instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void perf_event_task_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_task_event *task_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct task_struct *task = task_event->task;
int ret, size = task_event->event_id.header.size;
perf_event_header__init_id(&task_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
task_event->event_id.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
task_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ppid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
task_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ptid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
perf_output_put(&handle, task_event->event_id);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
task_event->event_id.header.size = size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,835 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be\u4e36\u4e40\u4e41\u4e3f])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u4e00\u3127])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u3099|\u309A|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309} | Medium | 172,727 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct btrfs_dir_item *btrfs_match_dir_item_name(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *dir_item;
unsigned long name_ptr;
u32 total_len;
u32 cur = 0;
u32 this_len;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
dir_item = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0], struct btrfs_dir_item);
if (verify_dir_item(root, leaf, dir_item))
return NULL;
total_len = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, path->slots[0]);
while (cur < total_len) {
this_len = sizeof(*dir_item) +
btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, dir_item) +
btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, dir_item);
name_ptr = (unsigned long)(dir_item + 1);
if (btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, dir_item) == name_len &&
memcmp_extent_buffer(leaf, name, name_ptr, name_len) == 0)
return dir_item;
cur += this_len;
dir_item = (struct btrfs_dir_item *)((char *)dir_item +
this_len);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.19 does not ensure that the visible xattr state is consistent with a requested replacement, which allows local users to bypass intended ACL settings and gain privileges via standard filesystem operations (1) during an xattr-replacement time window, related to a race condition, or (2) after an xattr-replacement attempt that fails because the data does not fit.
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size) {
return malloc(size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the h264dec component in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a large memory allocation, aka internal bug 27855419.
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
| High | 173,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct ib_ucontext *hns_roce_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_device *ib_dev,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hns_roce_ucontext *context;
struct hns_roce_ib_alloc_ucontext_resp resp;
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = to_hr_dev(ib_dev);
resp.qp_tab_size = hr_dev->caps.num_qps;
context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!context)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = hns_roce_uar_alloc(hr_dev, &context->uar);
if (ret)
goto error_fail_uar_alloc;
if (hr_dev->caps.flags & HNS_ROCE_CAP_FLAG_RECORD_DB) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->page_list);
mutex_init(&context->page_mutex);
}
ret = ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &resp, sizeof(resp));
if (ret)
goto error_fail_copy_to_udata;
return &context->ibucontext;
error_fail_copy_to_udata:
hns_roce_uar_free(hr_dev, &context->uar);
error_fail_uar_alloc:
kfree(context);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-665
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.17, hns_roce_alloc_ucontext in drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c does not initialize the resp data structure, which might allow attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory, aka CID-df7e40425813.
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,504 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
void *buf, void *end)
{
void *p = buf;
char *dbuf;
char *ticket_buf;
u8 reply_struct_v;
u32 num;
int ret;
dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!dbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = -ENOMEM;
ticket_buf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ticket_buf)
goto out_dbuf;
ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
if (reply_struct_v != 1)
return -EINVAL;
ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, num, bad);
dout("%d tickets\n", num);
while (num--) {
ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
dbuf, ticket_buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(ticket_buf);
out_dbuf:
kfree(dbuf);
return ret;
bad:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/ceph/auth_x.c in Ceph, as used in the Linux kernel before 3.16.3, does not properly validate auth replies, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data from the IP address of a Ceph Monitor.
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]> | High | 166,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_build(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
char build[ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE + 1];
int ret;
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_BUILD, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
build, ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
build[ret] = 0;
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Firmware: build %s\n", build);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 168,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: t42_parse_charstrings( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table code_table = &loader->charstrings;
PS_Table name_table = &loader->glyph_names;
PS_Table swap_table = &loader->swap_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_UInt n;
FT_UInt notdef_index = 0;
FT_Byte notdef_found = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( ft_isdigit( *parser->root.cursor ) )
{
loader->num_glyphs = (FT_UInt)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '<' )
{
/* We have `<< ... >>'. Count the number of `/' in the dictionary */
/* to get its size. */
FT_UInt count = 0;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
if ( *parser->root.cursor == '/' )
count++;
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '>' )
{
loader->num_glyphs = count;
parser->root.cursor = cur; /* rewind */
break;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: invalid token\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* initialize tables */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( code_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( name_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Initialize table for swapping index notdef_index and */
/* index 0 names and codes (if necessary). */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( swap_table, 4, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
n = 0;
for (;;)
{
/* The format is simple: */
/* `/glyphname' + index [+ def] */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* We stop when we find an `end' keyword or '>' */
if ( *cur == 'e' &&
cur + 3 < limit &&
cur[1] == 'n' &&
cur[2] == 'd' &&
t42_is_space( cur[3] ) )
break;
if ( *cur == '>' )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
if ( *cur == '/' )
{
FT_PtrDist len;
if ( cur + 1 >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
cur++; /* skip `/' */
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* add a trailing zero to the name table */
name_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
/* record index of /.notdef */
if ( *cur == '.' &&
ft_strcmp( ".notdef",
(const char*)(name_table->elements[n]) ) == 0 )
{
notdef_index = n;
notdef_found = 1;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
(void)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
code_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
n++;
if ( n >= loader->num_glyphs )
break;
}
}
loader->num_glyphs = n;
if ( !notdef_found )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: no /.notdef glyph\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* if /.notdef does not occupy index 0, do our magic. */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)name_table->elements[0] ) )
{
/* Swap glyph in index 0 with /.notdef glyph. First, add index 0 */
/* name and code entries to swap_table. Then place notdef_index */
/* name and code entries into swap_table. Then swap name and code */
/* entries at indices notdef_index and 0 using values stored in */
/* swap_table. */
/* Index 0 name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 0,
name_table->elements[0],
name_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index 0 code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 1,
code_table->elements[0],
code_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 2,
name_table->elements[notdef_index],
name_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 3,
code_table->elements[notdef_index],
code_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[0],
swap_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[1],
swap_table->lengths [1] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[2],
swap_table->lengths [2] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[3],
swap_table->lengths [3] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeType before 2.5.4 does not check for the end of the data during certain parsing actions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Type42 font, related to type42/t42parse.c and type1/t1load.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_ip6_sock *lsk = l2tp_ip6_sk(sk);
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (peer) {
if (!lsk->peer_conn_id)
return -ENOTCONN;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->peer_conn_id;
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->rcv_saddr))
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->saddr;
else
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->rcv_saddr;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->conn_id;
}
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The l2tp_ip6_getname function in net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_unused member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via
the getsockname() syscall. Initialize l2tp_unused with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset, int clockrt)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct restart_block *restart;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
q.pi_state = NULL;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = NULL;
q.requeue_pi_key = NULL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, clockrt ? CLOCK_REALTIME :
CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
retry:
/* Prepare to wait on uaddr. */
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, fshared, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* queue_me and wait for wakeup, timeout, or a signal. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
/* If we were woken (and unqueued), we succeeded, whatever. */
ret = 0;
if (!unqueue_me(&q))
goto out_put_key;
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
if (to && !to->task)
goto out_put_key;
/*
* We expect signal_pending(current), but we might be the
* victim of a spurious wakeup as well.
*/
if (!signal_pending(current)) {
put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key);
goto retry;
}
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!abs_time)
goto out_put_key;
restart = ¤t_thread_info()->restart_block;
restart->fn = futex_wait_restart;
restart->futex.uaddr = (u32 *)uaddr;
restart->futex.val = val;
restart->futex.time = abs_time->tv64;
restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
restart->futex.flags = FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
if (fshared)
restart->futex.flags |= FLAGS_SHARED;
if (clockrt)
restart->futex.flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
out_put_key:
put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The futex_wait function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly maintain a certain reference count during requeue operations, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that triggers a zero count.
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 166,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int hns_nic_net_xmit_hw(struct net_device *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
struct device *dev = ring_to_dev(ring);
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
struct skb_frag_struct *frag;
int buf_num;
int seg_num;
dma_addr_t dma;
int size, next_to_use;
int i;
switch (priv->ops.maybe_stop_tx(&skb, &buf_num, ring)) {
case -EBUSY:
ring->stats.tx_busy++;
goto out_net_tx_busy;
case -ENOMEM:
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
netdev_err(ndev, "no memory to xmit!\n");
goto out_err_tx_ok;
default:
break;
}
/* no. of segments (plus a header) */
seg_num = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1;
next_to_use = ring->next_to_use;
/* fill the first part */
size = skb_headlen(skb);
dma = dma_map_single(dev, skb->data, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma)) {
netdev_err(ndev, "TX head DMA map failed\n");
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
goto out_err_tx_ok;
}
priv->ops.fill_desc(ring, skb, size, dma, seg_num == 1 ? 1 : 0,
buf_num, DESC_TYPE_SKB, ndev->mtu);
/* fill the fragments */
for (i = 1; i < seg_num; i++) {
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1];
size = skb_frag_size(frag);
dma = skb_frag_dma_map(dev, frag, 0, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma)) {
netdev_err(ndev, "TX frag(%d) DMA map failed\n", i);
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
goto out_map_frag_fail;
}
priv->ops.fill_desc(ring, skb_frag_page(frag), size, dma,
seg_num - 1 == i ? 1 : 0, buf_num,
DESC_TYPE_PAGE, ndev->mtu);
}
/*complete translate all packets*/
dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(ndev, skb->queue_mapping);
netdev_tx_sent_queue(dev_queue, skb->len);
wmb(); /* commit all data before submit */
assert(skb->queue_mapping < priv->ae_handle->q_num);
hnae_queue_xmit(priv->ae_handle->qs[skb->queue_mapping], buf_num);
ring->stats.tx_pkts++;
ring->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
out_map_frag_fail:
while (ring->next_to_use != next_to_use) {
unfill_desc(ring);
if (ring->next_to_use != next_to_use)
dma_unmap_page(dev,
ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use].dma,
ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use].length,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else
dma_unmap_single(dev,
ring->desc_cb[next_to_use].dma,
ring->desc_cb[next_to_use].length,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
out_err_tx_ok:
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
out_net_tx_busy:
netif_stop_subqueue(ndev, skb->queue_mapping);
/* Herbert's original patch had:
* smp_mb__after_netif_stop_queue();
* but since that doesn't exist yet, just open code it.
*/
smp_mb();
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, local users can cause a denial of service (use-after-free and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging differences in skb handling between hns_nic_net_xmit_hw and hns_nic_net_xmit.
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 169,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCacheForWorker(
int host_id, int parent_process_id, int parent_host_id) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCacheForWorker(parent_process_id, parent_host_id);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815} | High | 171,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", (long long)*offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
int32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, (long long)*offset, depth);
if (kUseHexDump) {
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
}
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f') && !mMoofFound) {
mMoofFound = true;
mMoofOffset = *offset;
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (chunk_size < 20 || pssh.datalen > chunk_size - 20) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (!timescale) {
ALOGE("timescale should not be ZERO.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0 && mLastTrack->timescale != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
if (max_size > SIZE_MAX - 10 * 2) {
ALOGE("max sample size too big: %zu", max_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
uint32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, (int32_t*)&width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight,(int32_t*) &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
} else {
if (width > 32768 || height > 32768) {
ALOGE("can't support %u x %u video", width, height);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC(0xA9, 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v')) {
ESDS esds(&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
uint8_t objectTypeIndication;
if (esds.getObjectTypeIndication(&objectTypeIndication) == OK) {
if (objectTypeIndication >= 0x60 && objectTypeIndication <= 0x65) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG2);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", (long long)chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
bool isParsingMetaKeys = underQTMetaPath(mPath, 2);
if (!isParsingMetaKeys) {
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return OK;
}
*offset += sizeof(buffer);
}
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
mMdatFound = true;
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
break;
}
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
if (mLastTrack != NULL) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('k', 'e', 'y', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaKey(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if ((chunk_size > SIZE_MAX) || (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %" PRId64 " and data_offset = %" PRId64,
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0 || static_cast<uint64_t>(chunk_data_size) >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaVal(chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
| High | 173,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | Medium | 167,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FaviconSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
FaviconService* favicon_service =
profile_->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (favicon_service) {
FaviconService::Handle handle;
if (path.empty()) {
SendDefaultResponse(request_id);
return;
}
if (path.size() > 8 && path.substr(0, 8) == "iconurl/") {
handle = favicon_service->GetFavicon(
GURL(path.substr(8)),
history::FAVICON,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
} else {
handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
icon_types_,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
}
cancelable_consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, request_id);
} else {
SendResponse(request_id, NULL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that trigger an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::LearnOrigins(
const std::string& host,
const GURL& main_frame_origin,
const std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>& summaries) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (host.size() > ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::kMaxStringLength)
return;
OriginData data;
bool exists = origin_data_->TryGetData(host, &data);
if (!exists) {
data.set_host(host);
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
size_t origins_size = summaries.size();
auto ordered_origins =
std::vector<const OriginRequestSummary*>(origins_size);
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
size_t index = kv.second.first_occurrence;
DCHECK_LT(index, origins_size);
ordered_origins[index] = &kv.second;
}
for (const OriginRequestSummary* summary : ordered_origins) {
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, *summary);
}
} else {
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
std::map<GURL, int> old_index;
int old_size = static_cast<int>(data.origins_size());
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
bool is_new =
old_index.insert({GURL(data.origins(i).origin()), i}).second;
DCHECK(is_new);
}
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
auto* old_origin = data.mutable_origins(i);
GURL origin(old_origin->origin());
auto it = summaries.find(origin);
if (it == summaries.end()) {
old_origin->set_number_of_misses(old_origin->number_of_misses() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(old_origin->consecutive_misses() +
1);
} else {
const auto& new_origin = it->second;
old_origin->set_always_access_network(new_origin.always_access_network);
old_origin->set_accessed_network(new_origin.accessed_network);
int position = new_origin.first_occurrence + 1;
int total =
old_origin->number_of_hits() + old_origin->number_of_misses();
old_origin->set_average_position(
((old_origin->average_position() * total) + position) /
(total + 1));
old_origin->set_number_of_hits(old_origin->number_of_hits() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(0);
}
}
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
if (old_index.find(kv.first) != old_index.end())
continue;
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, kv.second);
}
}
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::TrimOrigins(&data,
config_.max_consecutive_misses);
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::SortOrigins(&data, main_frame_origin.spec());
if (data.origins_size() > static_cast<int>(config_.max_origins_per_entry)) {
data.mutable_origins()->DeleteSubrange(
config_.max_origins_per_entry,
data.origins_size() - config_.max_origins_per_entry);
}
if (data.origins_size() == 0)
origin_data_->DeleteData({host});
else
origin_data_->UpdateData(host, data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rm_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
int rc;
bool found_cred;
CredentialWrapper * cred_wrapper = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Attempting to delete cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
found_cred=false;
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred_wrapper)) {
if (cred_wrapper->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
credentials.DeleteCurrent();
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
if (found_cred) {
priv_state priv = set_root_priv();
unlink (cred_wrapper->GetStorageName());
SaveCredentialList();
set_priv(priv);
delete cred_wrapper;
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Removed credential %s for owner %s\n", name, owner);
} else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to remove credential %s:%s (not found)\n", owner, name);
}
free (owner);
socket->encode();
rc = (found_cred)?CREDD_SUCCESS:CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code(rc);
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if (name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ape_read_header(AVFormatContext * s, AVFormatParameters * ap)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
APEContext *ape = s->priv_data;
AVStream *st;
uint32_t tag;
int i;
int total_blocks;
int64_t pts;
/* TODO: Skip any leading junk such as id3v2 tags */
ape->junklength = 0;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('M', 'A', 'C', ' '))
return -1;
ape->fileversion = avio_rl16(pb);
if (ape->fileversion < APE_MIN_VERSION || ape->fileversion > APE_MAX_VERSION) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unsupported file version - %d.%02d\n", ape->fileversion / 1000, (ape->fileversion % 1000) / 10);
return -1;
}
if (ape->fileversion >= 3980) {
ape->padding1 = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->descriptorlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->headerlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->seektablelength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavheaderlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->audiodatalength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->audiodatalength_high = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavtaillength = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_read(pb, ape->md5, 16);
/* Skip any unknown bytes at the end of the descriptor.
This is for future compatibility */
if (ape->descriptorlength > 52)
avio_seek(pb, ape->descriptorlength - 52, SEEK_CUR);
/* Read header data */
ape->compressiontype = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->formatflags = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->blocksperframe = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->finalframeblocks = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->totalframes = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->bps = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->channels = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->samplerate = avio_rl32(pb);
} else {
ape->descriptorlength = 0;
ape->headerlength = 32;
ape->compressiontype = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->formatflags = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->channels = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->samplerate = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavheaderlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavtaillength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->totalframes = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->finalframeblocks = avio_rl32(pb);
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_HAS_PEAK_LEVEL) {
avio_seek(pb, 4, SEEK_CUR); /* Skip the peak level */
ape->headerlength += 4;
}
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_HAS_SEEK_ELEMENTS) {
ape->seektablelength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->headerlength += 4;
ape->seektablelength *= sizeof(int32_t);
} else
ape->seektablelength = ape->totalframes * sizeof(int32_t);
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_8_BIT)
ape->bps = 8;
else if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_24_BIT)
ape->bps = 24;
else
ape->bps = 16;
if (ape->fileversion >= 3950)
ape->blocksperframe = 73728 * 4;
else if (ape->fileversion >= 3900 || (ape->fileversion >= 3800 && ape->compressiontype >= 4000))
ape->blocksperframe = 73728;
else
ape->blocksperframe = 9216;
/* Skip any stored wav header */
if (!(ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_CREATE_WAV_HEADER))
avio_seek(pb, ape->wavheaderlength, SEEK_CUR);
}
if(ape->totalframes > UINT_MAX / sizeof(APEFrame)){
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many frames: %d\n", ape->totalframes);
return -1;
}
ape->frames = av_malloc(ape->totalframes * sizeof(APEFrame));
if(!ape->frames)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ape->firstframe = ape->junklength + ape->descriptorlength + ape->headerlength + ape->seektablelength + ape->wavheaderlength;
ape->currentframe = 0;
ape->totalsamples = ape->finalframeblocks;
if (ape->totalframes > 1)
ape->totalsamples += ape->blocksperframe * (ape->totalframes - 1);
if (ape->seektablelength > 0) {
ape->seektable = av_malloc(ape->seektablelength);
for (i = 0; i < ape->seektablelength / sizeof(uint32_t); i++)
ape->seektable[i] = avio_rl32(pb);
}
ape->frames[0].pos = ape->firstframe;
ape->frames[0].nblocks = ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[0].skip = 0;
for (i = 1; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
ape->frames[i].pos = ape->seektable[i]; //ape->frames[i-1].pos + ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[i].nblocks = ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[i - 1].size = ape->frames[i].pos - ape->frames[i - 1].pos;
ape->frames[i].skip = (ape->frames[i].pos - ape->frames[0].pos) & 3;
}
ape->frames[ape->totalframes - 1].size = ape->finalframeblocks * 4;
ape->frames[ape->totalframes - 1].nblocks = ape->finalframeblocks;
for (i = 0; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
if(ape->frames[i].skip){
ape->frames[i].pos -= ape->frames[i].skip;
ape->frames[i].size += ape->frames[i].skip;
}
ape->frames[i].size = (ape->frames[i].size + 3) & ~3;
}
ape_dumpinfo(s, ape);
/* try to read APE tags */
if (!url_is_streamed(pb)) {
ff_ape_parse_tag(s);
avio_seek(pb, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Decoding file - v%d.%02d, compression level %d\n", ape->fileversion / 1000, (ape->fileversion % 1000) / 10, ape->compressiontype);
/* now we are ready: build format streams */
st = av_new_stream(s, 0);
if (!st)
return -1;
total_blocks = (ape->totalframes == 0) ? 0 : ((ape->totalframes - 1) * ape->blocksperframe) + ape->finalframeblocks;
st->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
st->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_APE;
st->codec->codec_tag = MKTAG('A', 'P', 'E', ' ');
st->codec->channels = ape->channels;
st->codec->sample_rate = ape->samplerate;
st->codec->bits_per_coded_sample = ape->bps;
st->codec->frame_size = MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
st->nb_frames = ape->totalframes;
st->start_time = 0;
st->duration = total_blocks / MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
av_set_pts_info(st, 64, MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE, ape->samplerate);
st->codec->extradata = av_malloc(APE_EXTRADATA_SIZE);
st->codec->extradata_size = APE_EXTRADATA_SIZE;
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 0, ape->fileversion);
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 2, ape->compressiontype);
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 4, ape->formatflags);
pts = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
ape->frames[i].pts = pts;
av_add_index_entry(st, ape->frames[i].pos, ape->frames[i].pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
pts += ape->blocksperframe / MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ape_read_header function in ape.c in libavformat in FFmpeg before 0.5.4, as used in MPlayer, VideoLAN VLC media player, and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via an APE (aka Monkey's Audio) file that contains a header but no frames.
Commit Message: Do not attempt to decode APE file with no frames
This fixes invalid reads/writes with this sample:
http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/1103-exploits/vlc105-dos.txt | Medium | 165,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ScreenLockLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetScreenLockLibrary() {
return screen_lock_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static BOOL zgfx_decompress_segment(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, wStream* stream, size_t segmentSize)
{
BYTE c;
BYTE flags;
int extra;
int opIndex;
int haveBits;
int inPrefix;
UINT32 count;
UINT32 distance;
BYTE* pbSegment;
size_t cbSegment = segmentSize - 1;
if ((Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentSize) || (segmentSize < 1))
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, flags); /* header (1 byte) */
zgfx->OutputCount = 0;
pbSegment = Stream_Pointer(stream);
Stream_Seek(stream, cbSegment);
if (!(flags & PACKET_COMPRESSED))
{
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, pbSegment, cbSegment);
CopyMemory(zgfx->OutputBuffer, pbSegment, cbSegment);
zgfx->OutputCount = cbSegment;
return TRUE;
}
zgfx->pbInputCurrent = pbSegment;
zgfx->pbInputEnd = &pbSegment[cbSegment - 1];
/* NumberOfBitsToDecode = ((NumberOfBytesToDecode - 1) * 8) - ValueOfLastByte */
zgfx->cBitsRemaining = 8 * (cbSegment - 1) - *zgfx->pbInputEnd;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
while (zgfx->cBitsRemaining)
{
haveBits = 0;
inPrefix = 0;
for (opIndex = 0; ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength != 0; opIndex++)
{
while (haveBits < ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength)
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
inPrefix = (inPrefix << 1) + zgfx->bits;
haveBits++;
}
if (inPrefix == ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixCode)
{
if (ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].tokenType == 0)
{
/* Literal */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
c = (BYTE)(ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits);
zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex] = c;
if (++zgfx->HistoryIndex == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount++] = c;
}
else
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
distance = ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits;
if (distance != 0)
{
/* Match */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
if (zgfx->bits == 0)
{
count = 3;
}
else
{
count = 4;
extra = 2;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
while (zgfx->bits == 1)
{
count *= 2;
extra++;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
}
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, extra);
count += zgfx->bits;
}
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_read(zgfx, distance, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 15);
count = zgfx->bits;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx->pbInputCurrent += count;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= (8 * count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains a Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in function zgfx_decompress() that results in a memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8785
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | High | 169,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawImage(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
#define RenderImageTag "Render/Image"
AffineMatrix
affine,
current;
char
key[2*MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
name[MaxTextExtent],
*next_token,
pattern[MaxTextExtent],
*primitive,
*token;
const char
*q;
double
angle,
factor,
primitive_extent;
DrawInfo
**graphic_context;
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
MagickSizeType
length,
number_points;
MagickStatusType
status;
PointInfo
point;
PixelPacket
start_color;
PrimitiveInfo
*primitive_info;
PrimitiveType
primitive_type;
register const char
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
size_t
extent;
ssize_t
j,
k,
n;
/*
Ensure the annotation info is valid.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if ((draw_info->primitive == (char *) NULL) ||
(*draw_info->primitive == '\0'))
return(MagickFalse);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"begin draw-image");
if (*draw_info->primitive != '@')
primitive=AcquireString(draw_info->primitive);
else
primitive=FileToString(draw_info->primitive+1,~0UL,&image->exception);
if (primitive == (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
primitive_extent=(double) strlen(primitive);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,"MVG",primitive);
n=0;
/*
Allocate primitive info memory.
*/
graphic_context=(DrawInfo **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*graphic_context));
if (graphic_context == (DrawInfo **) NULL)
{
primitive=DestroyString(primitive);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
number_points=6553;
primitive_info=(PrimitiveInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_points,
sizeof(*primitive_info));
if (primitive_info == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
{
primitive=DestroyString(primitive);
for ( ; n >= 0; n--)
graphic_context[n]=DestroyDrawInfo(graphic_context[n]);
graphic_context=(DrawInfo **) RelinquishMagickMemory(graphic_context);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
graphic_context[n]=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
graphic_context[n]->viewbox=image->page;
if ((image->page.width == 0) || (image->page.height == 0))
{
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.width=image->columns;
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.height=image->rows;
}
token=AcquireString(primitive);
extent=strlen(token)+MaxTextExtent;
(void) QueryColorDatabase("#000000",&start_color,&image->exception);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
status=MagickTrue;
for (q=primitive; *q != '\0'; )
{
/*
Interpret graphic primitive.
*/
GetNextToken(q,&q,MaxTextExtent,keyword);
if (*keyword == '\0')
break;
if (*keyword == '#')
{
/*
Comment.
*/
while ((*q != '\n') && (*q != '\0'))
q++;
continue;
}
p=q-strlen(keyword)-1;
primitive_type=UndefinedPrimitive;
current=graphic_context[n]->affine;
GetAffineMatrix(&affine);
switch (*keyword)
{
case ';':
break;
case 'a':
case 'A':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affine",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.sx=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.rx=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.ry=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.sy=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.tx=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.ty=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("arc",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=ArcPrimitive;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare("bezier",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=BezierPrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("border-color",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) QueryColorDatabase(token,&graphic_context[n]->border_color,
&image->exception);
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare("clip-path",keyword) == 0)
{
/*
Create clip mask.
*/
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CloneString(&graphic_context[n]->clip_mask,token);
(void) DrawClipPath(image,graphic_context[n],
graphic_context[n]->clip_mask);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clip-rule",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
fill_rule;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
fill_rule=ParseCommandOption(MagickFillRuleOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (fill_rule == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->fill_rule=(FillRule) fill_rule;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clip-units",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
clip_units;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
clip_units=ParseCommandOption(MagickClipPathOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (clip_units == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->clip_units=(ClipPathUnits) clip_units;
if (clip_units == ObjectBoundingBox)
{
GetAffineMatrix(¤t);
affine.sx=draw_info->bounds.x2;
affine.sy=draw_info->bounds.y2;
affine.tx=draw_info->bounds.x1;
affine.ty=draw_info->bounds.y1;
break;
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("circle",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=CirclePrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("color",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=ColorPrimitive;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare("decorate",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
decorate;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
decorate=ParseCommandOption(MagickDecorateOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (decorate == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->decorate=(DecorationType) decorate;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("direction",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
direction;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
direction=ParseCommandOption(MagickDirectionOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (direction == -1)
status=MagickFalse;
else
graphic_context[n]->direction=(DirectionType) direction;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ellipse",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=EllipsePrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("encoding",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CloneString(&graphic_context[n]->encoding,token);
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'f':
case 'F':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fill",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) FormatLocaleString(pattern,MaxTextExtent,"%s",token);
if (GetImageArtifact(image,pattern) != (const char *) NULL)
(void) DrawPatternPath(image,draw_info,token,
&graphic_context[n]->fill_pattern);
else
{
status&=QueryColorDatabase(token,&graphic_context[n]->fill,
&image->exception);
if (graphic_context[n]->fill_opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
graphic_context[n]->fill.opacity=
graphic_context[n]->fill_opacity;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ImageInfo
*pattern_info;
pattern_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(pattern_info->filename,token,
MaxTextExtent);
graphic_context[n]->fill_pattern=
ReadImage(pattern_info,&image->exception);
CatchException(&image->exception);
pattern_info=DestroyImageInfo(pattern_info);
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fill-opacity",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
factor=strchr(token,'%') != (char *) NULL ? 0.01 : 1.0;
graphic_context[n]->fill.opacity=QuantumRange*factor*
StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fill-rule",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
fill_rule;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
fill_rule=ParseCommandOption(MagickFillRuleOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (fill_rule == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->fill_rule=(FillRule) fill_rule;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CloneString(&graphic_context[n]->font,token);
if (LocaleCompare("none",token) == 0)
graphic_context[n]->font=(char *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(graphic_context[n]->font);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font-family",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CloneString(&graphic_context[n]->family,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font-size",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->pointsize=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font-stretch",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
stretch;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
stretch=ParseCommandOption(MagickStretchOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (stretch == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->stretch=(StretchType) stretch;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font-style",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
style;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
style=ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (style == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->style=(StyleType) style;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("font-weight",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
weight;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
weight=ParseCommandOption(MagickWeightOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (weight == -1)
weight=(ssize_t) StringToUnsignedLong(token);
graphic_context[n]->weight=(size_t) weight;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gradient-units",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (gravity == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare("image",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
primitive_type=ImagePrimitive;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (compose == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interline-spacing",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->interline_spacing=StringToDouble(token,
&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interword-spacing",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->interword_spacing=StringToDouble(token,
&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'k':
case 'K':
{
if (LocaleCompare("kerning",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->kerning=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'l':
case 'L':
{
if (LocaleCompare("line",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=LinePrimitive;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare("matte",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=MattePrimitive;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare("offset",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("opacity",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
factor=strchr(token,'%') != (char *) NULL ? 0.01 : 1.0;
graphic_context[n]->fill_opacity=QuantumRange-QuantumRange*((1.0-
QuantumScale*graphic_context[n]->fill_opacity)*factor*
StringToDouble(token,&next_token));
graphic_context[n]->stroke_opacity=QuantumRange-QuantumRange*((1.0-
QuantumScale*graphic_context[n]->stroke_opacity)*factor*
StringToDouble(token,&next_token));
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare("path",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=PathPrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("point",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=PointPrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("polyline",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=PolylinePrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("polygon",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=PolygonPrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("pop",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare("clip-path",token) == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare("defs",token) == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare("gradient",token) == 0)
break;
if (LocaleCompare("graphic-context",token) == 0)
{
if (n <= 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),DrawError,
"UnbalancedGraphicContextPushPop","`%s'",token);
status=MagickFalse;
n=0;
break;
}
if (graphic_context[n]->clip_mask != (char *) NULL)
if (LocaleCompare(graphic_context[n]->clip_mask,
graphic_context[n-1]->clip_mask) != 0)
(void) SetImageClipMask(image,(Image *) NULL);
graphic_context[n]=DestroyDrawInfo(graphic_context[n]);
n--;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("pattern",token) == 0)
break;
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("push",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare("clip-path",token) == 0)
{
char
name[MaxTextExtent];
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,MaxTextExtent,"%s",token);
for (p=q; *q != '\0'; )
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"pop") != 0)
continue;
GetNextToken(q,(const char **) NULL,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"clip-path") != 0)
continue;
break;
}
(void) CopyMagickString(token,p,(size_t) (q-p-4+1));
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,name,token);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("gradient",token) == 0)
{
char
key[2*MaxTextExtent],
name[MaxTextExtent],
type[MaxTextExtent];
SegmentInfo
segment;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CopyMagickString(name,token,MaxTextExtent);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CopyMagickString(type,token,MaxTextExtent);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
segment.x1=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
segment.y1=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
segment.x2=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
segment.y2=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
if (LocaleCompare(type,"radial") == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
}
for (p=q; *q != '\0'; )
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"pop") != 0)
continue;
GetNextToken(q,(const char **) NULL,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"gradient") != 0)
continue;
break;
}
(void) CopyMagickString(token,p,(size_t) (q-p-4+1));
bounds.x1=graphic_context[n]->affine.sx*segment.x1+
graphic_context[n]->affine.ry*segment.y1+
graphic_context[n]->affine.tx;
bounds.y1=graphic_context[n]->affine.rx*segment.x1+
graphic_context[n]->affine.sy*segment.y1+
graphic_context[n]->affine.ty;
bounds.x2=graphic_context[n]->affine.sx*segment.x2+
graphic_context[n]->affine.ry*segment.y2+
graphic_context[n]->affine.tx;
bounds.y2=graphic_context[n]->affine.rx*segment.x2+
graphic_context[n]->affine.sy*segment.y2+
graphic_context[n]->affine.ty;
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"%s",name);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,key,token);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"%s-type",name);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,key,type);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"%s-geometry",name);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%gx%g%+.15g%+.15g",
MagickMax(fabs(bounds.x2-bounds.x1+1.0),1.0),
MagickMax(fabs(bounds.y2-bounds.y1+1.0),1.0),
bounds.x1,bounds.y1);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,key,geometry);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("pattern",token) == 0)
{
RectangleInfo
bounds;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) CopyMagickString(name,token,MaxTextExtent);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
bounds.x=(ssize_t) ceil(StringToDouble(token,&next_token)-0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
bounds.y=(ssize_t) ceil(StringToDouble(token,&next_token)-0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
bounds.width=(size_t) floor(StringToDouble(token,&next_token)+
0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
bounds.height=(size_t) floor(StringToDouble(token,&next_token)+
0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
for (p=q; *q != '\0'; )
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"pop") != 0)
continue;
GetNextToken(q,(const char **) NULL,extent,token);
if (LocaleCompare(token,"pattern") != 0)
continue;
break;
}
(void) CopyMagickString(token,p,(size_t) (q-p-4+1));
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"%s",name);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,key,token);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"%s-geometry",name);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) bounds.width,(double)
bounds.height,(double) bounds.x,(double) bounds.y);
(void) SetImageArtifact(image,key,geometry);
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("graphic-context",token) == 0)
{
n++;
graphic_context=(DrawInfo **) ResizeQuantumMemory(
graphic_context,(size_t) (n+1),sizeof(*graphic_context));
if (graphic_context == (DrawInfo **) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
graphic_context[n]=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,
graphic_context[n-1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("defs",token) == 0)
break;
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rectangle",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=RectanglePrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("rotate",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
angle=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
affine.sx=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
affine.rx=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
affine.ry=(-sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0))));
affine.sy=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("roundRectangle",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=RoundRectanglePrimitive;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare("scale",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.sx=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.sy=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("skewX",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
angle=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
affine.ry=sin(DegreesToRadians(angle));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("skewY",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
angle=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
affine.rx=(-tan(DegreesToRadians(angle)/2.0));
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stop-color",keyword) == 0)
{
GradientType
type;
PixelPacket
stop_color;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) QueryColorDatabase(token,&stop_color,&image->exception);
type=LinearGradient;
if (draw_info->gradient.type == RadialGradient)
type=RadialGradient;
(void) GradientImage(image,type,PadSpread,&start_color,&stop_color);
start_color=stop_color;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) FormatLocaleString(pattern,MaxTextExtent,"%s",token);
if (GetImageArtifact(image,pattern) != (const char *) NULL)
(void) DrawPatternPath(image,draw_info,token,
&graphic_context[n]->stroke_pattern);
else
{
status&=QueryColorDatabase(token,&graphic_context[n]->stroke,
&image->exception);
if (graphic_context[n]->stroke_opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
graphic_context[n]->stroke.opacity=
graphic_context[n]->stroke_opacity;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ImageInfo
*pattern_info;
pattern_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(pattern_info->filename,token,
MaxTextExtent);
graphic_context[n]->stroke_pattern=
ReadImage(pattern_info,&image->exception);
CatchException(&image->exception);
pattern_info=DestroyImageInfo(pattern_info);
}
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-antialias",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->stroke_antialias=
StringToLong(token) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-dasharray",keyword) == 0)
{
if (graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL)
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern=(double *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern);
if (IsPoint(q) != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*p;
p=q;
GetNextToken(p,&p,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,extent,token);
for (x=0; IsPoint(token) != MagickFalse; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,extent,token);
}
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern=(double *)
AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (2UL*x+1UL),
sizeof(*graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern));
if (graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern == (double *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
for (j=0; j < x; j++)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern[j]=StringToDouble(token,
&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
if (graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern[j] < 0.0)
status=MagickFalse;
}
if ((x & 0x01) != 0)
for ( ; j < (2*x); j++)
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern[j]=
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern[j-x];
graphic_context[n]->dash_pattern[j]=0.0;
break;
}
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-dashoffset",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->dash_offset=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-linecap",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
linecap;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
linecap=ParseCommandOption(MagickLineCapOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (linecap == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->linecap=(LineCap) linecap;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-linejoin",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
linejoin;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
linejoin=ParseCommandOption(MagickLineJoinOptions,MagickFalse,
token);
if (linejoin == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->linejoin=(LineJoin) linejoin;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-miterlimit",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->miterlimit=StringToUnsignedLong(token);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-opacity",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
factor=strchr(token,'%') != (char *) NULL ? 0.01 : 1.0;
graphic_context[n]->stroke.opacity=QuantumRange*factor*
StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("stroke-width",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->stroke_width=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare("text",keyword) == 0)
{
primitive_type=TextPrimitive;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("text-align",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
align;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
align=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlignOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (align == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->align=(AlignType) align;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("text-anchor",keyword) == 0)
{
ssize_t
align;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
align=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlignOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (align == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
graphic_context[n]->align=(AlignType) align;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("text-antialias",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->text_antialias=
StringToLong(token) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("text-undercolor",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
(void) QueryColorDatabase(token,&graphic_context[n]->undercolor,
&image->exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("translate",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.tx=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
affine.ty=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 'v':
case 'V':
{
if (LocaleCompare("viewbox",keyword) == 0)
{
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.x=(ssize_t) ceil(StringToDouble(token,
&next_token)-0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.y=(ssize_t) ceil(StringToDouble(token,
&next_token)-0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.width=(size_t) floor(StringToDouble(
token,&next_token)+0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
graphic_context[n]->viewbox.height=(size_t) floor(StringToDouble(
token,&next_token)+0.5);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
default:
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((fabs(affine.sx-1.0) >= DrawEpsilon) ||
(fabs(affine.rx) >= DrawEpsilon) ||
(fabs(affine.ry) >= DrawEpsilon) ||
(fabs(affine.sy-1.0) >= DrawEpsilon) ||
(fabs(affine.tx) >= DrawEpsilon) ||
(fabs(affine.ty) >= DrawEpsilon))
{
graphic_context[n]->affine.sx=current.sx*affine.sx+current.ry*affine.rx;
graphic_context[n]->affine.rx=current.rx*affine.sx+current.sy*affine.rx;
graphic_context[n]->affine.ry=current.sx*affine.ry+current.ry*affine.sy;
graphic_context[n]->affine.sy=current.rx*affine.ry+current.sy*affine.sy;
graphic_context[n]->affine.tx=current.sx*affine.tx+current.ry*affine.ty+
current.tx;
graphic_context[n]->affine.ty=current.rx*affine.tx+current.sy*affine.ty+
current.ty;
}
if (primitive_type == UndefinedPrimitive)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," %.*s",
(int) (q-p),p);
continue;
}
/*
Parse the primitive attributes.
*/
i=0;
j=0;
primitive_info[0].point.x=0.0;
primitive_info[0].point.y=0.0;
for (x=0; *q != '\0'; x++)
{
/*
Define points.
*/
if (IsPoint(q) == MagickFalse)
break;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
point.x=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
point.y=StringToDouble(token,&next_token);
if (token == next_token)
status=MagickFalse;
GetNextToken(q,(const char **) NULL,extent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
primitive_info[i].primitive=primitive_type;
primitive_info[i].point=point;
primitive_info[i].coordinates=0;
primitive_info[i].method=FloodfillMethod;
i++;
if (i < (ssize_t) number_points)
continue;
number_points<<=1;
primitive_info=(PrimitiveInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(primitive_info,
(size_t) number_points,sizeof(*primitive_info));
if ((primitive_info == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL) ||
(number_points != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) number_points)))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
}
primitive_info[j].primitive=primitive_type;
primitive_info[j].coordinates=(size_t) x;
primitive_info[j].method=FloodfillMethod;
primitive_info[j].text=(char *) NULL;
/*
Circumscribe primitive within a circle.
*/
bounds.x1=primitive_info[j].point.x;
bounds.y1=primitive_info[j].point.y;
bounds.x2=primitive_info[j].point.x;
bounds.y2=primitive_info[j].point.y;
for (k=1; k < (ssize_t) primitive_info[j].coordinates; k++)
{
point=primitive_info[j+k].point;
if (point.x < bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=point.x;
if (point.y < bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=point.y;
if (point.x > bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=point.x;
if (point.y > bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=point.y;
}
/*
Speculate how many points our primitive might consume.
*/
length=primitive_info[j].coordinates;
switch (primitive_type)
{
case RectanglePrimitive:
{
length*=5;
break;
}
case RoundRectanglePrimitive:
{
double
alpha,
beta,
radius;
alpha=bounds.x2-bounds.x1;
beta=bounds.y2-bounds.y1;
radius=hypot((double) alpha,(double) beta);
length*=5;
length+=2*((size_t) ceil((double) MagickPI*radius))+6*BezierQuantum+360;
break;
}
case BezierPrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates > 107)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
DrawError,"TooManyBezierCoordinates","`%s'",token);
length=BezierQuantum*primitive_info[j].coordinates;
break;
}
case PathPrimitive:
{
char
*s,
*t;
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
length=1;
t=token;
for (s=token; *s != '\0'; s=t)
{
double
value;
value=StringToDouble(s,&t);
(void) value;
if (s == t)
{
t++;
continue;
}
length++;
}
length=length*BezierQuantum/2;
break;
}
case CirclePrimitive:
case ArcPrimitive:
case EllipsePrimitive:
{
double
alpha,
beta,
radius;
alpha=bounds.x2-bounds.x1;
beta=bounds.y2-bounds.y1;
radius=hypot((double) alpha,(double) beta);
length=2*((size_t) ceil((double) MagickPI*radius))+6*BezierQuantum+360;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((i+length) >= number_points)
{
/*
Resize based on speculative points required by primitive.
*/
number_points+=length+1;
primitive_info=(PrimitiveInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(primitive_info,
(size_t) number_points,sizeof(*primitive_info));
if ((primitive_info == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL) ||
(number_points != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) number_points)))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
switch (primitive_type)
{
case PointPrimitive:
default:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TracePoint(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case LinePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 2)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceLine(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case RectanglePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 2)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceRectangle(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case RoundRectanglePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 3)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceRoundRectangle(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point,primitive_info[j+2].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case ArcPrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 3)
{
primitive_type=UndefinedPrimitive;
break;
}
TraceArc(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point,primitive_info[j+2].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case EllipsePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 3)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceEllipse(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point,primitive_info[j+2].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case CirclePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 2)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceCircle(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].point,
primitive_info[j+1].point);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case PolylinePrimitive:
break;
case PolygonPrimitive:
{
primitive_info[i]=primitive_info[j];
primitive_info[i].coordinates=0;
primitive_info[j].coordinates++;
i++;
break;
}
case BezierPrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates < 3)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
TraceBezier(primitive_info+j,primitive_info[j].coordinates);
i=(ssize_t) (j+primitive_info[j].coordinates);
break;
}
case PathPrimitive:
{
i=(ssize_t) (j+TracePath(primitive_info+j,token));
break;
}
case ColorPrimitive:
case MattePrimitive:
{
ssize_t
method;
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
method=ParseCommandOption(MagickMethodOptions,MagickFalse,token);
if (method == -1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
primitive_info[j].method=(PaintMethod) method;
break;
}
case TextPrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 1)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (*token != ',')
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
primitive_info[j].text=AcquireString(token);
break;
}
case ImagePrimitive:
{
if (primitive_info[j].coordinates != 2)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
GetNextToken(q,&q,extent,token);
primitive_info[j].text=AcquireString(token);
break;
}
}
if (primitive_info == (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
break;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," %.*s",(int) (q-p),p);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
primitive_info[i].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
if (i == 0)
continue;
/*
Transform points.
*/
for (i=0; primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive; i++)
{
point=primitive_info[i].point;
primitive_info[i].point.x=graphic_context[n]->affine.sx*point.x+
graphic_context[n]->affine.ry*point.y+graphic_context[n]->affine.tx;
primitive_info[i].point.y=graphic_context[n]->affine.rx*point.x+
graphic_context[n]->affine.sy*point.y+graphic_context[n]->affine.ty;
point=primitive_info[i].point;
if (point.x < graphic_context[n]->bounds.x1)
graphic_context[n]->bounds.x1=point.x;
if (point.y < graphic_context[n]->bounds.y1)
graphic_context[n]->bounds.y1=point.y;
if (point.x > graphic_context[n]->bounds.x2)
graphic_context[n]->bounds.x2=point.x;
if (point.y > graphic_context[n]->bounds.y2)
graphic_context[n]->bounds.y2=point.y;
if (primitive_info[i].primitive == ImagePrimitive)
break;
if (i >= (ssize_t) number_points)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (graphic_context[n]->render != MagickFalse)
{
if ((n != 0) && (graphic_context[n]->clip_mask != (char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(graphic_context[n]->clip_mask,
graphic_context[n-1]->clip_mask) != 0))
status&=DrawClipPath(image,graphic_context[n],
graphic_context[n]->clip_mask);
status&=DrawPrimitive(image,graphic_context[n],primitive_info);
}
if (primitive_info->text != (char *) NULL)
primitive_info->text=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
primitive_info->text);
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,RenderImageTag,q-primitive,(MagickSizeType)
primitive_extent);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
if (status == 0)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end draw-image");
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
token=DestroyString(token);
if (primitive_info != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL)
primitive_info=(PrimitiveInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(primitive_info);
primitive=DestroyString(primitive);
for ( ; n >= 0; n--)
graphic_context[n]=DestroyDrawInfo(graphic_context[n]);
graphic_context=(DrawInfo **) RelinquishMagickMemory(graphic_context);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowBinaryException(DrawError,"NonconformingDrawingPrimitiveDefinition",
keyword);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the DrawImage function in magick/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane) | Medium | 168,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DataReductionProxyIOData::DataReductionProxyIOData(
Client client,
PrefService* prefs,
network::NetworkConnectionTracker* network_connection_tracker,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner,
bool enabled,
const std::string& user_agent,
const std::string& channel)
: client_(client),
network_connection_tracker_(network_connection_tracker),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
ui_task_runner_(ui_task_runner),
enabled_(enabled),
channel_(channel),
effective_connection_type_(net::EFFECTIVE_CONNECTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_);
DCHECK(ui_task_runner_);
configurator_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfigurator());
configurator_->SetConfigUpdatedCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyIOData::OnProxyConfigUpdated, base::Unretained(this)));
DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues* raw_mutable_config = nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues> mutable_config =
std::make_unique<DataReductionProxyMutableConfigValues>();
raw_mutable_config = mutable_config.get();
config_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfig(
io_task_runner, ui_task_runner, network_connection_tracker_,
std::move(mutable_config), configurator_.get()));
request_options_.reset(
new DataReductionProxyRequestOptions(client_, config_.get()));
request_options_->Init();
request_options_->SetUpdateHeaderCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyIOData::UpdateProxyRequestHeaders,
base::Unretained(this)));
config_client_.reset(new DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient(
GetBackoffPolicy(), request_options_.get(), raw_mutable_config,
config_.get(), this, network_connection_tracker_,
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyIOData::StoreSerializedConfig,
base::Unretained(this))));
network_properties_manager_.reset(new NetworkPropertiesManager(
base::DefaultClock::GetInstance(), prefs, ui_task_runner_));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649} | Medium | 172,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::ConfirmPairing() {
if (!agent_.get() || confirmation_callback_.is_null())
return;
confirmation_callback_.Run(SUCCESS);
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,220 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
size_t size;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles, &size)) {
return -1;
}
dec->numtiles = size;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The jas_seq2d_create function in jas_seq.c in JasPer before 1.900.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area. | Medium | 168,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the license_read_scope_list function in libfreerdp/core/license.c in FreeRDP through 1.0.2 allows remote RDP servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large ScopeCount value in a Scope List in a Server License Request packet.
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list() | Medium | 166,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_alloc2(lutsize, sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_alloc2(pclr->numchans, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems. | Medium | 168,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: standard_info_part2(standard_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_const_infop pi, int nImages)
{
/* Record cbRow now that it can be found. */
dp->pixel_size = bit_size(pp, png_get_color_type(pp, pi),
png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi));
dp->bit_width = png_get_image_width(pp, pi) * dp->pixel_size;
dp->cbRow = png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi);
/* Validate the rowbytes here again. */
if (dp->cbRow != (dp->bit_width+7)/8)
png_error(pp, "bad png_get_rowbytes calculation");
/* Then ensure there is enough space for the output image(s). */
store_ensure_image(dp->ps, pp, nImages, dp->cbRow, dp->h);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
std::string data(kPostXml);
const std::string placeholder("__BRANDCODE_PLACEHOLDER__");
size_t placeholder_pos = data.find(placeholder);
DCHECK(placeholder_pos != std::string::npos);
data.replace(placeholder_pos, placeholder.size(), brand);
return data;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner function in extensions/renderer/module_system.cc in the Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Use install_static::GetAppGuid instead of the hardcoded string in BrandcodeConfigFetcher.
Bug: 769756
Change-Id: Ifdcb0a5145ffad1d563562e2b2ea2390ff074cdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1213178
Reviewed-by: Dominic Battré <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#590275} | Medium | 172,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n)
{
int ret;
int len;
char *dest;
char *rundir;
/* lockfile will be:
* "/run" + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root
* or
* $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root
*/
/* length of "/lock/lxc/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */
len = strlen("/lock/lxc/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3;
rundir = get_rundir();
if (!rundir)
return NULL;
len += strlen(rundir);
if ((dest = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s", rundir, p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
/* fall back to "/tmp/" + $(id -u) + "/lxc" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0'
* * maximum length of $(id -u) is 10 calculated by (log (2 ** (sizeof(uid_t) * 8) - 1) / log 10 + 1)
* * lxcpath always starts with '/'
*/
int l2 = 22 + strlen(n) + strlen(p);
if (l2 > len) {
char *d;
d = realloc(dest, l2);
if (!d) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
len = l2;
dest = d;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s", geteuid(), p);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755);
if (ret < 0) {
free(dest);
free(rundir);
return NULL;
}
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s/.%s", geteuid(), p, n);
} else
ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n);
free(rundir);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) {
free(dest);
return NULL;
}
return dest;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxclock.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier allows local users to create arbitrary files via a symlink attack on /run/lock/lxc/*.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: explicit LogoDelegateImpl(
std::unique_ptr<image_fetcher::ImageDecoder> image_decoder)
: image_decoder_(std::move(image_decoder)) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374} | High | 171,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
int i;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
if (maskColors) {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) {
if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255||
pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) {
*dest = *dest | 0xff000000;
break;
}
}
pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps();
dest++;
}
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
width, height, width * 4);
}
else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, width * 4);
}
if (image == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
if (pattern == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
LOG (printf ("drawImageMask %dx%d\n", width, height));
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&matrix, 0, height);
cairo_matrix_scale (&matrix, width, -height);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_set_source (cairo, pattern);
cairo_paint (cairo);
if (cairo_shape) {
#if 0
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
#else
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
/* this should draw a rectangle the size of the image
* we use this instead of rect,fill because of the lack
* of EXTEND_PAD */
/* NOTE: this will multiply the edges of the image twice */
cairo_set_source (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_paint(cairo_shape);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
#endif
}
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: INST_HANDLER (sbrx) { // SBRC Rr, b
int b = buf[0] & 0x7;
int r = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x01) << 4);
RAnalOp next_op;
avr_op_analyze (anal,
&next_op,
op->addr + op->size, buf + op->size, len - op->size,
cpu);
r_strbuf_fini (&next_op.esil);
op->jump = op->addr + next_op.size + 2;
op->cycles = 1; // XXX: This is a bug, because depends on eval state,
ESIL_A ("%d,1,<<,r%d,&,", b, r); // Rr(b)
ESIL_A ((buf[1] & 0xe) == 0xc
? "!," // SBRC => branch if cleared
: "!,!,"); // SBRS => branch if set
ESIL_A ("?{,%"PFMT64d",pc,=,},", op->jump); // ?true => jmp
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The avr_op_analyze() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix invalid free in RAnal.avr | Medium | 169,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
if (connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
connection_change_handler_(language_library_, true);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int fr_add_pvc(struct net_device *frad, unsigned int dlci, int type)
{
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(frad);
pvc_device *pvc;
struct net_device *dev;
int used;
if ((pvc = add_pvc(frad, dlci)) == NULL) {
netdev_warn(frad, "Memory squeeze on fr_add_pvc()\n");
return -ENOBUFS;
}
if (*get_dev_p(pvc, type))
return -EEXIST;
used = pvc_is_used(pvc);
if (type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
dev = alloc_netdev(0, "pvceth%d", ether_setup);
else
dev = alloc_netdev(0, "pvc%d", pvc_setup);
if (!dev) {
netdev_warn(frad, "Memory squeeze on fr_pvc()\n");
delete_unused_pvcs(hdlc);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
if (type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
else {
*(__be16*)dev->dev_addr = htons(dlci);
dlci_to_q922(dev->broadcast, dlci);
}
dev->netdev_ops = &pvc_ops;
dev->mtu = HDLC_MAX_MTU;
dev->tx_queue_len = 0;
dev->ml_priv = pvc;
if (register_netdevice(dev) != 0) {
free_netdev(dev);
delete_unused_pvcs(hdlc);
return -EIO;
}
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
*get_dev_p(pvc, type) = dev;
if (!used) {
state(hdlc)->dce_changed = 1;
state(hdlc)->dce_pvc_count++;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof
(cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser | Medium | 167,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sma->sem_perm);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void pipe_advance(struct iov_iter *i, size_t size)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = i->pipe;
struct pipe_buffer *buf;
int idx = i->idx;
size_t off = i->iov_offset, orig_sz;
if (unlikely(i->count < size))
size = i->count;
orig_sz = size;
if (size) {
if (off) /* make it relative to the beginning of buffer */
size += off - pipe->bufs[idx].offset;
while (1) {
buf = &pipe->bufs[idx];
if (size <= buf->len)
break;
size -= buf->len;
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
}
buf->len = size;
i->idx = idx;
off = i->iov_offset = buf->offset + size;
}
if (off)
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
if (pipe->nrbufs) {
int unused = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
/* [curbuf,unused) is in use. Free [idx,unused) */
while (idx != unused) {
pipe_buf_release(pipe, &pipe->bufs[idx]);
idx = next_idx(idx, pipe);
pipe->nrbufs--;
}
}
i->count -= orig_sz;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Off-by-one error in the pipe_advance function in lib/iov_iter.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized heap-memory locations in opportunistic circumstances by reading from a pipe after an incorrect buffer-release decision.
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Low | 168,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( const_cast<char*>(error.Value()));
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline bool cfs_rq_is_decayed(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
if (cfs_rq->load.weight)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.load_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.util_sum)
return false;
if (cfs_rq->avg.runnable_load_sum)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.20.2, kernel/sched/fair.c mishandles leaf cfs_rq's, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop in update_blocked_averages) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inducing a high load.
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | High | 169,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog(
ui::SelectFileDialog::Type type,
const base::FilePath& default_path) {
AddRef();
WebContents* web_contents = dispatcher()->delegate()->
GetAssociatedWebContents();
select_file_dialog_ = ui::SelectFileDialog::Create(
this, new ChromeSelectFilePolicy(web_contents));
ui::SelectFileDialog::FileTypeInfo file_type_info;
file_type_info.extensions.resize(1);
file_type_info.extensions[0].push_back(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("html"));
if (type == ui::SelectFileDialog::SELECT_OPEN_FILE)
file_type_info.support_drive = true;
select_file_dialog_->SelectFile(type,
string16(),
default_path,
&file_type_info,
0,
FILE_PATH_LITERAL(""),
NULL,
NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the extension bookmarks API in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct page *follow_pmd_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp,
unsigned int flags,
struct follow_page_context *ctx)
{
pmd_t *pmd, pmdval;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
/*
* The READ_ONCE() will stabilize the pmdval in a register or
* on the stack so that it will stop changing under the code.
*/
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
if (pmd_huge(pmdval) && vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
page = follow_huge_pmd(mm, address, pmd, flags);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (is_hugepd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)))) {
page = follow_huge_pd(vma, address,
__hugepd(pmd_val(pmdval)), flags,
PMD_SHIFT);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
retry:
if (!pmd_present(pmdval)) {
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
VM_BUG_ON(thp_migration_supported() &&
!is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval));
if (is_pmd_migration_entry(pmdval))
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
pmdval = READ_ONCE(*pmd);
/*
* MADV_DONTNEED may convert the pmd to null because
* mmap_sem is held in read mode
*/
if (pmd_none(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
goto retry;
}
if (pmd_devmap(pmdval)) {
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
page = follow_devmap_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (page)
return page;
}
if (likely(!pmd_trans_huge(pmdval)))
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pmd_protnone(pmdval))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
retry_locked:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(pmd_none(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_present(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd);
goto retry_locked;
}
if (unlikely(!pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
return follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT) {
int ret;
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
if (is_huge_zero_page(page)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
ret = 0;
split_huge_pmd(vma, pmd, address);
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
get_page(page);
spin_unlock(ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) :
follow_page_pte(vma, address, pmd, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
}
page = follow_trans_huge_pmd(vma, address, pmd, flags);
spin_unlock(ptl);
ctx->page_mask = HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1;
return page;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit | High | 170,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InterstitialPage* WebContentsImpl::GetInterstitialPage() const {
return GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelPixels(Image *image,
const size_t channels,const size_t row,const ssize_t type,
const unsigned char *pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Quantum
pixel;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned short
nibble;
p=pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,row,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
pixel=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
else
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&nibble);
pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum(nibble);
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
if (channels == 1 || type == -2)
SetPixelGray(image,pixel,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception),q);
if (image->depth == 1)
{
ssize_t
bit,
number_bits;
number_bits=image->columns-x;
if (number_bits > 8)
number_bits=8;
for (bit=0; bit < number_bits; bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(((unsigned char) pixel) &
(0x01 << (7-bit))) != 0 ? 0 : 255,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
GetPixelIndex(image,q),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
x++;
}
x--;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
return(SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDChannelPixels function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Added missing call to ConstrainColormapIndex. | Medium | 168,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int err;
struct sock_diag_req *req = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = hndl->dump(skb, nlh);
sock_diag_unlock_handler(hndl);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Array index error in the __sock_diag_rcv_msg function in net/core/sock_diag.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.10 allows local users to gain privileges via a large family value in a Netlink message.
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,128 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
header[12],
*stream;
WebPDecoderConfig
configure;
WebPDecBuffer
*magick_restrict webp_image = &configure.output;
WebPBitstreamFeatures
*magick_restrict features = &configure.input;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (WebPInitDecoderConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToDecodeImageFile");
webp_image->colorspace=MODE_RGBA;
count=ReadBlob(image,12,header);
if (count != 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=IsWEBP(header,count);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
length=(size_t) (ReadWebPLSBWord(header+4)+8);
if (length < 12)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
stream=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*stream));
if (stream == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memcpy(stream,header,12);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-12,stream+12);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-12))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
webp_status=WebPGetFeatures(stream,length,features);
if (webp_status == VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
image->columns=(size_t) features->width;
image->rows=(size_t) features->height;
image->depth=8;
image->matte=features->has_alpha != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (IsWEBPImageLossless(stream,length) != MagickFalse)
image->quality=100;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
webp_status=WebPDecode(stream,length,&configure);
}
if (webp_status != VP8_STATUS_OK)
{
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
switch (webp_status)
{
case VP8_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_INVALID_PARAM:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"invalid parameter");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_BITSTREAM_ERROR:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_FEATURE:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_SUSPENDED:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"decoder suspended");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_USER_ABORT:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"user abort");
break;
}
case VP8_STATUS_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA:
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
}
p=(unsigned char *) webp_image->u.RGBA.rgba;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
WebPFreeDecBuffer(webp_image);
stream=(unsigned char*) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 6.9.7. A specially crafted webp file could lead to a file-descriptor leak in libmagickcore (thus, a DoS).
Commit Message: Fixed fd leak for webp coder (patch from #382) | Medium | 168,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:xid_map_enter().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
return image_transform_png_set_expand_add(this, that, colour_type,
bit_depth);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::ZeroTest() {
for (int i = 0; i <= 255; ++i) {
memset(src_, i, block_size_);
for (int j = 0; j <= 255; ++j) {
memset(ref_, j, block_size_);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, var) << "src values: " << i << "ref values: " << j;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,593 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ShouldAllowOpenURL(
content::SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& to_url,
bool* result) {
DCHECK(result);
url::Origin to_origin(to_url);
if (to_origin.scheme() != kExtensionScheme) {
return false;
}
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
const Extension* to_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(to_origin.host());
if (!to_extension) {
*result = true;
return true;
}
GURL site_url(site_instance->GetSiteURL());
const Extension* from_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(site_url);
if (from_extension && from_extension == to_extension) {
*result = true;
return true;
}
if (to_url.SchemeIsFileSystem() || to_url.SchemeIsBlob()) {
if (to_url.SchemeIsFileSystem())
RecordShouldAllowOpenURLFailure(FAILURE_FILE_SYSTEM_URL, site_url);
else
RecordShouldAllowOpenURLFailure(FAILURE_BLOB_URL, site_url);
char site_url_copy[256];
base::strlcpy(site_url_copy, site_url.spec().c_str(),
arraysize(site_url_copy));
base::debug::Alias(&site_url_copy);
char to_origin_copy[256];
base::strlcpy(to_origin_copy, to_origin.Serialize().c_str(),
arraysize(to_origin_copy));
base::debug::Alias(&to_origin_copy);
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
*result = false;
return true;
}
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) ||
site_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme) ||
site_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeSearchScheme)) {
*result = true;
return true;
}
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kGuestScheme)) {
*result = true;
return true;
}
if (WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(to_extension,
to_url.path())) {
*result = true;
return true;
}
if (!site_url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS() && !site_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme)) {
RecordShouldAllowOpenURLFailure(
FAILURE_SCHEME_NOT_HTTP_OR_HTTPS_OR_EXTENSION, site_url);
} else {
RecordShouldAllowOpenURLFailure(FAILURE_RESOURCE_NOT_WEB_ACCESSIBLE,
site_url);
}
*result = false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to access Extension pages without authorisation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779} | Medium | 172,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void* ipc_rcu_alloc(int size)
{
void* out;
/*
* We prepend the allocation with the rcu struct, and
* workqueue if necessary (for vmalloc).
*/
if (rcu_use_vmalloc(size)) {
out = vmalloc(HDRLEN_VMALLOC + size);
if (out) {
out += HDRLEN_VMALLOC;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc = 1;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount = 1;
}
} else {
out = kmalloc(HDRLEN_KMALLOC + size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (out) {
out += HDRLEN_KMALLOC;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc = 0;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount = 1;
}
}
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned char **read_ptr)
{
uint32 i;
float xres = 0.0, yres = 0.0;
uint16 nstrips = 0, ntiles = 0, planar = 0;
uint16 bps = 0, spp = 0, res_unit = 0;
uint16 orientation = 0;
uint16 input_compression = 0, input_photometric = 0;
uint16 subsampling_horiz, subsampling_vert;
uint32 width = 0, length = 0;
uint32 stsize = 0, tlsize = 0, buffsize = 0, scanlinesize = 0;
uint32 tw = 0, tl = 0; /* Tile width and length */
uint32 tile_rowsize = 0;
unsigned char *read_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *new_buff = NULL;
int readunit = 0;
static uint32 prev_readsize = 0;
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &spp);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, &orientation);
if (! TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &input_photometric))
TIFFError("loadImage","Image lacks Photometric interpreation tag");
if (! TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, &width))
TIFFError("loadimage","Image lacks image width tag");
if(! TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, &length))
TIFFError("loadimage","Image lacks image length tag");
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION, &xres);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION, &yres);
if (!TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT, &res_unit))
res_unit = RESUNIT_INCH;
if (!TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &input_compression))
input_compression = COMPRESSION_NONE;
#ifdef DEBUG2
char compressionid[16];
switch (input_compression)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: /* 1 dump mode */
strcpy (compressionid, "None/dump");
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTRLE: /* 2 CCITT modified Huffman RLE */
strcpy (compressionid, "Huffman RLE");
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: /* 3 CCITT Group 3 fax encoding */
strcpy (compressionid, "Group3 Fax");
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: /* 4 CCITT Group 4 fax encoding */
strcpy (compressionid, "Group4 Fax");
break;
case COMPRESSION_LZW: /* 5 Lempel-Ziv & Welch */
strcpy (compressionid, "LZW");
break;
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: /* 6 !6.0 JPEG */
strcpy (compressionid, "Old Jpeg");
break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG: /* 7 %JPEG DCT compression */
strcpy (compressionid, "New Jpeg");
break;
case COMPRESSION_NEXT: /* 32766 NeXT 2-bit RLE */
strcpy (compressionid, "Next RLE");
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTRLEW: /* 32771 #1 w/ word alignment */
strcpy (compressionid, "CITTRLEW");
break;
case COMPRESSION_PACKBITS: /* 32773 Macintosh RLE */
strcpy (compressionid, "Mac Packbits");
break;
case COMPRESSION_THUNDERSCAN: /* 32809 ThunderScan RLE */
strcpy (compressionid, "Thunderscan");
break;
case COMPRESSION_IT8CTPAD: /* 32895 IT8 CT w/padding */
strcpy (compressionid, "IT8 padded");
break;
case COMPRESSION_IT8LW: /* 32896 IT8 Linework RLE */
strcpy (compressionid, "IT8 RLE");
break;
case COMPRESSION_IT8MP: /* 32897 IT8 Monochrome picture */
strcpy (compressionid, "IT8 mono");
break;
case COMPRESSION_IT8BL: /* 32898 IT8 Binary line art */
strcpy (compressionid, "IT8 lineart");
break;
case COMPRESSION_PIXARFILM: /* 32908 Pixar companded 10bit LZW */
strcpy (compressionid, "Pixar 10 bit");
break;
case COMPRESSION_PIXARLOG: /* 32909 Pixar companded 11bit ZIP */
strcpy (compressionid, "Pixar 11bit");
break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: /* 32946 Deflate compression */
strcpy (compressionid, "Deflate");
break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: /* 8 Deflate compression */
strcpy (compressionid, "Adobe deflate");
break;
default:
strcpy (compressionid, "None/unknown");
break;
}
TIFFError("loadImage", "Input compression %s", compressionid);
#endif
scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
image->bps = bps;
image->spp = spp;
image->planar = planar;
image->width = width;
image->length = length;
image->xres = xres;
image->yres = yres;
image->res_unit = res_unit;
image->compression = input_compression;
image->photometric = input_photometric;
#ifdef DEBUG2
char photometricid[12];
switch (input_photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
strcpy (photometricid, "MinIsWhite");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
strcpy (photometricid, "MinIsBlack");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
strcpy (photometricid, "RGB");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
strcpy (photometricid, "Palette");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
strcpy (photometricid, "Mask");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
strcpy (photometricid, "Separated");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
strcpy (photometricid, "YCBCR");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
strcpy (photometricid, "CIELab");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_ICCLAB:
strcpy (photometricid, "ICCLab");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_ITULAB:
strcpy (photometricid, "ITULab");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
strcpy (photometricid, "LogL");
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
strcpy (photometricid, "LOGLuv");
break;
default:
strcpy (photometricid, "Unknown");
break;
}
TIFFError("loadImage", "Input photometric interpretation %s", photometricid);
#endif
image->orientation = orientation;
switch (orientation)
{
case 0:
case ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT:
image->adjustments = 0;
break;
case ORIENTATION_TOPRIGHT:
image->adjustments = MIRROR_HORIZ;
break;
case ORIENTATION_BOTRIGHT:
image->adjustments = ROTATECW_180;
break;
case ORIENTATION_BOTLEFT:
image->adjustments = MIRROR_VERT;
break;
case ORIENTATION_LEFTTOP:
image->adjustments = MIRROR_VERT | ROTATECW_90;
break;
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTTOP:
image->adjustments = ROTATECW_90;
break;
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTBOT:
image->adjustments = MIRROR_VERT | ROTATECW_270;
break;
case ORIENTATION_LEFTBOT:
image->adjustments = ROTATECW_270;
break;
default:
image->adjustments = 0;
image->orientation = ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT;
}
if ((bps == 0) || (spp == 0))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Invalid samples per pixel (%d) or bits per sample (%d)",
spp, bps);
return (-1);
}
if (TIFFIsTiled(in))
{
readunit = TILE;
tlsize = TIFFTileSize(in);
ntiles = TIFFNumberOfTiles(in);
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
if (ntiles == 0 || tlsize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "File appears to be tiled, but the number of tiles, tile size, or tile rowsize is zero.");
exit(-1);
}
buffsize = tlsize * ntiles;
if (tlsize != (buffsize / ntiles))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
if (buffsize < (uint32)(ntiles * tl * tile_rowsize))
{
buffsize = ntiles * tl * tile_rowsize;
if (ntiles != (buffsize / tl / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("loadImage",
"Tilesize %u is too small, using ntiles * tilelength * tilerowsize %lu",
tlsize, (unsigned long)buffsize);
#endif
}
if (dump->infile != NULL)
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Tilesize: %u, Number of Tiles: %u, Tile row size: %u",
tlsize, ntiles, tile_rowsize);
}
else
{
uint32 buffsize_check;
readunit = STRIP;
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rowsperstrip);
stsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
if (nstrips == 0 || stsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "File appears to be striped, but the number of stipes or stripe size is zero.");
exit(-1);
}
buffsize = stsize * nstrips;
if (stsize != (buffsize / nstrips))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
buffsize_check = ((length * width * spp * bps) + 7);
if (length != ((buffsize_check - 7) / width / spp / bps))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Integer overflow detected.");
exit(-1);
}
if (buffsize < (uint32) (((length * width * spp * bps) + 7) / 8))
{
buffsize = ((length * width * spp * bps) + 7) / 8;
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("loadImage",
"Stripsize %u is too small, using imagelength * width * spp * bps / 8 = %lu",
stsize, (unsigned long)buffsize);
#endif
}
if (dump->infile != NULL)
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Stripsize: %u, Number of Strips: %u, Rows per Strip: %u, Scanline size: %u",
stsize, nstrips, rowsperstrip, scanlinesize);
}
if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG)
{ /* Force conversion to RGB */
jpegcolormode = JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB;
TIFFSetField(in, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
}
/* The clause up to the read statement is taken from Tom Lane's tiffcp patch */
else
{ /* Otherwise, can't handle subsampled input */
if (input_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR)
{
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&subsampling_horiz, &subsampling_vert);
if (subsampling_horiz != 1 || subsampling_vert != 1)
{
TIFFError("loadImage",
"Can't copy/convert subsampled image with subsampling %d horiz %d vert",
subsampling_horiz, subsampling_vert);
return (-1);
}
}
}
read_buff = *read_ptr;
/* +3 : add a few guard bytes since reverseSamples16bits() can read a bit */
/* outside buffer */
if (!read_buff)
read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize+3);
else
{
if (prev_readsize < buffsize)
{
new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(read_buff, buffsize+3);
if (!new_buff)
{
free (read_buff);
read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize+3);
}
else
read_buff = new_buff;
}
}
if (!read_buff)
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
return (-1);
}
read_buff[buffsize] = 0;
read_buff[buffsize+1] = 0;
read_buff[buffsize+2] = 0;
prev_readsize = buffsize;
*read_ptr = read_buff;
/* N.B. The read functions used copy separate plane data into a buffer as interleaved
* samples rather than separate planes so the same logic works to extract regions
* regardless of the way the data are organized in the input file.
*/
switch (readunit) {
case STRIP:
if (planar == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG)
{
if (!(readContigStripsIntoBuffer(in, read_buff)))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to read contiguous strips into buffer");
return (-1);
}
}
else
{
if (!(readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer(in, read_buff, length, width, spp, dump)))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to read separate strips into buffer");
return (-1);
}
}
break;
case TILE:
if (planar == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG)
{
if (!(readContigTilesIntoBuffer(in, read_buff, length, width, tw, tl, spp, bps)))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to read contiguous tiles into buffer");
return (-1);
}
}
else
{
if (!(readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer(in, read_buff, length, width, tw, tl, spp, bps)))
{
TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to read separate tiles into buffer");
return (-1);
}
}
break;
default: TIFFError("loadImage", "Unsupported image file format");
return (-1);
break;
}
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 2))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "loadImage",
"Image width %d, length %d, Raw image data, %4d bytes",
width, length, buffsize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d", bps, spp);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
dump_buffer(dump->infile, dump->format, 1, scanlinesize,
i, read_buff + (i * scanlinesize));
}
return (0);
} /* end loadImage */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 has out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093, MSVR 35096, and MSVR 35097.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | High | 166,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dissect_ppi(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
{
proto_tree *ppi_tree = NULL, *ppi_flags_tree = NULL, *seg_tree = NULL, *ampdu_tree = NULL;
proto_tree *agg_tree = NULL;
proto_item *ti = NULL;
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
int offset = 0;
guint version, flags;
gint tot_len, data_len;
guint data_type;
guint32 dlt;
guint32 n_ext_flags = 0;
guint32 ampdu_id = 0;
fragment_head *fd_head = NULL;
fragment_item *ft_fdh = NULL;
gint mpdu_count = 0;
gchar *mpdu_str;
gboolean first_mpdu = TRUE;
guint last_frame = 0;
gint len_remain, /*pad_len = 0,*/ ampdu_len = 0;
struct ieee_802_11_phdr phdr;
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PPI");
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
version = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
tot_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
dlt = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "PPI version %u, %u bytes",
version, tot_len);
/* Dissect the packet */
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree, proto_ppi,
tvb, 0, tot_len, "PPI version %u, %u bytes", version, tot_len);
ppi_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_pph);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_version,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ti = proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_flags,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ppi_flags_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_flags);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_alignment,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_reserved,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_len,
tvb, offset + 2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_dlt,
tvb, offset + 4, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
tot_len -= PPI_V0_HEADER_LEN;
offset += 8;
/* We don't have any 802.11 metadata yet. */
memset(&phdr, 0, sizeof(phdr));
phdr.fcs_len = -1;
phdr.decrypted = FALSE;
phdr.datapad = FALSE;
phdr.phy = PHDR_802_11_PHY_UNKNOWN;
phdr.presence_flags = 0;
while (tot_len > 0) {
data_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
data_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset + 2) + 4;
tot_len -= data_len;
switch (data_type) {
case PPI_80211_COMMON:
dissect_80211_common(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC:
dissect_80211n_mac(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len,
TRUE, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC_PHY:
dissect_80211n_mac_phy(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset,
data_len, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_SPECTRUM_MAP:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_spectrum_map);
break;
case PPI_PROCESS_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_process_info);
break;
case PPI_CAPTURE_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_capture_info);
break;
case PPI_AGGREGATION_EXTENSION:
dissect_aggregation_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_8023_EXTENSION:
dissect_8023_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_GPS_INFO:
if (ppi_gps_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_gps, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated GPS dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_gps_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_VECTOR_INFO:
if (ppi_vector_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_vector, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated VECTOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_vector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_SENSOR_INFO:
if (ppi_sensor_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_harris, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated SENSOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_sensor_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_ANTENNA_INFO:
if (ppi_antenna_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_antenna, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated ANTENNA dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_antenna_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case FNET_PRIVATE:
if (ppi_fnet_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_fnet, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated FNET dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_fnet_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_reserved, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
offset += data_len;
if (IS_PPI_FLAG_ALIGN(flags)){
offset += PADDING4(offset);
}
}
if (ppi_ampdu_reassemble && DOT11N_IS_AGGREGATE(n_ext_flags)) {
len_remain = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
#if 0 /* XXX: pad_len never actually used ?? */
if (DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
pad_len = PADDING4(len_remain);
}
#endif
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Make sure we aren't going to go past AGGREGATE_MAX
* and caclulate our full A-MPDU length */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
while (fd_head) {
ampdu_len += fd_head->len + PADDING4(fd_head->len) + 4;
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
if (ampdu_len > AGGREGATE_MAX) {
if (tree) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(ppi_tree, pinfo, &ei_ppi_invalid_length, tvb, offset, -1, "Aggregate length greater than maximum (%u)", AGGREGATE_MAX);
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
} else {
return;
}
}
/*
* Note that we never actually reassemble our A-MPDUs. Doing
* so would require prepending each MPDU with an A-MPDU delimiter
* and appending it with padding, only to hand it off to some
* routine which would un-do the work we just did. We're using
* the reassembly code to track MPDU sizes and frame numbers.
*/
/*??fd_head = */fragment_add_seq_next(&du_reassembly_table,
tvb, offset, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL, len_remain, TRUE);
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Do reassembly? */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
/* Show our fragments */
if (fd_head && tree) {
ft_fdh = fd_head;
/* List our fragments */
seg_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(ppi_tree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_ampdu_segments, &ti, "A-MPDU (%u bytes w/hdrs):", ampdu_len);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti);
while (ft_fdh) {
if (ft_fdh->tvb_data && ft_fdh->len) {
last_frame = ft_fdh->frame;
if (!first_mpdu)
proto_item_append_text(ti, ",");
first_mpdu = FALSE;
proto_item_append_text(ti, " #%u(%u)",
ft_fdh->frame, ft_fdh->len);
proto_tree_add_uint_format(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_segment,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame,
"Frame: %u (%u byte%s)",
last_frame,
ft_fdh->len,
plurality(ft_fdh->len, "", "s"));
}
ft_fdh = ft_fdh->next;
}
if (last_frame && last_frame != pinfo->fd->num)
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_reassembled_in,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame);
}
if (fd_head && !DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree,
proto_get_id_by_filter_name("wlan_aggregate"),
tvb, 0, tot_len, "IEEE 802.11 Aggregate MPDU");
agg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ampdu);
}
while (fd_head) {
if (fd_head->tvb_data && fd_head->len) {
mpdu_count++;
mpdu_str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "MPDU #%d", mpdu_count);
next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, fd_head->tvb_data);
add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, mpdu_str);
ampdu_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(agg_tree, next_tvb, 0, -1, ett_ampdu_segment, NULL, mpdu_str);
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ampdu_tree, &phdr);
}
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_count, tvb, 0, 0, mpdu_count);
pinfo->fragmented=FALSE;
} else {
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "IEEE 802.11n");
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Unreassembled A-MPDU data");
call_dissector(data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
}
return;
}
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
/*
* You can't just call an arbitrary subdissector based on a
* LINKTYPE_ value, because they may expect a particular
* pseudo-header to be passed to them.
*
* So we look for LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11, which is 105, and, if
* that's what the LINKTYPE_ value is, pass it a pointer
* to a struct ieee_802_11_phdr; otherwise, we pass it
* a null pointer - if it actually matters, we need to
* construct the appropriate pseudo-header and pass that.
*/
if (dlt == 105) {
/* LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11 */
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree, &phdr);
} else {
/* Everything else. This will pass a NULL data argument. */
dissector_try_uint(wtap_encap_dissector_table,
wtap_pcap_encap_to_wtap_encap(dlt), next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-pktap.c in the Ethernet dissector in Wireshark 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles the packet-header data type, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserProcessMainImpl::Shutdown() {
if (state_ != STATE_STARTED) {
CHECK_NE(state_, STATE_SHUTTING_DOWN);
return;
MessagePump::Get()->Stop();
WebContentsUnloader::GetInstance()->Shutdown();
if (process_model_ != PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS) {
BrowserContext::AssertNoContextsExist();
}
browser_main_runner_->Shutdown();
browser_main_runner_.reset();
if (process_model_ != PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS) {
BrowserContext::AssertNoContextsExist();
}
browser_main_runner_->Shutdown();
browser_main_runner_.reset();
exit_manager_.reset();
main_delegate_.reset();
platform_delegate_.reset();
state_ = STATE_SHUTDOWN;
}
BrowserProcessMain::BrowserProcessMain() {}
BrowserProcessMain::~BrowserProcessMain() {}
ProcessModel BrowserProcessMain::GetProcessModelOverrideFromEnv() {
static bool g_initialized = false;
static ProcessModel g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_UNDEFINED;
if (g_initialized) {
return g_process_model;
}
g_initialized = true;
std::unique_ptr<base::Environment> env = base::Environment::Create();
if (IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled("SINGLE_PROCESS", env.get())) {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS;
} else {
std::string model = GetEnvironmentOption("PROCESS_MODEL", env.get());
if (!model.empty()) {
if (model == "multi-process") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_MULTI_PROCESS;
} else if (model == "single-process") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_SINGLE_PROCESS;
} else if (model == "process-per-site-instance") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_SITE_INSTANCE;
} else if (model == "process-per-view") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_VIEW;
} else if (model == "process-per-site") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_PROCESS_PER_SITE;
} else if (model == "site-per-process") {
g_process_model = PROCESS_MODEL_SITE_PER_PROCESS;
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Invalid process mode: " << model;
}
}
}
return g_process_model;
}
BrowserProcessMain* BrowserProcessMain::GetInstance() {
static BrowserProcessMainImpl g_instance;
return &g_instance;
}
} // namespace oxide
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
uint64_t maxFrameNumber = data.readUint64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen, maxFrameNumber);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = -1;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = static_cast<uint64_t>(data.readInt64());
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(static_cast<int64_t>(slotMask));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(width, height);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
PixelFormat defaultFormat = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_DATA_SPACE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
android_dataspace defaultDataSpace =
static_cast<android_dataspace>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferDataSpace(defaultDataSpace);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream = getSidebandStream();
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(stream != NULL));
if (stream != NULL) {
reply->writeNativeHandle(stream->handle());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not initialize certain data structures, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, related to IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp and IGraphicBufferProducer.cpp, aka internal bug 27555981.
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
| Medium | 173,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert,
int *pathLenConstraint)
{
int ret = X509_OK, i = 0;
bigint *cert_sig;
X509_CTX *next_cert = NULL;
BI_CTX *ctx = NULL;
bigint *mod = NULL, *expn = NULL;
int match_ca_cert = 0;
struct timeval tv;
uint8_t is_self_signed = 0;
if (cert == NULL)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;
goto end_verify;
}
/* a self-signed certificate that is not in the CA store - use this
to check the signature */
if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, cert->cert_dn) == 0)
{
is_self_signed = 1;
ctx = cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
mod = cert->rsa_ctx->m;
expn = cert->rsa_ctx->e;
}
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
/* check the not before date */
if (tv.tv_sec < cert->not_before)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID;
goto end_verify;
}
/* check the not after date */
if (tv.tv_sec > cert->not_after)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED;
goto end_verify;
}
if (cert->basic_constraint_present)
{
/* If the cA boolean is not asserted,
then the keyCertSign bit in the key usage extension MUST NOT be
asserted. */
if (!cert->basic_constraint_cA &&
IS_SET_KEY_USAGE_FLAG(cert, KEY_USAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT;
goto end_verify;
}
/* The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
keyCertSign bit. In this case, it gives the maximum number of
non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this
certificate in a valid certification path. */
if (cert->basic_constraint_cA &&
(!cert->key_usage_present ||
IS_SET_KEY_USAGE_FLAG(cert, KEY_USAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) &&
(cert->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint+1) < *pathLenConstraint)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT;
goto end_verify;
}
}
next_cert = cert->next;
/* last cert in the chain - look for a trusted cert */
if (next_cert == NULL)
{
if (ca_cert_ctx != NULL)
{
/* go thru the CA store */
while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
{
/* the extension is present but the cA boolean is not
asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used
to verify certificate signatures. */
if (cert->basic_constraint_present &&
!ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->basic_constraint_cA)
continue;
if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn,
ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->cert_dn) == 0)
{
/* use this CA certificate for signature verification */
match_ca_cert = true;
ctx = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
mod = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->m;
expn = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->e;
break;
}
i++;
}
}
/* couldn't find a trusted cert (& let self-signed errors
be returned) */
if (!match_ca_cert && !is_self_signed)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;
goto end_verify;
}
}
else if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, next_cert->cert_dn) != 0)
{
/* check the chain */
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN;
goto end_verify;
}
else /* use the next certificate in the chain for signature verify */
{
ctx = next_cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
mod = next_cert->rsa_ctx->m;
expn = next_cert->rsa_ctx->e;
}
/* cert is self signed */
if (!match_ca_cert && is_self_signed)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED;
goto end_verify;
}
/* check the signature */
cert_sig = sig_verify(ctx, cert->signature, cert->sig_len,
bi_clone(ctx, mod), bi_clone(ctx, expn));
if (cert_sig && cert->digest)
{
if (bi_compare(cert_sig, cert->digest) != 0)
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
bi_free(ctx, cert_sig);
}
else
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
}
bi_clear_cache(ctx);
if (ret)
goto end_verify;
/* go down the certificate chain using recursion. */
if (next_cert != NULL)
{
(*pathLenConstraint)++; /* don't include last certificate */
ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert, pathLenConstraint);
}
end_verify:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-347
Summary: In sig_verify() in x509.c in axTLS version 2.1.3 and before, the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification does not properly verify the ASN.1 metadata. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used, which could lead to impersonation through fake X.509 certificates. This is an even more permissive variant of CVE-2006-4790 and CVE-2014-1568.
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info. | Medium | 169,087 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual std::string GetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return "";
return chromeos::GetKeyboardOverlayId(input_method_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate(struct ib_uverbs_file *ufile)
{
struct rdma_umap_priv *priv, *next_priv;
lockdep_assert_held(&ufile->hw_destroy_rwsem);
while (1) {
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
/* Get an arbitrary mm pointer that hasn't been cleaned yet */
mutex_lock(&ufile->umap_lock);
while (!list_empty(&ufile->umaps)) {
int ret;
priv = list_first_entry(&ufile->umaps,
struct rdma_umap_priv, list);
mm = priv->vma->vm_mm;
ret = mmget_not_zero(mm);
if (!ret) {
list_del_init(&priv->list);
mm = NULL;
continue;
}
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&ufile->umap_lock);
if (!mm)
return;
/*
* The umap_lock is nested under mmap_sem since it used within
* the vma_ops callbacks, so we have to clean the list one mm
* at a time to get the lock ordering right. Typically there
* will only be one mm, so no big deal.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mutex_lock(&ufile->umap_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe (priv, next_priv, &ufile->umaps,
list) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = priv->vma;
if (vma->vm_mm != mm)
continue;
list_del_init(&priv->list);
zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE);
}
mutex_unlock(&ufile->umap_lock);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (nbytes + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | High | 164,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int php_var_unserialize_internal(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER)
{
const unsigned char *cursor, *limit, *marker, *start;
zval *rval_ref;
limit = max;
cursor = *p;
if (YYCURSOR >= YYLIMIT) {
return 0;
}
if (var_hash && (*p)[0] != 'R') {
var_push(var_hash, rval);
}
start = cursor;
#line 554 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
{
YYCTYPE yych;
static const unsigned char yybm[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,
128, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 7) YYFILL(7);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
switch (yych) {
case 'C':
case 'O': goto yy13;
case 'N': goto yy5;
case 'R': goto yy2;
case 'S': goto yy10;
case 'a': goto yy11;
case 'b': goto yy6;
case 'd': goto yy8;
case 'i': goto yy7;
case 'o': goto yy12;
case 'r': goto yy4;
case 's': goto yy9;
case '}': goto yy14;
default: goto yy16;
}
yy2:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy95;
yy3:
#line 884 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{ return 0; }
#line 580 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy4:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy89;
goto yy3;
yy5:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == ';') goto yy87;
goto yy3;
yy6:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy83;
goto yy3;
yy7:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy77;
goto yy3;
yy8:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy53;
goto yy3;
yy9:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy46;
goto yy3;
yy10:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy39;
goto yy3;
yy11:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy32;
goto yy3;
yy12:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy25;
goto yy3;
yy13:
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych == ':') goto yy17;
goto yy3;
yy14:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 878 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
/* this is the case where we have less data than planned */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Unexpected end of serialized data");
return 0; /* not sure if it should be 0 or 1 here? */
}
#line 629 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy16:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy3;
yy17:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
if (yych == '+') goto yy19;
yy18:
YYCURSOR = YYMARKER;
goto yy3;
yy19:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
goto yy18;
yy20:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy20;
}
if (yych != ':') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 733 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, len2, len3, maxlen;
zend_long elements;
char *str;
zend_string *class_name;
zend_class_entry *ce;
int incomplete_class = 0;
int custom_object = 0;
zval user_func;
zval retval;
zval args[1];
if (!var_hash) return 0;
if (*start == 'C') {
custom_object = 1;
}
len2 = len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len || len == 0) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
str = (char*)YYCURSOR;
YYCURSOR += len;
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR+1) != ':') {
*p = YYCURSOR+1;
return 0;
}
len3 = strspn(str, "0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\177\200\201\202\203\204\205\206\207\210\211\212\213\214\215\216\217\220\221\222\223\224\225\226\227\230\231\232\233\234\235\236\237\240\241\242\243\244\245\246\247\250\251\252\253\254\255\256\257\260\261\262\263\264\265\266\267\270\271\272\273\274\275\276\277\300\301\302\303\304\305\306\307\310\311\312\313\314\315\316\317\320\321\322\323\324\325\326\327\330\331\332\333\334\335\336\337\340\341\342\343\344\345\346\347\350\351\352\353\354\355\356\357\360\361\362\363\364\365\366\367\370\371\372\373\374\375\376\377\\");
if (len3 != len)
{
*p = YYCURSOR + len3 - len;
return 0;
}
class_name = zend_string_init(str, len, 0);
do {
if(!unserialize_allowed_class(class_name, classes)) {
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
break;
}
/* Try to find class directly */
BG(serialize_lock)++;
ce = zend_lookup_class(class_name);
if (ce) {
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
zend_string_release(class_name);
return 0;
}
break;
}
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
zend_string_release(class_name);
return 0;
}
/* Check for unserialize callback */
if ((PG(unserialize_callback_func) == NULL) || (PG(unserialize_callback_func)[0] == '\0')) {
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
break;
}
/* Call unserialize callback */
ZVAL_STRING(&user_func, PG(unserialize_callback_func));
ZVAL_STR_COPY(&args[0], class_name);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), NULL, &user_func, &retval, 1, args, 0, NULL) != SUCCESS) {
BG(serialize_lock)--;
if (EG(exception)) {
zend_string_release(class_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
return 0;
}
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "defined (%s) but not found", Z_STRVAL(user_func));
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
break;
}
BG(serialize_lock)--;
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
if (EG(exception)) {
zend_string_release(class_name);
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
return 0;
}
/* The callback function may have defined the class */
if ((ce = zend_lookup_class(class_name)) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Function %s() hasn't defined the class it was called for", Z_STRVAL(user_func));
incomplete_class = 1;
ce = PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&user_func);
zval_ptr_dtor(&args[0]);
break;
} while (1);
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (custom_object) {
int ret;
ret = object_custom(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ce);
if (ret && incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(rval, ZSTR_VAL(class_name), len2);
}
zend_string_release(class_name);
return ret;
}
elements = object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ce);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(rval, ZSTR_VAL(class_name), len2);
}
zend_string_release(class_name);
return object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, elements);
}
#line 804 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy25:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy26;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy27;
goto yy18;
}
yy26:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy27:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy27;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 726 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
if (!var_hash) return 0;
return object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU,
object_common1(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, ZEND_STANDARD_CLASS_DEF_PTR));
}
#line 836 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy32:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy33;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy34;
goto yy18;
yy33:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy34:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy34;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '{') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 702 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
zend_long elements = parse_iv(start + 2);
/* use iv() not uiv() in order to check data range */
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
if (elements < 0) {
return 0;
}
array_init_size(rval, elements);
if (elements) {
/* we can't convert from packed to hash during unserialization, because
reference to some zvals might be keept in var_hash (to support references) */
zend_hash_real_init(Z_ARRVAL_P(rval), 0);
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_ARRVAL_P(rval), elements, 0)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
#line 881 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy39:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy40;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy41;
goto yy18;
yy40:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy41:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy41;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 668 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, maxlen;
zend_string *str;
len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
if ((str = unserialize_str(&YYCURSOR, len, maxlen)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
zend_string_free(str);
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR + 1) != ';') {
efree(str);
*p = YYCURSOR + 1;
return 0;
}
YYCURSOR += 2;
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_STR(rval, str);
return 1;
}
#line 936 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy46:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '+') goto yy47;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy48;
goto yy18;
yy47:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy48:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy48;
if (yych >= ';') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '"') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 636 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
size_t len, maxlen;
char *str;
len = parse_uiv(start + 2);
maxlen = max - YYCURSOR;
if (maxlen < len) {
*p = start + 2;
return 0;
}
str = (char*)YYCURSOR;
YYCURSOR += len;
if (*(YYCURSOR) != '"') {
*p = YYCURSOR;
return 0;
}
if (*(YYCURSOR + 1) != ';') {
*p = YYCURSOR + 1;
return 0;
}
YYCURSOR += 2;
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_STRINGL(rval, str, len);
return 1;
}
#line 989 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy53:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych == '+') goto yy57;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy55;
if (yych <= '.') goto yy60;
goto yy18;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'I') {
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
if (yych <= 'H') goto yy18;
goto yy56;
} else {
if (yych != 'N') goto yy18;
}
}
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'A') goto yy76;
goto yy18;
yy55:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych == '.') goto yy60;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
if (yych != 'I') goto yy18;
}
yy56:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'N') goto yy72;
goto yy18;
yy57:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == '.') goto yy60;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy58:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ':') {
if (yych <= '.') {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy18;
goto yy70;
} else {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy58;
goto yy18;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= ';') goto yy63;
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy60:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy61:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ';') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy61;
if (yych <= ':') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy63:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 627 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
#if SIZEOF_ZEND_LONG == 4
use_double:
#endif
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_DOUBLE(rval, zend_strtod((const char *)start + 2, NULL));
return 1;
}
#line 1086 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy65:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy66;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy18;
}
yy66:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych == '+') goto yy69;
goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy69;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
}
yy67:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
if (yych == ';') goto yy63;
goto yy18;
yy69:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy18;
yy70:
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 4) YYFILL(4);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ';') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy70;
if (yych <= ':') goto yy18;
goto yy63;
} else {
if (yych <= 'E') {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy18;
goto yy65;
} else {
if (yych == 'e') goto yy65;
goto yy18;
}
}
yy72:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'F') goto yy18;
yy73:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 611 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!strncmp((char*)start + 2, "NAN", 3)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(rval, php_get_nan());
} else if (!strncmp((char*)start + 2, "INF", 3)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(rval, php_get_inf());
} else if (!strncmp((char*)start + 2, "-INF", 4)) {
ZVAL_DOUBLE(rval, -php_get_inf());
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(rval);
}
return 1;
}
#line 1161 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy76:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'N') goto yy73;
goto yy18;
yy77:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy78;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy79;
goto yy18;
}
yy78:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy79:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy79;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 585 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
#if SIZEOF_ZEND_LONG == 4
int digits = YYCURSOR - start - 3;
if (start[2] == '-' || start[2] == '+') {
digits--;
}
/* Use double for large zend_long values that were serialized on a 64-bit system */
if (digits >= MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1) {
if (digits == MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1) {
int cmp = strncmp((char*)YYCURSOR - MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG, long_min_digits, MAX_LENGTH_OF_LONG - 1);
if (!(cmp < 0 || (cmp == 0 && start[2] == '-'))) {
goto use_double;
}
} else {
goto use_double;
}
}
#endif
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_LONG(rval, parse_iv(start + 2));
return 1;
}
#line 1214 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy83:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy18;
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 579 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_BOOL(rval, parse_iv(start + 2));
return 1;
}
#line 1228 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy87:
++YYCURSOR;
#line 573 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
*p = YYCURSOR;
ZVAL_NULL(rval);
return 1;
}
#line 1237 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy89:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy90;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy91;
goto yy18;
}
yy90:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy91:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy91;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 548 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
zend_long id;
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
id = parse_iv(start + 2) - 1;
if (id == -1 || (rval_ref = var_access(var_hash, id)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (rval_ref == rval) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_ISUNDEF_P(rval_ref) || (Z_ISREF_P(rval_ref) && Z_ISUNDEF_P(Z_REFVAL_P(rval_ref)))) {
ZVAL_UNDEF(rval);
return 1;
}
ZVAL_COPY(rval, rval_ref);
return 1;
}
#line 1285 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
yy95:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych != '+') goto yy18;
} else {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy96;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy97;
goto yy18;
}
yy96:
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy18;
yy97:
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy18;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy97;
if (yych != ';') goto yy18;
++YYCURSOR;
#line 522 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
{
zend_long id;
*p = YYCURSOR;
if (!var_hash) return 0;
id = parse_iv(start + 2) - 1;
if (id == -1 || (rval_ref = var_access(var_hash, id)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(rval);
if (Z_ISUNDEF_P(rval_ref) || (Z_ISREF_P(rval_ref) && Z_ISUNDEF_P(Z_REFVAL_P(rval_ref)))) {
ZVAL_UNDEF(rval);
return 1;
}
if (Z_ISREF_P(rval_ref)) {
ZVAL_COPY(rval, rval_ref);
} else {
ZVAL_NEW_REF(rval_ref, rval_ref);
ZVAL_COPY(rval, rval_ref);
}
return 1;
}
#line 1334 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.c"
}
#line 886 "ext/standard/var_unserializer.re"
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-502
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 mishandles certain invalid objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data that leads to a (1) __destruct call or (2) magic method call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72663 - destroy broken object when unserializing
(cherry picked from commit 448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059) | High | 166,960 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage(const float* impulseResponse, size_t, size_t reverbTotalLatency, size_t stageOffset, size_t stageLength,
size_t fftSize, size_t renderPhase, size_t renderSliceSize, ReverbAccumulationBuffer* accumulationBuffer, bool directMode)
: m_accumulationBuffer(accumulationBuffer)
, m_accumulationReadIndex(0)
, m_inputReadIndex(0)
, m_directMode(directMode)
{
ASSERT(impulseResponse);
ASSERT(accumulationBuffer);
if (!m_directMode) {
m_fftKernel = adoptPtr(new FFTFrame(fftSize));
m_fftKernel->doPaddedFFT(impulseResponse + stageOffset, stageLength);
m_fftConvolver = adoptPtr(new FFTConvolver(fftSize));
} else {
m_directKernel = adoptPtr(new AudioFloatArray(fftSize / 2));
m_directKernel->copyToRange(impulseResponse + stageOffset, 0, fftSize / 2);
m_directConvolver = adoptPtr(new DirectConvolver(renderSliceSize));
}
m_temporaryBuffer.allocate(renderSliceSize);
size_t totalDelay = stageOffset + reverbTotalLatency;
size_t halfSize = fftSize / 2;
if (!m_directMode) {
ASSERT(totalDelay >= halfSize);
if (totalDelay >= halfSize)
totalDelay -= halfSize;
}
int maxPreDelayLength = std::min(halfSize, totalDelay);
m_preDelayLength = totalDelay > 0 ? renderPhase % maxPreDelayLength : 0;
if (m_preDelayLength > totalDelay)
m_preDelayLength = 0;
m_postDelayLength = totalDelay - m_preDelayLength;
m_preReadWriteIndex = 0;
m_framesProcessed = 0; // total frames processed so far
size_t delayBufferSize = m_preDelayLength < fftSize ? fftSize : m_preDelayLength;
delayBufferSize = delayBufferSize < renderSliceSize ? renderSliceSize : delayBufferSize;
m_preDelayBuffer.allocate(delayBufferSize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage function in core/platform/audio/ReverbConvolverStage.cpp in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors related to the impulseResponse array.
Commit Message: Don't read past the end of the impulseResponse array
BUG=281480
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23689004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_host_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftHEVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL && (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx);
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
ALOGV("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
| High | 174,181 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameworkListener::init(const char *socketName UNUSED, bool withSeq) {
mCommands = new FrameworkCommandCollection();
errorRate = 0;
mCommandCount = 0;
mWithSeq = withSeq;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libsysutils/src/FrameworkListener.cpp in Framework Listener in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29831647.
Commit Message: Fix vold vulnerability in FrameworkListener
Modify FrameworkListener to ignore commands that exceed the maximum
buffer length and send an error message.
Bug: 29831647
Change-Id: I9e57d1648d55af2ca0191bb47868e375ecc26950
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit baa126dc158a40bc83c17c6d428c760e5b93fb1a)
(cherry picked from commit 470484d2a25ad432190a01d1c763b4b36db33c7e)
| High | 173,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HostCache::ClearForHosts(
const base::Callback<bool(const std::string&)>& host_filter) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (host_filter.is_null()) {
clear();
return;
}
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
for (EntryMap::iterator it = entries_.begin(); it != entries_.end();) {
EntryMap::iterator next_it = std::next(it);
if (host_filter.Run(it->first.hostname)) {
RecordErase(ERASE_CLEAR, now, it->second);
entries_.erase(it);
}
it = next_it;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015} | High | 172,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct svc_rdma_req_map *alloc_req_map(gfp_t flags)
{
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = kmalloc(sizeof(*map), flags);
if (map)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&map->free);
return map;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,177 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsSync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects,
base::SharedMemoryHandle bitmap_handle) {
DCHECK(base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(bitmap_handle))
<< "Bad bitmap handle";
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> long_living_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
if (!ui::Clipboard::ReplaceSharedMemHandle(
long_living_objects.get(), bitmap_handle, PeerHandle()))
return;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WriteObjectsOnUIThread,
base::Owned(long_living_objects.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ScopedClipboardWriter::WritePickledData function in ui/base/clipboard/scoped_clipboard_writer.cc in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows does not verify a certain format value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the clipboard.
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void gmc_mmx(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src,
int stride, int h, int ox, int oy,
int dxx, int dxy, int dyx, int dyy,
int shift, int r, int width, int height)
{
const int w = 8;
const int ix = ox >> (16 + shift);
const int iy = oy >> (16 + shift);
const int oxs = ox >> 4;
const int oys = oy >> 4;
const int dxxs = dxx >> 4;
const int dxys = dxy >> 4;
const int dyxs = dyx >> 4;
const int dyys = dyy >> 4;
const uint16_t r4[4] = { r, r, r, r };
const uint16_t dxy4[4] = { dxys, dxys, dxys, dxys };
const uint16_t dyy4[4] = { dyys, dyys, dyys, dyys };
const uint64_t shift2 = 2 * shift;
#define MAX_STRIDE 4096U
#define MAX_H 8U
uint8_t edge_buf[(MAX_H + 1) * MAX_STRIDE];
int x, y;
const int dxw = (dxx - (1 << (16 + shift))) * (w - 1);
const int dyh = (dyy - (1 << (16 + shift))) * (h - 1);
const int dxh = dxy * (h - 1);
const int dyw = dyx * (w - 1);
int need_emu = (unsigned) ix >= width - w ||
(unsigned) iy >= height - h;
if ( // non-constant fullpel offset (3% of blocks)
((ox ^ (ox + dxw)) | (ox ^ (ox + dxh)) | (ox ^ (ox + dxw + dxh)) |
(oy ^ (oy + dyw)) | (oy ^ (oy + dyh)) | (oy ^ (oy + dyw + dyh))) >> (16 + shift) ||
(dxx | dxy | dyx | dyy) & 15 ||
(need_emu && (h > MAX_H || stride > MAX_STRIDE))) {
ff_gmc_c(dst, src, stride, h, ox, oy, dxx, dxy, dyx, dyy,
shift, r, width, height);
return;
}
src += ix + iy * stride;
if (need_emu) {
ff_emulated_edge_mc_8(edge_buf, src, stride, stride, w + 1, h + 1, ix, iy, width, height);
src = edge_buf;
}
__asm__ volatile (
"movd %0, %%mm6 \n\t"
"pxor %%mm7, %%mm7 \n\t"
"punpcklwd %%mm6, %%mm6 \n\t"
"punpcklwd %%mm6, %%mm6 \n\t"
:: "r" (1 << shift));
for (x = 0; x < w; x += 4) {
uint16_t dx4[4] = { oxs - dxys + dxxs * (x + 0),
oxs - dxys + dxxs * (x + 1),
oxs - dxys + dxxs * (x + 2),
oxs - dxys + dxxs * (x + 3) };
uint16_t dy4[4] = { oys - dyys + dyxs * (x + 0),
oys - dyys + dyxs * (x + 1),
oys - dyys + dyxs * (x + 2),
oys - dyys + dyxs * (x + 3) };
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
__asm__ volatile (
"movq %0, %%mm4 \n\t"
"movq %1, %%mm5 \n\t"
"paddw %2, %%mm4 \n\t"
"paddw %3, %%mm5 \n\t"
"movq %%mm4, %0 \n\t"
"movq %%mm5, %1 \n\t"
"psrlw $12, %%mm4 \n\t"
"psrlw $12, %%mm5 \n\t"
: "+m" (*dx4), "+m" (*dy4)
: "m" (*dxy4), "m" (*dyy4));
__asm__ volatile (
"movq %%mm6, %%mm2 \n\t"
"movq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t"
"psubw %%mm4, %%mm2 \n\t"
"psubw %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t"
"movq %%mm2, %%mm0 \n\t"
"movq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t"
"pmullw %%mm1, %%mm0 \n\t" // (s - dx) * (s - dy)
"pmullw %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" // dx * dy
"pmullw %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" // (s - dx) * dy
"pmullw %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" // dx * (s - dy)
"movd %4, %%mm5 \n\t"
"movd %3, %%mm4 \n\t"
"punpcklbw %%mm7, %%mm5 \n\t"
"punpcklbw %%mm7, %%mm4 \n\t"
"pmullw %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" // src[1, 1] * dx * dy
"pmullw %%mm4, %%mm2 \n\t" // src[0, 1] * (s - dx) * dy
"movd %2, %%mm5 \n\t"
"movd %1, %%mm4 \n\t"
"punpcklbw %%mm7, %%mm5 \n\t"
"punpcklbw %%mm7, %%mm4 \n\t"
"pmullw %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" // src[1, 0] * dx * (s - dy)
"pmullw %%mm4, %%mm0 \n\t" // src[0, 0] * (s - dx) * (s - dy)
"paddw %5, %%mm1 \n\t"
"paddw %%mm3, %%mm2 \n\t"
"paddw %%mm1, %%mm0 \n\t"
"paddw %%mm2, %%mm0 \n\t"
"psrlw %6, %%mm0 \n\t"
"packuswb %%mm0, %%mm0 \n\t"
"movd %%mm0, %0 \n\t"
: "=m" (dst[x + y * stride])
: "m" (src[0]), "m" (src[1]),
"m" (src[stride]), "m" (src[stride + 1]),
"m" (*r4), "m" (shift2));
src += stride;
}
src += 4 - h * stride;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The gmc_mmx function in libavcodec/x86/mpegvideodsp.c in FFmpeg 3.4 does not properly validate widths and heights, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer signedness error and out-of-array read) via a crafted MPEG file.
Commit Message: avcodec/x86/mpegvideodsp: Fix signedness bug in need_emu
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: 3516/attachment-311488.dat
Found-by: Insu Yun, Georgia Tech.
Tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t)TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point");
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV");
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK");
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated");
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown");
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric"));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb");
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb");
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->x_resolution=x_resolution;
image->y_resolution=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->x_resolution-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->y_resolution-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MaxTextExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MaxTextExtent,"%dx%d",
horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified");
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->matte=MagickTrue;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated");
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated");
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%u",(unsigned int)
rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)));
SetPixelMagenta(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)));
SetPixelYellow(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)*(p+3)));
q++;
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_pixels,
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
PixelPacket
*tile;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)));
q++;
p++;
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q+=image->columns-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetR(*p)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetG(*p)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetB(*p)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) TIFFGetA(*p)));
p--;
q--;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image = DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Improve buffer flow sanity check | Medium | 168,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *device,
unsigned char map[],
unsigned int nmap)
{
int status = 0;
unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
xGetDeviceButtonMappingReply rep;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return (NoSuchExtension);
GetReq(GetDeviceButtonMapping, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceButtonMapping;
req->deviceid = device->device_id;
status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
if (status == 1) {
if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) {
unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
if (rep.nElts)
memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
status = rep.nElts;
} else {
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
status = 0;
}
} else
status = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: X.org libXi before 1.7.7 allows remote X servers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors involving length fields.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
phys_addr_t p = *ppos;
ssize_t written, sz;
unsigned long copied;
void *ptr;
if (p != *ppos)
return -EFBIG;
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
written = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
/* we don't have page 0 mapped on sparc and m68k.. */
if (p < PAGE_SIZE) {
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
/* Hmm. Do something? */
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
}
#endif
while (count > 0) {
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
if (!range_is_allowed(p >> PAGE_SHIFT, sz))
return -EPERM;
/*
* On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as uncached, then
* it must also be accessed uncached by the kernel or data
* corruption may occur.
*/
ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
if (!ptr) {
if (written)
break;
return -EFAULT;
}
copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz);
unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
if (copied) {
written += sz - copied;
if (written)
break;
return -EFAULT;
}
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
}
*ppos += written;
return written;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: The mm subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.10.10 does not properly enforce the CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM protection mechanism, which allows local users to read or write to kernel memory locations in the first megabyte (and bypass slab-allocation access restrictions) via an application that opens the /dev/mem file, related to arch/x86/mm/init.c and drivers/char/mem.c.
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> | High | 168,243 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int su3000_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
{
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x80, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x02;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(300);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x83;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
d->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(ds3000_attach, &su3000_ds3000_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap);
if (d->fe_adap[0].fe == NULL)
return -EIO;
if (dvb_attach(ts2020_attach, d->fe_adap[0].fe,
&dw2104_ts2020_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap)) {
info("Attached DS3000/TS2020!");
return 0;
}
info("Failed to attach DS3000/TS2020!");
return -EIO;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x and 4.10.x before 4.10.4 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 168,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int myrecvfrom6(int sockfd, void *buf, size_t *buflen, int flags,
struct in6_addr *addr, uint32_t *ifindex)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
unsigned char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))];
struct iovec iovec;
struct msghdr msghdr;
struct cmsghdr *cmsghdr;
ssize_t len;
iovec.iov_len = *buflen;
iovec.iov_base = buf;
memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
msghdr.msg_name = &sin6;
msghdr.msg_namelen = sizeof(sin6);
msghdr.msg_iov = &iovec;
msghdr.msg_iovlen = 1;
msghdr.msg_control = cbuf;
msghdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
len = recvmsg(sockfd, &msghdr, flags);
if (len == -1)
return -errno;
*buflen = len;
/* Set ifindex to scope_id now. But since scope_id gets not
* set by kernel for linklocal addresses, use pktinfo to obtain that
* value right after.
*/
*ifindex = sin6.sin6_scope_id;
for (cmsghdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msghdr); cmsghdr;
cmsghdr = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msghdr, cmsghdr)) {
if (cmsghdr->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IPV6 &&
cmsghdr->cmsg_type == IPV6_PKTINFO &&
cmsghdr->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
struct in6_pktinfo *pktinfo;
pktinfo = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA(cmsghdr);
*ifindex = pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex;
}
}
*addr = sin6.sin6_addr;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: libndp before 1.6, as used in NetworkManager, does not properly validate the origin of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) messages, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or cause a denial of service (network connectivity disruption) by advertising a node as a router from a non-local network.
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uch *readpng_get_image(double display_exponent, int *pChannels, ulg *pRowbytes)
{
ulg rowbytes;
/* expand palette images to RGB, low-bit-depth grayscale images to 8 bits,
* transparency chunks to full alpha channel; strip 16-bit-per-sample
* images to 8 bits per sample; and convert grayscale to RGB[A] */
/* GRR WARNING: grayscale needs to be expanded and channels reset! */
*pRowbytes = rowbytes = channels*width;
*pChannels = channels;
if ((image_data = (uch *)malloc(rowbytes*height)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trace((stderr, "readpng_get_image: rowbytes = %ld, height = %ld\n", rowbytes, height));
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
fread(image_data, 1L, rowbytes*height, saved_infile);
return image_data;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static lba512_t lba512_muldiv(lba512_t block_count, lba512_t mul_by, int div_by)
{
lba512_t bc_quot, bc_rem;
/* x * m / d == x / d * m + (x % d) * m / d */
bc_quot = block_count >> div_by;
bc_rem = block_count - (bc_quot << div_by);
return bc_quot * mul_by + ((bc_rem * mul_by) >> div_by);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes | High | 169,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal(Node& root, NodeVector& postInsertionNotificationTargets)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
if (!inDocument() && !node.isContainerNode())
continue;
if (Node::InsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions == node.insertedInto(this))
postInsertionNotificationTargets.append(&node);
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
notifyNodeInsertedInternal(*shadowRoot, postInsertionNotificationTargets);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in the DOM implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to DOMCharacterDataModified events for certain detached-subtree insertions.
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
[email protected]
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240} | High | 171,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
switch (tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) {
case TUN_TUN_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tun_netdev_ops;
/* Point-to-Point TUN Device */
dev->hard_header_len = 0;
dev->addr_len = 0;
dev->mtu = 1500;
/* Zero header length */
dev->type = ARPHRD_NONE;
dev->flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_NOARP | IFF_MULTICAST;
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
case TUN_TAP_DEV:
dev->netdev_ops = &tap_netdev_ops;
/* Ethernet TAP Device */
ether_setup(dev);
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
dev->tx_queue_len = TUN_READQ_SIZE; /* We prefer our own queue length */
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The net subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly restrict use of the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to access /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl, and then using the pktgen package in conjunction with a bridge device for a VLAN interface.
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::ParseBlockGroup(long long payload_size, long long& pos,
long& len) {
const long long payload_start = pos;
const long long payload_stop = pos + payload_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((total >= 0) && (payload_stop > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (payload_stop > avail) {
len = static_cast<long>(payload_size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long discard_padding = 0;
while (pos < payload_stop) {
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) // not a value ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume size field
if (pos > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x35A2) { // DiscardPadding
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, discard_padding);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
if (id != 0x21) { // sub-part of BlockGroup is not a Block
pos += size; // consume sub-part of block group
if (pos > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
continue;
}
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (block_stop > payload_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; // consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail) {
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; // consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; // consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail)) {
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos = block_stop; // consume block-part of block group
assert(pos <= payload_stop);
}
assert(pos == payload_stop);
status = CreateBlock(0x20, // BlockGroup ID
payload_start, payload_size, discard_padding);
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = payload_stop;
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,847 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*actualCount = count;
for (names = list+1; *names; names++)
Xfree (*names);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The XListFonts function in X.org libX11 before 1.6.4 might allow remote X servers to gain privileges via vectors involving length fields, which trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: | High | 164,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Tracks* Segment::GetTracks() const
{
return m_pTracks;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0600) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix | Medium | 170,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void zend_throw_or_error(int fetch_type, zend_class_entry *exception_ce, const char *format, ...) /* {{{ */
{
va_list va;
char *message = NULL;
va_start(va, format);
zend_vspprintf(&message, 0, format, va);
if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_EXCEPTION) {
zend_throw_error(exception_ce, message);
} else {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "%s", message);
}
efree(message);
va_end(va);
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Format string vulnerability in the zend_throw_or_error function in Zend/zend_execute_API.c in PHP 7.x before 7.0.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in a string that is misused as a class name, leading to incorrect error handling.
Commit Message: Use format string | High | 167,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getpwnam_r(
const char *name,
struct passwd *pwd,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t uid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(pwd);
p = startswith(name, "vu-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_uid(e + 1, &uid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineUser",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) uid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = strlen(name);
if (buflen < l+1) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memcpy(buffer, name, l+1);
pwd->pw_name = buffer;
pwd->pw_uid = mapped;
pwd->pw_gid = 65534; /* nobody */
pwd->pw_gecos = buffer;
pwd->pw_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
pwd->pw_dir = (char*) "/";
pwd->pw_shell = (char*) "/sbin/nologin";
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the getpwnam and getgrnam functions of the NSS module nss-mymachines in systemd.
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002 | High | 168,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; ട > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Missing confusable characters in Internationalization in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Add a few more entries to the confusables list for IDN
U+04CA (ӊ) => h
U+0E1F (ฟ) => w
U+0E23 (ร) => s
Bug: 813925, 813814
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: If81ea9bf1c1729f1b6ffc71d718dc5950ac825b5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927741
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538159} | Medium | 172,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UserSelectionScreen::OnBeforeUserRemoved(const AccountId& account_id) {
for (user_manager::UserList::iterator it = users_.begin(); it != users_.end();
++it) {
if ((*it)->GetAccountId() == account_id) {
users_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224} | High | 172,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*output)(struct net *, struct sock *, struct sk_buff *))
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ?
inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
struct frag_hdr *fh;
unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;
int hroom, troom;
__be32 frag_id;
int ptr, offset = 0, err = 0;
u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0;
hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb);
/* We must not fragment if the socket is set to force MTU discovery
* or if the skb it not generated by a local socket.
*/
if (unlikely(!skb->ignore_df && skb->len > mtu))
goto fail_toobig;
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size) {
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu)
goto fail_toobig;
/* don't send fragments larger than what we received */
mtu = IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size;
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
}
if (np && np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
if (mtu < hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) + 8)
goto fail_toobig;
mtu -= hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
frag_id = ipv6_select_ident(net, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
(err = skb_checksum_help(skb)))
goto fail;
hroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
unsigned int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag2;
if (first_len - hlen > mtu ||
((first_len - hlen) & 7) ||
skb_cloned(skb) ||
skb_headroom(skb) < (hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
/* Correct geometry. */
if (frag->len > mtu ||
((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) ||
skb_headroom(frag) < (hlen + hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path_clean;
/* Partially cloned skb? */
if (skb_shared(frag))
goto slow_path_clean;
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
}
err = 0;
offset = 0;
/* BUILD HEADER */
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb_network_header(skb), hlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(skb);
__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memcpy(skb_network_header(skb), tmp_hdr, hlen);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb);
skb->len = first_len;
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
for (;;) {
/* Prepare header of the next frame,
* before previous one went down. */
if (frag) {
frag->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_reset_transport_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(frag, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(frag, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
memcpy(skb_network_header(frag), tmp_hdr,
hlen);
offset += skb->len - hlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (frag->next)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len =
htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
}
err = output(net, sk, skb);
if (!err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
if (err || !frag)
break;
skb = frag;
frag = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
}
kfree(tmp_hdr);
if (err == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return 0;
}
kfree_skb_list(frag);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return err;
slow_path_clean:
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) {
if (frag2 == frag)
break;
frag2->sk = NULL;
frag2->destructor = NULL;
skb->truesize += frag2->truesize;
}
}
slow_path:
left = skb->len - hlen; /* Space per frame */
ptr = hlen; /* Where to start from */
/*
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
troom = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while (left > 0) {
u8 *fragnexthdr_offset;
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
len = mtu;
/* IF: we are not sending up to and including the packet end
then align the next start on an eight byte boundary */
if (len < left) {
len &= ~7;
}
/* Allocate buffer */
frag = alloc_skb(len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
hroom + troom, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!frag) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/*
* Set up data on packet
*/
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
skb_reserve(frag, hroom);
skb_put(frag, len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(frag) + hlen);
frag->transport_header = (frag->network_header + hlen +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
/*
* Charge the memory for the fragment to any owner
* it might possess
*/
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(frag, skb->sk);
/*
* Copy the packet header into the new buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
fragnexthdr_offset = skb_network_header(frag);
fragnexthdr_offset += prevhdr - skb_network_header(skb);
*fragnexthdr_offset = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->identification = frag_id;
/*
* Copy a block of the IP datagram.
*/
BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, skb_transport_header(frag),
len));
left -= len;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (left > 0)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len = htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ptr += len;
offset += len;
/*
* Put this fragment into the sending queue.
*/
err = output(net, sk, frag);
if (err)
goto fail;
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
consume_skb(skb);
return err;
fail_toobig:
if (skb->sk && dst_allfrag(skb_dst(skb)))
sk_nocaps_add(skb->sk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
fail:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 fragmentation implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 does not consider that the nexthdr field may be associated with an invalid option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and BUG) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted socket and send system calls.
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 168,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned long Segment::GetCount() const
{
return m_clusterCount;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766} | Medium | 172,266 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.26 mishandles object-deserialization failures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an unserialize call that references a partially constructed object.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction | High | 166,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FileEntrySync* DirectoryEntrySync::getFile(const String& path, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
FileSystemFlags flags(options);
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getFile(this, path, flags, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return static_cast<FileEntrySync*>(helper->getResult(exceptionState));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int string_scan_range(RList *list, RBinFile *bf, int min,
const ut64 from, const ut64 to, int type) {
ut8 tmp[R_STRING_SCAN_BUFFER_SIZE];
ut64 str_start, needle = from;
int count = 0, i, rc, runes;
int str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT;
if (type == -1) {
type = R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT;
}
if (from >= to) {
eprintf ("Invalid range to find strings 0x%llx .. 0x%llx\n", from, to);
return -1;
}
ut8 *buf = calloc (to - from, 1);
if (!buf || !min) {
return -1;
}
r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, from, buf, to - from);
while (needle < to) {
rc = r_utf8_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, NULL);
if (!rc) {
needle++;
continue;
}
if (type == R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT) {
char *w = (char *)buf + needle + rc - from;
if ((to - needle) > 5) {
bool is_wide32 = needle + rc + 2 < to && !w[0] && !w[1] && !w[2] && w[3] && !w[4];
if (is_wide32) {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32;
} else {
bool is_wide = needle + rc + 2 < to && !w[0] && w[1] && !w[2];
str_type = is_wide? R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE: R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII;
}
} else {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII;
}
} else {
str_type = type;
}
runes = 0;
str_start = needle;
/* Eat a whole C string */
for (rc = i = 0; i < sizeof (tmp) - 3 && needle < to; i += rc) {
RRune r = {0};
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32) {
rc = r_utf32le_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc) {
rc = 4;
}
} else if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE) {
rc = r_utf16le_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc == 1) {
rc = 2;
}
} else {
rc = r_utf8_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc > 1) {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_UTF8;
}
}
/* Invalid sequence detected */
if (!rc) {
needle++;
break;
}
needle += rc;
if (r_isprint (r) && r != '\\') {
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32) {
if (r == 0xff) {
r = 0;
}
}
rc = r_utf8_encode (&tmp[i], r);
runes++;
/* Print the escape code */
} else if (r && r < 0x100 && strchr ("\b\v\f\n\r\t\a\033\\", (char)r)) {
if ((i + 32) < sizeof (tmp) && r < 93) {
tmp[i + 0] = '\\';
tmp[i + 1] = " abtnvfr e "
" "
" "
" \\"[r];
} else {
break;
}
rc = 2;
runes++;
} else {
/* \0 marks the end of C-strings */
break;
}
}
tmp[i++] = '\0';
if (runes >= min) {
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
char ch = tmp[j];
if (ch != '\n' && ch != '\r' && ch != '\t') {
if (!IS_PRINTABLE (tmp[j])) {
continue;
}
}
}
}
RBinString *bs = R_NEW0 (RBinString);
if (!bs) {
break;
}
bs->type = str_type;
bs->length = runes;
bs->size = needle - str_start;
bs->ordinal = count++;
switch (str_type) {
case R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE:
if (str_start -from> 1) {
const ut8 *p = buf + str_start - 2 - from;
if (p[0] == 0xff && p[1] == 0xfe) {
str_start -= 2; // \xff\xfe
}
}
break;
case R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32:
if (str_start -from> 3) {
const ut8 *p = buf + str_start - 4 - from;
if (p[0] == 0xff && p[1] == 0xfe) {
str_start -= 4; // \xff\xfe\x00\x00
}
}
break;
}
bs->paddr = bs->vaddr = str_start;
bs->string = r_str_ndup ((const char *)tmp, i);
if (list) {
r_list_append (list, bs);
} else {
print_string (bs, bf);
r_bin_string_free (bs);
}
}
}
free (buf);
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The string_scan_range() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range | Medium | 169,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_jcxz(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0)
jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 169,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
time_t ltime;
time(<ime);
RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
(unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
"please set a ticket first");
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the reds_handle_ticket function in server/reds.c in SPICE 0.12.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a long password in a SPICE ticket.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AutocompleteLog::AutocompleteLog(
const string16& text,
bool just_deleted_text,
AutocompleteInput::Type input_type,
size_t selected_index,
SessionID::id_type tab_id,
metrics::OmniboxEventProto::PageClassification current_page_classification,
base::TimeDelta elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox,
size_t inline_autocompleted_length,
const AutocompleteResult& result)
: text(text),
just_deleted_text(just_deleted_text),
input_type(input_type),
selected_index(selected_index),
tab_id(tab_id),
current_page_classification(current_page_classification),
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox(
elapsed_time_since_user_first_modified_omnibox),
inline_autocompleted_length(inline_autocompleted_length),
result(result) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
uint64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
digit = *p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) {
l = (l * 10) + digit;
digit = *++p - '0';
}
return (l);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive 3.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (xml_data heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted xar archive, related to the mishandling of empty strings in the atol8 function in archive_read_support_format_xar.c.
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy. | Medium | 167,767 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long size,
long long& result) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
assert(size > 0);
assert(size <= 8);
{
signed char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result = b;
++pos;
}
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return 0; // success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,866 |
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