instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CuePoint::Load(IMkvReader* pReader) {
if (m_timecode >= 0) // already loaded
return;
assert(m_track_positions == NULL);
assert(m_track_positions_count == 0);
long long pos_ = -m_timecode;
const long long element_start = pos_;
long long stop;
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos_, len);
assert(id == 0x3B); // CuePoint ID
if (id != 0x3B)
return;
pos_ += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos_, len);
assert(size >= 0);
pos_ += len; // consume Size field
stop = pos_ + size;
}
const long long element_size = stop - element_start;
long long pos = pos_;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x33) // CueTime ID
m_timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x37) // CueTrackPosition(s) ID
++m_track_positions_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
assert(m_track_positions_count > 0);
m_track_positions = new TrackPosition[m_track_positions_count];
TrackPosition* p = m_track_positions;
pos = pos_;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x37) { // CueTrackPosition(s) ID
TrackPosition& tp = *p++;
tp.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(size_t(p - m_track_positions) == m_track_positions_count);
m_element_start = element_start;
m_element_size = element_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *cJSON_Print( cJSON *item )
{
return print_value( item, 0, 1 );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FrameView::FrameView(LocalFrame* frame)
: m_frame(frame)
, m_canHaveScrollbars(true)
, m_slowRepaintObjectCount(0)
, m_hasPendingLayout(false)
, m_layoutSubtreeRoot(0)
, m_inSynchronousPostLayout(false)
, m_postLayoutTasksTimer(this, &FrameView::postLayoutTimerFired)
, m_updateWidgetsTimer(this, &FrameView::updateWidgetsTimerFired)
, m_isTransparent(false)
, m_baseBackgroundColor(Color::white)
, m_mediaType("screen")
, m_overflowStatusDirty(true)
, m_viewportRenderer(0)
, m_wasScrolledByUser(false)
, m_inProgrammaticScroll(false)
, m_safeToPropagateScrollToParent(true)
, m_isTrackingPaintInvalidations(false)
, m_scrollCorner(nullptr)
, m_hasSoftwareFilters(false)
, m_visibleContentScaleFactor(1)
, m_inputEventsScaleFactorForEmulation(1)
, m_layoutSizeFixedToFrameSize(true)
, m_didScrollTimer(this, &FrameView::didScrollTimerFired)
{
ASSERT(m_frame);
init();
if (!m_frame->isMainFrame())
return;
ScrollableArea::setVerticalScrollElasticity(ScrollElasticityAllowed);
ScrollableArea::setHorizontalScrollElasticity(ScrollElasticityAllowed);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers a widget-position update that improperly interacts with the render tree, related to the FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting function in core/frame/FrameView.cpp and the RenderLayerScrollableArea::setScrollOffset function in core/rendering/RenderLayerScrollableArea.cpp.
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int gdTransformAffineCopy(gdImagePtr dst,
int dst_x, int dst_y,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_region,
const double affine[6])
{
int c1x,c1y,c2x,c2y;
int backclip = 0;
int backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1, backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2;
register int x, y, src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
double inv[6];
int *dst_p;
gdPointF pt, src_pt;
gdRect bbox;
int end_x, end_y;
gdInterpolationMethod interpolation_id_bak = GD_DEFAULT;
interpolation_method interpolation_bak;
/* These methods use special implementations */
if (src->interpolation_id == GD_BILINEAR_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_BICUBIC_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR) {
interpolation_id_bak = src->interpolation_id;
interpolation_bak = src->interpolation;
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, GD_BICUBIC);
}
gdImageClipRectangle(src, src_region);
if (src_region->x > 0 || src_region->y > 0
|| src_region->width < gdImageSX(src)
|| src_region->height < gdImageSY(src)) {
backclip = 1;
gdImageGetClip(src, &backup_clipx1, &backup_clipy1,
&backup_clipx2, &backup_clipy2);
gdImageSetClip(src, src_region->x, src_region->y,
src_region->x + src_region->width - 1,
src_region->y + src_region->height - 1);
}
if (!gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_region, affine, &bbox)) {
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_FALSE;
}
gdImageGetClip(dst, &c1x, &c1y, &c2x, &c2y);
end_x = bbox.width + (int) fabs(bbox.x);
end_y = bbox.height + (int) fabs(bbox.y);
/* Get inverse affine to let us work with destination -> source */
gdAffineInvert(inv, affine);
src_offset_x = src_region->x;
src_offset_y = src_region->y;
if (dst->alphaBlendingFlag) {
for (y = bbox.y; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
gdImageSetPixel(dst, dst_x + x, dst_y + y, getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, 0));
}
}
} else {
for (y = 0; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5 + bbox.y;
if ((dst_y + y) < 0 || ((dst_y + y) > gdImageSY(dst) -1)) {
continue;
}
dst_p = dst->tpixels[dst_y + y] + dst_x;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5 + bbox.x;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
if ((dst_x + x) < 0 || (dst_x + x) > (gdImageSX(dst) - 1)) {
break;
}
*(dst_p++) = getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, -1);
}
}
}
/* Restore clip if required */
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.1.1, as used in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image that is mishandled by the imagescale function.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a | Medium | 170,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void testRandomDecodeAfterClearFrameBufferCache(const char* gifFile)
{
SCOPED_TRACE(gifFile);
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data = readFile(gifFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(data.get());
Vector<unsigned> baselineHashes;
createDecodingBaseline(data.get(), &baselineHashes);
size_t frameCount = baselineHashes.size();
OwnPtr<GIFImageDecoder> decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(data.get(), true);
for (size_t clearExceptFrame = 0; clearExceptFrame < frameCount; ++clearExceptFrame) {
decoder->clearCacheExceptFrame(clearExceptFrame);
const size_t skippingStep = 5;
for (size_t i = 0; i < skippingStep; ++i) {
for (size_t j = 0; j < frameCount; j += skippingStep) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Random i:" << i << " j:" << j);
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(j);
EXPECT_EQ(baselineHashes[j], hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GIFImageReader::parseData function in platform/image-decoders/gif/GIFImageReader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted frame size in a GIF image.
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 172,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void Update(scoped_refptr<ClipPaintPropertyNode> node,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> new_parent,
const FloatRoundedRect& new_clip_rect) {
node->Update(std::move(new_parent),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{nullptr, new_clip_rect});
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
int length;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary() {
WebContentsImpl* old_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (old_contents == this)
return;
GetOutermostWebContents()->node_.SetFocusedWebContents(this);
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this) && browser_plugin_guest_)
return;
if (old_contents)
old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(false);
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate())
GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()->SetFocusedFrame();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetPageFocus(true);
} else {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(true);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,333 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AudioSystemImplTest()
: use_audio_thread_(GetParam()), audio_thread_("AudioSystemThread") {
if (use_audio_thread_) {
audio_thread_.StartAndWaitForTesting();
audio_manager_.reset(
new media::MockAudioManager(audio_thread_.task_runner()));
} else {
audio_manager_.reset(new media::MockAudioManager(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get()));
}
audio_manager_->SetInputStreamParameters(
media::AudioParameters::UnavailableDeviceParams());
audio_system_ = media::AudioSystemImpl::Create(audio_manager_.get());
EXPECT_EQ(AudioSystem::Get(), audio_system_.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939} | High | 171,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (ret < local_nr_pages) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user functions in block/bio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 do unbalanced refcounting when a SCSI I/O vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page. The bio_add_pc_page function merges them into one, but the page reference is never dropped. This causes a memory leak and possible system lockup (exploitable against the host OS by a guest OS user, if a SCSI disk is passed through to a virtual machine) due to an out-of-memory condition.
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: string DecodeFile(const string& filename, int num_threads) {
libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource video(filename);
video.Init();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
cfg.threads = num_threads;
libvpx_test::VP9Decoder decoder(cfg, 0);
libvpx_test::MD5 md5;
for (video.Begin(); video.cxdata(); video.Next()) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
decoder.DecodeFrame(video.cxdata(), video.frame_size());
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << decoder.DecodeError();
break;
}
libvpx_test::DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder.GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next())) {
md5.Add(img);
}
}
return string(md5.Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SProcXFixesQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->majorVersion);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: formUpdateBuffer(Anchor *a, Buffer *buf, FormItemList *form)
{
Buffer save;
char *p;
int spos, epos, rows, c_rows, pos, col = 0;
Line *l;
copyBuffer(&save, buf);
gotoLine(buf, a->start.line);
switch (form->type) {
case FORM_TEXTAREA:
case FORM_INPUT_TEXT:
case FORM_INPUT_FILE:
case FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD:
case FORM_INPUT_CHECKBOX:
case FORM_INPUT_RADIO:
#ifdef MENU_SELECT
case FORM_SELECT:
#endif /* MENU_SELECT */
spos = a->start.pos;
epos = a->end.pos;
break;
default:
spos = a->start.pos + 1;
epos = a->end.pos - 1;
}
switch (form->type) {
case FORM_INPUT_CHECKBOX:
case FORM_INPUT_RADIO:
if (buf->currentLine == NULL ||
spos >= buf->currentLine->len || spos < 0)
break;
if (form->checked)
buf->currentLine->lineBuf[spos] = '*';
else
buf->currentLine->lineBuf[spos] = ' ';
break;
case FORM_INPUT_TEXT:
case FORM_INPUT_FILE:
case FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD:
case FORM_TEXTAREA:
#ifdef MENU_SELECT
case FORM_SELECT:
if (form->type == FORM_SELECT) {
p = form->label->ptr;
updateSelectOption(form, form->select_option);
}
else
#endif /* MENU_SELECT */
{
if (!form->value)
break;
p = form->value->ptr;
}
l = buf->currentLine;
if (!l)
break;
if (form->type == FORM_TEXTAREA) {
int n = a->y - buf->currentLine->linenumber;
if (n > 0)
for (; l && n; l = l->prev, n--) ;
else if (n < 0)
for (; l && n; l = l->prev, n++) ;
if (!l)
break;
}
rows = form->rows ? form->rows : 1;
col = COLPOS(l, a->start.pos);
for (c_rows = 0; c_rows < rows; c_rows++, l = l->next) {
if (rows > 1) {
pos = columnPos(l, col);
a = retrieveAnchor(buf->formitem, l->linenumber, pos);
if (a == NULL)
break;
spos = a->start.pos;
epos = a->end.pos;
}
if (a->start.line != a->end.line || spos > epos || epos >= l->len ||
spos < 0 || epos < 0 || COLPOS(l, epos) < col)
break;
pos = form_update_line(l, &p, spos, epos, COLPOS(l, epos) - col,
rows > 1,
form->type == FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD);
if (pos != epos) {
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->href, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->name, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->img, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->formitem, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
}
}
break;
}
copyBuffer(buf, &save);
arrangeLine(buf);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: w3m through 0.5.3 is prone to a NULL pointer dereference flaw in formUpdateBuffer in form.c.
Commit Message: Prevent invalid columnPos() call in formUpdateBuffer()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/89 | Medium | 169,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Convert HRZ raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=256;
image->rows=240;
image->depth=8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,3*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) (3*image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc->name == NULL ||
cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mxf_parse_structural_metadata(MXFContext *mxf)
{
MXFPackage *material_package = NULL;
int i, j, k, ret;
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "metadata sets count %d\n", mxf->metadata_sets_count);
/* TODO: handle multiple material packages (OP3x) */
for (i = 0; i < mxf->packages_count; i++) {
material_package = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &mxf->packages_refs[i], MaterialPackage);
if (material_package) break;
}
if (!material_package) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "no material package found\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
mxf_add_umid_metadata(&mxf->fc->metadata, "material_package_umid", material_package);
if (material_package->name && material_package->name[0])
av_dict_set(&mxf->fc->metadata, "material_package_name", material_package->name, 0);
mxf_parse_package_comments(mxf, &mxf->fc->metadata, material_package);
for (i = 0; i < material_package->tracks_count; i++) {
MXFPackage *source_package = NULL;
MXFTrack *material_track = NULL;
MXFTrack *source_track = NULL;
MXFTrack *temp_track = NULL;
MXFDescriptor *descriptor = NULL;
MXFStructuralComponent *component = NULL;
MXFTimecodeComponent *mxf_tc = NULL;
UID *essence_container_ul = NULL;
const MXFCodecUL *codec_ul = NULL;
const MXFCodecUL *container_ul = NULL;
const MXFCodecUL *pix_fmt_ul = NULL;
AVStream *st;
AVTimecode tc;
int flags;
if (!(material_track = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &material_package->tracks_refs[i], Track))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve material track strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if ((component = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &material_track->sequence_ref, TimecodeComponent))) {
mxf_tc = (MXFTimecodeComponent*)component;
flags = mxf_tc->drop_frame == 1 ? AV_TIMECODE_FLAG_DROPFRAME : 0;
if (av_timecode_init(&tc, mxf_tc->rate, flags, mxf_tc->start_frame, mxf->fc) == 0) {
mxf_add_timecode_metadata(&mxf->fc->metadata, "timecode", &tc);
}
}
if (!(material_track->sequence = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &material_track->sequence_ref, Sequence))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve material track sequence strong ref\n");
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < material_track->sequence->structural_components_count; j++) {
component = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &material_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[j], TimecodeComponent);
if (!component)
continue;
mxf_tc = (MXFTimecodeComponent*)component;
flags = mxf_tc->drop_frame == 1 ? AV_TIMECODE_FLAG_DROPFRAME : 0;
if (av_timecode_init(&tc, mxf_tc->rate, flags, mxf_tc->start_frame, mxf->fc) == 0) {
mxf_add_timecode_metadata(&mxf->fc->metadata, "timecode", &tc);
break;
}
}
/* TODO: handle multiple source clips, only finds first valid source clip */
if(material_track->sequence->structural_components_count > 1)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "material track %d: has %d components\n",
material_track->track_id, material_track->sequence->structural_components_count);
for (j = 0; j < material_track->sequence->structural_components_count; j++) {
component = mxf_resolve_sourceclip(mxf, &material_track->sequence->structural_components_refs[j]);
if (!component)
continue;
source_package = mxf_resolve_source_package(mxf, component->source_package_ul, component->source_package_uid);
if (!source_package) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "material track %d: no corresponding source package found\n", material_track->track_id);
continue;
}
for (k = 0; k < source_package->tracks_count; k++) {
if (!(temp_track = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &source_package->tracks_refs[k], Track))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track strong ref\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail_and_free;
}
if (temp_track->track_id == component->source_track_id) {
source_track = temp_track;
break;
}
}
if (!source_track) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "material track %d: no corresponding source track found\n", material_track->track_id);
break;
}
for (k = 0; k < mxf->essence_container_data_count; k++) {
MXFEssenceContainerData *essence_data;
if (!(essence_data = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &mxf->essence_container_data_refs[k], EssenceContainerData))) {
av_log(mxf, AV_LOG_TRACE, "could not resolve essence container data strong ref\n");
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(component->source_package_ul, essence_data->package_ul, sizeof(UID)) && !memcmp(component->source_package_uid, essence_data->package_uid, sizeof(UID))) {
source_track->body_sid = essence_data->body_sid;
source_track->index_sid = essence_data->index_sid;
break;
}
}
if(source_track && component)
break;
}
if (!source_track || !component || !source_package) {
if((ret = mxf_add_metadata_stream(mxf, material_track)))
goto fail_and_free;
continue;
}
if (!(source_track->sequence = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &source_track->sequence_ref, Sequence))) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not resolve source track sequence strong ref\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail_and_free;
}
/* 0001GL00.MXF.A1.mxf_opatom.mxf has the same SourcePackageID as 0001GL.MXF.V1.mxf_opatom.mxf
* This would result in both files appearing to have two streams. Work around this by sanity checking DataDefinition */
if (memcmp(material_track->sequence->data_definition_ul, source_track->sequence->data_definition_ul, 16)) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "material track %d: DataDefinition mismatch\n", material_track->track_id);
continue;
}
st = avformat_new_stream(mxf->fc, NULL);
if (!st) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not allocate stream\n");
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail_and_free;
}
st->id = material_track->track_id;
st->priv_data = source_track;
source_package->descriptor = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &source_package->descriptor_ref, AnyType);
descriptor = mxf_resolve_multidescriptor(mxf, source_package->descriptor, source_track->track_id);
/* A SourceClip from a EssenceGroup may only be a single frame of essence data. The clips duration is then how many
* frames its suppose to repeat for. Descriptor->duration, if present, contains the real duration of the essence data */
if (descriptor && descriptor->duration != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
source_track->original_duration = st->duration = FFMIN(descriptor->duration, component->duration);
else
source_track->original_duration = st->duration = component->duration;
if (st->duration == -1)
st->duration = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
st->start_time = component->start_position;
if (material_track->edit_rate.num <= 0 ||
material_track->edit_rate.den <= 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Invalid edit rate (%d/%d) found on stream #%d, "
"defaulting to 25/1\n",
material_track->edit_rate.num,
material_track->edit_rate.den, st->index);
material_track->edit_rate = (AVRational){25, 1};
}
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, material_track->edit_rate.den, material_track->edit_rate.num);
/* ensure SourceTrack EditRate == MaterialTrack EditRate since only
* the former is accessible via st->priv_data */
source_track->edit_rate = material_track->edit_rate;
PRINT_KEY(mxf->fc, "data definition ul", source_track->sequence->data_definition_ul);
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(ff_mxf_data_definition_uls, &source_track->sequence->data_definition_ul);
st->codecpar->codec_type = codec_ul->id;
if (!descriptor) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "source track %d: stream %d, no descriptor found\n", source_track->track_id, st->index);
continue;
}
PRINT_KEY(mxf->fc, "essence codec ul", descriptor->essence_codec_ul);
PRINT_KEY(mxf->fc, "essence container ul", descriptor->essence_container_ul);
essence_container_ul = &descriptor->essence_container_ul;
source_track->wrapping = (mxf->op == OPAtom) ? ClipWrapped : mxf_get_wrapping_kind(essence_container_ul);
if (source_track->wrapping == UnknownWrapped)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "wrapping of stream %d is unknown\n", st->index);
/* HACK: replacing the original key with mxf_encrypted_essence_container
* is not allowed according to s429-6, try to find correct information anyway */
if (IS_KLV_KEY(essence_container_ul, mxf_encrypted_essence_container)) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "broken encrypted mxf file\n");
for (k = 0; k < mxf->metadata_sets_count; k++) {
MXFMetadataSet *metadata = mxf->metadata_sets[k];
if (metadata->type == CryptoContext) {
essence_container_ul = &((MXFCryptoContext *)metadata)->source_container_ul;
break;
}
}
}
/* TODO: drop PictureEssenceCoding and SoundEssenceCompression, only check EssenceContainer */
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(ff_mxf_codec_uls, &descriptor->essence_codec_ul);
st->codecpar->codec_id = (enum AVCodecID)codec_ul->id;
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) {
codec_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(ff_mxf_codec_uls, &descriptor->codec_ul);
st->codecpar->codec_id = (enum AVCodecID)codec_ul->id;
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "%s: Universal Label: ",
avcodec_get_name(st->codecpar->codec_id));
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "%.2x",
descriptor->essence_codec_ul[k]);
if (!(k+1 & 19) || k == 5)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, ".");
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
mxf_add_umid_metadata(&st->metadata, "file_package_umid", source_package);
if (source_package->name && source_package->name[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "file_package_name", source_package->name, 0);
if (material_track->name && material_track->name[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "track_name", material_track->name, 0);
mxf_parse_physical_source_package(mxf, source_track, st);
if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
source_track->intra_only = mxf_is_intra_only(descriptor);
container_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_picture_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE)
st->codecpar->codec_id = container_ul->id;
st->codecpar->width = descriptor->width;
st->codecpar->height = descriptor->height; /* Field height, not frame height */
switch (descriptor->frame_layout) {
case FullFrame:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_PROGRESSIVE;
break;
case OneField:
/* Every other line is stored and needs to be duplicated. */
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "OneField frame layout isn't currently supported\n");
break; /* The correct thing to do here is fall through, but by breaking we might be
able to decode some streams at half the vertical resolution, rather than not al all.
It's also for compatibility with the old behavior. */
case MixedFields:
break;
case SegmentedFrame:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_PROGRESSIVE;
case SeparateFields:
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "video_line_map: (%d, %d), field_dominance: %d\n",
descriptor->video_line_map[0], descriptor->video_line_map[1],
descriptor->field_dominance);
if ((descriptor->video_line_map[0] > 0) && (descriptor->video_line_map[1] > 0)) {
/* Detect coded field order from VideoLineMap:
* (even, even) => bottom field coded first
* (even, odd) => top field coded first
* (odd, even) => top field coded first
* (odd, odd) => bottom field coded first
*/
if ((descriptor->video_line_map[0] + descriptor->video_line_map[1]) % 2) {
switch (descriptor->field_dominance) {
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_DEFAULT:
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_FF:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_TT;
break;
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_FL:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_TB;
break;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(mxf->fc,
"Field dominance %d support",
descriptor->field_dominance);
}
} else {
switch (descriptor->field_dominance) {
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_DEFAULT:
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_FF:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_BB;
break;
case MXF_FIELD_DOMINANCE_FL:
st->codecpar->field_order = AV_FIELD_BT;
break;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(mxf->fc,
"Field dominance %d support",
descriptor->field_dominance);
}
}
}
/* Turn field height into frame height. */
st->codecpar->height *= 2;
break;
default:
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "Unknown frame layout type: %d\n", descriptor->frame_layout);
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO) {
st->codecpar->format = descriptor->pix_fmt;
if (st->codecpar->format == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
pix_fmt_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(ff_mxf_pixel_format_uls,
&descriptor->essence_codec_ul);
st->codecpar->format = (enum AVPixelFormat)pix_fmt_ul->id;
if (st->codecpar->format== AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
st->codecpar->codec_tag = mxf_get_codec_ul(ff_mxf_codec_tag_uls,
&descriptor->essence_codec_ul)->id;
if (!st->codecpar->codec_tag) {
/* support files created before RP224v10 by defaulting to UYVY422
if subsampling is 4:2:2 and component depth is 8-bit */
if (descriptor->horiz_subsampling == 2 &&
descriptor->vert_subsampling == 1 &&
descriptor->component_depth == 8) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_UYVY422;
}
}
}
}
}
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_HEADERS;
if (material_track->sequence->origin) {
av_dict_set_int(&st->metadata, "material_track_origin", material_track->sequence->origin, 0);
}
if (source_track->sequence->origin) {
av_dict_set_int(&st->metadata, "source_track_origin", source_track->sequence->origin, 0);
}
if (descriptor->aspect_ratio.num && descriptor->aspect_ratio.den)
st->display_aspect_ratio = descriptor->aspect_ratio;
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) {
container_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_sound_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
/* Only overwrite existing codec ID if it is unset or A-law, which is the default according to SMPTE RP 224. */
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE || (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_ALAW && (enum AVCodecID)container_ul->id != AV_CODEC_ID_NONE))
st->codecpar->codec_id = (enum AVCodecID)container_ul->id;
st->codecpar->channels = descriptor->channels;
st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample = descriptor->bits_per_sample;
if (descriptor->sample_rate.den > 0) {
st->codecpar->sample_rate = descriptor->sample_rate.num / descriptor->sample_rate.den;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, descriptor->sample_rate.den, descriptor->sample_rate.num);
} else {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "invalid sample rate (%d/%d) "
"found for stream #%d, time base forced to 1/48000\n",
descriptor->sample_rate.num, descriptor->sample_rate.den,
st->index);
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 1, 48000);
}
/* if duration is set, rescale it from EditRate to SampleRate */
if (st->duration != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
st->duration = av_rescale_q(st->duration,
av_inv_q(material_track->edit_rate),
st->time_base);
/* TODO: implement AV_CODEC_ID_RAWAUDIO */
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE) {
if (descriptor->bits_per_sample > 16 && descriptor->bits_per_sample <= 24)
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24LE;
else if (descriptor->bits_per_sample == 32)
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32LE;
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S16BE) {
if (descriptor->bits_per_sample > 16 && descriptor->bits_per_sample <= 24)
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24BE;
else if (descriptor->bits_per_sample == 32)
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32BE;
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MP2) {
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
}
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA) {
enum AVMediaType type;
container_ul = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_data_essence_container_uls, essence_container_ul);
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE)
st->codecpar->codec_id = container_ul->id;
type = avcodec_get_type(st->codecpar->codec_id);
if (type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE)
st->codecpar->codec_type = type;
if (container_ul->desc)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "data_type", container_ul->desc, 0);
}
if (descriptor->extradata) {
if (!ff_alloc_extradata(st->codecpar, descriptor->extradata_size)) {
memcpy(st->codecpar->extradata, descriptor->extradata, descriptor->extradata_size);
}
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264) {
int coded_width = mxf_get_codec_ul(mxf_intra_only_picture_coded_width,
&descriptor->essence_codec_ul)->id;
if (coded_width)
st->codecpar->width = coded_width;
ret = ff_generate_avci_extradata(st);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA && source_track->wrapping != FrameWrapped) {
/* TODO: decode timestamps */
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_TIMESTAMPS;
}
}
ret = 0;
fail_and_free:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FFmpeg before commit bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75 contains an out of array access vulnerability in MXF format demuxer that can result in DoS. This attack appear to be exploitable via specially crafted MXF file which has to be provided as input. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakePairing(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& address,
const std::string& icon,
const std::string& pairing) {
DictionaryValue device;
device.SetString("name", name);
device.SetString("address", address);
device.SetString("icon", icon);
device.SetBoolean("paired", false);
device.SetBoolean("connected", false);
DictionaryValue op;
op.SetString("pairing", pairing);
if (pairing.compare("bluetoothEnterPasskey") != 0)
op.SetInteger("passkey", 12345);
if (pairing.compare("bluetoothRemotePasskey") == 0)
op.SetInteger("entered", 2);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.connectBluetoothDevice", device, op);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int enable(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
if (!interface_ready())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
stack_manager_get_interface()->start_up_stack_async();
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
| Medium | 173,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.3 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via a crafted application that leverages instruction emulation for fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt, and sidt.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 168,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TestAppInstancesHelper(const std::string& app_name) {
LOG(INFO) << "Start of test.";
extensions::ProcessMap* process_map =
extensions::ProcessMap::Get(browser()->profile());
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadExtension(
test_data_dir_.AppendASCII(app_name)));
const Extension* extension = GetSingleLoadedExtension();
GURL base_url = GetTestBaseURL(app_name);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 1.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->GetWebUI());
content::WindowedNotificationObserver tab_added_observer(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
chrome::NewTab(browser());
tab_added_observer.Wait();
LOG(INFO) << "New tab.";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(),
base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"));
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 2.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->GetWebUI());
ASSERT_EQ(3, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
WebContents* tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1);
WebContents* tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2);
EXPECT_NE(tab1->GetRenderProcessHost(), tab2->GetRenderProcessHost());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, chrome::GetBrowserCount(browser()->profile()));
OpenWindow(tab1, base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "WindowOpenHelper 1.";
OpenWindow(tab2, base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "End of test.";
UnloadExtension(extension->id());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to access Extension pages without authorisation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779} | Medium | 172,956 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InputHandlerProxy::DispatchSingleInputEvent(
std::unique_ptr<EventWithCallback> event_with_callback,
const base::TimeTicks now) {
const ui::LatencyInfo& original_latency_info =
event_with_callback->latency_info();
ui::LatencyInfo monitored_latency_info = original_latency_info;
std::unique_ptr<cc::SwapPromiseMonitor> latency_info_swap_promise_monitor =
input_handler_->CreateLatencyInfoSwapPromiseMonitor(
&monitored_latency_info);
current_overscroll_params_.reset();
InputHandlerProxy::EventDisposition disposition = RouteToTypeSpecificHandler(
event_with_callback->event(), original_latency_info);
blink::WebGestureEvent::Type type = event_with_callback->event().GetType();
switch (type) {
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollBegin:
is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ = true;
FALLTHROUGH;
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGesturePinchBegin:
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate:
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGesturePinchUpdate:
has_ongoing_compositor_scroll_or_pinch_ = disposition == DID_HANDLE;
break;
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollEnd:
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGesturePinchEnd:
has_ongoing_compositor_scroll_or_pinch_ = false;
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (type) {
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollBegin:
momentum_scroll_jank_tracker_ =
std::make_unique<MomentumScrollJankTracker>();
break;
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate:
if (momentum_scroll_jank_tracker_) {
momentum_scroll_jank_tracker_->OnDispatchedInputEvent(
event_with_callback.get(), now);
}
break;
case blink::WebGestureEvent::kGestureScrollEnd:
momentum_scroll_jank_tracker_.reset();
break;
default:
break;
}
event_with_callback->RunCallbacks(disposition, monitored_latency_info,
std::move(current_overscroll_params_));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-281
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to local scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page, related to the unsafe-inline keyword.
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150} | Medium | 172,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (npalette > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> idbKeyCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.idbKey");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<IDBKey>, key, createIDBKeyFromValue(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->idbKey(key.get());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* First slice of a picture is always considered as part of new picture */
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 2)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
if((ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 0) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice++;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* If the slice is part of new picture, do End of Pic processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
UWORD8 uc_mbs_exceed = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
/*u2_total_mbs_coded is forced to u2_max_mb_addr+ 1 at the end of decode ,so
,if it is first slice in pic dont consider u2_total_mbs_coded to detect new picture */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
uc_mbs_exceed = 1;
}
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || uc_mbs_exceed)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
#if WIN32
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(" ------ PIC SKIPPED ------\n");
#endif
return RET_LAST_SKIP;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33641588.
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
| High | 174,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static double ipow( double n, int exp )
{
double r;
if ( exp < 0 )
return 1.0 / ipow( n, -exp );
r = 1;
while ( exp > 0 ) {
if ( exp & 1 )
r *= n;
exp >>= 1;
n *= n;
}
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Write(base::Pickle* m, const SkBitmap& p) {
size_t fixed_size = sizeof(SkBitmap_Data);
SkBitmap_Data bmp_data;
bmp_data.InitSkBitmapDataForTransfer(p);
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&bmp_data),
static_cast<int>(fixed_size));
size_t pixel_size = p.computeByteSize();
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(p.getPixels()),
static_cast<int>(pixel_size));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562} | Medium | 172,895 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GpuProcessHost::~GpuProcessHost() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
SendOutstandingReplies();
if (process_launched_ && kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED) {
if (software_rendering_) {
if (++g_gpu_software_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
gpu_enabled_ = false;
}
} else {
if (++g_gpu_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
hardware_gpu_enabled_ = false;
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->BlacklistCard();
#endif
}
}
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
DIED_FIRST_TIME + g_gpu_crash_count,
GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
int exit_code;
base::TerminationStatus status = process_->GetTerminationStatus(&exit_code);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessTerminationStatus",
status,
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_MAX_ENUM);
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION ||
status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessExitCode",
exit_code,
content::RESULT_CODE_LAST_CODE);
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (gpu_process_)
CloseHandle(gpu_process_);
#endif
while (!queued_messages_.empty()) {
delete queued_messages_.front();
queued_messages_.pop();
}
if (g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] == this)
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] = NULL;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Destroy, host_id_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(
const gfx::Rect& client_bounds) const {
int closeButtonOffsetX =
(kCaptionHeight - close_button_->height()) / 2;
int header_width = close_button_->width() + closeButtonOffsetX * 2;
return gfx::Rect(client_bounds.x(),
std::max(0, client_bounds.y() - kCaptionHeight),
std::max(header_width, client_bounds.width()),
client_bounds.height() + kCaptionHeight);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCache::AddEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
DCHECK(entries_.find(url) == entries_.end());
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
cache_size_ += entry.response_size();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TargetHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
auto_attacher_.SetRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct gnttab_copy **gopp)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = *gopp;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info = netbk->pending_tx_info;
struct xenvif *vif = pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i, err, start;
/* Check status of header. */
err = gop->status;
if (unlikely(err)) {
pending_ring_idx_t index;
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
txp = &pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
}
/* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */
start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx);
for (i = start; i < nr_frags; i++) {
int j, newerr;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[i]);
/* Check error status: if okay then remember grant handle. */
newerr = (++gop)->status;
if (likely(!newerr)) {
/* Had a previous error? Invalidate this fragment. */
if (unlikely(err))
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
continue;
}
/* Error on this fragment: respond to client with an error. */
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
/* Not the first error? Preceding frags already invalidated. */
if (err)
continue;
/* First error: invalidate header and preceding fragments. */
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
for (j = start; j < i; j++) {
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[j]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
/* Remember the error: invalidate all subsequent fragments. */
err = newerr;
}
*gopp = gop + 1;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c in the Xen netback functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.8 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering certain error conditions.
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The VTP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-vtp.c:vtp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13020/VTP: Add some missing bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | High | 167,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BEEP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-beep.c:l_strnstart().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: PgBouncer before 1.5.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) by sending a password packet before a startup packet.
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42). | Medium | 170,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SendAutomationJSONRequest(AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const DictionaryValue& request_dict,
DictionaryValue* reply_dict,
std::string* error_msg) {
std::string request, reply;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&request_dict, false, &request);
bool success = false;
int timeout_ms = TestTimeouts::action_max_timeout_ms();
base::Time before_sending = base::Time::Now();
if (!SendAutomationJSONRequest(
sender, request, timeout_ms, &reply, &success)) {
int64 elapsed_ms = (base::Time::Now() - before_sending).InMilliseconds();
std::string command;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
if (elapsed_ms >= timeout_ms) {
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Chrome did not respond to '%s'. Request may have timed out. "
"Elapsed time was %" PRId64 " ms. Request timeout was %d ms. "
"Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
elapsed_ms,
timeout_ms,
request.c_str());
} else {
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Chrome did not respond to '%s'. Elapsed time was %" PRId64 " ms. "
"Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
elapsed_ms,
request.c_str());
}
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Value> value(base::JSONReader::Read(reply, true));
if (!value.get() || !value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
std::string command;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
LOG(ERROR) << "JSON request did not return dict: " << command << "\n";
return false;
}
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(value.get());
if (!success) {
std::string command, error;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
dict->GetString("error", &error);
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Internal Chrome error during '%s': (%s). Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
error.c_str(),
request.c_str());
LOG(ERROR) << "JSON request failed: " << command << "\n"
<< " with error: " << error;
return false;
}
reply_dict->MergeDictionary(dict);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup | High | 166,818 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltNumberFormatAlpha(xmlBufferPtr buffer,
double number,
int is_upper)
{
char temp_string[sizeof(double) * CHAR_BIT * sizeof(xmlChar) + 1];
char *pointer;
int i;
char *alpha_list;
double alpha_size = (double)(sizeof(alpha_upper_list) - 1);
/* Build buffer from back */
pointer = &temp_string[sizeof(temp_string)];
*(--pointer) = 0;
alpha_list = (is_upper) ? alpha_upper_list : alpha_lower_list;
for (i = 1; i < (int)sizeof(temp_string); i++) {
number--;
*(--pointer) = alpha_list[((int)fmod(number, alpha_size))];
number /= alpha_size;
if (fabs(number) < 1.0)
break; /* for */
}
xmlBufferCCat(buffer, pointer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int iucv_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
unsigned int copied, rlen;
struct sk_buff *skb, *rskb, *cskb;
int err = 0;
if ((sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN) &&
skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q) &&
skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) &&
list_empty(&iucv->message_q.list))
return 0;
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* receive/dequeue next skb:
* the function understands MSG_PEEK and, thus, does not dequeue skb */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
rlen = skb->len; /* real length of skb */
copied = min_t(unsigned int, rlen, len);
if (!rlen)
sk->sk_shutdown = sk->sk_shutdown | RCV_SHUTDOWN;
cskb = skb;
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(cskb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied)) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: set MSG_TRUNC if recv buf size is too small */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
if (copied < rlen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
/* each iucv message contains a complete record */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
}
/* create control message to store iucv msg target class:
* get the trgcls from the control buffer of the skb due to
* fragmentation of original iucv message. */
err = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IUCV, SCM_IUCV_TRGCLS,
CB_TRGCLS_LEN, CB_TRGCLS(skb));
if (err) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return err;
}
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* SOCK_STREAM: re-queue skb if it contains unreceived data */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
skb_pull(skb, copied);
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
goto done;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER) {
atomic_inc(&iucv->msg_recv);
if (atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) > iucv->msglimit) {
WARN_ON(1);
iucv_sock_close(sk);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
/* Queue backlog skbs */
spin_lock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
rskb = skb_dequeue(&iucv->backlog_skb_q);
while (rskb) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, rskb)) {
skb_queue_head(&iucv->backlog_skb_q,
rskb);
break;
} else {
rskb = skb_dequeue(&iucv->backlog_skb_q);
}
}
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (!list_empty(&iucv->message_q.list))
iucv_process_message_q(sk);
if (atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) >=
iucv->msglimit / 2) {
err = iucv_send_ctrl(sk, AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN);
if (err) {
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
}
done:
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: return real length if MSG_TRUNC is set */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && (flags & MSG_TRUNC))
copied = rlen;
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The iucv_sock_recvmsg function in net/iucv/af_iucv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void Unregister(const GURL& url) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::IO));
net::URLRequestFilter::GetInstance()->RemoveUrlHandler(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652} | High | 172,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int parse_import_ptr(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, struct reloc_t *reloc, int idx) {
int i, j, sym, wordsize;
ut32 stype;
wordsize = MACH0_(get_bits)(bin) / 8;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nsymtab) {
return 0;
}
if ((bin->symtab[idx].n_desc & REFERENCE_TYPE) == REFERENCE_FLAG_UNDEFINED_LAZY) {
stype = S_LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS;
} else {
stype = S_NON_LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS;
}
reloc->offset = 0;
reloc->addr = 0;
reloc->addend = 0;
#define CASE(T) case (T / 8): reloc->type = R_BIN_RELOC_ ## T; break
switch (wordsize) {
CASE(8);
CASE(16);
CASE(32);
CASE(64);
default: return false;
}
#undef CASE
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if ((bin->sects[i].flags & SECTION_TYPE) == stype) {
for (j=0, sym=-1; bin->sects[i].reserved1+j < bin->nindirectsyms; j++)
if (idx == bin->indirectsyms[bin->sects[i].reserved1 + j]) {
sym = j;
break;
}
reloc->offset = sym == -1 ? 0 : bin->sects[i].offset + sym * wordsize;
reloc->addr = sym == -1 ? 0 : bin->sects[i].addr + sym * wordsize;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The parse_import_ptr() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted Mach-O file.
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026) | Medium | 169,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderBlock::styleWillChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle& newStyle)
{
RenderStyle* oldStyle = style();
setReplaced(newStyle.isDisplayInlineType());
if (oldStyle && parent() && diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && oldStyle->position() != newStyle.position()) {
if (newStyle.position() == StaticPosition)
removePositionedObjects(0, NewContainingBlock);
else if (oldStyle->position() == StaticPosition) {
RenderObject* cb = parent();
while (cb && (cb->style()->position() == StaticPosition || (cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced())) && !cb->isRenderView()) {
if (cb->style()->position() == RelativePosition && cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced()) {
cb = cb->containingBlock();
break;
}
cb = cb->parent();
}
if (cb->isRenderBlock())
toRenderBlock(cb)->removePositionedObjects(this, NewContainingBlock);
}
}
RenderBox::styleWillChange(diff, newStyle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Low | 165,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ShellSurface::CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
DCHECK(enabled());
DCHECK(!widget_);
views::Widget::InitParams params;
params.type = views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW;
params.ownership = views::Widget::InitParams::NATIVE_WIDGET_OWNS_WIDGET;
params.delegate = this;
params.shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.show_state = show_state;
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container_);
params.bounds = initial_bounds_;
bool activatable = activatable_ && !surface_->GetHitTestBounds().IsEmpty();
params.activatable = activatable ? views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_YES
: views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_NO;
widget_ = new ShellSurfaceWidget(this);
widget_->Init(params);
widget_->set_movement_disabled(!initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
aura::Window* window = widget_->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetName("ExoShellSurface");
window->AddChild(surface_->window());
window->SetEventTargeter(base::WrapUnique(new CustomWindowTargeter));
SetApplicationId(window, &application_id_);
SetMainSurface(window, surface_);
window->AddObserver(this);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->AddObserver(this);
if (parent_)
wm::AddTransientChild(parent_, window);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->set_window_position_managed(
ash::wm::ToWindowShowState(ash::wm::WINDOW_STATE_TYPE_AUTO_POSITIONED) ==
show_state &&
initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = widget_->GetFocusManager();
for (const auto& entry : kCloseWindowAccelerators) {
focus_manager->RegisterAccelerator(
ui::Accelerator(entry.keycode, entry.modifiers),
ui::AcceleratorManager::kNormalPriority, this);
}
pending_show_widget_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Web Workers implementation in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115} | High | 171,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l2_hdr->iov_len = eth_get_l2_hdr_length(l2_hdr->iov_base);
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
l2_hdr->iov_len + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_base + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It occurs when a guest sends a Layer-2 packet smaller than 22 bytes. A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen;
int exthdrlen;
int dst_exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
exthdrlen = (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0);
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
if (cork->length + length > sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN - fragheaderlen) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
/* For UDP, check if TX timestamp is enabled */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if (length > mtu) {
int proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, rt);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else {
/* Only the initial fragment
* is time stamped.
*/
tx_flags = 0;
}
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
} else if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
struct page_frag *pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ip6_append_data_mtu function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not properly maintain information about whether the IPV6_MTU setsockopt option had been specified, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226} | Medium | 172,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IsSmartVirtualKeyboardEnabled() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard)) {
return false;
}
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
keyboard::switches::kDisableSmartVirtualKeyboard);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in modules/speech/SpeechSynthesis.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of a certain utterance data structure.
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058} | High | 171,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRegistry::registerURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& publicURL, URLRegistrable* blob)
{
ASSERT(&blob->registry() == this);
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(origin, publicURL, static_cast<Blob*>(blob)->url());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs)
{
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(child);
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs;
int ret = 0;
#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
/* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */
coprocessor_flush_all(ti);
coprocessor_release_all(ti);
ret |= __copy_from_user(&ti->xtregs_cp, &xtregs->cp0,
sizeof(xtregs_coprocessor_t));
#endif
ret |= __copy_from_user(®s->xtregs_opt, &xtregs->opt,
sizeof(xtregs->opt));
ret |= __copy_from_user(&ti->xtregs_user, &xtregs->user,
sizeof(xtregs->user));
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ptrace_setxregs function in arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not validate user-space pointers, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory locations via a crafted PTRACE_SETXTREGS request.
Commit Message: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[[email protected]: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnDestructionImminent(AppCacheHost* host) {
PendingMasters::iterator found =
pending_master_entries_.find(host->pending_master_entry_url());
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
PendingHosts::iterator it = std::find(hosts.begin(), hosts.end(), host);
DCHECK(it != hosts.end());
hosts.erase(it);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815} | High | 171,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The _TIFFmalloc function in tif_unix.c in LibTIFF 4.0.3 does not reject a zero size, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted TIFF image that is mishandled by the TIFFWriteScanline function in tif_write.c, as demonstrated by tiffdither.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does. | Medium | 169,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cg_open(const char *path, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
const char *cgroup;
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2, * cgdir = NULL, *controller;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *file_info;
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2);
if (!k) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
free_key(k);
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, path2, fi->flags)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
/* we'll free this at cg_release */
file_info = malloc(sizeof(*file_info));
if (!file_info) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
file_info->controller = must_copy_string(controller);
file_info->cgroup = must_copy_string(path1);
file_info->file = must_copy_string(path2);
file_info->type = LXC_TYPE_CGFILE;
file_info->buf = NULL;
file_info->buflen = 0;
fi->fh = (unsigned long)file_info;
ret = 0;
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::GpuChannelEstablishedOnIO(
EstablishRequest* request,
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle gpu_process_handle,
const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
request->channel_handle = channel_handle;
request->gpu_process_handle = gpu_process_handle;
request->gpu_info = gpu_info;
request->event.Signal();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
long ret = 0;
int i = 0;
struct blk_plug plug;
struct kiocb_batch batch;
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
kiocb_batch_init(&batch, nr);
blk_start_plug(&plug);
/*
* AKPM: should this return a partial result if some of the IOs were
* successfully submitted?
*/
for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
struct iocb tmp;
if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&tmp, user_iocb, sizeof(tmp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = io_submit_one(ctx, user_iocb, &tmp, &batch, compat);
if (ret)
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
kiocb_batch_free(&batch);
put_ioctx(ctx);
return i ? i : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The kiocb_batch_free function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via vectors that trigger incorrect iocb management.
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
host_ = frame_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct raw6_frag_vec rfv;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
u16 proto;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (sin6->sin6_family && sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
/* port is the proto value [0..255] carried in nexthdr */
proto = ntohs(sin6->sin6_port);
if (!proto)
proto = inet->inet_num;
else if (proto != inet->inet_num)
return -EINVAL;
if (proto > 255)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
proto = inet->inet_num;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = proto;
rfv.msg = msg;
rfv.hlen = 0;
err = rawv6_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl6);
if (err)
goto out;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
if (inet->hdrincl)
fl6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH;
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, msg, len, &fl6, &dst, msg->msg_flags);
else {
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, raw6_getfrag, &rfv,
len, 0, hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = rawv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, rp);
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::MoveRangeSelection(const VisiblePosition& base_position,
const VisiblePosition& extent_position,
TextGranularity granularity) {
SelectionInDOMTree new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtentDeprecated(base_position.DeepEquivalent(),
extent_position.DeepEquivalent())
.SetAffinity(base_position.Affinity())
.SetIsHandleVisible(IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
if (new_selection.IsNone())
return;
const VisibleSelection& visible_selection =
CreateVisibleSelectionWithGranularity(new_selection, granularity);
if (visible_selection.IsNone())
return;
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder;
if (visible_selection.IsBaseFirst()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(visible_selection.Start(),
visible_selection.End());
} else {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(visible_selection.End(),
visible_selection.Start());
}
builder.SetAffinity(visible_selection.Affinity());
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(IsHandleVisible());
SetSelection(builder.Build(), SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.Build());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660} | High | 171,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame,
bool is_new_navigation) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
if (document_state->commit_load_time().is_null())
document_state->set_commit_load_time(Time::Now());
if (is_new_navigation) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = next_page_id_++;
if (GetLoadingUrl(frame) != GURL("about:swappedout")) {
history_list_offset_++;
if (history_list_offset_ >= content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
history_list_offset_ = content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
history_list_length_ = history_list_offset_ + 1;
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] = page_id_;
}
} else {
if (navigation_state->pending_page_id() != -1 &&
navigation_state->pending_page_id() != page_id_ &&
!navigation_state->request_committed()) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = navigation_state->pending_page_id();
history_list_offset_ = navigation_state->pending_history_list_offset();
DCHECK(history_list_length_ <= 0 ||
history_list_offset_ < 0 ||
history_list_offset_ >= history_list_length_ ||
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] == page_id_);
}
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, is_new_navigation));
navigation_state->set_request_committed(true);
UpdateURL(frame);
completed_client_redirect_src_ = Referrer();
UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int jpg_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[JPG_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= JPG_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, JPG_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < JPG_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Does this look like JPEG? */
if (buf[0] != (JPG_MAGIC >> 8) || buf[1] != (JPG_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::UpdatePrinterSettings(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings, const PageRanges& ranges) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool landscape = false;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(kSettingLandscape, &landscape))
return OnError();
settings_.SetOrientation(landscape);
settings_.ranges = ranges;
return OK;
#else
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
if (!print_dialog_->UpdateSettings(job_settings, ranges))
return OnError();
return OK;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WebContents* TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::GetWebContentsForID(
int window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(chrome_details_, window_id, &browser, error))
return nullptr;
WebContents* contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
*error = "No active web contents to capture";
return nullptr;
}
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
contents->GetLastCommittedURL(),
SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id(), error)) {
return nullptr;
}
return contents;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass restrictions on file URIs via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248} | Medium | 173,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode, bool hidden_inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct fileEntry *fe;
struct extendedFileEntry *efe;
uint16_t ident;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct kernel_lb_addr *iloc = &iinfo->i_location;
unsigned int link_count;
unsigned int indirections = 0;
int ret = -EIO;
reread:
if (iloc->logicalBlockNum >=
sbi->s_partmaps[iloc->partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
udf_debug("block=%d, partition=%d out of range\n",
iloc->logicalBlockNum, iloc->partitionReferenceNum);
return -EIO;
}
/*
* Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
* Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
* i_sb = sb
* i_no = ino
* i_flags = sb->s_flags
* i_state = 0
* clean_inode(): zero fills and sets
* i_count = 1
* i_nlink = 1
* i_op = NULL;
*/
bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino);
return -EIO;
}
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE &&
ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, ident);
goto out;
}
fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data;
efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data;
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) {
struct buffer_head *ibh;
ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 1, &ident);
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
struct indirectEntry *ie;
ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
if (ie->indirectICB.extLength) {
brelse(ibh);
memcpy(&iinfo->i_location, &loc,
sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
if (++indirections > UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb,
"too many ICBs in ICB hierarchy"
" (max %d supported)\n",
UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING);
goto out;
}
brelse(bh);
goto reread;
}
}
brelse(ibh);
} else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType));
goto out;
}
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4))
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0;
else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1;
iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) &
ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK;
iinfo->i_unique = 0;
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 1;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct fileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 1;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(
((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
return 0;
}
ret = -EIO;
read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid));
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET))
inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid;
i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid));
if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET))
inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid;
if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode;
else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode;
else
inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe);
inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask;
read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount);
if (!link_count) {
if (!hidden_inode) {
ret = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
link_count = 1;
}
set_nlink(inode, link_count);
inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength);
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
fe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
efe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime))
iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint);
}
inode->i_generation = iinfo->i_unique;
switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) {
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inc_nlink(inode);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20:
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
else
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK:
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN:
udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR:
udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP:
udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n");
break;
default:
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType);
goto out;
}
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct deviceSpec *dsea =
(struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1);
if (dsea) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent),
le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent)));
/* Developer ID ??? */
} else
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The udf_read_inode function in fs/udf/inode.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not ensure a certain data-structure size consistency, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted UDF filesystem image.
Commit Message: udf: Verify i_size when loading inode
Verify that inode size is sane when loading inode with data stored in
ICB. Otherwise we may get confused later when working with the inode and
inode size is too big.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
int, which, compat_pid_t, pid,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, infop, int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, uru)
{
struct rusage ru;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
}
if (!err && uru) {
/* kernel_waitid() overwrites everything in ru */
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
err = copy_to_user(uru, &ru, sizeof(ru));
else
err = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The waitid implementation in kernel/exit.c in the Linux kernel through 4.13.4 accesses rusage data structures in unintended cases, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism, via a crafted system call.
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Low | 167,742 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _ksba_name_new_from_der (ksba_name_t *r_name,
const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_name_t name;
struct tag_info ti;
const unsigned char *der;
size_t derlen;
int n;
char *p;
if (!r_name || !image)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
*r_name = NULL;
/* count and check for encoding errors - we won;t do this again
during the second pass */
der = image;
derlen = imagelen;
n = 0;
while (derlen)
{
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (&der, &derlen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
if (ti.class != CLASS_CONTEXT)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ); /* we expected a tag */
if (ti.ndef)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_DER_ENCODED);
if (derlen < ti.length)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
switch (ti.tag)
{
case 1: /* rfc822Name - this is an imlicit IA5_STRING */
case 4: /* Name */
case 6: /* URI */
n++;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* advance pointer */
der += ti.length;
derlen -= ti.length;
}
/* allocate array and set all slots to NULL for easier error recovery */
err = ksba_name_new (&name);
if (err)
return err;
if (!n)
return 0; /* empty GeneralNames */
name->names = xtrycalloc (n, sizeof *name->names);
if (!name->names)
{
ksba_name_release (name);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
}
name->n_names = n;
/* start the second pass */
der = image;
derlen = imagelen;
n = 0;
while (derlen)
{
char numbuf[21];
err = _ksba_ber_parse_tl (&der, &derlen, &ti);
assert (!err);
switch (ti.tag)
{
case 1: /* rfc822Name - this is an imlicit IA5_STRING */
p = name->names[n] = xtrymalloc (ti.length+3);
if (!p)
{
ksba_name_release (name);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
}
*p++ = '<';
memcpy (p, der, ti.length);
p += ti.length;
*p++ = '>';
*p = 0;
n++;
break;
case 4: /* Name */
err = _ksba_derdn_to_str (der, ti.length, &p);
if (err)
return err; /* FIXME: we need to release some of the memory */
name->names[n++] = p;
break;
case 6: /* URI */
sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", (unsigned int)ti.length);
p = name->names[n] = xtrymalloc (1+5+strlen (numbuf)
+ ti.length +1+1);
if (!p)
{
ksba_name_release (name);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
}
p = stpcpy (p, "(3:uri");
p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
memcpy (p, der, ti.length);
p += ti.length;
*p++ = ')';
*p = 0; /* extra safeguard null */
n++;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* advance pointer */
der += ti.length;
derlen -= ti.length;
}
*r_name = name;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Libksba before 1.3.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and crash) via unspecified vectors, related to the "returned length of the object from _ksba_ber_parse_tl."
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DeviceFound(const std::string& adapter_id,
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device) {
VLOG(2) << "Device found on " << adapter_id;
DCHECK(device);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.addBluetoothDevice", device->AsDictionary());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pop_fetch_message(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg, int msgno)
{
void *uidl = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct Progress progressbar;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct PopCache *cache = NULL;
struct Header *h = ctx->hdrs[msgno];
unsigned short bcache = 1;
/* see if we already have the message in body cache */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_get(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
/*
* see if we already have the message in our cache in
* case $message_cachedir is unset
*/
cache = &pop_data->cache[h->index % POP_CACHE_LEN];
if (cache->path)
{
if (cache->index == h->index)
{
/* yes, so just return a pointer to the message */
msg->fp = fopen(cache->path, "r");
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
mutt_perror(cache->path);
return -1;
}
else
{
/* clear the previous entry */
unlink(cache->path);
FREE(&cache->path);
}
}
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
/* verify that massage index is correct */
if (h->refno < 0)
{
mutt_error(
_("The message index is incorrect. Try reopening the mailbox."));
return -1;
}
mutt_progress_init(&progressbar, _("Fetching message..."), MUTT_PROGRESS_SIZE,
NetInc, h->content->length + h->content->offset - 1);
/* see if we can put in body cache; use our cache as fallback */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_put(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
if (!msg->fp)
{
/* no */
bcache = 0;
mutt_mktemp(path, sizeof(path));
msg->fp = mutt_file_fopen(path, "w+");
if (!msg->fp)
{
mutt_perror(path);
return -1;
}
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "RETR %d\r\n", h->refno);
const int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, buf, &progressbar, fetch_message, msg->fp);
if (ret == 0)
break;
mutt_file_fclose(&msg->fp);
/* if RETR failed (e.g. connection closed), be sure to remove either
* the file in bcache or from POP's own cache since the next iteration
* of the loop will re-attempt to put() the message */
if (!bcache)
unlink(path);
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
if (ret == -3)
{
mutt_error(_("Can't write message to temporary file!"));
return -1;
}
}
/* Update the header information. Previously, we only downloaded a
* portion of the headers, those required for the main display.
*/
if (bcache)
mutt_bcache_commit(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
else
{
cache->index = h->index;
cache->path = mutt_str_strdup(path);
}
rewind(msg->fp);
uidl = h->data;
/* we replace envelop, key in subj_hash has to be updated as well */
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_delete(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_remove(ctx, h);
mutt_env_free(&h->env);
h->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(msg->fp, h, 0, 0);
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_insert(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_add(ctx, h);
h->data = uidl;
h->lines = 0;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
while (!feof(msg->fp))
{
ctx->hdrs[msgno]->lines++;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
}
h->content->length = ftello(msg->fp) - h->content->offset;
/* This needs to be done in case this is a multipart message */
if (!WithCrypto)
h->security = crypt_query(h->content);
mutt_clear_error();
rewind(msg->fp);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. newsrc.c does not properly restrict '/' characters that may have unsafe interaction with cache pathnames.
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ctdb_tcp_listen_automatic(struct ctdb_context *ctdb)
{
struct ctdb_tcp *ctcp = talloc_get_type(ctdb->private_data,
struct ctdb_tcp);
ctdb_sock_addr sock;
int lock_fd, i;
const char *lock_path = "/tmp/.ctdb_socket_lock";
struct flock lock;
int one = 1;
int sock_size;
struct tevent_fd *fde;
/* If there are no nodes, then it won't be possible to find
* the first one. Log a failure and short circuit the whole
* process.
*/
if (ctdb->num_nodes == 0) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("No nodes available to attempt bind to - is the nodes file empty?\n"));
return -1;
}
/* in order to ensure that we don't get two nodes with the
same adddress, we must make the bind() and listen() calls
atomic. The SO_REUSEADDR setsockopt only prevents double
binds if the first socket is in LISTEN state */
lock_fd = open(lock_path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666);
if (lock_fd == -1) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to open %s\n", lock_path));
return -1;
}
lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
lock.l_start = 0;
lock.l_len = 1;
lock.l_pid = 0;
if (fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, &lock) != 0) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to lock %s\n", lock_path));
close(lock_fd);
return -1;
}
for (i=0; i < ctdb->num_nodes; i++) {
if (ctdb->nodes[i]->flags & NODE_FLAGS_DELETED) {
continue;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(sock);
if (ctdb_tcp_get_address(ctdb,
ctdb->nodes[i]->address.address,
&sock) != 0) {
continue;
}
switch (sock.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sock.ip.sin_port = htons(ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port);
sock_size = sizeof(sock.ip);
break;
case AF_INET6:
sock.ip6.sin6_port = htons(ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port);
sock_size = sizeof(sock.ip6);
break;
default:
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ " unknown family %u\n",
sock.sa.sa_family));
continue;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SOCK_SIN_LEN
sock.ip.sin_len = sock_size;
#endif
ctcp->listen_fd = socket(sock.sa.sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (ctcp->listen_fd == -1) {
ctdb_set_error(ctdb, "socket failed\n");
continue;
}
set_close_on_exec(ctcp->listen_fd);
setsockopt(ctcp->listen_fd,SOL_SOCKET,SO_REUSEADDR,(char *)&one,sizeof(one));
if (bind(ctcp->listen_fd, (struct sockaddr * )&sock, sock_size) == 0) {
break;
}
if (errno == EADDRNOTAVAIL) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_DEBUG,(__location__ " Failed to bind() to socket. %s(%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
} else {
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR,(__location__ " Failed to bind() to socket. %s(%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
}
}
if (i == ctdb->num_nodes) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to bind to any of the node addresses - giving up\n"));
goto failed;
}
ctdb->address.address = talloc_strdup(ctdb, ctdb->nodes[i]->address.address);
ctdb->address.port = ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port;
ctdb->name = talloc_asprintf(ctdb, "%s:%u",
ctdb->address.address,
ctdb->address.port);
ctdb->pnn = ctdb->nodes[i]->pnn;
DEBUG(DEBUG_INFO,("ctdb chose network address %s:%u pnn %u\n",
ctdb->address.address,
ctdb->address.port,
ctdb->pnn));
if (listen(ctcp->listen_fd, 10) == -1) {
goto failed;
}
fde = event_add_fd(ctdb->ev, ctcp, ctcp->listen_fd, EVENT_FD_READ,
ctdb_listen_event, ctdb);
tevent_fd_set_auto_close(fde);
close(lock_fd);
return 0;
failed:
close(lock_fd);
close(ctcp->listen_fd);
ctcp->listen_fd = -1;
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: ctdb before 2.3 in OpenSUSE 12.3 and 13.1 does not create temporary files securely, which has unspecified impact related to "several temp file vulnerabilities" in (1) tcp/tcp_connect.c, (2) server/eventscript.c, (3) tools/ctdb_diagnostics, (4) config/gdb_backtrace, and (5) include/ctdb_private.h.
Commit Message: | High | 165,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int unimac_mdio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct unimac_mdio_pdata *pdata = pdev->dev.platform_data;
struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv;
struct device_node *np;
struct mii_bus *bus;
struct resource *r;
int ret;
np = pdev->dev.of_node;
priv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
r = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
/* Just ioremap, as this MDIO block is usually integrated into an
* Ethernet MAC controller register range
*/
priv->base = devm_ioremap(&pdev->dev, r->start, resource_size(r));
if (!priv->base) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to remap register\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
priv->mii_bus = mdiobus_alloc();
if (!priv->mii_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
bus = priv->mii_bus;
bus->priv = priv;
if (pdata) {
bus->name = pdata->bus_name;
priv->wait_func = pdata->wait_func;
priv->wait_func_data = pdata->wait_func_data;
bus->phy_mask = ~pdata->phy_mask;
} else {
bus->name = "unimac MII bus";
priv->wait_func_data = priv;
priv->wait_func = unimac_mdio_poll;
}
bus->parent = &pdev->dev;
bus->read = unimac_mdio_read;
bus->write = unimac_mdio_write;
bus->reset = unimac_mdio_reset;
snprintf(bus->id, MII_BUS_ID_SIZE, "%s-%d", pdev->name, pdev->id);
ret = of_mdiobus_register(bus, np);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "MDIO bus registration failed\n");
goto out_mdio_free;
}
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, priv);
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Broadcom UniMAC MDIO bus at 0x%p\n", priv->base);
return 0;
out_mdio_free:
mdiobus_free(bus);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The unimac_mdio_probe function in drivers/net/phy/mdio-bcm-unimac.c in the Linux kernel through 4.15.8 does not validate certain resource availability, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 169,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnAcceptIncomingTcpConnection(
const IPC::Message& msg, int listen_socket_id,
net::IPEndPoint remote_address, int connected_socket_id) {
P2PSocketHost* socket = LookupSocket(msg.routing_id(), listen_socket_id);
if (!socket) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_AcceptIncomingTcpConnection "
"for invalid socket_id.";
return;
}
P2PSocketHost* accepted_connection =
socket->AcceptIncomingTcpConnection(remote_address, connected_socket_id);
if (accepted_connection) {
sockets_.insert(std::pair<ExtendedSocketId, P2PSocketHost*>(
ExtendedSocketId(msg.routing_id(), connected_socket_id),
accepted_connection));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle Khmer characters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::update_portdef(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
if (!portDefn) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("omx_vdec::update_portdef");
portDefn->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
portDefn->nSize = sizeof(portDefn);
portDefn->eDomain = OMX_PortDomainVideo;
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator > 0)
portDefn->format.video.xFramerate = (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) << 16; //Q16 format
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: Divide by zero");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (0 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirInput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount;
portDefn->nBufferSize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = eCompressionFormat;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_inp_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_inp_bPopulated;
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
} else if (1 == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
unsigned int buf_size = 0;
if (!client_buffers.update_buffer_req()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("client_buffers.update_buffer_req Failed");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buf_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update buffer requirements");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
portDefn->nBufferSize = buf_size;
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirOutput;
portDefn->nBufferCountActual = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
portDefn->nBufferCountMin = drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount;
portDefn->format.video.eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
portDefn->bEnabled = m_out_bEnabled;
portDefn->bPopulated = m_out_bPopulated;
if (!client_buffers.get_color_format(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting color format");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
} else {
portDefn->eDir = OMX_DirMax;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" get_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
int ret = 0;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("update_portdef : Error in getting port resolution");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].bytesperline;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = fmt.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].reserved[0];
}
} else {
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
portDefn->format.video.nStride = drv_ctx.video_resolution.stride;
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.scan_lines;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) ||
(portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)) {
portDefn->format.video.nStride = ALIGN(drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width, 16);
portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("update_portdef(%u): Width = %u Height = %u Stride = %d "
"SliceHeight = %u eColorFormat = %d nBufSize %u nBufCnt %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nStride,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nSliceHeight,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
| High | 173,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Arm Mbed TLS before 2.19.0 and Arm Mbed Crypto before 2.0.0, when deterministic ECDSA is enabled, use an RNG with insufficient entropy for blinding, which might allow an attacker to recover a private key via side-channel attacks if a victim signs the same message many times. (For Mbed TLS, the fix is also available in versions 2.7.12 and 2.16.3.)
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted | Low | 169,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCUTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowCUTReaderException(severity,tag) \
{ \
if (palette != NULL) \
palette=DestroyImage(palette); \
if (clone_info != NULL) \
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image *image,*palette;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
MagickBooleanType status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t EncodedByte;
unsigned char RunCount,RunValue,RunCountMasked;
CUTHeader Header;
CUTPalHeader PalHeader;
ssize_t depth;
ssize_t i,j;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff=NULL,*ptrB;
register Quantum *q;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CUT image.
*/
palette=NULL;
clone_info=NULL;
Header.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.Width==0 || Header.Height==0 || Header.Reserved!=0)
CUT_KO: ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*---This code checks first line of image---*/
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
ldblk=0;
while((int) RunCountMasked!=0) /*end of line?*/
{
i=1;
if((int) RunCount<0x80) i=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
offset=SeekBlob(image,TellBlob(image)+i,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data*/
EncodedByte-=i+1;
ldblk+=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: unexpected eof in line*/
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
if(EncodedByte!=1) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: size incorrect*/
i=0; /*guess a number of bit planes*/
if(ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=8;
if(2*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=4;
if(8*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=1;
if(i==0) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: incorrect bit planes*/
depth=i;
image->columns=Header.Width;
image->rows=Header.Height;
image->depth=8;
image->colors=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(1UL*i)+1);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) goto Finish;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/* ----- Do something with palette ----- */
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL) goto NoPalette;
i=(ssize_t) strlen(clone_info->filename);
j=i;
while(--i>0)
{
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='.')
{
break;
}
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='/' || clone_info->filename[i]=='\\' ||
clone_info->filename[i]==':' )
{
i=j;
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".PAL",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".pal",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info->filename[i]='\0';
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
}
}
if( (palette=AcquireImage(clone_info,exception))==NULL ) goto NoPalette;
status=OpenBlob(clone_info,palette,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ErasePalette:
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
palette=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
if(palette!=NULL)
{
(void) ReadBlob(palette,2,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.FileId);
if(strncmp(PalHeader.FileId,"AH",2) != 0) goto ErasePalette;
PalHeader.Version=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.Size=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.FileType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.SubType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.BoardID=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.GraphicsMode=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxRed=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxGreen=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxBlue=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
(void) ReadBlob(palette,20,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.PaletteId);
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if(PalHeader.MaxIndex<1) goto ErasePalette;
image->colors=PalHeader.MaxIndex+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse) goto NoMemory;
if(PalHeader.MaxRed==0) PalHeader.MaxRed=(unsigned int) QuantumRange; /*avoid division by 0*/
if(PalHeader.MaxGreen==0) PalHeader.MaxGreen=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
if(PalHeader.MaxBlue==0) PalHeader.MaxBlue=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
for(i=0;i<=(int) PalHeader.MaxIndex;i++)
{ /*this may be wrong- I don't know why is palette such strange*/
j=(ssize_t) TellBlob(palette);
if((j % 512)>512-6)
{
j=((j / 512)+1)*512;
offset=SeekBlob(palette,j,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxRed)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
image->colormap[i].red*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxRed>>1))/
PalHeader.MaxRed);
}
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxGreen)
{
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum
(((double) image->colormap[i].green*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxGreen>>1))/PalHeader.MaxGreen);
}
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxBlue)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum
(((double)image->colormap[i].blue*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxBlue>>1))/PalHeader.MaxBlue);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
NoPalette:
if(palette==NULL)
{
image->colors=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
NoMemory:
ThrowCUTReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
}
/* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/
if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory;
offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < (int) Header.Height; i++)
{
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
ptrB=BImgBuff;
j=ldblk;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
while ((int) RunCountMasked != 0)
{
if((ssize_t) RunCountMasked>j)
{ /*Wrong Data*/
RunCountMasked=(unsigned char) j;
if(j==0)
{
break;
}
}
if((int) RunCount>0x80)
{
RunValue=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) memset(ptrB,(int) RunValue,(size_t) RunCountMasked);
}
else {
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) RunCountMasked,ptrB);
}
ptrB+=(int) RunCountMasked;
j-=(int) RunCountMasked;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto Finish; /* wrong data: unexpected eof in line */
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
InsertRow(image,depth,BImgBuff,i,exception);
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
/*detect monochrome image*/
if(palette==NULL)
{ /*attempt to detect binary (black&white) images*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if(GetCutColors(image,exception)==2)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
register Quantum
sample;
sample=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
if(image->colormap[i].red!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].green!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].blue!=sample) goto Finish;
}
image->colormap[1].red=image->colormap[1].green=
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->rows; i++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t)image->columns; j++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(image,q) == ScaleCharToQuantum(1))
{
SetPixelRed(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,QuantumRange,q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) goto Finish;
}
}
}
}
Finish:
if (BImgBuff != NULL)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a *use of uninitialized value* vulnerability in the function ReadCUTImage in coders/cut.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599 | Medium | 169,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegammacorrect)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
int i;
double input, output;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdd", &IM, &input, &output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
int x, y, c;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,
gdTrueColorAlpha(
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetRed(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetGreen(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetBlue(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c)
)
);
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(im); i++) {
im->red[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->red[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->green[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->green[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->blue[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->blue[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The imagegammacorrect function in ext/gd/gd.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 does not properly validate gamma values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact by providing different signs for the second and third arguments.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access | High | 166,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: decode_multicast_vpn(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
uint8_t route_type, route_length, addr_length, sg_length;
u_int offset;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 2);
route_type = *pptr++;
route_length = *pptr++;
snprintf(buf, buflen, "Route-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_multicast_vpn_route_type_values,
"Unknown", route_type),
route_type, route_length);
switch(route_type) {
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,
(route_length - BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTER_AS_I_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN + 4);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_S_PMSI:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
sg_length = bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
addr_length = route_length - sg_length;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], addr_length);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", Originator %s",
bgp_vpn_ip_print(ndo, pptr, addr_length << 3));
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_ACTIVE:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SHARED_TREE_JOIN: /* fall through */
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_SOURCE_TREE_JOIN:
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
offset = strlen(buf);
snprintf(buf + offset, buflen - offset, ", RD: %s, Source-AS %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(pptr + BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
pptr += BGP_VPN_RD_LEN;
bgp_vpn_sg_print(ndo, pptr, buf, buflen);
break;
/*
* no per route-type printing yet.
*/
case BGP_MULTICAST_VPN_ROUTE_TYPE_INTRA_AS_SEG_LEAF:
default:
break;
}
return route_length + 2;
trunc:
return -2;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:decode_multicast_vpn().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13043/BGP: fix decoding of MVPN route types 6 and 7
RFC 6514 Section 4.6 defines the structure for Shared Tree Join (6) and
Source Tree Join (7) multicast VPN route types. decode_multicast_vpn()
didn't implement the Source AS field of that structure properly, adjust
the offsets to put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
video_ = new libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource(kVP9TestFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(video_ != NULL);
video_->Init();
video_->Begin();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
decoder_ = new libvpx_test::VP9Decoder(cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder_ != NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xml_parse_into_struct function in ext/xml/xml.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted XML data in the second argument, leading to a parser level of zero.
Commit Message: | High | 165,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int flag)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_extent *ex, *fex;
struct ext4_extent *nearex; /* nearest extent */
struct ext4_ext_path *npath = NULL;
int depth, len, err;
ext4_lblk_t next;
unsigned uninitialized = 0;
BUG_ON(ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext) == 0);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_hdr == NULL);
/* try to insert block into found extent and return */
if (ex && (flag != EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO)
&& ext4_can_extents_be_merged(inode, ex, newext)) {
ext_debug("append [%d]%d block to %d:[%d]%d (from %llu)\n",
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(newext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext),
le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex), ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* ext4_can_extents_be_merged should have checked that either
* both extents are uninitialized, or both aren't. Thus we
* need to check only one of them here.
*/
if (ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex))
uninitialized = 1;
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex)
+ ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext));
if (uninitialized)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
nearex = ex;
goto merge;
}
repeat:
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
if (le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries) < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_max))
goto has_space;
/* probably next leaf has space for us? */
fex = EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh);
next = ext4_ext_next_leaf_block(inode, path);
if (le32_to_cpu(newext->ee_block) > le32_to_cpu(fex->ee_block)
&& next != EXT_MAX_BLOCK) {
ext_debug("next leaf block - %d\n", next);
BUG_ON(npath != NULL);
npath = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, next, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(npath))
return PTR_ERR(npath);
BUG_ON(npath->p_depth != path->p_depth);
eh = npath[depth].p_hdr;
if (le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries) < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_max)) {
ext_debug("next leaf isnt full(%d)\n",
le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries));
path = npath;
goto repeat;
}
ext_debug("next leaf has no free space(%d,%d)\n",
le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_max));
}
/*
* There is no free space in the found leaf.
* We're gonna add a new leaf in the tree.
*/
err = ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(handle, inode, path, newext);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
has_space:
nearex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
if (!nearex) {
/* there is no extent in this leaf, create first one */
ext_debug("first extent in the leaf: %d:%llu:[%d]%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(newext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(newext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(newext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext));
path[depth].p_ext = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(newext->ee_block)
> le32_to_cpu(nearex->ee_block)) {
/* BUG_ON(newext->ee_block == nearex->ee_block); */
if (nearex != EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh)) {
len = EXT_MAX_EXTENT(eh) - nearex;
len = (len - 1) * sizeof(struct ext4_extent);
len = len < 0 ? 0 : len;
ext_debug("insert %d:%llu:[%d]%d after: nearest 0x%p, "
"move %d from 0x%p to 0x%p\n",
le32_to_cpu(newext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(newext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(newext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext),
nearex, len, nearex + 1, nearex + 2);
memmove(nearex + 2, nearex + 1, len);
}
path[depth].p_ext = nearex + 1;
} else {
BUG_ON(newext->ee_block == nearex->ee_block);
len = (EXT_MAX_EXTENT(eh) - nearex) * sizeof(struct ext4_extent);
len = len < 0 ? 0 : len;
ext_debug("insert %d:%llu:[%d]%d before: nearest 0x%p, "
"move %d from 0x%p to 0x%p\n",
le32_to_cpu(newext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(newext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(newext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(newext),
nearex, len, nearex + 1, nearex + 2);
memmove(nearex + 1, nearex, len);
path[depth].p_ext = nearex;
}
le16_add_cpu(&eh->eh_entries, 1);
nearex = path[depth].p_ext;
nearex->ee_block = newext->ee_block;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(nearex, ext_pblock(newext));
nearex->ee_len = newext->ee_len;
merge:
/* try to merge extents to the right */
if (flag != EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO)
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, nearex);
/* try to merge extents to the left */
/* time to correct all indexes above */
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
cleanup:
if (npath) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(npath);
kfree(npath);
}
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: print_decnet_ctlmsg(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const union routehdr *rhp, u_int length,
u_int caplen)
{
int mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
register const union controlmsg *cmp = (const union controlmsg *)rhp;
int src, dst, info, blksize, eco, ueco, hello, other, vers;
etheraddr srcea, rtea;
int priority;
const char *rhpx = (const char *)rhp;
int ret;
switch (mflags & RMF_CTLMASK) {
case RMF_INIT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "init "));
if (length < sizeof(struct initmsg))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_init);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_src);
info = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_info);
blksize = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_blksize);
vers = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_vers);
eco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_eco);
ueco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_ueco);
hello = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_init.in_hello);
print_t_info(ndo, info);
ND_PRINT((ndo,
"src %sblksize %d vers %d eco %d ueco %d hello %d",
dnaddr_string(ndo, src), blksize, vers, eco, ueco,
hello));
ret = 1;
break;
case RMF_VER:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "verification "));
if (length < sizeof(struct verifmsg))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_ver);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_ver.ve_src);
other = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ver.ve_fcnval);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "src %s fcnval %o", dnaddr_string(ndo, src), other));
ret = 1;
break;
case RMF_TEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "test "));
if (length < sizeof(struct testmsg))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_test);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_test.te_src);
other = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_test.te_data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "src %s data %o", dnaddr_string(ndo, src), other));
ret = 1;
break;
case RMF_L1ROUT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "lev-1-routing "));
if (length < sizeof(struct l1rout))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_l1rou);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_l1rou.r1_src);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "src %s ", dnaddr_string(ndo, src)));
ret = print_l1_routes(ndo, &(rhpx[sizeof(struct l1rout)]),
length - sizeof(struct l1rout));
break;
case RMF_L2ROUT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "lev-2-routing "));
if (length < sizeof(struct l2rout))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_l2rout);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_l2rout.r2_src);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "src %s ", dnaddr_string(ndo, src)));
ret = print_l2_routes(ndo, &(rhpx[sizeof(struct l2rout)]),
length - sizeof(struct l2rout));
break;
case RMF_RHELLO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "router-hello "));
if (length < sizeof(struct rhellomsg))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_rhello);
vers = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_vers);
eco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_eco);
ueco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_ueco);
memcpy((char *)&srcea, (const char *)&(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_src),
sizeof(srcea));
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(srcea.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
info = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_info);
blksize = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_blksize);
priority = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_priority);
hello = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_rhello.rh_hello);
print_i_info(ndo, info);
ND_PRINT((ndo,
"vers %d eco %d ueco %d src %s blksize %d pri %d hello %d",
vers, eco, ueco, dnaddr_string(ndo, src),
blksize, priority, hello));
ret = print_elist(&(rhpx[sizeof(struct rhellomsg)]),
length - sizeof(struct rhellomsg));
break;
case RMF_EHELLO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "endnode-hello "));
if (length < sizeof(struct ehellomsg))
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(cmp->cm_ehello);
vers = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_vers);
eco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_eco);
ueco = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_ueco);
memcpy((char *)&srcea, (const char *)&(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_src),
sizeof(srcea));
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(srcea.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
info = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_info);
blksize = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_blksize);
/*seed*/
memcpy((char *)&rtea, (const char *)&(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_router),
sizeof(rtea));
dst = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rtea.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
hello = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_hello);
other = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(cmp->cm_ehello.eh_data);
print_i_info(ndo, info);
ND_PRINT((ndo,
"vers %d eco %d ueco %d src %s blksize %d rtr %s hello %d data %o",
vers, eco, ueco, dnaddr_string(ndo, src),
blksize, dnaddr_string(ndo, dst), hello, other));
ret = 1;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown control message"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)rhp, min(length, caplen));
ret = 1;
break;
}
return (ret);
trunc:
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DECnet parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-decnet.c:decnet_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 170,034 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::SetUp() {
task_runner_ = new AutoThreadTaskRunner(
message_loop_.message_loop_proxy(),
base::Bind(&WorkerProcessLauncherTest::QuitMainMessageLoop,
base::Unretained(this)));
exit_code_ = STILL_ACTIVE;
launcher_delegate_.reset(new MockProcessLauncherDelegate());
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, Send(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, GetExitCode())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnPointee(&exit_code_));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, KillProcess(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(this, &WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess));
EXPECT_CALL(ipc_delegate_, OnMessageReceived(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int swevent_hlist_get_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int cpu)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = &per_cpu(swevent_htable, cpu);
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
if (!swevent_hlist_deref(swhash) && cpu_online(cpu)) {
struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
hlist = kzalloc(sizeof(*hlist), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hlist) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(swhash->swevent_hlist, hlist);
}
swhash->hlist_refcount++;
exit:
mutex_unlock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging incorrect handling of an swevent data structure during a CPU unplug operation.
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | High | 167,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
BoxBlurContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
int plane;
int cw = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub), ch = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(in->height, s->vsub);
int w[4] = { inlink->w, cw, cw, inlink->w };
int h[4] = { in->height, ch, ch, in->height };
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
for (plane = 0; in->data[plane] && plane < 4; plane++)
hblur(out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
in ->data[plane], in ->linesize[plane],
w[plane], h[plane], s->radius[plane], s->power[plane],
s->temp);
for (plane = 0; in->data[plane] && plane < 4; plane++)
vblur(out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
w[plane], h[plane], s->radius[plane], s->power[plane],
s->temp);
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 165,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
| High | 173,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
local_socket_close_locked(s);
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
| High | 174,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: flatpak_proxy_client_init (FlatpakProxyClient *client)
{
init_side (client, &client->client_side);
init_side (client, &client->bus_side);
client->auth_end_offset = AUTH_END_INIT_OFFSET;
client->rewrite_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_object_unref);
client->get_owner_reply = g_hash_table_new_full (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal, NULL, g_free);
client->unique_id_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-436
Summary: In dbus-proxy/flatpak-proxy.c in Flatpak before 0.8.9, and 0.9.x and 0.10.x before 0.10.3, crafted D-Bus messages to the host can be used to break out of the sandbox, because whitespace handling in the proxy is not identical to whitespace handling in the daemon.
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter. | Medium | 169,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType EncodeImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
const size_t data_size)
{
#define MaxCode(number_bits) ((one << (number_bits))-1)
#define MaxHashTable 5003
#define MaxGIFBits 12UL
#define MaxGIFTable (1UL << MaxGIFBits)
#define GIFOutputCode(code) \
{ \
/* \
Emit a code. \
*/ \
if (bits > 0) \
datum|=(size_t) (code) << bits; \
else \
datum=(size_t) (code); \
bits+=number_bits; \
while (bits >= 8) \
{ \
/* \
Add a character to current packet. \
*/ \
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff); \
if (length >= 254) \
{ \
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length); \
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet); \
length=0; \
} \
datum>>=8; \
bits-=8; \
} \
if (free_code > max_code) \
{ \
number_bits++; \
if (number_bits == MaxGIFBits) \
max_code=MaxGIFTable; \
else \
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits); \
} \
}
IndexPacket
index;
short
*hash_code,
*hash_prefix,
waiting_code;
size_t
bits,
clear_code,
datum,
end_of_information_code,
free_code,
length,
max_code,
next_pixel,
number_bits,
one,
pass;
ssize_t
displacement,
offset,
k,
y;
unsigned char
*packet,
*hash_suffix;
/*
Allocate encoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
one=1;
packet=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,sizeof(*packet));
hash_code=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_code));
hash_prefix=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_prefix));
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,
sizeof(*hash_suffix));
if ((packet == (unsigned char *) NULL) || (hash_code == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_prefix == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_suffix == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (packet != (unsigned char *) NULL)
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
if (hash_code != (short *) NULL)
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
if (hash_prefix != (short *) NULL)
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
if (hash_suffix != (unsigned char *) NULL)
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Initialize GIF encoder.
*/
(void) memset(packet,0,256*sizeof(*packet));
(void) memset(hash_code,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_code));
(void) memset(hash_prefix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_prefix));
(void) memset(hash_suffix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_suffix));
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
clear_code=((short) one << (data_size-1));
end_of_information_code=clear_code+1;
free_code=clear_code+2;
length=0;
datum=0;
bits=0;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
/*
Encode pixels.
*/
offset=0;
pass=0;
waiting_code=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
if (y == 0)
{
waiting_code=(short) (*indexes);
p++;
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (y == 0 ? 1 : 0); x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/*
Probe hash table.
*/
index=(IndexPacket) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) & 0xff);
p++;
k=(ssize_t) (((size_t) index << (MaxGIFBits-8))+waiting_code);
if (k >= MaxHashTable)
k-=MaxHashTable;
next_pixel=MagickFalse;
displacement=1;
if (hash_code[k] > 0)
{
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
continue;
}
if (k != 0)
displacement=MaxHashTable-k;
for ( ; ; )
{
k-=displacement;
if (k < 0)
k+=MaxHashTable;
if (hash_code[k] == 0)
break;
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
next_pixel=MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (next_pixel != MagickFalse)
continue;
}
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
if (free_code < MaxGIFTable)
{
hash_code[k]=(short) free_code++;
hash_prefix[k]=waiting_code;
hash_suffix[k]=(unsigned char) index;
}
else
{
/*
Fill the hash table with empty entries.
*/
for (k=0; k < MaxHashTable; k++)
hash_code[k]=0;
/*
Reset compressor and issue a clear code.
*/
free_code=clear_code+2;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
}
waiting_code=(short) index;
}
if (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
}
/*
Flush out the buffered code.
*/
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
GIFOutputCode(end_of_information_code);
if (bits > 0)
{
/*
Add a character to current packet.
*/
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff);
if (length >= 254)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
length=0;
}
}
/*
Flush accumulated data.
*/
if (length > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
}
/*
Free encoder memory.
*/
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImage.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595 | Medium | 169,593 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> scaleSkImage(sk_sp<SkImage> skImage,
unsigned resizeWidth,
unsigned resizeHeight,
SkFilterQuality resizeQuality) {
SkImageInfo resizedInfo = SkImageInfo::Make(
resizeWidth, resizeHeight, kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
resizeWidth * resizeHeight, resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> resizedPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
SkPixmap pixmap(
resizedInfo, resizedPixels->data(),
static_cast<size_t>(resizeWidth) * resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
skImage->scalePixels(pixmap, resizeQuality);
return SkImage::MakeFromRaster(pixmap,
[](const void*, void* pixels) {
static_cast<Uint8Array*>(pixels)->deref();
},
resizedPixels.release().leakRef());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 172,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectGetProto(AppLayerProtoDetectThreadCtx *tctx,
Flow *f,
uint8_t *buf, uint32_t buflen,
uint8_t ipproto, uint8_t direction)
{
SCEnter();
SCLogDebug("buflen %u for %s direction", buflen,
(direction & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? "toserver" : "toclient");
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
if (!FLOW_IS_PM_DONE(f, direction)) {
AppProto pm_results[ALPROTO_MAX];
uint16_t pm_matches = AppLayerProtoDetectPMGetProto(tctx, f,
buf, buflen,
direction,
ipproto,
pm_results);
if (pm_matches > 0) {
alproto = pm_results[0];
goto end;
}
}
if (!FLOW_IS_PP_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPPGetProto(f, buf, buflen,
ipproto, direction);
if (alproto != ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)
goto end;
}
/* Look if flow can be found in expectation list */
if (!FLOW_IS_PE_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(f, ipproto, direction);
}
end:
SCReturnUInt(alproto);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Open Information Security Foundation Suricata prior to version 4.1.2 is affected by: Denial of Service - DNS detection bypass. The impact is: An attacker can evade a signature detection with a specialy formed network packet. The component is: app-layer-detect-proto.c, decode.c, decode-teredo.c and decode-ipv6.c (https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3590/commits/11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe, https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3590/commits/8357ef3f8ffc7d99ef6571350724160de356158b). The attack vector is: An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by sending a specifically crafted network request. The fixed version is: 4.1.2.
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736. | Medium | 170,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_ptrace(compat_long_t request, compat_long_t pid,
compat_long_t addr, compat_long_t data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
goto out;
}
child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid);
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(child);
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (!ret)
ret = compat_arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks() {
TRACE_EVENT0(
"cc", "PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks");
DCHECK(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_);
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_callback_.Cancel();
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_ = false;
CheckForCompletedWorkerTasks();
CheckForCompletedUploads();
FlushUploads();
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasks());
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending;
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending;
scheduled_raster_task_count_ = 0;
if (PendingRasterTaskCount())
ScheduleMoreTasks();
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1(
"cc", "ScheduledTasks", this, StateName(),
"state", TracedValue::FromValue(StateAsValue().release()));
if (HasPendingTasks())
ScheduleCheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending) {
DCHECK(std::find_if(raster_tasks_required_for_activation().begin(),
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end(),
WasCanceled) ==
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasksRequiredForActivation();
}
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "ScheduledTasks", this);
DCHECK(!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasks();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ff_jpeg2000_cleanup(Jpeg2000Component *comp, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty)
{
int reslevelno, bandno, precno;
for (reslevelno = 0;
comp->reslevel && reslevelno < codsty->nreslevels;
reslevelno++) {
Jpeg2000ResLevel *reslevel = comp->reslevel + reslevelno;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < reslevel->nbands; bandno++) {
Jpeg2000Band *band = reslevel->band + bandno;
for (precno = 0; precno < reslevel->num_precincts_x * reslevel->num_precincts_y; precno++) {
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
av_freep(&prec->zerobits);
av_freep(&prec->cblkincl);
av_freep(&prec->cblk);
}
av_freep(&band->prec);
}
av_freep(&reslevel->band);
}
ff_dwt_destroy(&comp->dwt);
av_freep(&comp->reslevel);
av_freep(&comp->i_data);
av_freep(&comp->f_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: libavcodec/jpeg2000.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data.
Commit Message: jpeg2000: fix dereferencing invalid pointers
Found-by: Laurent Butti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,921 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The pkinit_check_kdc_pkid function in plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c in the PKINIT implementation in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.4 and 1.11.x before 1.11.1 does not properly handle errors during extraction of fields from an X.509 certificate, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a malformed KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ AS-REQ request.
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved | High | 166,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlXPathCompOpEvalPositionalPredicate(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathStepOpPtr op,
xmlNodeSetPtr set,
int contextSize,
int minPos,
int maxPos,
int hasNsNodes)
{
if (op->ch1 != -1) {
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp = ctxt->comp;
if (comp->steps[op->ch1].op != XPATH_OP_PREDICATE) {
/*
* TODO: raise an internal error.
*/
}
contextSize = xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1], set, contextSize, hasNsNodes);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (contextSize <= 0)
return(0);
}
/*
* Check if the node set contains a sufficient number of nodes for
* the requested range.
*/
if (contextSize < minPos) {
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
return(0);
}
if (op->ch2 == -1) {
/*
* TODO: Can this ever happen?
*/
return (contextSize);
} else {
xmlDocPtr oldContextDoc;
int i, pos = 0, newContextSize = 0, contextPos = 0, res;
xmlXPathStepOpPtr exprOp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr contextObj = NULL, exprRes = NULL;
xmlNodePtr oldContextNode, contextNode = NULL;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->context;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* URGENT TODO: Check the following:
* We don't expect location sets if evaluating prediates, right?
* Only filters should expect location sets, right?
*/
#endif /* LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED */
/*
* Save old context.
*/
oldContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
/*
* Get the expression of this predicate.
*/
exprOp = &ctxt->comp->steps[op->ch2];
for (i = 0; i < set->nodeNr; i++) {
if (set->nodeTab[i] == NULL)
continue;
contextNode = set->nodeTab[i];
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = contextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = ++contextPos;
/*
* Initialize the new set.
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() evaluation are attempted on the predicate
*/
if ((contextNode->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(contextNode->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = contextNode->doc;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate expression with 1 context node
* at a time; this node is packaged into a node set; this
* node set is handed over to the evaluation mechanism.
*/
if (contextObj == NULL)
contextObj = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(xpctxt, contextNode);
else
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(contextObj->nodesetval,
contextNode);
valuePush(ctxt, contextObj);
res = xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt, exprOp, 1);
if ((ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) || (res == -1)) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
/* pop the result if any */
tmp = valuePop(ctxt);
if (tmp != contextObj)
/*
* Free up the result
* then pop off contextObj, which will be freed later
*/
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, tmp);
valuePop(ctxt);
goto evaluation_error;
}
if (res)
pos++;
if (res && (pos >= minPos) && (pos <= maxPos)) {
/*
* Fits in the requested range.
*/
newContextSize++;
if (minPos == maxPos) {
/*
* Only 1 node was requested.
*/
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) {
/*
* As always: take care of those nasty
* namespace nodes.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
}
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
set->nodeNr = 1;
set->nodeTab[0] = contextNode;
goto evaluation_exit;
}
if (pos == maxPos) {
/*
* We are done.
*/
xmlXPathNodeSetClearFromPos(set, i +1, hasNsNodes);
goto evaluation_exit;
}
} else {
/*
* Remove the entry from the initial node set.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
xmlXPathNodeSetFreeNs((xmlNsPtr) contextNode);
}
if (exprRes != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
exprRes = NULL;
}
if (ctxt->value == contextObj) {
/*
* Don't free the temporary XPath object holding the
* context node, in order to avoid massive recreation
* inside this loop.
*/
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(contextObj->nodesetval, hasNsNodes);
} else {
/*
* The object was lost in the evaluation machinery.
* Can this happen? Maybe in case of internal-errors.
*/
contextObj = NULL;
}
}
goto evaluation_exit;
evaluation_error:
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
newContextSize = 0;
evaluation_exit:
if (contextObj != NULL) {
if (ctxt->value == contextObj)
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, contextObj);
}
if (exprRes != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
/*
* Reset/invalidate the context.
*/
xpctxt->node = oldContextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldContextDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = -1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = -1;
return(newContextSize);
}
return(contextSize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in libxml2, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted XPath expression.
Commit Message: Fix libxml XPath bug.
BUG=89402
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7508039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95382 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadLABELImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*property;
const char
*label;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
label=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
draw_info->text=ConstantString(label);
metrics.width=0;
metrics.ascent=0.0;
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
image->columns=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
}
else
if ((strlen(label) > 0) &&
(((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) ||
(fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon)))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0-0.5;
}
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor(draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+
0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor(metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor(draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+
0.5);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Draw label.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : 0.0,draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity ?
metrics.ascent : 0.0);
draw_info->geometry=AcquireString(geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label:pointsize",pointsize);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in the caption and label handling code in ImageMagick allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a small memory leak | High | 168,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cff_decoder_parse_charstrings( CFF_Decoder* decoder,
FT_Byte* charstring_base,
FT_ULong charstring_len )
{
FT_Error error;
CFF_Decoder_Zone* zone;
FT_Byte* ip;
FT_Byte* limit;
CFF_Builder* builder = &decoder->builder;
FT_Pos x, y;
FT_Fixed seed;
FT_Fixed* stack;
FT_Int charstring_type =
decoder->cff->top_font.font_dict.charstring_type;
T2_Hints_Funcs hinter;
/* set default width */
decoder->num_hints = 0;
decoder->read_width = 1;
/* compute random seed from stack address of parameter */
seed = (FT_Fixed)( ( (FT_PtrDist)(char*)&seed ^
(FT_PtrDist)(char*)&decoder ^
(FT_PtrDist)(char*)&charstring_base ) &
FT_ULONG_MAX ) ;
seed = ( seed ^ ( seed >> 10 ) ^ ( seed >> 20 ) ) & 0xFFFFL;
if ( seed == 0 )
seed = 0x7384;
/* initialize the decoder */
decoder->top = decoder->stack;
decoder->zone = decoder->zones;
zone = decoder->zones;
stack = decoder->top;
hinter = (T2_Hints_Funcs)builder->hints_funcs;
builder->path_begun = 0;
zone->base = charstring_base;
limit = zone->limit = charstring_base + charstring_len;
ip = zone->cursor = zone->base;
error = CFF_Err_Ok;
x = builder->pos_x;
y = builder->pos_y;
/* begin hints recording session, if any */
if ( hinter )
hinter->open( hinter->hints );
/* now execute loop */
while ( ip < limit )
{
CFF_Operator op;
FT_Byte v;
/********************************************************************/
/* */
/* Decode operator or operand */
/* */
v = *ip++;
if ( v >= 32 || v == 28 )
{
FT_Int shift = 16;
FT_Int32 val;
/* this is an operand, push it on the stack */
if ( v == 28 )
{
if ( ip + 1 >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
val = (FT_Short)( ( (FT_Short)ip[0] << 8 ) | ip[1] );
ip += 2;
}
else if ( v < 247 )
val = (FT_Int32)v - 139;
else if ( v < 251 )
{
if ( ip >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
val = ( (FT_Int32)v - 247 ) * 256 + *ip++ + 108;
}
else if ( v < 255 )
{
if ( ip >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
val = -( (FT_Int32)v - 251 ) * 256 - *ip++ - 108;
}
else
{
if ( ip + 3 >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
val = ( (FT_Int32)ip[0] << 24 ) |
( (FT_Int32)ip[1] << 16 ) |
( (FT_Int32)ip[2] << 8 ) |
ip[3];
ip += 4;
if ( charstring_type == 2 )
shift = 0;
}
if ( decoder->top - stack >= CFF_MAX_OPERANDS )
goto Stack_Overflow;
val <<= shift;
*decoder->top++ = val;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
if ( !( val & 0xFFFFL ) )
FT_TRACE4(( " %ld", (FT_Int32)( val >> 16 ) ));
else
FT_TRACE4(( " %.2f", val / 65536.0 ));
#endif
}
else
{
/* The specification says that normally arguments are to be taken */
/* from the bottom of the stack. However, this seems not to be */
/* correct, at least for Acroread 7.0.8 on GNU/Linux: It pops the */
/* arguments similar to a PS interpreter. */
FT_Fixed* args = decoder->top;
FT_Int num_args = (FT_Int)( args - decoder->stack );
FT_Int req_args;
/* find operator */
op = cff_op_unknown;
switch ( v )
{
case 1:
op = cff_op_hstem;
break;
case 3:
op = cff_op_vstem;
break;
case 4:
op = cff_op_vmoveto;
break;
case 5:
op = cff_op_rlineto;
break;
case 6:
op = cff_op_hlineto;
break;
case 7:
op = cff_op_vlineto;
break;
case 8:
op = cff_op_rrcurveto;
break;
case 9:
op = cff_op_closepath;
break;
case 10:
op = cff_op_callsubr;
break;
case 11:
op = cff_op_return;
break;
case 12:
{
if ( ip >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
v = *ip++;
switch ( v )
{
case 0:
op = cff_op_dotsection;
break;
case 1: /* this is actually the Type1 vstem3 operator */
op = cff_op_vstem;
break;
case 2: /* this is actually the Type1 hstem3 operator */
op = cff_op_hstem;
break;
case 3:
op = cff_op_and;
break;
case 4:
op = cff_op_or;
break;
case 5:
op = cff_op_not;
break;
case 6:
op = cff_op_seac;
break;
case 7:
op = cff_op_sbw;
break;
case 8:
op = cff_op_store;
break;
case 9:
op = cff_op_abs;
break;
case 10:
op = cff_op_add;
break;
case 11:
op = cff_op_sub;
break;
case 12:
op = cff_op_div;
break;
case 13:
op = cff_op_load;
break;
case 14:
op = cff_op_neg;
break;
case 15:
op = cff_op_eq;
break;
case 16:
op = cff_op_callothersubr;
break;
case 17:
op = cff_op_pop;
break;
case 18:
op = cff_op_drop;
break;
case 20:
op = cff_op_put;
break;
case 21:
op = cff_op_get;
break;
case 22:
op = cff_op_ifelse;
break;
case 23:
op = cff_op_random;
break;
case 24:
op = cff_op_mul;
break;
case 26:
op = cff_op_sqrt;
break;
case 27:
op = cff_op_dup;
break;
case 28:
op = cff_op_exch;
break;
case 29:
op = cff_op_index;
break;
case 30:
op = cff_op_roll;
break;
case 33:
op = cff_op_setcurrentpoint;
break;
case 34:
op = cff_op_hflex;
break;
case 35:
op = cff_op_flex;
break;
case 36:
op = cff_op_hflex1;
break;
case 37:
op = cff_op_flex1;
break;
default:
/* decrement ip for syntax error message */
ip--;
}
}
break;
case 13:
op = cff_op_hsbw;
break;
case 14:
op = cff_op_endchar;
break;
case 16:
op = cff_op_blend;
break;
case 18:
op = cff_op_hstemhm;
break;
case 19:
op = cff_op_hintmask;
break;
case 20:
op = cff_op_cntrmask;
break;
case 21:
op = cff_op_rmoveto;
break;
case 22:
op = cff_op_hmoveto;
break;
case 23:
op = cff_op_vstemhm;
break;
case 24:
op = cff_op_rcurveline;
break;
case 25:
op = cff_op_rlinecurve;
break;
case 26:
op = cff_op_vvcurveto;
break;
case 27:
op = cff_op_hhcurveto;
break;
case 29:
op = cff_op_callgsubr;
break;
case 30:
op = cff_op_vhcurveto;
break;
case 31:
op = cff_op_hvcurveto;
break;
default:
break;
}
if ( op == cff_op_unknown )
goto Syntax_Error;
/* check arguments */
req_args = cff_argument_counts[op];
if ( req_args & CFF_COUNT_CHECK_WIDTH )
{
if ( num_args > 0 && decoder->read_width )
{
/* If `nominal_width' is non-zero, the number is really a */
/* difference against `nominal_width'. Else, the number here */
/* is truly a width, not a difference against `nominal_width'. */
/* If the font does not set `nominal_width', then */
/* `nominal_width' defaults to zero, and so we can set */
/* `glyph_width' to `nominal_width' plus number on the stack */
/* -- for either case. */
FT_Int set_width_ok;
switch ( op )
{
case cff_op_hmoveto:
case cff_op_vmoveto:
set_width_ok = num_args & 2;
break;
case cff_op_hstem:
case cff_op_vstem:
case cff_op_hstemhm:
case cff_op_vstemhm:
case cff_op_rmoveto:
case cff_op_hintmask:
case cff_op_cntrmask:
set_width_ok = num_args & 1;
break;
case cff_op_endchar:
/* If there is a width specified for endchar, we either have */
/* 1 argument or 5 arguments. We like to argue. */
set_width_ok = ( num_args == 5 ) || ( num_args == 1 );
break;
default:
set_width_ok = 0;
break;
}
if ( set_width_ok )
{
decoder->glyph_width = decoder->nominal_width +
( stack[0] >> 16 );
if ( decoder->width_only )
{
/* we only want the advance width; stop here */
break;
}
/* Consumed an argument. */
num_args--;
}
}
decoder->read_width = 0;
req_args = 0;
}
req_args &= 0x000F;
if ( num_args < req_args )
goto Stack_Underflow;
args -= req_args;
num_args -= req_args;
/* At this point, `args' points to the first argument of the */
/* operand in case `req_args' isn't zero. Otherwise, we have */
/* to adjust `args' manually. */
/* Note that we only pop arguments from the stack which we */
/* really need and can digest so that we can continue in case */
/* of superfluous stack elements. */
switch ( op )
{
case cff_op_hstem:
case cff_op_vstem:
case cff_op_hstemhm:
case cff_op_vstemhm:
/* the number of arguments is always even here */
FT_TRACE4((
op == cff_op_hstem ? " hstem\n" :
( op == cff_op_vstem ? " vstem\n" :
( op == cff_op_hstemhm ? " hstemhm\n" : " vstemhm\n" ) ) ));
if ( hinter )
hinter->stems( hinter->hints,
( op == cff_op_hstem || op == cff_op_hstemhm ),
num_args / 2,
args - ( num_args & ~1 ) );
decoder->num_hints += num_args / 2;
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_hintmask:
case cff_op_cntrmask:
FT_TRACE4(( op == cff_op_hintmask ? " hintmask" : " cntrmask" ));
/* implement vstem when needed -- */
/* the specification doesn't say it, but this also works */
/* with the 'cntrmask' operator */
/* */
if ( num_args > 0 )
{
if ( hinter )
hinter->stems( hinter->hints,
0,
num_args / 2,
args - ( num_args & ~1 ) );
decoder->num_hints += num_args / 2;
}
if ( hinter )
{
if ( op == cff_op_hintmask )
hinter->hintmask( hinter->hints,
builder->current->n_points,
decoder->num_hints,
ip );
else
hinter->counter( hinter->hints,
decoder->num_hints,
ip );
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_UInt maskbyte;
FT_TRACE4(( " (maskbytes: " ));
for ( maskbyte = 0;
maskbyte < (FT_UInt)(( decoder->num_hints + 7 ) >> 3);
maskbyte++, ip++ )
FT_TRACE4(( "0x%02X", *ip ));
FT_TRACE4(( ")\n" ));
}
#else
ip += ( decoder->num_hints + 7 ) >> 3;
#endif
if ( ip >= limit )
goto Syntax_Error;
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_rmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " rmoveto\n" ));
cff_builder_close_contour( builder );
builder->path_begun = 0;
x += args[-2];
y += args[-1];
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_vmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " vmoveto\n" ));
cff_builder_close_contour( builder );
builder->path_begun = 0;
y += args[-1];
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_hmoveto:
FT_TRACE4(( " hmoveto\n" ));
cff_builder_close_contour( builder );
builder->path_begun = 0;
x += args[-1];
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_rlineto:
FT_TRACE4(( " rlineto\n" ));
if ( cff_builder_start_point ( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, num_args / 2 ) )
goto Fail;
if ( num_args < 2 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
args -= num_args & ~1;
while ( args < decoder->top )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 2;
}
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_hlineto:
case cff_op_vlineto:
{
FT_Int phase = ( op == cff_op_hlineto );
FT_TRACE4(( op == cff_op_hlineto ? " hlineto\n"
: " vlineto\n" ));
if ( num_args < 1 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
if ( cff_builder_start_point ( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, num_args ) )
goto Fail;
args = stack;
while ( args < decoder->top )
{
if ( phase )
x += args[0];
else
y += args[0];
if ( cff_builder_add_point1( builder, x, y ) )
goto Fail;
args++;
phase ^= 1;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_rrcurveto:
{
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( " rrcurveto\n" ));
if ( num_args < 6 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
nargs = num_args - num_args % 6;
if ( cff_builder_start_point ( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, nargs / 2 ) )
goto Fail;
args -= nargs;
while ( args < decoder->top )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[2];
y += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[4];
y += args[5];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 6;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_vvcurveto:
{
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( " vvcurveto\n" ));
if ( num_args < 4 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
/* if num_args isn't of the form 4n or 4n+1, */
/* we reduce it to 4n+1 */
nargs = num_args - num_args % 4;
if ( num_args - nargs > 0 )
nargs += 1;
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) )
goto Fail;
args -= nargs;
if ( nargs & 1 )
{
x += args[0];
args++;
nargs--;
}
if ( check_points( builder, 3 * ( nargs / 4 ) ) )
goto Fail;
while ( args < decoder->top )
{
y += args[0];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[1];
y += args[2];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
y += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 4;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_hhcurveto:
{
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( " hhcurveto\n" ));
if ( num_args < 4 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
/* if num_args isn't of the form 4n or 4n+1, */
/* we reduce it to 4n+1 */
nargs = num_args - num_args % 4;
if ( num_args - nargs > 0 )
nargs += 1;
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) )
goto Fail;
args -= nargs;
if ( nargs & 1 )
{
y += args[0];
args++;
nargs--;
}
if ( check_points( builder, 3 * ( nargs / 4 ) ) )
goto Fail;
while ( args < decoder->top )
{
x += args[0];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[1];
y += args[2];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 4;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_vhcurveto:
case cff_op_hvcurveto:
{
FT_Int phase;
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( op == cff_op_vhcurveto ? " vhcurveto\n"
: " hvcurveto\n" ));
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) )
goto Fail;
if ( num_args < 4 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
/* if num_args isn't of the form 8n, 8n+1, 8n+4, or 8n+5, */
/* we reduce it to the largest one which fits */
nargs = num_args - num_args % 4;
if ( num_args - nargs > 0 )
nargs += 1;
args -= nargs;
if ( check_points( builder, ( nargs / 4 ) * 3 ) )
goto Stack_Underflow;
phase = ( op == cff_op_hvcurveto );
while ( nargs >= 4 )
{
nargs -= 4;
if ( phase )
{
x += args[0];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[1];
y += args[2];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
y += args[3];
if ( nargs == 1 )
x += args[4];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
}
else
{
y += args[0];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[1];
y += args[2];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[3];
if ( nargs == 1 )
y += args[4];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
}
args += 4;
phase ^= 1;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_rlinecurve:
{
FT_Int num_lines;
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( " rlinecurve\n" ));
if ( num_args < 8 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
nargs = num_args & ~1;
num_lines = ( nargs - 6 ) / 2;
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, num_lines + 3 ) )
goto Fail;
args -= nargs;
/* first, add the line segments */
while ( num_lines > 0 )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 2;
num_lines--;
}
/* then the curve */
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[2];
y += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[4];
y += args[5];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_rcurveline:
{
FT_Int num_curves;
FT_Int nargs;
FT_TRACE4(( " rcurveline\n" ));
if ( num_args < 8 )
goto Stack_Underflow;
nargs = num_args - 2;
nargs = nargs - nargs % 6 + 2;
num_curves = ( nargs - 2 ) / 6;
if ( cff_builder_start_point ( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, num_curves * 3 + 2 ) )
goto Fail;
args -= nargs;
/* first, add the curves */
while ( num_curves > 0 )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[2];
y += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
x += args[4];
y += args[5];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args += 6;
num_curves--;
}
/* then the final line */
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_hflex1:
{
FT_Pos start_y;
FT_TRACE4(( " hflex1\n" ));
/* adding five more points: 4 control points, 1 on-curve point */
/* -- make sure we have enough space for the start point if it */
/* needs to be added */
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, 6 ) )
goto Fail;
/* record the starting point's y position for later use */
start_y = y;
/* first control point */
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* second control point */
x += args[2];
y += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* join point; on curve, with y-value the same as the last */
/* control point's y-value */
x += args[4];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
/* third control point, with y-value the same as the join */
/* point's y-value */
x += args[5];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* fourth control point */
x += args[6];
y += args[7];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* ending point, with y-value the same as the start */
x += args[8];
y = start_y;
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args = stack;
break;
}
case cff_op_hflex:
{
FT_Pos start_y;
FT_TRACE4(( " hflex\n" ));
/* adding six more points; 4 control points, 2 on-curve points */
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, 6 ) )
goto Fail;
/* record the starting point's y-position for later use */
start_y = y;
/* first control point */
x += args[0];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* second control point */
x += args[1];
y += args[2];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* join point; on curve, with y-value the same as the last */
/* control point's y-value */
x += args[3];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
/* third control point, with y-value the same as the join */
/* point's y-value */
x += args[4];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* fourth control point */
x += args[5];
y = start_y;
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 0 );
/* ending point, with y-value the same as the start point's */
/* y-value -- we don't add this point, though */
x += args[6];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args = stack;
break;
}
case cff_op_flex1:
{
FT_Pos start_x, start_y; /* record start x, y values for */
/* alter use */
FT_Fixed dx = 0, dy = 0; /* used in horizontal/vertical */
/* algorithm below */
FT_Int horizontal, count;
FT_Fixed* temp;
FT_TRACE4(( " flex1\n" ));
/* adding six more points; 4 control points, 2 on-curve points */
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, 6 ) )
goto Fail;
/* record the starting point's x, y position for later use */
start_x = x;
start_y = y;
/* XXX: figure out whether this is supposed to be a horizontal */
/* or vertical flex; the Type 2 specification is vague... */
temp = args;
/* grab up to the last argument */
for ( count = 5; count > 0; count-- )
{
dx += temp[0];
dy += temp[1];
temp += 2;
}
if ( dx < 0 )
dx = -dx;
if ( dy < 0 )
dy = -dy;
/* strange test, but here it is... */
horizontal = ( dx > dy );
for ( count = 5; count > 0; count-- )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y,
(FT_Bool)( count == 3 ) );
args += 2;
}
/* is last operand an x- or y-delta? */
if ( horizontal )
{
x += args[0];
y = start_y;
}
else
{
x = start_x;
y += args[0];
}
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y, 1 );
args = stack;
break;
}
case cff_op_flex:
{
FT_UInt count;
FT_TRACE4(( " flex\n" ));
if ( cff_builder_start_point( builder, x, y ) ||
check_points( builder, 6 ) )
goto Fail;
for ( count = 6; count > 0; count-- )
{
x += args[0];
y += args[1];
cff_builder_add_point( builder, x, y,
(FT_Bool)( count == 4 || count == 1 ) );
args += 2;
}
args = stack;
}
break;
case cff_op_seac:
FT_TRACE4(( " seac\n" ));
error = cff_operator_seac( decoder,
args[0], args[1], args[2],
(FT_Int)( args[3] >> 16 ),
(FT_Int)( args[4] >> 16 ) );
/* add current outline to the glyph slot */
FT_GlyphLoader_Add( builder->loader );
/* return now! */
FT_TRACE4(( "\n" ));
return error;
case cff_op_endchar:
FT_TRACE4(( " endchar\n" ));
/* We are going to emulate the seac operator. */
if ( num_args >= 4 )
{
/* Save glyph width so that the subglyphs don't overwrite it. */
FT_Pos glyph_width = decoder->glyph_width;
error = cff_operator_seac( decoder,
0L, args[-4], args[-3],
(FT_Int)( args[-2] >> 16 ),
(FT_Int)( args[-1] >> 16 ) );
decoder->glyph_width = glyph_width;
}
else
{
if ( !error )
error = CFF_Err_Ok;
cff_builder_close_contour( builder );
/* close hints recording session */
if ( hinter )
{
if ( hinter->close( hinter->hints,
builder->current->n_points ) )
goto Syntax_Error;
/* apply hints to the loaded glyph outline now */
hinter->apply( hinter->hints,
builder->current,
(PSH_Globals)builder->hints_globals,
decoder->hint_mode );
}
/* add current outline to the glyph slot */
FT_GlyphLoader_Add( builder->loader );
}
/* return now! */
FT_TRACE4(( "\n" ));
return error;
case cff_op_abs:
FT_TRACE4(( " abs\n" ));
if ( args[0] < 0 )
args[0] = -args[0];
args++;
break;
case cff_op_add:
FT_TRACE4(( " add\n" ));
args[0] += args[1];
args++;
break;
case cff_op_sub:
FT_TRACE4(( " sub\n" ));
args[0] -= args[1];
args++;
break;
case cff_op_div:
FT_TRACE4(( " div\n" ));
args[0] = FT_DivFix( args[0], args[1] );
args++;
break;
case cff_op_neg:
FT_TRACE4(( " neg\n" ));
args[0] = -args[0];
args++;
break;
case cff_op_random:
{
FT_Fixed Rand;
FT_TRACE4(( " rand\n" ));
Rand = seed;
if ( Rand >= 0x8000L )
Rand++;
args[0] = Rand;
seed = FT_MulFix( seed, 0x10000L - seed );
if ( seed == 0 )
seed += 0x2873;
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_mul:
FT_TRACE4(( " mul\n" ));
args[0] = FT_MulFix( args[0], args[1] );
args++;
break;
case cff_op_sqrt:
FT_TRACE4(( " sqrt\n" ));
if ( args[0] > 0 )
{
FT_Int count = 9;
FT_Fixed root = args[0];
FT_Fixed new_root;
for (;;)
{
new_root = ( root + FT_DivFix( args[0], root ) + 1 ) >> 1;
if ( new_root == root || count <= 0 )
break;
root = new_root;
}
args[0] = new_root;
}
else
args[0] = 0;
args++;
break;
case cff_op_drop:
/* nothing */
FT_TRACE4(( " drop\n" ));
break;
case cff_op_exch:
{
FT_Fixed tmp;
FT_TRACE4(( " exch\n" ));
tmp = args[0];
args[0] = args[1];
args[1] = tmp;
args += 2;
}
break;
case cff_op_index:
{
FT_Int idx = (FT_Int)( args[0] >> 16 );
FT_TRACE4(( " index\n" ));
if ( idx < 0 )
idx = 0;
else if ( idx > num_args - 2 )
idx = num_args - 2;
args[0] = args[-( idx + 1 )];
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_roll:
{
FT_Int count = (FT_Int)( args[0] >> 16 );
FT_Int idx = (FT_Int)( args[1] >> 16 );
FT_TRACE4(( " roll\n" ));
if ( count <= 0 )
count = 1;
args -= count;
if ( args < stack )
goto Stack_Underflow;
if ( idx >= 0 )
{
while ( idx > 0 )
{
FT_Fixed tmp = args[count - 1];
FT_Int i;
for ( i = count - 2; i >= 0; i-- )
args[i + 1] = args[i];
args[0] = tmp;
idx--;
}
}
else
{
while ( idx < 0 )
{
FT_Fixed tmp = args[0];
FT_Int i;
for ( i = 0; i < count - 1; i++ )
args[i] = args[i + 1];
args[count - 1] = tmp;
idx++;
}
}
args += count;
}
break;
case cff_op_dup:
FT_TRACE4(( " dup\n" ));
args[1] = args[0];
args += 2;
break;
case cff_op_put:
{
FT_Fixed val = args[0];
FT_Int idx = (FT_Int)( args[1] >> 16 );
FT_TRACE4(( " put\n" ));
if ( idx >= 0 && idx < CFF_MAX_TRANS_ELEMENTS )
decoder->buildchar[idx] = val;
}
break;
case cff_op_get:
{
FT_Int idx = (FT_Int)( args[0] >> 16 );
FT_Fixed val = 0;
FT_TRACE4(( " get\n" ));
if ( idx >= 0 && idx < CFF_MAX_TRANS_ELEMENTS )
val = decoder->buildchar[idx];
args[0] = val;
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_store:
FT_TRACE4(( " store\n"));
goto Unimplemented;
case cff_op_load:
FT_TRACE4(( " load\n" ));
goto Unimplemented;
case cff_op_dotsection:
/* this operator is deprecated and ignored by the parser */
FT_TRACE4(( " dotsection\n" ));
break;
case cff_op_closepath:
/* this is an invalid Type 2 operator; however, there */
/* exist fonts which are incorrectly converted from probably */
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " closepath (invalid op)\n" ));
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_hsbw:
/* this is an invalid Type 2 operator; however, there */
/* exist fonts which are incorrectly converted from probably */
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " hsbw (invalid op)\n" ));
decoder->glyph_width = decoder->nominal_width + ( args[1] >> 16 );
decoder->builder.left_bearing.x = args[0];
decoder->builder.left_bearing.y = 0;
x = decoder->builder.pos_x + args[0];
y = decoder->builder.pos_y;
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_sbw:
/* this is an invalid Type 2 operator; however, there */
/* exist fonts which are incorrectly converted from probably */
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " sbw (invalid op)\n" ));
decoder->glyph_width = decoder->nominal_width + ( args[2] >> 16 );
decoder->builder.left_bearing.x = args[0];
decoder->builder.left_bearing.y = args[1];
x = decoder->builder.pos_x + args[0];
y = decoder->builder.pos_y + args[1];
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_setcurrentpoint:
/* this is an invalid Type 2 operator; however, there */
/* exist fonts which are incorrectly converted from probably */
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " setcurrentpoint (invalid op)\n" ));
x = decoder->builder.pos_x + args[0];
y = decoder->builder.pos_y + args[1];
args = stack;
break;
case cff_op_callothersubr:
/* this is an invalid Type 2 operator; however, there */
/* exist fonts which are incorrectly converted from probably */
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " callothersubr (invalid op)\n" ));
/* subsequent `pop' operands should add the arguments, */
/* this is the implementation described for `unknown' other */
/* subroutines in the Type1 spec. */
args -= 2 + ( args[-2] >> 16 );
break;
case cff_op_pop:
/* Type 1 to CFF, and some parsers seem to accept it */
FT_TRACE4(( " pop (invalid op)\n" ));
args++;
break;
case cff_op_and:
{
FT_Fixed cond = args[0] && args[1];
FT_TRACE4(( " and\n" ));
args[0] = cond ? 0x10000L : 0;
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_or:
{
FT_Fixed cond = args[0] || args[1];
FT_TRACE4(( " or\n" ));
args[0] = cond ? 0x10000L : 0;
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_eq:
{
FT_Fixed cond = !args[0];
FT_TRACE4(( " eq\n" ));
args[0] = cond ? 0x10000L : 0;
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_ifelse:
{
FT_Fixed cond = ( args[2] <= args[3] );
FT_TRACE4(( " ifelse\n" ));
if ( !cond )
args[0] = args[1];
args++;
}
break;
case cff_op_callsubr:
{
FT_UInt idx = (FT_UInt)( ( args[0] >> 16 ) +
decoder->locals_bias );
FT_TRACE4(( " callsubr(%d)\n", idx ));
if ( idx >= decoder->num_locals )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid local subr index\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
if ( zone - decoder->zones >= CFF_MAX_SUBRS_CALLS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" too many nested subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
zone->cursor = ip; /* save current instruction pointer */
zone++;
zone->base = decoder->locals[idx];
zone->limit = decoder->locals[idx + 1];
zone->cursor = zone->base;
if ( !zone->base || zone->limit == zone->base )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invoking empty subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
decoder->zone = zone;
ip = zone->base;
limit = zone->limit;
}
break;
case cff_op_callgsubr:
{
FT_UInt idx = (FT_UInt)( ( args[0] >> 16 ) +
decoder->globals_bias );
FT_TRACE4(( " callgsubr(%d)\n", idx ));
if ( idx >= decoder->num_globals )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invalid global subr index\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
if ( zone - decoder->zones >= CFF_MAX_SUBRS_CALLS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" too many nested subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
zone->cursor = ip; /* save current instruction pointer */
zone++;
zone->base = decoder->globals[idx];
zone->limit = decoder->globals[idx + 1];
zone->cursor = zone->base;
if ( !zone->base || zone->limit == zone->base )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" invoking empty subrs\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
decoder->zone = zone;
ip = zone->base;
limit = zone->limit;
}
break;
case cff_op_return:
FT_TRACE4(( " return\n" ));
if ( decoder->zone <= decoder->zones )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings:"
" unexpected return\n" ));
goto Syntax_Error;
}
decoder->zone--;
zone = decoder->zone;
ip = zone->cursor;
limit = zone->limit;
break;
default:
Unimplemented:
FT_ERROR(( "Unimplemented opcode: %d", ip[-1] ));
if ( ip[-1] == 12 )
FT_ERROR(( " %d", ip[0] ));
FT_ERROR(( "\n" ));
return CFF_Err_Unimplemented_Feature;
}
decoder->top = args;
} /* general operator processing */
} /* while ip < limit */
FT_TRACE4(( "..end..\n\n" ));
Fail:
return error;
Syntax_Error:
FT_TRACE4(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings: syntax error\n" ));
return CFF_Err_Invalid_File_Format;
Stack_Underflow:
FT_TRACE4(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings: stack underflow\n" ));
return CFF_Err_Too_Few_Arguments;
Stack_Overflow:
FT_TRACE4(( "cff_decoder_parse_charstrings: stack overflow\n" ));
return CFF_Err_Stack_Overflow;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in glyph handling in FreeType before 2.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
CHECK(context->IsOffTheRecord() || !context->HasOffTheRecordContext());
content::BrowserContext::NotifyWillBeDestroyed(context);
std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*> hosts;
for (content::RenderProcessHost::iterator it =
content::RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator();
!it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
content::RenderProcessHost* host = it.GetCurrentValue();
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != context) {
continue;
}
hosts.insert(host);
//// static
}
if (hosts.empty()) {
delete context;
} else {
new BrowserContextDestroyer(context, hosts);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf)
{
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack;
__be16 err_code;
int length = 0;
int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
int all_param_pass = 1;
chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
/* Skip the addiphdr and store a pointer to address parameter. */
length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length);
chunk_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first
* asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
asconf_param = (void *)addr_param + length;
chunk_len -= length;
/* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk.
* Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of
* ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the fourfold of ASCONF
* parameters.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 4);
if (!asconf_ack)
goto done;
/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */
while (chunk_len > 0) {
err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,
asconf_param);
/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)
* If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,
* all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
* considered successful if not reported. All TLVs after
* the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless
* a specific success indication is present for the parameter.
*/
if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code)
all_param_pass = 0;
if (!all_param_pass)
sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack,
asconf_param->crr_id, err_code,
asconf_param);
/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add
* an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it
* MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled
* in the ASCONF.
*/
if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code)
goto done;
/* Move to the next ASCONF param. */
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
chunk_len -= length;
}
done:
asoc->peer.addip_serial++;
/* If we are sending a new ASCONF_ACK hold a reference to it in assoc
* after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any.
*/
if (asconf_ack) {
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack);
list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list,
&asoc->asconf_ack_list);
}
return asconf_ack;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a malformed ASCONF chunk, related to net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c and net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,333 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void testInspectorDefault(InspectorTest* test, gconstpointer)
{
test->showInWindowAndWaitUntilMapped(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
test->resizeView(200, 200);
test->loadHtml("<html><body><p>WebKitGTK+ Inspector test</p></body></html>", 0);
test->waitUntilLoadFinished();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(false);
GRefPtr<WebKitWebViewBase> inspectorView = webkit_web_inspector_get_web_view(test->m_inspector);
g_assert(inspectorView.get());
test->assertObjectIsDeletedWhenTestFinishes(G_OBJECT(inspectorView.get()));
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
g_assert_cmpuint(webkit_web_inspector_get_attached_height(test->m_inspector), ==, 0);
Vector<InspectorTest::InspectorEvents>& events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(true);
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Attach);
test->m_events.clear();
test->detachAndWaitUntilWindowOpened();
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->closeAndWaitUntilClosed();
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Closed);
test->m_events.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a malformed name for the font encoding.
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mcid_char_imp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p, tag_record *tr, int uni, int remove)
{
if (tr->mcid_obj == NULL)
/* No object, or already deleted */
return;
if (remove)
{
/* Remove the expanded abbreviation, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(E));
/* Remove the structure title, if there is one. */
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(T));
}
/* Edit the Alt string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->alt);
/* Edit the ActualText string */
walk_string(ctx, uni, remove, &tr->actualtext);
/* If we're removing a character, and either of the strings
* haven't matched up to what we were expecting, then just
* delete the whole string. */
else if (tr->alt.pos >= 0 || tr->actualtext.pos >= 0)
{
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
/* The strings are making sense so far */
remove = 0;
}
if (remove)
{
/* Anything else we have to err on the side of caution and
if (tr->alt.pos == -1)
pdf_dict_del(ctx, tr->mcid_obj, PDF_NAME(Alt));
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, tr->mcid_obj);
tr->mcid_obj = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->alt.utf8);
tr->alt.utf8 = NULL;
fz_free(ctx, tr->actualtext.utf8);
tr->actualtext.utf8 = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Artifex MuPDF before 1.16.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read in fz_chartorune in fitz/string.c because pdf/pdf-op-filter.c does not check for a missing string.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,659 |
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