instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader =
port->mBuffers.editItemAt(mNumSamplesOutput & 1).mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
++mInputBufferCount;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
uint8_t *bitstream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
uint32_t *start_code = (uint32_t *)bitstream;
bool volHeader = *start_code == 0xB0010000;
if (volHeader) {
PVCleanUpVideoDecoder(mHandle);
mInitialized = false;
}
if (!mInitialized) {
uint8_t *vol_data[1];
int32_t vol_size = 0;
vol_data[0] = NULL;
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) || volHeader) {
vol_data[0] = bitstream;
vol_size = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
MP4DecodingMode mode =
(mMode == MODE_MPEG4) ? MPEG4_MODE : H263_MODE;
Bool success = PVInitVideoDecoder(
mHandle, vol_data, &vol_size, 1,
outputBufferWidth(), outputBufferHeight(), mode);
if (!success) {
ALOGW("PVInitVideoDecoder failed. Unsupported content?");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
MP4DecodingMode actualMode = PVGetDecBitstreamMode(mHandle);
if (mode != actualMode) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetPostProcType((VideoDecControls *) mHandle, 0);
bool hasFrameData = false;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else if (volHeader) {
hasFrameData = true;
}
mInitialized = true;
if (mode == MPEG4_MODE && handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
if (!hasFrameData) {
continue;
}
}
if (!mFramesConfigured) {
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = port->mBuffers.editItemAt(1).mHeader;
PVSetReferenceYUV(mHandle, outHeader->pBuffer);
mFramesConfigured = true;
}
uint32_t useExtTimestamp = (inHeader->nOffset == 0);
uint32_t timestamp = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (useExtTimestamp) {
mPvToOmxTimeMap.add(mPvTime, inHeader->nTimeStamp);
timestamp = mPvTime;
mPvTime++;
}
int32_t bufferSize = inHeader->nFilledLen;
int32_t tmp = bufferSize;
if (PVDecodeVideoFrame(
mHandle, &bitstream, ×tamp, &tmp,
&useExtTimestamp,
outHeader->pBuffer) != PV_TRUE) {
ALOGE("failed to decode video frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mPvToOmxTimeMap.valueFor(timestamp);
mPvToOmxTimeMap.removeItem(timestamp);
inHeader->nOffset += bufferSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
++mInputBufferCount;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (mWidth * mHeight * 3) / 2;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mNumSamplesOutput;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
| High | 174,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
{
MATLAB_KO:
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned long)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
END_OF_READING:
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In ImageMagick before 6.9.9-3 and 7.x before 7.0.6-3, there is a missing NULL check in the ReadMATImage function in coders/mat.c, leading to a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) in the DestroyImageInfo function in MagickCore/image.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/598 | Medium | 167,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeArrowFunction(JsVar *funcVar, JsVar *a) {
assert(!a || jsvIsName(a));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION);
funcVar = jspeAddNamedFunctionParameter(funcVar, a);
bool expressionOnly = lex->tk!='{';
jspeFunctionDefinitionInternal(funcVar, expressionOnly);
if (execInfo.thisVar) {
jsvObjectSetChild(funcVar, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_THIS_NAME, execInfo.thisVar);
}
return funcVar;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction() {
JsVar *a = 0;
JsVar *funcVar = 0;
bool allNames = true;
while (lex->tk!=')' && !JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
if (allNames && a) {
funcVar = jspeAddNamedFunctionParameter(funcVar, a);
}
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (!(jsvIsName(a) && jsvIsString(a))) allNames = false;
if (lex->tk!=')') JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(',', jsvUnLock2(a,funcVar), 0);
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(')', jsvUnLock2(a,funcVar), 0);
if (allNames && lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION) {
funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(funcVar, a);
jsvUnLock(a);
return funcVar;
} else {
jsvUnLock(funcVar);
return a;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeClassDefinition(bool parseNamedClass) {
JsVar *classFunction = 0;
JsVar *classPrototype = 0;
JsVar *classInternalName = 0;
bool actuallyCreateClass = JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE;
if (actuallyCreateClass)
classFunction = jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_FUNCTION);
if (parseNamedClass && lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
if (classFunction)
classInternalName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
}
if (classFunction) {
JsVar *prototypeName = jsvFindChildFromString(classFunction, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, true);
jspEnsureIsPrototype(classFunction, prototypeName); // make sure it's an object
classPrototype = jsvSkipName(prototypeName);
jsvUnLock(prototypeName);
}
if (lex->tk==LEX_R_EXTENDS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_EXTENDS);
JsVar *extendsFrom = actuallyCreateClass ? jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex))) : 0;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock4(extendsFrom,classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
if (classPrototype) {
if (jsvIsFunction(extendsFrom)) {
jsvObjectSetChild(classPrototype, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, extendsFrom);
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME, jsvNewFromString("if(this.__proto__.__proto__)this.__proto__.__proto__.apply(this,arguments)"));
} else
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "'extends' argument should be a function, got %t", extendsFrom);
}
jsvUnLock(extendsFrom);
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('{',jsvUnLock3(classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
while ((lex->tk==LEX_ID || lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC) && !jspIsInterrupted()) {
bool isStatic = lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC;
if (isStatic) JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_STATIC);
JsVar *funcName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock3(classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
JsVar *method = jspeFunctionDefinition(false);
if (classFunction && classPrototype) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "get") || jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "set")) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "'get' and 'set' and not supported in Espruino");
} else if (jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "constructor")) {
jswrap_function_replaceWith(classFunction, method);
} else {
funcName = jsvMakeIntoVariableName(funcName, 0);
jsvSetValueOfName(funcName, method);
jsvAddName(isStatic ? classFunction : classPrototype, funcName);
}
}
jsvUnLock2(method,funcName);
}
jsvUnLock(classPrototype);
if (classInternalName)
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_NAME_NAME, classInternalName);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('}',jsvUnLock(classFunction),0);
return classFunction;
}
#endif
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeFactor() {
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
JsVar *a = jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL)
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Tagged template literals not supported");
else if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION && jsvIsName(a)) {
JsVar *funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(0,a);
jsvUnLock(a);
a=funcVar;
}
#endif
return a;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_INT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromLongInteger(stringToInt(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_INT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_FLOAT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromFloat(stringToFloat(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_FLOAT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk=='(') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('(');
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
JsVar *a = jspeExpression();
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(')',a);
return a;
#else
return jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TRUE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_TRUE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(true) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FALSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FALSE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(false) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_NULL) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_NULL);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_NULL) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_UNDEFINED) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_UNDEFINED);
return 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_STR) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
a = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_STR);
return a;
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL) {
return jspeTemplateLiteral();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_REGEX) {
JsVar *a = 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "RegEx are not supported in this version of Espruino\n");
#else
JsVar *regex = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
size_t regexEnd = 0, regexLen = 0;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, regex, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
regexLen++;
if (jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it)=='/')
regexEnd = regexLen;
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
JsVar *flags = 0;
if (regexEnd < regexLen)
flags = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, regexEnd, JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
JsVar *regexSource = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, 1, regexEnd-2);
a = jswrap_regexp_constructor(regexSource, flags);
jsvUnLock3(regex, flags, regexSource);
#endif
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_REGEX);
return a;
} else if (lex->tk=='{') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorObject();
} else if (lex->tk=='[') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorArray();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FUNCTION) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FUNCTION);
return jspeFunctionDefinition(true);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_CLASS) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_CLASS);
return jspeClassDefinition(true);
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_SUPER) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SUPER);
/* This is kind of nasty, since super appears to do
three different things.
* In the constructor it references the extended class's constructor
* in a method it references the constructor's prototype.
* in a static method it references the extended class's constructor (but this is different)
*/
if (jsvIsObject(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0); // if we're in a method, get __proto__ first
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0; // still in method, get __proto__.__proto__
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
if (lex->tk=='(') return proto2; // eg. used in a constructor
JsVar *proto3 = jsvIsFunction(proto2) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto2, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto2);
return proto3;
} else if (jsvIsFunction(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0);
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
return proto2;
}
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_THIS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_THIS);
return jsvLockAgain( execInfo.thisVar ? execInfo.thisVar : execInfo.root );
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DELETE) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorDelete();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TYPEOF) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorTypeOf();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);
jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
return 0;
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_EOF);
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Unexpected end of Input\n");
return 0;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspePostfixExpression(JsVar *a) {
while (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *oldValue = jsvAsNumberAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a)); // keep the old value (but convert to number)
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(oldValue, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = oldValue;
}
}
return a;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeUnaryExpression() {
if (lex->tk=='!' || lex->tk=='~' || lex->tk=='-' || lex->tk=='+') {
short tk = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(tk);
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
return jspeUnaryExpression();
}
if (tk=='!') { // logical not
return jsvNewFromBool(!jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='~') { // bitwise not
return jsvNewFromInteger(~jsvGetIntegerAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='-') { // unary minus
return jsvNegateAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression()); // names already skipped
} else if (tk=='+') { // unary plus (convert to number)
JsVar *v = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
JsVar *r = jsvAsNumber(v); // names already skipped
jsvUnLock(v);
return r;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
} else
return jspePostfixExpression();
}
unsigned int jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(int op) {
switch (op) {
case LEX_OROR: return 1; break;
case LEX_ANDAND: return 2; break;
case '|' : return 3; break;
case '^' : return 4; break;
case '&' : return 5; break;
case LEX_EQUAL:
case LEX_NEQUAL:
case LEX_TYPEEQUAL:
case LEX_NTYPEEQUAL: return 6;
case LEX_LEQUAL:
case LEX_GEQUAL:
case '<':
case '>':
case LEX_R_INSTANCEOF: return 7;
case LEX_R_IN: return (execInfo.execute&EXEC_FOR_INIT)?0:7;
case LEX_LSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED: return 8;
case '+':
case '-': return 9;
case '*':
case '/':
case '%': return 10;
default: return 0;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
JsVar *jspeBinaryExpression() {
return __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),0);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeConditionalExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='?') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('?');
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_MATCH(':');
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
} else {
bool first = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(lhs));
jsvUnLock(lhs);
if (first) {
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
JSP_MATCH(':');
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
}
}
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeConditionalExpression() {
return __jspeConditionalExpression(jspeBinaryExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeAssignmentExpression() {
return __jspeAssignmentExpression(jspeConditionalExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpression() {
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
JsVar *a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (lex->tk!=',') return a;
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(',');
}
return 0;
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` but assume brackets are already parsed */
NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
JsVar *a = jspeStatement();
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
}
} else {
int brackets = 0;
while (lex->tk && (brackets || lex->tk != '}')) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
if (lex->tk == '}') brackets--;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and a potential Information Disclosure with user crafted input files via a Buffer Overflow or Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing of certain for loops in jsparse.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437) | Medium | 169,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int atl2_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
{
struct net_device *netdev;
struct atl2_adapter *adapter;
static int cards_found;
unsigned long mmio_start;
int mmio_len;
int err;
cards_found = 0;
err = pci_enable_device(pdev);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* atl2 is a shared-high-32-bit device, so we're stuck with 32-bit DMA
* until the kernel has the proper infrastructure to support 64-bit DMA
* on these devices.
*/
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32)) &&
pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "atl2: No usable DMA configuration, aborting\n");
goto err_dma;
}
/* Mark all PCI regions associated with PCI device
* pdev as being reserved by owner atl2_driver_name */
err = pci_request_regions(pdev, atl2_driver_name);
if (err)
goto err_pci_reg;
/* Enables bus-mastering on the device and calls
* pcibios_set_master to do the needed arch specific settings */
pci_set_master(pdev);
err = -ENOMEM;
netdev = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(struct atl2_adapter));
if (!netdev)
goto err_alloc_etherdev;
SET_NETDEV_DEV(netdev, &pdev->dev);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, netdev);
adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
adapter->netdev = netdev;
adapter->pdev = pdev;
adapter->hw.back = adapter;
mmio_start = pci_resource_start(pdev, 0x0);
mmio_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, 0x0);
adapter->hw.mem_rang = (u32)mmio_len;
adapter->hw.hw_addr = ioremap(mmio_start, mmio_len);
if (!adapter->hw.hw_addr) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_ioremap;
}
atl2_setup_pcicmd(pdev);
netdev->netdev_ops = &atl2_netdev_ops;
netdev->ethtool_ops = &atl2_ethtool_ops;
netdev->watchdog_timeo = 5 * HZ;
strncpy(netdev->name, pci_name(pdev), sizeof(netdev->name) - 1);
netdev->mem_start = mmio_start;
netdev->mem_end = mmio_start + mmio_len;
adapter->bd_number = cards_found;
adapter->pci_using_64 = false;
/* setup the private structure */
err = atl2_sw_init(adapter);
if (err)
goto err_sw_init;
err = -EIO;
netdev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX;
netdev->features |= (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX);
/* Init PHY as early as possible due to power saving issue */
atl2_phy_init(&adapter->hw);
/* reset the controller to
* put the device in a known good starting state */
if (atl2_reset_hw(&adapter->hw)) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_reset;
}
/* copy the MAC address out of the EEPROM */
atl2_read_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, adapter->hw.mac_addr, netdev->addr_len);
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(netdev->dev_addr)) {
err = -EIO;
goto err_eeprom;
}
atl2_check_options(adapter);
setup_timer(&adapter->watchdog_timer, atl2_watchdog,
(unsigned long)adapter);
setup_timer(&adapter->phy_config_timer, atl2_phy_config,
(unsigned long)adapter);
INIT_WORK(&adapter->reset_task, atl2_reset_task);
INIT_WORK(&adapter->link_chg_task, atl2_link_chg_task);
strcpy(netdev->name, "eth%d"); /* ?? */
err = register_netdev(netdev);
if (err)
goto err_register;
/* assume we have no link for now */
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
netif_stop_queue(netdev);
cards_found++;
return 0;
err_reset:
err_register:
err_sw_init:
err_eeprom:
iounmap(adapter->hw.hw_addr);
err_ioremap:
free_netdev(netdev);
err_alloc_etherdev:
pci_release_regions(pdev);
err_pci_reg:
err_dma:
pci_disable_device(pdev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The atl2_probe function in drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/atlx/atl2.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 incorrectly enables scatter/gather I/O, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by reading packet data.
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ScreenPositionController::ConvertHostPointToRelativeToRootWindow(
aura::Window* root_window,
const aura::Window::Windows& root_windows,
gfx::Point* point,
aura::Window** target_root) {
DCHECK(!root_window->parent());
gfx::Point point_in_root(*point);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointFromHost(&point_in_root);
*target_root = root_window;
*point = point_in_root;
#if defined(USE_X11) || defined(USE_OZONE)
if (!root_window->GetHost()->GetBounds().Contains(*point)) {
gfx::Point location_in_native(point_in_root);
root_window->GetHost()->ConvertPointToNativeScreen(&location_in_native);
for (size_t i = 0; i < root_windows.size(); ++i) {
aura::WindowTreeHost* host = root_windows[i]->GetHost();
const gfx::Rect native_bounds = host->GetBounds();
if (native_bounds.Contains(location_in_native)) {
*target_root = root_windows[i];
*point = location_in_native;
host->ConvertPointFromNativeScreen(point);
break;
}
}
}
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: Use the host coordinate when comparing to host window bounds.
I somehow overlooked this and the test was not strict enough to catch this.
BUG=521919
TEST=Updated ScreenPositionControllerTest.ConvertHostPointToScreenHiDPI so that it fails without the patch.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344186} | High | 171,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
header[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IsRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Write header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(header,' ',MagickPathExtent);
length=CopyMagickString(header,"#?RGBE\n",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) header);
property=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if ((property != (const char *) NULL) &&
(strchr(property,'\n') == (char *) NULL))
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"#%s\n",property);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
property=GetImageProperty(image,"hdr:exposure",exception);
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"EXPOSURE=%g\n",
strtod(property,(char **) NULL));
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"GAMMA=%g\n",image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
}
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,
"PRIMARIES=%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g\n",
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.white_point.x,image->chromaticity.white_point.y);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
length=CopyMagickString(header,"FORMAT=32-bit_rle_rgbe\n\n",MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) header);
count=FormatLocaleString(header,MagickPathExtent,"-Y %.20g +X %.20g\n",
(double) image->rows,(double) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) header);
/*
Write HDR pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
pixel[0]=2;
pixel[1]=2;
pixel[2]=(unsigned char) (image->columns >> 8);
pixel[3]=(unsigned char) (image->columns & 0xff);
count=WriteBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*sizeof(*pixel)))
break;
}
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
pixel[0]=0;
pixel[1]=0;
pixel[2]=0;
pixel[3]=0;
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(image,p);
if ((QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p)) > gamma)
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p);
if ((QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p)) > gamma)
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p);
if (gamma > MagickEpsilon)
{
int
exponent;
gamma=frexp(gamma,&exponent)*256.0/gamma;
pixel[0]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(image,p));
pixel[1]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(image,p));
pixel[2]=(unsigned char) (gamma*QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(image,p));
pixel[3]=(unsigned char) (exponent+128);
}
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
pixels[x]=pixel[0];
pixels[x+image->columns]=pixel[1];
pixels[x+2*image->columns]=pixel[2];
pixels[x+3*image->columns]=pixel[3];
}
else
{
pixels[i++]=pixel[0];
pixels[i++]=pixel[1];
pixels[i++]=pixel[2];
pixels[i++]=pixel[3];
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns >= 8) && (image->columns <= 0x7ffff))
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
length=HDRWriteRunlengthPixels(image,&pixels[i*image->columns]);
}
else
{
count=WriteBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in coders/hdr.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted HDR file.
Commit Message: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1537213 | Medium | 168,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PropertyTreeState LayerState() {
DEFINE_STATIC_REF(
TransformPaintPropertyNode, transform,
CreateTransform(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
TransformationMatrix().Translate(123, 456),
FloatPoint3D(1, 2, 3)));
DEFINE_STATIC_REF(ClipPaintPropertyNode, clip,
CreateClip(ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(), transform,
FloatRoundedRect(12, 34, 56, 78)));
DEFINE_STATIC_REF(
EffectPaintPropertyNode, effect,
EffectPaintPropertyNode::Create(
EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State{
transform, clip, kColorFilterLuminanceToAlpha,
CompositorFilterOperations(), 0.789f, SkBlendMode::kSrcIn}));
return PropertyTreeState(transform, clip, effect);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void perf_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
{
struct syscall_metadata *sys_data;
struct syscall_trace_exit *rec;
struct hlist_head *head;
int syscall_nr;
int rctx;
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
if (syscall_nr < 0)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_exit_syscalls))
return;
sys_data = syscall_nr_to_meta(syscall_nr);
if (!sys_data)
return;
head = this_cpu_ptr(sys_data->exit_event->perf_events);
if (hlist_empty(head))
return;
/* We can probably do that at build time */
size = ALIGN(sizeof(*rec) + sizeof(u32), sizeof(u64));
size -= sizeof(u32);
rec = (struct syscall_trace_exit *)perf_trace_buf_prepare(size,
sys_data->exit_event->event.type, regs, &rctx);
if (!rec)
return;
rec->nr = syscall_nr;
rec->ret = syscall_get_return_value(current, regs);
perf_trace_buf_submit(rec, size, rctx, 0, 1, regs, head, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly handle private syscall numbers during use of the ftrace subsystem, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/[email protected]
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, const char *buf)
{
int sock[2] = {-1, -1};
pid_t qpid, cpid = -1;
FILE *pids_file = NULL;
bool answer = false, fail = false;
pids_file = open_pids_file(contrl, cg);
if (!pids_file)
return false;
/*
* write the pids to a socket, have helper in writer's pidns
* call movepid for us
*/
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) {
perror("socketpair");
goto out;
}
cpid = fork();
if (cpid == -1)
goto out;
if (!cpid) { // child
fclose(pids_file);
pid_from_ns_wrapper(sock[1], tpid);
}
const char *ptr = buf;
while (sscanf(ptr, "%d", &qpid) == 1) {
struct ucred cred;
char v;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid, sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error writing pid to child: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (recv_creds(sock[0], &cred, &v)) {
if (v == '0') {
if (fprintf(pids_file, "%d", (int) cred.pid) < 0)
fail = true;
}
}
ptr = strchr(ptr, '\n');
if (!ptr)
break;
ptr++;
}
/* All good, write the value */
qpid = -1;
if (write(sock[0], &qpid ,sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid))
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: failed to ask child to exit\n");
if (!fail)
answer = true;
out:
if (cpid != -1)
wait_for_pid(cpid);
if (sock[0] != -1) {
close(sock[0]);
close(sock[1]);
}
if (pids_file) {
if (fclose(pids_file) != 0)
answer = false;
}
return answer;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The do_write_pids function in lxcfs.c in LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly check permissions, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a pid to the tasks file.
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> | High | 166,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Textfield::OnBlur() {
gfx::RenderText* render_text = GetRenderText();
render_text->set_focused(false);
if (PlatformStyle::kTextfieldScrollsToStartOnFocusChange)
model_->MoveCursorTo(gfx::SelectionModel(0, gfx::CURSOR_FORWARD));
if (GetInputMethod()) {
GetInputMethod()->DetachTextInputClient(this);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
wm::RestoreWindowBoundsOnClientFocusLost(
GetNativeView()->GetToplevelWindow());
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
StopBlinkingCursor();
cursor_view_.SetVisible(false);
DestroyTouchSelection();
if (use_focus_ring_)
FocusRing::Uninstall(this);
SchedulePaint();
View::OnBlur();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 46.0.2490.71 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517} | High | 171,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source | High | 169,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int output_quantization_factor(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth,
int out_depth)
{
if (out_depth == 16 && in_depth != 16 &&
pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
return 257;
else
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void aes_crypt_ecb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
int i;
unsigned long *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;
#if defined(XYSSL_PADLOCK_C) && defined(XYSSL_HAVE_X86)
if( padlock_supports( PADLOCK_ACE ) )
{
if( padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return;
}
#endif
RK = ctx->rk;
GET_ULONG_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
else /* AES_ENCRYPT */
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
PUT_ULONG_LE( X0, output, 0 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X1, output, 4 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X2, output, 8 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X3, output, 12 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript 9.23 before 2018-08-24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript could use uninitialized memory access in the aesdecode operator to crash the interpreter or potentially execute code.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTab(gfx::Canvas* canvas, const SkPath& clip) const {
int active_tab_fill_id = 0;
int active_tab_y_inset = 0;
if (tab_->GetThemeProvider()->HasCustomImage(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR)) {
active_tab_fill_id = IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR;
active_tab_y_inset = GetStrokeThickness(true);
}
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
} else {
PaintInactiveTabBackground(canvas, clip);
const float throb_value = GetThrobValue();
if (throb_value > 0) {
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(gfx::ToRoundedInt(throb_value * 0xff),
tab_->GetLocalBounds());
PaintTabBackground(canvas, true /* active */, active_tab_fill_id,
active_tab_y_inset, nullptr /* clip */);
canvas->Restore();
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | Medium | 172,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Track::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
assert(pBlockEntry);
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
assert(pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == m_info.number);
if (!pBlock || pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != m_info.number)
return false;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR _params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoIntraVOPRefresh:
{
OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *params =
(OMX_CONFIG_INTRAREFRESHVOPTYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
mKeyFrameRequested = params->IntraRefreshVOP;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexConfigVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *params =
(OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_BITRATETYPE *)_params;
if (params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (mBitrate != params->nEncodeBitrate) {
mBitrate = params->nEncodeBitrate;
mBitrateUpdated = true;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setConfig(index, _params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 174,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct thread_info *ti;
unsigned long *stackend;
int err;
prepare_to_copy(orig);
tsk = alloc_task_struct();
if (!tsk)
return NULL;
ti = alloc_thread_info(tsk);
if (!ti) {
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
if (err)
goto out;
tsk->stack = ti;
err = prop_local_init_single(&tsk->dirties);
if (err)
goto out;
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
stackend = end_of_stack(tsk);
*stackend = STACK_END_MAGIC; /* for overflow detection */
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
#endif
/* One for us, one for whoever does the "release_task()" (usually parent) */
atomic_set(&tsk->usage,2);
atomic_set(&tsk->fs_excl, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
tsk->btrace_seq = 0;
#endif
tsk->splice_pipe = NULL;
account_kernel_stack(ti, 1);
return tsk;
out:
free_thread_info(ti);
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void __skb_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *orig_skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps,
struct sock *sk, int tstype)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
bool tsonly;
if (!sk)
return;
tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly))
return;
if (tsonly) {
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS) &&
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
skb = tcp_get_timestamping_opt_stats(sk);
else
#endif
skb = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
skb = skb_clone(orig_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
if (!skb)
return;
if (tsonly) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tx_flags;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey = skb_shinfo(orig_skb)->tskey;
}
if (hwtstamps)
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
else
skb->tstamp = ktime_get_real();
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, tstype);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 mishandles the SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS feature, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from the kernel's internal socket data structures or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted system calls, related to net/core/skbuff.c and net/socket.c.
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, isDot)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 167,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(StringBuilder& result, Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
result.append('\n');
MarkupFormatter::appendComment(result, String::format(" saved from url=(%04d)%s ",
static_cast<int>(document().url().string().utf8().length()),
document().url().string().utf8().data()));
result.append('\n');
}
if (element.hasTagName(HTMLNames::baseTag)) {
result.appendLiteral("<base href=\".\"");
if (!document().baseTarget().isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral(" target=\"");
MarkupFormatter::appendAttributeValue(result, document().baseTarget(), document().isHTMLDocument());
result.append('"');
}
if (document().isXHTMLDocument())
result.appendLiteral(" />");
else
result.appendLiteral(">");
} else {
SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendElement(result, element, namespaces);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The page serializer in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 mishandles Mark of the Web (MOTW) comments for URLs containing a *--* sequence, which might allow remote attackers to inject HTML via a crafted URL, as demonstrated by an initial http://example.com?-- substring.
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736} | Medium | 171,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[64];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks;
cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0,
0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the jpc_tsfb_getbands2 function in jpc_tsfb.c in JasPer before 1.900.30 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder. | Medium | 168,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DebuggerDetachFunction::RunAsync() {
std::unique_ptr<Detach::Params> params(Detach::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, params->target);
if (!InitClientHost())
return false;
client_host_->Close();
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916} | High | 173,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
unsigned int
blue,
green,
offset_bits,
red;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
offset_bits=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
PixelInfo
quantum_bits;
PixelPacket
shift;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
if (bmp_info.ba_offset == 0)
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count != 2) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MagickPathExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
gamma=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.red_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.red_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.green_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.green_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.blue_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MagickPathExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile data */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Profile size */
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
image->compression=NoCompression;
break;
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->alpha_trait=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
image->resolution.x=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (bmp_info.offset_bits == offset_bits)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset_bits=bmp_info.offset_bits;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
if (((MagickSizeType) length/8) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels,
image->columns*image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
/*
We should ignore the alpha value in BMP3 files but there have been
reports about 32 bit files with alpha. We do a quick check to see if
the alpha channel contains a value that is not zero (default value).
If we find a non zero value we asume the program that wrote the file
wants to use the alpha channel.
*/
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) && (bmp_info.size == 40) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*(p+3) != 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
y=-1;
break;
}
p+=4;
}
}
}
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
(void) memset(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) memset(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register unsigned int
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.red++;
if (shift.red >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.green++;
if (shift.green >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.blue++;
if (shift.blue >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.alpha) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.alpha++;
if (shift.alpha >= 32U)
break;
}
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.red=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.green=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.blue=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.alpha;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.alpha=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.alpha);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0x0f),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) (*p & 0x0f),&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
x++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (y > 0)
break;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image, flipped_image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*magick='\0';
if (bmp_info.ba_offset != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: There is an excessive memory allocation issue in the functions ReadBMPImage of coders/bmp.c and ReadDIBImage of coders/dib.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-11, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1268 | Medium | 169,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the IndexedDB implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static irqreturn_t i8042_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct i8042_port *port;
struct serio *serio;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned char str, data;
unsigned int dfl;
unsigned int port_no;
bool filtered;
int ret = 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&i8042_lock, flags);
str = i8042_read_status();
if (unlikely(~str & I8042_STR_OBF)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (irq)
dbg("Interrupt %d, without any data\n", irq);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
data = i8042_read_data();
if (i8042_mux_present && (str & I8042_STR_AUXDATA)) {
static unsigned long last_transmit;
static unsigned char last_str;
dfl = 0;
if (str & I8042_STR_MUXERR) {
dbg("MUX error, status is %02x, data is %02x\n",
str, data);
/*
* When MUXERR condition is signalled the data register can only contain
* 0xfd, 0xfe or 0xff if implementation follows the spec. Unfortunately
* it is not always the case. Some KBCs also report 0xfc when there is
* nothing connected to the port while others sometimes get confused which
* port the data came from and signal error leaving the data intact. They
* _do not_ revert to legacy mode (actually I've never seen KBC reverting
* to legacy mode yet, when we see one we'll add proper handling).
* Anyway, we process 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe and 0xff as timeouts, and for the
* rest assume that the data came from the same serio last byte
* was transmitted (if transmission happened not too long ago).
*/
switch (data) {
default:
if (time_before(jiffies, last_transmit + HZ/10)) {
str = last_str;
break;
}
/* fall through - report timeout */
case 0xfc:
case 0xfd:
case 0xfe: dfl = SERIO_TIMEOUT; data = 0xfe; break;
case 0xff: dfl = SERIO_PARITY; data = 0xfe; break;
}
}
port_no = I8042_MUX_PORT_NO + ((str >> 6) & 3);
last_str = str;
last_transmit = jiffies;
} else {
dfl = ((str & I8042_STR_PARITY) ? SERIO_PARITY : 0) |
((str & I8042_STR_TIMEOUT && !i8042_notimeout) ? SERIO_TIMEOUT : 0);
port_no = (str & I8042_STR_AUXDATA) ?
I8042_AUX_PORT_NO : I8042_KBD_PORT_NO;
}
port = &i8042_ports[port_no];
serio = port->exists ? port->serio : NULL;
filter_dbg(port->driver_bound, data, "<- i8042 (interrupt, %d, %d%s%s)\n",
port_no, irq,
dfl & SERIO_PARITY ? ", bad parity" : "",
dfl & SERIO_TIMEOUT ? ", timeout" : "");
filtered = i8042_filter(data, str, serio);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (likely(port->exists && !filtered))
serio_interrupt(serio, data, dfl);
out:
return IRQ_RETVAL(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/input/serio/i8042.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact because the port->exists value can change after it is validated.
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | High | 169,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __init ip6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int err;
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip4ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip6ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto unreg_ip4ip6;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto err_pernet;
return 0;
err_pernet:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6);
unreg_ip4ip6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int cx24116_send_diseqc_msg(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *d)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
int i, ret;
/* Dump DiSEqC message */
if (debug) {
printk(KERN_INFO "cx24116: %s(", __func__);
for (i = 0 ; i < d->msg_len ;) {
printk(KERN_INFO "0x%02x", d->msg[i]);
if (++i < d->msg_len)
printk(KERN_INFO ", ");
}
printk(") toneburst=%d\n", toneburst);
}
/* Validate length */
if (d->msg_len > (CX24116_ARGLEN - CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS))
return -EINVAL;
/* DiSEqC message */
for (i = 0; i < d->msg_len; i++)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS + i] = d->msg[i];
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = d->msg_len;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS +
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN];
/* DiSEqC toneburst */
if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_MESGCACHE)
/* Message is cached */
return 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF)
/* Message is sent without burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = 0;
else if (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONECACHE) {
/*
* Message is sent with derived else cached burst
*
* WRITE PORT GROUP COMMAND 38
*
* 0/A/A: E0 10 38 F0..F3
* 1/B/B: E0 10 38 F4..F7
* 2/C/A: E0 10 38 F8..FB
* 3/D/B: E0 10 38 FC..FF
*
* databyte[3]= 8421:8421
* ABCD:WXYZ
* CLR :SET
*
* WX= PORT SELECT 0..3 (X=TONEBURST)
* Y = VOLTAGE (0=13V, 1=18V)
* Z = BAND (0=LOW, 1=HIGH(22K))
*/
if (d->msg_len >= 4 && d->msg[2] == 0x38)
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] =
((d->msg[3] & 4) >> 2);
if (debug)
dprintk("%s burst=%d\n", __func__,
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST]);
}
/* Wait for LNB ready */
ret = cx24116_wait_for_lnb(fe);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Wait for voltage/min repeat delay */
msleep(100);
/* Command */
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &state->dsec_cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/*
* Wait for send
*
* Eutelsat spec:
* >15ms delay + (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
* 13.5ms per byte +
* >15ms delay +
* 12.5ms burst +
* >15ms delay (XXX determine if FW does this, see set_tone)
*/
msleep((state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] << 4) +
((toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 30 : 60));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.1.4, a buffer overflow occurs when checking userspace params in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c. The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the userspace API. However, the code allows larger values such as 23.
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | High | 169,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OpenSession() {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://test.com"));
ASSERT_TRUE(opened_device_label_.empty());
MediaDeviceInfoArray video_devices;
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::BindOnce(&VideoInputDevicesEnumerated, run_loop.QuitClosure(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin, &video_devices));
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_FALSE(video_devices.empty());
{
base::RunLoop run_loop;
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
video_devices[0].device_id, MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
browser_context_.GetMediaDeviceIDSalt(),
security_origin},
base::BindOnce(&VideoCaptureTest::OnDeviceOpened,
base::Unretained(this), run_loop.QuitClosure()),
MediaStreamManager::DeviceStoppedCallback());
run_loop.Run();
}
ASSERT_NE(MediaStreamDevice::kNoId, opened_session_id_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,109 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Block::SetKey(bool bKey)
{
if (bKey)
m_flags |= static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7);
else
m_flags &= 0x7F;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Display::Display()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag && (num_mb_skip & 1))
{
num_mb_skip++;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].ps_sps->u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
j = i;
break;
}
}
}
if(j == -1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T;
}
/* call ih264d_start_of_pic only if it was not called earlier*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
if((u1_mbaff) && (ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb & 1))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb - 1;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
}
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Inserting new slice only if the current slice has atleast 1 MB*/
if(ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice <
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag))
{
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= u1_mbaff;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-34097915.
Commit Message: Decoder: Return correct error code for slice header errors
Return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T instead of ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T for slice
header errors.
Bug: 34097915
Change-Id: I45d14a71f2322ff349058baaf65fb0f3c1140fba
| High | 174,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.13.3 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (assertion failure, and hypervisor hang or crash) via an out-of bounds guest_irq value, related to arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c and virt/kvm/eventfd.c.
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 167,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
first = mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The psh_glyph_find_strong_points function in pshinter/pshalgo.c in FreeType before 2.4.0 does not properly implement hinting masks, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file that triggers an invalid free operation.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: process_open(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int32_t pflags;
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
(flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
if (fd < 0) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
if (handle < 0) {
close(fd);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: The process_open function in sftp-server.c in OpenSSH before 7.6 does not properly prevent write operations in readonly mode, which allows attackers to create zero-length files.
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@ | Medium | 167,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
number_planes_filled,
one,
pixel_info_length;
ssize_t
count,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 2) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->page.x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->page.y=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->alpha_trait=flags & 0x04 ? BlendPixelTrait : UndefinedPixelTrait;
number_planes=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 22)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) ||
((flags & 0x04) && (number_colormaps > 254)) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
3*map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
number_planes_filled=(number_planes % 2 == 0) ? number_planes :
number_planes+1;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes_filled) != (size_t) (number_pixels*
number_planes_filled))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
MagickMax(number_planes_filled,4)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info_length=image->columns*image->rows*
MagickMax(number_planes_filled,4);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if ((offset < 0) ||
(offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length))
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if ((offset < 0) ||
(offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length))
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
x=(ssize_t) number_planes;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,*p & mask,&index,exception);
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(size_t) (x*map_length+
(*p & mask)),&index,exception);
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
if ((i < (ssize_t) number_pixels) || (x < (ssize_t) number_planes))
{
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].red),q);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].green),q);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
index].blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.5-2 and GraphicsMagick before 1.3.24 use uninitialized memory in the RLE decoder, allowing an attacker to leak sensitive information from process memory space, as demonstrated by remote attacks against ImageMagick code in a long-running server process that converts image data on behalf of multiple users. This is caused by a missing initialization step in the ReadRLEImage function in coders/rle.c.
Commit Message: Reset memory for RLE decoder (patch provided by scarybeasts) | Medium | 168,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int pppol2tp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
err = -EIO;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND)
goto end;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto end;
if (len > skb->len)
len = skb->len;
else if (len < skb->len)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, len);
if (likely(err == 0))
err = len;
kfree_skb(skb);
end:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
ALOGI("There are reordered frames present.");
if (mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size_t numEntries = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (data_size != (numEntries + 1) * 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = numEntries;
uint64_t allocSize = numEntries * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = new uint32_t[2 * numEntries];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries, numEntries * 8)
< (ssize_t)numEntries * 8) {
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < 2 * numEntries; ++i) {
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i] = ntohl(mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i]);
}
mCompositionDeltaLookup->setEntries(
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries, mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not properly consider integer promotion, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via crafted atoms in MP4 data, aka internal bug 20139950, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-1538. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-7915, CVE-2014-7916, and/or CVE-2014-7917.
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
| High | 173,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_list_xattr function in hw/9pfs/9p-xattr.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via vectors involving the orig_value variable.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Parse()
{
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) // EditionEntry ID
{
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
interpolate_method=UndefinedInterpolatePixel;
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*channel_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
channel_image=ChannelFxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (channel_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=channel_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImage(image,clut_image,interpolate_method,exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
colorspace=(*images)->colorspace;
if ((*images)->number_channels < GetImageListLength(*images))
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
if (*option == '+')
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,colorspace,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,
&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*new_images,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE: this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity,&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,
OverCompositeOp,clip_to_self,0,0,exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=new_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
deconstruct_image=CompareImagesLayers(*images,CompareAnyLayer,
exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither_method=NoDitherMethod;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fx_image=FxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImage(image,hald_image,exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",option+1) == 0)
{
interpolate_method=(PixelInterpolateMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
LayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(LayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImagesLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImage(*images,number_arguments >> 1,
arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*argument;
int
next,
token_status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
argument=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token_status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,argument,"",
"=","\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (token_status == 0)
{
const char
*arg;
arg=(&(argument[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&arg,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"cache:%s",
argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616 | Medium | 170,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 168,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
return 0;
}
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
return 0;
}
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
return 0;
}
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The bmp_getdata function in libjasper/bmp/bmp_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted BMP image in an imginfo command.
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes. | Medium | 168,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void mp_decode_to_lua_array(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c, size_t len) {
assert(len <= UINT_MAX);
int index = 1;
lua_newtable(L);
while(len--) {
lua_pushnumber(L,index++);
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c);
if (c->err) return;
lua_settable(L,-3);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems. | High | 169,238 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_qmf_hbe_data_reinit(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD16 *p_freq_band_tab[2],
WORD16 *p_num_sfb, WORD32 upsamp_4_flag) {
WORD32 synth_size, sfb, patch, stop_patch;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer != NULL) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][0];
ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band = p_freq_band_tab[LOW][p_num_sfb[LOW]];
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size =
4 * ((ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band + 4) / 8 + 1);
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start =
ixheaacd_start_subband2kL_tbl[ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band];
ptr_hbe_txposer->upsamp_4_flag = upsamp_4_flag;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 16)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 16 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
} else if (ptr_hbe_txposer->core_frame_length == 768) {
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size > 24)
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start = 24 - ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
}
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf, 0, 1280 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf_offset = 18 * synth_size;
switch (synth_size) {
case 4:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 8:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_8;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_16;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 12:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_12;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_24;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p3;
break;
case 16:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_16;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_32;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
break;
case 20:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_20;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_40;
break;
default:
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_synth_cos_table_kl_4;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab =
(FLOAT32 *)ixheaacd_analy_cos_sin_table_kl_8;
ixheaacd_real_synth_fft = &ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p2;
ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft = &ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft_p2;
}
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf, 0, 640 * sizeof(FLOAT32));
synth_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff = ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(synth_size);
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf, 0, MAX_NUM_PATCHES * sizeof(WORD32));
sfb = 0;
if (upsamp_4_flag) {
stop_patch = MAX_NUM_PATCHES;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = MAX_STRETCH;
} else {
stop_patch = MAX_STRETCH;
}
for (patch = 1; patch <= stop_patch; patch++) {
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW] &&
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb] <= patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
if (sfb <= p_num_sfb[LOW]) {
if ((patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band -
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1]) <= 3) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[LOW][sfb - 1];
} else {
WORD32 sfb = 0;
while (sfb <= p_num_sfb[HIGH] &&
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb] <=
patch * ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band)
sfb++;
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] =
p_freq_band_tab[HIGH][sfb - 1];
}
} else {
ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[patch - 1] = ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band;
ptr_hbe_txposer->max_stretch = min(patch, MAX_STRETCH);
break;
}
}
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| High | 174,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool IsManualFallbackForFillingEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling) &&
!IsPreLollipopAndroid();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The provisional-load commit implementation in WebKit/Source/bindings/core/v8/WindowProxy.cpp in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by leveraging a delay in window proxy clearing.
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923} | High | 171,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByIndex(unsigned long idx) const
{
const ptrdiff_t count = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return m_trackEntries[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
const void __user * __user *, pages,
const int __user *, nodes,
int __user *, status, int, flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
nodemask_t task_nodes;
/* Check flags */
if (flags & ~(MPOL_MF_MOVE|MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL))
return -EINVAL;
if ((flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
/* Find the mm_struct */
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
if (!task) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -ESRCH;
}
get_task_struct(task);
/*
* Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
* process. The right exists if the process has administrative
* capabilities, superuser privileges or the same
* userid as the target process.
*/
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
!uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
err = security_task_movememory(task);
if (err)
goto out;
task_nodes = cpuset_mems_allowed(task);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!mm)
return -EINVAL;
if (nodes)
err = do_pages_move(mm, task_nodes, nr_pages, pages,
nodes, status, flags);
else
err = do_pages_stat(mm, nr_pages, pages, status);
mmput(mm);
return err;
out:
put_task_struct(task);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The move_pages system call in mm/migrate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.9 doesn't check the effective uid of the target process, enabling a local attacker to learn the memory layout of a setuid executable despite ASLR.
Commit Message: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks
The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).
That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.
So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.
This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.
Famous last words.
Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 167,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PaintController::CopyCachedSubsequence(size_t begin_index,
size_t end_index) {
DCHECK(!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled());
base::AutoReset<size_t> subsequence_begin_index(
¤t_cached_subsequence_begin_index_in_new_list_,
new_display_item_list_.size());
DisplayItem* cached_item =
¤t_paint_artifact_.GetDisplayItemList()[begin_index];
Vector<PaintChunk>::const_iterator cached_chunk;
base::Optional<PropertyTreeState> properties_before_subsequence;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
cached_chunk =
current_paint_artifact_.FindChunkByDisplayItemIndex(begin_index);
DCHECK(cached_chunk != current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().end());
properties_before_subsequence =
new_paint_chunks_.CurrentPaintChunkProperties();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkPropertiesUsingIdWithFragment(
cached_chunk->id, cached_chunk->properties.GetPropertyTreeState());
} else {
cached_chunk = current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().begin();
}
for (size_t current_index = begin_index; current_index < end_index;
++current_index) {
cached_item = ¤t_paint_artifact_.GetDisplayItemList()[current_index];
SECURITY_CHECK(!cached_item->IsTombstone());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(cached_item->Client().IsAlive());
#endif
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled() &&
current_index == cached_chunk->end_index) {
++cached_chunk;
DCHECK(cached_chunk != current_paint_artifact_.PaintChunks().end());
new_paint_chunks_.ForceNewChunk();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkPropertiesUsingIdWithFragment(
cached_chunk->id, cached_chunk->properties.GetPropertyTreeState());
}
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (cached_item->VisualRect() !=
FloatRect(cached_item->Client().VisualRect())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Visual rect changed in a cached subsequence: "
<< cached_item->Client().DebugName()
<< " old=" << cached_item->VisualRect().ToString()
<< " new=" << cached_item->Client().VisualRect().ToString();
}
#endif
ProcessNewItem(MoveItemFromCurrentListToNewList(current_index));
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
DCHECK((!new_paint_chunks_.LastChunk().is_cacheable &&
!cached_chunk->is_cacheable) ||
new_paint_chunks_.LastChunk().Matches(*cached_chunk));
}
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PaintUnderInvalidationCheckingEnabled()) {
under_invalidation_checking_end_ = end_index;
DCHECK(IsCheckingUnderInvalidation());
} else if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled()) {
new_paint_chunks_.ForceNewChunk();
UpdateCurrentPaintChunkProperties(base::nullopt,
*properties_before_subsequence);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The set_pixel_format function in ui/vnc.c in QEMU allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a small bytes_per_pixel value.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char **argv)
{
FILE *fp = stdout;
const char *file_name = NULL;
int color_type = 8; /* invalid */
int bit_depth = 32; /* invalid */
unsigned int colors[5];
unsigned int filters = PNG_ALL_FILTERS;
png_fixed_point gamma = 0; /* not set */
chunk_insert *head_insert = NULL;
chunk_insert **insert_ptr = &head_insert;
memset(colors, 0, sizeof colors);
while (--argc > 0)
{
char *arg = *++argv;
if (strcmp(arg, "--sRGB") == 0)
{
gamma = PNG_DEFAULT_sRGB;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(arg, "--linear") == 0)
{
gamma = PNG_FP_1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(arg, "--1.8") == 0)
{
gamma = PNG_GAMMA_MAC_18;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(arg, "--nofilters") == 0)
{
filters = PNG_FILTER_NONE;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(arg, "--color=", 8) == 0)
{
parse_color(arg+8, colors);
continue;
}
if (argc >= 3 && strcmp(arg, "--insert") == 0)
{
png_const_charp what = *++argv;
png_charp param = *++argv;
chunk_insert *new_insert;
argc -= 2;
new_insert = find_insert(what, param);
if (new_insert != NULL)
{
*insert_ptr = new_insert;
insert_ptr = &new_insert->next;
}
continue;
}
if (arg[0] == '-')
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: %s: invalid option\n", arg);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(arg, "palette") == 0)
{
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
continue;
}
if (strncmp(arg, "gray", 4) == 0)
{
if (arg[4] == 0)
{
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
continue;
}
else if (strcmp(arg+4, "a") == 0 ||
strcmp(arg+4, "alpha") == 0 ||
strcmp(arg+4, "-alpha") == 0)
{
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
continue;
}
}
if (strncmp(arg, "rgb", 3) == 0)
{
if (arg[3] == 0)
{
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
continue;
}
else if (strcmp(arg+3, "a") == 0 ||
strcmp(arg+3, "alpha") == 0 ||
strcmp(arg+3, "-alpha") == 0)
{
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
continue;
}
}
if (color_type == 8 && isdigit(arg[0]))
{
color_type = atoi(arg);
if (color_type < 0 || color_type > 6 || color_type == 1 ||
color_type == 5)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: %s: not a valid color type\n", arg);
exit(1);
}
continue;
}
if (bit_depth == 32 && isdigit(arg[0]))
{
bit_depth = atoi(arg);
if (bit_depth <= 0 || bit_depth > 16 ||
(bit_depth & -bit_depth) != bit_depth)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: %s: not a valid bit depth\n", arg);
exit(1);
}
continue;
}
if (argc == 1) /* It's the file name */
{
fp = fopen(arg, "wb");
if (fp == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: could not open\n", arg, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
file_name = arg;
continue;
}
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: %s: unknown argument\n", arg);
exit(1);
} /* argument while loop */
if (color_type == 8 || bit_depth == 32)
{
fprintf(stderr, "usage: makepng [--sRGB|--linear|--1.8] "
"[--color=...] color-type bit-depth [file-name]\n"
" Make a test PNG file, by default writes to stdout.\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Check the colors */
{
const unsigned int lim = (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE ? 255U :
(1U<<bit_depth)-1);
unsigned int i;
for (i=1; i<=colors[0]; ++i)
if (colors[i] > lim)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: --color=...: %u out of range [0..%u]\n",
colors[i], lim);
exit(1);
}
}
/* Restrict the filters for more speed to those we know are used for the
* generated images.
*/
if (filters == PNG_ALL_FILTERS)
{
if ((color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_PALETTE) != 0 || bit_depth < 8)
filters = PNG_FILTER_NONE;
else if (color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) /* rgb */
{
if (bit_depth == 8)
filters &= ~(PNG_FILTER_NONE | PNG_FILTER_AVG);
else
filters = PNG_FILTER_SUB | PNG_FILTER_PAETH;
}
else /* gray 8 or 16-bit */
filters &= ~PNG_FILTER_NONE;
}
{
int ret = write_png(&file_name, fp, color_type, bit_depth, gamma,
head_insert, filters, colors);
if (ret != 0 && file_name != NULL)
remove(file_name);
return ret;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int walk_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
int err = 0;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
again:
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
if (walk->pte_hole)
err = walk->pte_hole(addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
continue;
}
/*
* This implies that each ->pmd_entry() handler
* needs to know about pmd_trans_huge() pmds
*/
if (walk->pmd_entry)
err = walk->pmd_entry(pmd, addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
/*
* Check this here so we only break down trans_huge
* pages when we _need_ to
*/
if (!walk->pte_entry)
continue;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
goto again;
err = walk_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,636 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageType(Image *image,const ImageType type)
{
const char
*artifact;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
status=MagickTrue;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
image_info->dither=image->dither;
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"dither");
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"dither",artifact);
switch (type)
{
case BilevelType:
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
(void) NormalizeImage(image);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=2;
quantize_info->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->colors=2;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleMatteType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case PaletteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=256;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PaletteBilevelMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
(void) BilevelImageChannel(image,AlphaChannel,(double) QuantumRange/2.0);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case PaletteMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->colorspace=TransparentColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case TrueColorType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case TrueColorMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case ColorSeparationType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case ColorSeparationMatteType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case OptimizeType:
case UndefinedType:
break;
}
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
image->type=type;
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: magick/attribute.c in ImageMagick 7.0.3-2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281 | Medium | 168,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 low32, high32;
unsigned long tmpl;
struct desc_ptr dt;
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_TS); /* 22.2.3 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, read_cr4()); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, read_cr3()); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
* __vmx_load_host_state(), in case userspace uses the null selectors
* too (the expected case).
*/
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
#else
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
native_store_idt(&dt);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, dt.address); /* 22.2.4 */
vmx->host_idt_base = dt.address;
vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, vmx_return); /* 22.2.5 */
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl); /* 22.2.3 */
if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.17.2 on Intel processors does not ensure that the value in the CR4 control register remains the same after a VM entry, which allows host OS users to kill arbitrary processes or cause a denial of service (system disruption) by leveraging /dev/kvm access, as demonstrated by PR_SET_TSC prctl calls within a modified copy of QEMU.
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply(
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params params;
if (printer_query->last_status() != printing::PrintingContext::OK) {
params.Reset();
} else {
RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(printer_query->settings(), ¶ms.params);
params.params.document_cookie = printer_query->cookie();
params.pages =
printing::PageRange::GetPages(printer_query->settings().ranges);
}
PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, params);
Send(reply_msg);
if (printer_query->cookie() && printer_query->settings().dpi())
print_job_manager_->QueuePrinterQuery(printer_query.get());
else
printer_query->StopWorker();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltCopyTreeInternal(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlNodePtr invocNode,
xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE, int topElemVisited)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if (node == NULL)
return(NULL);
switch (node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE:
case XML_ENTITY_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
case XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE:
#endif
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE: {
int noenc = (node->name == xmlStringTextNoenc);
return(xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, insert, node->content, noenc));
}
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
return(xsltCopyTextString(ctxt, insert, node->content, 0));
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
return((xmlNodePtr)
xsltShallowCopyAttr(ctxt, invocNode, insert, (xmlAttrPtr) node));
case XML_NAMESPACE_DECL:
return((xmlNodePtr) xsltShallowCopyNsNode(ctxt, invocNode,
insert, (xmlNsPtr) node));
case XML_DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_FRAG_NODE:
case XML_NOTATION_NODE:
case XML_DTD_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_DECL:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_DECL:
case XML_ENTITY_DECL:
case XML_XINCLUDE_START:
case XML_XINCLUDE_END:
return(NULL);
}
if (XSLT_IS_RES_TREE_FRAG(node)) {
if (node->children != NULL)
copy = xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, invocNode,
node->children, insert, 0, 0);
else
copy = NULL;
return(copy);
}
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
/*
* The node may have been coalesced into another text node.
*/
if (insert->last != copy)
return(insert->last);
copy->next = NULL;
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Copy in-scope namespace nodes.
*
* REVISIT: Since we try to reuse existing in-scope ns-decls by
* using xmlSearchNsByHref(), this will eventually change
* the prefix of an original ns-binding; thus it might
* break QNames in element/attribute content.
* OPTIMIZE TODO: If we had a xmlNsPtr * on the transformation
* context, plus a ns-lookup function, which writes directly
* to a given list, then we wouldn't need to create/free the
* nsList every time.
*/
if ((topElemVisited == 0) &&
(node->parent != NULL) &&
(node->parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
(node->parent->type != XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE))
{
xmlNsPtr *nsList, *curns, ns;
/*
* If this is a top-most element in a tree to be
* copied, then we need to ensure that all in-scope
* namespaces are copied over. For nodes deeper in the
* tree, it is sufficient to reconcile only the ns-decls
* (node->nsDef entries).
*/
nsList = xmlGetNsList(node->doc, node);
if (nsList != NULL) {
curns = nsList;
do {
/*
* Search by prefix first in order to break as less
* QNames in element/attribute content as possible.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(insert->doc, insert,
(*curns)->prefix);
if ((ns == NULL) ||
(! xmlStrEqual(ns->href, (*curns)->href)))
{
ns = NULL;
/*
* Search by namespace name.
* REVISIT TODO: Currently disabled.
*/
#if 0
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(insert->doc,
insert, (*curns)->href);
#endif
}
if (ns == NULL) {
/*
* Declare a new namespace on the copied element.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(copy, (*curns)->href,
(*curns)->prefix);
/* TODO: Handle errors */
}
if (node->ns == *curns) {
/*
* If this was the original's namespace then set
* the generated counterpart on the copy.
*/
copy->ns = ns;
}
curns++;
} while (*curns != NULL);
xmlFree(nsList);
}
} else if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* Copy over all namespace declaration attributes.
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
}
/*
* Set the namespace.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (copy->ns == NULL) {
/*
* This will map copy->ns to one of the newly created
* in-scope ns-decls, OR create a new ns-decl on @copy.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, invocNode,
node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace on @copy with xmlns="".
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, invocNode, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
/*
* Copy attribute nodes.
*/
if (node->properties != NULL) {
xsltCopyAttrListNoOverwrite(ctxt, invocNode,
copy, node->properties);
}
if (topElemVisited == 0)
topElemVisited = 1;
}
/*
* Copy the subtree.
*/
if (node->children != NULL) {
xsltCopyTreeList(ctxt, invocNode,
node->children, copy, isLRE, topElemVisited);
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"xsltCopyTreeInternal: Copying of '%s' failed.\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Verify_StoreExistingGroupExistingCache(base::Time expected_update_time) {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
EXPECT_EQ(cache_.get(), group_->newest_complete_cache());
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindCache(1, &cache_record));
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.group_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(cache_record.online_wildcard);
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_update_time == cache_record.update_time);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, cache_record.cache_size);
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord> entry_records;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntriesForCache(1, &entry_records));
EXPECT_EQ(2U, entry_records.size());
if (entry_records[0].url == kDefaultEntryUrl)
entry_records.erase(entry_records.begin());
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, entry_records[0].url);
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, entry_records[0].flags);
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].response_id);
EXPECT_EQ(100, entry_records[0].response_size);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
EXPECT_EQ(1, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_modified_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(kOrigin, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_origin_);
EXPECT_EQ(100, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_delta_);
TestFinished();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int jas_iccgetuint16(jas_stream_t *in, jas_iccuint16_t *val)
{
ulonglong tmp;
if (jas_iccgetuint(in, 2, &tmp))
return -1;
*val = tmp;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2cap_sock_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p backlog %d", sk, backlog);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND || sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
if (enable_ertm)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
if (!l2cap_pi(sk)->psm) {
bdaddr_t *src = &bt_sk(sk)->src;
u16 psm;
err = -EINVAL;
write_lock_bh(&l2cap_sk_list.lock);
for (psm = 0x1001; psm < 0x1100; psm += 2)
if (!__l2cap_get_sock_by_addr(cpu_to_le16(psm), src)) {
l2cap_pi(sk)->psm = cpu_to_le16(psm);
l2cap_pi(sk)->sport = cpu_to_le16(psm);
err = 0;
break;
}
write_unlock_bh(&l2cap_sk_list.lock);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
}
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The native Bluetooth stack in the Linux Kernel (BlueZ), starting at the Linux kernel version 2.6.32 and up to and including 4.13.1, are vulnerable to a stack overflow vulnerability in the processing of L2CAP configuration responses resulting in Remote code execution in kernel space.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 167,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void traverse_commit_list(struct rev_info *revs,
show_commit_fn show_commit,
show_object_fn show_object,
void *data)
{
int i;
struct commit *commit;
struct strbuf base;
strbuf_init(&base, PATH_MAX);
while ((commit = get_revision(revs)) != NULL) {
/*
* an uninteresting boundary commit may not have its tree
* parsed yet, but we are not going to show them anyway
*/
if (commit->tree)
add_pending_tree(revs, commit->tree);
show_commit(commit, data);
}
for (i = 0; i < revs->pending.nr; i++) {
struct object_array_entry *pending = revs->pending.objects + i;
struct object *obj = pending->item;
const char *name = pending->name;
const char *path = pending->path;
if (obj->flags & (UNINTERESTING | SEEN))
continue;
if (obj->type == OBJ_TAG) {
obj->flags |= SEEN;
show_object(obj, NULL, name, data);
continue;
}
if (!path)
path = "";
if (obj->type == OBJ_TREE) {
process_tree(revs, (struct tree *)obj, show_object,
&base, path, data);
continue;
}
if (obj->type == OBJ_BLOB) {
process_blob(revs, (struct blob *)obj, show_object,
NULL, path, data);
continue;
}
die("unknown pending object %s (%s)",
oid_to_hex(&obj->oid), name);
}
object_array_clear(&revs->pending);
strbuf_release(&base);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
VLOGF(2) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 172,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_trns_chunk(AVCodecContext *avctx, PNGDecContext *s,
uint32_t length)
{
int v, i;
if (s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) {
if (length > 256 || !(s->state & PNG_PLTE))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
v = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->gb);
s->palette[i] = (s->palette[i] & 0x00ffffff) | (v << 24);
}
} else if (s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY || s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) {
if ((s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && length != 2) ||
(s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB && length != 6))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < length / 2; i++) {
/* only use the least significant bits */
v = av_mod_uintp2(bytestream2_get_be16(&s->gb), s->bit_depth);
if (s->bit_depth > 8)
AV_WB16(&s->transparent_color_be[2 * i], v);
else
s->transparent_color_be[i] = v;
}
} else {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
s->has_trns = 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: FFmpeg before 2017-02-04 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow related to the decode_frame_common function in libavcodec/pngdec.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Check trns more completely
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 546/clusterfuzz-testcase-4809433909559296
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 168,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool DoResolveRelativeHost(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
url_parse::Parsed relative_parsed; // Everything but the scheme is valid.
url_parse::ParseAfterScheme(&relative_url[relative_component.begin],
relative_component.len, relative_component.begin,
&relative_parsed);
Replacements<CHAR> replacements;
replacements.SetUsername(relative_url, relative_parsed.username);
replacements.SetPassword(relative_url, relative_parsed.password);
replacements.SetHost(relative_url, relative_parsed.host);
replacements.SetPort(relative_url, relative_parsed.port);
replacements.SetPath(relative_url, relative_parsed.path);
replacements.SetQuery(relative_url, relative_parsed.query);
replacements.SetRef(relative_url, relative_parsed.ref);
return ReplaceStandardURL(base_url, base_parsed, replacements,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DoResolveRelativeHost function in url/url_canon_relative.cc in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a relative URL containing a hostname, as demonstrated by a protocol-relative URL beginning with a //www.google.com/ substring.
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,192 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
uint16_t panid = 0;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return caplen;
}
hdrlen = 3;
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[FC_FRAME_TYPE(fc)]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
/*
* Destination address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_DEST_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* PAN ID compression; this requires that both
* the source and destination addresses be present,
* but the destination address is missing.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return hdrlen;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p + 2)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
/*
* Source address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_SRC_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return hdrlen;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Fix bug introduced by previous fix.
We've already advanced the pointer past the PAN ID, if present; it now
points to the address, so don't add 2 to it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 170,031 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
svm->vcpu.fpu_active = 1;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
set_dr_intercepts(svm);
set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
control->iopm_base_pa = iopm_base;
control->msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->msrpm);
control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
init_seg(&save->es);
init_seg(&save->ss);
init_seg(&save->ds);
init_seg(&save->fs);
init_seg(&save->gs);
save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, 0);
save->dr6 = 0xffff0ff0;
kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, 2);
save->rip = 0x0000fff0;
svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = save->rip;
/*
* svm_set_cr0() sets PG and WP and clears NW and CD on save->cr0.
* It also updates the guest-visible cr0 value.
*/
svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(&svm->vcpu);
save->cr4 = X86_CR4_PAE;
/* rdx = ?? */
if (npt_enabled) {
/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
control->nested_ctl = 1;
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat;
save->cr3 = 0;
save->cr4 = 0;
}
svm->asid_generation = 0;
svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
control->pause_filter_count = 3000;
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
}
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
enable_gif(svm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #DB (aka Debug) exceptions, related to svm.c.
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool WebviewInfo::IsResourceWebviewAccessible(
const Extension* extension,
const std::string& partition_id,
const std::string& relative_path) {
if (!extension)
return false;
const WebviewInfo* info = GetResourcesInfo(*extension);
if (!info)
return false;
bool partition_is_privileged = false;
for (size_t i = 0;
i < info->webview_privileged_partitions_.size();
++i) {
if (MatchPattern(partition_id, info->webview_privileged_partitions_[i])) {
partition_is_privileged = true;
break;
}
}
return partition_is_privileged && extension->ResourceMatches(
info->webview_accessible_resources_, relative_path);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to not properly considering focus during the processing of JavaScript events in the presence of a multiple-fields input type.
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented, uint32 sync_point) {
GpuProcessHostUIShim* ui_shim = GpuProcessHostUIShim::FromID(gpu_host_id);
if (ui_shim)
ui_shim->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(route_id,
presented,
sync_point));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool isUserInteractionEventForSlider(Event* event, LayoutObject* layoutObject) {
if (isUserInteractionEvent(event))
return true;
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject));
if (!slider.isNull() && !slider.inDragMode())
return false;
const AtomicString& type = event->type();
return type == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
type == EventTypeNames::mouseout || type == EventTypeNames::mousemove;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly handle certain out-of-memory conditions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document that triggers a large memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032} | Medium | 171,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: make_size_image(png_store* PNG_CONST ps, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte PNG_CONST bit_depth, int PNG_CONST interlace_type,
png_uint_32 PNG_CONST w, png_uint_32 PNG_CONST h,
int PNG_CONST do_interlace)
{
context(ps, fault);
/* At present libpng does not support the write of an interlaced image unless
* PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED, even with do_interlace so the code here
* does the pixel interlace itself, so:
*/
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_infop pi;
png_structp pp;
unsigned int pixel_size;
/* Make a name and get an appropriate id for the store: */
char name[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 id = FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, w, h, do_interlace);
standard_name_from_id(name, sizeof name, 0, id);
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
/* In the event of a problem return control to the Catch statement below
* to do the clean up - it is not possible to 'return' directly from a Try
* block.
*/
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, w, h, bit_depth, colour_type, interlace_type,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
{
static char key[] = "image name"; /* must be writeable */
size_t pos;
png_text text;
char copy[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
/* Yuck: the text must be writable! */
pos = safecat(copy, sizeof copy, 0, ps->wname);
text.text = copy;
text.text_length = pos;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* Calculate the bit size, divide by 8 to get the byte size - this won't
* overflow because we know the w values are all small enough even for
* a system where 'unsigned int' is only 16 bits.
*/
pixel_size = bit_size(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) != ((w * pixel_size) + 7) / 8)
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
int npasses = npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type);
png_uint_32 y;
int pass;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
int nfilter = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST;
# endif
png_byte image[16][SIZE_ROWMAX];
/* To help consistent error detection make the parts of this buffer
* that aren't set below all '1':
*/
memset(image, 0xff, sizeof image);
if (!do_interlace && npasses != png_set_interlace_handling(pp))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
/* Prepare the whole image first to avoid making it 7 times: */
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
size_row(image[y], w * pixel_size, y);
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
/* The following two are for checking the macros: */
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 wPass = PNG_PASS_COLS(w, pass);
/* If do_interlace is set we don't call png_write_row for every
* row because some of them are empty. In fact, for a 1x1 image,
* most of them are empty!
*/
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep row = image[y];
png_byte tempRow[SIZE_ROWMAX];
/* If do_interlace *and* the image is interlaced we
* need a reduced interlace row; this may be reduced
* to empty.
*/
if (do_interlace && interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
{
/* The row must not be written if it doesn't exist, notice
* that there are two conditions here, either the row isn't
* ever in the pass or the row would be but isn't wide
* enough to contribute any pixels. In fact the wPass test
* can be used to skip the whole y loop in this case.
*/
if (PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, pass) && wPass > 0)
{
/* Set to all 1's for error detection (libpng tends to
* set unset things to 0).
*/
memset(tempRow, 0xff, sizeof tempRow);
interlace_row(tempRow, row, pixel_size, w, pass);
row = tempRow;
}
else
continue;
}
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Only get to here if the row has some pixels in it, set the
* filters to 'all' for the very first row and thereafter to a
* single filter. It isn't well documented, but png_set_filter
* does accept a filter number (per the spec) as well as a bit
* mask.
*
* The apparent wackiness of decrementing nfilter rather than
* incrementing is so that Paeth gets used in all images bigger
* than 1 row - it's the tricky one.
*/
png_set_filter(pp, 0/*method*/,
nfilter >= PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST ? PNG_ALL_FILTERS : nfilter);
if (nfilter-- == 0)
nfilter = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST-1;
# endif
png_write_row(pp, row);
}
}
}
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
{
static char key[] = "end marker";
static char comment[] = "end";
png_text text;
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
text.text = comment;
text.text_length = (sizeof comment)-1;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* And store this under the appropriate id, then clean up. */
store_storefile(ps, id);
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
/* Use the png_store returned by the exception. This may help the compiler
* because 'ps' is not used in this branch of the setjmp. Note that fault
* and ps will always be the same value.
*/
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::resolveURL(ExecutionContext* context, const KURL& fileSystemURL, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal, this, contextPtr, fileSystemURL, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool VideoTrack::VetEntry(const BlockEntry* pBlockEntry) const
{
return Track::VetEntry(pBlockEntry) && pBlockEntry->GetBlock()->IsKey();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SparseBitSet::initFromRanges(const uint32_t* ranges, size_t nRanges) {
if (nRanges == 0) {
mMaxVal = 0;
mIndices.reset();
mBitmaps.reset();
return;
}
mMaxVal = ranges[nRanges * 2 - 1];
size_t indexSize = (mMaxVal + kPageMask) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
mIndices.reset(new uint32_t[indexSize]);
uint32_t nPages = calcNumPages(ranges, nRanges);
mBitmaps.reset(new element[nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)]);
memset(mBitmaps.get(), 0, nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - 3));
mZeroPageIndex = noZeroPage;
uint32_t nonzeroPageEnd = 0;
uint32_t currentPage = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < nRanges; i++) {
uint32_t start = ranges[i * 2];
uint32_t end = ranges[i * 2 + 1];
uint32_t startPage = start >> kLogValuesPerPage;
uint32_t endPage = (end - 1) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
if (startPage >= nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (startPage > nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (mZeroPageIndex == noZeroPage) {
mZeroPageIndex = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
for (uint32_t j = nonzeroPageEnd; j < startPage; j++) {
mIndices[j] = mZeroPageIndex;
}
}
mIndices[startPage] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
size_t index = ((currentPage - 1) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)) +
((start & kPageMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl);
size_t nElements = (end - (start & ~kElMask) + kElMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl;
if (nElements == 1) {
mBitmaps[index] |= (kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask)) &
(kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask));
} else {
mBitmaps[index] |= kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask);
for (size_t j = 1; j < nElements - 1; j++) {
mBitmaps[index + j] = kElAllOnes;
}
mBitmaps[index + nElements - 1] |= kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask);
}
for (size_t j = startPage + 1; j < endPage + 1; j++) {
mIndices[j] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
nonzeroPageEnd = endPage + 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
| Medium | 174,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: stringprep_strerror (Stringprep_rc rc)
{
const char *p;
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
switch (rc)
{
case STRINGPREP_OK:
p = _("Success");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_UNASSIGNED:
p = _("Forbidden unassigned code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_BOTH_L_AND_RAL:
p = _("Conflicting bidirectional properties in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_LEADTRAIL_NOT_RAL:
p = _("Malformed bidirectional string");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited bidirectional code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER:
p = _("Output would exceed the buffer space provided");
break;
case STRINGPREP_PROFILE_ERROR:
p = _("Error in stringprep profile definition");
break;
case STRINGPREP_FLAG_ERROR:
p = _("Flag conflict with profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
p = _("Unknown profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_NFKC_FAILED:
p = _("Unicode normalization failed (internal error)");
break;
default:
p = _("Unknown error");
break;
}
return p;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 function in libin before 1.31, as used in jabberd2, allows context-dependent attackers to read system memory and possibly have other unspecified impact via invalid UTF-8 characters in a string, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: | High | 164,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::TestWebKitPlatformSupport(bool unit_test_mode)
: unit_test_mode_(unit_test_mode) {
v8::V8::SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
WebKit::initialize(this);
WebKit::setLayoutTestMode(true);
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsLocal(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsNoAccess(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebScriptController::enableV8SingleThreadMode();
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSockets(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableApplicationCache(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDatabase(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDataTransferItems(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enablePushState(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(true);
bool enable_media = false;
FilePath module_path;
if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path)) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::AmIBundled())
module_path = module_path.DirName().DirName().DirName();
#endif
if (media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path))
enable_media = true;
}
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaPlayer(enable_media);
LOG_IF(WARNING, !enable_media) << "Failed to initialize the media library.\n";
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGeolocation(false);
if (!appcache_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the appcache, "
"using in-memory storage.";
DCHECK(appcache_dir_.path().empty());
}
SimpleAppCacheSystem::InitializeOnUIThread(appcache_dir_.path());
WebKit::WebDatabase::setObserver(&database_system_);
blob_registry_ = new TestShellWebBlobRegistryImpl();
file_utilities_.set_sandbox_enabled(false);
if (!file_system_root_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the filesystem."
"FileSystem feature will be disabled.";
DCHECK(file_system_root_.path().empty());
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
SetThemeEngine(NULL);
#endif
net::HttpCache::Mode cache_mode = net::HttpCache::NORMAL;
net::CookieMonster::EnableFileScheme();
SimpleResourceLoaderBridge::Init(FilePath(), cache_mode, true);
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebScriptController::registerExtension(extensions_v8::GCExtension::Get());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly perform window navigation, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
int copy = output_size - count;
if (avail < copy) copy = avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer signedness error in the png_inflate function in pngrutil.c in libpng before 1.4.10beta01, as used in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PNG file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-3026.
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: append_utf8_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
struct stringbuf *sb)
{
unsigned char tmp[6];
const unsigned char *s;
size_t n;
int i, nmore;
if (length && (*value == ' ' || *value == '#'))
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *value;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
value++;
length--;
}
if (length && value[length-1] == ' ')
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = ' ';
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
length--;
}
/* FIXME: check that the invalid encoding handling is correct */
for (s=value, n=0;;)
{
for (value = s; n < length && !(*s & 0x80); n++, s++)
for (value = s; n < length && !(*s & 0x80); n++, s++)
;
append_quoted (sb, value, s-value, 0);
if (n==length)
return; /* ready */
assert ((*s & 0x80));
if ( (*s & 0xe0) == 0xc0 ) /* 110x xxxx */
nmore = 1;
else if ( (*s & 0xf0) == 0xe0 ) /* 1110 xxxx */
nmore = 2;
else if ( (*s & 0xf8) == 0xf0 ) /* 1111 0xxx */
nmore = 3;
else if ( (*s & 0xfc) == 0xf8 ) /* 1111 10xx */
nmore = 4;
else if ( (*s & 0xfe) == 0xfc ) /* 1111 110x */
nmore = 5;
else /* invalid encoding */
nmore = 5; /* we will reduce the check length anyway */
if (n+nmore > length)
nmore = length - n; /* oops, encoding to short */
tmp[0] = *s++; n++;
for (i=1; i <= nmore; i++)
{
if ( (*s & 0xc0) != 0x80)
break; /* invalid encoding - stop */
tmp[i] = *s++;
n++;
}
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, i);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The append_utf8_value function in the DN decoder (dn.c) in Libksba before 1.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by clearing the high bit of the byte after invalid utf-8 encoded data.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
Rec2.RecordLength=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if (Rec.RecordLength > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp <= 16))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries-WPG_Palette.StartIndex) >
(Rec2.RecordLength-2-2) / 3)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidColormapIndex");
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ReadWPGImage function in coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-9 does not properly validate the colormap index in a WPG palette, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use of uninitialized data or invalid memory allocation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a malformed WPG file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/85 | Medium | 167,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt received: %s", ssn, PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) ?
"toclient":"toserver");
/* RST */
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_WINDOW(p), 0) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), (ssn->client.isn + 1)))
{
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
} else {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
/* FIN */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) {
/** \todo */
/* SYN/ACK */
} else if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) && PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received on 4WHS session", ssn);
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ACK mismatch, packet ACK %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet SEQ's the *FIRST* received SYN
* packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_SYN);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from *first* SYN pkt", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn);
return -1;
}
/* update state */
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_SYN_RECV);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ 4WHS ssn state is now TCP_SYN_RECV", ssn);
/* sequence number & window */
ssn->client.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->client, ssn->client.isn);
ssn->client.next_seq = ssn->client.isn + 1;
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS window %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.window);
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets. */
if ((TCP_HAS_TS(p)) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->client.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.last_ts %" PRIu32" "
"ssn->server.last_ts %" PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.last_ts, ssn->server.last_ts);
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
if (ssn->client.last_ts == 0)
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
} else {
ssn->server.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->server.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = ssn->client.isn + 1;
/** check for the presense of the ws ptr to determine if we
* support wscale at all */
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) &&
(TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)))
{
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) &&
TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SACK permitted for 4WHS session", ssn);
}
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->server.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %" PRIu32 " "
"(ssn->server.last_ack %" PRIu32 ")", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack, ssn->server.last_ack);
/* done here */
return 0;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_IN_WRONG_DIRECTION);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received in the wrong direction", ssn);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK mismatch, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
StreamTcp3whsSynAckUpdate(ssn, p, /* no queue override */NULL);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent", ssn);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent of "
"4WHS SYN", ssn);
}
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
/** a SYN only packet in the opposite direction could be:
* http://www.breakingpointsystems.com/community/blog/tcp-
* portals-the-three-way-handshake-is-a-lie
*
* \todo improve resetting the session */
/* indicate that we're dealing with 4WHS here */
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS flag set", ssn);
/* set the sequence numbers and window for server
* We leave the ssn->client.isn in place as we will
* check the SYN/ACK pkt with that.
*/
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
/* Set the stream timestamp value, if packet has timestamp
* option enabled. */
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p)) {
ssn->server.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: %02x", ssn, ssn->server.last_ts);
if (ssn->server.last_ts == 0)
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->server.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
if (TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if (TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->server.isn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
/** \todo check if it's correct or set event */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
/* Handle the asynchronous stream, when we receive a SYN packet
and now istead of receving a SYN/ACK we receive a ACK from the
same host, which sent the SYN, this suggests the ASNYC streams.*/
if (stream_config.async_oneside == FALSE)
return 0;
/* we are in AYNC (one side) mode now. */
/* one side async means we won't see a SYN/ACK, so we can
* only check the SYN. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_ASYNC_WRONG_SEQ);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream",ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
return -1;
}
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
/* Set the server side parameters */
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_ACK(p) - 1;
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
ssn->server.last_ack = ssn->server.next_seq;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: synsent => Asynchronous stream, packet SEQ"
" %" PRIu32 ", payload size %" PRIu32 " (%" PRIu32 "), "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ""
,ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)
+ p->payload_len, ssn->client.next_seq);
/* if SYN had wscale, assume it to be supported. Otherwise
* we know it not to be supported. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) {
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
}
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets.*/
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p) &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
} else {
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received).
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin | Medium | 169,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
size_t size;
matrix = 0;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
goto error;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
goto error;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = 0;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(numrows, numcols, &size)) {
goto error;
}
matrix->datasize_ = size;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
goto error;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
error:
if (matrix) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
#define ADD_DELTA(o, shift) { if (delta < delta_end) (o) |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << shift); else goto fail; }
if (cmd & 0x01) ADD_DELTA(off, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x02) ADD_DELTA(off, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x04) ADD_DELTA(off, 16UL);
if (cmd & 0x08) ADD_DELTA(off, 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) ADD_DELTA(len, 0UL);
if (cmd & 0x20) ADD_DELTA(len, 8UL);
if (cmd & 0x40) ADD_DELTA(len, 16UL);
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
#undef ADD_DELTA
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A flaw was found in libgit2 before version 0.27.3. It has been discovered that an unexpected sign extension in git_delta_apply function in delta.c file may lead to an integer overflow which in turn leads to an out of bound read, allowing to read before the base object. An attacker may use this flaw to leak memory addresses or cause a Denial of Service.
Commit Message: delta: fix overflow when computing limit
When checking whether a delta base offset and length fit into the base
we have in memory already, we can trigger an overflow which breaks the
check. This would subsequently result in us reading memory from out of
bounds of the base.
The issue is easily fixed by checking for overflow when adding `off` and
`len`, thus guaranteeting that we are never indexing beyond `base_len`.
This corresponds to the git patch 8960844a7 (check patch_delta bounds
more carefully, 2006-04-07), which adds these overflow checks.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: construct_command_line(struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
static char cmd[BUF_SIZE];
char *method = manager->method;
int i;
build_config(working_dir, server);
if (server->method) method = server->method;
memset(cmd, 0, BUF_SIZE);
snprintf(cmd, BUF_SIZE,
"%s -m %s --manager-address %s -f %s/.shadowsocks_%s.pid -c %s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf",
executable, method, manager->manager_address,
working_dir, server->port, working_dir, server->port);
if (manager->acl != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --acl %s", manager->acl);
}
if (manager->timeout != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -t %s", manager->timeout);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
if (manager->nofile) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -n %d", manager->nofile);
}
#endif
if (manager->user != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -a %s", manager->user);
}
if (manager->verbose) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -v");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == UDP_ONLY) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -U");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == TCP_AND_UDP) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -u");
}
if (server->fast_open[0] == 0 && manager->fast_open) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --fast-open");
}
if (manager->ipv6first) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -6");
}
if (manager->mtu) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --mtu %d", manager->mtu);
}
if (server->plugin == NULL && manager->plugin) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin \"%s\"", manager->plugin);
}
if (server->plugin_opts == NULL && manager->plugin_opts) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin-opts \"%s\"", manager->plugin_opts);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->nameserver_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -d %s", manager->nameservers[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->host_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -s %s", manager->hosts[i]);
}
{
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --reuse-port");
}
if (verbose) {
LOGI("cmd: %s", cmd);
}
return cmd;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: In manager.c in ss-manager in shadowsocks-libev 3.1.0, improper parsing allows command injection via shell metacharacters in a JSON configuration request received via 127.0.0.1 UDP traffic, related to the add_server, build_config, and construct_command_line functions.
Commit Message: Fix #1734 | High | 167,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
number_planes_filled,
one,
offset,
pixel_info_length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 2) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->page.x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->page.y=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->matte=flags & 0x04 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_planes=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) ||
((flags & 0x04) && (number_colormaps > 254)) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
3*map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
number_planes_filled=(number_planes % 2 == 0) ? number_planes :
number_planes+1;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes_filled) != (size_t) (number_pixels*
number_planes_filled))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
number_planes_filled*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info_length=image->columns*image->rows*number_planes_filled;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
operand++;
if (offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length)
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
p=pixels+offset;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
operand++;
offset=((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+x*
number_planes+plane;
p=pixels+offset;
if (offset+((size_t) operand*number_planes) > pixel_info_length)
{
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
x=(ssize_t) number_planes;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,*p & mask,&index,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
break;
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (x*map_length+
(*p & mask)),&index,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
*p=colormap[(ssize_t) index];
p++;
}
if ((i < (ssize_t) number_pixels) || (x < (ssize_t) number_planes))
{
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,*p++,&index,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].red);
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,*p++,&index,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].green);
if (IsValidColormapIndex(image,*p++,&index,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].blue);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadRLEImage function in coders/rle.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted RLE file.
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=29710 | Medium | 168,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
if (buffer == 0) {
return NULL;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
ssize_t index = mBufferIDToBufferHeader.indexOfKey(buffer);
if (index < 0) {
CLOGW("findBufferHeader: buffer %u not found", buffer);
return NULL;
}
return mBufferIDToBufferHeader.valueAt(index);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
| Medium | 173,528 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeString(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size_,
char*& str)
{
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) //we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size+1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status)
{
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
/* len == 0 means wake all */
struct userfaultfd_wake_range range = { .len = 0, };
unsigned long new_flags;
WRITE_ONCE(ctx->released, true);
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto wakeup;
/*
* Flush page faults out of all CPUs. NOTE: all page faults
* must be retried without returning VM_FAULT_SIGBUS if
* userfaultfd_ctx_get() succeeds but vma->vma_userfault_ctx
* changes while handle_userfault released the mmap_sem. So
* it's critical that released is set to true (above), before
* taking the mmap_sem for writing.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
prev = NULL;
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx) {
prev = vma;
continue;
}
new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP);
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (prev)
vma = prev;
else
prev = vma;
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX;
}
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
wakeup:
/*
* After no new page faults can wait on this fault_*wqh, flush
* the last page faults that may have been already waiting on
* the fault_*wqh.
*/
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
__wake_up_locked_key(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, &range);
__wake_up(&ctx->fault_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, 1, &range);
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
/* Flush pending events that may still wait on event_wqh */
wake_up_all(&ctx->event_wqh);
wake_up_poll(&ctx->fd_wqh, EPOLLHUP);
userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static BOOL zgfx_decompress_segment(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, wStream* stream, size_t segmentSize)
{
BYTE c;
BYTE flags;
UINT32 extra = 0;
int opIndex;
int haveBits;
int inPrefix;
UINT32 count;
UINT32 distance;
BYTE* pbSegment;
size_t cbSegment = segmentSize - 1;
if ((Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentSize) || (segmentSize < 1))
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, flags); /* header (1 byte) */
zgfx->OutputCount = 0;
pbSegment = Stream_Pointer(stream);
Stream_Seek(stream, cbSegment);
if (!(flags & PACKET_COMPRESSED))
{
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, pbSegment, cbSegment);
CopyMemory(zgfx->OutputBuffer, pbSegment, cbSegment);
zgfx->OutputCount = cbSegment;
return TRUE;
}
zgfx->pbInputCurrent = pbSegment;
zgfx->pbInputEnd = &pbSegment[cbSegment - 1];
/* NumberOfBitsToDecode = ((NumberOfBytesToDecode - 1) * 8) - ValueOfLastByte */
zgfx->cBitsRemaining = 8 * (cbSegment - 1) - *zgfx->pbInputEnd;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
while (zgfx->cBitsRemaining)
{
haveBits = 0;
inPrefix = 0;
for (opIndex = 0; ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength != 0; opIndex++)
{
while (haveBits < ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength)
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
inPrefix = (inPrefix << 1) + zgfx->bits;
haveBits++;
}
if (inPrefix == ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixCode)
{
if (ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].tokenType == 0)
{
/* Literal */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
c = (BYTE)(ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits);
zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex] = c;
if (++zgfx->HistoryIndex == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount++] = c;
}
else
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
distance = ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits;
if (distance != 0)
{
/* Match */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
if (zgfx->bits == 0)
{
count = 3;
}
else
{
count = 4;
extra = 2;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
while (zgfx->bits == 1)
{
count *= 2;
extra++;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
}
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, extra);
count += zgfx->bits;
}
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_read(zgfx, distance, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 15);
count = zgfx->bits;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx->pbInputCurrent += count;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= (8 * count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains a Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in function zgfx_decompress_segment() that results in a memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8784
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | High | 169,297 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: raptor_libxml_getEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_getEntity(sax2->xc, name);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa. | Medium | 165,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: dump_keywords(vector_t *keydump, int level, FILE *fp)
{
unsigned int i;
keyword_t *keyword_vec;
char file_name[21];
if (!level) {
snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name), "/tmp/keywords.%d", getpid());
fp = fopen(file_name, "w");
if (!fp)
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < vector_size(keydump); i++) {
keyword_vec = vector_slot(keydump, i);
fprintf(fp, "%*sKeyword : %s (%s)\n", level * 2, "", keyword_vec->string, keyword_vec->active ? "active": "disabled");
if (keyword_vec->sub)
dump_keywords(keyword_vec->sub, level + 1, fp);
}
if (!level)
fclose(fp);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | Low | 168,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
if (!sensor_device_manager_)
sensor_device_manager_.reset(new SensorDeviceManager());
if (IsFusionSensorType(type)) {
CreateFusionSensor(type, std::move(mapping), callback);
return;
}
if (!sensor_nodes_enumerated_) {
if (!sensor_nodes_enumeration_started_) {
sensor_nodes_enumeration_started_ = file_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SensorDeviceManager::Start,
base::Unretained(sensor_device_manager_.get()), this));
}
return;
}
SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device = GetSensorDevice(type);
if (!sensor_device) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
SensorDeviceFound(type, std::move(mapping), callback, sensor_device);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int lxc_attach(const char* name, const char* lxcpath, lxc_attach_exec_t exec_function, void* exec_payload, lxc_attach_options_t* options, pid_t* attached_process)
{
int ret, status;
pid_t init_pid, pid, attached_pid, expected;
struct lxc_proc_context_info *init_ctx;
char* cwd;
char* new_cwd;
int ipc_sockets[2];
signed long personality;
if (!options)
options = &attach_static_default_options;
init_pid = lxc_cmd_get_init_pid(name, lxcpath);
if (init_pid < 0) {
ERROR("failed to get the init pid");
return -1;
}
init_ctx = lxc_proc_get_context_info(init_pid);
if (!init_ctx) {
ERROR("failed to get context of the init process, pid = %ld", (long)init_pid);
return -1;
}
personality = get_personality(name, lxcpath);
if (init_ctx->personality < 0) {
ERROR("Failed to get personality of the container");
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
init_ctx->personality = personality;
if (!fetch_seccomp(name, lxcpath, init_ctx, options))
WARN("Failed to get seccomp policy");
cwd = getcwd(NULL, 0);
/* determine which namespaces the container was created with
* by asking lxc-start, if necessary
*/
if (options->namespaces == -1) {
options->namespaces = lxc_cmd_get_clone_flags(name, lxcpath);
/* call failed */
if (options->namespaces == -1) {
ERROR("failed to automatically determine the "
"namespaces which the container unshared");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
}
/* create a socket pair for IPC communication; set SOCK_CLOEXEC in order
* to make sure we don't irritate other threads that want to fork+exec away
*
* IMPORTANT: if the initial process is multithreaded and another call
* just fork()s away without exec'ing directly after, the socket fd will
* exist in the forked process from the other thread and any close() in
* our own child process will not really cause the socket to close properly,
* potentiall causing the parent to hang.
*
* For this reason, while IPC is still active, we have to use shutdown()
* if the child exits prematurely in order to signal that the socket
* is closed and cannot assume that the child exiting will automatically
* do that.
*
* IPC mechanism: (X is receiver)
* initial process intermediate attached
* X <--- send pid of
* attached proc,
* then exit
* send 0 ------------------------------------> X
* [do initialization]
* X <------------------------------------ send 1
* [add to cgroup, ...]
* send 2 ------------------------------------> X
* close socket close socket
* run program
*/
ret = socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ipc_sockets);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not set up required IPC mechanism for attaching");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
/* create intermediate subprocess, three reasons:
* 1. runs all pthread_atfork handlers and the
* child will no longer be threaded
* (we can't properly setns() in a threaded process)
* 2. we can't setns() in the child itself, since
* we want to make sure we are properly attached to
* the pidns
* 3. also, the initial thread has to put the attached
* process into the cgroup, which we can only do if
* we didn't already setns() (otherwise, user
* namespaces will hate us)
*/
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to create first subprocess");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
if (pid) {
pid_t to_cleanup_pid = pid;
/* initial thread, we close the socket that is for the
* subprocesses
*/
close(ipc_sockets[1]);
free(cwd);
/* attach to cgroup, if requested */
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_MOVE_TO_CGROUP) {
if (!cgroup_attach(name, lxcpath, pid))
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* Let the child process know to go ahead */
status = 0;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (0)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* get pid from intermediate process */
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[0], &attached_pid, sizeof(attached_pid), NULL);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (ret != 0)
ERROR("error using IPC to receive pid of attached process");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* ignore SIGKILL (CTRL-C) and SIGQUIT (CTRL-\) - issue #313 */
if (options->stdin_fd == 0) {
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
}
/* reap intermediate process */
ret = wait_for_pid(pid);
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup_error;
/* we will always have to reap the grandchild now */
to_cleanup_pid = attached_pid;
/* tell attached process it may start initializing */
status = 0;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (0)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* wait for the attached process to finish initializing */
expected = 1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (ret != 0)
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from attached process (1)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* tell attached process we're done */
status = 2;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (2)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* now shut down communication with child, we're done */
shutdown(ipc_sockets[0], SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* we're done, the child process should now execute whatever
* it is that the user requested. The parent can now track it
* with waitpid() or similar.
*/
*attached_process = attached_pid;
return 0;
cleanup_error:
/* first shut down the socket, then wait for the pid,
* otherwise the pid we're waiting for may never exit
*/
shutdown(ipc_sockets[0], SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
if (to_cleanup_pid)
(void) wait_for_pid(to_cleanup_pid);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
/* first subprocess begins here, we close the socket that is for the
* initial thread
*/
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
/* Wait for the parent to have setup cgroups */
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[1], &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error communicating with child process");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* attach now, create another subprocess later, since pid namespaces
* only really affect the children of the current process
*/
ret = lxc_attach_to_ns(init_pid, options->namespaces);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("failed to enter the namespace");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* attach succeeded, try to cwd */
if (options->initial_cwd)
new_cwd = options->initial_cwd;
else
new_cwd = cwd;
ret = chdir(new_cwd);
if (ret < 0)
WARN("could not change directory to '%s'", new_cwd);
free(cwd);
/* now create the real child process */
{
struct attach_clone_payload payload = {
.ipc_socket = ipc_sockets[1],
.options = options,
.init_ctx = init_ctx,
.exec_function = exec_function,
.exec_payload = exec_payload
};
/* We use clone_parent here to make this subprocess a direct child of
* the initial process. Then this intermediate process can exit and
* the parent can directly track the attached process.
*/
pid = lxc_clone(attach_child_main, &payload, CLONE_PARENT);
}
/* shouldn't happen, clone() should always return positive pid */
if (pid <= 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to create subprocess");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell grandparent the pid of the pid of the newly created child */
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[1], &pid, sizeof(pid));
if (ret != sizeof(pid)) {
/* if this really happens here, this is very unfortunate, since the
* parent will not know the pid of the attached process and will
* not be able to wait for it (and we won't either due to CLONE_PARENT)
* so the parent won't be able to reap it and the attached process
* will remain a zombie
*/
ERROR("error using IPC to notify main process of pid of the attached process");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* the rest is in the hands of the initial and the attached process */
rexit(0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: attach.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier uses the proc filesystem in a container, which allows local container users to escape AppArmor or SELinux confinement by mounting a proc filesystem with a crafted (1) AppArmor profile or (2) SELinux label.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 167,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RemoveInvalidFilesFromPersistentDirectory(
const GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap& persistent_file_map,
const GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap& outgoing_file_map,
GDataCacheMetadataMap::CacheMap* cache_map) {
for (GDataCacheMetadataMap::ResourceIdToFilePathMap::const_iterator iter =
persistent_file_map.begin();
iter != persistent_file_map.end(); ++iter) {
const std::string& resource_id = iter->first;
const FilePath& file_path = iter->second;
GDataCacheMetadataMap::CacheMap::iterator cache_map_iter =
cache_map->find(resource_id);
if (cache_map_iter != cache_map->end()) {
const GDataCache::CacheEntry& cache_entry = cache_map_iter->second;
if (cache_entry.IsDirty() && outgoing_file_map.count(resource_id) == 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing dirty-but-not-committed file: "
<< file_path.value();
file_util::Delete(file_path, false);
cache_map->erase(cache_map_iter);
}
if (!cache_entry.IsDirty() && !cache_entry.IsPinned()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Removing persistent-but-dangling file: "
<< file_path.value();
file_util::Delete(file_path, false);
cache_map->erase(cache_map_iter);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: vpx_codec_err_t Decoder::DecodeFrame(const uint8_t *cxdata, size_t size) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec;
InitOnce();
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res_dec = vpx_codec_decode(&decoder_,
cxdata, static_cast<unsigned int>(size),
NULL, 0));
return res_dec;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xmlParse3986Port(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur = *str;
unsigned port = 0; /* unsigned for defined overflow behavior */
if (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
while (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
port = port * 10 + (*cur - '0');
cur++;
}
if (uri != NULL)
uri->port = port & INT_MAX; /* port value modulo INT_MAX+1 */
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in libxml2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging an incorrect limit for port values when handling redirects.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
| High | 174,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ogg_uint32_t decpack(long entry,long used_entry,long quantvals,
codebook *b,oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
ogg_uint32_t ret=0;
int j;
switch(b->dec_type){
case 0:
return (ogg_uint32_t)entry;
case 1:
if(maptype==1){
/* vals are already read into temporary column vector here */
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=((ogg_uint16_t *)(b->q_val))[off]<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
}else{
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++)
ret|=oggpack_read(opb,b->q_bits)<<(b->q_bits*j);
}
return ret;
case 2:
for(j=0;j<b->dim;j++){
ogg_uint32_t off=entry%quantvals;
entry/=quantvals;
ret|=off<<(b->q_pack*j);
}
return ret;
case 3:
return (ogg_uint32_t)used_entry;
}
return 0; /* silence compiler */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
| High | 173,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
const char *test_name = NULL;
bool skip_sanity_suite = false;
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
if (!strcmp("--help", argv[i])) {
print_usage(argv[0]);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp("--insanity", argv[i])) {
skip_sanity_suite = true;
continue;
}
if (!is_valid(argv[i])) {
printf("Error: invalid test name.\n");
print_usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
if (test_name != NULL) {
printf("Error: invalid arguments.\n");
print_usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
test_name = argv[i];
}
if (is_shell_running()) {
printf("Run 'adb shell stop' before running %s.\n", argv[0]);
return -1;
}
config_t *config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
printf("Error: unable to open stack config file.\n");
print_usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
for (const config_section_node_t *node = config_section_begin(config); node != config_section_end(config); node = config_section_next(node)) {
const char *name = config_section_name(node);
if (config_has_key(config, name, "LinkKey") && string_to_bdaddr(name, &bt_remote_bdaddr)) {
break;
}
}
config_free(config);
if (bdaddr_is_empty(&bt_remote_bdaddr)) {
printf("Error: unable to find paired device in config file.\n");
print_usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
if (!hal_open(callbacks_get_adapter_struct())) {
printf("Unable to open Bluetooth HAL.\n");
return 1;
}
if (!btsocket_init()) {
printf("Unable to initialize Bluetooth sockets.\n");
return 2;
}
if (!pan_init()) {
printf("Unable to initialize PAN.\n");
return 3;
}
if (!gatt_init()) {
printf("Unable to initialize GATT.\n");
return 4;
}
watchdog_running = true;
pthread_create(&watchdog_thread, NULL, watchdog_fn, NULL);
static const char *DEFAULT = "\x1b[0m";
static const char *GREEN = "\x1b[0;32m";
static const char *RED = "\x1b[0;31m";
if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) {
DEFAULT = GREEN = RED = "";
}
int pass = 0;
int fail = 0;
int case_num = 0;
if (!skip_sanity_suite) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sanity_suite_size; ++i) {
if (!test_name || !strcmp(test_name, sanity_suite[i].function_name)) {
callbacks_init();
if (sanity_suite[i].function()) {
printf("[%4d] %-64s [%sPASS%s]\n", ++case_num, sanity_suite[i].function_name, GREEN, DEFAULT);
++pass;
} else {
printf("[%4d] %-64s [%sFAIL%s]\n", ++case_num, sanity_suite[i].function_name, RED, DEFAULT);
++fail;
}
callbacks_cleanup();
++watchdog_id;
}
}
}
if (fail) {
printf("\n%sSanity suite failed with %d errors.%s\n", RED, fail, DEFAULT);
hal_close();
return 4;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < test_suite_size; ++i) {
if (!test_name || !strcmp(test_name, test_suite[i].function_name)) {
callbacks_init();
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
if (test_suite[i].function()) {
printf("[%4d] %-64s [%sPASS%s]\n", ++case_num, test_suite[i].function_name, GREEN, DEFAULT);
++pass;
} else {
printf("[%4d] %-64s [%sFAIL%s]\n", ++case_num, test_suite[i].function_name, RED, DEFAULT);
++fail;
}
CALL_AND_WAIT(bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
callbacks_cleanup();
++watchdog_id;
}
}
printf("\n");
if (fail) {
printf("%d/%d tests failed. See above for failed test cases.\n", fail, sanity_suite_size + test_suite_size);
} else {
printf("All tests passed!\n");
}
watchdog_running = false;
pthread_join(watchdog_thread, NULL);
hal_close();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows local users to gain privileges by establishing a pairing that remains present during a session of the primary user, aka internal bug 27410683.
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
| Medium | 173,557 |
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