instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree()
{
ASSERT(!m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree);
m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree = true;
if (SpinButtonElement* element = spinButtonElement())
element->removeSpinButtonOwner();
if (ClearButtonElement* element = clearButtonElement())
element->removeClearButtonOwner();
if (DateTimeEditElement* element = dateTimeEditElement())
element->removeEditControlOwner();
if (PickerIndicatorElement* element = pickerIndicatorElement())
element->removePickerIndicatorOwner();
if (element()->focused())
element()->focus();
BaseDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree();
m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to not properly considering focus during the processing of JavaScript events in the presence of a multiple-fields input type.
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,210 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void StreamTcpPacketSetState(Packet *p, TcpSession *ssn,
uint8_t state)
{
if (state == ssn->state || PKT_IS_PSEUDOPKT(p))
return;
ssn->state = state;
/* update the flow state */
switch(ssn->state) {
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
case TCP_CLOSING:
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
FlowUpdateState(p->flow, FLOW_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
case TCP_TIME_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSED:
FlowUpdateState(p->flow, FLOW_STATE_CLOSED);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received).
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin | Medium | 169,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMarkOfTheWebDeclaration(const WebURL& url)
{
return String::format("\n<!-- saved from url=(%04d)%s -->\n",
static_cast<int>(url.spec().length()),
url.spec().data());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The page serializer in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 mishandles Mark of the Web (MOTW) comments for URLs containing a *--* sequence, which might allow remote attackers to inject HTML via a crafted URL, as demonstrated by an initial http://example.com?-- substring.
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736} | Medium | 171,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
const char __user *, _description,
const void __user *, _payload,
size_t, plen,
key_serial_t, ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
char type[32], *description;
void *payload;
long ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* draw all the data into kernel space */
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
description = NULL;
if (_description) {
description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
goto error;
}
if (!*description) {
kfree(description);
description = NULL;
} else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
(strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto error2;
}
}
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error2;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
goto error3;
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
}
/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
* keyring */
key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
}
else {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
}
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
kvfree(payload);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: security/keys/keyctl.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11.5 does not consider the case of a NULL payload in conjunction with a nonzero length value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted add_key or keyctl system call, a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-12192.
Commit Message: KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,726 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *dev;
rcu_read_lock();
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(net, name);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!dev && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
request_module("%s", name);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The dev_load function in net/core/dev.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 allows local users to bypass an intended CAP_SYS_MODULE capability requirement and load arbitrary modules by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> | Low | 166,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi4 *fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = 0;
skb = ip_finish_skb(sk, fl4);
if (!skb)
goto out;
err = udp_send_skb(skb, fl4);
out:
up->len = 0;
up->pending = 0;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The udp_v6_push_pending_frames function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 makes an incorrect function call for pending data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,016 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::deleteVertexArray(
WebGLVertexArrayObject* vertex_array) {
if (isContextLost() || !vertex_array)
return;
if (!vertex_array->IsDefaultObject() &&
vertex_array == bound_vertex_array_object_)
SetBoundVertexArrayObject(nullptr);
vertex_array->DeleteObject(ContextGL());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016} | Medium | 173,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: match_at(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end,
#ifdef USE_MATCH_RANGE_MUST_BE_INSIDE_OF_SPECIFIED_RANGE
const UChar* right_range,
#endif
const UChar* sstart, UChar* sprev, OnigMatchArg* msa)
{
static UChar FinishCode[] = { OP_FINISH };
int i, n, num_mem, best_len, pop_level;
LengthType tlen, tlen2;
MemNumType mem;
RelAddrType addr;
UChar *s, *q, *sbegin;
int is_alloca;
char *alloc_base;
OnigStackType *stk_base, *stk, *stk_end;
OnigStackType *stkp; /* used as any purpose. */
OnigStackIndex si;
OnigStackIndex *repeat_stk;
OnigStackIndex *mem_start_stk, *mem_end_stk;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
int scv;
unsigned char* state_check_buff = msa->state_check_buff;
int num_comb_exp_check = reg->num_comb_exp_check;
#endif
UChar *p = reg->p;
OnigOptionType option = reg->options;
OnigEncoding encode = reg->enc;
OnigCaseFoldType case_fold_flag = reg->case_fold_flag;
pop_level = reg->stack_pop_level;
num_mem = reg->num_mem;
STACK_INIT(INIT_MATCH_STACK_SIZE);
UPDATE_FOR_STACK_REALLOC;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
mem_start_stk[i] = mem_end_stk[i] = INVALID_STACK_INDEX;
}
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "match_at: str: %d, end: %d, start: %d, sprev: %d\n",
(int )str, (int )end, (int )sstart, (int )sprev);
fprintf(stderr, "size: %d, start offset: %d\n",
(int )(end - str), (int )(sstart - str));
#endif
STACK_PUSH_ENSURED(STK_ALT, FinishCode); /* bottom stack */
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
s = (UChar* )sstart;
while (1) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
{
UChar *q, *bp, buf[50];
int len;
fprintf(stderr, "%4d> \"", (int )(s - str));
bp = buf;
for (i = 0, q = s; i < 7 && q < end; i++) {
len = enclen(encode, q);
while (len-- > 0) *bp++ = *q++;
}
if (q < end) { xmemcpy(bp, "...\"", 4); bp += 4; }
else { xmemcpy(bp, "\"", 1); bp += 1; }
*bp = 0;
fputs((char* )buf, stderr);
for (i = 0; i < 20 - (bp - buf); i++) fputc(' ', stderr);
onig_print_compiled_byte_code(stderr, p, NULL, encode);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
sbegin = s;
switch (*p++) {
case OP_END: MOP_IN(OP_END);
n = s - sstart;
if (n > best_len) {
OnigRegion* region;
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option)) {
if (n > msa->best_len) {
msa->best_len = n;
msa->best_s = (UChar* )sstart;
}
else
goto end_best_len;
}
#endif
best_len = n;
region = msa->region;
if (region) {
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
if (IS_POSIX_REGION(msa->options)) {
posix_regmatch_t* rmt = (posix_regmatch_t* )region;
rmt[0].rm_so = sstart - str;
rmt[0].rm_eo = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
rmt[i].rm_so = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
rmt[i].rm_so = (UChar* )((void* )(mem_start_stk[i])) - str;
rmt[i].rm_eo = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
rmt[i].rm_so = rmt[i].rm_eo = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
}
else {
#endif /* USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION */
region->beg[0] = sstart - str;
region->end[0] = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
region->beg[i] = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
region->beg[i] = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[i]) - str;
region->end[i] = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
region->beg[i] = region->end[i] = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
#ifdef USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY
if (reg->capture_history != 0) {
int r;
OnigCaptureTreeNode* node;
if (IS_NULL(region->history_root)) {
region->history_root = node = history_node_new();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(node);
}
else {
node = region->history_root;
history_tree_clear(node);
}
node->group = 0;
node->beg = sstart - str;
node->end = s - str;
stkp = stk_base;
r = make_capture_history_tree(region->history_root, &stkp,
stk, (UChar* )str, reg);
if (r < 0) {
best_len = r; /* error code */
goto finish;
}
}
#endif /* USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
} /* else IS_POSIX_REGION() */
#endif
} /* if (region) */
} /* n > best_len */
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
end_best_len:
#endif
MOP_OUT;
if (IS_FIND_CONDITION(option)) {
if (IS_FIND_NOT_EMPTY(option) && s == sstart) {
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option) && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
}
/* default behavior: return first-matching result. */
goto finish;
break;
case OP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1);
#if 0
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
#endif
if (*p != *s++) goto fail;
DATA_ENSURE(0);
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT1_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) {
goto fail;
}
p++; q++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT2);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT3);
DATA_ENSURE(3);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT4: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT4);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT5: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT5);
DATA_ENSURE(5);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p++ != *s++) goto fail;
}
sprev = s - 1;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, *endp, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
endp = p + tlen;
while (p < endp) {
sprev = s;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) goto fail;
p++; q++;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N1);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N2);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N3);
DATA_ENSURE(6);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 2);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 2;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB3N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB3N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 3);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 3;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMBN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMBN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p); /* mb-len */
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen2, p); /* string len */
tlen2 *= tlen;
DATA_ENSURE(tlen2);
while (tlen2-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - tlen;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_CCLASS: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s); /* OP_CCLASS can match mb-code. \D, \S */
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) goto fail;
cclass_mb:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(mb_len);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
s++;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
cclass_mb_not:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
if (! DATA_ENSURE_CHECK(mb_len)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
s = (UChar* )end;
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
cc_mb_not_success:
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb_not;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NODE: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NODE);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
void *node;
int mb_len;
UChar *ss;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
GET_POINTER_INC(node, p);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(0);
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
if (onig_is_code_in_cc_len(mb_len, code, node) == 0) goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT:MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR:
MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
== ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
!= ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_WORD_BEGIN_END
case OP_WORD_BEGIN: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BEGIN);
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_WORD_END: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_END);
if (!ON_STR_BEGIN(s) && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
if (ON_STR_END(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
#endif
case OP_BEGIN_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_END_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_END(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_LINE);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (IS_NOTBOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end) && !ON_STR_END(s)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_END_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_END_LINE);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_SEMI_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_SEMI_END_BUF);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end) &&
ON_STR_END(s + enclen(encode, s))) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
UChar* ss = s + enclen(encode, s);
ss += enclen(encode, ss);
if (ON_STR_END(ss)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_POSITION: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_POSITION);
if (s != msa->start)
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp); /* should be before push mem-end. */
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp);
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
else
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )stkp->u.mem.pstr);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END_MARK(mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_BACKREF1: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF1);
mem = 1;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREF2: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF2);
mem = 2;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREFN: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
backref:
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP(pstart, s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREFN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN_IC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE(pstart, swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#ifdef USE_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL
case OP_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL:
{
int len;
OnigOptionType ic;
LengthType level;
GET_OPTION_INC(ic, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(level, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
sprev = s;
if (backref_match_at_nested_level(reg, stk, stk_base, ic
, case_fold_flag, (int )level, (int )tlen, p, &s, end)) {
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * tlen);
}
else
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#endif
#if 0 /* no need: IS_DYNAMIC_OPTION() == 0 */
case OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += SIZE_OP_SET_OPTION + SIZE_OP_FAIL;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_SET_OPTION: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_NULL_CHECK_START: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK(isnull, mem, s);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
null_check_found:
/* empty loop founded, skip next instruction */
switch (*p++) {
case OP_JUMP:
case OP_PUSH:
p += SIZE_RELADDR;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG:
p += SIZE_MEMNUM;
break;
default:
goto unexpected_bytecode_error;
break;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST(isnull, mem, s, reg);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH:
MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST_REC(isnull, mem, s, reg);
#else
STACK_NULL_CHECK_REC(isnull, mem, s);
#endif
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_END(mem);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_JUMP);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
p += addr;
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) {
p += addr;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_STATE_CHECK(s, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_POP: MOP_IN(OP_POP);
STACK_POP_ONE;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p += (addr + 1);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_NG);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += addr;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
/* end of repeat. Nothing to do. */
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p = STACK_AT(si)->u.repeat.pcode; /* Don't use stkp after PUSH. */
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
}
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc_ng:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count < reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
UChar* pcode = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(pcode, s, sprev);
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count == reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc_ng;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS);
STACK_PUSH_POS(s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_POS: MOP_IN(OP_POP_POS);
{
STACK_POS_END(stkp);
s = stkp->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stkp->u.state.pstr_prev;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_POS_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_POS: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_POS);
STACK_POP_TIL_POS_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
case OP_PUSH_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_STOP_BT);
STACK_PUSH_STOP_BT;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_POP_STOP_BT);
STACK_STOP_BT_END;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND: MOP_IN(OP_LOOK_BEHIND);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
s = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(s)) goto fail;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
q = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(q)) {
/* too short case -> success. ex. /(?<!XXX)a/.match("a")
If you want to change to fail, replace following line. */
p += addr;
/* goto fail; */
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
s = q;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
STACK_POP_TIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_CALL: MOP_IN(OP_CALL);
GET_ABSADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_CALL_FRAME(p);
p = reg->p + addr;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_RETURN: MOP_IN(OP_RETURN);
STACK_RETURN(p);
STACK_PUSH_RETURN;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_FINISH:
goto finish;
break;
fail:
MOP_OUT;
/* fall */
case OP_FAIL: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL);
STACK_POP;
p = stk->u.state.pcode;
s = stk->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stk->u.state.pstr_prev;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
if (stk->u.state.state_check != 0) {
stk->type = STK_STATE_CHECK_MARK;
stk++;
}
#endif
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
default:
goto bytecode_error;
} /* end of switch */
sprev = sbegin;
} /* end of while(1) */
finish:
STACK_SAVE;
return best_len;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG
stack_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_STACK_BUG;
#endif
bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNDEFINED_BYTECODE;
unexpected_bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNEXPECTED_BYTECODE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A stack out-of-bounds read occurs in match_at() during regular expression searching. A logical error involving order of validation and access in match_at() could result in an out-of-bounds read from a stack buffer.
Commit Message: fix #57 : DATA_ENSURE() check must be before data access | High | 168,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(
long long id,
long long pos, //absolute pos of payload
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); //BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) //haven't parsed anything yet
{
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry*[m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
}
else
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size)
{
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry*[entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else //SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
char description[16];
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = user_match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | High | 168,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech keyboard report descriptor\n");
rdesc[84] = rdesc[89] = 0x4d;
rdesc[85] = rdesc[90] = 0x10;
}
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&
rdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&
rdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up rel/abs in Logitech report descriptor\n");
rdesc[33] = rdesc[50] = 0x02;
}
switch (hdev->product) {
/* Several wheels report as this id when operating in emulation mode. */
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WHEEL:
udesc = &(hid_to_usb_dev(hdev)->descriptor);
if (!udesc) {
hid_err(hdev, "NULL USB device descriptor\n");
break;
}
bcdDevice = le16_to_cpu(udesc->bcdDevice);
rev_maj = bcdDevice >> 8;
rev_min = bcdDevice & 0xff;
/* Update the report descriptor for only the Driving Force wheel */
if (rev_maj == 1 && rev_min == 2 &&
*rsize == DF_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force report descriptor\n");
rdesc = df_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(df_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == MOMO_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Force (Red) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
if (*rsize == MOMO2_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Racing Force (Black) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo2_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo2_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_VIBRATION_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == FV_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Formula Vibration report descriptor\n");
rdesc = fv_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(fv_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFP_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == DFP_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force Pro report descriptor\n");
rdesc = dfp_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(dfp_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WII_WHEEL:
if (*rsize >= 101 && rdesc[41] == 0x95 && rdesc[42] == 0x0B &&
rdesc[47] == 0x05 && rdesc[48] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Logitech Speed Force Wireless report descriptor\n");
rdesc[41] = 0x05;
rdesc[42] = 0x09;
rdesc[47] = 0x95;
rdesc[48] = 0x0B;
}
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *suhosin_decrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key, char **where TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
int o_name_len = name_len;
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
decrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '='; *where +=1;
memcpy(*where, value, value_len);
*where += value_len;
return *where;
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto decrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_decrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key, &l, SUHOSIN_G(cookie_checkraddr) TSRMLS_CC);
if (d == NULL) {
goto skip_cookie;
}
d_url = php_url_encode(d, l, &l);
efree(d);
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '=';*where += 1;
memcpy(*where, d_url, l);
*where += l;
efree(d_url);
skip_cookie:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return *where;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie function in the transparent cookie-encryption feature in the Suhosin extension before 0.9.33 for PHP, when suhosin.cookie.encrypt and suhosin.multiheader are enabled, might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long string that is used in a Set-Cookie HTTP header.
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory) | Medium | 165,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_process_intra_mb(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_mb_info_t * ps_cur_mb_info,
UWORD8 u1_mb_num)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type;
UWORD8 uc_temp = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
UWORD8 u1_top_available = BOOLEAN(uc_temp & TOP_MB_AVAILABLE_MASK);
UWORD8 u1_left_available = BOOLEAN(uc_temp & LEFT_MB_AVAILABLE_MASK);
UWORD8 u1_use_top_right_mb = BOOLEAN(uc_temp & TOP_RIGHT_MB_AVAILABLE_MASK);
UWORD8 u1_use_top_left_mb = BOOLEAN(uc_temp & TOP_LEFT_MB_AVAILABLE_MASK);
UWORD8 uc_useTopMB = u1_top_available;
UWORD16 u2_use_left_mb = u1_left_available;
UWORD16 u2_use_left_mb_pack;
UWORD8 *pu1_luma_pred_buffer;
/* CHANGED CODE */
UWORD8 *pu1_luma_rec_buffer;
UWORD8 *puc_top;
mb_neigbour_params_t *ps_left_mb;
mb_neigbour_params_t *ps_top_mb;
mb_neigbour_params_t *ps_top_right_mb;
mb_neigbour_params_t *ps_curmb;
UWORD16 u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
UWORD32 ui_pred_width, ui_rec_width;
WORD16 *pi2_y_coeff;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff, u1_topmb, u1_mb_field_decoding_flag;
UWORD32 u4_num_pmbair;
UWORD16 ui2_luma_csbp = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_luma_csbp;
UWORD8 *pu1_yleft, *pu1_ytop_left;
/* Chroma variables*/
UWORD8 *pu1_top_u;
UWORD8 *pu1_uleft;
UWORD8 *pu1_u_top_left;
/* CHANGED CODE */
UWORD8 *pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer, *pu1_mb_cr_rei1_buffer;
UWORD32 u4_recwidth_cr;
/* CHANGED CODE */
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_frame_buf = ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon;
UWORD32 u4_luma_dc_only_csbp = 0;
UWORD32 u4_luma_dc_only_cbp = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data; //Pointer to keep track of intra4x4_pred_mode data in pv_proc_tu_coeff_data buffer
u1_mbaff = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_topmb = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb;
u4_num_pmbair = (u1_mb_num >> u1_mbaff);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Find the current MB's mb params */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mb_field_decoding_flag = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_field_decodingflag;
ps_curmb = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb;
ps_top_mb = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_top_mb;
ps_left_mb = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_left_mb;
ps_top_right_mb = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_top_right_mb;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check whether neighbouring MB is Inter MB and */
/* constrained intra pred is 1. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u2_use_left_mb_pack = (u2_use_left_mb << 8) + u2_use_left_mb;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_constrained_intra_pred_flag)
{
UWORD8 u1_left = (UWORD8)u2_use_left_mb;
uc_useTopMB = uc_useTopMB
&& ((ps_top_mb->u1_mb_type != P_MB)
&& (ps_top_mb->u1_mb_type != B_MB));
u2_use_left_mb = u2_use_left_mb
&& ((ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != P_MB)
&& (ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != B_MB));
u2_use_left_mb_pack = (u2_use_left_mb << 8) + u2_use_left_mb;
if(u1_mbaff)
{
if(u1_mb_field_decoding_flag ^ ps_left_mb->u1_mb_fld)
{
u1_left = u1_left
&& (((ps_left_mb + 1)->u1_mb_type != P_MB)
&& ((ps_left_mb + 1)->u1_mb_type
!= B_MB));
u2_use_left_mb = u2_use_left_mb && u1_left;
if(u1_mb_field_decoding_flag)
u2_use_left_mb_pack = (u1_left << 8)
+ (u2_use_left_mb_pack & 0xff);
else
u2_use_left_mb_pack = (u2_use_left_mb << 8)
+ (u2_use_left_mb);
}
}
u1_use_top_right_mb =
u1_use_top_right_mb
&& ((ps_top_right_mb->u1_mb_type != P_MB)
&& (ps_top_right_mb->u1_mb_type
!= B_MB));
u1_use_top_left_mb =
u1_use_top_left_mb
&& ((ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topleft_mbtype != P_MB)
&& (ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topleft_mbtype
!= B_MB));
}
/*********************Common pointer calculations *************************/
/* CHANGED CODE */
pu1_luma_pred_buffer = ps_dec->pu1_y;
pu1_luma_rec_buffer = ps_frame_buf->pu1_dest_y + (u4_num_pmbair << 4);
pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer = ps_frame_buf->pu1_dest_u
+ (u4_num_pmbair << 3) * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
pu1_mb_cr_rei1_buffer = ps_frame_buf->pu1_dest_v + (u4_num_pmbair << 3);
ui_pred_width = MB_SIZE;
ui_rec_width = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_mb_field_decoding_flag;
u4_recwidth_cr = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_mb_field_decoding_flag;
/************* Current and top luma pointer *****************/
if(u1_mbaff)
{
if(u1_topmb == 0)
{
pu1_luma_rec_buffer += (
u1_mb_field_decoding_flag ?
(ui_rec_width >> 1) :
(ui_rec_width << 4));
pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer += (
u1_mb_field_decoding_flag ?
(u4_recwidth_cr >> 1) :
(u4_recwidth_cr << 3));
pu1_mb_cr_rei1_buffer += (
u1_mb_field_decoding_flag ?
(u4_recwidth_cr >> 1) :
(u4_recwidth_cr << 3));
}
}
/* CHANGED CODE */
if(ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy == 1)
{
puc_top = ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line + (ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx << 4);
pu1_top_u = ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx << 3) * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
}
else
{
puc_top = pu1_luma_rec_buffer - ui_rec_width;
pu1_top_u = pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer - u4_recwidth_cr;
}
/* CHANGED CODE */
/************* Left pointer *****************/
pu1_yleft = pu1_luma_rec_buffer - 1;
pu1_uleft = pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer - 1 * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
/**************Top Left pointer calculation**********/
pu1_ytop_left = puc_top - 1;
pu1_u_top_left = pu1_top_u - 1 * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
/* CHANGED CODE */
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
{
pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data;
if(u1_mb_type == I_4x4_MB && ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8 == 0)
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data + 32);
}
else if (u1_mb_type == I_4x4_MB && ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8 == 1)
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data + 8);
}
}
if(!ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8)
{
u4_luma_dc_only_csbp = ih264d_unpack_luma_coeff4x4_mb(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info,
1);
}
else
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
u4_luma_dc_only_cbp = ih264d_unpack_luma_coeff4x4_mb(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info,
1);
}
else
{
u4_luma_dc_only_cbp = ih264d_unpack_luma_coeff8x8_mb(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info);
}
}
pi2_y_coeff = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
if(u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
UWORD8 u1_intrapred_mode = MB_TYPE_TO_INTRA_16x16_MODE(u1_mb_type);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* 16x16 IntraPrediction */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD8 u1_packed_modes = (u1_top_available << 1)
+ u1_left_available;
UWORD8 u1_err_code =
(u1_intrapred_mode & 1) ?
u1_intrapred_mode :
(u1_intrapred_mode ^ 2);
if((u1_err_code & u1_packed_modes) ^ u1_err_code)
{
u1_intrapred_mode = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_INTRAPRED;
}
}
{
UWORD8 au1_ngbr_pels[33];
/* Get neighbour pixels */
/* left pels */
if(u2_use_left_mb)
{
WORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
au1_ngbr_pels[16 - 1 - i] = pu1_yleft[i * ui_rec_width];
}
else
{
memset(au1_ngbr_pels, 0, 16);
}
/* top left pels */
au1_ngbr_pels[16] = *pu1_ytop_left;
/* top pels */
if(uc_useTopMB)
{
memcpy(au1_ngbr_pels + 16 + 1, puc_top, 16);
}
else
{
memset(au1_ngbr_pels + 16 + 1, 0, 16);
}
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
ps_dec->apf_intra_pred_luma_16x16[u1_intrapred_mode](
au1_ngbr_pels, pu1_luma_rec_buffer, 1, ui_rec_width,
((uc_useTopMB << 2) | u2_use_left_mb));
}
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD16 ai2_tmp[16];
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
WORD16 *pi2_level = pi2_y_coeff + (i << 4);
UWORD8 *pu1_pred_sblk = pu1_luma_rec_buffer
+ ((i & 0x3) * BLK_SIZE)
+ (i >> 2) * (ui_rec_width << 2);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IQ_IT_RECON()
{
if(CHECKBIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u2_luma_csbp, i))
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_4x4(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[0],
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 1,
pi2_level);
}
else if((CHECKBIT(u4_luma_dc_only_csbp, i)) && pi2_level[0] != 0)
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_4x4_dc(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[0],
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 1,
pi2_level);
}
}
}
}
}
else if(!ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8)
{
UWORD8 u1_is_left_sub_block, u1_is_top_sub_block = uc_useTopMB;
UWORD8 u1_sub_blk_x, u1_sub_blk_y, u1_sub_mb_num;
WORD8 i1_top_pred_mode;
WORD8 i1_left_pred_mode;
UWORD8 *pu1_top, *pu1_left, *pu1_top_left, *pu1_top_right;
WORD8 *pi1_cur_pred_mode, *pi1_left_pred_mode, *pc_topPredMode;
UWORD16 ui2_left_pred_buf_width = 0xffff;
WORD8 i1_intra_pred;
UWORD8 *pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_flag = pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data;
UWORD8 *pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode = pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data + 16;
WORD16 *pi2_y_coeff1;
UWORD8 u1_cur_sub_block;
UWORD16 ui2_top_rt_mask;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* 4x4 IntraPrediction */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Calculation of Top Right subblock mask */
/* */
/* (a) Set it to default mask */
/* [It has 0 for sublocks which will never have top-right sub block] */
/* */
/* (b) If top MB is not available */
/* Clear the bits of the first row sub blocks */
/* */
/* (c) Set/Clear bit for top-right sublock of MB */
/* [5 sub-block in decoding order] based on TOP RIGHT MB availablity */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
pu1_top = puc_top;
ui2_top_rt_mask = (u1_use_top_right_mb << 3) | (0x5750);
if(uc_useTopMB)
ui2_top_rt_mask |= 0x7;
/*Top Related initialisations*/
pi1_cur_pred_mode = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->pi1_intrapredmodes;
pc_topPredMode = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_top_mb->pi1_intrapredmodes;
/*--------------------------------------
if(u1_mbaff)
{
pi1_cur_pred_mode += (u2_mbx << 2);
pc_topPredMode = pi1_cur_pred_mode + ps_cur_mb_info->i1_offset;
pi1_cur_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0: 4;
}*/
if(u1_top_available)
{
if(ps_top_mb->u1_mb_type == I_4x4_MB)
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode = *(WORD32*)pc_topPredMode;
else
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode =
(uc_useTopMB) ? DC_DC_DC_DC : NOT_VALID;
}
else
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
/* CHANGED CODE */
/* CHANGED CODE */
/*Left Related initialisations*/
pi1_left_pred_mode = ps_dec->pi1_left_pred_mode;
if(!u1_mbaff)
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode =
(u2_use_left_mb_pack) ?
DC_DC_DC_DC :
NOT_VALID;
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
{
UWORD8 u1_curMbfld = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_field_decodingflag;
UWORD8 u1_leftMbfld = ps_left_mb->u1_mb_fld;
if(u1_curMbfld ^ u1_leftMbfld)
{
if(u1_topmb
| ((u1_topmb == 0)
&& ((ps_curmb - 1)->u1_mb_type
!= I_4x4_MB)))
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
if(CHECKBIT(u2_use_left_mb_pack,0) == 0)
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
else
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = DC_DC_DC_DC;
}
}
else
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
if(u1_curMbfld)
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if((ps_left_mb + 1)->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
if(u2_use_left_mb_pack >> 8)
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
DC_DC_DC_DC;
else
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) = NOT_VALID;
pi1_left_pred_mode[1] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[2] = pi1_left_pred_mode[4];
pi1_left_pred_mode[3] = pi1_left_pred_mode[6];
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode;
}
else
{
pi1_left_pred_mode[7] = pi1_left_pred_mode[3];
pi1_left_pred_mode[6] = pi1_left_pred_mode[3];
pi1_left_pred_mode[5] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[4] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[3] = pi1_left_pred_mode[1];
pi1_left_pred_mode[2] = pi1_left_pred_mode[1];
pi1_left_pred_mode[1] = pi1_left_pred_mode[0];
}
}
pi1_left_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0 : 4;
}
else
{
pi1_left_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0 : 4;
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode =
(u2_use_left_mb_pack) ?
DC_DC_DC_DC :
NOT_VALID;
}
else
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
}
/* One time pointer initialisations*/
pi2_y_coeff1 = pi2_y_coeff;
pu1_top_left = pu1_ytop_left;
/* Scan the sub-blocks in Raster Scan Order */
for(u1_sub_mb_num = 0; u1_sub_mb_num < 16; u1_sub_mb_num++)
{
UWORD8 au1_ngbr_pels[13];
u1_sub_blk_x = u1_sub_mb_num & 0x3;
u1_sub_blk_y = u1_sub_mb_num >> 2;
i1_top_pred_mode = pi1_cur_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_x];
i1_left_pred_mode = pi1_left_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_y];
u1_use_top_right_mb = (!!CHECKBIT(ui2_top_rt_mask, u1_sub_mb_num));
/*********** left subblock availability**********/
if(u1_sub_blk_x)
u1_is_left_sub_block = 1;
else
u1_is_left_sub_block =
(u1_sub_blk_y < 2) ?
(CHECKBIT(u2_use_left_mb_pack,
0)) :
(u2_use_left_mb_pack >> 8);
/* CHANGED CODE */
if(u1_sub_blk_y)
u1_is_top_sub_block = 1;
/* CHANGED CODE */
/***************** Top *********************/
if(ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy == 1)
{
if(u1_sub_blk_y)
pu1_top = pu1_luma_rec_buffer - ui_rec_width;
else
pu1_top = puc_top + (u1_sub_blk_x << 2);
}
else
{
pu1_top = pu1_luma_rec_buffer - ui_rec_width;
}
/***************** Top Right *********************/
pu1_top_right = pu1_top + 4;
/***************** Top Left *********************/
pu1_top_left = pu1_top - 1;
/***************** Left *********************/
pu1_left = pu1_luma_rec_buffer - 1;
/* CHANGED CODE */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Calculation of Intra prediction mode */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
i1_intra_pred = ((i1_left_pred_mode < 0) | (i1_top_pred_mode < 0)) ?
DC : MIN(i1_left_pred_mode, i1_top_pred_mode);
{
UWORD8 u1_packed_modes = (u1_is_top_sub_block << 1)
+ u1_is_left_sub_block;
UWORD8 *pu1_intra_err_codes =
(UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_intra_pred_err_code;
UWORD8 uc_b2b0 = ((u1_sub_mb_num & 4) >> 1) | (u1_sub_mb_num & 1);
UWORD8 uc_b3b1 = ((u1_sub_mb_num & 8) >> 2)
| ((u1_sub_mb_num & 2) >> 1);
u1_cur_sub_block = (uc_b3b1 << 2) + uc_b2b0;
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
if(!pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_flag[u1_cur_sub_block])
{
i1_intra_pred =
pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode[u1_cur_sub_block]
+ (pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode[u1_cur_sub_block]
>= i1_intra_pred);
}
{
UWORD8 u1_err_code = pu1_intra_err_codes[i1_intra_pred];
if((u1_err_code & u1_packed_modes) ^ u1_err_code)
{
i1_intra_pred = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_INTRAPRED;
}
}
}
{
/* Get neighbour pixels */
/* left pels */
if(u1_is_left_sub_block)
{
WORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
au1_ngbr_pels[4 - 1 - i] = pu1_left[i * ui_rec_width];
}
else
{
memset(au1_ngbr_pels, 0, 4);
}
/* top left pels */
au1_ngbr_pels[4] = *pu1_top_left;
/* top pels */
if(u1_is_top_sub_block)
{
memcpy(au1_ngbr_pels + 4 + 1, pu1_top, 4);
}
else
{
memset(au1_ngbr_pels + 4 + 1, 0, 4);
}
/* top right pels */
if(u1_use_top_right_mb)
{
memcpy(au1_ngbr_pels + 4 * 2 + 1, pu1_top_right, 4);
}
else if(u1_is_top_sub_block)
{
memset(au1_ngbr_pels + 4 * 2 + 1, au1_ngbr_pels[4 * 2], 4);
}
}
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
ps_dec->apf_intra_pred_luma_4x4[i1_intra_pred](
au1_ngbr_pels, pu1_luma_rec_buffer, 1,
ui_rec_width,
((u1_is_top_sub_block << 2) | u1_is_left_sub_block));
/* CHANGED CODE */
if(CHECKBIT(ui2_luma_csbp, u1_sub_mb_num))
{
WORD16 ai2_tmp[16];
PROFILE_DISABLE_IQ_IT_RECON()
{
if(CHECKBIT(u4_luma_dc_only_csbp, u1_sub_mb_num))
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_4x4_dc(
pi2_y_coeff1,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[0],
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 0,
NULL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_4x4(
pi2_y_coeff1,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[0],
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 0,
NULL);
}
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Update sub block number */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
pi2_y_coeff1 += 16;
pu1_luma_rec_buffer +=
(u1_sub_blk_x == 3) ? (ui_rec_width << 2) - 12 : 4;
pu1_luma_pred_buffer +=
(u1_sub_blk_x == 3) ? (ui_pred_width << 2) - 12 : 4;
/* CHANGED CODE */
pi1_cur_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_x] = i1_intra_pred;
pi1_left_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_y] = i1_intra_pred;
}
}
else if((u1_mb_type == I_4x4_MB) && (ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8 == 1))
{
UWORD8 u1_is_left_sub_block, u1_is_top_sub_block = uc_useTopMB;
UWORD8 u1_sub_blk_x, u1_sub_blk_y, u1_sub_mb_num;
WORD8 i1_top_pred_mode;
WORD8 i1_left_pred_mode;
UWORD8 *pu1_top, *pu1_left, *pu1_top_left;
WORD8 *pi1_cur_pred_mode, *pi1_left_pred_mode, *pc_topPredMode;
UWORD16 ui2_left_pred_buf_width = 0xffff;
WORD8 i1_intra_pred;
UWORD8 *pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_flag = pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data;
UWORD8 *pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode = pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_data + 4;
WORD16 *pi2_y_coeff1;
UWORD16 ui2_top_rt_mask;
UWORD32 u4_4x4_left_offset = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* 8x8 IntraPrediction */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Calculation of Top Right subblock mask */
/* */
/* (a) Set it to default mask */
/* [It has 0 for sublocks which will never have top-right sub block] */
/* */
/* (b) If top MB is not available */
/* Clear the bits of the first row sub blocks */
/* */
/* (c) Set/Clear bit for top-right sublock of MB */
/* [5 sub-block in decoding order] based on TOP RIGHT MB availablity */
/* */
/* ui2_top_rt_mask: marks availibility of top right(neighbour) */
/* in the 8x8 Block ordering */
/* */
/* tr0 tr1 */
/* 0 1 tr3 */
/* 2 3 */
/* */
/* Top rights for 0 is in top MB */
/* top right of 1 will be in top right MB */
/* top right of 3 in right MB and hence not available */
/* This corresponds to ui2_top_rt_mask having default value 0x4 */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ui2_top_rt_mask = (u1_use_top_right_mb << 1) | (0x4);
if(uc_useTopMB)
{
ui2_top_rt_mask |= 0x1;
}
/* Top Related initialisations */
pi1_cur_pred_mode = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->pi1_intrapredmodes;
pc_topPredMode = ps_cur_mb_info->ps_top_mb->pi1_intrapredmodes;
/*
if(u1_mbaff)
{
pi1_cur_pred_mode += (u2_mbx << 2);
pc_topPredMode = pi1_cur_pred_mode + ps_cur_mb_info->i1_offset;
pi1_cur_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0: 4;
}
*/
if(u1_top_available)
{
if(ps_top_mb->u1_mb_type == I_4x4_MB)
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode = *(WORD32*)pc_topPredMode;
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode =
(uc_useTopMB) ? DC_DC_DC_DC : NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_cur_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
pu1_top = puc_top - 8;
/*Left Related initialisations*/
pi1_left_pred_mode = ps_dec->pi1_left_pred_mode;
if(!u1_mbaff)
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode =
(u2_use_left_mb_pack) ?
DC_DC_DC_DC :
NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
{
UWORD8 u1_curMbfld = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_field_decodingflag;
UWORD8 u1_leftMbfld = ps_left_mb->u1_mb_fld;
if((!u1_curMbfld) && (u1_leftMbfld))
{
u4_4x4_left_offset = 1;
}
if(u1_curMbfld ^ u1_leftMbfld)
{
if(u1_topmb
| ((u1_topmb == 0)
&& ((ps_curmb - 1)->u1_mb_type
!= I_4x4_MB)))
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
if(CHECKBIT(u2_use_left_mb_pack,0) == 0)
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = DC_DC_DC_DC;
}
}
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
if(u1_curMbfld)
{
if(u1_left_available)
{
if((ps_left_mb + 1)->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
if(u2_use_left_mb_pack >> 8)
{
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
DC_DC_DC_DC;
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
NOT_VALID;
}
}
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) = NOT_VALID;
}
pi1_left_pred_mode[1] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[2] = pi1_left_pred_mode[4];
pi1_left_pred_mode[3] = pi1_left_pred_mode[6];
*(WORD32*)(pi1_left_pred_mode + 4) =
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode;
}
else
{
pi1_left_pred_mode[7] = pi1_left_pred_mode[3];
pi1_left_pred_mode[6] = pi1_left_pred_mode[3];
pi1_left_pred_mode[5] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[4] = pi1_left_pred_mode[2];
pi1_left_pred_mode[3] = pi1_left_pred_mode[1];
pi1_left_pred_mode[2] = pi1_left_pred_mode[1];
pi1_left_pred_mode[1] = pi1_left_pred_mode[0];
}
}
pi1_left_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0 : 4;
}
else
{
pi1_left_pred_mode += (u1_topmb) ? 0 : 4;
if(u1_left_available)
{
if(ps_left_mb->u1_mb_type != I_4x4_MB)
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode =
(u2_use_left_mb_pack) ?
DC_DC_DC_DC :
NOT_VALID;
}
}
else
{
*(WORD32*)pi1_left_pred_mode = NOT_VALID;
}
}
}
/* One time pointer initialisations*/
pi2_y_coeff1 = pi2_y_coeff;
if(u1_use_top_left_mb)
{
pu1_top_left = pu1_ytop_left;
}
else
{
pu1_top_left = NULL;
}
/* Scan the sub-blocks in Raster Scan Order */
for(u1_sub_mb_num = 0; u1_sub_mb_num < 4; u1_sub_mb_num++)
{
u1_sub_blk_x = (u1_sub_mb_num & 0x1);
u1_sub_blk_y = (u1_sub_mb_num >> 1);
i1_top_pred_mode = pi1_cur_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_x << 1];
i1_left_pred_mode = pi1_left_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_y << 1];
if(2 == u1_sub_mb_num)
{
i1_left_pred_mode = pi1_left_pred_mode[(u1_sub_blk_y << 1)
+ u4_4x4_left_offset];
}
u1_use_top_right_mb = (!!CHECKBIT(ui2_top_rt_mask, u1_sub_mb_num));
/*********** left subblock availability**********/
if(u1_sub_blk_x)
{
u1_is_left_sub_block = 1;
}
else
{
u1_is_left_sub_block =
(u1_sub_blk_y < 1) ?
(CHECKBIT(u2_use_left_mb_pack,
0)) :
(u2_use_left_mb_pack >> 8);
}
/***************** Top *********************/
if(u1_sub_blk_y)
{
u1_is_top_sub_block = 1;
pu1_top = /*pu1_luma_pred_buffer*/pu1_luma_rec_buffer - ui_rec_width;
}
else
{
pu1_top += 8;
}
/***************** Left *********************/
if((u1_sub_blk_x) | (u4_num_pmbair != 0))
{
pu1_left = /*pu1_luma_pred_buffer*/pu1_luma_rec_buffer - 1;
ui2_left_pred_buf_width = ui_rec_width;
}
else
{
pu1_left = pu1_yleft;
pu1_yleft += (ui_rec_width << 3);
ui2_left_pred_buf_width = ui_rec_width;
}
/***************** Top Left *********************/
if(u1_sub_mb_num)
{
pu1_top_left = (u1_sub_blk_x) ?
pu1_top - 1 : pu1_left - ui_rec_width;
if((u1_sub_blk_x && (!u1_is_top_sub_block))
|| ((!u1_sub_blk_x) && (!u1_is_left_sub_block)))
{
pu1_top_left = NULL;
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Calculation of Intra prediction mode */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
i1_intra_pred = ((i1_left_pred_mode < 0) | (i1_top_pred_mode < 0)) ?
DC : MIN(i1_left_pred_mode, i1_top_pred_mode);
{
UWORD8 u1_packed_modes = (u1_is_top_sub_block << 1)
+ u1_is_left_sub_block;
UWORD8 *pu1_intra_err_codes =
(UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_intra_pred_err_code;
/********************************************************************/
/* Same intra4x4_pred_mode array is filled with intra4x4_pred_mode */
/* for a MB with 8x8 intrapredicition */
/********************************************************************/
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
if(!pu1_prev_intra4x4_pred_mode_flag[u1_sub_mb_num])
{
i1_intra_pred = pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode[u1_sub_mb_num]
+ (pu1_rem_intra4x4_pred_mode[u1_sub_mb_num]
>= i1_intra_pred);
}
{
UWORD8 u1_err_code = pu1_intra_err_codes[i1_intra_pred];
if((u1_err_code & u1_packed_modes) ^ u1_err_code)
{
i1_intra_pred = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_INTRAPRED;
}
}
}
{
UWORD8 au1_ngbr_pels[25];
WORD32 ngbr_avail;
ngbr_avail = u1_is_left_sub_block << 0;
ngbr_avail |= u1_is_top_sub_block << 2;
if(pu1_top_left)
ngbr_avail |= 1 << 1;
ngbr_avail |= u1_use_top_right_mb << 3;
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
{
ps_dec->pf_intra_pred_ref_filtering(pu1_left, pu1_top_left,
pu1_top, au1_ngbr_pels,
ui2_left_pred_buf_width,
ngbr_avail);
ps_dec->apf_intra_pred_luma_8x8[i1_intra_pred](
au1_ngbr_pels, pu1_luma_rec_buffer, 1,
ui_rec_width,
((u1_is_top_sub_block << 2) | u1_is_left_sub_block));
}
}
/* Inverse Transform and Reconstruction */
if(CHECKBIT(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp, u1_sub_mb_num))
{
WORD16 *pi2_scale_matrix_ptr;
WORD16 ai2_tmp[64];
pi2_scale_matrix_ptr =
ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist8x8[0];
PROFILE_DISABLE_IQ_IT_RECON()
{
if(CHECKBIT(u4_luma_dc_only_cbp, u1_sub_mb_num))
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_8x8_dc(
pi2_y_coeff1,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau1_ih264d_dequant8x8_cavlc[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)pi2_scale_matrix_ptr,
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 0,
NULL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_luma_8x8(
pi2_y_coeff1,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
pu1_luma_rec_buffer,
ui_rec_width,
ui_rec_width,
gau1_ih264d_dequant8x8_cavlc[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)pi2_scale_matrix_ptr,
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qp_div6, ai2_tmp, 0,
NULL);
}
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Update sub block number */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
pi2_y_coeff1 += 64;
pu1_luma_rec_buffer +=
(u1_sub_blk_x == 1) ?
(ui_rec_width << 3) - (8 * 1) : 8;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Pred mode filled in terms of 4x4 block so replicated in 2 */
/* locations. */
/*---------------------------------------------------------------*/
pi1_cur_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_x << 1] = i1_intra_pred;
pi1_cur_pred_mode[(u1_sub_blk_x << 1) + 1] = i1_intra_pred;
pi1_left_pred_mode[u1_sub_blk_y << 1] = i1_intra_pred;
pi1_left_pred_mode[(u1_sub_blk_y << 1) + 1] = i1_intra_pred;
}
}
/* Decode Chroma Block */
ih264d_unpack_chroma_coeff4x4_mb(ps_dec,
ps_cur_mb_info);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Chroma Blocks decoding */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD8 u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode;
UWORD8 u1_chroma_cbp = (UWORD8)(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp >> 4);
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Perform Chroma intra prediction */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode = CHROMA_TO_LUMA_INTRA_MODE(
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_chroma_pred_mode);
{
UWORD8 u1_packed_modes = (u1_top_available << 1)
+ u1_left_available;
UWORD8 u1_err_code =
(u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode & 1) ?
u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode :
(u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode ^ 2);
if((u1_err_code & u1_packed_modes) ^ u1_err_code)
{
u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_INTRAPRED;
}
}
/* CHANGED CODE */
if(u1_chroma_cbp != CBPC_ALLZERO)
{
UWORD16 u2_chroma_csbp =
(u1_chroma_cbp == CBPC_ACZERO) ?
0 : ps_cur_mb_info->u2_chroma_csbp;
UWORD32 u4_scale_u;
UWORD32 u4_scale_v;
{
UWORD16 au2_ngbr_pels[33];
UWORD8 *pu1_ngbr_pels = (UWORD8 *)au2_ngbr_pels;
UWORD16 *pu2_left_uv;
UWORD16 *pu2_topleft_uv;
WORD32 use_left1 = (u2_use_left_mb_pack & 0x0ff);
WORD32 use_left2 = (u2_use_left_mb_pack & 0xff00) >> 8;
pu2_left_uv = (UWORD16 *)pu1_uleft;
pu2_topleft_uv = (UWORD16 *)pu1_u_top_left;
/* Get neighbour pixels */
/* left pels */
if(u2_use_left_mb_pack)
{
WORD32 i;
if(use_left1)
{
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
au2_ngbr_pels[8 - 1 - i] = pu2_left_uv[i
* u4_recwidth_cr / YUV420SP_FACTOR];
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels + 4, 0, 4 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
if(use_left2)
{
for(i = 4; i < 8; i++)
au2_ngbr_pels[8 - 1 - i] = pu2_left_uv[i
* u4_recwidth_cr / YUV420SP_FACTOR];
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels, 0, 4 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels, 0, 8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
/* top left pels */
au2_ngbr_pels[8] = *pu2_topleft_uv;
/* top pels */
if(uc_useTopMB)
{
memcpy(au2_ngbr_pels + 8 + 1, pu1_top_u,
8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels + 8 + 1, 0, 8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
ps_dec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode](
pu1_ngbr_pels,
pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer,
1,
u4_recwidth_cr,
((uc_useTopMB << 2) | (use_left2 << 4)
| use_left1));
}
u4_scale_u = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpc_div6;
u4_scale_v = ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpcr_div6;
pi2_y_coeff = ps_dec->pi2_coeff_data;
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD16 ai2_tmp[16];
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
WORD16 *pi2_level = pi2_y_coeff + (i << 4);
UWORD8 *pu1_pred_sblk = pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer
+ ((i & 0x1) * BLK_SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR)
+ (i >> 1) * (u4_recwidth_cr << 2);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IQ_IT_RECON()
{
if(CHECKBIT(u2_chroma_csbp, i))
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_chroma_4x4(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
u4_recwidth_cr,
u4_recwidth_cr,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpc_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[1],
u4_scale_u, ai2_tmp, pi2_level);
}
else if(pi2_level[0] != 0)
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_chroma_4x4_dc(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
u4_recwidth_cr,
u4_recwidth_cr,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpc_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[1],
u4_scale_u, ai2_tmp, pi2_level);
}
}
}
}
pi2_y_coeff += MB_CHROM_SIZE;
u2_chroma_csbp = u2_chroma_csbp >> 4;
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD16 ai2_tmp[16];
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
WORD16 *pi2_level = pi2_y_coeff + (i << 4);
UWORD8 *pu1_pred_sblk = pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer + 1
+ ((i & 0x1) * BLK_SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR)
+ (i >> 1) * (u4_recwidth_cr << 2);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IQ_IT_RECON()
{
if(CHECKBIT(u2_chroma_csbp, i))
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_chroma_4x4(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
u4_recwidth_cr,
u4_recwidth_cr,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpcr_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[2],
u4_scale_v, ai2_tmp, pi2_level);
}
else if(pi2_level[0] != 0)
{
ps_dec->pf_iquant_itrans_recon_chroma_4x4_dc(
pi2_level,
pu1_pred_sblk,
pu1_pred_sblk,
u4_recwidth_cr,
u4_recwidth_cr,
gau2_ih264_iquant_scale_4x4[ps_cur_mb_info->u1_qpcr_rem6],
(UWORD16 *)ps_dec->s_high_profile.i2_scalinglist4x4[2],
u4_scale_v, ai2_tmp, pi2_level);
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
/* If no inverse transform is needed, pass recon buffer pointer */
/* to Intraprediction module instead of pred buffer pointer */
{
UWORD16 au2_ngbr_pels[33];
UWORD8 *pu1_ngbr_pels = (UWORD8 *)au2_ngbr_pels;
UWORD16 *pu2_left_uv;
UWORD16 *pu2_topleft_uv;
WORD32 use_left1 = (u2_use_left_mb_pack & 0x0ff);
WORD32 use_left2 = (u2_use_left_mb_pack & 0xff00) >> 8;
pu2_topleft_uv = (UWORD16 *)pu1_u_top_left;
pu2_left_uv = (UWORD16 *)pu1_uleft;
/* Get neighbour pixels */
/* left pels */
if(u2_use_left_mb_pack)
{
WORD32 i;
if(use_left1)
{
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
au2_ngbr_pels[8 - 1 - i] = pu2_left_uv[i
* u4_recwidth_cr / YUV420SP_FACTOR];
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels + 4, 0, 4 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
if(use_left2)
{
for(i = 4; i < 8; i++)
au2_ngbr_pels[8 - 1 - i] = pu2_left_uv[i
* u4_recwidth_cr / YUV420SP_FACTOR];
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels, 0, 4 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels, 0, 8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
/* top left pels */
au2_ngbr_pels[8] = *pu2_topleft_uv;
/* top pels */
if(uc_useTopMB)
{
memcpy(au2_ngbr_pels + 8 + 1, pu1_top_u,
8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
else
{
memset(au2_ngbr_pels + 8 + 1, 0, 8 * sizeof(UWORD16));
}
PROFILE_DISABLE_INTRA_PRED()
ps_dec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[u1_intra_chrom_pred_mode](
pu1_ngbr_pels,
pu1_mb_cb_rei1_buffer,
1,
u4_recwidth_cr,
((uc_useTopMB << 2) | (use_left2 << 4)
| use_left1));
}
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: decoder/ih264d_process_intra_mb.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 mishandles intra mode, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165659.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix for handling invalid intra mode
Bug: 28165659
Change-Id: I2291a287c27291695f4f3d6e753b6bbd7dfd9e42
| High | 173,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeOSSendHandwritingStroke(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->SendHandwritingStroke(stroke);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getUniform()");
if (args.Length() != 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
WebGLProgram* program = V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0]) ? V8WebGLProgram::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])) : 0;
if (args.Length() > 1 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[1]) && !V8WebGLUniformLocation::HasInstance(args[1])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
bool ok = false;
WebGLUniformLocation* location = toWebGLUniformLocation(args[1], ok);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getUniform(program, location, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int btrfs_truncate_inode_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *inode,
u64 new_size, u32 min_type)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
u64 extent_start = 0;
u64 extent_num_bytes = 0;
u64 extent_offset = 0;
u64 item_end = 0;
u64 last_size = new_size;
u32 found_type = (u8)-1;
int found_extent;
int del_item;
int pending_del_nr = 0;
int pending_del_slot = 0;
int extent_type = -1;
int ret;
int err = 0;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
u64 bytes_deleted = 0;
bool be_nice = 0;
bool should_throttle = 0;
bool should_end = 0;
BUG_ON(new_size > 0 && min_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY);
/*
* for non-free space inodes and ref cows, we want to back off from
* time to time
*/
if (!btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode) &&
test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
be_nice = 1;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->reada = -1;
/*
* We want to drop from the next block forward in case this new size is
* not block aligned since we will be keeping the last block of the
* extent just the way it is.
*/
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state) ||
root == root->fs_info->tree_root)
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, ALIGN(new_size,
root->sectorsize), (u64)-1, 0);
/*
* This function is also used to drop the items in the log tree before
* we relog the inode, so if root != BTRFS_I(inode)->root, it means
* it is used to drop the loged items. So we shouldn't kill the delayed
* items.
*/
if (min_type == 0 && root == BTRFS_I(inode)->root)
btrfs_kill_delayed_inode_items(inode);
key.objectid = ino;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
key.type = (u8)-1;
search_again:
/*
* with a 16K leaf size and 128MB extents, you can actually queue
* up a huge file in a single leaf. Most of the time that
* bytes_deleted is > 0, it will be huge by the time we get here
*/
if (be_nice && bytes_deleted > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
if (btrfs_should_end_transaction(trans, root)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
}
path->leave_spinning = 1;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
err = ret;
goto out;
}
if (ret > 0) {
/* there are no items in the tree for us to truncate, we're
* done
*/
if (path->slots[0] == 0)
goto out;
path->slots[0]--;
}
while (1) {
fi = NULL;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
found_type = found_key.type;
if (found_key.objectid != ino)
break;
if (found_type < min_type)
break;
item_end = found_key.offset;
if (found_type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
extent_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end +=
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
item_end += btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
path->slots[0], fi);
}
item_end--;
}
if (found_type > min_type) {
del_item = 1;
} else {
if (item_end < new_size)
break;
if (found_key.offset >= new_size)
del_item = 1;
else
del_item = 0;
}
found_extent = 0;
/* FIXME, shrink the extent if the ref count is only 1 */
if (found_type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
goto delete;
if (del_item)
last_size = found_key.offset;
else
last_size = new_size;
if (extent_type != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
u64 num_dec;
extent_start = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
if (!del_item) {
u64 orig_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
extent_num_bytes = ALIGN(new_size -
found_key.offset,
root->sectorsize);
btrfs_set_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi,
extent_num_bytes);
num_dec = (orig_num_bytes -
extent_num_bytes);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state) &&
extent_start != 0)
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
} else {
extent_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf,
fi);
extent_offset = found_key.offset -
btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
/* FIXME blocksize != 4096 */
num_dec = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_start != 0) {
found_extent = 1;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state))
inode_sub_bytes(inode, num_dec);
}
}
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
/*
* we can't truncate inline items that have had
* special encodings
*/
if (!del_item &&
btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) == 0 &&
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi) == 0) {
u32 size = new_size - found_key.offset;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state))
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
new_size);
/*
* update the ram bytes to properly reflect
* the new size of our item
*/
btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi, size);
size =
btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(size);
btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, size, 1);
} else if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS,
&root->state)) {
inode_sub_bytes(inode, item_end + 1 -
found_key.offset);
}
}
delete:
if (del_item) {
if (!pending_del_nr) {
/* no pending yet, add ourselves */
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
pending_del_nr = 1;
} else if (pending_del_nr &&
path->slots[0] + 1 == pending_del_slot) {
/* hop on the pending chunk */
pending_del_nr++;
pending_del_slot = path->slots[0];
} else {
BUG();
}
} else {
break;
}
should_throttle = 0;
if (found_extent &&
(test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS, &root->state) ||
root == root->fs_info->tree_root)) {
btrfs_set_path_blocking(path);
bytes_deleted += extent_num_bytes;
ret = btrfs_free_extent(trans, root, extent_start,
extent_num_bytes, 0,
btrfs_header_owner(leaf),
ino, extent_offset, 0);
BUG_ON(ret);
if (btrfs_should_throttle_delayed_refs(trans, root))
btrfs_async_run_delayed_refs(root,
trans->delayed_ref_updates * 2, 0);
if (be_nice) {
if (truncate_space_check(trans, root,
extent_num_bytes)) {
should_end = 1;
}
if (btrfs_should_throttle_delayed_refs(trans,
root)) {
should_throttle = 1;
}
}
}
if (found_type == BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY)
break;
if (path->slots[0] == 0 ||
path->slots[0] != pending_del_slot ||
should_throttle || should_end) {
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path,
pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans,
root, ret);
goto error;
}
pending_del_nr = 0;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (should_throttle) {
unsigned long updates = trans->delayed_ref_updates;
if (updates) {
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, updates * 2);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
}
}
/*
* if we failed to refill our space rsv, bail out
* and let the transaction restart
*/
if (should_end) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
goto search_again;
} else {
path->slots[0]--;
}
}
out:
if (pending_del_nr) {
ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path, pending_del_slot,
pending_del_nr);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
}
error:
if (root->root_key.objectid != BTRFS_TREE_LOG_OBJECTID)
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, last_size, NULL);
btrfs_free_path(path);
if (be_nice && bytes_deleted > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
unsigned long updates = trans->delayed_ref_updates;
if (updates) {
trans->delayed_ref_updates = 0;
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, updates * 2);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: fs/btrfs/inode.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles compressed inline extents, which allows local users to obtain sensitive pre-truncation information from a file via a clone action.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> | Low | 166,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::free_input_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHdr)
{
unsigned int index = 0;
OMX_U8 *temp_buff ;
if (bufferHdr == NULL || m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: free_input: Invalid bufferHdr[%p] or m_inp_mem_ptr[%p]",
bufferHdr, m_inp_mem_ptr);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
index = bufferHdr - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable) {
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
memset(&meta_buffer_hdr[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffer_hdr[index]));
memset(&meta_buffers[index], 0, sizeof(meta_buffers[index]));
}
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat)
return OMX_ErrorNone;
else {
c2d_conv.close();
opaque_buffer_hdr[index] = NULL;
}
}
#endif
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && !mUseProxyColorFormat &&
dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if (index < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual && m_pInput_pmem) {
if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && input_use_buffer == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p AllocateBuffer case");
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
} else {
free(m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else if (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd > 0 && (input_use_buffer == true &&
m_use_input_pmem == OMX_FALSE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer:: i/p Heap UseBuffer case");
if (dev_free_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[index],PORT_INDEX_IN) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_free_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
}
if(!secure_session) {
munmap (m_pInput_pmem[index].buffer,m_pInput_pmem[index].size);
}
close (m_pInput_pmem[index].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[index]);
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[index].fd = -1;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FreeBuffer:: fd is invalid or i/p PMEM UseBuffer case");
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27903498.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
| High | 173,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in wddx.c in the WDDX extension in PHP before 5.5.33 and 5.6.x before 5.6.19 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a wddx_deserialize call on XML data containing a crafted var element.
Commit Message: | High | 165,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int hash_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct ahash_request *req = &ctx->req;
char state[crypto_ahash_statesize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req))];
struct sock *sk2;
struct alg_sock *ask2;
struct hash_ctx *ctx2;
int err;
err = crypto_ahash_export(req, state);
if (err)
return err;
err = af_alg_accept(ask->parent, newsock);
if (err)
return err;
sk2 = newsock->sk;
ask2 = alg_sk(sk2);
ctx2 = ask2->private;
ctx2->more = 1;
err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
if (err) {
sock_orphan(sk2);
sock_put(sk2);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The hash_accept function in crypto/algif_hash.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by attempting to trigger use of in-kernel hash algorithms for a socket that has received zero bytes of data.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data
The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.
This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
int i;
if (!s)
return NULL;
if (security_sb_alloc(s))
goto fail;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
s->s_files = alloc_percpu(struct list_head);
if (!s->s_files)
goto fail;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(per_cpu_ptr(s->s_files, i));
#else
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (percpu_counter_init(&s->s_writers.counter[i], 0) < 0)
goto fail;
lockdep_init_map(&s->s_writers.lock_map[i], sb_writers_name[i],
&type->s_writers_key[i], 0);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_flags = flags;
s->s_bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_anon);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_inodes);
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_dentry_lru))
goto fail;
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_inode_lru))
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
* When it cannot find a suitable sb, it allocates a new
* one (this one), and tries again to find a suitable old
* one.
*
* In case that succeeds, it will acquire the s_umount
* lock of the old one. Since these are clearly distrinct
* locks, and this object isn't exposed yet, there's no
* risk of deadlocks.
*
* Annotate this by putting this lock in a different
* subclass.
*/
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqonoff_mutex);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqptr_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
s->s_time_gran = 1000000000;
s->cleancache_poolid = -1;
s->s_shrink.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS;
s->s_shrink.scan_objects = super_cache_scan;
s->s_shrink.count_objects = super_cache_count;
s->s_shrink.batch = 1024;
s->s_shrink.flags = SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE;
return s;
fail:
destroy_super(s);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int khugepaged_scan_mm_slot(unsigned int pages,
struct page **hpage)
{
struct mm_slot *mm_slot;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int progress = 0;
VM_BUG_ON(!pages);
VM_BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&khugepaged_mm_lock));
if (khugepaged_scan.mm_slot)
mm_slot = khugepaged_scan.mm_slot;
else {
mm_slot = list_entry(khugepaged_scan.mm_head.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_node);
khugepaged_scan.address = 0;
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = mm_slot;
}
spin_unlock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
mm = mm_slot->mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm)))
vma = NULL;
else
vma = find_vma(mm, khugepaged_scan.address);
progress++;
for (; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
unsigned long hstart, hend;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm))) {
progress++;
break;
}
if ((!(vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE) &&
!khugepaged_always()) ||
(vma->vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE)) {
skip:
progress++;
continue;
}
/* VM_PFNMAP vmas may have vm_ops null but vm_file set */
if (!vma->anon_vma || vma->vm_ops || vma->vm_file)
goto skip;
if (is_vma_temporary_stack(vma))
goto skip;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart >= hend)
goto skip;
if (khugepaged_scan.address > hend)
goto skip;
if (khugepaged_scan.address < hstart)
khugepaged_scan.address = hstart;
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK);
while (khugepaged_scan.address < hend) {
int ret;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm)))
goto breakouterloop;
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.address < hstart ||
khugepaged_scan.address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE >
hend);
ret = khugepaged_scan_pmd(mm, vma,
khugepaged_scan.address,
hpage);
/* move to next address */
khugepaged_scan.address += HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
progress += HPAGE_PMD_NR;
if (ret)
/* we released mmap_sem so break loop */
goto breakouterloop_mmap_sem;
if (progress >= pages)
goto breakouterloop;
}
}
breakouterloop:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); /* exit_mmap will destroy ptes after this */
breakouterloop_mmap_sem:
spin_lock(&khugepaged_mm_lock);
VM_BUG_ON(khugepaged_scan.mm_slot != mm_slot);
/*
* Release the current mm_slot if this mm is about to die, or
* if we scanned all vmas of this mm.
*/
if (khugepaged_test_exit(mm) || !vma) {
/*
* Make sure that if mm_users is reaching zero while
* khugepaged runs here, khugepaged_exit will find
* mm_slot not pointing to the exiting mm.
*/
if (mm_slot->mm_node.next != &khugepaged_scan.mm_head) {
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = list_entry(
mm_slot->mm_node.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_node);
khugepaged_scan.address = 0;
} else {
khugepaged_scan.mm_slot = NULL;
khugepaged_full_scans++;
}
collect_mm_slot(mm_slot);
}
return progress;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly create transparent huge pages in response to a MAP_PRIVATE mmap system call on /dev/zero, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DefragInOrderSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = BuildTestPacket(id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 39) {
goto end;
}
/* 20 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 20; i < 20 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A') {
goto end;
}
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 28; i < 28 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B') {
goto end;
}
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 36; i < 36 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int http_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags,
AVDictionary **options)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int ret;
if( s->seekable == 1 )
h->is_streamed = 0;
else
h->is_streamed = 1;
s->filesize = -1;
s->location = av_strdup(uri);
if (!s->location)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&s->chained_options, *options, 0);
if (s->headers) {
int len = strlen(s->headers);
if (len < 2 || strcmp("\r\n", s->headers + len - 2)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"No trailing CRLF found in HTTP header.\n");
ret = av_reallocp(&s->headers, len + 3);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->headers[len] = '\r';
s->headers[len + 1] = '\n';
s->headers[len + 2] = '\0';
}
}
if (s->listen) {
return http_listen(h, uri, flags, options);
}
ret = http_open_cnx(h, options);
if (ret < 0)
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in libavformat/http.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.10, 3.0.x before 3.0.5, 3.1.x before 3.1.6, and 3.2.x before 3.2.2 allows remote web servers to execute arbitrary code via a negative chunk size in an HTTP response.
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>. | High | 168,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> navigation_handle) {
FrameTree* frame_tree = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree();
bool oopifs_possible = SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible();
bool is_navigation_within_page = controller_->IsURLInPageNavigation(
params.url, params.origin, params.was_within_same_document,
render_frame_host);
if (is_navigation_within_page &&
render_frame_host !=
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()
->render_manager()
->current_frame_host()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(render_frame_host->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NI_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
is_navigation_within_page = false;
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
if (delegate_) {
if (delegate_->CanOverscrollContent()) {
if (!params.was_within_same_document)
controller_->TakeScreenshot();
}
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePreCommit(is_navigation_within_page);
}
if (!oopifs_possible)
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentOrigin(
params.origin, params.has_potentially_trustworthy_unique_origin);
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetInsecureRequestPolicy(
params.insecure_request_policy);
if (!is_navigation_within_page) {
render_frame_host->ResetContentSecurityPolicies();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetCspHeaders();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetFeaturePolicyHeader();
}
if (oopifs_possible) {
FrameTreeNode* frame = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node();
frame->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
if (!site_instance->HasSite() && ShouldAssignSiteForURL(params.url) &&
!params.url_is_unreachable) {
site_instance->SetSite(params.url);
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition) && delegate_)
delegate_->SetMainFrameMimeType(params.contents_mime_type);
int old_entry_count = controller_->GetEntryCount();
LoadCommittedDetails details;
bool did_navigate = controller_->RendererDidNavigate(
render_frame_host, params, &details, is_navigation_within_page,
navigation_handle.get());
if (old_entry_count != controller_->GetEntryCount() ||
details.previous_entry_index !=
controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex()) {
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->SendPageMessage(
new PageMsg_SetHistoryOffsetAndLength(
MSG_ROUTING_NONE, controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_->GetEntryCount()),
site_instance);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentURL(params.url);
render_frame_host->SetLastCommittedOrigin(params.origin);
if (!params.url_is_unreachable)
render_frame_host->set_last_successful_url(params.url);
if (did_navigate && !is_navigation_within_page)
render_frame_host->ResetFeaturePolicy();
if (details.type != NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE && delegate_) {
DCHECK_EQ(!render_frame_host->GetParent(),
did_navigate ? details.is_main_frame : false);
navigation_handle->DidCommitNavigation(params, did_navigate,
details.did_replace_entry,
details.previous_url, details.type,
render_frame_host);
navigation_handle.reset();
}
if (!did_navigate)
return; // No navigation happened.
RecordNavigationMetrics(details, params, site_instance);
if (delegate_) {
if (details.is_main_frame) {
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(render_frame_host,
details, params);
}
delegate_->DidNavigateAnyFramePostCommit(
render_frame_host, details, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that a PDF document's modal dialog is closed upon navigation to an interstitial page, which allows remote attackers to spoof URLs via a crafted document, as demonstrated by the alert_dialog.pdf document.
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778} | Medium | 171,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Segment::DoLoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; //offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; //size of cluster payload
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; //no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; //no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) //weird
{
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 //we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) &&
(size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop))
{
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 //commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this,
pos,
size,
idpos,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; //relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); //have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) //error, or underflow
{
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
{
if (status == 0) //no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else
{
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; //move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; //success
}
}
if (status == 0) //no entries found
{
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
m_pos = total;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; //try again
}
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this,
idx,
cluster_off);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0)
{
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; //partial success, since we have a new cluster
//// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
//// pos designates start of payload
//// m_pos has NOT been adjusted yet (in case we need to come back here)
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) //unknown size
{
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void IOHandler::Read(
const std::string& handle,
Maybe<int> offset,
Maybe<int> max_size,
std::unique_ptr<ReadCallback> callback) {
static const size_t kDefaultChunkSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
static const char kBlobPrefix[] = "blob:";
scoped_refptr<DevToolsIOContext::ROStream> stream =
io_context_->GetByHandle(handle);
if (!stream && process_host_ &&
StartsWith(handle, kBlobPrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserContext* browser_context = process_host_->GetBrowserContext();
ChromeBlobStorageContext* blob_context =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(browser_context);
StoragePartition* storage_partition = process_host_->GetStoragePartition();
std::string uuid = handle.substr(strlen(kBlobPrefix));
stream =
io_context_->OpenBlob(blob_context, storage_partition, handle, uuid);
}
if (!stream) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid stream handle"));
return;
}
stream->Read(
offset.fromMaybe(-1), max_size.fromMaybe(kDefaultChunkSize),
base::BindOnce(&IOHandler::ReadComplete, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.9-0 and 7.x before 7.0.6-1, a crafted PNG file could trigger a crash because there was an insufficient check for short files.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 167,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c in ServiceManager in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not properly restrict service registration, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29431260.
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Restore basic uid check
Prevent apps from registering services without relying on selinux checks.
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: I38c6e8bc7f7cba1cbd3568e8fed1ae7ac2054a9b
(cherry picked from commit 2b74d2c1d2a2c1bb6e9c420f7e9b339ba2a95179)
| High | 174,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete(
const std::vector<scoped_refptr<UsbDevice>>& devices) {
result_.reset(new base::ListValue());
barrier_ = base::BarrierClosure(
devices.size(), base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OpenComplete, this));
for (const scoped_refptr<UsbDevice>& device : devices) {
if (device->vendor_id() != vendor_id_ ||
device->product_id() != product_id_) {
barrier_.Run();
} else {
device->OpenInterface(
interface_id_,
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnDeviceOpened, this));
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the WebSocketDispatcherHost::SendOrDrop function in content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc in the Web Sockets implementation in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149 might allow remote attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism by leveraging an incorrect deletion in a certain failure case.
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354} | High | 171,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.raw",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mChannelCount = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
EXPECT_EQ(routing_id_, routing_id);
widget_ = listener;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_this_buffer_proxy(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
int push_cnt = 0,i=0;
unsigned nPortIndex = 0;
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct vdec_input_frameinfo frameinfo;
struct vdec_bufferpayload *temp_buffer;
struct vdec_seqheader seq_header;
bool port_setting_changed = true;
/*Should we generate a Aync error event*/
if (buffer == NULL || buffer->pInputPortPrivate == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:empty_this_buffer_proxy is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
nPortIndex = buffer-((OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (nPortIndex > drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:empty_this_buffer_proxy invalid nPortIndex[%u]",
nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
pending_input_buffers++;
/* return zero length and not an EOS buffer */
if (!arbitrary_bytes && (buffer->nFilledLen == 0) &&
((buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) == 0)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("return zero legth buffer");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (input_flush_progress == true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Flush in progress return buffer ");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
temp_buffer = (struct vdec_bufferpayload *)buffer->pInputPortPrivate;
if ((temp_buffer - drv_ctx.ptr_inputbuffer) > (int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/* If its first frame, H264 codec and reject is true, then parse the nal
and get the profile. Based on this, reject the clip playback */
if (first_frame == 0 && codec_type_parse == CODEC_TYPE_H264 &&
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp) {
first_frame = 1;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Parse nal to get the profile");
h264_parser->parse_nal((OMX_U8*)buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nFilledLen,
NALU_TYPE_SPS);
m_profile = h264_parser->get_profile();
ret = is_video_session_supported();
if (ret) {
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
post_event(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorInvalidState,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
/* Move the state to Invalid to avoid queueing of pending ETB to the driver */
m_state = OMX_StateInvalid;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETBProxy: bufhdr = %p, bufhdr->pBuffer = %p", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
/*for use buffer we need to memcpy the data*/
temp_buffer->buffer_len = buffer->nFilledLen;
if (input_use_buffer) {
if (buffer->nFilledLen <= temp_buffer->buffer_len) {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
memcpy (temp_buffer->bufferaddr, (buffer->pBuffer + buffer->nOffset),buffer->nFilledLen);
} else {
memcpy (temp_buffer->bufferaddr, (m_inp_heap_ptr[nPortIndex].pBuffer + m_inp_heap_ptr[nPortIndex].nOffset),
buffer->nFilledLen);
}
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
frameinfo.bufferaddr = temp_buffer->bufferaddr;
frameinfo.client_data = (void *) buffer;
frameinfo.datalen = temp_buffer->buffer_len;
frameinfo.flags = 0;
frameinfo.offset = buffer->nOffset;
frameinfo.pmem_fd = temp_buffer->pmem_fd;
frameinfo.pmem_offset = temp_buffer->offset;
frameinfo.timestamp = buffer->nTimeStamp;
if (drv_ctx.disable_dmx && m_desc_buffer_ptr && m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].buf_addr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: dmx enabled");
if (m_demux_entries == 0) {
extract_demux_addr_offsets(buffer);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: handle_demux_data - entries=%u",(unsigned int)m_demux_entries);
handle_demux_data(buffer);
frameinfo.desc_addr = (OMX_U8 *)m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].buf_addr;
frameinfo.desc_size = m_desc_buffer_ptr[nPortIndex].desc_data_size;
} else {
frameinfo.desc_addr = NULL;
frameinfo.desc_size = 0;
}
if (!arbitrary_bytes) {
frameinfo.flags |= buffer->nFlags;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inserting TIMESTAMP (%lld) into queue", buffer->nTimeStamp);
m_timestamp_list.insert_ts(buffer->nTimeStamp);
} else if (!arbitrary_bytes && !(buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inserting TIMESTAMP (%lld) into queue", buffer->nTimeStamp);
m_timestamp_list.insert_ts(buffer->nTimeStamp);
}
}
#endif
log_input_buffers((const char *)temp_buffer->bufferaddr, temp_buffer->buffer_len);
if (buffer->nFlags & QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ) {
frameinfo.flags |= QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ;
buffer->nFlags &= ~QOMX_VIDEO_BUFFERFLAG_EOSEQ;
}
if (temp_buffer->buffer_len == 0 || (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Rxd i/p EOS, Notify Driver that EOS has been reached");
frameinfo.flags |= VDEC_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
h264_scratch.nFilledLen = 0;
nal_count = 0;
look_ahead_nal = false;
frame_count = 0;
if (m_frame_parser.mutils)
m_frame_parser.mutils->initialize_frame_checking_environment();
m_frame_parser.flush();
h264_last_au_ts = LLONG_MAX;
h264_last_au_flags = 0;
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
m_demux_entries = 0;
}
struct v4l2_buffer buf;
struct v4l2_plane plane;
memset( (void *)&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memset( (void *)&plane, 0, sizeof(plane));
int rc;
unsigned long print_count;
if (temp_buffer->buffer_len == 0 || (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
buf.flags = V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_EOS;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INPUT EOS reached") ;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
buf.index = nPortIndex;
buf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
buf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
plane.bytesused = temp_buffer->buffer_len;
plane.length = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
plane.m.userptr = (unsigned long)temp_buffer->bufferaddr -
(unsigned long)temp_buffer->offset;
plane.reserved[0] = temp_buffer->pmem_fd;
plane.reserved[1] = temp_buffer->offset;
plane.data_offset = 0;
buf.m.planes = &plane;
buf.length = 1;
if (frameinfo.timestamp >= LLONG_MAX) {
buf.flags |= V4L2_QCOM_BUF_TIMESTAMP_INVALID;
}
buf.timestamp.tv_sec = frameinfo.timestamp / 1000000;
buf.timestamp.tv_usec = (frameinfo.timestamp % 1000000);
buf.flags |= (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) ? V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_CODECCONFIG: 0;
buf.flags |= (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_DECODEONLY) ? V4L2_QCOM_BUF_FLAG_DECODEONLY: 0;
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Increment codec_config buffer counter");
android_atomic_inc(&m_queued_codec_config_count);
}
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_QBUF, &buf);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to qbuf Input buffer to driver");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (codec_config_flag && !(buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
codec_config_flag = false;
}
if (!streaming[OUTPUT_PORT]) {
enum v4l2_buf_type buf_type;
int ret,r;
buf_type=V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("send_command_proxy(): Idle-->Executing");
ret=ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_STREAMON,&buf_type);
if (!ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Streamon on OUTPUT Plane was successful");
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = true;
} else if (errno == EBUSY) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call stream on OUTPUT due to HW_OVERLOAD");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer, VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call streamon on OUTPUT");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("If Stream on failed no buffer should be queued");
post_event ((unsigned long)buffer,VDEC_S_SUCCESS,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[ETBP] pBuf(%p) nTS(%lld) Sz(%u)",
frameinfo.bufferaddr, (long long)frameinfo.timestamp,
(unsigned int)frameinfo.datalen);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
| High | 173,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int bzrtp_packetParser(bzrtpContext_t *zrtpContext, bzrtpChannelContext_t *zrtpChannelContext, const uint8_t * input, uint16_t inputLength, bzrtpPacket_t *zrtpPacket) {
int i;
/* now allocate and fill the correct message structure according to the message type */
/* messageContent points to the begining of the ZRTP message */
uint8_t *messageContent = (uint8_t *)(input+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH+ZRTP_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH);
switch (zrtpPacket->messageType) {
case MSGTYPE_HELLO :
{
/* allocate a Hello message structure */
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpHelloMessage_t));
/* fill it */
memcpy(messageData->version, messageContent, 4);
messageContent +=4;
memcpy(messageData->clientIdentifier, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
memcpy(messageData->H3, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
memcpy(messageData->ZID, messageContent, 12);
messageContent +=12;
messageData->S = ((*messageContent)>>6)&0x01;
messageData->M = ((*messageContent)>>5)&0x01;
messageData->P = ((*messageContent)>>4)&0x01;
messageContent +=1;
messageData->hc = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
messageData->cc = MIN(((*messageContent)>>4)&0x0F, 7);
messageData->ac = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
messageData->kc = MIN(((*messageContent)>>4)&0x0F, 7);
messageData->sc = MIN((*messageContent)&0x0F, 7);
messageContent +=1;
/* Check message length according to value in hc, cc, ac, kc and sc */
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_HELLOMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH + 4*((uint16_t)(messageData->hc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->cc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->ac)+(uint16_t)(messageData->kc)+(uint16_t)(messageData->sc))) {
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
/* parse the variable length part: algorithms types */
for (i=0; i<messageData->hc; i++) {
messageData->supportedHash[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_HASH_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->cc; i++) {
messageData->supportedCipher[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->ac; i++) {
messageData->supportedAuthTag[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->kc; i++) {
messageData->supportedKeyAgreement[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
for (i=0; i<messageData->sc; i++) {
messageData->supportedSas[i] = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_SAS_TYPE);
messageContent +=4;
}
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_HASH_TYPE, messageData->supportedHash, &messageData->hc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE, messageData->supportedCipher, &messageData->cc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE, messageData->supportedAuthTag, &messageData->ac);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE, messageData->supportedKeyAgreement, &messageData->kc);
addMandatoryCryptoTypesIfNeeded(ZRTP_SAS_TYPE, messageData->supportedSas, &messageData->sc);
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed Hello packet must be saved as it may be used to generate commit message or the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_HELLO */
case MSGTYPE_HELLOACK :
{
/* check message length */
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_HELLOACKMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_HELLOACK */
case MSGTYPE_COMMIT:
{
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
uint16_t variableLength = 0;
/* allocate a commit message structure */
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpCommitMessage_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->H2, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
/* We have now H2, check it matches the H3 we had in the hello message H3=SHA256(H2) and that the Hello message MAC is correct */
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this commit shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(H2) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
memcpy(messageData->ZID, messageContent, 12);
messageContent +=12;
messageData->hashAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_HASH_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->cipherAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_CIPHERBLOCK_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->authTagAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_AUTHTAG_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
messageData->keyAgreementAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
/* commit message length depends on the key agreement type choosen (and set in the zrtpContext->keyAgreementAlgo) */
switch(messageData->keyAgreementAlgo) {
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_DH2k :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC25 :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_DH3k :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC38 :
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_EC52 :
variableLength = 32; /* hvi is 32 bytes length in DH Commit message format */
break;
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh :
variableLength = 24; /* nonce (16 bytes) and keyID(8 bytes) are 24 bytes length in preshared Commit message format */
break;
case ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult :
variableLength = 16; /* nonce is 24 bytes length in multistream Commit message format */
break;
default:
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_COMMITMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH + variableLength) {
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
messageData->sasAlgo = cryptoAlgoTypeStringToInt(messageContent, ZRTP_SAS_TYPE);
messageContent += 4;
/* if it is a multistream or preshared commit, get the 16 bytes nonce */
if ((messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh) || (messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult)) {
memcpy(messageData->nonce, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
/* and the keyID for preshared commit only */
if (messageData->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh) {
memcpy(messageData->keyID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
}
} else { /* it's a DH commit message, get the hvi */
memcpy(messageData->hvi, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
}
/* get the MAC and attach the message data to the packet structure */
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to generate the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_COMMIT */
case MSGTYPE_DHPART1 :
case MSGTYPE_DHPART2 :
{
bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *messageData;
/*check message length, depends on the selected key agreement algo set in zrtpContext */
uint16_t pvLength = computeKeyAgreementPrivateValueLength(zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo);
if (pvLength == 0) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
if (zrtpPacket->messageLength != ZRTP_DHPARTMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH+pvLength) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDMESSAGE;
}
/* allocate a DHPart message structure and pv */
messageData = (bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpDHPartMessage_t));
messageData->pv = (uint8_t *)malloc(pvLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->H1, messageContent, 32);
messageContent +=32;
/* We have now H1, check it matches the H2 we had in the commit message H2=SHA256(H1) and that the Commit message MAC is correct */
if ( zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) { /* do it only if we are responder (we received a commit packet) */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *peerCommitMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Commit message in this channel, this DHPart2 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerCommitMessageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H2 = SHA256(H1) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H1, 32, 32, checkH2);
if (memcmp(checkH2, peerCommitMessageData->H2, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the Commit MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H1, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerCommitMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
} else { /* if we are initiator(we didn't received any commit message and then no H2), we must check that H3=SHA256(SHA256(H1)) and the Hello message MAC */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this DHPart1 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(SHA256(H1)) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H1, 32, 32, checkH2);
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
memcpy(messageData->rs1ID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->rs2ID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->auxsecretID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->pbxsecretID, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->pv, messageContent, pvLength);
messageContent +=pvLength;
memcpy(messageData->MAC, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to generate the total_hash */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_DHPART1 and MSGTYPE_DHPART2 */
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1:
case MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2:
{
uint8_t *confirmMessageKey = NULL;
uint8_t *confirmMessageMacKey = NULL;
bzrtpConfirmMessage_t *messageData;
uint16_t cipherTextLength;
uint8_t computedHmac[8];
uint8_t *confirmPlainMessageBuffer;
uint8_t *confirmPlainMessage;
/* we shall first decrypt and validate the message, check we have the keys to do it */
if (zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) { /* responder uses initiator's keys to decrypt */
if ((zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyi == NULL) || (zrtpChannelContext->mackeyi == NULL)) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
confirmMessageKey = zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyi;
confirmMessageMacKey = zrtpChannelContext->mackeyi;
}
if (zrtpChannelContext->role == INITIATOR) { /* the iniator uses responder's keys to decrypt */
if ((zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyr == NULL) || (zrtpChannelContext->mackeyr == NULL)) {
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_INVALIDCONTEXT;
}
confirmMessageKey = zrtpChannelContext->zrtpkeyr;
confirmMessageMacKey = zrtpChannelContext->mackeyr;
}
/* allocate a confirm message structure */
messageData = (bzrtpConfirmMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpConfirmMessage_t));
/* get the mac and the IV */
memcpy(messageData->confirm_mac, messageContent, 8);
messageContent +=8;
memcpy(messageData->CFBIV, messageContent, 16);
messageContent +=16;
/* get the cipher text length */
cipherTextLength = zrtpPacket->messageLength - ZRTP_MESSAGE_HEADER_LENGTH - 24; /* confirm message is header, confirm_mac(8 bytes), CFB IV(16 bytes), encrypted part */
/* validate the mac over the cipher text */
zrtpChannelContext->hmacFunction(confirmMessageMacKey, zrtpChannelContext->hashLength, messageContent, cipherTextLength, 8, computedHmac);
if (memcmp(computedHmac, messageData->confirm_mac, 8) != 0) { /* confirm_mac doesn't match */
free(messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGCONFIRMMAC;
}
/* get plain message */
confirmPlainMessageBuffer = (uint8_t *)malloc(cipherTextLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
zrtpChannelContext->cipherDecryptionFunction(confirmMessageKey, messageData->CFBIV, messageContent, cipherTextLength, confirmPlainMessageBuffer);
confirmPlainMessage = confirmPlainMessageBuffer; /* point into the allocated buffer */
/* parse it */
memcpy(messageData->H0, confirmPlainMessage, 32);
confirmPlainMessage +=33; /* +33 because next 8 bits are unused */
/* Hash chain checking: if we are in multichannel or shared mode, we had not DHPart and then no H1 */
if (zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Prsh || zrtpChannelContext->keyAgreementAlgo == ZRTP_KEYAGREEMENT_Mult) {
/* compute the H1=SHA256(H0) we never received */
uint8_t checkH1[32];
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H0, 32, 32, checkH1);
/* if we are responder, we received a commit packet with H2 then check that H2=SHA256(H1) and that the commit message MAC keyed with H1 match */
if ( zrtpChannelContext->role == RESPONDER) {
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpCommitMessage_t *peerCommitMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Commit message in this channel, this Confirm2 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerCommitMessageData = (bzrtpCommitMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H2 = SHA256(H1) */
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH1, 32, 32, checkH2);
if (memcmp(checkH2, peerCommitMessageData->H2, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the Commit MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH1, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[COMMIT_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerCommitMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
} else { /* if we are initiator(we didn't received any commit message and then no H2), we must check that H3=SHA256(SHA256(H1)) and the Hello message MAC */
uint8_t checkH2[32];
uint8_t checkH3[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpHelloMessage_t *peerHelloMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no Hello message in this channel, this Confirm1 shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerHelloMessageData = (bzrtpHelloMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H3 = SHA256(SHA256(H1)) */
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH1, 32, 32, checkH2);
bctoolbox_sha256(checkH2, 32, 32, checkH3);
if (memcmp(checkH3, peerHelloMessageData->H3, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the hello MAC message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(checkH2, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[HELLO_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerHelloMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
} else { /* we are in DHM mode */
/* We have now H0, check it matches the H1 we had in the DHPart message H1=SHA256(H0) and that the DHPart message MAC is correct */
uint8_t checkH1[32];
uint8_t checkMAC[32];
bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *peerDHPartMessageData;
if (zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID] == NULL) {
free (messageData);
/* we have no DHPART message in this channel, this confirm shall never have arrived, discard it as invalid */
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNEXPECTEDMESSAGE;
}
peerDHPartMessageData = (bzrtpDHPartMessage_t *)zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageData;
/* Check H1 = SHA256(H0) */
bctoolbox_sha256(messageData->H0, 32, 32, checkH1);
if (memcmp(checkH1, peerDHPartMessageData->H1, 32) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGHASHCHAIN;
}
/* Check the DHPart message.
* MAC is 8 bytes long and is computed on the message(skip the ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER) and exclude the mac itself (-8 bytes from message Length) */
bctoolbox_hmacSha256(messageData->H0, 32, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->packetString+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH, zrtpChannelContext->peerPackets[DHPART_MESSAGE_STORE_ID]->messageLength-8, 8, checkMAC);
if (memcmp(checkMAC, peerDHPartMessageData->MAC, 8) != 0) {
free (messageData);
return BZRTP_PARSER_ERROR_UNMATCHINGMAC;
}
}
messageData->sig_len = ((uint16_t)(confirmPlainMessage[0]&0x01))<<8 | (((uint16_t)confirmPlainMessage[1])&0x00FF);
confirmPlainMessage += 2;
messageData->E = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x08)>>3;
messageData->V = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x04)>>2;
messageData->A = ((*confirmPlainMessage)&0x02)>>1;
messageData->D = (*confirmPlainMessage)&0x01;
confirmPlainMessage += 1;
messageData->cacheExpirationInterval = (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[0])<<24) | (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[1])<<16) | (((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[2])<<8) | ((uint32_t)confirmPlainMessage[3]);
confirmPlainMessage += 4;
/* if sig_len indicate a signature, parse it */
if (messageData->sig_len>0) {
memcpy(messageData->signatureBlockType, confirmPlainMessage, 4);
confirmPlainMessage += 4;
/* allocate memory for the signature block, sig_len is in words(32 bits) and includes the signature block type word */
messageData->signatureBlock = (uint8_t *)malloc(4*(messageData->sig_len-1)*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(messageData->signatureBlock, confirmPlainMessage, 4*(messageData->sig_len-1));
} else {
messageData->signatureBlock = NULL;
}
/* free plain buffer */
free(confirmPlainMessageBuffer);
/* the parsed commit packet must be saved as it is used to check correct packet repetition */
zrtpPacket->packetString = (uint8_t *)malloc(inputLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(zrtpPacket->packetString, input, inputLength); /* store the whole packet even if we may use the message only */
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_CONFIRM1 and MSGTYPE_CONFIRM2 */
case MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK:
/* nothing to do for this one */
break; /* MSGTYPE_CONF2ACK */
case MSGTYPE_PING:
{
/* allocate a ping message structure */
bzrtpPingMessage_t *messageData;
messageData = (bzrtpPingMessage_t *)malloc(sizeof(bzrtpPingMessage_t));
/* fill the structure */
memcpy(messageData->version, messageContent, 4);
messageContent +=4;
memcpy(messageData->endpointHash, messageContent, 8);
/* attach the message structure to the packet one */
zrtpPacket->messageData = (void *)messageData;
}
break; /* MSGTYPE_PING */
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Bzrtp library (aka libbzrtp) 1.0.x before 1.0.4 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct spoofing attacks by leveraging a missing HVI check on DHPart2 packet reception.
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception | Medium | 168,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int add_post_vars(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *vars, zend_bool eof TSRMLS_DC)
{
uint64_t max_vars = PG(max_input_vars);
vars->ptr = vars->str.c;
vars->end = vars->str.c + vars->str.len;
while (add_post_var(arr, vars, eof TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (++vars->cnt > max_vars) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"Input variables exceeded %" PRIu64 ". "
"To increase the limit change max_input_vars in php.ini.",
max_vars);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!eof) {
memmove(vars->str.c, vars->ptr, vars->str.len = vars->end - vars->ptr);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.17, and 7.1.x before 7.1.3, remote attackers could cause a CPU consumption denial of service attack by injecting long form variables, related to main/php_variables.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807 | High | 168,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
switch (e) {
case Value::TYPE_NULL:
return "NULL ";
case Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN:
return "BOOL";
case Value::TYPE_INTEGER:
return "INT";
case Value::TYPE_DOUBLE:
return "DOUBLE";
case Value::TYPE_STRING:
return "STRING";
case Value::TYPE_BINARY:
return "BIN";
case Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY:
return "DICT";
case Value::TYPE_LIST:
return "LIST";
default:
return "ERROR";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestRunWithoutQuit() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
}
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_ABORTED, result);
PASS();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 172,128 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
int noblock;
struct vmci_datagram *dg;
size_t payload_len;
struct sk_buff *skb;
noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
if (flags & MSG_OOB || flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Retrieve the head sk_buff from the socket's receive queue. */
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(&vsk->sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (err)
return err;
if (!skb)
return -EAGAIN;
dg = (struct vmci_datagram *)skb->data;
if (!dg)
/* err is 0, meaning we read zero bytes. */
goto out;
payload_len = dg->payload_size;
/* Ensure the sk_buff matches the payload size claimed in the packet. */
if (payload_len != skb->len - sizeof(*dg)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (payload_len > len) {
payload_len = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
/* Place the datagram payload in the user's iovec. */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(*dg), msg->msg_iov,
payload_len);
if (err)
goto out;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_vm *vm_addr;
/* Provide the address of the sender. */
vm_addr = (struct sockaddr_vm *)msg->msg_name;
vsock_addr_init(vm_addr, dg->src.context, dg->src.resource);
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*vm_addr);
}
err = payload_len;
out:
skb_free_datagram(&vsk->sk, skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue function in net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not properly initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t ocfs2_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
get_block_t *get_block;
/*
* Fallback to buffered I/O if we see an inode without
* extents.
*/
if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL)
return 0;
/* Fallback to buffered I/O if we do not support append dio. */
if (iocb->ki_pos + iter->count > i_size_read(inode) &&
!ocfs2_supports_append_dio(osb))
return 0;
if (iov_iter_rw(iter) == READ)
get_block = ocfs2_get_block;
else
get_block = ocfs2_dio_get_block;
return __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
iter, get_block,
ocfs2_dio_end_io, NULL, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.15, fs/ocfs2/aops.c omits use of a semaphore and consequently has a race condition for access to the extent tree during read operations in DIRECT mode, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG) by modifying a certain e_cpos field.
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[[email protected]: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cfm_network_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr)
{
u_int network_addr_type;
u_int hexdump = FALSE;
/*
* Altough AFIs are tpically 2 octects wide,
* 802.1ab specifies that this field width
* is only once octet
*/
network_addr_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Network Address Type %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", network_addr_type),
network_addr_type));
/*
* Resolve the passed in Address.
*/
switch(network_addr_type) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The CFM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-cfm.c:cfm_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13052/CFM: refine decoding of the Sender ID TLV
In cfm_network_addr_print() add a length argument and use it to validate
the input buffer.
In cfm_print() add a length check for MAC address chassis ID. Supply
cfm_network_addr_print() with the length of its buffer and a correct
pointer to the buffer (it was off-by-one before). Change some error
handling blocks to skip to the next TLV in the current PDU rather than to
stop decoding the PDU. Print the management domain and address contents,
although in hex only so far.
Add some comments to clarify the code flow and to tell exact sections in
IEEE standard documents. Add new error messages and make some existing
messages more specific.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + nbytes;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c interprets a variable as signed instead of unsigned, resulting in an out-of-bounds write (of up to 128 bytes), leading to DoS or remote code execution.
Commit Message: | High | 164,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | High | 167,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The gdImageCreate function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an oversized image.
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317 | High | 168,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintViewManager::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == print_preview_rfh_)
print_preview_state_ = NOT_PREVIEWING;
PrintViewManagerBase::RenderFrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A use after free in printing in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.133 for Linux and Windows allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Properly clean up in PrintViewManager::RenderFrameCreated().
BUG=694382,698622
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2742853003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#457363} | High | 172,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int skt_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t len)
{
int sent;
struct pollfd pfd;
FNLOG();
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
/* poll for 500 ms */
/* send time out */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, 500) == 0)
return 0;
ts_log("skt_write", len, NULL);
if ((sent = send(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return sent;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void removeAllDOMObjects()
{
DOMDataStore& store = DOMData::getCurrentStore();
v8::HandleScope scope;
if (isMainThread()) {
DOMData::removeObjectsFromWrapperMap<Node>(&store, store.domNodeMap());
DOMData::removeObjectsFromWrapperMap<Node>(&store, store.activeDomNodeMap());
}
DOMData::removeObjectsFromWrapperMap<void>(&store, store.domObjectMap());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the JS API in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [V8] ASSERT that removeAllDOMObjects() is called only on worker threads
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100046
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
This function is called only on worker threads. We should ASSERT that
fact and remove the dead code that tries to handle the main thread
case.
* bindings/v8/V8DOMMap.cpp:
(WebCore::removeAllDOMObjects):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@132156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ContainerNode::replaceChild(PassRefPtr<Node> newChild, Node* oldChild, ExceptionCode& ec, bool shouldLazyAttach)
{
ASSERT(refCount() || parentOrHostNode());
RefPtr<Node> protect(this);
ec = 0;
if (oldChild == newChild) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (!oldChild || oldChild->parentNode() != this) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return false;
}
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
ChildListMutationScope mutation(this);
#endif
RefPtr<Node> next = oldChild->nextSibling();
RefPtr<Node> removedChild = oldChild;
removeChild(oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
if (next && (next->previousSibling() == newChild || next == newChild)) // nothing to do
return true;
checkReplaceChild(newChild.get(), oldChild, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
NodeVector targets;
collectChildrenAndRemoveFromOldParent(newChild.get(), targets, ec);
if (ec)
return false;
InspectorInstrumentation::willInsertDOMNode(document(), this);
for (NodeVector::const_iterator it = targets.begin(); it != targets.end(); ++it) {
Node* child = it->get();
if (next && next->parentNode() != this)
break;
if (child->parentNode())
break;
treeScope()->adoptIfNeeded(child);
forbidEventDispatch();
if (next)
insertBeforeCommon(next.get(), child);
else
appendChildToContainer(child, this);
allowEventDispatch();
updateTreeAfterInsertion(this, child, shouldLazyAttach);
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to table styles.
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, size_t len, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
rw_iter_op *iter_op;
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct iov_iter iter;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
iter_op = file->f_op->read_iter;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
iter_op = file->f_op->write_iter;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op && !iter_op)
return -EINVAL;
if (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV || opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&len, &iovec, compat);
else
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
len, iovec);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, len);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
len = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
if (iter_op) {
iov_iter_init(&iter, rw, iovec, nr_segs, len);
ret = iter_op(req, &iter);
} else {
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in the aio_setup_single_vector function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel 4.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a CVE-2012-6701 regression.
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | High | 170,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPICTException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (tile_image != (Image *) NULL) \
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image); \
if (read_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL) \
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
geometry[MagickPathExtent],
header_ole[4];
Image
*image,
*tile_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
code;
MagickBooleanType
jpeg,
status;
PICTRectangle
frame;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
flags,
j,
version,
y;
StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PICT header.
*/
read_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
tile_image=(Image *) NULL;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=0;
pixmap.component_count=0;
/*
Skip header : 512 for standard PICT and 4, ie "PICT" for OLE2.
*/
header_ole[0]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[1]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[2]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[3]=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!((header_ole[0] == 0x50) && (header_ole[1] == 0x49) &&
(header_ole[2] == 0x43) && (header_ole[3] == 0x54 )))
for (i=0; i < 508; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* skip picture size */
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
while ((c=ReadBlobByte(image)) == 0) ;
if (c != 0x11)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
version=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (version == 2)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c != 0xff)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
else
if (version != 1)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((frame.left < 0) || (frame.right < 0) || (frame.top < 0) ||
(frame.bottom < 0) || (frame.left >= frame.right) ||
(frame.top >= frame.bottom))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Create black canvas.
*/
flags=0;
image->depth=8;
image->columns=(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left);
image->rows=(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
image->resolution.x=DefaultResolution;
image->resolution.y=DefaultResolution;
image->units=UndefinedResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ResetImagePixels(image,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Interpret PICT opcodes.
*/
jpeg=MagickFalse;
for (code=0; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((version == 1) || ((TellBlob(image) % 2) != 0))
code=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (version == 2)
code=ReadBlobMSBSignedShort(image);
if (code < 0)
break;
if (code == 0)
continue;
if (code > 0xa1)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%04X:",code);
}
else
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" %04X %s: %s",code,codes[code].name,codes[code].description);
switch (code)
{
case 0x01:
{
/*
Clipping rectangle.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (length != 0x000a)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((frame.left & 0x8000) != 0) || ((frame.top & 0x8000) != 0))
break;
image->columns=(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left);
image->rows=(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ResetImagePixels(image,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
break;
}
case 0x12:
case 0x13:
case 0x14:
{
ssize_t
pattern;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Skip pattern definition.
*/
pattern=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
if (pattern == 2)
{
for (i=0; i < 5; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
if (pattern != 1)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"UnknownPatternType");
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (ReadPixmap(image,&pixmap) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->depth=(size_t) pixmap.component_size;
image->resolution.x=1.0*pixmap.horizontal_resolution;
image->resolution.y=1.0*pixmap.vertical_resolution;
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
flags=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) length; i++)
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
width=(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
height=(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left);
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel <= 8)
length&=0x7fff;
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel == 16)
width<<=1;
if (length == 0)
length=width;
if (length < 8)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length*height); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) height; i++)
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
if (length > 200)
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); j++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image); j++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x1b:
{
/*
Initialize image background color.
*/
image->background_color.red=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
image->background_color.green=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
image->background_color.blue=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
break;
}
case 0x70:
case 0x71:
case 0x72:
case 0x73:
case 0x74:
case 0x75:
case 0x76:
case 0x77:
{
/*
Skip polygon or region.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
case 0x90:
case 0x91:
case 0x98:
case 0x99:
case 0x9a:
case 0x9b:
{
PICTRectangle
source,
destination;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
j;
ssize_t
bytes_per_line;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Pixmap clipped by a rectangle.
*/
bytes_per_line=0;
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b))
bytes_per_line=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
else
{
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
}
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize tile image.
*/
tile_image=CloneImage(image,(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left),
(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top),MagickTrue,exception);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((code == 0x9a) || (code == 0x9b) ||
((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0))
{
if (ReadPixmap(image,&pixmap) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
tile_image->depth=(size_t) pixmap.component_size;
tile_image->alpha_trait=pixmap.component_count == 4 ?
BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
tile_image->resolution.x=(double) pixmap.horizontal_resolution;
tile_image->resolution.y=(double) pixmap.vertical_resolution;
tile_image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (tile_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlpha(tile_image,OpaqueAlpha,exception);
}
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b))
{
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tile_image->colors=2;
if ((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0)
{
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
flags=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
tile_image->colors=1UL*ReadBlobMSBShort(image)+1;
}
status=AcquireImageColormap(tile_image,tile_image->colors,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tile_image->colors; i++)
{
j=ReadBlobMSBShort(image) % tile_image->colors;
if ((flags & 0x8000) != 0)
j=(size_t) i;
tile_image->colormap[j].red=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
tile_image->colormap[j].green=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
tile_image->colormap[j].blue=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
}
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tile_image->colors; i++)
{
tile_image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].red);
tile_image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].green);
tile_image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].blue);
}
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (ReadRectangle(image,&source) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (ReadRectangle(image,&destination) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((code == 0x91) || (code == 0x99) || (code == 0x9b))
{
/*
Skip region.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b) &&
(bytes_per_line & 0x8000) == 0)
pixels=DecodeImage(image,tile_image,(size_t) bytes_per_line,1,
&extent);
else
pixels=DecodeImage(image,tile_image,(size_t) bytes_per_line,
(unsigned int) pixmap.bits_per_pixel,&extent);
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage");
/*
Convert PICT tile image to pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+image->columns))
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughPixelData");
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
if (tile_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(tile_image,(ssize_t)
*p,exception);
SetPixelIndex(tile_image,index,q);
SetPixelRed(tile_image,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].red,q);
SetPixelGreen(tile_image,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].green,q);
SetPixelBlue(tile_image,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].blue,q);
}
else
{
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
i=(ssize_t) (*p++);
j=(size_t) (*p);
SetPixelRed(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ((i & 0x7c) << 1)),q);
SetPixelGreen(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) (((i & 0x03) << 6) |
((j & 0xe0) >> 2))),q);
SetPixelBlue(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ((j & 0x1f) << 3)),q);
}
else
if (tile_image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+2*image->columns))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"NotEnoughPixelData");
SetPixelRed(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+tile_image->columns)),q);
SetPixelBlue(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+2*tile_image->columns)),q);
}
else
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+3*image->columns))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"NotEnoughPixelData");
SetPixelAlpha(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelRed(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+tile_image->columns)),q);
SetPixelGreen(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+2*tile_image->columns)),q);
SetPixelBlue(tile_image,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+3*tile_image->columns)),q);
}
}
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(tile_image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(tile_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((tile_image->storage_class == DirectClass) &&
(pixmap.bits_per_pixel != 16))
{
p+=(pixmap.component_count-1)*tile_image->columns;
if (p < pixels)
break;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
tile_image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if ((jpeg == MagickFalse) && (EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse))
if ((code == 0x9a) || (code == 0x9b) ||
((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0))
(void) CompositeImage(image,tile_image,CopyCompositeOp,
MagickTrue,(ssize_t) destination.left,(ssize_t)
destination.top,exception);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
break;
}
case 0xa1:
{
unsigned char
*info;
size_t
type;
/*
Comment.
*/
type=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (length == 0)
break;
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length-=MagickMin(length,4);
if (length == 0)
break;
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,length,info);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
switch (type)
{
case 0xe0:
{
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,info);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case 0x1f2:
{
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,info);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"iptc",profile,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
break;
}
default:
{
/*
Skip to next op code.
*/
if (codes[code].length == -1)
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) codes[code].length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
}
}
if (code == 0xc00)
{
/*
Skip header.
*/
for (i=0; i < 24; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
if (((code >= 0xb0) && (code <= 0xcf)) ||
((code >= 0x8000) && (code <= 0x80ff)))
continue;
if (code == 0x8200)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
int
unique_file;
/*
Embedded JPEG.
*/
jpeg=MagickTrue;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"jpeg:%s",
filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,read_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
ThrowPICTException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
}
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length > 154)
{
for (i=0; i < 6; i++)
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < 122; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-154); i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) close(unique_file);
tile_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) MagickMax(image->columns,tile_image->columns),
(double) MagickMax(image->rows,tile_image->rows));
(void) SetImageExtent(image,
MagickMax(image->columns,tile_image->columns),
MagickMax(image->rows,tile_image->rows),exception);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,tile_image->colorspace,exception);
(void) CompositeImage(image,tile_image,CopyCompositeOp,MagickTrue,
(ssize_t) frame.left,(ssize_t) frame.right,exception);
image->compression=tile_image->compression;
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
continue;
}
if ((code == 0xff) || (code == 0xffff))
break;
if (((code >= 0xd0) && (code <= 0xfe)) ||
((code >= 0x8100) && (code <= 0xffff)))
{
/*
Skip reserved.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
if ((code >= 0x100) && (code <= 0x7fff))
{
/*
Skip reserved.
*/
length=(size_t) ((code >> 7) & 0xff);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The functions ReadDCMImage in coders/dcm.c, ReadPWPImage in coders/pwp.c, ReadCALSImage in coders/cals.c, and ReadPICTImage in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-4 do not check the return value of the fputc function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199 | Medium | 169,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
const vpx_image_t *img,
vpx_codec_pts_t pts,
unsigned int duration,
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags,
unsigned int deadline,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(ctx, img, pts, duration, flags,
deadline);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to encode frame.");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(ctx, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer, pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts))
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to write compressed frame.");
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NavigationObserver::PromptToEnableExtensionIfNecessary(
NavigationController* nav_controller) {
if (!in_progress_prompt_extension_id_.empty())
return;
NavigationEntry* nav_entry = nav_controller->GetVisibleEntry();
if (!nav_entry)
return;
const GURL& url = (nav_entry->GetPageType() == content::PAGE_TYPE_ERROR &&
nav_entry->GetURL() == url::kAboutBlankURL &&
nav_entry->GetVirtualURL().SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme))
? nav_entry->GetVirtualURL()
: nav_entry->GetURL();
if (!url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme))
return;
const Extension* extension = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)
->disabled_extensions()
.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!prompted_extensions_.insert(extension->id()).second &&
!g_repeat_prompting) {
return;
}
ExtensionPrefs* extension_prefs = ExtensionPrefs::Get(profile_);
if (extension_prefs->DidExtensionEscalatePermissions(extension->id())) {
in_progress_prompt_extension_id_ = extension->id();
in_progress_prompt_navigation_controller_ = nav_controller;
extension_install_prompt_.reset(
new ExtensionInstallPrompt(nav_controller->GetWebContents()));
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PromptType type =
ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetReEnablePromptTypeForExtension(profile_,
extension);
extension_install_prompt_->ShowDialog(
base::Bind(&NavigationObserver::OnInstallPromptDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
extension, nullptr,
base::MakeUnique<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt>(type),
ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetDefaultShowDialogCallback());
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of back navigations in error pages in Navigation in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942} | Medium | 172,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteCALSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
header[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*group4_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
density,
length,
orient_x,
orient_y;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*group4;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Create standard CALS header.
*/
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcdocid: NONE");
(void) count;
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"dstdocid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"txtfilid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"figid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcgph: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"doccls: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"rtype: 1");
orient_x=0;
orient_y=0;
switch (image->orientation)
{
case TopRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=270;
break;
}
case BottomRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case BottomLeftOrientation:
{
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case LeftTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
break;
}
case RightTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case RightBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case LeftBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
break;
}
default:
{
orient_y=270;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rorient: %03ld,%03ld",
(long) orient_x,(long) orient_y);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rpelcnt: %06lu,%06lu",
(unsigned long) image->columns,(unsigned long) image->rows);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
density=200;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
(void) ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
density=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rdensty: %04lu",
(unsigned long) density);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"notes: NONE");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(header,' ',128);
for (i=0; i < 5; i++)
(void) WriteBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) header);
/*
Write CALS pixels.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->filename,"GROUP4:",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"GROUP4",MaxTextExtent);
group4_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (group4_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
group4=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,group4_image,&length,
&image->exception);
group4_image=DestroyImage(group4_image);
if (group4 == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (WriteBlob(image,length,group4) != (ssize_t) length)
status=MagickFalse;
group4=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(group4);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WriteCALSImage in coders/cals.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/571 | Medium | 167,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
unsigned int total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
}
if (ctx->num != 0) {
i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
in += i;
inl -= i;
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
ctx->num = 0;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
while (inl >= ctx->length) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
out += j;
*(out++) = '\n';
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;
*outl = total;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function in crypto/evp/encode.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.1t and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via a large amount of binary data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
if (xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) !=
xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not verify that the actual Netlink message length is consistent with a certain header field, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a (1) new or (2) updated state.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:
1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
code later on.
2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.
To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.
To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool semaphore_try_wait(semaphore_t *semaphore) {
assert(semaphore != NULL);
assert(semaphore->fd != INVALID_FD);
int flags = fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to get flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to set O_NONBLOCK for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
eventfd_t value;
if (eventfd_read(semaphore->fd, &value) == -1)
return false;
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to resetore flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::ShareMetricsAllocatorToProcess() {
if (metrics_allocator_) {
HistogramController::GetInstance()->SetHistogramMemory<ChildProcessHost>(
GetHost(),
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(
metrics_allocator_->shared_memory()->handle().Duplicate(),
metrics_allocator_->shared_memory()->mapped_size(), false));
} else {
HistogramController::GetInstance()->SetHistogramMemory<ChildProcessHost>(
GetHost(), mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle());
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: layer_resize(int layer, int x_size, int y_size)
{
int old_height;
int old_width;
struct map_tile* tile;
int tile_width;
int tile_height;
struct map_tile* tilemap;
struct map_trigger* trigger;
struct map_zone* zone;
int x, y, i;
old_width = s_map->layers[layer].width;
old_height = s_map->layers[layer].height;
if (!(tilemap = malloc(x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile))))
return false;
for (x = 0; x < x_size; ++x) {
for (y = 0; y < y_size; ++y) {
if (x < old_width && y < old_height) {
tilemap[x + y * x_size] = s_map->layers[layer].tilemap[x + y * old_width];
}
else {
tile = &tilemap[x + y * x_size];
tile->frames_left = tileset_get_delay(s_map->tileset, 0);
tile->tile_index = 0;
}
}
}
free(s_map->layers[layer].tilemap);
s_map->layers[layer].tilemap = tilemap;
s_map->layers[layer].width = x_size;
s_map->layers[layer].height = y_size;
tileset_get_size(s_map->tileset, &tile_width, &tile_height);
s_map->width = 0;
s_map->height = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s_map->num_layers; ++i) {
if (!s_map->layers[i].is_parallax) {
s_map->width = fmax(s_map->width, s_map->layers[i].width * tile_width);
s_map->height = fmax(s_map->height, s_map->layers[i].height * tile_height);
}
}
for (i = (int)vector_len(s_map->zones) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
zone = vector_get(s_map->zones, i);
if (zone->bounds.x1 >= s_map->width || zone->bounds.y1 >= s_map->height)
vector_remove(s_map->zones, i);
else {
if (zone->bounds.x2 > s_map->width)
zone->bounds.x2 = s_map->width;
if (zone->bounds.y2 > s_map->height)
zone->bounds.y2 = s_map->height;
}
}
for (i = (int)vector_len(s_map->triggers) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
trigger = vector_get(s_map->triggers, i);
if (trigger->x >= s_map->width || trigger->y >= s_map->height)
vector_remove(s_map->triggers, i);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: miniSphere version 5.2.9 and earlier contains a Integer Overflow vulnerability in layer_resize() function in map_engine.c that can result in remote denial of service. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must load a specially-crafted map which calls SetLayerSize in its entry script. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 5.0.3, 5.1.5, 5.2.10 and later.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line | Medium | 168,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetLanguage() const
{
return m_info.language;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CopyKeyAliasesToKeymap(struct xkb_keymap *keymap, KeyNamesInfo *info)
{
AliasInfo *alias;
unsigned i, num_key_aliases;
struct xkb_key_alias *key_aliases;
/*
* Do some sanity checking on the aliases. We can't do it before
* because keys and their aliases may be added out-of-order.
*/
num_key_aliases = 0;
darray_foreach(alias, info->aliases) {
/* Check that ->real is a key. */
if (!XkbKeyByName(keymap, alias->real, false)) {
log_vrb(info->ctx, 5,
"Attempt to alias %s to non-existent key %s; Ignored\n",
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->alias),
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->real));
alias->real = XKB_ATOM_NONE;
continue;
}
/* Check that ->alias is not a key. */
if (XkbKeyByName(keymap, alias->alias, false)) {
log_vrb(info->ctx, 5,
"Attempt to create alias with the name of a real key; "
"Alias \"%s = %s\" ignored\n",
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->alias),
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->real));
alias->real = XKB_ATOM_NONE;
continue;
}
num_key_aliases++;
}
/* Copy key aliases. */
key_aliases = NULL;
if (num_key_aliases > 0) {
key_aliases = calloc(num_key_aliases, sizeof(*key_aliases));
if (!key_aliases)
return false;
}
i = 0;
darray_foreach(alias, info->aliases) {
if (alias->real != XKB_ATOM_NONE) {
key_aliases[i].alias = alias->alias;
key_aliases[i].real = alias->real;
i++;
}
}
keymap->num_key_aliases = num_key_aliases;
keymap->key_aliases = key_aliases;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Unchecked NULL pointer usage when handling invalid aliases in CopyKeyAliasesToKeymap in xkbcomp/keycodes.c in xkbcommon before 0.8.1 could be used by local attackers to crash (NULL pointer dereference) the xkbcommon parser by supplying a crafted keymap file.
Commit Message: keycodes: don't try to copy zero key aliases
Move the aliases copy to within the (num_key_aliases > 0) block.
Passing info->aliases into this fuction with invalid aliases will
cause log messages but num_key_aliases stays on 0. The key_aliases array
is never allocated and remains NULL. We then loop through the aliases, causing
a null-pointer dereference.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> | Low | 169,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::UntrustedSigninConfirmed(
StartSyncMode response) {
if (response == UNDO_SYNC) {
CancelSigninAndDelete();
} else {
if (response == CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST)
start_mode_ = response;
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
signin->CompletePendingSignin();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly determine the circumstances in which a renderer process can be considered a trusted process for sign-in and subsequent sync operations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct phishing attacks via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UnloadController::TabDetachedImpl(TabContents* contents) {
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_)
ClearUnloadState(contents->web_contents(), false);
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::CallClientFunction(const std::string& function_name,
const base::Value* arg1,
const base::Value* arg2,
const base::Value* arg3) {
if (!web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
return;
std::string javascript = function_name + "(";
if (arg1) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg1, &json);
javascript.append(json);
if (arg2) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg2, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
if (arg3) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg3, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
}
}
}
javascript.append(");");
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->ExecuteJavaScript(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(javascript));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926} | Medium | 172,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
/* [M225] page 5 */
size_t b;
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
} while( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) == 0);
/* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */
b = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1; /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based */
if( b > grp->nbits )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits ) );
else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 ) );
/* Make sure the last three bits are unset */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
}
else
#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
/* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
int count = 0;
/*
* Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
* - use the same byte ordering;
* - keep the leftmost nbits bits of the generated octet string;
* - try until result is in the desired range.
* This also avoids any biais, which is especially important for ECDSA.
*/
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
/*
* Each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing (the msb has
* a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will be < N),
* so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30).
*
* For most curves, 1 try is enough with overwhelming probability,
* since N starts with a lot of 1s in binary, but some curves
* such as secp224k1 are actually very close to the worst case.
*/
if( ++count > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
}
else
#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cleanup:
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted | Low | 170,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int start = 0;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 does not reset the PIT counter values during state restoration, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and host OS crash) via a zero value, related to the kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit and kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2 functions.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileResult> create()
{
return adoptRefWillBeNoop(new CreateFileResult());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex;
int depth;
int err = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ext_debug("ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/* note: ext4_ext_correct_indexes() isn't needed here because
* borders are not changed
*/
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Low | 165,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
wchar_t c,
std::vector<std::wstring>* r) {
SplitStringT(str, c, true, r);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG fonts.
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
//// return includes terminator; if unterminated, returns > limit
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in id3/ID3.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32377688.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
| Medium | 174,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vqp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct vqp_common_header_t *vqp_common_header;
const struct vqp_obj_tlv_t *vqp_obj_tlv;
const u_char *tptr;
uint16_t vqp_obj_len;
uint32_t vqp_obj_type;
int tlen;
uint8_t nitems;
tptr=pptr;
tlen = len;
vqp_common_header = (const struct vqp_common_header_t *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vqp_common_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version) != VQP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VQP version %u packet not supported",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version)));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VQPv%u %s Message, error-code %s (%u), length %u",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version),
tok2str(vqp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->msg_type),
tok2str(vqp_error_code_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->error_code),
vqp_common_header->error_code,
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
nitems = vqp_common_header->nitems;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVQPv%u, %s Message, error-code %s (%u), seq 0x%08x, items %u, length %u",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version),
tok2str(vqp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->msg_type),
tok2str(vqp_error_code_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->error_code),
vqp_common_header->error_code,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vqp_common_header->sequence),
nitems,
len));
/* skip VQP Common header */
tptr+=sizeof(const struct vqp_common_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(const struct vqp_common_header_t);
while (nitems > 0 && tlen > 0) {
vqp_obj_tlv = (const struct vqp_obj_tlv_t *)tptr;
vqp_obj_type = EXTRACT_32BITS(vqp_obj_tlv->obj_type);
vqp_obj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(vqp_obj_tlv->obj_length);
tptr+=sizeof(struct vqp_obj_tlv_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct vqp_obj_tlv_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (0x%08x), length %u, value: ",
tok2str(vqp_obj_values, "Unknown", vqp_obj_type),
vqp_obj_type, vqp_obj_len));
/* basic sanity check */
if (vqp_obj_type == 0 || vqp_obj_len ==0) {
return;
}
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, vqp_obj_len);
switch(vqp_obj_type) {
case VQP_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%08x)", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
/* those objects have similar semantics - fall through */
case VQP_OBJ_PORT_NAME:
case VQP_OBJ_VLAN_NAME:
case VQP_OBJ_VTP_DOMAIN:
case VQP_OBJ_ETHERNET_PKT:
safeputs(ndo, tptr, vqp_obj_len);
break;
/* those objects have similar semantics - fall through */
case VQP_OBJ_MAC_ADDRESS:
case VQP_OBJ_MAC_NULL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", etheraddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr, "\n\t ", vqp_obj_len);
break;
}
tptr += vqp_obj_len;
tlen -= vqp_obj_len;
nitems--;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t[|VQP]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VQP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-vqp.c:vqp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13045/VQP: add some bounds checks
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_esbr_radix4bfly(const WORD32 *w, WORD32 *x, WORD32 index1,
WORD32 index) {
int i;
WORD32 l1, l2, h2, fft_jmp;
WORD32 xt0_0, yt0_0, xt1_0, yt1_0, xt2_0, yt2_0;
WORD32 xh0_0, xh1_0, xh20_0, xh21_0, xl0_0, xl1_0, xl20_0, xl21_0;
WORD32 x_0, x_1, x_l1_0, x_l1_1, x_l2_0, x_l2_1;
WORD32 x_h2_0, x_h2_1;
WORD32 si10, si20, si30, co10, co20, co30;
WORD64 mul_1, mul_2, mul_3, mul_4, mul_5, mul_6;
WORD64 mul_7, mul_8, mul_9, mul_10, mul_11, mul_12;
WORD32 *x_l1;
WORD32 *x_l2;
WORD32 *x_h2;
const WORD32 *w_ptr = w;
WORD32 i1;
h2 = index << 1;
l1 = index << 2;
l2 = (index << 2) + (index << 1);
x_l1 = &(x[l1]);
x_l2 = &(x[l2]);
x_h2 = &(x[h2]);
fft_jmp = 6 * (index);
for (i1 = 0; i1 < index1; i1++) {
for (i = 0; i < index; i++) {
si10 = (*w_ptr++);
co10 = (*w_ptr++);
si20 = (*w_ptr++);
co20 = (*w_ptr++);
si30 = (*w_ptr++);
co30 = (*w_ptr++);
x_0 = x[0];
x_h2_0 = x[h2];
x_l1_0 = x[l1];
x_l2_0 = x[l2];
xh0_0 = x_0 + x_l1_0;
xl0_0 = x_0 - x_l1_0;
xh20_0 = x_h2_0 + x_l2_0;
xl20_0 = x_h2_0 - x_l2_0;
x[0] = xh0_0 + xh20_0;
xt0_0 = xh0_0 - xh20_0;
x_1 = x[1];
x_h2_1 = x[h2 + 1];
x_l1_1 = x[l1 + 1];
x_l2_1 = x[l2 + 1];
xh1_0 = x_1 + x_l1_1;
xl1_0 = x_1 - x_l1_1;
xh21_0 = x_h2_1 + x_l2_1;
xl21_0 = x_h2_1 - x_l2_1;
x[1] = xh1_0 + xh21_0;
yt0_0 = xh1_0 - xh21_0;
xt1_0 = xl0_0 + xl21_0;
xt2_0 = xl0_0 - xl21_0;
yt2_0 = xl1_0 + xl20_0;
yt1_0 = xl1_0 - xl20_0;
mul_11 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt2_0, co30);
mul_3 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt2_0, si30);
x[l2] = (WORD32)((mul_3 + mul_11) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
mul_5 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt2_0, si30);
mul_9 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt2_0, co30);
x[l2 + 1] = (WORD32)((mul_9 - mul_5) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
mul_12 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt0_0, co20);
mul_2 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt0_0, si20);
x[l1] = (WORD32)((mul_2 + mul_12) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
mul_6 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt0_0, si20);
mul_8 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt0_0, co20);
x[l1 + 1] = (WORD32)((mul_8 - mul_6) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
mul_4 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt1_0, co10);
mul_1 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt1_0, si10);
x[h2] = (WORD32)((mul_1 + mul_4) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
mul_10 = ixheaacd_mult64(xt1_0, si10);
mul_7 = ixheaacd_mult64(yt1_0, co10);
x[h2 + 1] = (WORD32)((mul_7 - mul_10) >> 32) << RADIXSHIFT;
x += 2;
}
x += fft_jmp;
w_ptr = w_ptr - fft_jmp;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| High | 174,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
footnote_view_ = new LayoutPropagationView();
footnote_view_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical,
kDialogEdgePadding,
kDialogEdgePadding,
0));
footnote_view_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
footnote_view_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor));
legal_document_view_ = new views::StyledLabel(base::string16(), this);
footnote_view_->AddChildView(legal_document_view_);
footnote_view_->SetVisible(false);
return footnote_view_;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FrameLoader::notifyIfInitialDocumentAccessed function in core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.63, makes an incorrect check for an empty document during presentation of a modal dialog, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via vectors involving the document.write method.
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959} | Medium | 171,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
exit_code_ = exit_code;
BOOL result = SetEvent(process_exit_event_);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: juniper_monitor_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_monitor_header {
uint8_t pkt_type;
uint8_t padding;
uint8_t iif[2];
uint8_t service_id[4];
};
const struct juniper_monitor_header *mh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MONITOR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
mh = (const struct juniper_monitor_header *)p;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "service-id %u, iif %u, pkt-type %u: ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&mh->service_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->iif),
mh->pkt_type));
/* no proto field - lets guess by first byte of IP header*/
ip_heuristic_guess (ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BlockEntry::Kind SimpleBlock::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockSimple;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,332 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: transform_test(png_modifier *pmIn, PNG_CONST png_uint_32 idIn,
PNG_CONST image_transform* transform_listIn, PNG_CONST char * volatile name)
{
transform_display d;
context(&pmIn->this, fault);
transform_display_init(&d, pmIn, idIn, transform_listIn);
Try
{
size_t pos = 0;
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
char full_name[256];
/* Make sure the encoding fields are correct and enter the required
* modifications.
*/
transform_set_encoding(&d);
/* Add any modifications required by the transform list. */
d.transform_list->ini(d.transform_list, &d);
/* Add the color space information, if any, to the name. */
pos = safecat(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, name);
pos = safecat_current_encoding(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, d.pm);
/* Get a png_struct for reading the image. */
pp = set_modifier_for_read(d.pm, &pi, d.this.id, full_name);
standard_palette_init(&d.this);
# if 0
/* Logging (debugging only) */
{
char buffer[256];
(void)store_message(&d.pm->this, pp, buffer, sizeof buffer, 0,
"running test");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", buffer);
}
# endif
/* Introduce the correct read function. */
if (d.pm->this.progressive)
{
/* Share the row function with the standard implementation. */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(pp, &d, transform_info, progressive_row,
transform_end);
/* Now feed data into the reader until we reach the end: */
modifier_progressive_read(d.pm, pp, pi);
}
else
{
/* modifier_read expects a png_modifier* */
png_set_read_fn(pp, d.pm, modifier_read);
/* Check the header values: */
png_read_info(pp, pi);
/* Process the 'info' requirements. Only one image is generated */
transform_info_imp(&d, pp, pi);
sequential_row(&d.this, pp, pi, -1, 0);
if (!d.this.speed)
transform_image_validate(&d, pp, pi);
else
d.this.ps->validated = 1;
}
modifier_reset(d.pm);
}
Catch(fault)
{
modifier_reset(voidcast(png_modifier*,(void*)fault));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int bmp_getint32(jas_stream_t *in, int_fast32_t *val)
{
int n;
uint_fast32_t v;
int c;
for (n = 4, v = 0;;) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v |= (c << 24);
if (--n <= 0) {
break;
}
v >>= 8;
}
if (val) {
*val = v;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The bmp_getdata function in libjasper/bmp/bmp_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted BMP image in an imginfo command.
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes. | Medium | 168,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cp2112_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
buf[1] &= ~(1 << offset);
buf[2] = gpio_push_pull;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_CONFIG_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0) {
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO config: %d\n", ret);
goto exit;
}
ret = 0;
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
return ret <= 0 ? ret : -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-388
Summary: The cp2112_gpio_direction_input function in drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 does not have the expected EIO error status for a zero-length report, which allows local users to have an unspecified impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | High | 168,207 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
{
int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
uint16_t csum;
if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
return; /* not IPv4 */
hlen = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
csum_offset = 16;
break;
case PROTO_UDP:
csum_offset = 6;
break;
default:
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The net_checksum_calculate function in net/checksum.c in QEMU allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap read and crash) via the payload length in a crafted packet.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<views::Border> AutofillPopupBaseView::CreateBorder() {
auto border = std::make_unique<views::BubbleBorder>(
views::BubbleBorder::NONE, views::BubbleBorder::SMALL_SHADOW,
SK_ColorWHITE);
border->SetCornerRadius(GetCornerRadius());
border->set_md_shadow_elevation(
ChromeLayoutProvider::Get()->GetShadowElevationMetric(
views::EMPHASIS_MEDIUM));
return border;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android incorrectly allowed reentrance of FrameView::updateLifecyclePhasesInternal(), which allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360} | Medium | 172,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(
Profile* profile,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& extension_name,
const Debuggee& debuggee)
: profile_(profile),
agent_host_(agent_host),
extension_id_(extension_id),
last_request_id_(0),
infobar_(nullptr),
detach_reason_(api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_TARGET_CLOSED),
extension_registry_observer_(this) {
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, debuggee);
g_attached_client_hosts.Get().insert(this);
extension_registry_observer_.Add(ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
agent_host_->AttachClient(this);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kSilentDebuggerExtensionAPI)) {
return;
}
const Extension* extension =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile)->enabled_extensions().GetByID(
extension_id);
if (extension && Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension->location()))
return;
infobar_ = ExtensionDevToolsInfoBar::Create(
extension_id, extension_name, this,
base::Bind(&ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_strip_alpha(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct mmu_gather tlb;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
bool ret = true;
/*
* We have to make sure to not race with the victim exit path
* and cause premature new oom victim selection:
* __oom_reap_task_mm exit_mm
* mmget_not_zero
* mmput
* atomic_dec_and_test
* exit_oom_victim
* [...]
* out_of_memory
* select_bad_process
* # no TIF_MEMDIE task selects new victim
* unmap_page_range # frees some memory
*/
mutex_lock(&oom_lock);
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
ret = false;
trace_skip_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
goto unlock_oom;
}
/*
* If the mm has notifiers then we would need to invalidate them around
* unmap_page_range and that is risky because notifiers can sleep and
* what they do is basically undeterministic. So let's have a short
* sleep to give the oom victim some more time.
* TODO: we really want to get rid of this ugly hack and make sure that
* notifiers cannot block for unbounded amount of time and add
* mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_{start,end} around unmap_page_range
*/
if (mm_has_notifiers(mm)) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
schedule_timeout_idle(HZ);
goto unlock_oom;
}
/*
* MMF_OOM_SKIP is set by exit_mmap when the OOM reaper can't
* work on the mm anymore. The check for MMF_OOM_SKIP must run
* under mmap_sem for reading because it serializes against the
* down_write();up_write() cycle in exit_mmap().
*/
if (test_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags)) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
trace_skip_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
goto unlock_oom;
}
trace_start_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
/*
* Tell all users of get_user/copy_from_user etc... that the content
* is no longer stable. No barriers really needed because unmapping
* should imply barriers already and the reader would hit a page fault
* if it stumbled over a reaped memory.
*/
set_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &mm->flags);
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1);
for (vma = mm->mmap ; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma))
continue;
/*
* Only anonymous pages have a good chance to be dropped
* without additional steps which we cannot afford as we
* are OOM already.
*
* We do not even care about fs backed pages because all
* which are reclaimable have already been reclaimed and
* we do not want to block exit_mmap by keeping mm ref
* count elevated without a good reason.
*/
if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
unmap_page_range(&tlb, vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
NULL);
}
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, 0, -1);
pr_info("oom_reaper: reaped process %d (%s), now anon-rss:%lukB, file-rss:%lukB, shmem-rss:%lukB\n",
task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm,
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES)),
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_FILEPAGES)),
K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_SHMEMPAGES)));
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
trace_finish_task_reaping(tsk->pid);
unlock_oom:
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The __oom_reap_task_mm function in mm/oom_kill.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.4 mishandles gather operations, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (TLB entry leak or use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a copy_to_user call within a certain time window.
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: call_bind_status(struct rpc_task *task)
{
int status = -EIO;
if (task->tk_status >= 0) {
dprint_status(task);
task->tk_status = 0;
task->tk_action = call_connect;
return;
}
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -ENOMEM:
dprintk("RPC: %5u rpcbind out of memory\n", task->tk_pid);
rpc_delay(task, HZ >> 2);
goto retry_timeout;
case -EACCES:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind: RPC program/version "
"unavailable\n", task->tk_pid);
/* fail immediately if this is an RPC ping */
if (task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc == 0) {
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
rpc_delay(task, 3*HZ);
goto retry_timeout;
case -ETIMEDOUT:
dprintk("RPC: %5u rpcbind request timed out\n",
task->tk_pid);
goto retry_timeout;
case -EPFNOSUPPORT:
/* server doesn't support any rpcbind version we know of */
dprintk("RPC: %5u unrecognized remote rpcbind service\n",
task->tk_pid);
break;
case -EPROTONOSUPPORT:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind version unavailable, retrying\n",
task->tk_pid);
task->tk_status = 0;
task->tk_action = call_bind;
return;
case -ECONNREFUSED: /* connection problems */
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOTCONN:
case -EHOSTDOWN:
case -EHOSTUNREACH:
case -ENETUNREACH:
case -EPIPE:
dprintk("RPC: %5u remote rpcbind unreachable: %d\n",
task->tk_pid, task->tk_status);
if (!RPC_IS_SOFTCONN(task)) {
rpc_delay(task, 5*HZ);
goto retry_timeout;
}
status = task->tk_status;
break;
default:
dprintk("RPC: %5u unrecognized rpcbind error (%d)\n",
task->tk_pid, -task->tk_status);
}
rpc_exit(task, status);
return;
retry_timeout:
task->tk_action = call_timeout;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Network Lock Manager (NLM) protocol implementation in the NFS client functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a LOCK_UN flock system call.
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 166,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostView* RenderFrameHostManager::GetRenderWidgetHostView() const {
if (interstitial_page_)
return interstitial_page_->GetView();
if (render_frame_host_)
return render_frame_host_->GetView();
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,322 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const net::HttpRequestHeaders& request_headers() const {
return request_headers_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652} | High | 172,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ppp_unregister_channel(struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch = chan->ppp;
struct ppp_net *pn;
if (!pch)
return; /* should never happen */
chan->ppp = NULL;
/*
* This ensures that we have returned from any calls into the
* the channel's start_xmit or ioctl routine before we proceed.
*/
down_write(&pch->chan_sem);
spin_lock_bh(&pch->downl);
pch->chan = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&pch->downl);
up_write(&pch->chan_sem);
ppp_disconnect_channel(pch);
pn = ppp_pernet(pch->chan_net);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
list_del(&pch->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
pch->file.dead = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&pch->file.rwait);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pch->file.refcnt))
ppp_destroy_channel(pch);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash, or spinlock) or possibly have unspecified other impact by removing a network namespace, related to the ppp_register_net_channel and ppp_unregister_channel functions.
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnUserInfoFetchComplete(
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
std::string email;
if (response_code == net::HTTP_OK) {
scoped_ptr<Value> message_value(base::JSONReader::Read(response));
if (message_value.get() &&
message_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> response_dict(
static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(message_value.release()));
response_dict->GetString(kEmailValue, &email);
}
}
if (email.empty()) {
delegate_->OnNetworkError(response_code);
} else {
delegate_->OnRefreshTokenResponse(
email, access_token_, expires_in_seconds_);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int msg_flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
long timeo;
int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
rdsdebug("size %zu flags 0x%x timeo %ld\n", size, msg_flags, timeo);
if (msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
while (1) {
/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (rs->rs_cong_notify) {
ret = rds_notify_cong(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
if (nonblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) ||
rs->rs_cong_notify ||
rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)), timeo);
rdsdebug("recvmsg woke inc %p timeo %ld\n", inc,
timeo);
if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)
continue;
ret = timeo;
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
&inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, msg->msg_iov,
size);
if (ret < 0)
break;
/*
* if the message we just copied isn't at the head of the
* recv queue then someone else raced us to return it, try
* to get the next message.
*/
if (!rds_still_queued(rs, inc, !(msg_flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
rds_inc_put(inc);
inc = NULL;
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
continue;
}
if (ret < be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len)) {
if (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)
ret = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_delivered);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inc->i_saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
break;
}
if (inc)
rds_inc_put(inc);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The rds_recvmsg function in net/rds/recv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0.44 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom or (2) recvmsg system call on an RDS socket.
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason ([email protected]) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 165,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceNode::OnCurrentSrcChanged(const KURL& current_src) {
GetMediaElementAudioSourceHandler().OnCurrentSrcChanged(current_src);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313} | Medium | 173,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: Division-by-zero vulnerabilities in the functions pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_cprl, and pi_next_rpcl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_process_request_internal(request_rec *r)
{
int file_req = (r->main && r->filename);
int access_status;
core_dir_config *d;
/* Ignore embedded %2F's in path for proxy requests */
if (!r->proxyreq && r->parsed_uri.path) {
d = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if (d->allow_encoded_slashes) {
access_status = ap_unescape_url_keep2f(r->parsed_uri.path, d->decode_encoded_slashes);
}
else {
access_status = ap_unescape_url(r->parsed_uri.path);
}
if (access_status) {
if (access_status == HTTP_NOT_FOUND) {
if (! d->allow_encoded_slashes) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00026)
"found %%2f (encoded '/') in URI "
"(decoded='%s'), returning 404",
r->parsed_uri.path);
}
}
return access_status;
}
}
ap_getparents(r->uri); /* OK --- shrinking transformations... */
/* All file subrequests are a huge pain... they cannot bubble through the
* next several steps. Only file subrequests are allowed an empty uri,
* otherwise let translate_name kill the request.
*/
if (!file_req) {
if ((access_status = ap_location_walk(r))) {
return access_status;
}
if ((access_status = ap_if_walk(r))) {
return access_status;
}
/* Don't set per-dir loglevel if LogLevelOverride is set */
if (!r->connection->log) {
d = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if (d->log)
r->log = d->log;
}
if ((access_status = ap_run_translate_name(r))) {
return decl_die(access_status, "translate", r);
}
}
/* Reset to the server default config prior to running map_to_storage
*/
r->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
if ((access_status = ap_run_map_to_storage(r))) {
/* This request wasn't in storage (e.g. TRACE) */
return access_status;
}
/* Rerun the location walk, which overrides any map_to_storage config.
*/
if ((access_status = ap_location_walk(r))) {
return access_status;
}
if ((access_status = ap_if_walk(r))) {
return access_status;
}
/* Don't set per-dir loglevel if LogLevelOverride is set */
if (!r->connection->log) {
d = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if (d->log)
r->log = d->log;
}
if ((access_status = ap_run_post_perdir_config(r))) {
return access_status;
}
/* Only on the main request! */
if (r->main == NULL) {
if ((access_status = ap_run_header_parser(r))) {
return access_status;
}
}
/* Skip authn/authz if the parent or prior request passed the authn/authz,
* and that configuration didn't change (this requires optimized _walk()
* functions in map_to_storage that use the same merge results given
* identical input.) If the config changes, we must re-auth.
*/
if (r->prev && (r->prev->per_dir_config == r->per_dir_config)) {
r->user = r->prev->user;
r->ap_auth_type = r->prev->ap_auth_type;
}
else if (r->main && (r->main->per_dir_config == r->per_dir_config)) {
r->user = r->main->user;
r->ap_auth_type = r->main->ap_auth_type;
}
else {
switch (ap_satisfies(r)) {
case SATISFY_ALL:
case SATISFY_NOSPEC:
if ((access_status = ap_run_access_checker(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status,
"check access (with Satisfy All)", r);
}
access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
if (access_status == OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
"request authorized without authentication by "
"access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
}
else if (access_status != DECLINED) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
}
else {
if ((access_status = ap_run_check_user_id(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
}
if (r->user == NULL) {
/* don't let buggy authn module crash us in authz */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(00027)
"No authentication done but request not "
"allowed without authentication for %s. "
"Authentication not configured?",
r->uri);
access_status = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
}
if ((access_status = ap_run_auth_checker(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check authorization", r);
}
}
break;
case SATISFY_ANY:
if ((access_status = ap_run_access_checker(r)) == OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
"request authorized without authentication by "
"access_checker hook and 'Satisfy any': %s",
r->uri);
break;
}
access_status = ap_run_access_checker_ex(r);
if (access_status == OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
"request authorized without authentication by "
"access_checker_ex hook: %s", r->uri);
}
else if (access_status != DECLINED) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check access", r);
}
else {
if ((access_status = ap_run_check_user_id(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
}
if (r->user == NULL) {
/* don't let buggy authn module crash us in authz */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(00028)
"No authentication done but request not "
"allowed without authentication for %s. "
"Authentication not configured?",
r->uri);
access_status = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
return decl_die(access_status, "check user", r);
}
if ((access_status = ap_run_auth_checker(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status, "check authorization", r);
}
}
break;
}
}
/* XXX Must make certain the ap_run_type_checker short circuits mime
* in mod-proxy for r->proxyreq && r->parsed_uri.scheme
* && !strcmp(r->parsed_uri.scheme, "http")
*/
if ((access_status = ap_run_type_checker(r)) != OK) {
return decl_die(access_status, "find types", r);
}
if ((access_status = ap_run_fixups(r)) != OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r, "fixups hook gave %d: %s",
access_status, r->uri);
return access_status;
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ap_some_auth_required function in server/request.c in the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.x before 2.4.14 does not consider that a Require directive may be associated with an authorization setting rather than an authentication setting, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging the presence of a module that relies on the 2.2 API behavior.
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,632 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Chapters::Atom::ExpandDisplaysArray()
{
if (m_displays_size > m_displays_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_displays_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_displays_size;
Display* const displays = new (std::nothrow) Display[size];
if (displays == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_displays_count; ++idx)
{
m_displays[idx].ShallowCopy(displays[idx]);
}
delete[] m_displays;
m_displays = displays;
m_displays_size = size;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer, OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
bufferMeta->setGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)) {
VideoGrallocMetadata &metadata = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
metadata.pHandle = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle;
} else if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)) {
VideoNativeMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
metadata.pBuffer = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
metadata.nFenceFd = -1;
} else {
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%u)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], header->nAllocLen);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). | High | 169,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gs_usb *dev;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int icount, i;
struct gs_host_config hconf = {
.byte_order = 0x0000beef,
};
struct gs_device_config dconf;
/* send host config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT,
USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
&hconf,
sizeof(hconf),
1000);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't send data format (err=%d)\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
/* read device config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_rcvctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_DEVICE_CONFIG,
USB_DIR_IN|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
1,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber,
&dconf,
sizeof(dconf),
1000);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Couldn't get device config: (err=%d)\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
icount = dconf.icount + 1;
dev_info(&intf->dev, "Configuring for %d interfaces\n", icount);
if (icount > GS_MAX_INTF) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"Driver cannot handle more that %d CAN interfaces\n",
GS_MAX_INTF);
return -EINVAL;
}
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
init_usb_anchor(&dev->rx_submitted);
atomic_set(&dev->active_channels, 0);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, dev);
dev->udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++) {
dev->canch[i] = gs_make_candev(i, intf, &dconf);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dev->canch[i])) {
/* save error code to return later */
rc = PTR_ERR(dev->canch[i]);
/* on failure destroy previously created candevs */
icount = i;
for (i = 0; i < icount; i++)
gs_destroy_candev(dev->canch[i]);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
kfree(dev);
return rc;
}
dev->canch[i]->parent = dev;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.2 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-stable <[email protected]> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> | High | 168,220 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void jp2_box_dump(jp2_box_t *box, FILE *out)
{
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
assert(boxinfo);
fprintf(out, "JP2 box: ");
fprintf(out, "type=%c%s%c (0x%08"PRIxFAST32"); length=%"PRIuFAST32"\n", '"', boxinfo->name,
'"', box->type, box->len);
if (box->ops->dumpdata) {
(*box->ops->dumpdata)(box, out);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by leveraging incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data on error. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-8887.
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error. | Medium | 168,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cff_charset_load( CFF_Charset charset,
FT_UInt num_glyphs,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong base_offset,
FT_ULong offset,
FT_Bool invert )
{
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
FT_Error error = CFF_Err_Ok;
FT_UShort glyph_sid;
/* If the the offset is greater than 2, we have to parse the */
/* charset table. */
if ( offset > 2 )
{
FT_UInt j;
charset->offset = base_offset + offset;
/* Get the format of the table. */
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( charset->offset ) ||
FT_READ_BYTE( charset->format ) )
goto Exit;
/* Allocate memory for sids. */
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( charset->sids, num_glyphs ) )
goto Exit;
/* assign the .notdef glyph */
charset->sids[0] = 0;
switch ( charset->format )
{
case 0:
if ( num_glyphs > 0 )
{
if ( FT_FRAME_ENTER( ( num_glyphs - 1 ) * 2 ) )
goto Exit;
for ( j = 1; j < num_glyphs; j++ )
charset->sids[j] = FT_GET_USHORT();
FT_FRAME_EXIT();
}
/* Read the first glyph sid of the range. */
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( glyph_sid ) )
goto Exit;
/* Read the number of glyphs in the range. */
if ( charset->format == 2 )
{
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( nleft ) )
goto Exit;
}
else
{
if ( FT_READ_BYTE( nleft ) )
goto Exit;
}
/* Fill in the range of sids -- `nleft + 1' glyphs. */
for ( i = 0; j < num_glyphs && i <= nleft; i++, j++, glyph_sid++ )
charset->sids[j] = glyph_sid;
}
}
break;
default:
FT_ERROR(( "cff_charset_load: invalid table format!\n" ));
error = CFF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
goto Exit;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in FreeType 2.3.9 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to large values in certain inputs in (1) smooth/ftsmooth.c, (2) sfnt/ttcmap.c, and (3) cff/cffload.c.
Commit Message: | High | 164,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint NotificationsEngine::Notify(const QString &app_name, uint replaces_id,
const QString &app_icon, const QString &summary, const QString &body,
const QStringList &actions, const QVariantMap &hints, int timeout)
{
uint partOf = 0;
const QString appRealName = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-appname")].toString();
const QString eventId = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-eventId")].toString();
const bool skipGrouping = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-skipGrouping")].toBool();
if (!replaces_id && m_activeNotifications.values().contains(app_name + summary) && !skipGrouping && !m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
partOf = m_activeNotifications.key(app_name + summary).midRef(13).toUInt();
}
qDebug() << "Currrent active notifications:" << m_activeNotifications;
qDebug() << "Guessing partOf as:" << partOf;
qDebug() << " New Notification: " << summary << body << timeout << "& Part of:" << partOf;
QString _body;
if (partOf > 0) {
const QString source = QStringLiteral("notification %1").arg(partOf);
Plasma::DataContainer *container = containerForSource(source);
if (container) {
_body = container->data()[QStringLiteral("body")].toString();
if (_body != body) {
_body.append("\n").append(body);
} else {
_body = body;
}
replaces_id = partOf;
CloseNotification(partOf);
}
}
uint id = replaces_id ? replaces_id : m_nextId++;
if (m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
if (m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.contains(app_name)) {
id = m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.value(app_name);
} else {
m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.insert(app_name, id);
}
}
QString appname_str = app_name;
if (appname_str.isEmpty()) {
appname_str = i18n("Unknown Application");
}
bool isPersistent = timeout == 0;
const int AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH = 6;
const int WORD_PER_MINUTE = 250;
int count = summary.length() + body.length();
timeout = 60000 * count / AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH / WORD_PER_MINUTE;
timeout = 2000 + qMax(timeout, 3000);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in KDE Plasma Workspace before 5.12.0. dataengines/notifications/notificationsengine.cpp allows remote attackers to discover client IP addresses via a URL in a notification, as demonstrated by the src attribute of an IMG element.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,025 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fbCompositeGeneral (CARD8 op,
PicturePtr pSrc,
PicturePtr pMask,
PicturePtr pDst,
INT16 xSrc,
INT16 ySrc,
INT16 xMask,
INT16 yMask,
INT16 xDst,
INT16 yDst,
CARD16 width,
CARD16 height)
{
RegionRec region;
int n;
BoxPtr pbox;
Bool srcRepeat = FALSE;
Bool maskRepeat = FALSE;
int w, h;
CARD32 _scanline_buffer[SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH*3];
CARD32 *scanline_buffer = _scanline_buffer;
FbComposeData compose_data;
if (pSrc->pDrawable)
srcRepeat = pSrc->repeatType == RepeatNormal && !pSrc->transform
&& (pSrc->pDrawable->width != 1 || pSrc->pDrawable->height != 1);
if (pMask && pMask->pDrawable)
maskRepeat = pMask->repeatType == RepeatNormal && !pMask->transform
&& (pMask->pDrawable->width != 1 || pMask->pDrawable->height != 1);
if (op == PictOpOver && !pMask && !pSrc->transform && !PICT_FORMAT_A(pSrc->format) && !pSrc->alphaMap)
op = PictOpSrc;
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion,
pSrc,
pMask,
pDst,
xSrc,
ySrc,
xMask,
yMask,
xDst,
yDst,
width,
height))
return;
compose_data.op = op;
compose_data.src = pSrc;
compose_data.mask = pMask;
compose_data.dest = pDst;
if (width > SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
scanline_buffer = (CARD32 *) malloc(width * 3 * sizeof(CARD32));
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
compose_data.ySrc = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
compose_data.yMask = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
compose_data.yDest = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
compose_data.height = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
compose_data.xSrc = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
compose_data.xMask = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
compose_data.xDest = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
compose_data.yMask = mod (compose_data.yMask, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (compose_data.height > pMask->pDrawable->height - compose_data.yMask)
compose_data.height = pMask->pDrawable->height - compose_data.yMask;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
compose_data.ySrc = mod (compose_data.ySrc, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (compose_data.height > pSrc->pDrawable->height - compose_data.ySrc)
compose_data.height = pSrc->pDrawable->height - compose_data.ySrc;
}
while (w)
{
compose_data.width = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
compose_data.xMask = mod (compose_data.xMask, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (compose_data.width > pMask->pDrawable->width - compose_data.xMask)
compose_data.width = pMask->pDrawable->width - compose_data.xMask;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
compose_data.xSrc = mod (compose_data.xSrc, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (compose_data.width > pSrc->pDrawable->width - compose_data.xSrc)
compose_data.width = pSrc->pDrawable->width - compose_data.xSrc;
}
fbCompositeRect(&compose_data, scanline_buffer);
w -= compose_data.width;
compose_data.xSrc += compose_data.width;
compose_data.xMask += compose_data.width;
compose_data.xDest += compose_data.width;
}
h -= compose_data.height;
compose_data.ySrc += compose_data.height;
compose_data.yMask += compose_data.height;
compose_data.yDest += compose_data.height;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
if (scanline_buffer != _scanline_buffer)
free(scanline_buffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The fbComposite function in fbpict.c in the Render extension in the X server in X.Org X11R7.1 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted request, related to an incorrect macro definition.
Commit Message: | High | 165,128 |
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