instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | Medium | 168,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
int sigalg_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
if (data > (d+n-len))
goto ri_check;
while (data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
goto ri_check;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
#endif
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
- Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
the value of the Host: field.
- Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
{
unsigned char *sdata;
int servname_type;
int dsize;
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size )
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3)
{
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata,len);
dsize -= 3;
if (len > dsize)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type)
{
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
}
else
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
dsize -= len;
}
if (dsize != 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
{
if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
else
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
{
if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
{
int dsize;
if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sigalg_seen = 1;
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
if (size < 5)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
const unsigned char *sdata;
int dsize;
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size )
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (dsize > 0)
{
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
if (dsize < 4)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
size -= 2 + idsize;
if (dsize < 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
data += idsize;
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
&sdata, idsize);
if (!id)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (data != sdata)
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0)
{
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
{
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
&sdata, dsize);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|| (data + dsize != sdata))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
/* We don't know what to do with any other type
* so ignore it.
*/
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
{
switch(data[0])
{
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
{
/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.) */
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
}
#endif
data+=size;
}
*p = data;
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Memory leak in d1_srtp.c in the DTLS SRTP extension in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1j allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted handshake message.
Commit Message: | High | 165,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::CreateVP8Picture() {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> va_surface = vaapi_dec_->CreateSurface();
if (!va_surface)
return nullptr;
return new VaapiVP8Picture(std::move(va_surface));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const PropertyTreeState& PropertyTreeState::Root() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
std::unique_ptr<PropertyTreeState>, root,
(std::make_unique<PropertyTreeState>(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root())));
return *root;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Disallow Arabic/Hebrew NSMs to come after an unrelated base char.
Arabic NSM(non-spacing mark)s and Hebrew NSMs are allowed to mix with
Latin with the current 'moderately restrictive script mixing policy'.
They're not blocked by BiDi check either because both LTR and RTL labels
can have an NSM.
Block them from coming after an unrelated script (e.g. Latin + Arabic
NSM).
Bug: chromium:729979
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: I5b93fbcf76d17121bf1baaa480ef3624424b3317
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/528348
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478205} | Medium | 172,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: AccessibilityButtonState AXObject::checkboxOrRadioValue() const {
const AtomicString& checkedAttribute =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kChecked);
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "true"))
return ButtonStateOn;
if (equalIgnoringCase(checkedAttribute, "mixed")) {
AccessibilityRole role = ariaRoleAttribute();
if (role == CheckBoxRole || role == MenuItemCheckBoxRole)
return ButtonStateMixed;
}
return ButtonStateOff;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: my_object_get_hash (MyObject *obj, GHashTable **ret, GError **error)
{
GHashTable *table;
table = g_hash_table_new (g_str_hash, g_str_equal);
g_hash_table_insert (table, "foo", "bar");
g_hash_table_insert (table, "baz", "whee");
g_hash_table_insert (table, "cow", "crack");
*ret = table;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int ulen = len;
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int free = 0;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr, faddr, saddr;
__be16 dport;
u8 tos;
int err, is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_in * usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
if (usin->sin_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
dport = usin->sin_port;
if (dport == 0)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
dport = inet->inet_dport;
/* Open fast path for connected socket.
Route will not be used, if at least one option is set.
*/
connected = 1;
}
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
err = sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &ipc.tx_flags);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
}
if (!ipc.opt)
ipc.opt = inet->opt;
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
faddr = ipc.opt->faddr;
connected = 0;
}
tos = RT_TOS(inet->tos);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE) ||
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE) ||
(ipc.opt && ipc.opt->is_strictroute)) {
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
connected = 0;
}
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
connected = 0;
}
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *)sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk)|FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP,
faddr, saddr, dport, inet->inet_sport);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
err = -EACCES;
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto out;
if (connected)
sk_dst_set(sk, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
}
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (!ipc.addr)
daddr = ipc.addr = rt->rt_dst;
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case. */
if (!corkreq) {
skb = ip_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
msg->msg_flags);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (skb && !IS_ERR(skb))
err = udp_send_skb(skb, daddr, dport);
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Now cork the socket to pend data.
*/
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
fl4->saddr = saddr;
fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
fl4->fl4_sport = inet->inet_sport;
up->pending = AF_INET;
do_append_data:
up->len += ulen;
err = ip_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
udp_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(&rt->dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int btsock_thread_add_fd(int h, int fd, int type, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
if(flags & SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC)
{
if(ts[h].thread_id == pthread_self())
{
flags &= ~SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC;
add_poll(h, fd, type, flags, user_id);
return TRUE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC is not called in poll thread, fallback to async");
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_ADD_FD, fd, type, flags, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("adding fd:%d, flags:0x%x", fd, flags);
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderSVGImage::paint(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint&)
{
ANNOTATE_GRAPHICS_CONTEXT(paintInfo, this);
if (paintInfo.context->paintingDisabled() || style()->visibility() == HIDDEN || !m_imageResource->hasImage())
return;
FloatRect boundingBox = repaintRectInLocalCoordinates();
if (!SVGRenderSupport::paintInfoIntersectsRepaintRect(boundingBox, m_localTransform, paintInfo))
return;
PaintInfo childPaintInfo(paintInfo);
bool drawsOutline = style()->outlineWidth() && (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseSelfOutline);
if (drawsOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground) {
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*childPaintInfo.context);
childPaintInfo.applyTransform(m_localTransform);
if (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground) {
SVGRenderingContext renderingContext(this, childPaintInfo);
if (renderingContext.isRenderingPrepared()) {
if (style()->svgStyle()->bufferedRendering() == BR_STATIC && renderingContext.bufferForeground(m_bufferedForeground))
return;
paintForeground(childPaintInfo);
}
}
if (drawsOutline)
paintOutline(childPaintInfo, IntRect(boundingBox));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the RenderSVGImage::paint function in core/rendering/svg/RenderSVGImage.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.102, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a zero-size SVG image.
Commit Message: Avoid drawing SVG image content when the image is of zero size.
R=pdr
BUG=330420
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/109753004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@164536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t WritePSDChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
rows_offset;
size_t
channels,
count,
length,
offset_length;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
count=0;
offset_length=0;
rows_offset=0;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(image,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
channels=1;
if (separate == MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) == MagickFalse)
channels=next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4 : 3;
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
channels++;
}
rows_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,channels);
offset_length=(next_image->rows*(psd_info->version == 1 ? 2 : 4));
}
size_offset+=2;
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
IndexQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GrayQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GreenQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlueQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlackQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
AlphaQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
mask=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,property,
exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (mask->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(mask,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,mask,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
count+=length;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
}
}
}
return(count);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted PSD file, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350 | Medium | 168,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void Predict(MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode) {
mbptr_->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode = mode;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(pred_fn_(mbptr_,
data_ptr_[0] - kStride,
data_ptr_[0] - 1, kStride,
data_ptr_[0], kStride));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SeekHead::SeekHead(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_entries(0),
m_entry_count(0),
m_void_elements(0),
m_void_element_count(0)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int uas_switch_interface(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int alt;
alt = uas_find_uas_alt_setting(intf);
if (alt < 0)
return alt;
return usb_set_interface(udev,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber, alt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The uas driver in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device, related to drivers/usb/storage/uas-detect.h and drivers/usb/storage/uas.c.
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
CC: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | High | 167,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
key_t key = params->key;
int shmflg = params->flg;
size_t size = params->u.size;
int error;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
size_t numpages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct file *file;
char name[13];
int id;
vm_flags_t acctflag = 0;
if (size < SHMMIN || size > ns->shm_ctlmax)
return -EINVAL;
if (numpages << PAGE_SHIFT < size)
return -ENOSPC;
if (ns->shm_tot + numpages < ns->shm_tot ||
ns->shm_tot + numpages > ns->shm_ctlall)
return -ENOSPC;
shp = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*shp));
if (!shp)
return -ENOMEM;
shp->shm_perm.key = key;
shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
error = security_shm_alloc(shp);
if (error) {
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, ipc_rcu_free);
return error;
}
sprintf(name, "SYSV%08x", key);
if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) {
struct hstate *hs;
size_t hugesize;
hs = hstate_sizelog((shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
if (!hs) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto no_file;
}
hugesize = ALIGN(size, huge_page_size(hs));
/* hugetlb_file_setup applies strict accounting */
if (shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, hugesize, acctflag,
&shp->mlock_user, HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE,
(shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
} else {
/*
* Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even
* if it's asked for.
*/
if ((shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) &&
sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup(name, size, acctflag);
}
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto no_file;
id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
if (id < 0) {
error = id;
goto no_id;
}
shp->shm_cprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_lprid = 0;
shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_segsz = size;
shp->shm_nattch = 0;
shp->shm_file = file;
shp->shm_creator = current;
list_add(&shp->shm_clist, ¤t->sysvshm.shm_clist);
/*
* shmid gets reported as "inode#" in /proc/pid/maps.
* proc-ps tools use this. Changing this will break them.
*/
file_inode(file)->i_ino = shp->shm_perm.id;
ns->shm_tot += numpages;
error = shp->shm_perm.id;
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
no_id:
if (is_file_hugepages(file) && shp->mlock_user)
user_shm_unlock(size, shp->mlock_user);
fput(file);
no_file:
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IPC object implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an ipc_addid call that leads to uid and gid comparisons against uninitialized data, related to msg.c, shm.c, and util.c.
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,579 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void fz_init_cached_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, fz_colorspace *is, fz_colorspace *ds, fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params)
{
int n = ss->n;
fz_cached_color_converter *cached = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_cached_color_converter);
cc->opaque = cached;
cc->convert = fz_cached_color_convert;
cc->ds = ds ? ds : fz_device_gray(ctx);
cc->ss = ss;
cc->is = is;
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base, is, cc->ds, ss, params);
cached->hash = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 256, n * sizeof(float), -1, fz_free);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base);
fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, cached->hash);
fz_free(ctx, cached);
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple use of uninitialized value bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (crash) or influence program flow via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
cctx->key_set = 0;
cctx->iv_set = 0;
cctx->L = 8;
cctx->M = 12;
cctx->tag_set = 0;
cctx->len_set = 0;
cctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
cctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
{
uint16_t len =
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
len -= cctx->M;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return cctx->M;
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
/* Sanity check length */
if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
return 0;
/* Just copy to first part of IV */
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
arg = 15 - arg;
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
return 0;
cctx->L = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
return 0;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) && ptr)
return 0;
if (ptr) {
cctx->tag_set = 1;
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
}
cctx->M = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set)
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
return 0;
cctx->tag_set = 0;
cctx->iv_set = 0;
cctx->len_set = 0;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out);
if (cctx->ccm.key) {
if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
return 0;
cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d. For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k.
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* expand_16 does something unless the bit depth is already 16. */
return bit_depth < 16;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,626 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
if((newSmp.nLength + info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopStart + info.loopLength > smp.nLength))
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: soundlib/Load_stp.cpp in OpenMPT through 1.27.04.00, and libopenmpt before 0.3.6, has an out-of-bounds read via a malformed STP file.
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27 | Medium | 169,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: content::DownloadFile* MockDownloadFileFactory::CreateFile(
DownloadCreateInfo* info,
scoped_ptr<content::ByteStreamReader> stream,
content::DownloadManager* download_manager,
bool calculate_hash,
const net::BoundNetLog& bound_net_log) {
DCHECK(files_.end() == files_.find(info->download_id));
MockDownloadFile* created_file = new MockDownloadFile();
files_[info->download_id] = created_file;
ON_CALL(*created_file, GetDownloadManager())
.WillByDefault(Return(download_manager));
EXPECT_CALL(*created_file, Initialize());
return created_file;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,880 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int chan = sa->rc_channel;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (chan && __rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(chan, &sa->rc_bdaddr)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
} else {
/* Save source address */
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = chan;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The rfcomm_sock_bind function in net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 allows local users to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via vectors involving a bind system call on a Bluetooth RFCOMM socket.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | Low | 167,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *AcquireVirtualMemory(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
size_t
length;
length=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (length/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return((MemoryInfo *) NULL);
}
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
sizeof(*memory_info)));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(memory_info,0,sizeof(*memory_info));
memory_info->length=length;
memory_info->signature=MagickSignature;
if (AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,length) != MagickFalse)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireAlignedMemory(1,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=AlignedVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,length);
}
if ((memory_info->blob == NULL) &&
(AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Heap memory failed, try anonymous memory mapping.
*/
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,length);
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
int
file;
/*
Anonymous memory mapping failed, try file-backed memory mapping.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
{
if ((lseek(file,length-1,SEEK_SET) >= 0) && (write(file,"",1) == 1))
{
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(file,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
(void) AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length);
}
}
(void) close(file);
}
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireMagickMemory(length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=UnalignedVirtualMemory;
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer truncation issue in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.5-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted .pict file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
{
int ret = 1;
int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
(unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
(unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
"extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (rs->cont_extent) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
rs->buffer = kmalloc(rs->cont_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rs->buffer) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
rs->cont_size);
put_bh(bh);
rs->chr = rs->buffer;
rs->len = rs->cont_size;
rs->cont_extent = 0;
rs->cont_size = 0;
rs->cont_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
printk("Unable to read rock-ridge attributes\n");
}
out:
kfree(rs->buffer);
rs->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The rock_continue function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 does not restrict the number of Rock Ridge continuation entries, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and system crash or hang) via a crafted iso9660 image.
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int proc_connectinfo(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct usbdevfs_connectinfo ci = {
.devnum = ps->dev->devnum,
.slow = ps->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW
};
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The proc_connectinfo function in drivers/usb/core/devio.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted USBDEVFS_CONNECTINFO ioctl call.
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Low | 167,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void readpng2_warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "readpng2 libpng warning: %s\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getAttachedShaders()");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() > 0 && !isUndefinedOrNull(args[0]) && !V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0])) {
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
WebGLProgram* program = V8WebGLProgram::HasInstance(args[0]) ? V8WebGLProgram::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0])) : 0;
Vector<RefPtr<WebGLShader> > shaders;
bool succeed = context->getAttachedShaders(program, shaders, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Null();
}
if (!succeed)
return v8::Null();
v8::Local<v8::Array> array = v8::Array::New(shaders.size());
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < shaders.size(); ++ii)
array->Set(v8::Integer::New(ii), toV8(shaders[ii].get(), args.GetIsolate()));
return array;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::parseAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& value)
{
if (name == nameAttr) {
removeFromRadioButtonGroup();
m_name = value;
addToRadioButtonGroup();
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
} else if (name == autocompleteAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "off"))
m_autocomplete = Off;
else {
if (value.isEmpty())
m_autocomplete = Uninitialized;
else
m_autocomplete = On;
}
} else if (name == typeAttr)
updateType();
else if (name == valueAttr) {
if (!hasDirtyValue()) {
updatePlaceholderVisibility(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
m_valueAttributeWasUpdatedAfterParsing = !m_parsingInProgress;
m_inputType->valueAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == checkedAttr) {
if (!m_parsingInProgress && m_reflectsCheckedAttribute) {
setChecked(!value.isNull());
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = true;
}
} else if (name == maxlengthAttr)
parseMaxLengthAttribute(value);
else if (name == sizeAttr) {
int oldSize = m_size;
int valueAsInteger = value.toInt();
m_size = valueAsInteger > 0 ? valueAsInteger : defaultSize;
if (m_size != oldSize && renderer())
renderer()->setNeedsLayoutAndPrefWidthsRecalc();
} else if (name == altAttr)
m_inputType->altAttributeChanged();
else if (name == srcAttr)
m_inputType->srcAttributeChanged();
else if (name == usemapAttr || name == accesskeyAttr) {
} else if (name == onsearchAttr) {
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().searchEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
} else if (name == resultsAttr) {
int oldResults = m_maxResults;
m_maxResults = !value.isNull() ? std::min(value.toInt(), maxSavedResults) : -1;
if (m_maxResults != oldResults && (m_maxResults <= 0 || oldResults <= 0))
lazyReattachIfAttached();
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ResultsAttribute);
} else if (name == incrementalAttr) {
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::IncrementalAttribute);
} else if (name == minAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MinAttribute);
} else if (name == maxAttr) {
m_inputType->minOrMaxAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::MaxAttribute);
} else if (name == multipleAttr) {
m_inputType->multipleAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
} else if (name == stepAttr) {
m_inputType->stepAttributeChanged();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::StepAttribute);
} else if (name == patternAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PatternAttribute);
} else if (name == precisionAttr) {
setNeedsValidityCheck();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrecisionAttribute);
} else if (name == disabledAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->disabledAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == readonlyAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->readonlyAttributeChanged();
} else if (name == listAttr) {
m_hasNonEmptyList = !value.isEmpty();
if (m_hasNonEmptyList) {
resetListAttributeTargetObserver();
listAttributeTargetChanged();
}
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::ListAttribute);
}
#if ENABLE(INPUT_SPEECH)
else if (name == webkitspeechAttr) {
if (renderer()) {
detach();
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
if (!attached())
attach();
} else {
m_inputType->destroyShadowSubtree();
m_inputType->createShadowSubtree();
}
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedSpeechAttribute);
} else if (name == onwebkitspeechchangeAttr)
setAttributeEventListener(eventNames().webkitspeechchangeEvent, createAttributeEventListener(this, name, value));
#endif
else if (name == webkitdirectoryAttr) {
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::PrefixedDirectoryAttribute);
}
else
HTMLTextFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
m_inputType->attributeChanged();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL | CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD);
type &= mask;
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
if (!alg) {
request_module("%s", name);
if (!((type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK) & mask &
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK))
request_module("%s-all", name);
alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask);
}
if (alg)
return crypto_is_larval(alg) ? crypto_larval_wait(alg) : alg;
return crypto_larval_add(name, type, mask);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Crypto API in the Linux kernel before 3.18.5 allows local users to load arbitrary kernel modules via a bind system call for an AF_ALG socket with a module name in the salg_name field, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-9644.
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 166,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::ClearState() {
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.clear();
pending_primary_services_requests_.clear();
descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.clear();
characteristic_id_to_service_id_.clear();
service_id_to_device_address_.clear();
connected_devices_.reset(
new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host_));
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().ReleaseAdapter(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition between permission prompts and navigations in Prompts in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900} | Low | 173,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
(void) ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
value);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->storage_class=
(viff_info.number_data_bands < 3 ? PseudoClass : DirectClass);
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (CheckMemoryOverflow((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(number_pixels,
max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)));
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].red);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(q);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].green);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].blue);
}
SetPixelOpacity(q,image->matte != MagickFalse ? QuantumRange-
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions | Medium | 168,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool UsbChooserContext::HasDevicePermission(
const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin,
const device::mojom::UsbDeviceInfo& device_info) {
if (UsbBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(device_info))
return false;
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return false;
auto it = ephemeral_devices_.find(
std::make_pair(requesting_origin, embedding_origin));
if (it != ephemeral_devices_.end() &&
base::ContainsKey(it->second, device_info.guid)) {
return true;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>> device_list =
GetGrantedObjects(requesting_origin, embedding_origin);
for (const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>& device_dict :
device_list) {
int vendor_id;
int product_id;
base::string16 serial_number;
if (device_dict->GetInteger(kVendorIdKey, &vendor_id) &&
device_info.vendor_id == vendor_id &&
device_dict->GetInteger(kProductIdKey, &product_id) &&
device_info.product_id == product_id &&
device_dict->GetString(kSerialNumberKey, &serial_number) &&
device_info.serial_number == serial_number) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles coincidence runs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted curves, related to SkOpCoincidence.cpp and SkPathOpsCommon.cpp.
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926} | Medium | 173,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unicode_unfold_key(OnigCodePoint code)
{
static const struct ByUnfoldKey wordlist[] =
{
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1040a, 3267, 1},
{0x1e0a, 1727, 1},
{0x040a, 1016, 1},
{0x010a, 186, 1},
{0x1f0a, 2088, 1},
{0x2c0a, 2451, 1},
{0x0189, 619, 1},
{0x1f89, 134, 2},
{0x1f85, 154, 2},
{0x0389, 733, 1},
{0x03ff, 724, 1},
{0xab89, 1523, 1},
{0xab85, 1511, 1},
{0x10c89, 3384, 1},
{0x10c85, 3372, 1},
{0x1e84, 1911, 1},
{0x03f5, 752, 1},
{0x0184, 360, 1},
{0x1f84, 149, 2},
{0x2c84, 2592, 1},
{0x017d, 351, 1},
{0x1ff3, 96, 2},
{0xab84, 1508, 1},
{0xa784, 3105, 1},
{0x10c84, 3369, 1},
{0xab7d, 1487, 1},
{0xa77d, 1706, 1},
{0x1e98, 38, 2},
{0x0498, 1106, 1},
{0x0198, 375, 1},
{0x1f98, 169, 2},
{0x2c98, 2622, 1},
{0x0398, 762, 1},
{0xa684, 2940, 1},
{0xab98, 1568, 1},
{0xa798, 3123, 1},
{0x10c98, 3429, 1},
{0x050a, 1277, 1},
{0x1ffb, 2265, 1},
{0x1e96, 16, 2},
{0x0496, 1103, 1},
{0x0196, 652, 1},
{0x1f96, 199, 2},
{0x2c96, 2619, 1},
{0x0396, 756, 1},
{0xa698, 2970, 1},
{0xab96, 1562, 1},
{0xa796, 3120, 1},
{0x10c96, 3423, 1},
{0x1feb, 2259, 1},
{0x2ceb, 2736, 1},
{0x1e90, 1929, 1},
{0x0490, 1094, 1},
{0x0190, 628, 1},
{0x1f90, 169, 2},
{0x2c90, 2610, 1},
{0x0390, 25, 3},
{0xa696, 2967, 1},
{0xab90, 1544, 1},
{0xa790, 3114, 1},
{0x10c90, 3405, 1},
{0x01d7, 444, 1},
{0x1fd7, 31, 3},
{0x1ea6, 1947, 1},
{0x04a6, 1127, 1},
{0x01a6, 676, 1},
{0x1fa6, 239, 2},
{0x2ca6, 2643, 1},
{0x03a6, 810, 1},
{0xa690, 2958, 1},
{0xaba6, 1610, 1},
{0xa7a6, 3144, 1},
{0x10ca6, 3471, 1},
{0x1ea4, 1944, 1},
{0x04a4, 1124, 1},
{0x01a4, 390, 1},
{0x1fa4, 229, 2},
{0x2ca4, 2640, 1},
{0x03a4, 804, 1},
{0x10a6, 2763, 1},
{0xaba4, 1604, 1},
{0xa7a4, 3141, 1},
{0x10ca4, 3465, 1},
{0x1ea0, 1938, 1},
{0x04a0, 1118, 1},
{0x01a0, 384, 1},
{0x1fa0, 209, 2},
{0x2ca0, 2634, 1},
{0x03a0, 792, 1},
{0x10a4, 2757, 1},
{0xaba0, 1592, 1},
{0xa7a0, 3135, 1},
{0x10ca0, 3453, 1},
{0x1eb2, 1965, 1},
{0x04b2, 1145, 1},
{0x01b2, 694, 1},
{0x1fb2, 249, 2},
{0x2cb2, 2661, 1},
{0x03fd, 718, 1},
{0x10a0, 2745, 1},
{0xabb2, 1646, 1},
{0xa7b2, 703, 1},
{0x10cb2, 3507, 1},
{0x1eac, 1956, 1},
{0x04ac, 1136, 1},
{0x01ac, 396, 1},
{0x1fac, 229, 2},
{0x2cac, 2652, 1},
{0x0537, 1352, 1},
{0x10b2, 2799, 1},
{0xabac, 1628, 1},
{0xa7ac, 637, 1},
{0x10cac, 3489, 1},
{0x1eaa, 1953, 1},
{0x04aa, 1133, 1},
{0x00dd, 162, 1},
{0x1faa, 219, 2},
{0x2caa, 2649, 1},
{0x03aa, 824, 1},
{0x10ac, 2781, 1},
{0xabaa, 1622, 1},
{0xa7aa, 646, 1},
{0x10caa, 3483, 1},
{0x1ea8, 1950, 1},
{0x04a8, 1130, 1},
{0x020a, 517, 1},
{0x1fa8, 209, 2},
{0x2ca8, 2646, 1},
{0x03a8, 817, 1},
{0x10aa, 2775, 1},
{0xaba8, 1616, 1},
{0xa7a8, 3147, 1},
{0x10ca8, 3477, 1},
{0x1ea2, 1941, 1},
{0x04a2, 1121, 1},
{0x01a2, 387, 1},
{0x1fa2, 219, 2},
{0x2ca2, 2637, 1},
{0x118a6, 3528, 1},
{0x10a8, 2769, 1},
{0xaba2, 1598, 1},
{0xa7a2, 3138, 1},
{0x10ca2, 3459, 1},
{0x2ced, 2739, 1},
{0x1fe9, 2283, 1},
{0x1fe7, 47, 3},
{0x1eb0, 1962, 1},
{0x04b0, 1142, 1},
{0x118a4, 3522, 1},
{0x10a2, 2751, 1},
{0x2cb0, 2658, 1},
{0x03b0, 41, 3},
{0x1fe3, 41, 3},
{0xabb0, 1640, 1},
{0xa7b0, 706, 1},
{0x10cb0, 3501, 1},
{0x01d9, 447, 1},
{0x1fd9, 2277, 1},
{0x118a0, 3510, 1},
{0x00df, 24, 2},
{0x00d9, 150, 1},
{0xab77, 1469, 1},
{0x10b0, 2793, 1},
{0x1eae, 1959, 1},
{0x04ae, 1139, 1},
{0x01ae, 685, 1},
{0x1fae, 239, 2},
{0x2cae, 2655, 1},
{0x118b2, 3564, 1},
{0xab73, 1457, 1},
{0xabae, 1634, 1},
{0xab71, 1451, 1},
{0x10cae, 3495, 1},
{0x1e2a, 1775, 1},
{0x042a, 968, 1},
{0x012a, 234, 1},
{0x1f2a, 2130, 1},
{0x2c2a, 2547, 1},
{0x118ac, 3546, 1},
{0x10ae, 2787, 1},
{0x0535, 1346, 1},
{0xa72a, 2988, 1},
{0x1e9a, 0, 2},
{0x049a, 1109, 1},
{0xff37, 3225, 1},
{0x1f9a, 179, 2},
{0x2c9a, 2625, 1},
{0x039a, 772, 1},
{0x118aa, 3540, 1},
{0xab9a, 1574, 1},
{0xa79a, 3126, 1},
{0x10c9a, 3435, 1},
{0x1e94, 1935, 1},
{0x0494, 1100, 1},
{0x0194, 640, 1},
{0x1f94, 189, 2},
{0x2c94, 2616, 1},
{0x0394, 749, 1},
{0x118a8, 3534, 1},
{0xab94, 1556, 1},
{0xa69a, 2973, 1},
{0x10c94, 3417, 1},
{0x10402, 3243, 1},
{0x1e02, 1715, 1},
{0x0402, 992, 1},
{0x0102, 174, 1},
{0x0533, 1340, 1},
{0x2c02, 2427, 1},
{0x118a2, 3516, 1},
{0x052a, 1325, 1},
{0xa694, 2964, 1},
{0x1e92, 1932, 1},
{0x0492, 1097, 1},
{0x2165, 2307, 1},
{0x1f92, 179, 2},
{0x2c92, 2613, 1},
{0x0392, 742, 1},
{0x2161, 2295, 1},
{0xab92, 1550, 1},
{0xa792, 3117, 1},
{0x10c92, 3411, 1},
{0x118b0, 3558, 1},
{0x1f5f, 2199, 1},
{0x1e8e, 1926, 1},
{0x048e, 1091, 1},
{0x018e, 453, 1},
{0x1f8e, 159, 2},
{0x2c8e, 2607, 1},
{0x038e, 833, 1},
{0xa692, 2961, 1},
{0xab8e, 1538, 1},
{0x0055, 59, 1},
{0x10c8e, 3399, 1},
{0x1f5d, 2196, 1},
{0x212a, 27, 1},
{0x04cb, 1181, 1},
{0x01cb, 425, 1},
{0x1fcb, 2241, 1},
{0x118ae, 3552, 1},
{0x0502, 1265, 1},
{0x00cb, 111, 1},
{0xa68e, 2955, 1},
{0x1e8a, 1920, 1},
{0x048a, 1085, 1},
{0x018a, 622, 1},
{0x1f8a, 139, 2},
{0x2c8a, 2601, 1},
{0x038a, 736, 1},
{0x2c67, 2571, 1},
{0xab8a, 1526, 1},
{0x1e86, 1914, 1},
{0x10c8a, 3387, 1},
{0x0186, 616, 1},
{0x1f86, 159, 2},
{0x2c86, 2595, 1},
{0x0386, 727, 1},
{0xff35, 3219, 1},
{0xab86, 1514, 1},
{0xa786, 3108, 1},
{0x10c86, 3375, 1},
{0xa68a, 2949, 1},
{0x0555, 1442, 1},
{0x1ebc, 1980, 1},
{0x04bc, 1160, 1},
{0x01bc, 411, 1},
{0x1fbc, 62, 2},
{0x2cbc, 2676, 1},
{0x1f5b, 2193, 1},
{0xa686, 2943, 1},
{0xabbc, 1676, 1},
{0x1eb8, 1974, 1},
{0x04b8, 1154, 1},
{0x01b8, 408, 1},
{0x1fb8, 2268, 1},
{0x2cb8, 2670, 1},
{0x01db, 450, 1},
{0x1fdb, 2247, 1},
{0xabb8, 1664, 1},
{0x10bc, 2829, 1},
{0x00db, 156, 1},
{0x1eb6, 1971, 1},
{0x04b6, 1151, 1},
{0xff33, 3213, 1},
{0x1fb6, 58, 2},
{0x2cb6, 2667, 1},
{0xff2a, 3186, 1},
{0x10b8, 2817, 1},
{0xabb6, 1658, 1},
{0xa7b6, 3153, 1},
{0x10426, 3351, 1},
{0x1e26, 1769, 1},
{0x0426, 956, 1},
{0x0126, 228, 1},
{0x0053, 52, 1},
{0x2c26, 2535, 1},
{0x0057, 65, 1},
{0x10b6, 2811, 1},
{0x022a, 562, 1},
{0xa726, 2982, 1},
{0x1e2e, 1781, 1},
{0x042e, 980, 1},
{0x012e, 240, 1},
{0x1f2e, 2142, 1},
{0x2c2e, 2559, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2167, 2313, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa72e, 2994, 1},
{0x1e2c, 1778, 1},
{0x042c, 974, 1},
{0x012c, 237, 1},
{0x1f2c, 2136, 1},
{0x2c2c, 2553, 1},
{0x1f6f, 2223, 1},
{0x2c6f, 604, 1},
{0xabbf, 1685, 1},
{0xa72c, 2991, 1},
{0x1e28, 1772, 1},
{0x0428, 962, 1},
{0x0128, 231, 1},
{0x1f28, 2124, 1},
{0x2c28, 2541, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0553, 1436, 1},
{0x10bf, 2838, 1},
{0xa728, 2985, 1},
{0x0526, 1319, 1},
{0x0202, 505, 1},
{0x1e40, 1808, 1},
{0x10424, 3345, 1},
{0x1e24, 1766, 1},
{0x0424, 950, 1},
{0x0124, 225, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c24, 2529, 1},
{0x052e, 1331, 1},
{0xa740, 3018, 1},
{0x118bc, 3594, 1},
{0xa724, 2979, 1},
{0x1ef2, 2061, 1},
{0x04f2, 1241, 1},
{0x01f2, 483, 1},
{0x1ff2, 257, 2},
{0x2cf2, 2742, 1},
{0x052c, 1328, 1},
{0x118b8, 3582, 1},
{0xa640, 2865, 1},
{0x10422, 3339, 1},
{0x1e22, 1763, 1},
{0x0422, 944, 1},
{0x0122, 222, 1},
{0x2126, 820, 1},
{0x2c22, 2523, 1},
{0x0528, 1322, 1},
{0x01f1, 483, 1},
{0x118b6, 3576, 1},
{0xa722, 2976, 1},
{0x03f1, 796, 1},
{0x1ebe, 1983, 1},
{0x04be, 1163, 1},
{0xfb02, 12, 2},
{0x1fbe, 767, 1},
{0x2cbe, 2679, 1},
{0x01b5, 405, 1},
{0x0540, 1379, 1},
{0xabbe, 1682, 1},
{0x0524, 1316, 1},
{0x00b5, 779, 1},
{0xabb5, 1655, 1},
{0x1eba, 1977, 1},
{0x04ba, 1157, 1},
{0x216f, 2337, 1},
{0x1fba, 2226, 1},
{0x2cba, 2673, 1},
{0x10be, 2835, 1},
{0x0051, 46, 1},
{0xabba, 1670, 1},
{0x10b5, 2808, 1},
{0x1e6e, 1878, 1},
{0x046e, 1055, 1},
{0x016e, 330, 1},
{0x1f6e, 2220, 1},
{0x2c6e, 664, 1},
{0x118bf, 3603, 1},
{0x0522, 1313, 1},
{0x10ba, 2823, 1},
{0xa76e, 3087, 1},
{0x1eb4, 1968, 1},
{0x04b4, 1148, 1},
{0x2c75, 2583, 1},
{0x1fb4, 50, 2},
{0x2cb4, 2664, 1},
{0xab75, 1463, 1},
{0x1ec2, 1989, 1},
{0xabb4, 1652, 1},
{0xa7b4, 3150, 1},
{0x1fc2, 253, 2},
{0x2cc2, 2685, 1},
{0x03c2, 800, 1},
{0x00c2, 83, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff26, 3174, 1},
{0x10b4, 2805, 1},
{0x1eca, 2001, 1},
{0x0551, 1430, 1},
{0x01ca, 425, 1},
{0x1fca, 2238, 1},
{0x2cca, 2697, 1},
{0x10c2, 2847, 1},
{0x00ca, 108, 1},
{0xff2e, 3198, 1},
{0x1e8c, 1923, 1},
{0x048c, 1088, 1},
{0x0226, 556, 1},
{0x1f8c, 149, 2},
{0x2c8c, 2604, 1},
{0x038c, 830, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab8c, 1532, 1},
{0xff2c, 3192, 1},
{0x10c8c, 3393, 1},
{0x1ec4, 1992, 1},
{0x022e, 568, 1},
{0x01c4, 417, 1},
{0x1fc4, 54, 2},
{0x2cc4, 2688, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x00c4, 89, 1},
{0xff28, 3180, 1},
{0xa68c, 2952, 1},
{0x01cf, 432, 1},
{0x022c, 565, 1},
{0x118be, 3600, 1},
{0x03cf, 839, 1},
{0x00cf, 123, 1},
{0x118b5, 3573, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10c4, 2853, 1},
{0x216e, 2334, 1},
{0x24cb, 2406, 1},
{0x0228, 559, 1},
{0xff24, 3168, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x118ba, 3588, 1},
{0x1efe, 2079, 1},
{0x04fe, 1259, 1},
{0x01fe, 499, 1},
{0x1e9e, 24, 2},
{0x049e, 1115, 1},
{0x03fe, 721, 1},
{0x1f9e, 199, 2},
{0x2c9e, 2631, 1},
{0x039e, 786, 1},
{0x0224, 553, 1},
{0xab9e, 1586, 1},
{0xa79e, 3132, 1},
{0x10c9e, 3447, 1},
{0x01f7, 414, 1},
{0x1ff7, 67, 3},
{0xff22, 3162, 1},
{0x03f7, 884, 1},
{0x118b4, 3570, 1},
{0x049c, 1112, 1},
{0x019c, 661, 1},
{0x1f9c, 189, 2},
{0x2c9c, 2628, 1},
{0x039c, 779, 1},
{0x24bc, 2361, 1},
{0xab9c, 1580, 1},
{0xa79c, 3129, 1},
{0x10c9c, 3441, 1},
{0x0222, 550, 1},
{0x1e7c, 1899, 1},
{0x047c, 1076, 1},
{0x1e82, 1908, 1},
{0x24b8, 2349, 1},
{0x0182, 357, 1},
{0x1f82, 139, 2},
{0x2c82, 2589, 1},
{0xab7c, 1484, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab82, 1502, 1},
{0xa782, 3102, 1},
{0x10c82, 3363, 1},
{0x2c63, 1709, 1},
{0x24b6, 2343, 1},
{0x1e80, 1905, 1},
{0x0480, 1082, 1},
{0x1f59, 2190, 1},
{0x1f80, 129, 2},
{0x2c80, 2586, 1},
{0x0059, 71, 1},
{0xa682, 2937, 1},
{0xab80, 1496, 1},
{0xa780, 3099, 1},
{0x10c80, 3357, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1e4c, 1826, 1},
{0x0145, 270, 1},
{0x014c, 279, 1},
{0x1f4c, 2184, 1},
{0x0345, 767, 1},
{0x0045, 12, 1},
{0x004c, 31, 1},
{0xa680, 2934, 1},
{0xa74c, 3036, 1},
{0x1e4a, 1823, 1},
{0x01d5, 441, 1},
{0x014a, 276, 1},
{0x1f4a, 2178, 1},
{0x03d5, 810, 1},
{0x00d5, 141, 1},
{0x004a, 24, 1},
{0x24bf, 2370, 1},
{0xa74a, 3033, 1},
{0xa64c, 2883, 1},
{0x1041c, 3321, 1},
{0x1e1c, 1754, 1},
{0x041c, 926, 1},
{0x011c, 213, 1},
{0x1f1c, 2118, 1},
{0x2c1c, 2505, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa64a, 2880, 1},
{0x1041a, 3315, 1},
{0x1e1a, 1751, 1},
{0x041a, 920, 1},
{0x011a, 210, 1},
{0x1f1a, 2112, 1},
{0x2c1a, 2499, 1},
{0xabbd, 1679, 1},
{0x0545, 1394, 1},
{0x054c, 1415, 1},
{0x10418, 3309, 1},
{0x1e18, 1748, 1},
{0x0418, 914, 1},
{0x0118, 207, 1},
{0x1f18, 2106, 1},
{0x2c18, 2493, 1},
{0x10bd, 2832, 1},
{0x2163, 2301, 1},
{0x054a, 1409, 1},
{0x1040e, 3279, 1},
{0x1e0e, 1733, 1},
{0x040e, 1028, 1},
{0x010e, 192, 1},
{0x1f0e, 2100, 1},
{0x2c0e, 2463, 1},
{0x1efc, 2076, 1},
{0x04fc, 1256, 1},
{0x01fc, 496, 1},
{0x1ffc, 96, 2},
{0x051c, 1304, 1},
{0x1040c, 3273, 1},
{0x1e0c, 1730, 1},
{0x040c, 1022, 1},
{0x010c, 189, 1},
{0x1f0c, 2094, 1},
{0x2c0c, 2457, 1},
{0x1f6d, 2217, 1},
{0x2c6d, 607, 1},
{0x051a, 1301, 1},
{0x24be, 2367, 1},
{0x10408, 3261, 1},
{0x1e08, 1724, 1},
{0x0408, 1010, 1},
{0x0108, 183, 1},
{0x1f08, 2082, 1},
{0x2c08, 2445, 1},
{0x04c9, 1178, 1},
{0x0518, 1298, 1},
{0x1fc9, 2235, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x24ba, 2355, 1},
{0x00c9, 105, 1},
{0x10416, 3303, 1},
{0x1e16, 1745, 1},
{0x0416, 908, 1},
{0x0116, 204, 1},
{0x050e, 1283, 1},
{0x2c16, 2487, 1},
{0x10414, 3297, 1},
{0x1e14, 1742, 1},
{0x0414, 902, 1},
{0x0114, 201, 1},
{0x042b, 971, 1},
{0x2c14, 2481, 1},
{0x1f2b, 2133, 1},
{0x2c2b, 2550, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x050c, 1280, 1},
{0x10406, 3255, 1},
{0x1e06, 1721, 1},
{0x0406, 1004, 1},
{0x0106, 180, 1},
{0x13fb, 1697, 1},
{0x2c06, 2439, 1},
{0x24c2, 2379, 1},
{0x118bd, 3597, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0508, 1274, 1},
{0x10404, 3249, 1},
{0x1e04, 1718, 1},
{0x0404, 998, 1},
{0x0104, 177, 1},
{0x1f95, 194, 2},
{0x2c04, 2433, 1},
{0x0395, 752, 1},
{0x24ca, 2403, 1},
{0xab95, 1559, 1},
{0x0531, 1334, 1},
{0x10c95, 3420, 1},
{0x0516, 1295, 1},
{0x1e6c, 1875, 1},
{0x046c, 1052, 1},
{0x016c, 327, 1},
{0x1f6c, 2214, 1},
{0x216d, 2331, 1},
{0x0514, 1292, 1},
{0x0245, 697, 1},
{0x024c, 598, 1},
{0xa76c, 3084, 1},
{0x10400, 3237, 1},
{0x1e00, 1712, 1},
{0x0400, 986, 1},
{0x0100, 171, 1},
{0x24c4, 2385, 1},
{0x2c00, 2421, 1},
{0x0506, 1271, 1},
{0x024a, 595, 1},
{0x1fab, 224, 2},
{0xa66c, 2931, 1},
{0x03ab, 827, 1},
{0x24cf, 2418, 1},
{0xabab, 1625, 1},
{0xa7ab, 631, 1},
{0x10cab, 3486, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0504, 1268, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x021c, 544, 1},
{0x01a9, 679, 1},
{0x1fa9, 214, 2},
{0x10ab, 2778, 1},
{0x03a9, 820, 1},
{0x212b, 92, 1},
{0xaba9, 1619, 1},
{0x1e88, 1917, 1},
{0x10ca9, 3480, 1},
{0x021a, 541, 1},
{0x1f88, 129, 2},
{0x2c88, 2598, 1},
{0x0388, 730, 1},
{0x13fd, 1703, 1},
{0xab88, 1520, 1},
{0x10a9, 2772, 1},
{0x10c88, 3381, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0218, 538, 1},
{0x0500, 1262, 1},
{0x1f4d, 2187, 1},
{0x01a7, 393, 1},
{0x1fa7, 244, 2},
{0x004d, 34, 1},
{0x03a7, 814, 1},
{0xa688, 2946, 1},
{0xaba7, 1613, 1},
{0x020e, 523, 1},
{0x10ca7, 3474, 1},
{0x1e6a, 1872, 1},
{0x046a, 1049, 1},
{0x016a, 324, 1},
{0x1f6a, 2208, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x216c, 2328, 1},
{0x10a7, 2766, 1},
{0x01d1, 435, 1},
{0xa76a, 3081, 1},
{0x020c, 520, 1},
{0x03d1, 762, 1},
{0x00d1, 129, 1},
{0x1e68, 1869, 1},
{0x0468, 1046, 1},
{0x0168, 321, 1},
{0x1f68, 2202, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff31, 3207, 1},
{0xa66a, 2928, 1},
{0x0208, 514, 1},
{0xa768, 3078, 1},
{0x1e64, 1863, 1},
{0x0464, 1040, 1},
{0x0164, 315, 1},
{0x054d, 1418, 1},
{0x2c64, 673, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff2b, 3189, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa764, 3072, 1},
{0xa668, 2925, 1},
{0x0216, 535, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x118ab, 3543, 1},
{0x1e62, 1860, 1},
{0x0462, 1037, 1},
{0x0162, 312, 1},
{0x0214, 532, 1},
{0x2c62, 655, 1},
{0xa664, 2919, 1},
{0x1ed2, 2013, 1},
{0x04d2, 1193, 1},
{0xa762, 3069, 1},
{0x1fd2, 20, 3},
{0x2cd2, 2709, 1},
{0x118a9, 3537, 1},
{0x00d2, 132, 1},
{0x0206, 511, 1},
{0x10420, 3333, 1},
{0x1e20, 1760, 1},
{0x0420, 938, 1},
{0x0120, 219, 1},
{0xa662, 2916, 1},
{0x2c20, 2517, 1},
{0x1e60, 1856, 1},
{0x0460, 1034, 1},
{0x0160, 309, 1},
{0x0204, 508, 1},
{0x2c60, 2562, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x24bd, 2364, 1},
{0x216a, 2322, 1},
{0xa760, 3066, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb16, 125, 2},
{0x118a7, 3531, 1},
{0x1efa, 2073, 1},
{0x04fa, 1253, 1},
{0x01fa, 493, 1},
{0x1ffa, 2262, 1},
{0xfb14, 109, 2},
{0x03fa, 887, 1},
{0xa660, 2913, 1},
{0x2168, 2316, 1},
{0x01b7, 700, 1},
{0x1fb7, 10, 3},
{0x1f6b, 2211, 1},
{0x2c6b, 2577, 1},
{0x0200, 502, 1},
{0xabb7, 1661, 1},
{0xfb06, 29, 2},
{0x1e56, 1841, 1},
{0x2164, 2304, 1},
{0x0156, 294, 1},
{0x1f56, 62, 3},
{0x0520, 1310, 1},
{0x004f, 40, 1},
{0x0056, 62, 1},
{0x10b7, 2814, 1},
{0xa756, 3051, 1},
{0xfb04, 5, 3},
{0x1e78, 1893, 1},
{0x0478, 1070, 1},
{0x0178, 168, 1},
{0x1e54, 1838, 1},
{0x2162, 2298, 1},
{0x0154, 291, 1},
{0x1f54, 57, 3},
{0xab78, 1472, 1},
{0xa656, 2898, 1},
{0x0054, 56, 1},
{0x1e52, 1835, 1},
{0xa754, 3048, 1},
{0x0152, 288, 1},
{0x1f52, 52, 3},
{0x24c9, 2400, 1},
{0x1e32, 1787, 1},
{0x0052, 49, 1},
{0x0132, 243, 1},
{0xa752, 3045, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb00, 4, 2},
{0xa654, 2895, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa732, 2997, 1},
{0x2160, 2292, 1},
{0x054f, 1424, 1},
{0x0556, 1445, 1},
{0x1e50, 1832, 1},
{0xa652, 2892, 1},
{0x0150, 285, 1},
{0x1f50, 84, 2},
{0x017b, 348, 1},
{0x1e4e, 1829, 1},
{0x0050, 43, 1},
{0x014e, 282, 1},
{0xa750, 3042, 1},
{0xab7b, 1481, 1},
{0xa77b, 3093, 1},
{0x004e, 37, 1},
{0x0554, 1439, 1},
{0xa74e, 3039, 1},
{0x1e48, 1820, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x216b, 2325, 1},
{0x1f48, 2172, 1},
{0xa650, 2889, 1},
{0x0552, 1433, 1},
{0x0048, 21, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa748, 3030, 1},
{0xa64e, 2886, 1},
{0x0532, 1337, 1},
{0x1041e, 3327, 1},
{0x1e1e, 1757, 1},
{0x041e, 932, 1},
{0x011e, 216, 1},
{0x118b7, 3579, 1},
{0x2c1e, 2511, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa648, 2877, 1},
{0x1ff9, 2253, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x03f9, 878, 1},
{0x0550, 1427, 1},
{0x10412, 3291, 1},
{0x1e12, 1739, 1},
{0x0412, 896, 1},
{0x0112, 198, 1},
{0x054e, 1421, 1},
{0x2c12, 2475, 1},
{0x10410, 3285, 1},
{0x1e10, 1736, 1},
{0x0410, 890, 1},
{0x0110, 195, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c10, 2469, 1},
{0x2132, 2289, 1},
{0x0548, 1403, 1},
{0x1ef8, 2070, 1},
{0x04f8, 1250, 1},
{0x01f8, 490, 1},
{0x1ff8, 2250, 1},
{0x0220, 381, 1},
{0x1ee2, 2037, 1},
{0x04e2, 1217, 1},
{0x01e2, 462, 1},
{0x1fe2, 36, 3},
{0x2ce2, 2733, 1},
{0x03e2, 857, 1},
{0x051e, 1307, 1},
{0x1ede, 2031, 1},
{0x04de, 1211, 1},
{0x01de, 456, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2cde, 2727, 1},
{0x03de, 851, 1},
{0x00de, 165, 1},
{0x1f69, 2205, 1},
{0x2c69, 2574, 1},
{0x1eda, 2025, 1},
{0x04da, 1205, 1},
{0x0512, 1289, 1},
{0x1fda, 2244, 1},
{0x2cda, 2721, 1},
{0x03da, 845, 1},
{0x00da, 153, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0510, 1286, 1},
{0x1ed8, 2022, 1},
{0x04d8, 1202, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1fd8, 2274, 1},
{0x2cd8, 2718, 1},
{0x03d8, 842, 1},
{0x00d8, 147, 1},
{0x1ed6, 2019, 1},
{0x04d6, 1199, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1fd6, 76, 2},
{0x2cd6, 2715, 1},
{0x03d6, 792, 1},
{0x00d6, 144, 1},
{0x1ec8, 1998, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x01c8, 421, 1},
{0x1fc8, 2232, 1},
{0x2cc8, 2694, 1},
{0xff32, 3210, 1},
{0x00c8, 102, 1},
{0x04c7, 1175, 1},
{0x01c7, 421, 1},
{0x1fc7, 15, 3},
{0x1ec0, 1986, 1},
{0x04c0, 1187, 1},
{0x00c7, 99, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2cc0, 2682, 1},
{0x0179, 345, 1},
{0x00c0, 77, 1},
{0x0232, 574, 1},
{0x01b3, 402, 1},
{0x1fb3, 62, 2},
{0xab79, 1475, 1},
{0xa779, 3090, 1},
{0x10c7, 2859, 1},
{0xabb3, 1649, 1},
{0xa7b3, 3156, 1},
{0x1fa5, 234, 2},
{0x10c0, 2841, 1},
{0x03a5, 807, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xaba5, 1607, 1},
{0x01b1, 691, 1},
{0x10ca5, 3468, 1},
{0x10b3, 2802, 1},
{0x2169, 2319, 1},
{0x024e, 601, 1},
{0xabb1, 1643, 1},
{0xa7b1, 682, 1},
{0x10cb1, 3504, 1},
{0x10a5, 2760, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x01af, 399, 1},
{0x1faf, 244, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0248, 592, 1},
{0x10b1, 2796, 1},
{0xabaf, 1637, 1},
{0x1fad, 234, 2},
{0x10caf, 3498, 1},
{0x04cd, 1184, 1},
{0x01cd, 429, 1},
{0xabad, 1631, 1},
{0xa7ad, 658, 1},
{0x10cad, 3492, 1},
{0x00cd, 117, 1},
{0x10af, 2790, 1},
{0x021e, 547, 1},
{0x1fa3, 224, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x03a3, 800, 1},
{0x10ad, 2784, 1},
{0xaba3, 1601, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10ca3, 3462, 1},
{0x10cd, 2862, 1},
{0x1fa1, 214, 2},
{0x24b7, 2346, 1},
{0x03a1, 796, 1},
{0x0212, 529, 1},
{0xaba1, 1595, 1},
{0x10a3, 2754, 1},
{0x10ca1, 3456, 1},
{0x01d3, 438, 1},
{0x1fd3, 25, 3},
{0x0210, 526, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x00d3, 135, 1},
{0x1e97, 34, 2},
{0x10a1, 2748, 1},
{0x0197, 649, 1},
{0x1f97, 204, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0397, 759, 1},
{0x1041d, 3324, 1},
{0xab97, 1565, 1},
{0x041d, 929, 1},
{0x10c97, 3426, 1},
{0x1f1d, 2121, 1},
{0x2c1d, 2508, 1},
{0x1e72, 1884, 1},
{0x0472, 1061, 1},
{0x0172, 336, 1},
{0x118b3, 3567, 1},
{0x2c72, 2580, 1},
{0x0372, 712, 1},
{0x1041b, 3318, 1},
{0xab72, 1454, 1},
{0x041b, 923, 1},
{0x118a5, 3525, 1},
{0x1f1b, 2115, 1},
{0x2c1b, 2502, 1},
{0x1e70, 1881, 1},
{0x0470, 1058, 1},
{0x0170, 333, 1},
{0x118b1, 3561, 1},
{0x2c70, 610, 1},
{0x0370, 709, 1},
{0x1e46, 1817, 1},
{0xab70, 1448, 1},
{0x1e66, 1866, 1},
{0x0466, 1043, 1},
{0x0166, 318, 1},
{0x1e44, 1814, 1},
{0x0046, 15, 1},
{0x118af, 3555, 1},
{0xa746, 3027, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa766, 3075, 1},
{0x0044, 9, 1},
{0x118ad, 3549, 1},
{0xa744, 3024, 1},
{0x1e7a, 1896, 1},
{0x047a, 1073, 1},
{0x1e3a, 1799, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa646, 2874, 1},
{0x1f3a, 2154, 1},
{0xa666, 2922, 1},
{0xab7a, 1478, 1},
{0x118a3, 3519, 1},
{0xa644, 2871, 1},
{0xa73a, 3009, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1ef4, 2064, 1},
{0x04f4, 1244, 1},
{0x01f4, 487, 1},
{0x1ff4, 101, 2},
{0x118a1, 3513, 1},
{0x03f4, 762, 1},
{0x1eec, 2052, 1},
{0x04ec, 1232, 1},
{0x01ec, 477, 1},
{0x1fec, 2286, 1},
{0x0546, 1397, 1},
{0x03ec, 872, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x013f, 261, 1},
{0x1f3f, 2169, 1},
{0x0544, 1391, 1},
{0x1eea, 2049, 1},
{0x04ea, 1229, 1},
{0x01ea, 474, 1},
{0x1fea, 2256, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x03ea, 869, 1},
{0x1ee8, 2046, 1},
{0x04e8, 1226, 1},
{0x01e8, 471, 1},
{0x1fe8, 2280, 1},
{0x053a, 1361, 1},
{0x03e8, 866, 1},
{0x1ee6, 2043, 1},
{0x04e6, 1223, 1},
{0x01e6, 468, 1},
{0x1fe6, 88, 2},
{0x1f4b, 2181, 1},
{0x03e6, 863, 1},
{0x1e5e, 1853, 1},
{0x004b, 27, 1},
{0x015e, 306, 1},
{0x2166, 2310, 1},
{0x1ee4, 2040, 1},
{0x04e4, 1220, 1},
{0x01e4, 465, 1},
{0x1fe4, 80, 2},
{0xa75e, 3063, 1},
{0x03e4, 860, 1},
{0x1ee0, 2034, 1},
{0x04e0, 1214, 1},
{0x01e0, 459, 1},
{0x053f, 1376, 1},
{0x2ce0, 2730, 1},
{0x03e0, 854, 1},
{0x1edc, 2028, 1},
{0x04dc, 1208, 1},
{0xa65e, 2910, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2cdc, 2724, 1},
{0x03dc, 848, 1},
{0x00dc, 159, 1},
{0x1ed0, 2010, 1},
{0x04d0, 1190, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2cd0, 2706, 1},
{0x03d0, 742, 1},
{0x00d0, 126, 1},
{0x1ecc, 2004, 1},
{0x054b, 1412, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1fcc, 71, 2},
{0x2ccc, 2700, 1},
{0x1ec6, 1995, 1},
{0x00cc, 114, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1fc6, 67, 2},
{0x2cc6, 2691, 1},
{0x24c8, 2397, 1},
{0x00c6, 96, 1},
{0x04c5, 1172, 1},
{0x01c5, 417, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1fbb, 2229, 1},
{0x24c7, 2394, 1},
{0x00c5, 92, 1},
{0x1fb9, 2271, 1},
{0xabbb, 1673, 1},
{0x24c0, 2373, 1},
{0x04c3, 1169, 1},
{0xabb9, 1667, 1},
{0x1fc3, 71, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x00c3, 86, 1},
{0x10c5, 2856, 1},
{0x10bb, 2826, 1},
{0x1ed4, 2016, 1},
{0x04d4, 1196, 1},
{0x10b9, 2820, 1},
{0x13fc, 1700, 1},
{0x2cd4, 2712, 1},
{0x0246, 589, 1},
{0x00d4, 138, 1},
{0x10c3, 2850, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff3a, 3234, 1},
{0x0244, 688, 1},
{0x019f, 670, 1},
{0x1f9f, 204, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x039f, 789, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab9f, 1589, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10c9f, 3450, 1},
{0x019d, 667, 1},
{0x1f9d, 194, 2},
{0x023a, 2565, 1},
{0x039d, 783, 1},
{0x1e5a, 1847, 1},
{0xab9d, 1583, 1},
{0x015a, 300, 1},
{0x10c9d, 3444, 1},
{0x1e9b, 1856, 1},
{0x24cd, 2412, 1},
{0x005a, 74, 1},
{0x1f9b, 184, 2},
{0xa75a, 3057, 1},
{0x039b, 776, 1},
{0x1ece, 2007, 1},
{0xab9b, 1577, 1},
{0x1e99, 42, 2},
{0x10c9b, 3438, 1},
{0x2cce, 2703, 1},
{0x1f99, 174, 2},
{0x00ce, 120, 1},
{0x0399, 767, 1},
{0xa65a, 2904, 1},
{0xab99, 1571, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10c99, 3432, 1},
{0x0193, 634, 1},
{0x1f93, 184, 2},
{0x1e58, 1844, 1},
{0x0393, 746, 1},
{0x0158, 297, 1},
{0xab93, 1553, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10c93, 3414, 1},
{0x0058, 68, 1},
{0x042d, 977, 1},
{0xa758, 3054, 1},
{0x1f2d, 2139, 1},
{0x2c2d, 2556, 1},
{0x118bb, 3591, 1},
{0x0191, 369, 1},
{0x1f91, 174, 2},
{0x118b9, 3585, 1},
{0x0391, 739, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab91, 1547, 1},
{0xa658, 2901, 1},
{0x10c91, 3408, 1},
{0x018f, 625, 1},
{0x1f8f, 164, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x038f, 836, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab8f, 1541, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x10c8f, 3402, 1},
{0x018b, 366, 1},
{0x1f8b, 144, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0187, 363, 1},
{0x1f87, 164, 2},
{0xab8b, 1529, 1},
{0xa78b, 3111, 1},
{0x10c8b, 3390, 1},
{0xab87, 1517, 1},
{0x04c1, 1166, 1},
{0x10c87, 3378, 1},
{0x1e7e, 1902, 1},
{0x047e, 1079, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x00c1, 80, 1},
{0x2c7e, 580, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab7e, 1490, 1},
{0xa77e, 3096, 1},
{0x1e76, 1890, 1},
{0x0476, 1067, 1},
{0x0176, 342, 1},
{0x1e42, 1811, 1},
{0x10c1, 2844, 1},
{0x0376, 715, 1},
{0x1e36, 1793, 1},
{0xab76, 1466, 1},
{0x0136, 249, 1},
{0x0042, 3, 1},
{0x1e3e, 1805, 1},
{0xa742, 3021, 1},
{0x1e38, 1796, 1},
{0x1f3e, 2166, 1},
{0xa736, 3003, 1},
{0x1f38, 2148, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0587, 105, 2},
{0xa73e, 3015, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xa738, 3006, 1},
{0xa642, 2868, 1},
{0x1e5c, 1850, 1},
{0x1e34, 1790, 1},
{0x015c, 303, 1},
{0x0134, 246, 1},
{0x1ef6, 2067, 1},
{0x04f6, 1247, 1},
{0x01f6, 372, 1},
{0x1ff6, 92, 2},
{0xa75c, 3060, 1},
{0xa734, 3000, 1},
{0x1ef0, 2058, 1},
{0x04f0, 1238, 1},
{0x01f0, 20, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1e30, 1784, 1},
{0x03f0, 772, 1},
{0x0130, 261, 2},
{0x0542, 1385, 1},
{0xa65c, 2907, 1},
{0x1f83, 144, 2},
{0x0536, 1349, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab83, 1505, 1},
{0x053e, 1373, 1},
{0x10c83, 3366, 1},
{0x0538, 1355, 1},
{0x1eee, 2055, 1},
{0x04ee, 1235, 1},
{0x01ee, 480, 1},
{0x1f8d, 154, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x03ee, 875, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab8d, 1535, 1},
{0xa78d, 643, 1},
{0x10c8d, 3396, 1},
{0x0534, 1343, 1},
{0x0181, 613, 1},
{0x1f81, 134, 2},
{0x013d, 258, 1},
{0x1f3d, 2163, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xab81, 1499, 1},
{0x017f, 52, 1},
{0x10c81, 3360, 1},
{0x2c7f, 583, 1},
{0x037f, 881, 1},
{0xff2d, 3195, 1},
{0xab7f, 1493, 1},
{0x1e74, 1887, 1},
{0x0474, 1064, 1},
{0x0174, 339, 1},
{0x1e3c, 1802, 1},
{0x0149, 46, 2},
{0x1f49, 2175, 1},
{0x1f3c, 2160, 1},
{0xab74, 1460, 1},
{0x0049, 3606, 1},
{0x0143, 267, 1},
{0x24cc, 2409, 1},
{0xa73c, 3012, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0043, 6, 1},
{0x0141, 264, 1},
{0x24c6, 2391, 1},
{0x013b, 255, 1},
{0x1f3b, 2157, 1},
{0x0041, 0, 1},
{0x0139, 252, 1},
{0x1f39, 2151, 1},
{0x24c5, 2388, 1},
{0x24bb, 2358, 1},
{0x13fa, 1694, 1},
{0x053d, 1370, 1},
{0x24b9, 2352, 1},
{0x0429, 965, 1},
{0x2183, 2340, 1},
{0x1f29, 2127, 1},
{0x2c29, 2544, 1},
{0x24c3, 2382, 1},
{0x10427, 3354, 1},
{0x10425, 3348, 1},
{0x0427, 959, 1},
{0x0425, 953, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c27, 2538, 1},
{0x2c25, 2532, 1},
{0x0549, 1406, 1},
{0x053c, 1367, 1},
{0x10423, 3342, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0423, 947, 1},
{0x0543, 1388, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c23, 2526, 1},
{0xff36, 3222, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0541, 1382, 1},
{0x10421, 3336, 1},
{0x053b, 1364, 1},
{0x0421, 941, 1},
{0xff38, 3228, 1},
{0x0539, 1358, 1},
{0x2c21, 2520, 1},
{0x10419, 3312, 1},
{0x10417, 3306, 1},
{0x0419, 917, 1},
{0x0417, 911, 1},
{0x1f19, 2109, 1},
{0x2c19, 2496, 1},
{0x2c17, 2490, 1},
{0x023e, 2568, 1},
{0xff34, 3216, 1},
{0x10415, 3300, 1},
{0x10413, 3294, 1},
{0x0415, 905, 1},
{0x0413, 899, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c15, 2484, 1},
{0x2c13, 2478, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x24ce, 2415, 1},
{0x1040f, 3282, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x040f, 1031, 1},
{0xff30, 3204, 1},
{0x1f0f, 2103, 1},
{0x2c0f, 2466, 1},
{0x1040d, 3276, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x040d, 1025, 1},
{0x0147, 273, 1},
{0x1f0d, 2097, 1},
{0x2c0d, 2460, 1},
{0x1040b, 3270, 1},
{0x0047, 18, 1},
{0x040b, 1019, 1},
{0x0230, 571, 1},
{0x1f0b, 2091, 1},
{0x2c0b, 2454, 1},
{0x10409, 3264, 1},
{0x10405, 3252, 1},
{0x0409, 1013, 1},
{0x0405, 1001, 1},
{0x1f09, 2085, 1},
{0x2c09, 2448, 1},
{0x2c05, 2436, 1},
{0x10403, 3246, 1},
{0x10401, 3240, 1},
{0x0403, 995, 1},
{0x0401, 989, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c03, 2430, 1},
{0x2c01, 2424, 1},
{0x13f9, 1691, 1},
{0x042f, 983, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x1f2f, 2145, 1},
{0x1041f, 3330, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x041f, 935, 1},
{0x023d, 378, 1},
{0x10411, 3288, 1},
{0x2c1f, 2514, 1},
{0x0411, 893, 1},
{0x0547, 1400, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c11, 2472, 1},
{0x10407, 3258, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0407, 1007, 1},
{0x24c1, 2376, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x2c07, 2442, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x13f8, 1688, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff39, 3231, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0243, 354, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0x0241, 586, 1},
{0xff29, 3183, 1},
{0x023b, 577, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff27, 3177, 1},
{0xff25, 3171, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff23, 3165, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff21, 3159, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb17, 117, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xff2f, 3201, 1},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb15, 113, 2},
{0xfb13, 121, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb05, 29, 2},
{0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0}, {0xffffffff, -1, 0},
{0xfb03, 0, 3},
{0xfb01, 8, 2}
};
if (0 == 0)
{
int key = hash(&code);
if (key <= MAX_HASH_VALUE && key >= 0)
{
OnigCodePoint gcode = wordlist[key].code;
if (code == gcode)
return &wordlist[key];
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A stack out-of-bounds write in onigenc_unicode_get_case_fold_codes_by_str() occurs during regular expression compilation. Code point 0xFFFFFFFF is not properly handled in unicode_unfold_key(). A malformed regular expression could result in 4 bytes being written off the end of a stack buffer of expand_case_fold_string() during the call to onigenc_unicode_get_case_fold_codes_by_str(), a typical stack buffer overflow.
Commit Message: fix #56 : return invalid result for codepoint 0xFFFFFFFF | High | 168,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AppCache::AddOrModifyEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
std::pair<EntryMap::iterator, bool> ret =
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
if (!ret.second)
ret.first->second.add_types(entry.types());
else
cache_size_ += entry.response_size(); // New entry. Add to cache size.
return ret.second;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ClipPaintPropertyNode* ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root() {
DEFINE_STATIC_REF(
ClipPaintPropertyNode, root,
(ClipPaintPropertyNode::Create(
nullptr, State{TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
FloatRoundedRect(LayoutRect::InfiniteIntRect())})));
return root;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void bump_cpu_timer(struct k_itimer *timer, u64 now)
{
int i;
u64 delta, incr;
if (timer->it.cpu.incr == 0)
return;
if (now < timer->it.cpu.expires)
return;
incr = timer->it.cpu.incr;
delta = now + incr - timer->it.cpu.expires;
/* Don't use (incr*2 < delta), incr*2 might overflow. */
for (i = 0; incr < delta - incr; i++)
incr = incr << 1;
for (; i >= 0; incr >>= 1, i--) {
if (delta < incr)
continue;
timer->it.cpu.expires += incr;
timer->it_overrun += 1 << i;
delta -= incr;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An Integer Overflow in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the POSIX timer code is caused by the way the overrun accounting works. Depending on interval and expiry time values, the overrun can be larger than INT_MAX, but the accounting is int based. This basically makes the accounting values, which are visible to user space via timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun, random. For example, a local user can cause a denial of service (signed integer overflow) via crafted mmap, futex, timer_create, and timer_settime system calls.
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] | Low | 169,177 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: perform_transform_test(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 0))
{
png_uint_32 counter = 0;
size_t base_pos;
char name[64];
base_pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, 0, "transform:");
for (;;)
{
size_t pos = base_pos;
PNG_CONST image_transform *list = 0;
/* 'max' is currently hardwired to '1'; this should be settable on the
* command line.
*/
counter = image_transform_add(&list, 1/*max*/, counter,
name, sizeof name, &pos, colour_type, bit_depth);
if (counter == 0)
break;
/* The command line can change this to checking interlaced images. */
do
{
pm->repeat = 0;
transform_test(pm, FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
pm->interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), list, name);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
while (pm->repeat);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
gfx::Point location_in_bar(event->location());
ConvertPointToTarget(this, this->progress_bar_, &location_in_bar);
if (event->type() != ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP ||
!progress_bar_->GetLocalBounds().Contains(location_in_bar)) {
return;
}
HandleSeeking(location_in_bar);
event->SetHandled();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | Low | 172,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in modal dialog handling in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to prevent a full screen warning from being displayed via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884} | Medium | 172,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* Release rx options */
skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Free flowlabels */
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
/* Free tx options */
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OPENSSL_fork_child(void)
{
rand_fork();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-330
Summary: OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c).
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TraceEvent::AppendAsJSON(
std::string* out,
const ArgumentFilterPredicate& argument_filter_predicate) const {
int64 time_int64 = timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
int process_id = TraceLog::GetInstance()->process_id();
const char* category_group_name =
TraceLog::GetCategoryGroupName(category_group_enabled_);
DCHECK(!strchr(name_, '"'));
StringAppendF(out, "{\"pid\":%i,\"tid\":%i,\"ts\":%" PRId64
","
"\"ph\":\"%c\",\"cat\":\"%s\",\"name\":\"%s\",\"args\":",
process_id, thread_id_, time_int64, phase_, category_group_name,
name_);
bool strip_args = arg_names_[0] && !argument_filter_predicate.is_null() &&
!argument_filter_predicate.Run(category_group_name, name_);
if (strip_args) {
*out += "\"__stripped__\"";
} else {
*out += "{";
for (int i = 0; i < kTraceMaxNumArgs && arg_names_[i]; ++i) {
if (i > 0)
*out += ",";
*out += "\"";
*out += arg_names_[i];
*out += "\":";
if (arg_types_[i] == TRACE_VALUE_TYPE_CONVERTABLE)
convertable_values_[i]->AppendAsTraceFormat(out);
else
AppendValueAsJSON(arg_types_[i], arg_values_[i], out);
}
*out += "}";
}
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_COMPLETE) {
int64 duration = duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"dur\":%" PRId64, duration);
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_duration = thread_duration_.ToInternalValue();
if (thread_duration != -1)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tdur\":%" PRId64, thread_duration);
}
}
if (!thread_timestamp_.is_null()) {
int64 thread_time_int64 = thread_timestamp_.ToInternalValue();
StringAppendF(out, ",\"tts\":%" PRId64, thread_time_int64);
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_ASYNC_TTS) {
StringAppendF(out, ", \"use_async_tts\":1");
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"", static_cast<uint64>(id_));
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_BIND_TO_ENCLOSING)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bp\":\"e\"");
if ((flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT) ||
(flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)) {
StringAppendF(out, ",\"bind_id\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(bind_id_));
}
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_IN)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_in\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_FLOW_OUT)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"flow_out\":true");
if (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_HAS_CONTEXT_ID)
StringAppendF(out, ",\"cid\":\"0x%" PRIx64 "\"",
static_cast<uint64>(context_id_));
if (phase_ == TRACE_EVENT_PHASE_INSTANT) {
char scope = '?';
switch (flags_ & TRACE_EVENT_FLAG_SCOPE_MASK) {
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_GLOBAL;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_PROCESS:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_PROCESS;
break;
case TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD:
scope = TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_NAME_THREAD;
break;
}
StringAppendF(out, ",\"s\":\"%c\"", scope);
}
*out += "}";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690} | High | 171,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. | Medium | 166,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int rds_ib_laddr_check(__be32 addr)
{
int ret;
struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
/* Create a CMA ID and try to bind it. This catches both
* IB and iWARP capable NICs.
*/
cm_id = rdma_create_id(NULL, NULL, RDMA_PS_TCP, IB_QPT_RC);
if (IS_ERR(cm_id))
return PTR_ERR(cm_id);
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
/* rdma_bind_addr will only succeed for IB & iWARP devices */
ret = rdma_bind_addr(cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&sin);
/* due to this, we will claim to support iWARP devices unless we
check node_type. */
if (ret || cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_IB_CA)
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
rdsdebug("addr %pI4 ret %d node type %d\n",
&addr, ret,
cm_id->device ? cm_id->device->node_type : -1);
rdma_destroy_id(cm_id);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The rds_ib_laddr_check function in net/rds/ib.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a bind system call for an RDS socket on a system that lacks RDS transports.
Commit Message: rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Output buffer check */
ret = ihevcd_check_out_buf_size(ps_codec);
RETURN_IF((ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS), ret);
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = MAX(0, (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx - 1));
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: A vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63045918.
Commit Message: Fix slice decrement for skipped slices
Test: run the poc with and without the patch
Bug: 63045918
Change-Id: I27804d42c55480c25303d1a5dbb43b1d86d7fa94
(cherry picked from commit 272f2c23c8ba8579adb0618b4124163b9bf086fb)
| High | 173,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned int ReferenceSAD(unsigned int max_sad, int block_idx = 0) {
unsigned int sad = 0;
const uint8_t* const reference = GetReference(block_idx);
for (int h = 0; h < height_; ++h) {
for (int w = 0; w < width_; ++w) {
sad += abs(source_data_[h * source_stride_ + w]
- reference[h * reference_stride_ + w]);
}
if (sad > max_sad) {
break;
}
}
return sad;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,574 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*image->columns*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*image->columns*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The quantum handling code in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error or out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105 | Medium | 168,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: base::string16 FormatBookmarkURLForDisplay(const GURL& url) {
return url_formatter::FormatUrl(
url, url_formatter::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~url_formatter::kFormatUrlOmitUsernamePassword,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Bookmark handling in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android had insufficient validation of supplied data, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via crafted HTML pages, as demonstrated by an interpretation conflict between userinfo and scheme in an http://javascript:
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:[email protected] is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467} | Medium | 172,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dhcp6opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct dhcp6opt *dh6o;
const u_char *tp;
size_t i;
uint16_t opttype;
size_t optlen;
uint8_t auth_proto;
u_int authinfolen, authrealmlen;
int remain_len; /* Length of remaining options */
int label_len; /* Label length */
uint16_t subopt_code;
uint16_t subopt_len;
if (cp == ep)
return;
while (cp < ep) {
if (ep < cp + sizeof(*dh6o))
goto trunc;
dh6o = (const struct dhcp6opt *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(*dh6o);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh6o->dh6opt_len);
if (ep < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)
goto trunc;
opttype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh6o->dh6opt_type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "opt_%u", opttype)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(cp + sizeof(*dh6o)), optlen);
switch (opttype) {
case DH6OPT_CLIENTID:
case DH6OPT_SERVERID:
if (optlen < 2) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)) {
case 1:
if (optlen >= 2 + 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hwaddr/time type %u time %u ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[2]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4])));
for (i = 8; i < optlen; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
case 2:
if (optlen >= 2 + 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vid "));
for (i = 2; i < 2 + 8; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
case 3:
if (optlen >= 2 + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hwaddr type %u ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[2])));
for (i = 4; i < optlen; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type %d)", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
break;
}
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_ADDR:
if (optlen < 24) {
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pltime:%u vltime:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[16]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[20])));
if (optlen > 24) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 24, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_ORO:
case DH6OPT_ERO:
if (optlen % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
for (i = 0; i < optlen; i += 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
tok2str(dh6opt_str, "opt_%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[i]))));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_PREFERENCE:
if (optlen != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", *tp));
break;
case DH6OPT_ELAPSED_TIME:
if (optlen != 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_RELAY_MSG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
dhcp6_print(ndo, tp, optlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTH:
if (optlen < 11) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
auth_proto = *tp;
switch (auth_proto) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_DELAYED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: delayed"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_RECONFIG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: reconfigure"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " proto: %d", auth_proto));
break;
}
tp++;
switch (*tp) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHALG_HMACMD5:
/* XXX: may depend on the protocol */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", alg: HMAC-MD5"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", alg: %d", *tp));
break;
}
tp++;
switch (*tp) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHRDM_MONOCOUNTER:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RDM: mono"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RDM: %d", *tp));
break;
}
tp++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RD:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp += 2)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tp)));
/* protocol dependent part */
authinfolen = optlen - 11;
switch (auth_proto) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_DELAYED:
if (authinfolen == 0)
break;
if (authinfolen < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
authrealmlen = authinfolen - 20;
if (authrealmlen > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", realm: "));
}
for (i = 0; i < authrealmlen; i++, tp++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *tp));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", key ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
tp += 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", HMAC-MD5:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp+= 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHPROTO_RECONFIG:
if (authinfolen != 17) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
switch (*tp++) {
case DH6OPT_AUTHRECONFIG_KEY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reconfig-key"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AUTHRECONFIG_HMACMD5:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type: HMAC-MD5"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type: ??"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value:"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, tp+= 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ??"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_RAPID_COMMIT: /* nothing todo */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_INTERFACE_ID:
case DH6OPT_SUBSCRIBER_ID:
/*
* Since we cannot predict the encoding, print hex dump
* at most 10 characters.
*/
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen && i < 10; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_RECONF_MSG:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (*tp) {
case DH6_RENEW:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for renew)"));
break;
case DH6_INFORM_REQ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for inf-req)"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " for ?\?\?(%02x))", *tp));
break;
}
break;
case DH6OPT_RECONF_ACCEPT: /* nothing todo */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_SIP_SERVER_A:
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_NIS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_NISP_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_BCMCS_SERVER_A:
case DH6OPT_PANA_AGENT:
case DH6OPT_LQ_CLIENT_LINK:
if (optlen % 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
for (i = 0; i < optlen; i += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[i])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_SIP_SERVER_D:
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
while (tp < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)) == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_STATUS_CODE:
if (optlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s)", dhcp6stcode(EXTRACT_16BITS(&tp[0]))));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_NA:
case DH6OPT_IA_PD:
if (optlen < 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " IAID:%u T1:%u T2:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[8])));
if (optlen > 12) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 12, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_TA:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " IAID:%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
if (optlen > 4) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 4, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_IA_PD_PREFIX:
if (optlen < 25) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s/%d", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[9]), tp[8]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pltime:%u vltime:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tp[4])));
if (optlen > 25) {
/* there are sub-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 25, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LIFETIME:
case DH6OPT_CLT_TIME:
if (optlen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d)", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
break;
case DH6OPT_REMOTE_ID:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d ", EXTRACT_32BITS(tp)));
/*
* Print hex dump first 10 characters.
*/
for (i = 4; i < optlen && i < 14; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LQ_QUERY:
if (optlen < 17) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
switch (*tp) {
case 1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " by-address"));
break;
case 2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " by-clientID"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type_%d", (int)*tp));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[1])));
if (optlen > 17) {
/* there are query-options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp + 17, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_CLIENT_DATA:
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
if (optlen > 0) {
/* there are encapsulated options */
dhcp6opt_print(ndo, tp, tp + optlen);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_LQ_RELAY_DATA:
if (optlen < 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s ", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
/*
* Print hex dump first 10 characters.
*/
for (i = 16; i < optlen && i < 26; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", tp[i]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
break;
case DH6OPT_NTP_SERVER:
if (optlen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
while (tp < cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen - 4) {
subopt_code = EXTRACT_16BITS(tp);
tp += 2;
subopt_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tp);
tp += 2;
if (tp + subopt_len > cp + sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subopt:%d", subopt_code));
switch (subopt_code) {
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_SRV_ADDR:
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_MC_ADDR:
if (subopt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &tp[0])));
break;
case DH6OPT_NTP_SUBOPTION_SRV_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (ns_nprint(ndo, tp, tp + subopt_len) == NULL)
goto trunc;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
tp += subopt_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_AFTR_NAME:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
remain_len = optlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
/* Encoding is described in section 3.1 of RFC 1035 */
while (remain_len && *tp) {
label_len = *tp++;
if (label_len < remain_len - 1) {
(void)fn_printn(ndo, tp, label_len, NULL);
tp += label_len;
remain_len -= (label_len + 1);
if(*tp) ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?"));
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case DH6OPT_NEW_POSIX_TIMEZONE: /* all three of these options */
case DH6OPT_NEW_TZDB_TIMEZONE: /* are encoded similarly */
case DH6OPT_MUDURL: /* although GMT might not work */
if (optlen < 5) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?)"));
break;
}
tp = (const u_char *)(dh6o + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "="));
(void)fn_printn(ndo, tp, (u_int)optlen, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
}
cp += sizeof(*dh6o) + optlen;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|dhcp6ext]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DHCPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-dhcp6.c:dhcp6opt_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13017/DHCPv6: Add a missing option length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | High | 167,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
err = 0;
if (_kctl) {
if (replace)
err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
else
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (replace)
err = -ENOENT;
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the tlv handler functionality in the snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv function in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::RunTests(const std::string& filter) {
RUN_TEST(Basics, filter);
RUN_TEST(RunWithoutQuit, filter);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 172,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod7Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod7");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<DOMStringList>, arrayArg, v8ValueToWebCoreDOMStringList(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->overloadedMethod(arrayArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gst_vorbis_tag_add_coverart (GstTagList * tags, const gchar * img_data_base64,
gint base64_len)
{
GstBuffer *img;
guchar *img_data;
gsize img_len;
guint save = 0;
gint state = 0;
if (base64_len < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
img_data = g_try_malloc0 (base64_len * 3 / 4);
if (img_data == NULL)
goto alloc_failed;
img_len = g_base64_decode_step (img_data_base64, base64_len, img_data,
&state, &save);
if (img_len == 0)
goto decode_failed;
img = gst_tag_image_data_to_image_buffer (img_data, img_len,
GST_TAG_IMAGE_TYPE_NONE);
if (img == NULL)
gst_tag_list_add (tags, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
gst_buffer_unref (img);
g_free (img_data);
return;
/* ERRORS */
{
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
return;
}
alloc_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't allocate enough memory to decode COVERART tag");
return;
}
decode_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't decode bas64 image data from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
convert_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't extract image or image type from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the gst_vorbis_tag_add_coverart function (gst-libs/gst/tag/gstvorbistag.c) in vorbistag in gst-plugins-base (aka gstreamer-plugins-base) before 0.10.23 in GStreamer allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted COVERART tag that is converted from a base64 representation, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: | High | 164,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
input_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kInputBufferSize + 1)) + 1;
output_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kOutputBufferSize));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_pps(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 pps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = value;
if((pps_id >= MAX_PPS_CNT) || (pps_id < 0))
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pps_done)
return IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_PPS_ID;
else
pps_id = 0;
}
ps_pps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + MAX_PPS_CNT - 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
UEV_PARSE("seq_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = value;
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = CLIP3(ps_pps->i1_sps_id, 0, MAX_SPS_CNT - 2);
ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + ps_pps->i1_sps_id);
/* If the SPS that is being referred to has not been parsed,
* copy an existing SPS to the current location */
if(0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid)
{
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
/*
sps_t *ps_sps_ref = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
while(0 == ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_valid)
ps_sps_ref++;
ihevcd_copy_sps(ps_codec, ps_pps->i1_sps_id, ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_id);
*/
}
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("output_flag_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("num_extra_slice_header_bits", value, ps_bitstrm, 3);
ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits = value;
BITS_PARSE("sign_data_hiding_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_sign_data_hiding_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active = value + 1;
SEV_PARSE("pic_init_qp_minus26", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_init_qp = value + 26;
BITS_PARSE("constrained_intra_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_constrained_intra_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transform_skip_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transform_skip_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("diff_cu_qp_delta_depth", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = value;
}
else
{
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = 0;
}
ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size = ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size - ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cb_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cr_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
BITS_PARSE("slicelevel_chroma_qp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_bipred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transquant_bypass_enable_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transquant_bypass_enable_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag = value;
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_columns_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_rows_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = value + 1;
if((ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
BITS_PARSE("uniform_spacing_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = value;
{
WORD32 start;
WORD32 i, j;
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("column_width_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + j * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + i;
ps_tile->u1_pos_x = start;
ps_tile->u2_wd = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows); i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("row_height_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + i * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + j;
ps_tile->u1_pos_y = start;
ps_tile->u2_ht = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
}
else
{
/* If tiles are not present, set first tile in each PPS to have tile
width and height equal to picture width and height */
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = 1;
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = 1;
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = 1;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_x = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_y = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_wd = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_ht = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_control_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag = value;
/* Default values */
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = 0;
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
if(!ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("pps_beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("pps_tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag)
{
COPY_DEFAULT_SCALING_LIST(ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
ihevcd_scaling_list_data(ps_codec, ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
}
BITS_PARSE("lists_modification_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("log2_parallel_merge_level_minus2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_log2_parallel_merge_level = value + 2;
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag = value;
/* Not present in HM */
BITS_PARSE("pps_extension_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_codec->i4_pps_done = 1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process.Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34064500.
Commit Message: Correct Tiles rows and cols check
Bug: 36231493
Bug: 34064500
Change-Id: Ib17b2c68360685c5a2c019e1497612a130f9f76a
(cherry picked from commit 07ef4e7138e0e13d61039530358343a19308b188)
| High | 174,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_memory_stat(php_stream *stream, php_stream_statbuf *ssb TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
time_t timestamp = 0;
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
memset(ssb, 0, sizeof(php_stream_statbuf));
/* read-only across the board */
ssb->sb.st_mode = ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY ? 0444 : 0666;
ssb->sb.st_size = ms->fsize;
ssb->sb.st_mode |= S_IFREG; /* regular file */
#ifdef NETWARE
ssb->sb.st_mtime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime.tv_sec = timestamp;
#else
ssb->sb.st_mtime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime = timestamp;
#endif
ssb->sb.st_nlink = 1;
ssb->sb.st_rdev = -1;
/* this is only for APC, so use /dev/null device - no chance of conflict there! */
ssb->sb.st_dev = 0xC;
/* generate unique inode number for alias/filename, so no phars will conflict */
ssb->sb.st_ino = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
ssb->sb.st_blksize = -1;
#endif
#if !defined(PHP_WIN32) && !defined(__BEOS__)
ssb->sb.st_blocks = -1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=arab}][\u064b-\u0655\u0670]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=hebr}]\u05b4|)"
R"([ijl\u0131]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Change the script mixing policy to highly restrictive
The current script mixing policy (moderately restricitive) allows
mixing of Latin-ASCII and one non-Latin script (unless the non-Latin
script is Cyrillic or Greek).
This CL tightens up the policy to block mixing of Latin-ASCII and
a non-Latin script unless the non-Latin script is Chinese (Hanzi,
Bopomofo), Japanese (Kanji, Hiragana, Katakana) or Korean (Hangul,
Hanja).
Major gTLDs (.net/.org/.com) do not allow the registration of
a domain that has both Latin and a non-Latin script. The only
exception is names with Latin + Chinese/Japanese/Korean scripts.
The same is true of ccTLDs with IDNs.
Given the above registration rules of major gTLDs and ccTLDs, allowing
mixing of Latin and non-Latin other than CJK has no practical effect. In
the meantime, domain names in TLDs with a laxer policy on script mixing
would be subject to a potential spoofing attempt with the current
moderately restrictive script mixing policy. To protect users from those
risks, there are a few ad-hoc rules in place.
By switching to highly restrictive those ad-hoc rules can be removed
simplifying the IDN display policy implementation a bit.
This is also coordinated with Mozilla. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1399939 .
BUG=726950, 756226, 756456, 756735, 770465
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ib96d0d588f7fcda38ffa0ce59e98a5bd5b439116
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/688825
Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#506561} | Medium | 172,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access,
unsigned long trans_exc_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long address;
unsigned int flags;
int fault;
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
* user context.
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
if (unlikely(!user_space_fault(trans_exc_code) || in_atomic() || !mm))
goto out;
address = trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (access == VM_WRITE || (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto out_up;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
address &= HPAGE_MASK;
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check will
* be repeated. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_PER_TRAP);
fault = 0;
out_up:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out:
return fault;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Gfx::Gfx(XRef *xrefA, OutputDev *outA, int pageNum, Dict *resDict, Catalog *catalogA,
double hDPI, double vDPI, PDFRectangle *box,
PDFRectangle *cropBox, int rotate,
GBool (*abortCheckCbkA)(void *data),
void *abortCheckCbkDataA)
#ifdef USE_CMS
: iccColorSpaceCache(5)
#endif
{
int i;
xref = xrefA;
catalog = catalogA;
subPage = gFalse;
printCommands = globalParams->getPrintCommands();
profileCommands = globalParams->getProfileCommands();
textHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
drawText = gFalse;
maskHaveCSPattern = gFalse;
mcStack = NULL;
res = new GfxResources(xref, resDict, NULL);
out = outA;
state = new GfxState(hDPI, vDPI, box, rotate, out->upsideDown());
stackHeight = 1;
pushStateGuard();
fontChanged = gFalse;
clip = clipNone;
ignoreUndef = 0;
out->startPage(pageNum, state);
out->setDefaultCTM(state->getCTM());
out->updateAll(state);
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
baseMatrix[i] = state->getCTM()[i];
}
formDepth = 0;
abortCheckCbk = abortCheckCbkA;
abortCheckCbkData = abortCheckCbkDataA;
if (cropBox) {
state->moveTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y1);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x2, cropBox->y2);
state->lineTo(cropBox->x1, cropBox->y2);
state->closePath();
state->clip();
out->clip(state);
state->clearPath();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Gfx::getPos function in the PDF parser in xpdf before 3.02pl5, poppler 0.8.7 and possibly other versions up to 0.15.1, CUPS, kdegraphics, and possibly other products allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via unknown vectors that trigger an uninitialized pointer dereference.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to decode default wallpaper. ";
return;
}
*result_out = std::move(user_image);
WallpaperInfo info(path.value(), layout, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetWallpaper((*result_out)->image(), info);
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982} | Medium | 171,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: INST_HANDLER (cpse) { // CPSE Rd, Rr
int r = (buf[0] & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x2) << 3);
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
RAnalOp next_op;
avr_op_analyze (anal,
&next_op,
op->addr + op->size, buf + op->size, len - op->size,
cpu);
r_strbuf_fini (&next_op.esil);
op->jump = op->addr + next_op.size + 2;
op->cycles = 1; // XXX: This is a bug, because depends on eval state,
ESIL_A ("r%d,r%d,^,!,", r, d); // Rr == Rd
ESIL_A ("?{,%"PFMT64d",pc,=,},", op->jump); // ?true => jmp
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The r_strbuf_fini() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid free and application crash) via a crafted ELF file because of an uninitialized variable in the CPSE handler in libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c.
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr | Medium | 169,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))
)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
} else {
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!IS_LETTER(c) && (c != '_') &&
(c != ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
if ((*ctxt->input->cur == '\n') && (ctxt->input->cur[-1] == '\r'))
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - (len + 1), len));
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,297 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: rx_cache_find(const struct rx_header *rxh, const struct ip *ip, int sport,
int32_t *opcode)
{
int i;
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
uint32_t clip;
uint32_t sip;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&clip, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&sip, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
/* Start the search where we last left off */
i = rx_cache_hint;
do {
rxent = &rx_cache[i];
if (rxent->callnum == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber) &&
rxent->client.s_addr == clip &&
rxent->server.s_addr == sip &&
rxent->serviceId == EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->serviceId) &&
rxent->dport == sport) {
/* We got a match! */
rx_cache_hint = i;
*opcode = rxent->opcode;
return(1);
}
if (++i >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
i = 0;
} while (i != rx_cache_hint);
/* Our search failed */
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Rx parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-rx.c:rx_cache_find() and rx_cache_insert().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 169,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Invoke completion routine to fetch data from host. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A Denial Of Service vulnerability in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 exists due to a NULL pointer dereference in copyIPv6IfDifferent in pcpserver.c.
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument | Medium | 169,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A missing check for JS-simulated input events in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to download arbitrary files with no user input via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051} | Low | 173,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PersistentHistogramAllocator::RecordCreateHistogramResult(
CreateHistogramResultType result) {
HistogramBase* result_histogram = GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
if (result_histogram)
result_histogram->Add(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986} | Medium | 172,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void jas_matrix_asr(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int n)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
int rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
assert(n >= 0);
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = jas_seqent_asr(*data, n);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ath_tx_aggr_sleep(struct ieee80211_sta *sta, struct ath_softc *sc,
struct ath_node *an)
{
struct ath_atx_tid *tid;
struct ath_atx_ac *ac;
struct ath_txq *txq;
bool buffered;
int tidno;
for (tidno = 0, tid = &an->tid[tidno];
tidno < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; tidno++, tid++) {
if (!tid->sched)
continue;
ac = tid->ac;
txq = ac->txq;
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
buffered = ath_tid_has_buffered(tid);
tid->sched = false;
list_del(&tid->list);
if (ac->sched) {
ac->sched = false;
list_del(&ac->list);
}
ath_txq_unlock(sc, txq);
ieee80211_sta_set_buffered(sta, tidno, buffered);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ath_tx_aggr_sleep function in drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a large amount of network traffic that triggers certain list deletions.
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> | High | 166,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TIFF_MetaHandler::ProcessXMP()
{
this->processedXMP = true; // Make sure we only come through here once.
bool found;
bool readOnly = ((this->parent->openFlags & kXMPFiles_OpenForUpdate) == 0);
if ( readOnly ) {
this->psirMgr = new PSIR_MemoryReader();
this->iptcMgr = new IPTC_Reader();
} else {
this->psirMgr = new PSIR_FileWriter();
this->iptcMgr = new IPTC_Writer(); // ! Parse it later.
}
TIFF_Manager & tiff = this->tiffMgr; // Give the compiler help in recognizing non-aliases.
PSIR_Manager & psir = *this->psirMgr;
IPTC_Manager & iptc = *this->iptcMgr;
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo psirInfo;
bool havePSIR = tiff.GetTag ( kTIFF_PrimaryIFD, kTIFF_PSIR, &psirInfo );
if ( havePSIR ) { // ! Do the Photoshop 6 integration before other legacy analysis.
psir.ParseMemoryResources ( psirInfo.dataPtr, psirInfo.dataLen );
PSIR_Manager::ImgRsrcInfo buriedExif;
found = psir.GetImgRsrc ( kPSIR_Exif, &buriedExif );
if ( found ) {
tiff.IntegrateFromPShop6 ( buriedExif.dataPtr, buriedExif.dataLen );
if ( ! readOnly ) psir.DeleteImgRsrc ( kPSIR_Exif );
}
}
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo iptcInfo;
bool haveIPTC = tiff.GetTag ( kTIFF_PrimaryIFD, kTIFF_IPTC, &iptcInfo ); // The TIFF IPTC tag.
int iptcDigestState = kDigestMatches;
if ( haveIPTC ) {
bool haveDigest = false;
PSIR_Manager::ImgRsrcInfo digestInfo;
if ( havePSIR ) haveDigest = psir.GetImgRsrc ( kPSIR_IPTCDigest, &digestInfo );
if ( digestInfo.dataLen != 16 ) haveDigest = false;
if ( ! haveDigest ) {
iptcDigestState = kDigestMissing;
} else {
iptcDigestState = PhotoDataUtils::CheckIPTCDigest ( iptcInfo.dataPtr, iptcInfo.dataLen, digestInfo.dataPtr );
if ( (iptcDigestState == kDigestDiffers) && (kTIFF_TypeSizes[iptcInfo.type] > 1) ) {
XMP_Uns8 * endPtr = (XMP_Uns8*)iptcInfo.dataPtr + iptcInfo.dataLen - 1;
XMP_Uns8 * minPtr = endPtr - kTIFF_TypeSizes[iptcInfo.type] + 1;
while ( (endPtr >= minPtr) && (*endPtr == 0) ) --endPtr;
iptcDigestState = PhotoDataUtils::CheckIPTCDigest ( iptcInfo.dataPtr, unpaddedLen, digestInfo.dataPtr );
}
}
}
XMP_OptionBits options = k2XMP_FileHadExif; // TIFF files are presumed to have Exif legacy.
if ( haveIPTC ) options |= k2XMP_FileHadIPTC;
if ( this->containsXMP ) options |= k2XMP_FileHadXMP;
bool haveXMP = false;
if ( ! this->xmpPacket.empty() ) {
XMP_Assert ( this->containsXMP );
XMP_StringPtr packetStr = this->xmpPacket.c_str();
XMP_StringLen packetLen = (XMP_StringLen)this->xmpPacket.size();
try {
this->xmpObj.ParseFromBuffer ( packetStr, packetLen );
} catch ( ... ) { /* Ignore parsing failures, someday we hope to get partial XMP back. */ }
haveXMP = true;
}
if ( haveIPTC && (! haveXMP) && (iptcDigestState == kDigestMatches) ) iptcDigestState = kDigestMissing;
bool parseIPTC = (iptcDigestState != kDigestMatches) || (! readOnly);
if ( parseIPTC ) iptc.ParseMemoryDataSets ( iptcInfo.dataPtr, iptcInfo.dataLen );
ImportPhotoData ( tiff, iptc, psir, iptcDigestState, &this->xmpObj, options );
this->containsXMP = true; // Assume we now have something in the XMP.
} // TIFF_MetaHandler::ProcessXMP
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi through 2.4.4. XMPFiles/source/FileHandlers/TIFF_Handler.cpp mishandles a case of a zero length, leading to a heap-based buffer over-read in the MD5Update() function in third-party/zuid/interfaces/MD5.cpp.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SetupMockGroup() {
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpResponseInfo> info(MakeMockResponseInfo());
const int kMockInfoSize = GetResponseInfoSize(info.get());
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> group(
new AppCacheGroup(service_->storage(), kManifestUrl, kMockGroupId));
scoped_refptr<AppCache> cache(
new AppCache(service_->storage(), kMockCacheId));
cache->AddEntry(
kManifestUrl,
AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST, kMockResponseId,
kMockInfoSize + kMockBodySize));
cache->set_complete(true);
group->AddCache(cache.get());
mock_storage()->AddStoredGroup(group.get());
mock_storage()->AddStoredCache(cache.get());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma_create_xprt(struct svc_serv *serv,
int listener)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *cma_xprt = kzalloc(sizeof *cma_xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cma_xprt)
return NULL;
svc_xprt_init(&init_net, &svc_rdma_class, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt, serv);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_accept_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_read_complete_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxts);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_maps);
init_waitqueue_head(&cma_xprt->sc_send_wait);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_map_lock);
/*
* Note that this implies that the underlying transport support
* has some form of congestion control (see RFC 7530 section 3.1
* paragraph 2). For now, we assume that all supported RDMA
* transports are suitable here.
*/
set_bit(XPT_CONG_CTRL, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
if (listener)
set_bit(XPT_LISTENER, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
return cma_xprt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetNext(const Cluster* pCurr) {
assert(pCurr);
assert(pCurr != &m_eos);
assert(m_clusters);
long idx = pCurr->m_index;
if (idx >= 0) {
assert(m_clusterCount > 0);
assert(idx < m_clusterCount);
assert(pCurr == m_clusters[idx]);
++idx;
if (idx >= m_clusterCount)
return &m_eos; // caller will LoadCluster as desired
Cluster* const pNext = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index >= 0);
assert(pNext->m_index == idx);
return pNext;
}
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
long long pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
assert(m_size >= 0); // TODO
const long long stop = m_start + m_size; // end of segment
{
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(id == 0x0F43B675); // Cluster ID
if (id != 0x0F43B675)
return NULL;
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size > 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
pos += size; // consume payload
}
long long off_next = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long idpos = pos; // pos of next (potential) cluster
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
assert(id > 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) { // Cluster ID
const long long off_next_ = idpos - m_start;
long long pos_;
long len_;
const long status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, off_next_, pos_, len_);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0) {
off_next = off_next_;
break;
}
}
pos += size; // consume payload
}
if (off_next <= 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
Cluster** i = ii;
Cluster** const jj = ii + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pNext = *k;
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index < 0);
pos = pNext->GetPosition();
if (pos < off_next)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > off_next)
j = k;
else
return pNext;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pNext = Cluster::Create(this, -1, off_next);
assert(pNext);
const ptrdiff_t idx_next = i - m_clusters; // insertion position
PreloadCluster(pNext, idx_next);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx_next < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx_next] == pNext);
return pNext;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Init(const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
PP_Module pp_module,
PP_GetInterface_Func local_get_interface,
const ppapi::Preferences& preferences,
SyncMessageStatusReceiver* status_receiver) {
dispatcher_delegate_.reset(new ProxyChannelDelegate);
dispatcher_.reset(new ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher(
pp_module, local_get_interface, status_receiver));
if (!dispatcher_->InitHostWithChannel(dispatcher_delegate_.get(),
channel_handle,
true, // Client.
preferences)) {
dispatcher_.reset();
dispatcher_delegate_.reset();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,735 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Initialize(uint32 session_id) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_XP)
launch_elevated_ = false;
if (launch_elevated_) {
process_exit_event_.Set(CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL));
if (!process_exit_event_.IsValid()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create a nameless event";
return false;
}
io_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Core::InitializeJob, this));
}
return CreateSessionToken(session_id, &session_token_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vrend_create_vertex_elements_state(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
unsigned num_elements,
const struct pipe_vertex_element *elements)
{
struct vrend_vertex_element_array *v = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_vertex_element_array);
const struct util_format_description *desc;
GLenum type;
int i;
uint32_t ret_handle;
if (!v)
return ENOMEM;
v->count = num_elements;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
memcpy(&v->elements[i].base, &elements[i], sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
FREE(v);
return EINVAL;
}
type = GL_FALSE;
if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_FLOAT) {
if (desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_FLOAT;
else if (desc->channel[0].size == 64)
type = GL_DOUBLE;
else if (desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_HALF_FLOAT;
} else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 8)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 8)
type = GL_BYTE;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_SHORT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_INT;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_SSCALED ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_SNORM ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_B10G10R10A2_SNORM)
type = GL_INT_2_10_10_10_REV;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_USCALED ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_UNORM ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_B10G10R10A2_UNORM)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R11G11B10_FLOAT)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV;
if (type == GL_FALSE) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_VERTEX_FORMAT, elements[i].src_format);
FREE(v);
return EINVAL;
}
v->elements[i].type = type;
if (desc->channel[0].normalized)
v->elements[i].norm = GL_TRUE;
if (desc->nr_channels == 4 && desc->swizzle[0] == UTIL_FORMAT_SWIZZLE_Z)
v->elements[i].nr_chan = GL_BGRA;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R11G11B10_FLOAT)
v->elements[i].nr_chan = 3;
else
v->elements[i].nr_chan = desc->nr_channels;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the vrend_create_vertex_elements_state function in vrend_renderer.c in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access and crash) via the num_elements parameter.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const
{
return m_info.seekPreRoll;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(strArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshcomp *comp;
int r, mode;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && comp->enabled &&
(r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl_parse_certificate( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t i, n;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state++;
/*
* Check if the client sent an empty certificate
*/
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
ssl->in_msg[1] == SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_MISSING;
if( ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
return( 0 );
else
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
}
}
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->minor_ver != SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( ssl->in_hslen == 7 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 4, "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_MISSING;
if( ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
else
return( 0 );
}
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || ssl->in_hslen < 10 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
/*
* Same message structure as in ssl_write_certificate()
*/
n = ( ssl->in_msg[5] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[6];
if( ssl->in_msg[4] != 0 || ssl->in_hslen != 7 + n )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = (x509_cert *) malloc(
sizeof( x509_cert ) ) ) == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "malloc(%d bytes) failed",
sizeof( x509_cert ) ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
}
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, 0, sizeof( x509_cert ) );
i = 7;
while( i < ssl->in_hslen )
{
if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 )
| (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2];
i += 3;
if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
ret = x509parse_crt( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, ssl->in_msg + i,
n );
if( ret != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " x509parse_crt", ret );
return( ret );
}
i += n;
}
SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
if( ssl->authmode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
if( ssl->ca_chain == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED );
}
ret = x509parse_verify( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
ssl->ca_chain, ssl->ca_crl,
ssl->peer_cn, &ssl->verify_result,
ssl->f_vrfy, ssl->p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
if( ssl->authmode != SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
ret = 0;
}
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x509parse_crt function in x509.h in PolarSSL 1.1.x before 1.1.7 and 1.2.x before 1.2.8 does not properly parse certificate messages during the SSL/TLS handshake, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and CPU consumption) via a certificate message that contains a PEM encoded certificate.
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly | Medium | 165,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForWebUI() {
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> users_list =
std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users_to_send_.begin();
it != users_to_send_.end(); ++it) {
const AccountId& account_id = (*it)->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = (account_id == owner);
const bool is_public_account =
((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT);
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(*it)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
auto user_dict = std::make_unique<base::DictionaryValue>();
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
FillUserDictionary(*it, is_owner, is_signin_to_add, initial_auth_type,
public_session_recommended_locales, user_dict.get());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyCanRemove, CanRemoveUser(*it));
users_list->Append(std::move(user_dict));
}
return users_list;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224} | High | 172,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (const char *str, ssize_t len)
{
return g_utf8_normalize (str, len, G_NORMALIZE_NFKC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize function in lib/nfkc.c in libidn before 1.33 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and crash) via crafted UTF-8 data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ImportCbYCrYQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 10:
{
Quantum
cbcr[4];
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x+=2)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
cbcr[i]=(Quantum) (quantum);
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[1],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[3],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The generic decoder in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126 | Medium | 168,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents(WebContents* contents) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateDevToolsForContents");
DevToolsWindow* new_devtools_window = contents ?
DevToolsWindow::GetDockedInstanceForInspectedTab(contents) : NULL;
if (devtools_window_ == new_devtools_window && (!new_devtools_window ||
new_devtools_window->dock_side() == devtools_dock_side_))
return;
if (devtools_window_ != new_devtools_window) {
if (devtools_window_)
devtools_container_->DetachTab(devtools_window_->tab_contents());
devtools_container_->SetTab(
new_devtools_window ? new_devtools_window->tab_contents() : NULL);
if (new_devtools_window) {
new_devtools_window->tab_contents()->web_contents()->WasShown();
}
}
if (devtools_window_) {
GtkAllocation contents_rect;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(contents_vsplit_, &contents_rect);
if (devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT) {
devtools_window_->SetWidth(
contents_rect.width -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_hsplit_)));
} else {
devtools_window_->SetHeight(
contents_rect.height -
gtk_paned_get_position(GTK_PANED(contents_vsplit_)));
}
}
bool should_hide = devtools_window_ && (!new_devtools_window ||
devtools_dock_side_ != new_devtools_window->dock_side());
bool should_show = new_devtools_window && (!devtools_window_ || should_hide);
if (should_hide)
HideDevToolsContainer();
devtools_window_ = new_devtools_window;
if (should_show) {
devtools_dock_side_ = new_devtools_window->dock_side();
ShowDevToolsContainer();
} else if (new_devtools_window) {
UpdateDevToolsSplitPosition();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded | Medium | 169,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Encoder::Flush() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
deadline_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void _php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type, char *tn, gdImagePtr (*func_p)(), gdImagePtr (*ioctx_func_p)())
{
char *file;
int file_len;
long srcx, srcy, width, height;
gdImagePtr im = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
FILE * fp = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
long ignore_warning;
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sllll", &file, &file_len, &srcx, &srcy, &width, &height) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (width < 1 || height < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Zero width or height not allowed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS|IGNORE_PATH|IGNORE_URL_WIN, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef USE_GD_IOCTX
ioctx_func_p = NULL; /* don't allow sockets without IOCtx */
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WEBP) {
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(buff_size, buff);
if (!im) {
goto out_err;
}
goto register_im;
}
/* try and avoid allocating a FILE* if the stream is not naturally a FILE* */
if (php_stream_is(stream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
} else if (ioctx_func_p) {
#ifdef USE_GD_IOCTX
/* we can create an io context */
gdIOCtx* io_ctx;
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
io_ctx = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(buff_size, buff, 0);
if (!io_ctx) {
pefree(buff, 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot allocate GD IO context");
goto out_err;
}
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx, srcx, srcy, width, height);
} else {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx);
}
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
pefree(buff, 1);
#endif
}
else {
/* try and force the stream to be FILE* */
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO | PHP_STREAM_CAST_TRY_HARD, (void **) &fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
}
if (!im && fp) {
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART:
im = (*func_p)(fp, srcx, srcy, width, height);
break;
#if defined(HAVE_GD_XPM) && defined(HAVE_GD_BUNDLED)
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_XPM:
im = gdImageCreateFromXpm(file);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
#ifdef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp, ignore_warning);
#else
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
im = (*func_p)(fp);
break;
}
fflush(fp);
}
register_im:
if (im) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
php_stream_close(stream);
return;
}
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s' is not a valid %s file", file, tn);
out_err:
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Editor::Transpose() {
if (!CanEdit())
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(GetFrame().GetDocument()), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (frame_->GetDocument()->GetFrame() != frame_)
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518} | High | 172,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171} | Medium | 172,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost");
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
const OMX_PTR param) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
return internalSetBitrateParams(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)param);
case OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
return internalSetVp8Params(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *)param);
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAndroidVp8Encoder:
return internalSetAndroidVp8Params(
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *)param);
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, param);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(mcrypt) /* {{{ */
{
char **modules;
char mcrypt_api_no[16];
int i, count;
smart_str tmp1 = {0};
smart_str tmp2 = {0};
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(MCG(algorithms_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp1, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp1, ' ');
}
smart_str_0(&tmp1);
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
modules = mcrypt_list_modes(MCG(modes_dir), &count);
if (count == 0) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, "none");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
smart_str_appends(&tmp2, modules[i]);
smart_str_appendc(&tmp2, ' ');
}
smart_str_0 (&tmp2);
mcrypt_free_p (modules, count);
snprintf (mcrypt_api_no, 16, "%d", MCRYPT_API_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_header(2, "mcrypt_filter support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Version", LIBMCRYPT_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Api No", mcrypt_api_no);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported ciphers", tmp1.c);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Supported modes", tmp2.c);
smart_str_free(&tmp1);
smart_str_free(&tmp2);
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | High | 167,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
interprocess_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
OM_uint32 length;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx = NULL;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
char *buf;
status = val_exp_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
context_handle, interprocess_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
if (!mech->gss_export_sec_context)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
status = mech->gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
&ctx->internal_ctx_id, &token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
map_error(minor_status, mech);
goto cleanup;
}
length = token.length + 4 + ctx->mech_type->length;
interprocess_token->length = length;
interprocess_token->value = malloc(length);
if (interprocess_token->value == 0) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
buf = interprocess_token->value;
length = ctx->mech_type->length;
buf[3] = (unsigned char) (length & 0xFF);
length >>= 8;
buf[2] = (unsigned char) (length & 0xFF);
length >>= 8;
buf[1] = (unsigned char) (length & 0xFF);
length >>= 8;
buf[0] = (unsigned char) (length & 0xFF);
memcpy(buf+4, ctx->mech_type->elements, (size_t) ctx->mech_type->length);
memcpy(buf+4+ctx->mech_type->length, token.value, token.length);
status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
(void) gss_release_buffer(minor_status, &token);
if (ctx != NULL && ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
/* If the mech deleted its context, delete the union context. */
free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
free(ctx->mech_type);
free(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 168,015 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i)
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitrate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (h263type->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline ||
h263type->eLevel != OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45 ||
(h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) ||
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed != OMX_FALSE ||
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero != OMX_FALSE ||
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition != 0 ||
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (mpeg4type->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore ||
mpeg4type->eLevel != OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2 ||
(mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) ||
mpeg4type->nBFrames != 0 ||
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold != 0 ||
mpeg4type->bACPred != OMX_TRUE ||
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize != 256 ||
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes != 1000 ||
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension != 0 ||
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC != OMX_FALSE) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,210 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,396 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void UtilityServiceFactory::RegisterServices(ServiceMap* services) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterServices(services);
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo video_capture_info;
video_capture_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateVideoCaptureService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(video_capture::mojom::kServiceName, video_capture_info));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PEPPER_CDMS)
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo info;
info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateMediaService);
services->insert(std::make_pair(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, info));
#endif
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo shape_detection_info;
shape_detection_info.factory =
base::Bind(&shape_detection::ShapeDetectionService::Create);
services->insert(std::make_pair(shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
shape_detection_info));
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo data_decoder_info;
data_decoder_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateDataDecoderService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName, data_decoder_info));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterNetworkBinders(
network_registry_.get());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo network_info;
network_info.factory = base::Bind(
&UtilityServiceFactory::CreateNetworkService, base::Unretained(this));
network_info.task_runner = ChildProcess::current()->io_task_runner();
services->insert(
std::make_pair(content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName, network_info));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 171,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lrmd_remote_client_msg(gpointer data)
{
int id = 0;
int rc = 0;
int disconnected = 0;
xmlNode *request = NULL;
crm_client_t *client = data;
if (client->remote->tls_handshake_complete == FALSE) {
int rc = 0;
/* Muliple calls to handshake will be required, this callback
* will be invoked once the client sends more handshake data. */
do {
rc = gnutls_handshake(*client->remote->tls_session);
if (rc < 0 && rc != GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
crm_err("Remote lrmd tls handshake failed");
return -1;
}
} while (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED);
if (rc == 0) {
crm_debug("Remote lrmd tls handshake completed");
client->remote->tls_handshake_complete = TRUE;
if (client->remote->auth_timeout) {
g_source_remove(client->remote->auth_timeout);
}
client->remote->auth_timeout = 0;
}
return 0;
}
rc = crm_remote_ready(client->remote, 0);
if (rc == 0) {
/* no msg to read */
return 0;
} else if (rc < 0) {
crm_info("Client disconnected during remote client read");
return -1;
}
crm_remote_recv(client->remote, -1, &disconnected);
request = crm_remote_parse_buffer(client->remote);
while (request) {
crm_element_value_int(request, F_LRMD_REMOTE_MSG_ID, &id);
crm_trace("processing request from remote client with remote msg id %d", id);
if (!client->name) {
const char *value = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_CLIENTNAME);
if (value) {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
lrmd_call_id++;
if (lrmd_call_id < 1) {
lrmd_call_id = 1;
}
crm_xml_add(request, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(request, F_LRMD_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
crm_xml_add_int(request, F_LRMD_CALLID, lrmd_call_id);
process_lrmd_message(client, id, request);
free_xml(request);
/* process all the messages in the current buffer */
request = crm_remote_parse_buffer(client->remote);
}
if (disconnected) {
crm_info("Client disconnect detected in tls msg dispatcher.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Pacemaker before 1.1.15, when using pacemaker remote, might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (node disconnection) via an unauthenticated connection.
Commit Message: Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388) | Medium | 168,784 |
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