObjectPoolClearTimer(this, &Document::sharedObjectPoolClearTimerFired)
#ifndef NDEBUG
, m_didDispatchViewportPropertiesChanged(false)
#endif
, m_timeline(DocumentTimeline::create(this))
, m_templateDocumentHost(0)
, m_fonts(0)
, m_didAssociateFormControlsTimer(this, &Document::didAssociateFormControlsTimerFired)
{
setClient(this);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
if (m_frame) {
provideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(this, m_frame->page());
m_fetcher = m_frame->loader()->activeDocumentLoader()->fetcher();
}
if (!m_fetcher)
m_fetcher = ResourceFetcher::create(0);
m_fetcher->setDocument(this);
if (initializer.shouldSetURL())
setURL(initializer.url());
initSecurityContext(initializer);
initDNSPrefetch();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(m_nodeListCounts); i++)
m_nodeListCounts[i] = 0;
InspectorCounters::incrementCounter(InspectorCounters::DocumentCounter);
m_lifecyle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Inactive);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during handling of the INPUT element, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted HTML document.
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
int al;
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
/* If sigalgs received process it. */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
} else
ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
return 1;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The sigalgs implementation in t1_lib.c in OpenSSL 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by using an invalid signature_algorithms extension in the ClientHello message during a renegotiation.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsAllowed(const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension,
const GURL& url,
PermittedFeature feature,
int tab_id) {
const PermissionsData* permissions_data = extension->permissions_data();
bool script = permissions_data->CanAccessPage(extension.get(), url, tab_id,
nullptr) &&
permissions_data->CanRunContentScriptOnPage(
extension.get(), url, tab_id, nullptr);
bool capture = HasTabsPermission(extension, tab_id) &&
permissions_data->CanCaptureVisiblePage(tab_id, NULL);
switch (feature) {
case PERMITTED_SCRIPT_ONLY:
return script && !capture;
case PERMITTED_CAPTURE_ONLY:
return capture && !script;
case PERMITTED_BOTH:
return script && capture;
case PERMITTED_NONE:
return !script && !capture;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891} | Medium | 173,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t wdm_read
(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int rv, cntr;
int i = 0;
struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
rv = mutex_lock_interruptible(&desc->rlock); /*concurrent reads */
if (rv < 0)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
cntr = ACCESS_ONCE(desc->length);
if (cntr == 0) {
desc->read = 0;
retry:
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
rv = cntr ? cntr : -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
rv = 0;
} else {
rv = wait_event_interruptible(desc->wait,
test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags));
}
/* may have happened while we slept */
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags)) {
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
usb_mark_last_busy(interface_to_usbdev(desc->intf));
if (rv < 0) {
rv = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
if (desc->rerr) { /* read completed, error happened */
desc->rerr = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/*
* recheck whether we've lost the race
* against the completion handler
*/
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) { /* lost race */
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
cntr = desc->length;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
}
if (cntr > count)
cntr = count;
rv = copy_to_user(buffer, desc->ubuf, cntr);
if (rv > 0) {
rv = -EFAULT;
goto err;
}
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
for (i = 0; i < desc->length - cntr; i++)
desc->ubuf[i] = desc->ubuf[i + cntr];
desc->length -= cntr;
/* in case we had outstanding data */
if (!desc->length)
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
rv = cntr;
err:
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void __init files_init(unsigned long mempages)
{
unsigned long n;
filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/*
* One file with associated inode and dcache is very roughly 1K.
* Per default don't use more than 10% of our memory for files.
*/
n = (mempages * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10;
files_stat.max_files = max_t(unsigned long, n, NR_FILE);
files_defer_init();
lg_lock_init(&files_lglock, "files_lglock");
percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LiveSyncTest::SetupMockGaiaResponses() {
username_ = "[email protected]";
password_ = "password";
factory_.reset(new FakeURLFetcherFactory());
factory_->SetFakeResponse(kClientLoginUrl, "SID=sid\nLSID=lsid", true);
factory_->SetFakeResponse(kGetUserInfoUrl, "[email protected]", true);
factory_->SetFakeResponse(kIssueAuthTokenUrl, "auth", true);
factory_->SetFakeResponse(kSearchDomainCheckUrl, ".google.com", true);
URLFetcher::set_factory(factory_.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to media selectors.
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in HevcUtils.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as Low due to details specific to the vulnerability. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35467107.
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
| High | 174,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int socket_accept(int fd, uint16_t port)
{
#ifdef WIN32
int addr_len;
#else
socklen_t addr_len;
#endif
int result;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
result = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The socket_create function in common/socket.c in libimobiledevice and libusbmuxd allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and communicate with services on iOS devices by connecting to an IPv4 TCP socket.
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally | Medium | 167,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void get_socket_name( char* buf, int len )
{
char* dpy = g_strdup(g_getenv("DISPLAY"));
if(dpy && *dpy)
{
char* p = strchr(dpy, ':');
for(++p; *p && *p != '.' && *p != '\n';)
++p;
if(*p)
*p = '\0';
}
g_snprintf( buf, len, "%s/.menu-cached-%s-%s", g_get_tmp_dir(),
dpy ? dpy : ":0", g_get_user_name() );
g_free(dpy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Libmenu-cache 1.0.2 insecurely uses /tmp for a socket file, allowing a local user to cause a denial of service (menu unavailability).
Commit Message: | Low | 164,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int fpm_stdio_init_child(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd == ZLOG_SYSLOG) {
closelog(); /* ensure to close syslog not to interrupt with PHP syslog code */
} else
#endif
/* Notice: child cannot use master error_log
* because not aware when being reopen
* else, should use if (!fpm_use_error_log())
*/
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd > 0) {
close(fpm_globals.error_log_fd);
}
fpm_globals.error_log_fd = -1;
zlog_set_fd(-1);
if (wp->listening_socket != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (0 > dup2(wp->listening_socket, STDIN_FILENO)) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init child stdio: dup2()");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in PHP 7.3.x before 7.3.0alpha3, 7.2.x before 7.2.8, and before 7.1.20. The php-fpm master process restarts a child process in an endless loop when using program execution functions (e.g., passthru, exec, shell_exec, or system) with a non-blocking STDIN stream, causing this master process to consume 100% of the CPU, and consume disk space with a large volume of error logs, as demonstrated by an attack by a customer of a shared-hosting facility.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that. | Medium | 169,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ClassicScript* ClassicPendingScript::GetSource(const KURL& document_url,
bool& error_occurred) const {
CheckState();
DCHECK(IsReady());
error_occurred = ErrorOccurred();
if (!is_external_) {
ScriptSourceCode source_code(
GetElement()->TextFromChildren(), source_location_type_,
nullptr /* cache_handler */, document_url, StartingPosition());
return ClassicScript::Create(source_code, base_url_for_inline_script_,
options_, kSharableCrossOrigin);
}
DCHECK(GetResource()->IsLoaded());
ScriptResource* resource = ToScriptResource(GetResource());
bool streamer_ready = (ready_state_ == kReady) && streamer_ &&
!streamer_->StreamingSuppressed();
ScriptSourceCode source_code(streamer_ready ? streamer_ : nullptr, resource);
const KURL& base_url = source_code.Url();
return ClassicScript::Create(source_code, base_url, options_,
resource->CalculateAccessControlStatus());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Lack of CORS checking by ResourceFetcher/ResourceLoader in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176} | Medium | 172,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AcpiNsTerminate (
void)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsTerminate);
#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP
{
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Prev;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Next;
/* Delete any module-level code blocks */
Next = AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList;
while (Next)
{
Prev = Next;
Next = Next->Method.Mutex;
Prev->Method.Mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Prev);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
* attached to the nodes
*/
AcpiNsDeleteNamespaceSubtree (AcpiGbl_RootNode);
/* Delete any objects attached to the root node */
Status = AcpiUtAcquireMutex (ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_VOID;
}
AcpiNsDeleteNode (AcpiGbl_RootNode);
(void) AcpiUtReleaseMutex (ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Namespace freed\n"));
return_VOID;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-755
Summary: The acpi_ns_terminate() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <[email protected]> | Low | 170,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PluginChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
base::ProcessHandle handle;
if (!base::OpenProcessHandle(peer_pid, &handle)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
renderer_handle_ = handle;
NPChannelBase::OnChannelConnected(peer_pid);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DrawingBuffer::FinishPrepareTextureMailboxGpu(
viz::TextureMailbox* out_mailbox,
std::unique_ptr<cc::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
DCHECK(state_restorer_);
if (web_gl_version_ > kWebGL1) {
state_restorer_->SetPixelUnpackBufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindBuffer(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER, 0);
}
RefPtr<ColorBuffer> color_buffer_for_mailbox;
if (preserve_drawing_buffer_ == kDiscard) {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = back_color_buffer_;
back_color_buffer_ = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
AttachColorBufferToReadFramebuffer();
if (discard_framebuffer_supported_) {
const GLenum kAttachments[3] = {GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0, GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT};
state_restorer_->SetFramebufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, fbo_);
gl_->DiscardFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, 3, kAttachments);
}
} else {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
gl_->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(back_color_buffer_->texture_id, 0,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, size_.Width(), size_.Height(), GL_FALSE,
GL_FALSE, GL_FALSE);
}
{
gl_->ProduceTextureDirectCHROMIUM(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox.name);
const GLuint64 fence_sync = gl_->InsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gl_->DescheduleUntilFinishedCHROMIUM();
#endif
gl_->Flush();
gl_->GenSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
fence_sync, color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token.GetData());
}
{
bool is_overlay_candidate = color_buffer_for_mailbox->image_id != 0;
bool secure_output_only = false;
*out_mailbox = viz::TextureMailbox(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target, gfx::Size(size_),
is_overlay_candidate, secure_output_only);
out_mailbox->set_color_space(color_space_);
auto func =
WTF::Bind(&DrawingBuffer::MailboxReleasedGpu,
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer>(this), color_buffer_for_mailbox);
*out_release_callback = cc::SingleReleaseCallback::Create(
ConvertToBaseCallback(std::move(func)));
}
front_color_buffer_ = color_buffer_for_mailbox;
contents_changed_ = false;
SetBufferClearNeeded(true);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518} | Medium | 172,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static BOOL nsc_context_initialize_encode(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
int i;
UINT32 length;
UINT32 tempWidth;
UINT32 tempHeight;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
tempHeight = ROUND_UP_TO(context->height, 2);
/* The maximum length a decoded plane can reach in all cases */
length = tempWidth * tempHeight + 16;
if (length > context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength)
{
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
BYTE* tmp = (BYTE*) realloc(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], length);
if (!tmp)
goto fail;
context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i] = tmp;
}
context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength = length;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel)
{
context->OrgByteCount[0] = tempWidth * context->height;
context->OrgByteCount[1] = tempWidth * tempHeight / 4;
context->OrgByteCount[2] = tempWidth * tempHeight / 4;
context->OrgByteCount[3] = context->width * context->height;
}
else
{
context->OrgByteCount[0] = context->width * context->height;
context->OrgByteCount[1] = context->width * context->height;
context->OrgByteCount[2] = context->width * context->height;
context->OrgByteCount[3] = context->width * context->height;
}
return TRUE;
fail:
if (length > context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength)
{
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
free(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i]);
}
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Out-Of-Bounds Write of up to 4 bytes in function nsc_rle_decode() that results in a memory corruption and possibly even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | High | 169,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(frame_);
visitor->Trace(progress_tracker_);
visitor->Trace(document_loader_);
visitor->Trace(provisional_document_loader_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect inheritance of a new document's policy in Content Security Policy in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850} | Medium | 173,059 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LauncherView::CalculateIdealBounds(IdealBounds* bounds) {
int available_size = primary_axis_coordinate(width(), height());
if (!available_size)
return;
int x = primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset, 0);
int y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, kLeadingInset);
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(i, gfx::Rect(
x, y, kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
}
if (view_model_->view_size() > 0) {
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(0, gfx::Rect(gfx::Size(
primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset + kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLauncherPreferredSize),
primary_axis_coordinate(kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLeadingInset + kLauncherPreferredSize))));
}
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_size(
gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize, kLauncherPreferredSize));
last_visible_index_ = DetermineLastVisibleIndex(
available_size - kLeadingInset - kLauncherPreferredSize -
kButtonSpacing - kLauncherPreferredSize);
int app_list_index = view_model_->view_size() - 1;
bool show_overflow = (last_visible_index_ + 1 < app_list_index);
for (int i = 0; i < view_model_->view_size(); ++i) {
view_model_->view_at(i)->SetVisible(
i == app_list_index || i <= last_visible_index_);
}
overflow_button_->SetVisible(show_overflow);
if (show_overflow) {
DCHECK_NE(0, view_model_->view_size());
if (last_visible_index_ == -1) {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(kLeadingInset, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, kLeadingInset);
} else {
x = primary_axis_coordinate(
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).right(), 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0,
view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_visible_index_).bottom());
}
gfx::Rect app_list_bounds = view_model_->ideal_bounds(app_list_index);
app_list_bounds.set_x(x);
app_list_bounds.set_y(y);
view_model_->set_ideal_bounds(app_list_index, app_list_bounds);
x = primary_axis_coordinate(x + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing, 0);
y = primary_axis_coordinate(0, y + kLauncherPreferredSize + kButtonSpacing);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_x(x);
bounds->overflow_bounds.set_y(y);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int needs_empty_write(sector_t block, struct inode *inode)
{
int error;
struct buffer_head bh_map = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
bh_map.b_size = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
error = gfs2_block_map(inode, block, &bh_map, 0);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
return !buffer_mapped(&bh_map);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The fallocate implementation in the GFS2 filesystem in the Linux kernel before 3.2 relies on the page cache, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service by preallocating blocks in certain situations involving insufficient memory.
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]> | Low | 166,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298 | Medium | 168,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write operation, a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-2883.
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check | Medium | 169,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SendTabToSelfInfoBar::ShowInfoBar(content::WebContents* web_contents,
SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate* delegate) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Type confusion in libGLESv2 in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android possibly allowed a remote attacker to bypass buffer validation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854} | Medium | 172,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: decode_rt_routing_info(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_target[8];
u_int plen;
ND_TCHECK(pptr[0]);
plen = pptr[0]; /* get prefix length */
if (0 == plen) {
snprintf(buf, buflen, "default route target");
return 1;
}
if (32 > plen)
return -1;
plen-=32; /* adjust prefix length */
if (64 < plen)
return -1;
memset(&route_target, 0, sizeof(route_target));
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[1], (plen + 7) / 8);
memcpy(&route_target, &pptr[1], (plen + 7) / 8);
if (plen % 8) {
((u_char *)&route_target)[(plen + 7) / 8 - 1] &=
((0xff00 >> (plen % 8)) & 0xff);
}
snprintf(buf, buflen, "origin AS: %s, route target %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr+1)),
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, (u_char *)&route_target));
return 5 + (plen + 7) / 8;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:decode_rt_routing_info().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_write_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool v)
{
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_write_uint8(data, v ? 0xFF : 0);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid wddxPacket XML document that is mishandled in a wddx_deserialize call, as demonstrated by a stray element inside a boolean element, leading to incorrect pop processing.
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799 | Medium | 166,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
{
rcu_read_lock();
__ptrace_link(child, new_parent, __task_cred(new_parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.17, ptrace_link in kernel/ptrace.c mishandles the recording of the credentials of a process that wants to create a ptrace relationship, which allows local users to obtain root access by leveraging certain scenarios with a parent-child process relationship, where a parent drops privileges and calls execve (potentially allowing control by an attacker). One contributing factor is an object lifetime issue (which can also cause a panic). Another contributing factor is incorrect marking of a ptrace relationship as privileged, which is exploitable through (for example) Polkit's pkexec helper with PTRACE_TRACEME. NOTE: SELinux deny_ptrace might be a usable workaround in some environments.
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 169,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaMetadataRetriever::MediaMetadataRetriever()
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getService());
if (service == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to obtain MediaMetadataRetrieverService");
return;
}
sp<IMediaMetadataRetriever> retriever(service->createMetadataRetriever());
if (retriever == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to create IMediaMetadataRetriever object from server");
}
mRetriever = retriever;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmedia/mediametadataretriever.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles cleared service binders, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26040840.
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
| High | 173,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BoundingBox "BoundingBox:"
#define BeginDocument "BeginDocument:"
#define BeginXMPPacket "<?xpacket begin="
#define EndXMPPacket "<?xpacket end="
#define ICCProfile "BeginICCProfile:"
#define CMYKCustomColor "CMYKCustomColor:"
#define CMYKProcessColor "CMYKProcessColor:"
#define DocumentMedia "DocumentMedia:"
#define DocumentCustomColors "DocumentCustomColors:"
#define DocumentProcessColors "DocumentProcessColors:"
#define EndDocument "EndDocument:"
#define HiResBoundingBox "HiResBoundingBox:"
#define ImageData "ImageData:"
#define PageBoundingBox "PageBoundingBox:"
#define LanguageLevel "LanguageLevel:"
#define PageMedia "PageMedia:"
#define Pages "Pages:"
#define PhotoshopProfile "BeginPhotoshop:"
#define PostscriptLevel "!PS-"
#define RenderPostscriptText " Rendering Postscript... "
#define SpotColor "+ "
char
command[MagickPathExtent],
*density,
filename[MagickPathExtent],
geometry[MagickPathExtent],
input_filename[MagickPathExtent],
message[MagickPathExtent],
*options,
postscript_filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*option;
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image,
*next,
*postscript_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
file;
MagickBooleanType
cmyk,
fitPage,
skip,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution;
RectangleInfo
page;
register char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds,
hires_bounds;
short int
hex_digits[256];
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
priority;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned long
columns,
extent,
language_level,
pages,
rows,
scene,
spotcolor;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=AcquireUniqueSymbolicLink(image_info->filename,input_filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize hex values.
*/
(void) memset(hex_digits,0,sizeof(hex_digits));
hex_digits[(int) '0']=0;
hex_digits[(int) '1']=1;
hex_digits[(int) '2']=2;
hex_digits[(int) '3']=3;
hex_digits[(int) '4']=4;
hex_digits[(int) '5']=5;
hex_digits[(int) '6']=6;
hex_digits[(int) '7']=7;
hex_digits[(int) '8']=8;
hex_digits[(int) '9']=9;
hex_digits[(int) 'a']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'b']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'c']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'd']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'e']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'f']=15;
hex_digits[(int) 'A']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'B']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'C']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'D']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'E']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'F']=15;
/*
Set the page density.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
if ((image->resolution.x == 0.0) || (image->resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
}
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(PSPageGeometry,&page);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
resolution=image->resolution;
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
/*
Determine page geometry from the Postscript bounding box.
*/
(void) memset(&bounds,0,sizeof(bounds));
(void) memset(command,0,sizeof(command));
cmyk=image_info->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) memset(&hires_bounds,0,sizeof(hires_bounds));
columns=0;
rows=0;
priority=0;
rows=0;
extent=0;
spotcolor=0;
language_level=1;
pages=(~0UL);
skip=MagickFalse;
p=command;
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
/*
Note document structuring comments.
*/
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MagickPathExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
/*
Skip %%BeginDocument thru %%EndDocument.
*/
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginDocument,command,strlen(BeginDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndDocument,command,strlen(EndDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickFalse;
if (skip != MagickFalse)
continue;
if (LocaleNCompare(PostscriptLevel,command,strlen(PostscriptLevel)) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:Level",command+4,exception);
if (GlobExpression(command,"*EPSF-*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse)
pages=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(LanguageLevel,command,strlen(LanguageLevel)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,LanguageLevel " %lu",&language_level);
if (LocaleNCompare(Pages,command,strlen(Pages)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,Pages " %lu",&pages);
if (LocaleNCompare(ImageData,command,strlen(ImageData)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,ImageData " %lu %lu",&columns,&rows);
/*
Is this a CMYK document?
*/
length=strlen(DocumentProcessColors);
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentProcessColors,command,length) == 0)
{
if ((GlobExpression(command,"*Cyan*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Magenta*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Yellow*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse))
cmyk=MagickTrue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKProcessColor,command,strlen(CMYKProcessColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
length=strlen(DocumentCustomColors);
if ((LocaleNCompare(DocumentCustomColors,command,length) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(SpotColor,command,strlen(SpotColor)) == 0))
{
char
property[MagickPathExtent],
*value;
register char
*q;
/*
Note spot names.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MagickPathExtent,
"ps:SpotColor-%.20g",(double) (spotcolor++));
for (q=command; *q != '\0'; q++)
if (isspace((int) (unsigned char) *q) != 0)
break;
value=ConstantString(q);
(void) SubstituteString(&value,"(","");
(void) SubstituteString(&value,")","");
(void) StripString(value);
if (*value != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,property,value,exception);
value=DestroyString(value);
continue;
}
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
continue;
/*
Note region defined by bounding box.
*/
count=0;
i=0;
if (LocaleNCompare(BoundingBox,command,strlen(BoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,BoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=2;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentMedia,command,strlen(DocumentMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,DocumentMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(HiResBoundingBox,command,strlen(HiResBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,HiResBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=3;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageBoundingBox,command,strlen(PageBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageMedia,command,strlen(PageMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if ((count != 4) || (i < (ssize_t) priority))
continue;
if ((fabs(bounds.x2-bounds.x1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)) ||
(fabs(bounds.y2-bounds.y1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)))
if (i == (ssize_t) priority)
continue;
hires_bounds=bounds;
priority=i;
}
if ((fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1) >= MagickEpsilon))
{
/*
Set Postscript render geometry.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%gx%g%+.15g%+.15g",
hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1,
hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:HiResBoundingBox",geometry,exception);
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)*
resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)*
resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
}
fitPage=MagickFalse;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:fit-page");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*page_geometry;
page_geometry=GetPageGeometry(option);
flags=ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&page.x,&page.y,&page.width,
&page.height);
if (flags == NoValue)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"InvalidGeometry","`%s'",option);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*image->resolution.x/delta.x)
-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*image->resolution.y/
delta.y) -0.5);
page_geometry=DestroyString(page_geometry);
fitPage=MagickTrue;
}
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image_info->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
cmyk=MagickFalse;
/*
Create Ghostscript control file.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(command,"/setpagedevice {pop} bind 1 index where {"
"dup wcheck {3 1 roll put} {pop def} ifelse} {def} ifelse\n"
"<</UseCIEColor true>>setpagedevice\n",MagickPathExtent);
count=write(file,command,(unsigned int) strlen(command));
if (image_info->page == (char *) NULL)
{
char
translate_geometry[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(translate_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%g %g translate\n",-bounds.x1,-bounds.y1);
count=write(file,translate_geometry,(unsigned int)
strlen(translate_geometry));
}
file=close(file)-1;
/*
Render Postscript with the Ghostscript delegate.
*/
if (image_info->monochrome != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:mono",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
if (cmyk != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:cmyk",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:alpha",(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
density=AcquireString("");
options=AcquireString("");
(void) FormatLocaleString(density,MagickPathExtent,"%gx%g",resolution.x,
resolution.y);
(void) FormatLocaleString(options,MagickPathExtent,"-g%.20gx%.20g ",(double)
page.width,(double) page.height);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
*read_info->magick='\0';
if (read_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
char
pages[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pages,MagickPathExtent,"-dFirstPage=%.20g "
"-dLastPage=%.20g ",(double) read_info->scene+1,(double)
(read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes));
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,pages,MagickPathExtent);
read_info->number_scenes=0;
if (read_info->scenes != (char *) NULL)
*read_info->scenes='\0';
}
if (*image_info->magick == 'E')
{
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:use-cropbox");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSCrop ",MagickPathExtent);
if (fitPage != MagickFalse)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSFitPage ",
MagickPathExtent);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,"%d",MagickPathExtent);
(void) FormatLocaleString(command,MagickPathExtent,
GetDelegateCommands(delegate_info),
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,density,options,filename,
postscript_filename,input_filename);
options=DestroyString(options);
density=DestroyString(density);
*message='\0';
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,exception);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,1,
read_info->filename,exception);
if ((status == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse))
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(command," -c showpage",MagickPathExtent);
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,
exception);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(input_filename);
postscript_image=(Image *) NULL;
if (status == MagickFalse)
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename,exception);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
}
else
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename,exception);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
read_info->blob=NULL;
read_info->length=0;
next=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
if (next == (Image *) NULL)
break;
AppendImageToList(&postscript_image,next);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (postscript_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (*message != '\0')
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
DelegateError,"PostscriptDelegateFailed","`%s'",message);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (LocaleCompare(postscript_image->magick,"BMP") == 0)
{
Image
*cmyk_image;
cmyk_image=ConsolidateCMYKImages(postscript_image,exception);
if (cmyk_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
postscript_image=DestroyImageList(postscript_image);
postscript_image=cmyk_image;
}
}
(void) SeekBlob(image,0,SEEK_SET);
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
/*
Note document structuring comments.
*/
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MagickPathExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
/*
Skip %%BeginDocument thru %%EndDocument.
*/
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginDocument,command,strlen(BeginDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndDocument,command,strlen(EndDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickFalse;
if (skip != MagickFalse)
continue;
if (LocaleNCompare(ICCProfile,command,strlen(ICCProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*datum;
/*
Read ICC profile.
*/
profile=AcquireStringInfo(MagickPathExtent);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; (c=ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits)) != EOF; i++)
{
if (i >= (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile))
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i << 1);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
}
datum[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i+1);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PhotoshopProfile,command,strlen(PhotoshopProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*q;
/*
Read Photoshop profile.
*/
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PhotoshopProfile " %lu",&extent);
if (count != 1)
continue;
length=extent;
if ((MagickSizeType) length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
q=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
*q++=(unsigned char) ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginXMPPacket,command,strlen(BeginXMPPacket)) == 0)
{
/*
Read XMP profile.
*/
p=command;
profile=StringToStringInfo(command);
for (i=(ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile)-1; c != EOF; i++)
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) (i+1));
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i]=(unsigned char) c;
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MagickPathExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndXMPPacket,command,strlen(EndXMPPacket)) == 0)
break;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"xmp",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
Image
*clone_image;
/*
Add place holder images to meet the subimage specification requirement.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
clone_image=CloneImage(postscript_image,1,1,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image != (Image *) NULL)
PrependImageToList(&postscript_image,clone_image);
}
}
do
{
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->filename,filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->magick,image->magick,
MagickPathExtent);
if (columns != 0)
postscript_image->magick_columns=columns;
if (rows != 0)
postscript_image->magick_rows=rows;
postscript_image->page=page;
(void) CloneImageProfiles(postscript_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(postscript_image,image);
next=SyncNextImageInList(postscript_image);
if (next != (Image *) NULL)
postscript_image=next;
} while (next != (Image *) NULL);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
scene=0;
for (next=GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image); next != (Image *) NULL; )
{
next->scene=scene++;
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadPSImage in coders/ps.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601 | Medium | 170,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014\
Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page;
struct kvm *kvm;
int r;
BUG_ON(vcpu->kvm == NULL);
kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.ops = &emulate_ops;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
else
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!page) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
vcpu->arch.pio_data = page_address(page);
kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, max_tsc_khz);
r = kvm_mmu_create(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_free_pio_data;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_mmu_destroy;
} else
static_key_slow_inc(&kvm_no_apic_vcpu);
vcpu->arch.mce_banks = kzalloc(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS * sizeof(u64) * 4,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vcpu->arch.mce_banks) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail_free_lapic;
}
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto fail_free_mce_banks;
r = fx_init(vcpu);
if (r)
goto fail_free_wbinvd_dirty_mask;
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = 0x0;
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
kvm_pmu_init(vcpu);
return 0;
fail_free_wbinvd_dirty_mask:
free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
fail_free_mce_banks:
kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
fail_free_lapic:
kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
fail_mmu_destroy:
kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
fail_free_pio_data:
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
fail:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that triggers use of a guest physical address (GPA) in (1) movable or (2) removable memory during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME kvm_set_msr_common operation.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* Expect expand_16 to expand everything to 16 bits as a result of also
* causing 'expand' to happen.
*/
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
if (that->bit_depth < 16)
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 16;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: smb_fdata(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const char *fmt, const u_char *maxbuf,
int unicodestr)
{
static int depth = 0;
char s[128];
char *p;
while (*fmt) {
switch (*fmt) {
case '*':
fmt++;
while (buf < maxbuf) {
const u_char *buf2;
depth++;
buf2 = smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt, maxbuf, unicodestr);
depth--;
if (buf2 == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (buf2 == buf)
return(buf);
buf = buf2;
}
return(buf);
case '|':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
break;
case '%':
fmt++;
buf = maxbuf;
break;
case '#':
fmt++;
return(buf);
break;
case '[':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
p = strchr(fmt, ']');
if ((size_t)(p - fmt + 1) > sizeof(s)) {
/* overrun */
return(buf);
}
strncpy(s, fmt, p - fmt);
s[p - fmt] = '\0';
fmt = p + 1;
buf = smb_fdata1(ndo, buf, s, maxbuf, unicodestr);
if (buf == NULL)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", *fmt));
fmt++;
break;
}
}
if (!depth && buf < maxbuf) {
size_t len = PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, buf);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data: (%lu bytes)\n", (unsigned long)len));
smb_print_data(ndo, buf, len);
return(buf + len);
}
return(buf);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: The SMB parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has stack exhaustion in smbutil.c:smb_fdata() via recursion.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16452/SMB: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times smb_fdata() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit. | Medium | 169,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
#if !defined(TIFFDefaultStripSize)
#define TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,request) (8192UL/TIFFScanlineSize(tiff))
#endif
const char
*mode,
*option;
CompressionType
compression;
EndianType
endian_type;
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFInfo
tiff_info;
uint16
bits_per_sample,
compress_tag,
endian,
photometric;
uint32
rows_per_strip;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open TIFF file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,&image->exception);
endian_type=UndefinedEndian;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:endian");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian_type=MSBEndian;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian_type=LSBEndian;;
}
switch (endian_type)
{
case LSBEndian: mode="wl"; break;
case MSBEndian: mode="wb"; break;
default: mode="w"; break;
}
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"TIFF64") == 0)
switch (endian_type)
{
case LSBEndian: mode="wl8"; break;
case MSBEndian: mode="wb8"; break;
default: mode="w8"; break;
}
#endif
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,mode,(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
scene=0;
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
do
{
/*
Initialize TIFF fields.
*/
if ((image_info->type != UndefinedType) &&
(image_info->type != OptimizeType))
(void) SetImageType(image,image_info->type);
compression=UndefinedCompression;
if (image->compression != JPEGCompression)
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,1);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image->storage_class != PseudoClass) && (image->depth >= 32) &&
(quantum_info->format == UndefinedQuantumFormat) &&
(IsHighDynamicRangeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") == 0) &&
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_REDUCEDIMAGE);
if ((image->columns != (uint32) image->columns) ||
(image->rows != (uint32) image->rows))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,(uint32) image->rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,(uint32) image->columns);
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3;
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
case Group4Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4;
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_JBIG)
case JBIG1Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JBIG;
break;
}
#endif
case JPEGCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JPEG;
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case LZMACompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZMA;
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZW;
break;
}
case RLECompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_PACKBITS;
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE;
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
}
#else
switch (compress_tag)
{
#if defined(CCITT_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
#endif
#if defined(YCBCR_SUPPORT) && defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
#endif
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
#endif
#if defined(LZW_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
#endif
#if defined(PACKBITS_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_PACKBITS:
#endif
#if defined(ZIP_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
#endif
case COMPRESSION_NONE:
break;
default:
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,4);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_INKSET,INKSET_CMYK);
}
else
{
/*
Full color TIFF raster.
*/
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB;
EncodeLabImage(image,&image->exception);
}
else
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,1,1);
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8);
}
else
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_RGB;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,3);
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image_info->type != TrueColorMatteType))
{
if ((image_info->type != PaletteType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
photometric=(uint16) (quantum_info->min_is_white !=
MagickFalse ? PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE :
PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->matte == MagickFalse))
SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception);
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
depth;
/*
Colormapped TIFF raster.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE;
depth=1;
while ((GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < image->colors)
depth<<=1;
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,depth);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian);
if ((compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
}
else
if ((compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:fill-order");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_LSB2MSB;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,compress_tag);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,endian);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,quantum_info->depth);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
uint16
extra_samples,
sample_info[1],
samples_per_pixel;
/*
TIFF has a matte channel.
*/
extra_samples=1;
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:alpha");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"associated") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA;
else
if (LocaleCompare(option,"unspecified") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNSPECIFIED;
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,samples_per_pixel+1);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (sample_info[0] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,AssociatedQuantumAlpha);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,photometric);
switch (quantum_info->format)
{
case FloatingPointQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMINSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->minimum);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMAXSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->maximum);
break;
}
case SignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_INT);
break;
}
case UnsignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB)
if ((image_info->interlace == PlaneInterlace) ||
(image_info->interlace == PartitionInterlace))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE);
rows_per_strip=TIFFDefaultStripSize(tiff,0);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:rows-per-strip");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
rows_per_strip=(size_t) strtol(option,(char **) NULL,10);
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
const char
*sampling_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
rows_per_strip+=(16-(rows_per_strip % 16));
if (image_info->quality != UndefinedCompressionQuality)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,image_info->quality);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*value;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
sampling_factor=(const char *) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
sampling_factor=value;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Input sampling-factors=%s",sampling_factor);
}
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
sampling_factor=image_info->sampling_factor;
if (sampling_factor != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(sampling_factor,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,(uint16)
geometry_info.rho,(uint16) geometry_info.sigma);
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (bits_per_sample == 12)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE,JPEGTABLESMODE_QUANT);
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
{
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
{
/*
Byte-aligned EOL.
*/
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS,4);
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
{
rows_per_strip=(uint32) image->rows;
break;
}
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
{
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_LZMAPRESET,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (rows_per_strip < 1)
rows_per_strip=1;
if ((image->rows/rows_per_strip) >= (1UL << 15))
rows_per_strip=(uint32) (image->rows >> 15);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,rows_per_strip);
if ((image->x_resolution != 0.0) && (image->y_resolution != 0.0))
{
unsigned short
units;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=RESUNIT_NONE;
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
units=RESUNIT_INCH;
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
units=RESUNIT_CENTIMETER;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,(uint16) units);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,image->x_resolution);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,image->y_resolution);
if ((image->page.x < 0) || (image->page.y < 0))
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"TIFF: negative image positions unsupported","%s",
image->filename);
if ((image->page.x > 0) && (image->x_resolution > 0.0))
{
/*
Set horizontal image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,(float) image->page.x/
image->x_resolution);
}
if ((image->page.y > 0) && (image->y_resolution > 0.0))
{
/*
Set vertical image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,(float) image->page.y/
image->y_resolution);
}
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
float
chromaticity[6];
/*
Set image chromaticity.
*/
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.y;
chromaticity[2]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
chromaticity[3]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.y;
chromaticity[4]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
chromaticity[5]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,chromaticity);
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,chromaticity);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
if (image->scene != 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,(uint16) image->scene,
GetImageListLength(image));
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,(uint16) image->orientation);
(void) TIFFSetProfiles(tiff,image);
{
uint16
page,
pages;
page=(uint16) scene;
pages=(uint16) GetImageListLength(image);
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (pages > 1))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,page,pages);
}
(void) TIFFSetProperties(tiff,image_info,image);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0)
RestoreMSCWarning
(void) TIFFSetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
/*
Write image scanlines.
*/
if (GetTIFFInfo(image_info,tiff,&tiff_info) == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
tiff_info.scanline=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
/*
RGB TIFF image.
*/
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: RRRRRR...GGGGGG...BBBBBB...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,100,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,1,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,200,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,2,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,300,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,3,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,400,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
/*
CMYK TIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
uint16
*blue,
*green,
*red;
/*
Colormapped TIFF image.
*/
red=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*red));
green=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*green));
blue=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*blue));
if ((red == (uint16 *) NULL) || (green == (uint16 *) NULL) ||
(blue == (uint16 *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize TIFF colormap.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(red,0,65536*sizeof(*red));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(green,0,65536*sizeof(*green));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(blue,0,65536*sizeof(*blue));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
red[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red);
green[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green);
blue[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,red,green,blue);
red=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(red);
green=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(green);
blue=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blue);
}
default:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packets to contiguous grayscale scanlines.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
else
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
}
else
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
DecodeLabImage(image,&image->exception);
DestroyTIFFInfo(&tiff_info);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
RestoreMSCWarning
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
(void) TIFFWriteDirectory(tiff);
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The WriteTIFFImage function in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix TIFF divide by zero (bug report from Donghai Zhu) | Medium | 168,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_bpcc_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_bpcc_t *bpcc = &box->data.bpcc;
unsigned int i;
bpcc->numcmpts = box->datalen;
if (!(bpcc->bpcs = jas_alloc2(bpcc->numcmpts, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < bpcc->numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &bpcc->bpcs[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems. | Medium | 168,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::RegisterNativeHandlers(
extensions::Dispatcher* dispatcher,
extensions::ModuleSystem* module_system,
extensions::ScriptContext* context) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AppBindings(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sync_file_system",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::SyncFileSystemCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_browser_handler",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_manager_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"notifications_private",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::NotificationsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"mediaGalleries",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::MediaGalleriesCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"page_capture", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PageCaptureCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"platform_keys_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::PlatformKeysNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"tabs", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::TabsCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"webstore", std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::WebstoreBindings(context)));
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"cast_streaming_natives",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::CastStreamingNativeHandler(context)));
#endif
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"automationInternal",
std::unique_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new extensions::AutomationInternalCustomBindings(context)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710} | Medium | 172,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
CameraMetadata *request) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: for template %d", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
switch (mStatus) {
case STATUS_ERROR:
CLOGE("Device has encountered a serious error");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNINITIALIZED:
CLOGE("Device is not initialized!");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNCONFIGURED:
case STATUS_CONFIGURED:
case STATUS_ACTIVE:
break;
default:
SET_ERR_L("Unexpected status: %d", mStatus);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mRequestTemplateCache[templateId].isEmpty()) {
*request = mRequestTemplateCache[templateId];
return OK;
}
const camera_metadata_t *rawRequest;
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->construct_default_request_settings");
rawRequest = mHal3Device->ops->construct_default_request_settings(
mHal3Device, templateId);
ATRACE_END();
if (rawRequest == NULL) {
ALOGI("%s: template %d is not supported on this camera device",
__FUNCTION__, templateId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
*request = rawRequest;
mRequestTemplateCache[templateId] = rawRequest;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: services/camera/libcameraservice/device3/Camera3Device.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate template IDs, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27568958.
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
| High | 173,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: camera/src/camera_metadata.c in the Camera service in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30591838.
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
| High | 173,396 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start,
long long size_,
Entry* pEntry)
{
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) //SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); //payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; //consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) //SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; //consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; //consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuChannelHost::Connect(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle client_process_for_gpu) {
DCHECK(factory_->IsMainThread());
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> io_loop = factory_->GetIOLoopProxy();
channel_.reset(new IPC::SyncChannel(
channel_handle, IPC::Channel::MODE_CLIENT, NULL,
io_loop, true,
factory_->GetShutDownEvent()));
sync_filter_ = new IPC::SyncMessageFilter(
factory_->GetShutDownEvent());
channel_->AddFilter(sync_filter_.get());
channel_filter_ = new MessageFilter(this);
channel_->AddFilter(channel_filter_.get());
state_ = kConnected;
Send(new GpuChannelMsg_Initialize(client_process_for_gpu));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *pl_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 60 && rdesc[39] == 0x2a && rdesc[40] == 0xf5 &&
rdesc[41] == 0x00 && rdesc[59] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[60] == 0xf9 && rdesc[61] == 0x00) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Petalynx Maxter Remote report descriptor\n");
rdesc[60] = 0xfa;
rdesc[40] = 0xfa;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main (int argc,
char **argv)
{
mode_t old_umask;
cleanup_free char *base_path = NULL;
int clone_flags;
char *old_cwd = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int event_fd = -1;
int child_wait_fd = -1;
const char *new_cwd;
uid_t ns_uid;
gid_t ns_gid;
struct stat sbuf;
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
real_uid = getuid ();
real_gid = getgid ();
/* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
acquire_privs ();
/* Never gain any more privs during exec */
if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_CAPS) failed");
/* The initial code is run with high permissions
(i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
read_overflowids ();
argv0 = argv[0];
if (isatty (1))
host_tty_dev = ttyname (1);
argv++;
argc--;
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
parse_args (&argc, &argv);
/* We have to do this if we weren't installed setuid (and we're not
* root), so let's just DWIM */
if (!is_privileged && getuid () != 0)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
if (opt_unshare_user_try &&
stat ("/proc/self/ns/user", &sbuf) == 0)
{
bool disabled = FALSE;
/* RHEL7 has a kernel module parameter that lets you enable user namespaces */
if (stat ("/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable", &sbuf) == 0)
{
cleanup_free char *enable = NULL;
enable = load_file_at (AT_FDCWD, "/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable");
if (enable != NULL && enable[0] == 'N')
disabled = TRUE;
}
/* Debian lets you disable *unprivileged* user namespaces. However this is not
a problem if we're privileged, and if we're not opt_unshare_user is TRUE
already, and there is not much we can do, its just a non-working setup. */
if (!disabled)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
__debug__ (("Creating root mount point\n"));
if (opt_sandbox_uid == -1)
opt_sandbox_uid = real_uid;
if (opt_sandbox_gid == -1)
opt_sandbox_gid = real_gid;
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_uid != real_uid)
die ("Specifying --uid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_gid != real_gid)
die ("Specifying --gid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_uts && opt_sandbox_hostname != NULL)
die ("Specifying --hostname requires --unshare-uts");
/* We need to read stuff from proc during the pivot_root dance, etc.
Lets keep a fd to it open */
proc_fd = open ("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_PATH);
if (proc_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't open /proc");
/* We need *some* mountpoint where we can mount the root tmpfs.
We first try in /run, and if that fails, try in /tmp. */
base_path = xasprintf ("/run/user/%d/.bubblewrap", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
{
free (base_path);
base_path = xasprintf ("/tmp/.bubblewrap-%d", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
die_with_error ("Creating root mountpoint failed");
}
__debug__ (("creating new namespace\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid)
{
event_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (event_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
}
/* We block sigchild here so that we can use signalfd in the monitor. */
block_sigchild ();
clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (opt_unshare_user)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
if (opt_unshare_pid)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
if (opt_unshare_net)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (opt_unshare_ipc)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;
if (opt_unshare_uts)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;
if (opt_unshare_cgroup)
{
if (stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
die ("Cannot create new cgroup namespace because the kernel does not support it");
else
die_with_error ("stat on /proc/self/ns/cgroup failed");
}
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
}
if (opt_unshare_cgroup_try)
if (!stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
child_wait_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (child_wait_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
pid = raw_clone (clone_flags, NULL);
if (pid == -1)
{
if (opt_unshare_user)
{
if (errno == EINVAL)
die ("Creating new namespace failed, likely because the kernel does not support user namespaces. bwrap must be installed setuid on such systems.");
else if (errno == EPERM && !is_privileged)
die ("No permissions to creating new namespace, likely because the kernel does not allow non-privileged user namespaces. On e.g. debian this can be enabled with 'sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1'.");
}
die_with_error ("Creating new namespace failed");
}
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Parent, outside sandbox, privileged (initially) */
if (is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* We're running as euid 0, but the uid we want to map is
* not 0. This means we're not allowed to write this from
* the child user namespace, so we do it from the parent.
*
* Also, we map uid/gid 0 in the namespace (to overflowuid)
* if opt_needs_devpts is true, because otherwise the mount
* of devpts fails due to root not being mapped.
*/
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
pid, TRUE, opt_needs_devpts);
}
/* Initial launched process, wait for exec:ed command to exit */
/* We don't need any privileges in the launcher, drop them immediately. */
drop_privs ();
/* Let child run now that the uid maps are set up */
val = 1;
res = write (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the child died and closed child_wait_fd we don't want to error out here */
close (child_wait_fd);
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *output = xasprintf ("{\n \"child-pid\": %i\n}\n", pid);
size_t len = strlen (output);
if (write (opt_info_fd, output, len) != len)
die_with_error ("Write to info_fd");
close (opt_info_fd);
}
monitor_child (event_fd);
exit (0); /* Should not be reached, but better safe... */
}
/* Child, in sandbox, privileged in the parent or in the user namespace (if --unshare-user).
*
* Note that for user namespaces we run as euid 0 during clone(), so
* the child user namespace is owned by euid 0., This means that the
* regular user namespace parent (with uid != 0) doesn't have any
* capabilities in it, which is nice as we can't exploit those. In
* particular the parent user namespace doesn't have CAP_PTRACE
* which would otherwise allow the parent to hijack of the child
* after this point.
*
* Unfortunately this also means you can't ptrace the final
* sandboxed process from outside the sandbox either.
*/
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
close (opt_info_fd);
/* Wait for the parent to init uid/gid maps and drop caps */
res = read (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
close (child_wait_fd);
/* At this point we can completely drop root uid, but retain the
* required permitted caps. This allow us to do full setup as
* the user uid, which makes e.g. fuse access work.
*/
switch_to_user_with_privs ();
if (opt_unshare_net && loopback_setup () != 0)
die ("Can't create loopback device");
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (!is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* In the unprivileged case we have to write the uid/gid maps in
* the child, because we have no caps in the parent */
if (opt_needs_devpts)
{
/* This is a bit hacky, but we need to first map the real uid/gid to
0, otherwise we can't mount the devpts filesystem because root is
not mapped. Later we will create another child user namespace and
map back to the real uid */
ns_uid = 0;
ns_gid = 0;
}
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
-1, TRUE, FALSE);
}
old_umask = umask (0);
/* Need to do this before the chroot, but after we're the real uid */
resolve_symlinks_in_ops ();
/* Mark everything as slave, so that we still
* receive mounts from the real root, but don't
* propagate mounts to the real root. */
if (mount (NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make / slave");
/* Create a tmpfs which we will use as / in the namespace */
if (mount ("", base_path, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to mount tmpfs");
old_cwd = get_current_dir_name ();
/* Chdir to the new root tmpfs mount. This will be the CWD during
the entire setup. Access old or new root via "oldroot" and "newroot". */
if (chdir (base_path) != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir base_path");
/* We create a subdir "$base_path/newroot" for the new root, that
* way we can pivot_root to base_path, and put the old root at
* "$base_path/oldroot". This avoids problems accessing the oldroot
* dir if the user requested to bind mount something over / */
if (mkdir ("newroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating newroot failed");
if (mkdir ("oldroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating oldroot failed");
if (pivot_root (base_path, "oldroot"))
die_with_error ("pivot_root");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir / (base path)");
if (is_privileged)
{
pid_t child;
int privsep_sockets[2];
if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, privsep_sockets) != 0)
die_with_error ("Can't create privsep socket");
child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork unprivileged helper");
if (child == 0)
{
/* Unprivileged setup process */
drop_privs ();
close (privsep_sockets[0]);
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, privsep_sockets[1]);
exit (0);
}
else
{
int status;
uint32_t buffer[2048]; /* 8k, but is int32 to guarantee nice alignment */
uint32_t op, flags;
const char *arg1, *arg2;
cleanup_fd int unpriv_socket = -1;
unpriv_socket = privsep_sockets[0];
close (privsep_sockets[1]);
do
{
op = read_priv_sec_op (unpriv_socket, buffer, sizeof (buffer),
&flags, &arg1, &arg2);
privileged_op (-1, op, flags, arg1, arg2);
if (write (unpriv_socket, buffer, 1) != 1)
die ("Can't write to op_socket");
}
while (op != PRIV_SEP_OP_DONE);
waitpid (child, &status, 0);
/* Continue post setup */
}
}
else
{
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, -1);
}
/* The old root better be rprivate or we will send unmount events to the parent namespace */
if (mount ("oldroot", "oldroot", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make old root rprivate");
if (umount2 ("oldroot", MNT_DETACH))
die_with_error ("unmount old root");
if (opt_unshare_user &&
(ns_uid != opt_sandbox_uid || ns_gid != opt_sandbox_gid))
{
/* Now that devpts is mounted and we've no need for mount
permissions we can create a new userspace and map our uid
1:1 */
if (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER))
die_with_error ("unshare user ns");
write_uid_gid_map (opt_sandbox_uid, ns_uid,
opt_sandbox_gid, ns_gid,
-1, FALSE, FALSE);
}
/* Now make /newroot the real root */
if (chdir ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir newroot");
if (chroot ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chroot /newroot");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir /");
/* All privileged ops are done now, so drop it */
drop_privs ();
if (opt_block_fd != -1)
{
char b[1];
read (opt_block_fd, b, 1);
close (opt_block_fd);
}
if (opt_seccomp_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *seccomp_data = NULL;
size_t seccomp_len;
struct sock_fprog prog;
seccomp_data = load_file_data (opt_seccomp_fd, &seccomp_len);
if (seccomp_data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read seccomp data");
if (seccomp_len % 8 != 0)
die ("Invalid seccomp data, must be multiple of 8");
prog.len = seccomp_len / 8;
prog.filter = (struct sock_filter *) seccomp_data;
close (opt_seccomp_fd);
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
umask (old_umask);
new_cwd = "/";
if (opt_chdir_path)
{
if (chdir (opt_chdir_path))
die_with_error ("Can't chdir to %s", opt_chdir_path);
new_cwd = opt_chdir_path;
}
else if (chdir (old_cwd) == 0)
{
/* If the old cwd is mapped in the sandbox, go there */
new_cwd = old_cwd;
}
else
{
/* If the old cwd is not mapped, go to home */
const char *home = getenv ("HOME");
if (home != NULL &&
chdir (home) == 0)
new_cwd = home;
}
xsetenv ("PWD", new_cwd, 1);
free (old_cwd);
__debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1)
{
/* We have to have a pid 1 in the pid namespace, because
* otherwise we'll get a bunch of zombies as nothing reaps
* them. Alternatively if we're using sync_fd or lock_files we
* need some process to own these.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork for pid 1");
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Close fds in pid 1, except stdio and optionally event_fd
(for syncing pid 2 lifetime with monitor_child) and
opt_sync_fd (for syncing sandbox lifetime with outside
process).
Any other fds will been passed on to the child though. */
{
int dont_close[3];
int j = 0;
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_sync_fd;
dont_close[j++] = -1;
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
}
return do_init (event_fd, pid);
}
}
__debug__ (("launch executable %s\n", argv[0]));
if (proc_fd != -1)
close (proc_fd);
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
close (opt_sync_fd);
/* We want sigchild in the child */
unblock_sigchild ();
if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
if (execvp (argv[0], argv) == -1)
die_with_error ("execvp %s", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: When executing a program via the bubblewrap sandbox, the nonpriv session can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl to push characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an attacker to escape the sandbox.
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters | High | 168,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int accept_server_socket(int s)
{
struct sockaddr_un client_address;
socklen_t clen;
int fd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr*)&client_address, &clen);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("accepted fd:%d for server fd:%d", fd, s);
return fd;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CopyDirectory(const FilePath& from_path,
const FilePath& to_path,
bool recursive) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
DCHECK(to_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
DCHECK(from_path.value().find('*') == std::string::npos);
char top_dir[PATH_MAX];
if (base::strlcpy(top_dir, from_path.value().c_str(),
arraysize(top_dir)) >= arraysize(top_dir)) {
return false;
}
FilePath real_to_path = to_path;
if (PathExists(real_to_path)) {
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
} else {
real_to_path = real_to_path.DirName();
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_to_path))
return false;
}
FilePath real_from_path = from_path;
if (!AbsolutePath(&real_from_path))
return false;
if (real_to_path.value().size() >= real_from_path.value().size() &&
real_to_path.value().compare(0, real_from_path.value().size(),
real_from_path.value()) == 0)
return false;
bool success = true;
int traverse_type = FileEnumerator::FILES | FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS;
if (recursive)
traverse_type |= FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES;
FileEnumerator traversal(from_path, recursive, traverse_type);
FileEnumerator::FindInfo info;
FilePath current = from_path;
if (stat(from_path.value().c_str(), &info.stat) < 0) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't stat source directory: "
<< from_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
struct stat to_path_stat;
FilePath from_path_base = from_path;
if (recursive && stat(to_path.value().c_str(), &to_path_stat) == 0 &&
S_ISDIR(to_path_stat.st_mode)) {
from_path_base = from_path.DirName();
}
DCHECK(recursive || S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode));
while (success && !current.empty()) {
std::string suffix(¤t.value().c_str()[from_path_base.value().size()]);
if (!suffix.empty()) {
DCHECK_EQ('/', suffix[0]);
suffix.erase(0, 1);
}
const FilePath target_path = to_path.Append(suffix);
if (S_ISDIR(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (mkdir(target_path.value().c_str(), info.stat.st_mode & 01777) != 0 &&
errno != EEXIST) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create directory: "
<< target_path.value() << " errno = " << errno;
success = false;
}
} else if (S_ISREG(info.stat.st_mode)) {
if (!CopyFile(current, target_path)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CopyDirectory() couldn't create file: "
<< target_path.value();
success = false;
}
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "CopyDirectory() skipping non-regular file: "
<< current.value();
}
current = traversal.Next();
traversal.GetFindInfo(&info);
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly handle pathnames during copy operations, which might make it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary programs via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long Cluster::GetFirstTime() const
{
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetFirst(pEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) //empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_create_cache(char *name)
{
return mb_cache_create(name, HASH_BUCKET_BITS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The do_check function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.1 does not make the allow_ptr_leaks value available for restricting the output of the print_bpf_insn function, which allows local users to obtain sensitive address information via crafted bpf system calls.
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 168,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.1.1, as used in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image that is mishandled by the imagescale function.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a | Medium | 170,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CreateOAuth2ServiceDelegate(
signin::AccountConsistencyMethod account_consistency) {
oauth2_service_delegate_.reset(new MutableProfileOAuth2TokenServiceDelegate(
client_.get(), &signin_error_controller_, &account_tracker_service_,
token_web_data_, account_consistency, revoke_all_tokens_on_load_,
true /* can_revoke_credantials */));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
oauth2_service_delegate_->AddObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181} | Medium | 172,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Plugin::Plugin(PP_Instance pp_instance)
: pp::InstancePrivate(pp_instance),
scriptable_plugin_(NULL),
argc_(-1),
argn_(NULL),
argv_(NULL),
main_subprocess_("main subprocess", NULL, NULL),
nacl_ready_state_(UNSENT),
nexe_error_reported_(false),
wrapper_factory_(NULL),
last_error_string_(""),
ppapi_proxy_(NULL),
enable_dev_interfaces_(false),
init_time_(0),
ready_time_(0),
nexe_size_(0),
time_of_last_progress_event_(0),
using_ipc_proxy_(false) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::Plugin (this=%p, pp_instance=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", static_cast<void*>(this), pp_instance));
callback_factory_.Initialize(this);
nexe_downloader_.Initialize(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the create_bits function in pixman-bits-image.c in Pixman before 0.32.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via large height and stride values.
Commit Message: | High | 165,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PP_Flash_Menu* ReadMenu(int depth,
const IPC::Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter) {
if (depth > kMaxMenuDepth)
return NULL;
++depth;
PP_Flash_Menu* menu = new PP_Flash_Menu;
menu->items = NULL;
if (!m->ReadUInt32(iter, &menu->count)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
if (menu->count == 0)
return menu;
menu->items = new PP_Flash_MenuItem[menu->count];
memset(menu->items, 0, sizeof(PP_Flash_MenuItem) * menu->count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i) {
if (!ReadMenuItem(depth, m, iter, menu->items + i)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
}
return menu;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t nr)
{
const unsigned char *b = buf;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
int c;
ssize_t retval = 0;
/* Job control check -- must be done at start (POSIX.1 7.1.1.4). */
if (L_TOSTOP(tty) && file->f_op->write != redirected_tty_write) {
retval = tty_check_change(tty);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
/* Write out any echoed characters that are still pending */
process_echoes(tty);
add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (tty_hung_up_p(file) || (tty->link && !tty->link->count)) {
retval = -EIO;
break;
}
if (O_OPOST(tty)) {
while (nr > 0) {
ssize_t num = process_output_block(tty, b, nr);
if (num < 0) {
if (num == -EAGAIN)
break;
retval = num;
goto break_out;
}
b += num;
nr -= num;
if (nr == 0)
break;
c = *b;
if (process_output(c, tty) < 0)
break;
b++; nr--;
}
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
while (nr > 0) {
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;
}
if (!c)
break;
b += c;
nr -= c;
}
}
if (!nr)
break;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
schedule();
down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
}
break_out:
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
if (b - buf != nr && tty->fasync)
set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem);
return (b - buf) ? b - buf : retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The n_tty_write function in drivers/tty/n_tty.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.3 does not properly manage tty driver access in the *LECHO & !OPOST* case, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or gain privileges by triggering a race condition involving read and write operations with long strings.
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ScaleYUVToRGB32(const uint8* y_buf,
const uint8* u_buf,
const uint8* v_buf,
uint8* rgb_buf,
int source_width,
int source_height,
int width,
int height,
int y_pitch,
int uv_pitch,
int rgb_pitch,
YUVType yuv_type,
Rotate view_rotate,
ScaleFilter filter) {
const int kFilterBufferSize = 4096;
if (source_width > kFilterBufferSize || view_rotate)
filter = FILTER_NONE;
unsigned int y_shift = yuv_type;
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_0) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90)) {
y_buf += source_width - 1;
u_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
v_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
source_width = -source_width;
}
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_180)) {
y_buf += (source_height - 1) * y_pitch;
u_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
v_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
source_height = -source_height;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0)
return;
int source_dx = source_width * kFractionMax / width;
int source_dy = source_height * kFractionMax / height;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
int source_dx_uv = source_dx;
#endif
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270)) {
int tmp = height;
height = width;
width = tmp;
tmp = source_height;
source_height = source_width;
source_width = tmp;
int original_dx = source_dx;
int original_dy = source_dy;
source_dx = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * y_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
source_dx_uv = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * uv_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#endif
source_dy = original_dx;
if (view_rotate == ROTATE_90) {
y_pitch = -1;
uv_pitch = -1;
source_height = -source_height;
} else {
y_pitch = 1;
uv_pitch = 1;
}
}
uint8 yuvbuf[16 + kFilterBufferSize * 3 + 16];
uint8* ybuf =
reinterpret_cast<uint8*>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(yuvbuf + 15) & ~15);
uint8* ubuf = ybuf + kFilterBufferSize;
uint8* vbuf = ubuf + kFilterBufferSize;
int yscale_fixed = (source_height << kFractionBits) / height;
for (int y = 0; y < height; ++y) {
uint8* dest_pixel = rgb_buf + y * rgb_pitch;
int source_y_subpixel = (y * yscale_fixed);
if (yscale_fixed >= (kFractionMax * 2)) {
source_y_subpixel += kFractionMax / 2; // For 1/2 or less, center filter.
}
int source_y = source_y_subpixel >> kFractionBits;
const uint8* y0_ptr = y_buf + source_y * y_pitch;
const uint8* y1_ptr = y0_ptr + y_pitch;
const uint8* u0_ptr = u_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* u1_ptr = u0_ptr + uv_pitch;
const uint8* v0_ptr = v_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* v1_ptr = v0_ptr + uv_pitch;
int source_y_fraction = (source_y_subpixel & kFractionMask) >> 8;
int source_uv_fraction =
((source_y_subpixel >> y_shift) & kFractionMask) >> 8;
const uint8* y_ptr = y0_ptr;
const uint8* u_ptr = u0_ptr;
const uint8* v_ptr = v0_ptr;
if (filter & media::FILTER_BILINEAR_V) {
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_y_fraction && ((source_y + 1) < source_height)) {
FilterRows(ybuf, y0_ptr, y1_ptr, source_width, source_y_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ybuf, y0_ptr, source_width);
}
y_ptr = ybuf;
ybuf[source_width] = ybuf[source_width-1];
int uv_source_width = (source_width + 1) / 2;
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_uv_fraction &&
(((source_y >> y_shift) + 1) < (source_height >> y_shift))) {
FilterRows(ubuf, u0_ptr, u1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
FilterRows(vbuf, v0_ptr, v1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ubuf, u0_ptr, uv_source_width);
memcpy(vbuf, v0_ptr, uv_source_width);
}
u_ptr = ubuf;
v_ptr = vbuf;
ubuf[uv_source_width] = ubuf[uv_source_width - 1];
vbuf[uv_source_width] = vbuf[uv_source_width - 1];
}
if (source_dx == kFractionMax) { // Not scaled
FastConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else {
if (filter & FILTER_BILINEAR_H) {
LinearScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
if (width == (source_width * 2)) {
DoubleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else if ((source_dx & kFractionMask) == 0) {
ConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits);
} else if (source_dx_uv == source_dx) { // Not rotated.
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
RotateConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits,
source_dx_uv >> kFractionBits);
}
#else
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
#endif
}
}
}
EMMS();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle video, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add check for zero-sized source YUV + tests.
Took the time to clean up said tests for improved coverage.
BUG=90173
TEST=media_unittests
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7794016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@99113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: hb_buffer_ensure (hb_buffer_t *buffer, unsigned int size)
{
unsigned int new_allocated = buffer->allocated;
if (size > new_allocated)
{
while (size > new_allocated)
new_allocated += (new_allocated >> 1) + 8;
if (buffer->pos)
buffer->pos = (hb_internal_glyph_position_t *) realloc (buffer->pos, new_allocated * sizeof (buffer->pos[0]));
if (buffer->out_info != buffer->info)
{
buffer->info = (hb_internal_glyph_info_t *) realloc (buffer->info, new_allocated * sizeof (buffer->info[0]));
buffer->out_info = (hb_internal_glyph_info_t *) buffer->pos;
}
else
{
buffer->info = (hb_internal_glyph_info_t *) realloc (buffer->info, new_allocated * sizeof (buffer->info[0]));
buffer->out_info = buffer->info;
}
buffer->allocated = new_allocated;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The hb_buffer_ensure function in hb-buffer.c in HarfBuzz, as used in Pango 1.28.3, Firefox, and other products, does not verify that memory reallocations succeed, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted OpenType font data that triggers use of an incorrect index.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RequestSender::OnNetworkFetcherComplete(
const GURL& original_url,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> response_body,
int net_error,
const std::string& header_etag,
int64_t xheader_retry_after_sec) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
VLOG(1) << "request completed from url: " << original_url.spec();
int error = -1;
if (response_body && response_code_ == 200) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, net_error);
error = 0;
} else if (response_code_ != -1) {
error = response_code_;
} else {
error = net_error;
}
int retry_after_sec = -1;
if (original_url.SchemeIsCryptographic() && error > 0)
retry_after_sec = base::saturated_cast<int>(xheader_retry_after_sec);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternalComplete,
base::Unretained(this), error,
response_body ? *response_body : std::string(),
header_etag, retry_after_sec));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199} | Medium | 172,364 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SVGImage::setContainerSize(const IntSize& size)
{
if (!m_page || !usesContainerSize())
return;
LocalFrame* frame = m_page->mainFrame();
SVGSVGElement* rootElement = toSVGDocument(frame->document())->rootElement();
if (!rootElement)
return;
RenderSVGRoot* renderer = toRenderSVGRoot(rootElement->renderer());
if (!renderer)
return;
FrameView* view = frameView();
view->resize(this->containerSize());
renderer->setContainerSize(size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void Sp_replace_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *source, *s, *r;
js_Buffer *sb = NULL;
int n, x;
Resub m;
source = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
if (js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, 0)) {
js_copy(J, 0);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
loop:
s = m.sub[0].sp;
n = m.sub[0].ep - m.sub[0].sp;
if (js_iscallable(J, 2)) {
js_copy(J, 2);
js_pushundefined(J);
for (x = 0; m.sub[x].sp; ++x) /* arg 0..x: substring and subexps that matched */
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep - m.sub[x].sp);
js_pushnumber(J, s - source); /* arg x+2: offset within search string */
js_copy(J, 0); /* arg x+3: search string */
js_call(J, 2 + x);
r = js_tostring(J, -1);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
js_puts(J, &sb, r);
js_pop(J, 1);
} else {
r = js_tostring(J, 2);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
while (*r) {
if (*r == '$') {
switch (*(++r)) {
case 0: --r; /* end of string; back up */
/* fallthrough */
case '$': js_putc(J, &sb, '$'); break;
case '`': js_putm(J, &sb, source, s); break;
case '\'': js_puts(J, &sb, s + n); break;
case '&':
js_putm(J, &sb, s, s + n);
break;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
x = *r - '0';
if (r[1] >= '0' && r[1] <= '9')
x = x * 10 + *(++r) - '0';
if (x > 0 && x < m.nsub) {
js_putm(J, &sb, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
if (x > 10) {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x / 10);
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x % 10);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x);
}
}
break;
default:
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
js_putc(J, &sb, *r);
break;
}
++r;
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, *r++);
}
}
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
source = m.sub[0].ep;
if (n == 0) {
if (*source)
js_putc(J, &sb, *source++);
else
goto end;
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, REG_NOTBOL))
goto loop;
}
end:
js_puts(J, &sb, s + n);
js_putc(J, &sb, 0);
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, sb);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pushstring(J, sb ? sb->s : "");
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, sb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings. | Medium | 169,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::Initialize() {
if (IsDestinationInitialized())
return;
FFTFrame::Initialize();
audio_worklet_ = AudioWorklet::Create(this);
if (destination_node_) {
destination_node_->Handler().Initialize();
listener_ = AudioListener::Create(*this);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in WebAudio in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Audio thread should not access destination node
The AudioDestinationNode is an object managed by Oilpan so the audio
thread should not access it. However, the audio thread needs
information (currentTime, etc) from the destination node. So instead
of accessing the audio destination handler (a scoped_refptr) via the
destination node, add a new member to the base audio context that
holds onto the destination handler.
The destination handler is not an oilpan object and lives at least as
long as the base audio context.
Bug: 860626, 860522, 863951
Test: Test case from 860522 doesn't crash on asan build
Change-Id: I3add844d4eb8fdc7e05b89292938b843a0abbb99
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1138974
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#575509} | Medium | 173,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_seal)
{
zval *pubkeys, **pubkey, *sealdata, *ekeys;
HashTable *pubkeysht;
HashPosition pos;
EVP_PKEY **pkeys;
long * key_resources; /* so we know what to cleanup */
int i, len1, len2, *eksl, nkeys;
unsigned char *buf = NULL, **eks;
char * data; int data_len;
char *method =NULL;
int method_len = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "szza/|s", &data, &data_len, &sealdata, &ekeys, &pubkeys, &method, &method_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pubkeysht = HASH_OF(pubkeys);
nkeys = pubkeysht ? zend_hash_num_elements(pubkeysht) : 0;
if (!nkeys) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Fourth argument to openssl_seal() must be a non-empty array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method) {
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Ciphers with modes requiring IV are not supported");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
cipher = EVP_rc4();
}
pkeys = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*pkeys), 0);
eksl = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eksl), 0);
eks = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eks), 0);
memset(eks, 0, sizeof(*eks) * nkeys);
key_resources = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(long), 0);
memset(key_resources, 0, sizeof(*key_resources) * nkeys);
/* get the public keys we are using to seal this data */
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(pubkeysht, &pos);
i = 0;
while (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(pubkeysht, (void **) &pubkey,
&pos) == SUCCESS) {
pkeys[i] = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(pubkey, 1, NULL, 0, &key_resources[i] TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkeys[i] == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "not a public key (%dth member of pubkeys)", i+1);
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
eks[i] = emalloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkeys[i]) + 1);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(pubkeysht, &pos);
i++;
}
if (!EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx,cipher,NULL,NULL)) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
goto clean_exit;
}
#if 0
/* Need this if allow ciphers that require initialization vector */
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
iv = ivlen ? emalloc(ivlen + 1) : NULL;
#endif
/* allocate one byte extra to make room for \0 */
buf = emalloc(data_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (!EVP_SealInit(&ctx, cipher, eks, eksl, NULL, pkeys, nkeys) || !EVP_SealUpdate(&ctx, buf, &len1, (unsigned char *)data, data_len)) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
efree(buf);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
goto clean_exit;
}
EVP_SealFinal(&ctx, buf + len1, &len2);
if (len1 + len2 > 0) {
zval_dtor(sealdata);
buf[len1 + len2] = '\0';
buf = erealloc(buf, len1 + len2 + 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(sealdata, (char *)buf, len1 + len2, 0);
zval_dtor(ekeys);
array_init(ekeys);
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
eks[i][eksl[i]] = '\0';
add_next_index_stringl(ekeys, erealloc(eks[i], eksl[i] + 1), eksl[i], 0);
eks[i] = NULL;
}
#if 0
/* If allow ciphers that need IV, we need this */
zval_dtor(*ivec);
if (ivlen) {
iv[ivlen] = '\0';
ZVAL_STRINGL(*ivec, erealloc(iv, ivlen + 1), ivlen, 0);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(*ivec);
}
#endif
} else {
efree(buf);
}
RETVAL_LONG(len1 + len2);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
clean_exit:
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
if (key_resources[i] == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkeys[i]);
}
if (eks[i]) {
efree(eks[i]);
}
}
efree(eks);
efree(eksl);
efree(pkeys);
efree(key_resources);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.21, and 7.1.x before 7.1.7, the openssl extension PEM sealing code did not check the return value of the OpenSSL sealing function, which could lead to a crash of the PHP interpreter, related to an interpretation conflict for a negative number in ext/openssl/openssl.c, and an OpenSSL documentation omission.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,757 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.