instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_create_iv)
{
char *iv;
long source = RANDOM;
long size;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|l", &size, &source) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (size <= 0 || size >= INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot create an IV with a size of less than 1 or greater than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
iv = ecalloc(size + 1, 1);
if (source == RANDOM || source == URANDOM) {
#if PHP_WIN32
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
BYTE *iv_b = (BYTE *) iv;
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(iv_b, (size_t) size) == FAILURE){
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
n = size;
#else
int *fd = &MCG(fd[source]);
size_t read_bytes = 0;
if (*fd < 0) {
*fd = open(source == RANDOM ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (*fd < 0) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot open source device");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
while (read_bytes < size) {
n = read(*fd, iv + read_bytes, size - read_bytes);
if (n < 0) {
break;
}
read_bytes += n;
}
n = read_bytes;
if (n < size) {
efree(iv);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not gather sufficient random data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
} else {
n = size;
while (size) {
iv[--size] = (char) (255.0 * php_rand(TSRMLS_C) / RAND_MAX);
}
}
RETURN_STRINGL(iv, n, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (is_software_event(event))
return 1;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1 on arm64 platforms allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via vectors involving events that are mishandled during a span of multiple HW PMUs.
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isChecked() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLInputElement(*node))
return toHTMLInputElement(*node).shouldAppearChecked();
switch (ariaRoleAttribute()) {
case CheckBoxRole:
case MenuItemCheckBoxRole:
case MenuItemRadioRole:
case RadioButtonRole:
case SwitchRole:
if (equalIgnoringCase(
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kChecked),
"true"))
return true;
return false;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
if (insn_bitness == 32) {
/* Relevant for 32-bit RSH: Information can propagate towards
* LSB, so it isn't sufficient to only truncate the output to
* 32 bits.
*/
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
if ((src_known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
* e.g. dead branches.
*/
__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
if (!src_known &&
opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) {
__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
* This includes shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
* This includes shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_ARSH:
if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
* This includes shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and
* umax_val is equal to umin_val.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
* dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
*/
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->32 */
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: horAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] + (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sample_hbp_handler(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "%s value is changed\n", ksym_name);
dump_stack();
printk(KERN_INFO "Dump stack from sample_hbp_handler\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_da3_fixhashpath(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_path *path)
{
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk;
struct xfs_da_intnode *node;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
xfs_dahash_t lasthash=0;
int level;
int count;
struct xfs_inode *dp = state->args->dp;
trace_xfs_da_fixhashpath(state->args);
level = path->active-1;
blk = &path->blk[ level ];
switch (blk->magic) {
case XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC:
lasthash = xfs_attr_leaf_lasthash(blk->bp, &count);
if (count == 0)
return;
break;
case XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC:
lasthash = xfs_dir2_leafn_lasthash(dp, blk->bp, &count);
if (count == 0)
return;
break;
case XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC:
lasthash = xfs_da3_node_lasthash(dp, blk->bp, &count);
if (count == 0)
return;
break;
}
for (blk--, level--; level >= 0; blk--, level--) {
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr nodehdr;
node = blk->bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&nodehdr, node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node);
if (be32_to_cpu(btree->hashval) == lasthash)
break;
blk->hashval = lasthash;
btree[blk->index].hashval = cpu_to_be32(lasthash);
xfs_trans_log_buf(state->args->trans, blk->bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(node, &btree[blk->index],
sizeof(*btree)));
lasthash = be32_to_cpu(btree[nodehdr.count - 1].hashval);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The xfs_da3_fixhashpath function in fs/xfs/xfs_da_btree.c in the xfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.2 does not properly compare btree hash values, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (filesystem corruption, and OOPS or panic) via operations on directories that have hash collisions, as demonstrated by rmdir operations.
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ID3::getAlbumArt(size_t *length, String8 *mime) const {
*length = 0;
mime->setTo("");
Iterator it(
*this,
(mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) ? "APIC" : "PIC");
while (!it.done()) {
size_t size;
const uint8_t *data = it.getData(&size);
if (!data) {
return NULL;
}
if (mVersion == ID3_V2_3 || mVersion == ID3_V2_4) {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
mime->setTo((const char *)&data[1]);
size_t mimeLen = strlen((const char *)&data[1]) + 1;
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[1 + mimeLen];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[2 + mimeLen], encoding);
if (size < 2 ||
size - 2 < mimeLen ||
size - 2 - mimeLen < descLen) {
ALOGW("bogus album art sizes");
return NULL;
}
*length = size - 2 - mimeLen - descLen;
return &data[2 + mimeLen + descLen];
} else {
uint8_t encoding = data[0];
if (!memcmp(&data[1], "PNG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/png");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "JPG", 3)) {
mime->setTo("image/jpeg");
} else if (!memcmp(&data[1], "-->", 3)) {
mime->setTo("text/plain");
} else {
return NULL;
}
#if 0
uint8_t picType = data[4];
if (picType != 0x03) {
it.next();
continue;
}
#endif
size_t descLen = StringSize(&data[5], encoding);
*length = size - 5 - descLen;
return &data[5 + descLen];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in id3/ID3.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32377688.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
| Medium | 174,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CreateFusionSensor(
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorFusionAlgorithm> fusion_algorithm) {
auto callback =
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorFusionTest::PlatformSensorFusionCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
SensorType type = fusion_algorithm->fused_type();
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(provider_->GetMapping(type), provider_.get(),
std::move(fusion_algorithm), callback);
EXPECT_TRUE(platform_sensor_fusion_callback_called_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ScopedRequest(PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper* owner,
const Delegate::EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback)
: owner_(owner),
callback_(callback),
requested_(false),
request_id_(0),
sync_call_(false) {
if (!owner_->document_url_.is_valid())
return;
requested_ = true;
sync_call_ = true;
request_id_ = owner_->delegate_->EnumerateDevices(
owner_->device_type_,
owner_->document_url_,
base::Bind(&ScopedRequest::EnumerateDevicesCallbackBody, AsWeakPtr()));
sync_call_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | High | 171,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getgrnam_r(
const char *name,
struct group *gr,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t gid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(gr);
p = startswith(name, "vg-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_gid(e + 1, &gid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineGroup",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) gid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_GROUP_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = sizeof(char*) + strlen(name) + 1;
if (buflen < l) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memzero(buffer, sizeof(char*));
strcpy(buffer + sizeof(char*), name);
gr->gr_name = buffer + sizeof(char*);
gr->gr_gid = gid;
gr->gr_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
gr->gr_mem = (char**) buffer;
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the getpwnam and getgrnam functions of the NSS module nss-mymachines in systemd.
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002 | High | 168,869 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int FindStartOffsetOfFileInZipFile(const char* zip_file, const char* filename) {
FileDescriptor fd;
if (!fd.OpenReadOnly(zip_file)) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: open failed trying to open zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
struct stat stat_buf;
if (stat(zip_file, &stat_buf) == -1) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: stat failed trying to stat zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
if (stat_buf.st_size > kMaxZipFileLength) {
LOG("%s: The size %ld of %s is too large to map\n",
__FUNCTION__, stat_buf.st_size, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
void* mem = fd.Map(NULL, stat_buf.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: mmap failed trying to mmap zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
ScopedMMap scoped_mmap(mem, stat_buf.st_size);
uint8_t* mem_bytes = static_cast<uint8_t*>(mem);
int off;
for (off = stat_buf.st_size - sizeof(kEndOfCentralDirectoryMarker);
off >= 0; --off) {
if (ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off) == kEndOfCentralDirectoryMarker) {
break;
}
}
if (off == -1) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find end of central directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t length_of_central_dir = ReadUInt32(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetOfCentralDirLengthInEndOfCentralDirectory);
uint32_t start_of_central_dir = ReadUInt32(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetOfStartOfCentralDirInEndOfCentralDirectory);
if (start_of_central_dir > off) {
LOG("%s: Found out of range offset %u for start of directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, start_of_central_dir, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t end_of_central_dir = start_of_central_dir + length_of_central_dir;
if (end_of_central_dir > off) {
LOG("%s: Found out of range offset %u for end of directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, end_of_central_dir, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t num_entries = ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetNumOfEntriesInEndOfCentralDirectory);
off = start_of_central_dir;
const int target_len = strlen(filename);
int n = 0;
for (; n < num_entries && off < end_of_central_dir; ++n) {
uint32_t marker = ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off);
if (marker != kCentralDirHeaderMarker) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find central directory header marker in %s. "
"Found 0x%x but expected 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__,
zip_file, marker, kCentralDirHeaderMarker);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t file_name_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetFilenameLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t extra_field_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetExtraFieldLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t comment_field_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetCommentLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t header_length = kOffsetFilenameInCentralDirectory +
file_name_length + extra_field_length + comment_field_length;
uint32_t local_header_offset =
ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetLocalHeaderOffsetInCentralDirectory);
uint8_t* filename_bytes =
mem_bytes + off + kOffsetFilenameInCentralDirectory;
if (file_name_length == target_len &&
memcmp(filename_bytes, filename, target_len) == 0) {
uint32_t marker = ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, local_header_offset);
if (marker != kLocalHeaderMarker) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find local file header marker in %s. "
"Found 0x%x but expected 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__,
zip_file, marker, kLocalHeaderMarker);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t compression_method =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetCompressionMethodInLocalHeader);
if (compression_method != kCompressionMethodStored) {
LOG("%s: %s is compressed within %s. "
"Found compression method %u but expected %u\n", __FUNCTION__,
filename, zip_file, compression_method, kCompressionMethodStored);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t file_name_length =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetFilenameLengthInLocalHeader);
uint32_t extra_field_length =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetExtraFieldLengthInLocalHeader);
uint32_t header_length =
kOffsetFilenameInLocalHeader + file_name_length + extra_field_length;
return local_header_offset + header_length;
}
off += header_length;
}
if (n < num_entries) {
LOG("%s: Did not find all the expected entries in the central directory. "
"Found %d but expected %d\n", __FUNCTION__, n, num_entries);
}
if (off < end_of_central_dir) {
LOG("%s: There are %d extra bytes at the end of the central directory.\n",
__FUNCTION__, end_of_central_dir - off);
}
LOG("%s: Did not find %s in %s\n", __FUNCTION__, filename, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FindStartOffsetOfFileInZipFile function in crazy_linker_zip.cpp in crazy_linker (aka Crazy Linker) in Android 5.x and 6.x, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, improperly searches for an EOCD record, which allows attackers to bypass a signature-validation requirement via a crafted ZIP archive.
Commit Message: crazy linker: Alter search for zip EOCD start
When loading directly from APK, begin searching backwards
for the zip EOCD record signature at size of EOCD record
bytes before the end of the file.
BUG=537205
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1390553002 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352577} | Medium | 171,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. | Medium | 170,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DeviceNotification(
const DictionaryValue& device) {
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.addBluetoothDevice", device);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_class_init (MyObjectClass *mobject_class)
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS (mobject_class);
gobject_class->finalize = my_object_finalize;
gobject_class->set_property = my_object_set_property;
gobject_class->get_property = my_object_get_property;
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class,
PROP_THIS_IS_A_STRING,
g_param_spec_string ("this_is_a_string",
_("Sample string"),
_("Example of a string property"),
"default value",
G_PARAM_READWRITE));
signals[FROBNICATE] =
g_signal_new ("frobnicate",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
g_cclosure_marshal_VOID__INT,
G_TYPE_NONE, 1, G_TYPE_INT);
signals[SIG0] =
g_signal_new ("sig0",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
my_object_marshal_VOID__STRING_INT_STRING,
G_TYPE_NONE, 3, G_TYPE_STRING, G_TYPE_INT, G_TYPE_STRING);
signals[SIG1] =
g_signal_new ("sig1",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
my_object_marshal_VOID__STRING_BOXED,
G_TYPE_NONE, 2, G_TYPE_STRING, G_TYPE_VALUE);
signals[SIG2] =
g_signal_new ("sig2",
G_OBJECT_CLASS_TYPE (mobject_class),
G_SIGNAL_RUN_LAST | G_SIGNAL_DETAILED,
0,
NULL, NULL,
g_cclosure_marshal_VOID__BOXED,
G_TYPE_NONE, 1, DBUS_TYPE_G_STRING_STRING_HASHTABLE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint32_t *GetPayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *lastpayload, uint32_t index)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return NULL;
uint32_t *MP4buffer = NULL;
if (index < mp4->indexcount && mp4->mediafp)
{
MP4buffer = (uint32_t *)realloc((void *)lastpayload, mp4->metasizes[index]);
if (MP4buffer)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, mp4->metaoffsets[index], SEEK_SET);
fread(MP4buffer, 1, mp4->metasizes[index], mp4->mediafp);
return MP4buffer;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader | Medium | 169,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
size_t frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, frameSize,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else {
if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
} else if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > frameSize) {
ALOGW("Input buffer contains too many pixels");
}
if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / mFramerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
if (outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > outputBufferHeader->nAllocLen) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process. This issue is rated as High because it could be used to gain local access to elevated capabilities, which are not normally accessible to a third-party application. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-34749392.
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
| High | 174,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
{
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
attr = (struct vendor_attribute *)*data;
*vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
*data = attr->attrib_data;
*len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
return (attr->attrib_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the radius_get_vendor_attr function in the Radius extension before 1.2.7 for PHP allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a large Vendor Specific Attributes (VSA) length value.
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h | High | 166,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType AnnotateImage(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*p,
primitive[MagickPathExtent],
*text,
**textlist;
DrawInfo
*annotate,
*annotate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register ssize_t
i;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
number_lines;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (draw_info->text == (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*draw_info->text == '\0')
return(MagickTrue);
annotate=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
text=annotate->text;
annotate->text=(char *) NULL;
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
number_lines=1;
for (p=text; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p == '\n')
number_lines++;
textlist=AcquireQuantumMemory(number_lines+1,sizeof(*textlist));
if (textlist == (char **) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
p=text;
for (i=0; i < number_lines; i++)
{
char
*q;
textlist[i]=p;
for (q=p; *q != '\0'; q++)
if ((*q == '\r') || (*q == '\n'))
break;
if (*q == '\r')
{
*q='\0';
q++;
}
*q='\0';
p=q+1;
}
textlist[i]=(char *) NULL;
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
SetGeometryInfo(&geometry_info);
if (annotate_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ParsePageGeometry(image,annotate_info->geometry,&geometry,
exception);
(void) ParseGeometry(annotate_info->geometry,&geometry_info);
}
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
(void) memset(&metrics,0,sizeof(metrics));
for (i=0; textlist[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
if (*textlist[i] == '\0')
continue;
/*
Position text relative to image.
*/
annotate_info->affine.tx=geometry_info.xi-image->page.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=geometry_info.psi-image->page.y;
(void) CloneString(&annotate->text,textlist[i]);
if ((metrics.width == 0) || (annotate->gravity != NorthWestGravity))
(void) GetTypeMetrics(image,annotate,&metrics,exception);
height=(ssize_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+0.5);
switch (annotate->gravity)
{
case UndefinedGravity:
default:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent;
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent)-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
case WestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case CenterGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+
annotate_info->affine.ry*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case SouthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0-
annotate_info->affine.ry*(number_lines-1.0)*height/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width-
annotate_info->affine.ry*(number_lines-1.0)*height-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
}
switch (annotate->align)
{
case LeftAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case CenterAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case RightAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (draw_info->undercolor.alpha != TransparentAlpha)
{
DrawInfo
*undercolor_info;
/*
Text box.
*/
undercolor_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
undercolor_info->fill=draw_info->undercolor;
undercolor_info->affine=draw_info->affine;
undercolor_info->affine.tx=offset.x-draw_info->affine.ry*metrics.ascent;
undercolor_info->affine.ty=offset.y-draw_info->affine.sy*metrics.ascent;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MagickPathExtent,
"rectangle 0.0,0.0 %g,%g",metrics.origin.x,(double) height);
(void) CloneString(&undercolor_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,undercolor_info,exception);
(void) DestroyDrawInfo(undercolor_info);
}
annotate_info->affine.tx=offset.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=offset.y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MagickPathExtent,"stroke-width %g "
"line 0,0 %g,0",metrics.underline_thickness,metrics.width);
if (annotate->decorate == OverlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+
metrics.descent-metrics.underline_position));
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
else
if (annotate->decorate == UnderlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*
metrics.underline_position);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
/*
Annotate image with text.
*/
status=RenderType(image,annotate,&offset,&metrics,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (annotate->decorate == LineThroughDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(height+
metrics.underline_position+metrics.descent)/2.0);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info,exception);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an AnnotateImage error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589 | Medium | 169,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
ssh->compat)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
free(sig);
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
authenticated = 0;
}
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
return authenticated;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: OpenSSH through 7.7 is prone to a user enumeration vulnerability due to not delaying bailout for an invalid authenticating user until after the packet containing the request has been fully parsed, related to auth2-gss.c, auth2-hostbased.c, and auth2-pubkey.c.
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt | Medium | 169,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct usb_serial_port *wport;
wport = serial->port[1];
tty_port_tty_set(&wport->port, tty);
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty, port);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The omninet_open function in drivers/usb/serial/omninet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (tty exhaustion) by leveraging reference count mishandling.
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> | Low | 168,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
int* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int encoded_pixels;
int rle_size;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (int*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
rle_size = gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx);
if (rle_size <= 0) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < rle_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & ~TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + pixel_block_size > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size) > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The read_image_tga function in gd_tga.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted TGA file, related to the decompression buffer.
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we also have to check for
potential decompression buffer overflows.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected];
a modified case exposing an off-by-one error of the first patch had been
provided by Konrad Beckmann.
This commit is an amendment to commit fb0e0cce, so we use CVE-2016-6906
as well. | Medium | 170,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonCommonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 || !pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 || !pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "(\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/* #3521 */
if (bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* \"");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~ \"");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '"';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in MapServer before 6.0.6, 6.2.x before 6.2.4, 6.4.x before 6.4.5, and 7.0.x before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via vectors involving WFS get feature requests.
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR) | High | 168,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
int ret = -ENOMEM, i;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
return -ERANGE;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
/* Handle the case where the passed-in buffer is too short */
if (res.acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_TRUNC) {
/* Did the user only issue a request for the acl length? */
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_ok;
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
if (buf)
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
out_ok:
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the __nfs4_get_acl_uncached function in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a getxattr system call for the system.nfs4_acl extended attribute of a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,956 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int check_mtab(const char *progname, const char *devname,
const char *dir)
{
if (check_newline(progname, devname) == -1 ||
check_newline(progname, dir) == -1)
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The check_mtab function in client/mount.cifs.c in mount.cifs in smbfs in Samba 3.5.10 and earlier does not properly verify that the (1) device name and (2) mountpoint strings are composed of valid characters, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (mtab corruption) via a crafted string. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-0547.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_.get()) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote servers to execute arbitrary code via crafted response traffic after a URL request.
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = poll(pfds, 1, 50);
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _PUBLIC_ char *strupper_talloc_n_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src, size_t n)
{
size_t size=0;
char *dest;
if (!src) {
return NULL;
}
/* this takes advantage of the fact that upper/lower can't
change the length of a character by more than 1 byte */
dest = talloc_array(ctx, char, 2*(n+1));
if (dest == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
while (n-- && *src) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(iconv_handle, src, n,
CH_UNIX, &c_size);
src += c_size;
c = toupper_m(c);
if (c_size == -1) {
talloc_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
size += c_size;
}
dest[size] = 0;
/* trim it so talloc_append_string() works */
dest = talloc_realloc(ctx, dest, char, size+1);
talloc_set_name_const(dest, dest);
return dest;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,669 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/122 | Medium | 168,802 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
const u8 *addr, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct sta_info *sta;
struct timespec uptime;
struct ieee80211_tx_latency_bin_ranges *tx_latency;
int i;
sta = kzalloc(sizeof(*sta) + local->hw.sta_data_size, gfp);
if (!sta)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
tx_latency = rcu_dereference(local->tx_latency);
/* init stations Tx latency statistics && TID bins */
if (tx_latency) {
sta->tx_lat = kzalloc(IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS *
sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_latency_stat),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
if (tx_latency->n_ranges) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/* size of bins is size of the ranges +1 */
sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count =
tx_latency->n_ranges + 1;
sta->tx_lat[i].bins =
kcalloc(sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count,
sizeof(u32), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat[i].bins) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_lock_init(&sta->lock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->drv_unblock_wk, sta_unblock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work, ieee80211_ba_session_work);
mutex_init(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_MESH
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif) &&
!sdata->u.mesh.user_mpm)
init_timer(&sta->plink_timer);
sta->nonpeer_pm = NL80211_MESH_POWER_ACTIVE;
#endif
memcpy(sta->sta.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
sta->local = local;
sta->sdata = sdata;
sta->last_rx = jiffies;
sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&uptime);
sta->last_connected = uptime.tv_sec;
ewma_init(&sta->avg_signal, 1024, 8);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->chain_signal_avg); i++)
ewma_init(&sta->chain_signal_avg[i], 1024, 8);
if (sta_prepare_rate_control(local, sta, gfp))
goto free;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/*
* timer_to_tid must be initialized with identity mapping
* to enable session_timer's data differentiation. See
* sta_rx_agg_session_timer_expired for usage.
*/
sta->timer_to_tid[i] = i;
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; i++) {
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->ps_tx_buf[i]);
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->tx_filtered[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
sta->last_seq_ctrl[i] = cpu_to_le16(USHRT_MAX);
sta->sta.smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband =
local->hw.wiphy->bands[ieee80211_get_sdata_band(sdata)];
u8 smps = (sband->ht_cap.cap & IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS) >>
IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS_SHIFT;
/*
* Assume that hostapd advertises our caps in the beacon and
* this is the known_smps_mode for a station that just assciated
*/
switch (smps) {
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DISABLED:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_STATIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_STATIC;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DYNAMIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_DYNAMIC;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
}
}
sta_dbg(sdata, "Allocated STA %pM\n", sta->sta.addr);
return sta;
free:
if (sta->tx_lat) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
kfree(sta->tx_lat[i].bins);
kfree(sta->tx_lat);
}
kfree(sta);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the mac80211 subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.13.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via network traffic that improperly interacts with the WLAN_STA_PS_STA state (aka power-save mode), related to sta_info.c and tx.c.
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> | High | 166,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintingDone(bool success) {
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
if (!success)
LOG(ERROR) << "Failure in OnPrintingDone";
DidFinishPrinting(success ? OK : FAIL_PRINT);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100} | High | 171,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: e1000e_write_packet_to_guest(E1000ECore *core, struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
const E1000E_RxRing *rxr,
const E1000E_RSSInfo *rss_info)
{
PCIDevice *d = core->owner;
dma_addr_t base;
uint8_t desc[E1000_MAX_RX_DESC_LEN];
size_t desc_size;
size_t desc_offset = 0;
size_t iov_ofs = 0;
struct iovec *iov = net_rx_pkt_get_iovec(pkt);
size_t size = net_rx_pkt_get_total_len(pkt);
size_t total_size = size + e1000x_fcs_len(core->mac);
const E1000E_RingInfo *rxi;
size_t ps_hdr_len = 0;
bool do_ps = e1000e_do_ps(core, pkt, &ps_hdr_len);
bool is_first = true;
rxi = rxr->i;
do {
hwaddr ba[MAX_PS_BUFFERS];
e1000e_ba_state bastate = { { 0 } };
bool is_last = false;
desc_size = total_size - desc_offset;
if (desc_size > core->rx_desc_buf_size) {
desc_size = core->rx_desc_buf_size;
desc_size = core->rx_desc_buf_size;
}
base = e1000e_ring_head_descr(core, rxi);
pci_dma_read(d, base, &desc, core->rx_desc_len);
if (ba[0]) {
if (desc_offset < size) {
static const uint32_t fcs_pad;
size_t iov_copy;
size_t copy_size = size - desc_offset;
if (copy_size > core->rx_desc_buf_size) {
copy_size = core->rx_desc_buf_size;
}
/* For PS mode copy the packet header first */
if (do_ps) {
if (is_first) {
size_t ps_hdr_copied = 0;
do {
iov_copy = MIN(ps_hdr_len - ps_hdr_copied,
iov->iov_len - iov_ofs);
e1000e_write_hdr_to_rx_buffers(core, &ba, &bastate,
iov->iov_base, iov_copy);
copy_size -= iov_copy;
ps_hdr_copied += iov_copy;
iov_ofs += iov_copy;
if (iov_ofs == iov->iov_len) {
iov++;
iov_ofs = 0;
}
} while (ps_hdr_copied < ps_hdr_len);
is_first = false;
} else {
/* Leave buffer 0 of each descriptor except first */
/* empty as per spec 7.1.5.1 */
e1000e_write_hdr_to_rx_buffers(core, &ba, &bastate,
NULL, 0);
}
}
/* Copy packet payload */
while (copy_size) {
iov_copy = MIN(copy_size, iov->iov_len - iov_ofs);
e1000e_write_to_rx_buffers(core, &ba, &bastate,
iov->iov_base + iov_ofs, iov_copy);
copy_size -= iov_copy;
iov_ofs += iov_copy;
if (iov_ofs == iov->iov_len) {
iov++;
iov_ofs = 0;
}
}
if (desc_offset + desc_size >= total_size) {
/* Simulate FCS checksum presence in the last descriptor */
e1000e_write_to_rx_buffers(core, &ba, &bastate,
(const char *) &fcs_pad, e1000x_fcs_len(core->mac));
}
}
desc_offset += desc_size;
if (desc_offset >= total_size) {
is_last = true;
}
} else { /* as per intel docs; skip descriptors with null buf addr */
trace_e1000e_rx_null_descriptor();
}
e1000e_write_rx_descr(core, desc, is_last ? core->rx_pkt : NULL,
rss_info, do_ps ? ps_hdr_len : 0, &bastate.written);
pci_dma_write(d, base, &desc, core->rx_desc_len);
e1000e_ring_advance(core, rxi,
core->rx_desc_len / E1000_MIN_RX_DESC_LEN);
} while (desc_offset < total_size);
e1000e_update_rx_stats(core, size, total_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with the e1000e NIC emulation support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors related to setting the initial receive / transmit descriptor head (TDH/RDH) outside the allocated descriptor buffer.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,800 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CheckClientDownloadRequest::UploadBinary(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
saved_result_ = result;
saved_reason_ = reason;
bool upload_for_dlp = ShouldUploadForDlpScan();
bool upload_for_malware = ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(reason);
auto request = std::make_unique<DownloadItemRequest>(
item_, /*read_immediately=*/true,
base::BindOnce(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::OnDeepScanningComplete,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext());
if (upload_for_dlp) {
DlpDeepScanningClientRequest dlp_request;
dlp_request.set_content_source(DlpDeepScanningClientRequest::FILE_DOWNLOAD);
request->set_request_dlp_scan(std::move(dlp_request));
}
if (upload_for_malware) {
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest malware_request;
malware_request.set_population(
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest::POPULATION_ENTERPRISE);
malware_request.set_download_token(
DownloadProtectionService::GetDownloadPingToken(item_));
request->set_request_malware_scan(std::move(malware_request));
}
request->set_dm_token(
policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken());
service()->UploadForDeepScanning(profile, std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 172,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadHALDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
cube_size,
level;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create HALD color lookup table image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
level=0;
if (*image_info->filename != '\0')
level=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->filename);
if (level < 2)
level=8;
status=MagickTrue;
cube_size=level*level;
image->columns=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
image->rows=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) level)
{
ssize_t
blue,
green,
red;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,(size_t) level,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
blue=y/(ssize_t) level;
for (green=0; green < (ssize_t) cube_size; green++)
{
for (red=0; red < (ssize_t) cube_size; red++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*red/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*green/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*blue/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
{
int fd1,fd2;
STRUCT_STAT st;
int iflags, xlen;
char *fname, fbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
char xname[MAXPATHLEN];
char fnametmp[MAXPATHLEN];
char *fnamecmp, *partialptr;
char fnamecmpbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
uchar fnamecmp_type;
struct file_struct *file;
int itemizing = am_server ? logfile_format_has_i : stdout_format_has_i;
enum logcode log_code = log_before_transfer ? FLOG : FINFO;
int max_phase = protocol_version >= 29 ? 2 : 1;
int dflt_perms = (ACCESSPERMS & ~orig_umask);
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
const char *parent_dirname = "";
#endif
int ndx, recv_ok;
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%d) starting\n", cur_flist->used);
if (delay_updates)
delayed_bits = bitbag_create(cur_flist->used + 1);
while (1) {
cleanup_disable();
/* This call also sets cur_flist. */
ndx = read_ndx_and_attrs(f_in, f_out, &iflags, &fnamecmp_type,
xname, &xlen);
if (ndx == NDX_DONE) {
if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 2) && cur_flist) {
set_current_file_index(NULL, 0);
end_progress(0);
}
if (inc_recurse && first_flist) {
if (read_batch) {
ndx = first_flist->used + first_flist->ndx_start;
gen_wants_ndx(ndx, first_flist->flist_num);
}
flist_free(first_flist);
if (first_flist)
continue;
} else if (read_batch && first_flist) {
ndx = first_flist->used;
gen_wants_ndx(ndx, first_flist->flist_num);
}
if (++phase > max_phase)
break;
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files phase=%d\n", phase);
if (phase == 2 && delay_updates)
handle_delayed_updates(local_name);
write_int(f_out, NDX_DONE);
continue;
}
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
if (daemon_filter_list.head
&& check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
if (preserve_xattrs && iflags & ITEM_REPORT_XATTR && do_xfers
&& !(want_xattr_optim && BITS_SET(iflags, ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS|ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE)))
recv_xattr_request(file, f_in);
#endif
if (!(iflags & ITEM_TRANSFER)) {
maybe_log_item(file, iflags, itemizing, xname);
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
if (preserve_xattrs && iflags & ITEM_REPORT_XATTR && do_xfers
&& !BITS_SET(iflags, ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS|ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE))
set_file_attrs(fname, file, NULL, fname, 0);
#endif
if (iflags & ITEM_IS_NEW) {
stats.created_files++;
if (S_ISREG(file->mode)) {
/* Nothing further to count. */
} else if (S_ISDIR(file->mode))
stats.created_dirs++;
#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
else if (S_ISLNK(file->mode))
stats.created_symlinks++;
#endif
else if (IS_DEVICE(file->mode))
stats.created_devices++;
else
stats.created_specials++;
}
continue;
}
if (phase == 2) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"got transfer request in phase 2 [%s]\n",
who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (file->flags & FLAG_FILE_SENT) {
if (csum_length == SHORT_SUM_LENGTH) {
if (keep_partial && !partial_dir)
make_backups = -make_backups; /* prevents double backup */
if (append_mode)
sparse_files = -sparse_files;
append_mode = -append_mode;
csum_length = SUM_LENGTH;
redoing = 1;
}
} else {
if (csum_length != SHORT_SUM_LENGTH) {
if (keep_partial && !partial_dir)
make_backups = -make_backups;
if (append_mode)
sparse_files = -sparse_files;
append_mode = -append_mode;
csum_length = SHORT_SUM_LENGTH;
redoing = 0;
}
if (iflags & ITEM_IS_NEW)
stats.created_files++;
}
if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
set_current_file_index(file, ndx);
stats.xferred_files++;
stats.total_transferred_size += F_LENGTH(file);
cleanup_got_literal = 0;
if (read_batch) {
int wanted = redoing
? we_want_redo(ndx)
: gen_wants_ndx(ndx, cur_flist->flist_num);
if (!wanted) {
rprintf(FINFO,
"(Skipping batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
redoing ? " resend of" : "",
fname);
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
continue;
}
}
remember_initial_stats();
if (!do_xfers) { /* log the transfer */
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
if (read_batch)
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
continue;
}
if (write_batch < 0) {
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
if (!am_server)
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
continue;
}
partialptr = partial_dir ? partial_dir_fname(fname) : fname;
if (protocol_version >= 29) {
switch (fnamecmp_type) {
case FNAMECMP_FNAME:
fnamecmp = fname;
break;
case FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR:
fnamecmp = partialptr;
break;
case FNAMECMP_BACKUP:
fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
break;
case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
if (file->dirname) {
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
} else
fnamecmp = xname;
break;
default:
if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) {
fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1;
if (file->dirname) {
stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname);
} else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n",
fnamecmp_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
break;
}
if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
&& check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0)) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
}
} else {
/* Reminder: --inplace && --partial-dir are never
* enabled at the same time. */
if (inplace && make_backups > 0) {
if (!(fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname)))
fnamecmp = fname;
else
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BACKUP;
} else if (partial_dir && partialptr)
fnamecmp = partialptr;
else
fnamecmp = fname;
}
/* open the file */
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
if (fnamecmp != fname) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[0], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
}
updating_basis_or_equiv = inplace
&& (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP);
if (fd1 == -1) {
st.st_mode = 0;
st.st_size = 0;
} else if (do_fstat(fd1,&st) != 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "fstat %s failed",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) && fnamecmp == fname) {
/* this special handling for directories
* wouldn't be necessary if robust_rename()
* and the underlying robust_unlink could cope
* with directories
*/
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "recv_files: %s is a directory\n",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
close(fd1);
fd1 = -1;
}
/* If we're not preserving permissions, change the file-list's
* mode based on the local permissions and some heuristics. */
if (!preserve_perms) {
int exists = fd1 != -1;
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
const char *dn = file->dirname ? file->dirname : ".";
if (parent_dirname != dn
&& strcmp(parent_dirname, dn) != 0) {
dflt_perms = default_perms_for_dir(dn);
parent_dirname = dn;
}
#endif
file->mode = dest_mode(file->mode, st.st_mode,
dflt_perms, exists);
}
/* We now check to see if we are writing the file "inplace" */
if (inplace) {
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (fd2 == -1) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s failed",
full_fname(fname));
} else if (updating_basis_or_equiv)
cleanup_set(NULL, NULL, file, fd1, fd2);
} else {
fd2 = open_tmpfile(fnametmp, fname, file);
if (fd2 != -1)
cleanup_set(fnametmp, partialptr, file, fd1, fd2);
}
if (fd2 == -1) {
discard_receive_data(f_in, F_LENGTH(file));
if (fd1 != -1)
close(fd1);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
/* log the transfer */
if (log_before_transfer)
log_item(FCLIENT, file, iflags, NULL);
else if (!am_server && INFO_GTE(NAME, 1) && INFO_EQ(PROGRESS, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "%s\n", fname);
/* recv file data */
recv_ok = receive_data(f_in, fnamecmp, fd1, st.st_size,
fname, fd2, F_LENGTH(file));
log_item(log_code, file, iflags, NULL);
if (fd1 != -1)
close(fd1);
if (close(fd2) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "close failed on %s",
full_fname(fnametmp));
exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
}
if ((recv_ok && (!delay_updates || !partialptr)) || inplace) {
if (partialptr == fname)
partialptr = NULL;
if (!finish_transfer(fname, fnametmp, fnamecmp,
partialptr, file, recv_ok, 1))
recv_ok = -1;
else if (fnamecmp == partialptr) {
do_unlink(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
} else if (keep_partial && partialptr) {
if (!handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_CREATE)) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n",
local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, NULL),
recv_ok ? "completed file" : "partial file");
do_unlink(fnametmp);
recv_ok = -1;
} else if (!finish_transfer(partialptr, fnametmp, fnamecmp, NULL,
file, recv_ok, !partial_dir))
recv_ok = -1;
else if (delay_updates && recv_ok) {
bitbag_set_bit(delayed_bits, ndx);
recv_ok = 2;
} else
partialptr = NULL;
} else
do_unlink(fnametmp);
cleanup_disable();
if (read_batch)
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
switch (recv_ok) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remove_source_files || inc_recurse
|| (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
break;
case 0: {
enum logcode msgtype = redoing ? FERROR_XFER : FWARNING;
if (msgtype == FERROR_XFER || INFO_GTE(NAME, 1)) {
char *errstr, *redostr, *keptstr;
if (!(keep_partial && partialptr) && !inplace)
keptstr = "discarded";
else if (partial_dir)
keptstr = "put into partial-dir";
else
keptstr = "retained";
if (msgtype == FERROR_XFER) {
errstr = "ERROR";
redostr = "";
} else {
errstr = "WARNING";
redostr = read_batch ? " (may try again)"
: " (will try again)";
}
rprintf(msgtype,
"%s: %s failed verification -- update %s%s.\n",
errstr, local_name ? f_name(file, NULL) : fname,
keptstr, redostr);
}
if (!redoing) {
if (read_batch)
flist_ndx_push(&batch_redo_list, ndx);
send_msg_int(MSG_REDO, ndx);
file->flags |= FLAG_FILE_SENT;
} else if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
break;
}
case -1:
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
break;
}
}
if (make_backups < 0)
make_backups = -make_backups;
if (phase == 2 && delay_updates) /* for protocol_version < 29 */
handle_delayed_updates(local_name);
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO,"recv_files finished\n");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The daemon in rsync 3.1.2, and 3.1.3-development before 2017-12-03, does not check for fnamecmp filenames in the daemon_filter_list data structure (in the recv_files function in receiver.c) and also does not apply the sanitize_paths protection mechanism to pathnames found in "xname follows" strings (in the read_ndx_and_attrs function in rsync.c), which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.
Commit Message: | High | 164,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_output_size,
OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
req_output_size,
max_input_size);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MultibufferDataSource::StartCallback() {
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!init_cb_) {
SetReader(nullptr);
return;
}
bool success = reader_ && reader_->Available() > 0 && url_data() &&
(!assume_fully_buffered() ||
url_data()->length() != kPositionNotSpecified);
if (success) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
total_bytes_ = url_data()->length();
}
streaming_ =
!assume_fully_buffered() && (total_bytes_ == kPositionNotSpecified ||
!url_data()->range_supported());
media_log_->SetDoubleProperty("total_bytes",
static_cast<double>(total_bytes_));
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("streaming", streaming_);
} else {
SetReader(nullptr);
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (stop_signal_received_)
return;
if (success) {
if (total_bytes_ != kPositionNotSpecified) {
host_->SetTotalBytes(total_bytes_);
if (assume_fully_buffered())
host_->AddBufferedByteRange(0, total_bytes_);
}
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("single_origin", single_origin_);
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("passed_cors_access_check",
DidPassCORSAccessCheck());
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("range_header_supported",
url_data()->range_supported());
}
render_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(std::move(init_cb_), success));
UpdateBufferSizes();
UpdateLoadingState_Locked(true);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | Medium | 172,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssize_t NaClDescCustomRecvMsg(void* handle, NaClImcTypedMsgHdr* msg,
int /* flags */) {
if (msg->iov_length != 1)
return -1;
msg->ndesc_length = 0; // Messages with descriptors aren't supported yet.
return static_cast<ssize_t>(
ToAdapter(handle)->BlockingReceive(static_cast<char*>(msg->iov[0].base),
msg->iov[0].length));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,730 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void comps_rtree_unite(COMPS_RTree *rt1, COMPS_RTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_rtree_set(rt1,
pair->key,
rt2->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free flaw has been discovered in libcomps before version 0.1.10 in the way ObjMRTrees are merged. An attacker, who is able to make an application read a crafted comps XML file, may be able to crash the application or execute malicious code.
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste. | Medium | 169,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(
Segment* pSegment,
long idx,
long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment,
idx,
element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UrlData::set_has_opaque_data(bool has_opaque_data) {
if (has_opaque_data_)
return;
has_opaque_data_ = has_opaque_data;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | Medium | 172,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
{
ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = 0;
bitmap_zero(ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map.map, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: KVM in the Linux kernel before 4.8.12, when I/O APIC is enabled, does not properly restrict the VCPU index, which allows guest OS users to gain host OS privileges or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access and host OS crash) via a crafted interrupt request, related to arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c and arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map
KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be
bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds
access.
Found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...]
Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101
CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905
[...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495
[...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86
[...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360
[...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222
[...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235
[...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668
[...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,847 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
/*
* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
* ATTR_FORCE.
*/
if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (error)
return error;
}
/* If force is set do it anyway. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
inode->i_gid) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The capabilities implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.8 does not properly consider that namespaces are inapplicable to inodes, which allows local users to bypass intended chmod restrictions by first creating a user namespace, as demonstrated by setting the setgid bit on a file with group ownership of root.
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *ret;
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_negative(bn))
ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
else
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
if (ret->length < len + 4) {
unsigned char *new_data = OPENSSL_realloc(ret->data, len + 4);
if (!new_data) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret->data = new_data;
}
ret->length = BN_bn2bin(bn, ret->data);
/* Correct zero case */
if (!ret->length) {
ret->data[0] = 0;
ret->length = 1;
}
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ASN.1 implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1o and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2c allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer underflow and memory corruption) via an ANY field in crafted serialized data, aka the "negative zero" issue.
Commit Message: | High | 165,209 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int irda_recvmsg_dgram(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), Received truncated frame (%zd < %zd)!\n",
__func__, copied, size);
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
/*
* Check if we have previously stopped IrTTP and we know
* have more free space in our rx_queue. If so tell IrTTP
* to start delivering frames again before our rx_queue gets
* empty
*/
if (self->rx_flow == FLOW_STOP) {
if ((atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), Starting IrTTP\n", __func__);
self->rx_flow = FLOW_START;
irttp_flow_request(self->tsap, FLOW_START);
}
}
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToArray( array, create_reference( item ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStreamsAfter(
SpdyStreamId last_good_stream_id) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[i];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() && (it->stream->stream_id() > last_good_stream_id ||
it->stream->stream_id() == 0)) {
delete it->frame_producer;
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
}
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/spdy/spdy_write_queue.cc in the SPDY implementation in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.153 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by leveraging incorrect queue maintenance.
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType(ContentSettingsType type,
PermissionType* out) {
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION) {
*out = PermissionType::GEOLOCATION;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS) {
*out = PermissionType::NOTIFICATIONS;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING) {
*out = PermissionType::PUSH_MESSAGING;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI_SYSEX;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_DURABLE_STORAGE) {
*out = PermissionType::DURABLE_STORAGE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA) {
*out = PermissionType::VIDEO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC) {
*out = PermissionType::AUDIO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC) {
*out = PermissionType::BACKGROUND_SYNC;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS) {
*out = PermissionType::FLASH;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER) {
*out = PermissionType::PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
#endif
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in core/html/HTMLInputElement.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger extraneous change events, as demonstrated by events for invalid input or input to read-only fields, related to the initializeTypeInParsing and updateType functions.
Commit Message: PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType needs to handle MIDI
After the recent PermissionManager's change, it calls
GetPermissionType even for CONTENT_SETTING_TYPE_MIDI.
BUG=697771
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454231} | High | 172,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | Medium | 167,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int atusb_read_reg(struct atusb *atusb, uint8_t reg)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
int ret;
uint8_t value;
dev_dbg(&usb_dev->dev, "atusb: reg = 0x%x\n", reg);
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_REG_READ, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV,
0, reg, &value, 1, 1000);
return ret >= 0 ? value : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 168,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
if ((fields->BufferOffset + fields->Len) > Stream_Length(s))
return -1;
fields->Buffer = (PBYTE) malloc(fields->Len);
if (!fields->Buffer)
return -1;
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Read(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 169,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Lack of CORS checking by ResourceFetcher/ResourceLoader in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176} | Medium | 172,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size LauncherView::GetPreferredSize() {
IdealBounds ideal_bounds;
CalculateIdealBounds(&ideal_bounds);
if (is_horizontal_alignment()) {
if (view_model_->view_size() >= 2) {
return gfx::Size(view_model_->ideal_bounds(1).right() + kLeadingInset,
kLauncherPreferredSize);
}
return gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize * 2 + kLeadingInset * 2,
kLauncherPreferredSize);
}
if (view_model_->view_size() >= 2) {
return gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize,
view_model_->ideal_bounds(1).bottom() + kLeadingInset);
}
return gfx::Size(kLauncherPreferredSize,
kLauncherPreferredSize * 2 + kLeadingInset * 2);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(contents);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, n;
const xmlChar *elem = NULL;
GROW;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == ')') {
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
NEXT;
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (RAW == '*') {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
if ((RAW == '(') || (RAW == '|')) {
ret = cur = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PCDATA);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
}
while (RAW == '|') {
NEXT;
if (elem == NULL) {
ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (ret == NULL) return(NULL);
ret->c1 = cur;
if (cur != NULL)
cur->parent = ret;
cur = ret;
} else {
n = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (n == NULL) return(NULL);
n->c1 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (n->c1 != NULL)
n->c1->parent = n;
cur->c2 = n;
if (n != NULL)
n->parent = cur;
cur = n;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl : Name expected\n");
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, cur);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((RAW == ')') && (NXT(1) == '*')) {
if (elem != NULL) {
cur->c2 = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem,
XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur->c2 != NULL)
cur->c2->parent = cur;
}
if (ret != NULL)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->input->id != inputchk)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP(2);
} else {
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED, NULL);
}
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GpuChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
renderer_pid_ = peer_pid;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int val;
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Options without arguments
*/
if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE)
return sock_setbindtodevice(sk, optval, optlen);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
valbool = val ? 1 : 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SO_DEBUG:
if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EACCES;
else
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool);
break;
case SO_REUSEADDR:
sk->sk_reuse = (valbool ? SK_CAN_REUSE : SK_NO_REUSE);
break;
case SO_REUSEPORT:
sk->sk_reuseport = valbool;
break;
case SO_TYPE:
case SO_PROTOCOL:
case SO_DOMAIN:
case SO_ERROR:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case SO_DONTROUTE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE, valbool);
break;
case SO_BROADCAST:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST, valbool);
break;
case SO_SNDBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
set_sndbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
/* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
break;
case SO_SNDBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_sndbuf;
case SO_RCVBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
* about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
* play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
* are treated in BSD as hints
*/
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_rmem_max);
set_rcvbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK;
/*
* We double it on the way in to account for
* "struct sk_buff" etc. overhead. Applications
* assume that the SO_RCVBUF setting they make will
* allow that much actual data to be received on that
* socket.
*
* Applications are unaware that "struct sk_buff" and
* other overheads allocate from the receive buffer
* during socket buffer allocation.
*
* And after considering the possible alternatives,
* returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
* is the most desirable behavior.
*/
sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
goto set_rcvbuf;
case SO_KEEPALIVE:
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
tcp_set_keepalive(sk, valbool);
#endif
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN, valbool);
break;
case SO_OOBINLINE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE, valbool);
break;
case SO_NO_CHECK:
sk->sk_no_check_tx = valbool;
break;
case SO_PRIORITY:
if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) ||
ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
sk->sk_priority = val;
else
ret = -EPERM;
break;
case SO_LINGER:
if (optlen < sizeof(ling)) {
ret = -EINVAL; /* 1003.1g */
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ling, optval, sizeof(ling))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!ling.l_onoff)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
else {
#if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
if ((unsigned int)ling.l_linger >= MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/HZ)
sk->sk_lingertime = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
else
#endif
sk->sk_lingertime = (unsigned int)ling.l_linger * HZ;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER);
}
break;
case SO_BSDCOMPAT:
sock_warn_obsolete_bsdism("setsockopt");
break;
case SO_PASSCRED:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMP:
case SO_TIMESTAMPNS:
if (valbool) {
if (optname == SO_TIMESTAMP)
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
else
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP);
} else {
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS);
}
break;
case SO_TIMESTAMPING:
if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID &&
!(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID)) {
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) &
(TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sk->sk_tskey = tcp_sk(sk)->snd_una;
} else {
sk->sk_tskey = 0;
}
}
sk->sk_tsflags = val;
if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE)
sock_enable_timestamp(sk,
SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE);
else
sock_disable_timestamp(sk,
(1UL << SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE));
break;
case SO_RCVLOWAT:
if (val < 0)
val = INT_MAX;
sk->sk_rcvlowat = val ? : 1;
break;
case SO_RCVTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_rcvtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_SNDTIMEO:
ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_sndtimeo, optval, optlen);
break;
case SO_ATTACH_FILTER:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);
}
break;
case SO_ATTACH_BPF:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(u32)) {
u32 ufd;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ufd, optval, sizeof(ufd)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_bpf(ufd, sk);
}
break;
case SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_CBPF:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_reuseport_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);
}
break;
case SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(u32)) {
u32 ufd;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ufd, optval, sizeof(ufd)))
break;
ret = sk_reuseport_attach_bpf(ufd, sk);
}
break;
case SO_DETACH_FILTER:
ret = sk_detach_filter(sk);
break;
case SO_LOCK_FILTER:
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_FILTER_LOCKED) && !valbool)
ret = -EPERM;
else
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_FILTER_LOCKED, valbool);
break;
case SO_PASSSEC:
if (valbool)
set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
else
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_MARK:
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
sk->sk_mark = val;
break;
case SO_RXQ_OVFL:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_RXQ_OVFL, valbool);
break;
case SO_WIFI_STATUS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_WIFI_STATUS, valbool);
break;
case SO_PEEK_OFF:
if (sock->ops->set_peek_off)
ret = sock->ops->set_peek_off(sk, val);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SO_NOFCS:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS, valbool);
break;
case SO_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE, valbool);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
case SO_BUSY_POLL:
/* allow unprivileged users to decrease the value */
if ((val > sk->sk_ll_usec) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else {
if (val < 0)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
sk->sk_ll_usec = val;
}
break;
#endif
case SO_MAX_PACING_RATE:
sk->sk_max_pacing_rate = val;
sk->sk_pacing_rate = min(sk->sk_pacing_rate,
sk->sk_max_pacing_rate);
break;
case SO_INCOMING_CPU:
sk->sk_incoming_cpu = val;
break;
case SO_CNX_ADVICE:
if (val == 1)
dst_negative_advice(sk);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sock_setsockopt function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.14 mishandles negative values of sk_sndbuf and sk_rcvbuf, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for a crafted setsockopt system call with the (1) SO_SNDBUFFORCE or (2) SO_RCVBUFFORCE option.
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 166,846 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DCTStream::init()
{
jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
jerr.error_exit = &exitErrorHandler;
src.pub.init_source = str_init_source;
src.pub.fill_input_buffer = str_fill_input_buffer;
src.pub.skip_input_data = str_skip_input_data;
src.pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src.pub.term_source = str_term_source;
src.pub.next_input_byte = NULL;
src.str = str;
src.index = 0;
src.abort = false;
current = NULL;
limit = NULL;
limit = NULL;
cinfo.err = &jerr;
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
cinfo.src = (jpeg_source_mgr *)&src;
row_buffer = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: DCTStream.cc in Poppler before 0.13.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::MakeAccelerated(
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper> context_wrapper) {
if (!context_wrapper)
return nullptr; // Can happen if the context is lost.
GrContext* grcontext = context_wrapper->ContextProvider()->GetGrContext();
if (!grcontext)
return nullptr; // Can happen if the context is lost.
sk_sp<SkImage> sk_image = paint_image_.GetSkImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> gpu_skimage =
sk_image->makeTextureImage(grcontext, sk_image->colorSpace());
if (!gpu_skimage)
return nullptr;
return AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CreateFromSkImage(
std::move(gpu_skimage), std::move(context_wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patlen, OnigOptionType options, OnigEncoding enc, OnigSyntaxType *syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
int err_code = 0;
int found = 0;
php_mb_regex_t *retval = NULL, **rc = NULL;
OnigErrorInfo err_info;
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
found = zend_hash_find(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *)pattern, patlen+1, (void **) &rc);
if (found == FAILURE || (*rc)->options != options || (*rc)->enc != enc || (*rc)->syntax != syntax) {
if ((err_code = onig_new(&retval, (OnigUChar *)pattern, (OnigUChar *)(pattern + patlen), options, enc, syntax, &err_info)) != ONIG_NORMAL) {
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err_code, err_info);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex compile err: %s", err_str);
retval = NULL;
goto out;
}
zend_hash_update(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *) pattern, patlen + 1, (void *) &retval, sizeof(retval), NULL);
} else if (found == SUCCESS) {
retval = *rc;
}
out:
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free | High | 167,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWindow(
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id,
int64* cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
bool no_javascript_access;
bool can_create_window =
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
GURL(params.opener_url),
GURL(params.opener_security_origin),
params.window_container_type,
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
&no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
*surface_id = 0;
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> cloned_namespace =
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context_,
params.session_storage_namespace_id);
*cloned_session_storage_namespace_id = cloned_namespace->id();
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWindow(params,
no_javascript_access,
peer_handle(),
route_id,
surface_id,
cloned_namespace);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 does not validate URLs during the opening of new windows, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AddChunk(const TransformPaintPropertyNode* t,
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c,
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* e,
const FloatRect& bounds = FloatRect(0, 0, 100, 100)) {
auto record = sk_make_sp<PaintRecord>();
record->push<cc::DrawRectOp>(bounds, cc::PaintFlags());
AddChunk(std::move(record), t, c, e, bounds);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static boolean str_fill_input_buffer(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
int c;
struct str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
if (src->abort) return FALSE;
if (src->index == 0) {
c = 0xFF;
src->index++;
src->index++;
}
else if (src->index == 1) {
c = 0xD8;
src->index++;
}
else c = src->str->getChar();
if (c != EOF)
{
src->buffer = c;
src->pub.next_input_byte = &src->buffer;
src->pub.bytes_in_buffer = 1;
return TRUE;
}
else return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: DCTStream.cc in Poppler before 0.13.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cop1Emulate(struct pt_regs *xcp, struct mips_fpu_struct *ctx,
void *__user *fault_addr)
{
mips_instruction ir;
unsigned long emulpc, contpc;
unsigned int cond;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, xcp->cp0_epc, sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir, (mips_instruction __user *) xcp->cp0_epc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
/* XXX NEC Vr54xx bug workaround */
if ((xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD) && !isBranchInstr(&ir))
xcp->cp0_cause &= ~CAUSEF_BD;
if (xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD) {
/*
* The instruction to be emulated is in a branch delay slot
* which means that we have to emulate the branch instruction
* BEFORE we do the cop1 instruction.
*
* This branch could be a COP1 branch, but in that case we
* would have had a trap for that instruction, and would not
* come through this route.
*
* Linux MIPS branch emulator operates on context, updating the
* cp0_epc.
*/
emulpc = xcp->cp0_epc + 4; /* Snapshot emulation target */
if (__compute_return_epc(xcp)) {
#ifdef CP1DBG
printk("failed to emulate branch at %p\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc));
#endif
return SIGILL;
}
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, emulpc, sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)emulpc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir, (mips_instruction __user *) emulpc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)emulpc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
/* __compute_return_epc() will have updated cp0_epc */
contpc = xcp->cp0_epc;
/* In order not to confuse ptrace() et al, tweak context */
xcp->cp0_epc = emulpc - 4;
} else {
emulpc = xcp->cp0_epc;
contpc = xcp->cp0_epc + 4;
}
emul:
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, xcp, 0);
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(emulated);
switch (MIPSInst_OPCODE(ir)) {
case ldc1_op:{
u64 __user *va = (u64 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u64 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(loads);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, va, sizeof(u64))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
DITOREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
break;
}
case sdc1_op:{
u64 __user *va = (u64 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u64 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(stores);
DIFROMREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, va, sizeof(u64))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__put_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
break;
}
case lwc1_op:{
u32 __user *va = (u32 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u32 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(loads);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, va, sizeof(u32))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
SITOREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
break;
}
case swc1_op:{
u32 __user *va = (u32 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u32 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(stores);
SIFROMREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, va, sizeof(u32))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__put_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
break;
}
case cop1_op:
switch (MIPSInst_RS(ir)) {
#if defined(__mips64)
case dmfc_op:
/* copregister fs -> gpr[rt] */
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) != 0) {
DIFROMREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)],
MIPSInst_RD(ir));
}
break;
case dmtc_op:
/* copregister fs <- rt */
DITOREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)], MIPSInst_RD(ir));
break;
#endif
case mfc_op:
/* copregister rd -> gpr[rt] */
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) != 0) {
SIFROMREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)],
MIPSInst_RD(ir));
}
break;
case mtc_op:
/* copregister rd <- rt */
SITOREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)], MIPSInst_RD(ir));
break;
case cfc_op:{
/* cop control register rd -> gpr[rt] */
u32 value;
if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_CSR) {
value = ctx->fcr31;
value = (value & ~FPU_CSR_RM) |
mips_rm[modeindex(value)];
#ifdef CSRTRACE
printk("%p gpr[%d]<-csr=%08x\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc),
MIPSInst_RT(ir), value);
#endif
}
else if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_RID)
value = 0;
else
value = 0;
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir))
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)] = value;
break;
}
case ctc_op:{
/* copregister rd <- rt */
u32 value;
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) == 0)
value = 0;
else
value = xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)];
/* we only have one writable control reg
*/
if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_CSR) {
#ifdef CSRTRACE
printk("%p gpr[%d]->csr=%08x\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc),
MIPSInst_RT(ir), value);
#endif
/*
* Don't write reserved bits,
* and convert to ieee library modes
*/
ctx->fcr31 = (value &
~(FPU_CSR_RSVD | FPU_CSR_RM)) |
ieee_rm[modeindex(value)];
}
if ((ctx->fcr31 >> 5) & ctx->fcr31 & FPU_CSR_ALL_E) {
return SIGFPE;
}
break;
}
case bc_op:{
int likely = 0;
if (xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD)
return SIGILL;
#if __mips >= 4
cond = ctx->fcr31 & fpucondbit[MIPSInst_RT(ir) >> 2];
#else
cond = ctx->fcr31 & FPU_CSR_COND;
#endif
switch (MIPSInst_RT(ir) & 3) {
case bcfl_op:
likely = 1;
case bcf_op:
cond = !cond;
break;
case bctl_op:
likely = 1;
case bct_op:
break;
default:
/* thats an illegal instruction */
return SIGILL;
}
xcp->cp0_cause |= CAUSEF_BD;
if (cond) {
/* branch taken: emulate dslot
* instruction
*/
xcp->cp0_epc += 4;
contpc = (xcp->cp0_epc +
(MIPSInst_SIMM(ir) << 2));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, xcp->cp0_epc,
sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir,
(mips_instruction __user *) xcp->cp0_epc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
switch (MIPSInst_OPCODE(ir)) {
case lwc1_op:
case swc1_op:
#if (__mips >= 2 || defined(__mips64))
case ldc1_op:
case sdc1_op:
#endif
case cop1_op:
#if __mips >= 4 && __mips != 32
case cop1x_op:
#endif
/* its one of ours */
goto emul;
#if __mips >= 4
case spec_op:
if (MIPSInst_FUNC(ir) == movc_op)
goto emul;
break;
#endif
}
/*
* Single step the non-cp1
* instruction in the dslot
*/
return mips_dsemul(xcp, ir, contpc);
}
else {
/* branch not taken */
if (likely) {
/*
* branch likely nullifies
* dslot if not taken
*/
xcp->cp0_epc += 4;
contpc += 4;
/*
* else continue & execute
* dslot as normal insn
*/
}
}
break;
}
default:
if (!(MIPSInst_RS(ir) & 0x10))
return SIGILL;
{
int sig;
/* a real fpu computation instruction */
if ((sig = fpu_emu(xcp, ctx, ir)))
return sig;
}
}
break;
#if __mips >= 4 && __mips != 32
case cop1x_op:{
int sig = fpux_emu(xcp, ctx, ir, fault_addr);
if (sig)
return sig;
break;
}
#endif
#if __mips >= 4
case spec_op:
if (MIPSInst_FUNC(ir) != movc_op)
return SIGILL;
cond = fpucondbit[MIPSInst_RT(ir) >> 2];
if (((ctx->fcr31 & cond) != 0) == ((MIPSInst_RT(ir) & 1) != 0))
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RD(ir)] =
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)];
break;
#endif
default:
return SIGILL;
}
/* we did it !! */
xcp->cp0_epc = contpc;
xcp->cp0_cause &= ~CAUSEF_BD;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: sfnt_init_face( FT_Stream stream,
TT_Face face,
FT_Int face_instance_index,
FT_Int num_params,
FT_Parameter* params )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Library library = face->root.driver->root.library;
SFNT_Service sfnt;
FT_Int face_index;
/* for now, parameters are unused */
FT_UNUSED( num_params );
FT_UNUSED( params );
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)face->sfnt;
if ( !sfnt )
{
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)FT_Get_Module_Interface( library, "sfnt" );
if ( !sfnt )
{
FT_ERROR(( "sfnt_init_face: cannot access `sfnt' module\n" ));
return FT_THROW( Missing_Module );
}
face->sfnt = sfnt;
face->goto_table = sfnt->goto_table;
}
FT_FACE_FIND_GLOBAL_SERVICE( face, face->psnames, POSTSCRIPT_CMAPS );
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
if ( !face->mm )
{
/* we want the MM interface from the `truetype' module only */
FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" );
face->mm = ft_module_get_service( tt_module,
FT_SERVICE_ID_MULTI_MASTERS,
0 );
}
if ( !face->var )
{
/* we want the metrics variations interface */
/* from the `truetype' module only */
FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" );
face->var = ft_module_get_service( tt_module,
FT_SERVICE_ID_METRICS_VARIATIONS,
0 );
}
#endif
FT_TRACE2(( "SFNT driver\n" ));
error = sfnt_open_font( stream, face );
if ( error )
return error;
/* Stream may have changed in sfnt_open_font. */
stream = face->root.stream;
FT_TRACE2(( "sfnt_init_face: %08p, %d\n", face, face_instance_index ));
face_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) & 0xFFFF;
/* value -(N+1) requests information on index N */
if ( face_instance_index < 0 )
face_index--;
if ( face_index >= face->ttc_header.count )
{
if ( face_instance_index >= 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
else
face_index = 0;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( face->ttc_header.offsets[face_index] ) )
return error;
/* check whether we have a valid TrueType file */
error = sfnt->load_font_dir( face, stream );
if ( error )
return error;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
{
FT_ULong fvar_len;
FT_ULong version;
FT_ULong offset;
FT_UShort num_axes;
FT_UShort axis_size;
FT_UShort num_instances;
FT_UShort instance_size;
FT_Int instance_index;
FT_Byte* default_values = NULL;
FT_Byte* instance_values = NULL;
face->is_default_instance = 1;
instance_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) >> 16;
/* test whether current face is a GX font with named instances */
if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_fvar, stream, &fvar_len ) ||
fvar_len < 20 ||
FT_READ_ULONG( version ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( offset ) ||
FT_STREAM_SKIP( 2 ) /* reserved */ ||
FT_READ_USHORT( num_axes ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( axis_size ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( num_instances ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( instance_size ) )
{
version = 0;
offset = 0;
num_axes = 0;
axis_size = 0;
num_instances = 0;
instance_size = 0;
}
/* check that the data is bound by the table length */
if ( version != 0x00010000UL ||
axis_size != 20 ||
num_axes == 0 ||
/* `num_axes' limit implied by 16-bit `instance_size' */
num_axes > 0x3FFE ||
!( instance_size == 4 + 4 * num_axes ||
instance_size == 6 + 4 * num_axes ) ||
/* `num_instances' limit implied by limited range of name IDs */
num_instances > 0x7EFF ||
offset +
axis_size * num_axes +
instance_size * num_instances > fvar_len )
num_instances = 0;
else
face->variation_support |= TT_FACE_FLAG_VAR_FVAR;
/*
* As documented in the OpenType specification, an entry for the
* default instance may be omitted in the named instance table. In
* particular this means that even if there is no named instance
* table in the font we actually do have a named instance, namely the
* default instance.
*
* For consistency, we always want the default instance in our list
* of named instances. If it is missing, we try to synthesize it
* later on. Here, we have to adjust `num_instances' accordingly.
*/
if ( !( FT_ALLOC( default_values, num_axes * 2 ) ||
FT_ALLOC( instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) ) )
{
/* the current stream position is 16 bytes after the table start */
FT_ULong array_start = FT_STREAM_POS() - 16 + offset;
FT_ULong default_value_offset, instance_offset;
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt i;
default_value_offset = array_start + 8;
p = default_values;
for ( i = 0; i < num_axes; i++ )
{
(void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( default_value_offset, p, 2 );
default_value_offset += axis_size;
p += 2;
}
instance_offset = array_start + axis_size * num_axes + 4;
for ( i = 0; i < num_instances; i++ )
{
(void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( instance_offset,
instance_values,
num_axes * 2 );
if ( !ft_memcmp( default_values, instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) )
break;
instance_offset += instance_size;
}
if ( i == num_instances )
{
/* no default instance in named instance table; */
/* we thus have to synthesize it */
num_instances++;
}
}
FT_FREE( default_values );
FT_FREE( instance_values );
/* we don't support Multiple Master CFFs yet */
if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_glyf, stream, 0 ) &&
!face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CFF, stream, 0 ) )
num_instances = 0;
if ( instance_index > num_instances )
{
if ( face_instance_index >= 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
else
num_instances = 0;
}
face->root.style_flags = (FT_Long)num_instances << 16;
}
#endif
face->root.num_faces = face->ttc_header.count;
face->root.face_index = face_instance_index;
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FreeType 2 before 2017-03-08 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the TT_Get_MM_Var function in truetype/ttgxvar.c and the sfnt_init_face function in sfnt/sfobjs.c.
Commit Message: | High | 164,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ring_buffer_resize(struct ring_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
int cpu_id)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
unsigned long nr_pages;
int cpu, err = 0;
/*
* Always succeed at resizing a non-existent buffer:
*/
if (!buffer)
return size;
/* Make sure the requested buffer exists */
if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS &&
!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
return size;
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
size *= BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
/* we need a minimum of two pages */
if (size < BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2)
size = BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2;
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be
* manipulating the ring buffer and is expecting a sane state while
* this is true.
*/
if (atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled))
return -EBUSY;
/* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex);
if (cpu_id == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
/* calculate the pages to update */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
/*
* nothing more to do for removing pages or no update
*/
if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update <= 0)
continue;
/*
* to add pages, make sure all new pages can be
* allocated without receiving ENOMEM
*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
if (__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
&cpu_buffer->new_pages, cpu)) {
/* not enough memory for new pages */
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
}
get_online_cpus();
/*
* Fire off all the required work handlers
* We can't schedule on offline CPUs, but it's not necessary
* since we can change their buffer sizes without any race.
*/
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
continue;
/* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
if (!cpu_online(cpu)) {
rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
} else {
schedule_work_on(cpu,
&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
}
}
/* wait for all the updates to complete */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
continue;
if (cpu_online(cpu))
wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
}
put_online_cpus();
} else {
/* Make sure this CPU has been intitialized */
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
goto out;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu_id];
if (nr_pages == cpu_buffer->nr_pages)
goto out;
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update > 0 &&
__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
&cpu_buffer->new_pages, cpu_id)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
get_online_cpus();
/* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
if (!cpu_online(cpu_id))
rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
else {
schedule_work_on(cpu_id,
&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
}
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
put_online_cpus();
}
out:
/*
* The ring buffer resize can happen with the ring buffer
* enabled, so that the update disturbs the tracing as little
* as possible. But if the buffer is disabled, we do not need
* to worry about that, and we can take the time to verify
* that the buffer is not corrupt.
*/
if (atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)) {
atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
/*
* Even though the buffer was disabled, we must make sure
* that it is truly disabled before calling rb_check_pages.
* There could have been a race between checking
* record_disable and incrementing it.
*/
synchronize_sched();
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
rb_check_pages(cpu_buffer);
}
atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
}
mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
return size;
out_err:
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
if (list_empty(&cpu_buffer->new_pages))
continue;
list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, &cpu_buffer->new_pages,
list) {
list_del_init(&bpage->list);
free_buffer_page(bpage);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The ring_buffer_resize function in kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c in the profiling subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.1 mishandles certain integer calculations, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing to the /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb file.
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> | High | 168,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* addToTrace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 172,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OMXNodeInstance::invalidateBufferID(OMX::buffer_id buffer __unused) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
| High | 173,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
int room;
struct icmp_bxm icmp_param;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb_in);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
struct net *net;
struct sock *sk;
if (!rt)
goto out;
net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
/*
* Find the original header. It is expected to be valid, of course.
* Check this, icmp_send is called from the most obscure devices
* sometimes.
*/
iph = ip_hdr(skb_in);
if ((u8 *)iph < skb_in->head ||
(skb_in->network_header + sizeof(*iph)) > skb_in->tail)
goto out;
/*
* No replies to physical multicast/broadcast
*/
if (skb_in->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto out;
/*
* Now check at the protocol level
*/
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))
goto out;
/*
* Only reply to fragment 0. We byte re-order the constant
* mask for efficiency.
*/
if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET))
goto out;
/*
* If we send an ICMP error to an ICMP error a mess would result..
*/
if (icmp_pointers[type].error) {
/*
* We are an error, check if we are replying to an
* ICMP error
*/
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
u8 _inner_type, *itp;
itp = skb_header_pointer(skb_in,
skb_network_header(skb_in) +
(iph->ihl << 2) +
offsetof(struct icmphdr,
type) -
skb_in->data,
sizeof(_inner_type),
&_inner_type);
if (itp == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* Assume any unknown ICMP type is an error. This
* isn't specified by the RFC, but think about it..
*/
if (*itp > NR_ICMP_TYPES ||
icmp_pointers[*itp].error)
goto out;
}
}
sk = icmp_xmit_lock(net);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
/*
* Construct source address and options.
*/
saddr = iph->daddr;
if (!(rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL)) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr)
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, rt->rt_iif);
if (dev)
saddr = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_LINK);
else
saddr = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
tos = icmp_pointers[type].error ? ((iph->tos & IPTOS_TOS_MASK) |
IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL) :
iph->tos;
if (ip_options_echo(&icmp_param.replyopts, skb_in))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Prepare data for ICMP header.
*/
icmp_param.data.icmph.type = type;
icmp_param.data.icmph.code = code;
icmp_param.data.icmph.un.gateway = info;
icmp_param.data.icmph.checksum = 0;
icmp_param.skb = skb_in;
icmp_param.offset = skb_network_offset(skb_in);
inet_sk(sk)->tos = tos;
ipc.addr = iph->saddr;
ipc.opt = &icmp_param.replyopts;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
rt = icmp_route_lookup(net, skb_in, iph, saddr, tos,
type, code, &icmp_param);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out_unlock;
if (!icmpv4_xrlim_allow(net, rt, type, code))
goto ende;
/* RFC says return as much as we can without exceeding 576 bytes. */
room = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (room > 576)
room = 576;
room -= sizeof(struct iphdr) + icmp_param.replyopts.optlen;
room -= sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_param.data_len = skb_in->len - icmp_param.offset;
if (icmp_param.data_len > room)
icmp_param.data_len = room;
icmp_param.head_len = sizeof(struct icmphdr);
icmp_push_reply(&icmp_param, &ipc, &rt);
ende:
ip_rt_put(rt);
out_unlock:
icmp_xmit_unlock(sk);
out:;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview(bool selection_only) {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = NULL;
GetPrintFrame(&frame);
DCHECK(frame);
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
if (!plugin.isNull()) {
PrintNode(plugin);
return;
}
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(selection_only
? PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_SELECTION
: PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100} | High | 171,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_select_best_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font)
{
static struct { int pid, eid; } xps_cmap_list[] =
{
{ 3, 10 }, /* Unicode with surrogates */
{ 3, 1 }, /* Unicode without surrogates */
{ 3, 5 }, /* Wansung */
{ 3, 4 }, /* Big5 */
{ 3, 3 }, /* Prc */
{ 3, 2 }, /* ShiftJis */
{ 3, 0 }, /* Symbol */
{ 1, 0 },
{ -1, -1 },
};
int i, k, n, pid, eid;
n = xps_count_font_encodings(font);
for (k = 0; xps_cmap_list[k].pid != -1; k++)
{
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
xps_identify_font_encoding(font, i, &pid, &eid);
if (pid == xps_cmap_list[k].pid && eid == xps_cmap_list[k].eid)
{
xps_select_font_encoding(font, i);
return;
}
}
}
gs_warn("could not find a suitable cmap");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __f2fs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl, struct page *ipage)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
set_acl_inode(inode, inode->i_mode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = f2fs_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value)) {
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ACL_MODE);
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
}
error = f2fs_setxattr(inode, name_index, "", value, size, ipage, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ACL_MODE);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.8.2 preserves the setgid bit during a setxattr call, which allows local users to gain group privileges by leveraging the existence of a setgid program with restrictions on execute permissions.
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> | Low | 166,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::error() {
return error_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidCallFocus() {
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect dialog placement in WebContents in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335} | Medium | 172,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CatalogueRescan (FontPathElementPtr fpe)
{
CataloguePtr cat = fpe->private;
char link[MAXFONTFILENAMELEN];
char dest[MAXFONTFILENAMELEN];
char *attrib;
FontPathElementPtr subfpe;
struct stat statbuf;
const char *path;
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *entry;
int len;
int pathlen;
path = fpe->name + strlen(CataloguePrefix);
if (stat(path, &statbuf) < 0 || !S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
return BadFontPath;
if (statbuf.st_mtime <= cat->mtime)
return Successful;
dir = opendir(path);
if (dir == NULL)
{
xfree(cat);
return BadFontPath;
}
CatalogueUnrefFPEs (fpe);
while (entry = readdir(dir), entry != NULL)
{
snprintf(link, sizeof link, "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name);
len = readlink(link, dest, sizeof dest);
if (len < 0)
continue;
dest[len] = '\0';
if (dest[0] != '/')
{
pathlen = strlen(path);
memmove(dest + pathlen + 1, dest, sizeof dest - pathlen - 1);
memcpy(dest, path, pathlen);
memcpy(dest + pathlen, "/", 1);
len += pathlen + 1;
}
attrib = strchr(link, ':');
if (attrib && len + strlen(attrib) < sizeof dest)
{
memcpy(dest + len, attrib, strlen(attrib));
len += strlen(attrib);
}
subfpe = xalloc(sizeof *subfpe);
if (subfpe == NULL)
continue;
/* The fonts returned by OpenFont will point back to the
* subfpe they come from. So set the type of the subfpe to
* what the catalogue fpe was assigned, so calls to CloseFont
* (which uses font->fpe->type) goes to CatalogueCloseFont. */
subfpe->type = fpe->type;
subfpe->name_length = len;
subfpe->name = xalloc (len + 1);
if (subfpe == NULL)
{
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
memcpy(subfpe->name, dest, len);
subfpe->name[len] = '\0';
/* The X server will manipulate the subfpe ref counts
* associated with the font in OpenFont and CloseFont, so we
* have to make sure it's valid. */
subfpe->refcount = 1;
if (FontFileInitFPE (subfpe) != Successful)
{
xfree(subfpe->name);
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
if (CatalogueAddFPE(cat, subfpe) != Successful)
{
FontFileFreeFPE (subfpe);
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
}
closedir(dir);
qsort(cat->fpeList,
cat->fpeCount, sizeof cat->fpeList[0], ComparePriority);
cat->mtime = statbuf.st_mtime;
return Successful;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A single byte overflow in catalogue.c in X.Org libXfont 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact.
Commit Message: | High | 165,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ConfirmInfoBar::ConfirmInfoBar(std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate)
: InfoBarView(std::move(delegate)) {
auto* delegate_ptr = GetDelegate();
label_ = CreateLabel(delegate_ptr->GetMessageText());
AddChildView(label_);
const auto buttons = delegate_ptr->GetButtons();
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK) {
ok_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_OK);
ok_button_->SetProminent(true);
if (delegate_ptr->OKButtonTriggersUACPrompt()) {
elevation_icon_setter_.reset(new ElevationIconSetter(
ok_button_,
base::BindOnce(&ConfirmInfoBar::Layout, base::Unretained(this))));
}
}
if (buttons & ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL) {
cancel_button_ = CreateButton(ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL);
if (buttons == ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::BUTTON_CANCEL)
cancel_button_->SetProminent(true);
}
link_ = CreateLink(delegate_ptr->GetLinkText(), this);
AddChildView(link_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Eliding from the wrong side in an infobar in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to Hide Chrome Security UI via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245} | Medium | 173,165 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(
long long start,
long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen, buf);
if (read_status) {
delete [] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
goto skip;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-74
Summary: ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 skips invalid session names in a way that triggers incorrect parsing, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary-type session data by leveraging control of a session name, as demonstrated by object injection.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them | Medium | 166,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImeConfig: IBus connection is not alive";
return false;
}
bool is_preload_engines = false;
std::vector<std::string> string_list;
if ((value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) &&
(section == kGeneralSectionName) &&
(config_name == kPreloadEnginesConfigName)) {
FilterInputMethods(value.string_list_value, &string_list);
is_preload_engines = true;
} else {
string_list = value.string_list_value;
}
GVariant* variant = NULL;
switch (value.type) {
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeString:
variant = g_variant_new_string(value.string_value.c_str());
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeInt:
variant = g_variant_new_int32(value.int_value);
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeBool:
variant = g_variant_new_boolean(value.bool_value);
break;
case ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList:
GVariantBuilder variant_builder;
g_variant_builder_init(&variant_builder, G_VARIANT_TYPE("as"));
const size_t size = string_list.size(); // don't use string_list_value.
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
g_variant_builder_add(&variant_builder, "s", string_list[i].c_str());
}
variant = g_variant_builder_end(&variant_builder);
break;
}
if (!variant) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImeConfig: variant is NULL";
return false;
}
DCHECK(g_variant_is_floating(variant));
ibus_config_set_value_async(ibus_config_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
variant,
-1, // use the default ibus timeout
NULL, // cancellable
SetImeConfigCallback,
g_object_ref(ibus_config_));
if (is_preload_engines) {
DLOG(INFO) << "SetImeConfig: " << section << "/" << config_name
<< ": " << value.ToString();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: std::string MediaStreamManager::MakeMediaAccessRequest(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
MediaAccessRequestCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
false /* user gesture */, MEDIA_DEVICE_ACCESS, controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{std::string() /* salt */,
std::string() /* group_id_salt */,
security_origin});
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->media_access_request_cb = std::move(callback);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
return label;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array> V8Debugger::internalProperties(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (!v8::Debug::GetInternalProperties(m_isolate, value).ToLocal(&properties))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array>();
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = functionLocation(context, function);
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[FunctionLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
if (function->IsGeneratorFunction()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[IsGenerator]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), v8::True(m_isolate));
}
}
if (!enabled())
return properties;
if (value->IsMap() || value->IsWeakMap() || value->IsSet() || value->IsWeakSet() || value->IsSetIterator() || value->IsMapIterator()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> entries = collectionEntries(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (entries->IsArray()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Entries]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), entries);
}
}
if (value->IsGeneratorObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[GeneratorLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
}
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> boundFunction = function->GetBoundFunction();
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopes;
if (boundFunction->IsUndefined() && functionScopes(function).ToLocal(&scopes)) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Scopes]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), scopes);
}
}
return properties;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436} | Medium | 172,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_vld_decode(
dec_state_t *ps_dec,
WORD16 *pi2_outAddr, /*!< Address where decoded symbols will be stored */
const UWORD8 *pu1_scan, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD8 *pu1_pos, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD16 u2_intra_flag, /*!< Intra Macroblock or not */
UWORD16 u2_chroma_flag, /*!< Chroma Block or not */
UWORD16 u2_d_picture, /*!< D Picture or not */
UWORD16 u2_intra_vlc_format, /*!< Intra VLC format */
UWORD16 u2_mpeg2, /*!< MPEG-2 or not */
WORD32 *pi4_num_coeffs /*!< Returns the number of coeffs in block */
)
{
UWORD32 u4_sym_len;
UWORD32 u4_decoded_value;
UWORD32 u4_level_first_byte;
WORD32 u4_level;
UWORD32 u4_run, u4_numCoeffs;
UWORD32 u4_buf;
UWORD32 u4_buf_nxt;
UWORD32 u4_offset;
UWORD32 *pu4_buf_aligned;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
WORD32 u4_pos;
UWORD32 u4_nz_cols;
UWORD32 u4_nz_rows;
*pi4_num_coeffs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = 0;
u4_nz_cols = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols;
u4_nz_rows = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows;
GET_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,pu4_buf_aligned,ps_stream)
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decode the DC coefficient in case of Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
if(u2_intra_flag)
{
WORD32 dc_size;
WORD32 dc_diff;
WORD32 maxLen;
WORD32 idx;
maxLen = MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_LEN;
idx = 0;
if(u2_chroma_flag != 0)
{
maxLen += 1;
idx++;
}
{
WORD16 end = 0;
UWORD32 maxLen_tmp = maxLen;
UWORD16 m_iBit;
/* Get the maximum number of bits needed to decode a symbol */
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,maxLen)
do
{
maxLen_tmp--;
/* Read one bit at a time from the variable to decode the huffman code */
m_iBit = (UWORD8)((u4_bits >> maxLen_tmp) & 0x1);
/* Get the next node pointer or the symbol from the tree */
end = gai2_impeg2d_dct_dc_size[idx][end][m_iBit];
}while(end > 0);
dc_size = end + MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_OFFSET;
/* Flush the appropriate number of bits from the stream */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,(maxLen - maxLen_tmp),pu4_buf_aligned)
}
if (dc_size != 0)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, dc_size)
dc_diff = u4_bits;
if ((dc_diff & (1 << (dc_size - 1))) == 0) //v Probably the prediction algo?
dc_diff -= (1 << dc_size) - 1;
}
else
{
dc_diff = 0;
}
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = dc_diff;
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
if (0 != dc_diff)
{
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
}
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decoding of first AC coefficient in case of non Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
else
{
/* First symbol can be 1s */
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,1, pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, 1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = -1;
}
else
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = 1;
}
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
else
{
u4_numCoeffs = 0;
}
}
if (1 == u2_d_picture)
{
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE);
}
if (1 == u2_intra_vlc_format && u2_intra_flag)
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
WORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = (DecodedValue & 0xf);
u4_level = DecodedValue >> 9;
/* One table lookup */
if(0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = ((DecodedValue >> 4) & 0x1f);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if (DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ONE)
{
u4_sym_len = 4;
break;
}
else
{
/*Second table lookup*/
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -16 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
if (1 == lead_zeros)
{
u4_sym_len = ((u4_bits & 0x18) >> 3) == 2 ? 11:10;
}
else
{
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
}
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG2 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
}
else
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
UWORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, u4_bits, u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = BITS(DecodedValue, 3, 0);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
if (0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if(DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ZERO)
{
u4_sym_len = 2;
break;
}
else
{
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -15 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
/*Second table lookup*/
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
if (1 == lead_zeros)
u4_sym_len--;
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*Escape Sequence*/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
}
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in decoder/impeg2d_vld.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25812590.
Commit Message: Fixed stack buffer overflow
Bugfix: 25812590
Moved check for numCoeffs > 64 inside the coeff decode loop
Change-Id: I444b77ef2a3da9233ec14bb72ac70b7e2fa56bd1
(cherry picked from commit ff3496c45c571da7eb93d6f9f05758813468fc72)
| High | 173,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sig_server_connect_copy(SERVER_CONNECT_REC **dest,
IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *src)
{
IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *rec;
g_return_if_fail(dest != NULL);
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(src))
return;
rec = g_new0(IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC, 1);
rec->chat_type = IRC_PROTOCOL;
rec->max_cmds_at_once = src->max_cmds_at_once;
rec->cmd_queue_speed = src->cmd_queue_speed;
rec->max_query_chans = src->max_query_chans;
rec->max_kicks = src->max_kicks;
rec->max_modes = src->max_modes;
rec->max_msgs = src->max_msgs;
rec->max_whois = src->max_whois;
rec->usermode = g_strdup(src->usermode);
rec->alternate_nick = g_strdup(src->alternate_nick);
rec->sasl_mechanism = src->sasl_mechanism;
rec->sasl_username = src->sasl_username;
rec->sasl_password = src->sasl_password;
*dest = (SERVER_CONNECT_REC *) rec;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Irssi before 1.0.8, 1.1.x before 1.1.3, and 1.2.x before 1.2.1, when SASL is enabled, has a use after free when sending SASL login to the server.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values | Medium | 169,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() {
DCHECK_NE(site_identity_status_, SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
DCHECK_NE(site_connection_status_, SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo info;
if (site_identity_status_ == SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_EV_CERT)
info.site_identity = UTF16ToUTF8(organization_name());
else
info.site_identity = UTF16ToUTF8(GetSimpleSiteName(site_url_));
info.connection_status = site_connection_status_;
info.connection_status_description = UTF16ToUTF8(site_connection_details_);
info.identity_status = site_identity_status_;
info.safe_browsing_status = safe_browsing_status_;
info.identity_status_description = UTF16ToUTF8(site_details_message_);
info.certificate = certificate_;
info.show_ssl_decision_revoke_button = show_ssl_decision_revoke_button_;
info.show_change_password_buttons = show_change_password_buttons_;
ui_->SetIdentityInfo(info);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932} | Low | 172,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
const struct rule_actions *actions = rule_get_actions(rule);
/* A rule may not be reinserted. */
ovs_assert(rule->state == RULE_INITIALIZED);
if (rule->hard_timeout || rule->idle_timeout) {
ovs_list_insert(&ofproto->expirable, &rule->expirable);
}
cookies_insert(ofproto, rule);
eviction_group_add_rule(rule);
if (actions->has_meter) {
meter_insert_rule(rule);
}
if (actions->has_groups) {
const struct ofpact_group *a;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH_TYPE_FLATTENED (a, GROUP, actions->ofpacts,
actions->ofpacts_len) {
struct ofgroup *group;
group = ofproto_group_lookup(ofproto, a->group_id, OVS_VERSION_MAX,
false);
ovs_assert(group != NULL);
group_add_rule(group, rule);
}
}
rule->state = RULE_INSERTED;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: An issue was discovered in Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.7.x through 2.7.6, affecting ofproto_rule_insert__ in ofproto/ofproto.c. During bundle commit, flows that are added in a bundle are applied to ofproto in order. If a flow cannot be added (e.g., the flow action is a go-to for a group id that does not exist), OvS tries to revert back all previous flows that were successfully applied from the same bundle. This is possible since OvS maintains list of old flows that were replaced by flows from the bundle. While reinserting old flows, OvS has an assertion failure due to a check on rule state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This would work for new flows, but for an old flow the rule state is RULE_REMOVED. The assertion failure causes an OvS crash.
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete [] key_id;
delete [] signature;
delete [] sig_key_id;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int disrsi_(
int stream,
int *negate,
unsigned *value,
unsigned count)
{
int c;
unsigned locval;
unsigned ndigs;
char *cp;
char scratch[DIS_BUFSIZ+1];
assert(negate != NULL);
assert(value != NULL);
assert(count);
assert(stream >= 0);
assert(dis_getc != NULL);
assert(dis_gets != NULL);
memset(scratch, 0, DIS_BUFSIZ+1);
if (dis_umaxd == 0)
disiui_();
switch (c = (*dis_getc)(stream))
{
case '-':
case '+':
*negate = c == '-';
if ((*dis_gets)(stream, scratch, count) != (int)count)
{
return(DIS_EOD);
}
if (count >= dis_umaxd)
{
if (count > dis_umaxd)
goto overflow;
if (memcmp(scratch, dis_umax, dis_umaxd) > 0)
goto overflow;
}
cp = scratch;
locval = 0;
do
{
if (((c = *cp++) < '0') || (c > '9'))
{
return(DIS_NONDIGIT);
}
locval = 10 * locval + c - '0';
}
while (--count);
*value = locval;
return (DIS_SUCCESS);
break;
case '0':
return (DIS_LEADZRO);
break;
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
ndigs = c - '0';
if (count > 1)
{
if ((*dis_gets)(stream, scratch + 1, count - 1) != (int)count - 1)
{
return(DIS_EOD);
}
cp = scratch;
if (count >= dis_umaxd)
{
if (count > dis_umaxd)
break;
*cp = c;
if (memcmp(scratch, dis_umax, dis_umaxd) > 0)
break;
}
while (--count)
{
if (((c = *++cp) < '0') || (c > '9'))
{
return(DIS_NONDIGIT);
}
ndigs = 10 * ndigs + c - '0';
}
} /* END if (count > 1) */
return(disrsi_(stream, negate, value, ndigs));
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
case - 1:
return(DIS_EOD);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
case -2:
return(DIS_EOF);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
default:
return(DIS_NONDIGIT);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
*negate = FALSE;
overflow:
*value = UINT_MAX;
return(DIS_OVERFLOW);
} /* END disrsi_() */
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in lib/Libdis/disrsi_.c in Terascale Open-Source Resource and Queue Manager (aka TORQUE Resource Manager) 2.5.x through 2.5.13 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large count value.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #171 into 2.5-fixes. | High | 166,441 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::CreateCanvasFromHandle(
const TransportDIB::Handle& dib_handle,
const gfx::Rect& window_rect,
scoped_ptr<skia::PlatformCanvas>* canvas_out) {
HANDLE section;
DuplicateHandle(channel_->renderer_handle(), dib_handle, GetCurrentProcess(),
§ion,
STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | FILE_MAP_READ | FILE_MAP_WRITE,
FALSE, 0);
scoped_ptr<skia::PlatformCanvas> canvas(new skia::PlatformCanvas);
if (!canvas->initialize(
window_rect.width(),
window_rect.height(),
true,
section)) {
canvas_out->reset();
}
canvas_out->reset(canvas.release());
CloseHandle(section);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static unsigned char mincore_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff)
{
unsigned char present = 0;
struct page *page;
/*
* When tmpfs swaps out a page from a file, any process mapping that
* file will not get a swp_entry_t in its pte, but rather it is like
* any other file mapping (ie. marked !present and faulted in with
* tmpfs's .fault). So swapped out tmpfs mappings are tested here.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
if (shmem_mapping(mapping)) {
page = find_get_entry(mapping, pgoff);
/*
* shmem/tmpfs may return swap: account for swapcache
* page too.
*/
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
swp_entry_t swp = radix_to_swp_entry(page);
page = find_get_page(swap_address_space(swp),
swp_offset(swp));
}
} else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#endif
if (page) {
present = PageUptodate(page);
put_page(page);
}
return present;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mincore() implementation in mm/mincore.c in the Linux kernel through 4.19.13 allowed local attackers to observe page cache access patterns of other processes on the same system, potentially allowing sniffing of secret information. (Fixing this affects the output of the fincore program.) Limited remote exploitation may be possible, as demonstrated by latency differences in accessing public files from an Apache HTTP Server.
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EAS_RESULT DLSParser (EAS_HW_DATA_HANDLE hwInstData, EAS_FILE_HANDLE fileHandle, EAS_I32 offset, EAS_DLSLIB_HANDLE *ppDLS)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA dls;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 pos;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 instSize;
EAS_I32 rgnPoolSize;
EAS_I32 artPoolSize;
EAS_I32 waveLenSize;
EAS_I32 endDLS;
EAS_I32 wvplPos;
EAS_I32 wvplSize;
EAS_I32 linsPos;
EAS_I32 linsSize;
EAS_I32 ptblPos;
EAS_I32 ptblSize;
void *p;
/* zero counts and pointers */
EAS_HWMemSet(&dls, 0, sizeof(dls));
/* save file handle and hwInstData to save copying pointers around */
dls.hwInstData = hwInstData;
dls.fileHandle = fileHandle;
/* NULL return value in case of error */
*ppDLS = NULL;
/* seek to start of DLS and read in RIFF tag and set processor endian flag */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, offset)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWReadFile(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, &temp, sizeof(temp), &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* check for processor endian-ness */
dls.bigEndian = (temp == CHUNK_RIFF);
/* first chunk should be DLS */
pos = offset;
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (temp != CHUNK_DLS)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Expected DLS chunk, got %08lx\n", temp); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* no instrument or wavepool chunks */
linsSize = wvplSize = ptblSize = linsPos = wvplPos = ptblPos = 0;
/* scan the chunks in the DLS list */
endDLS = offset + size;
pos = offset + 12;
while (pos < endDLS)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the next chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_CDL:
if ((result = Parse_cdl(&dls, size, &temp)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (!temp)
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
break;
case CHUNK_LINS:
linsPos = chunkPos + 12;
linsSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_WVPL:
wvplPos = chunkPos + 12;
wvplSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_PTBL:
ptblPos = chunkPos + 8;
ptblSize = size - 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* must have a lins chunk */
if (linsSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No lins chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a wvpl chunk */
if (wvplSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No wvpl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a ptbl chunk */
if ((ptblSize == 0) || (ptblSize > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT * sizeof(POOLCUE) + sizeof(POOLTABLE)))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No ptbl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* pre-parse the wave pool chunk */
if ((result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* limit check */
if ((dls.waveCount == 0) || (dls.waveCount > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #waves [%u]\n", dls.waveCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate memory for wsmp data */
dls.wsmpData = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
if (dls.wsmpData == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc for wsmp data failed\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.wsmpData, 0, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
/* pre-parse the lins chunk */
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
/* limit check */
if ((dls.regionCount == 0) || (dls.regionCount > DLS_MAX_REGION_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #regions [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.artCount == 0) || (dls.artCount > DLS_MAX_ART_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #articulations [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.instCount == 0) || (dls.instCount > DLS_MAX_INST_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #instruments [%u]\n", dls.instCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* Allocate memory for the converted DLS data */
/* calculate size of instrument data */
instSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_PROGRAM) * dls.instCount);
/* calculate size of region pool */
rgnPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_REGION) * dls.regionCount);
/* calculate size of articulation pool, add one for default articulation */
dls.artCount++;
artPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_ARTICULATION) * dls.artCount);
/* calculate size of wave length and offset arrays */
waveLenSize = (EAS_I32) (dls.waveCount * sizeof(EAS_U32));
/* calculate final memory size */
size = (EAS_I32) sizeof(S_EAS) + instSize + rgnPoolSize + artPoolSize + (2 * waveLenSize) + (EAS_I32) dls.wavePoolSize;
if (size <= 0) {
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate the main EAS chunk */
dls.pDLS = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, size);
if (dls.pDLS == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc failed for DLS memory allocation size %ld\n", size); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.pDLS, 0, size);
dls.pDLS->refCount = 1;
p = PtrOfs(dls.pDLS, sizeof(S_EAS));
/* setup pointer to programs */
dls.pDLS->numDLSPrograms = (EAS_U16) dls.instCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSPrograms = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, instSize);
/* setup pointer to regions */
dls.pDLS->pDLSRegions = p;
dls.pDLS->numDLSRegions = (EAS_U16) dls.regionCount;
p = PtrOfs(p, rgnPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to articulations */
dls.pDLS->numDLSArticulations = (EAS_U16) dls.artCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSArticulations = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, artPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to wave length table */
dls.pDLS->numDLSSamples = (EAS_U16) dls.waveCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleLen = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave offsets table */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave pool */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSamples = p;
/* clear filter flag */
dls.filterUsed = EAS_FALSE;
/* parse the wave pool and load samples */
result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize);
}
/* create the default articulation */
Convert_art(&dls, &defaultArt, 0);
dls.artCount = 1;
/* parse the lins chunk and load instruments */
dls.regionCount = dls.instCount = 0;
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
/* clean up any temporary objects that were allocated */
if (dls.wsmpData)
EAS_HWFree(dls.hwInstData, dls.wsmpData);
/* if successful, return a pointer to the EAS collection */
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
*ppDLS = dls.pDLS;
#ifdef _DEBUG_DLS
DumpDLS(dls.pDLS);
#endif
}
/* something went wrong, deallocate the EAS collection */
else
DLSCleanup(dls.hwInstData, dls.pDLS);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_mdls.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference, and device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29770686.
Commit Message: Fix NULL pointer dereference
Bug: 29770686
Bug: 23304983
Change-Id: I1648aab90bc281702a00744bf884ae8bb8009412
| High | 173,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InputMethodDescriptors* CrosMock::CreateInputMethodDescriptors() {
InputMethodDescriptors* descriptors = new InputMethodDescriptors;
descriptors->push_back(
input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return descriptors;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentMethodManifestParsed(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const std::vector<GURL>& default_applications,
const std::vector<url::Origin>& supported_origins,
bool all_origins_supported) {
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_parse_--;
if (web_contents() == nullptr)
return;
content::PermissionManager* permission_manager =
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()->GetPermissionManager();
if (permission_manager == nullptr)
return;
for (const auto& url : default_applications) {
if (downloaded_web_app_manifests_.find(url) !=
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.end()) {
continue;
}
if (permission_manager->GetPermissionStatus(
content::PermissionType::PAYMENT_HANDLER, url.GetOrigin(),
url.GetOrigin()) != blink::mojom::PermissionStatus::GRANTED) {
continue;
}
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_download_++;
downloaded_web_app_manifests_.insert(url);
downloader_->DownloadWebAppManifest(
url,
base::BindOnce(
&InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentWebAppManifestDownloaded,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), method_manifest_url, url));
}
FinishCrawlingPaymentAppsIfReady();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficiently strict origin checks during JIT payment app installation in Payments in Google Chrome prior to 70.0.3538.67 allowed a remote attacker to install a service worker for a domain that can host attacker controled files via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911} | Low | 172,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool TextTrackCueList::Add(TextTrackCue* cue) {
DCHECK_GE(cue->startTime(), 0);
DCHECK_GE(cue->endTime(), 0);
size_t index = FindInsertionIndex(cue);
if (!list_.IsEmpty() && (index > 0) && (list_[index - 1].Get() == cue))
return false;
list_.insert(index, cue);
InvalidateCueIndex(index);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012} | High | 171,771 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate::OpenTab() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Type confusion in libGLESv2 in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android possibly allowed a remote attacker to bypass buffer validation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854} | Medium | 172,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int do_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
{
int ret;
struct fd f;
struct sock *sock;
struct inode *inode;
struct mqueue_inode_info *info;
struct sk_buff *nc;
audit_mq_notify(mqdes, notification);
nc = NULL;
sock = NULL;
if (notification != NULL) {
if (unlikely(notification->sigev_notify != SIGEV_NONE &&
notification->sigev_notify != SIGEV_SIGNAL &&
notification->sigev_notify != SIGEV_THREAD))
return -EINVAL;
if (notification->sigev_notify == SIGEV_SIGNAL &&
!valid_signal(notification->sigev_signo)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (notification->sigev_notify == SIGEV_THREAD) {
long timeo;
/* create the notify skb */
nc = alloc_skb(NOTIFY_COOKIE_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(nc->data,
notification->sigev_value.sival_ptr,
NOTIFY_COOKIE_LEN)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* TODO: add a header? */
skb_put(nc, NOTIFY_COOKIE_LEN);
/* and attach it to the socket */
retry:
f = fdget(notification->sigev_signo);
if (!f.file) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto out;
}
sock = netlink_getsockbyfilp(f.file);
fdput(f);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sock);
sock = NULL;
goto out;
}
timeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
ret = netlink_attachskb(sock, nc, &timeo, NULL);
if (ret == 1)
goto retry;
if (ret) {
sock = NULL;
nc = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
}
f = fdget(mqdes);
if (!f.file) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto out;
}
inode = file_inode(f.file);
if (unlikely(f.file->f_op != &mqueue_file_operations)) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto out_fput;
}
info = MQUEUE_I(inode);
ret = 0;
spin_lock(&info->lock);
if (notification == NULL) {
if (info->notify_owner == task_tgid(current)) {
remove_notification(info);
inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
}
} else if (info->notify_owner != NULL) {
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
switch (notification->sigev_notify) {
case SIGEV_NONE:
info->notify.sigev_notify = SIGEV_NONE;
break;
case SIGEV_THREAD:
info->notify_sock = sock;
info->notify_cookie = nc;
sock = NULL;
nc = NULL;
info->notify.sigev_notify = SIGEV_THREAD;
break;
case SIGEV_SIGNAL:
info->notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
info->notify.sigev_value = notification->sigev_value;
info->notify.sigev_notify = SIGEV_SIGNAL;
break;
}
info->notify_owner = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
info->notify_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
}
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
out_fput:
fdput(f);
out:
if (sock)
netlink_detachskb(sock, nc);
else if (nc)
dev_kfree_skb(nc);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The mq_notify function in the Linux kernel through 4.11.9 does not set the sock pointer to NULL upon entry into the retry logic. During a user-space close of a Netlink socket, it allows attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 168,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int hashtable_init(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
size_t i;
hashtable->size = 0;
hashtable->num_buckets = 0; /* index to primes[] */
hashtable->buckets = jsonp_malloc(num_buckets(hashtable) * sizeof(bucket_t));
if(!hashtable->buckets)
return -1;
list_init(&hashtable->list);
for(i = 0; i < num_buckets(hashtable); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 166,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mWriteBuffer(NULL),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| High | 174,014 |
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