instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DetachWebContentsTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* first_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* second_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &first_lifecycle_unit,
&second_lifecycle_unit);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> owned_contents =
tab_strip_model_->DetachWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivialAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
NoUnloadListenerTabStripModelDelegate other_tab_strip_model_delegate;
TabStripModel other_tab_strip_model(&other_tab_strip_model_delegate,
profile());
other_tab_strip_model.AddObserver(source_);
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_));
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(CreateTestWebContents(),
/*foreground=*/true);
other_tab_strip_model.AppendWebContents(std::move(owned_contents), false);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(first_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE, first_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
first_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
first_lifecycle_unit);
CloseTabsAndExpectNotifications(&other_tab_strip_model,
{first_lifecycle_unit});
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | Medium | 172,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int br_parse_ip_options(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_options *opt;
struct iphdr *iph;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
u32 len;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (iph->ihl < 5 || iph->version != 4)
goto inhdr_error;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, iph->ihl*4))
goto inhdr_error;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
if (unlikely(ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, iph->ihl)))
goto inhdr_error;
len = ntohs(iph->tot_len);
if (skb->len < len) {
IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INTRUNCATEDPKTS);
goto drop;
} else if (len < (iph->ihl*4))
goto inhdr_error;
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len)) {
IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
/* Zero out the CB buffer if no options present */
if (iph->ihl == 5) {
memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
return 0;
}
opt->optlen = iph->ihl*4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (ip_options_compile(dev_net(dev), opt, skb))
goto inhdr_error;
/* Check correct handling of SRR option */
if (unlikely(opt->srr)) {
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (in_dev && !IN_DEV_SOURCE_ROUTE(in_dev))
goto drop;
if (ip_options_rcv_srr(skb))
goto drop;
}
return 0;
inhdr_error:
IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
drop:
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The br_parse_ip_options function in net/bridge/br_netfilter.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service by leveraging connectivity to a network interface that uses an Ethernet bridge device.
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: InputMethodStatusConnection* ChromeOSMonitorInputMethodStatus(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_changed) {
DLOG(INFO) << "MonitorInputMethodStatus";
return InputMethodStatusConnection::GetConnection(
language_library,
current_input_method_changed,
register_ime_properties,
update_ime_property,
connection_changed);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestMediaQueryListListener::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestMediaQueryListListener* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestMediaQueryListListener*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestMediaQueryListListener::s_info);
TestMediaQueryListListener* impl = static_cast<TestMediaQueryListListener*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
RefPtr<MediaQueryListListener> listener(MediaQueryListListener::create(ScriptValue(exec->globalData(), MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->method(listener);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static char *__filterShell(const char *arg) {
r_return_val_if_fail (arg, NULL);
char *a = malloc (strlen (arg) + 1);
if (!a) {
return NULL;
}
char *b = a;
while (*arg) {
switch (*arg) {
case '@':
case '`':
case '|':
case ';':
case '\n':
break;
default:
*b++ = *arg;
break;
}
arg++;
}
*b = 0;
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: In radare2 before 3.9.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient fix for CVE-2019-14745 and improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745 | Medium | 170,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int x25_negotiate_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
struct x25_facilities *new, struct x25_dte_facilities *dte)
{
struct x25_sock *x25 = x25_sk(sk);
struct x25_facilities *ours = &x25->facilities;
struct x25_facilities theirs;
int len;
memset(&theirs, 0, sizeof(theirs));
memcpy(new, ours, sizeof(*new));
len = x25_parse_facilities(skb, &theirs, dte, &x25->vc_facil_mask);
if (len < 0)
return len;
/*
* They want reverse charging, we won't accept it.
*/
if ((theirs.reverse & 0x01 ) && (ours->reverse & 0x01)) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: rejecting reverse charging request\n");
return -1;
}
new->reverse = theirs.reverse;
if (theirs.throughput) {
int theirs_in = theirs.throughput & 0x0f;
int theirs_out = theirs.throughput & 0xf0;
int ours_in = ours->throughput & 0x0f;
int ours_out = ours->throughput & 0xf0;
if (!ours_in || theirs_in < ours_in) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: inbound throughput negotiated\n");
new->throughput = (new->throughput & 0xf0) | theirs_in;
}
if (!ours_out || theirs_out < ours_out) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk,
"X.25: outbound throughput negotiated\n");
new->throughput = (new->throughput & 0x0f) | theirs_out;
}
}
if (theirs.pacsize_in && theirs.pacsize_out) {
if (theirs.pacsize_in < ours->pacsize_in) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: packet size inwards negotiated down\n");
new->pacsize_in = theirs.pacsize_in;
}
if (theirs.pacsize_out < ours->pacsize_out) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: packet size outwards negotiated down\n");
new->pacsize_out = theirs.pacsize_out;
}
}
if (theirs.winsize_in && theirs.winsize_out) {
if (theirs.winsize_in < ours->winsize_in) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: window size inwards negotiated down\n");
new->winsize_in = theirs.winsize_in;
}
if (theirs.winsize_out < ours->winsize_out) {
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "X.25: window size outwards negotiated down\n");
new->winsize_out = theirs.winsize_out;
}
}
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The x25_negotiate_facilities function in net/x25/x25_facilities.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via an X.25 Call Request.
Commit Message: net: fix a kernel infoleak in x25 module
Stack object "dte_facilities" is allocated in x25_rx_call_request(),
which is supposed to be initialized in x25_negotiate_facilities.
However, 5 fields (8 bytes in total) are not initialized. This
object is then copied to userland via copy_to_user, thus infoleak
occurs.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: fp_set_per_packet_inf_from_conv(umts_fp_conversation_info_t *p_conv_data,
tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree _U_)
{
fp_info *fpi;
guint8 tfi, c_t;
int offset = 0, i=0, j=0, num_tbs, chan, tb_size, tb_bit_off;
gboolean is_control_frame;
umts_mac_info *macinf;
rlc_info *rlcinf;
guint8 fake_lchid=0;
gint *cur_val=NULL;
fpi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), fp_info);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_fp, 0, fpi);
fpi->iface_type = p_conv_data->iface_type;
fpi->division = p_conv_data->division;
fpi->release = 7; /* Set values greater then the checks performed */
fpi->release_year = 2006;
fpi->release_month = 12;
fpi->channel = p_conv_data->channel;
fpi->dch_crc_present = p_conv_data->dch_crc_present;
/*fpi->paging_indications;*/
fpi->link_type = FP_Link_Ethernet;
#if 0
/*Only do this the first run, signals that we need to reset the RLC fragtable*/
if (!pinfo->fd->flags.visited && p_conv_data->reset_frag ) {
fpi->reset_frag = p_conv_data->reset_frag;
p_conv_data->reset_frag = FALSE;
}
#endif
/* remember 'lower' UDP layer port information so we can later
* differentiate 'lower' UDP layer from 'user data' UDP layer */
fpi->srcport = pinfo->srcport;
fpi->destport = pinfo->destport;
fpi->com_context_id = p_conv_data->com_context_id;
if (pinfo->link_dir == P2P_DIR_UL) {
fpi->is_uplink = TRUE;
} else {
fpi->is_uplink = FALSE;
}
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
switch (fpi->channel) {
case CHANNEL_HSDSCH: /* HS-DSCH - High Speed Downlink Shared Channel */
fpi->hsdsch_entity = p_conv_data->hsdsch_entity;
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
fpi->hsdsch_macflowd_id = p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id;
macinf->content[0] = hsdsch_macdflow_id_mac_content_map[p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id]; /*MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH;*/
macinf->lchid[0] = p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id;
/*macinf->content[0] = lchId_type_table[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[0]];*/
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
/*Figure out RLC_MODE based on MACd-flow-ID, basically MACd-flow-ID = 0 then it's SRB0 == UM else AM*/
rlcinf->mode[0] = hsdsch_macdflow_id_rlc_map[p_conv_data->hsdsch_macdflow_id];
if (fpi->hsdsch_entity == hs /*&& !rlc_is_ciphered(pinfo)*/) {
for (i=0; i<MAX_NUM_HSDHSCH_MACDFLOW; i++) {
/*Figure out if this channel is multiplexed (signaled from RRC)*/
if ((cur_val=(gint *)g_tree_lookup(hsdsch_muxed_flows, GINT_TO_POINTER((gint)p_conv_data->hrnti))) != NULL) {
j = 1 << i;
fpi->hsdhsch_macfdlow_is_mux[i] = j & *cur_val;
} else {
fpi->hsdhsch_macfdlow_is_mux[i] = FALSE;
}
}
}
/* Make configurable ?(available in NBAP?) */
/* urnti[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
/*
switch (p_conv_data->rlc_mode) {
case FP_RLC_TM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_TM;
break;
case FP_RLC_UM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_UM;
break;
case FP_RLC_AM:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;
break;
case FP_RLC_MODE_UNKNOWN:
default:
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_UNKNOWN_MODE;
break;
}*/
/* rbid[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we urnti signaled from NBAP */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->com_context_id;
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
return fpi;
case CHANNEL_EDCH:
/*Most configuration is now done in the actual dissecting function*/
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
fpi->no_ddi_entries = p_conv_data->no_ddi_entries;
for (i=0; i<fpi->no_ddi_entries; i++) {
fpi->edch_ddi[i] = p_conv_data->edch_ddi[i]; /*Set the DDI value*/
fpi->edch_macd_pdu_size[i] = p_conv_data->edch_macd_pdu_size[i]; /*Set the size*/
fpi->edch_lchId[i] = p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]; /*Set the channel id for this entry*/
/*macinf->content[i] = lchId_type_table[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]]; */ /*Set the proper Content type for the mac layer.*/
/* rlcinf->mode[i] = lchId_rlc_map[p_conv_data->edch_lchId[i]];*/ /* Set RLC mode by lchid to RLC_MODE map in nbap.h */
}
fpi->edch_type = p_conv_data->edch_type;
/* macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
macinf->content[0] = MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH;*/
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we need a urnti signaled from NBAP */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->com_context_id;
/* rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;*/
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
return fpi;
case CHANNEL_PCH:
fpi->paging_indications = p_conv_data->paging_indications;
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
*/
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to TFI */
offset = 3;
break;
case CHANNEL_DCH:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
offset = 2; /*To correctly read the tfi*/
fakes = 5; /* Reset fake counter. */
for (chan=0; chan < fpi->num_chans; chan++) { /*Iterate over the what channels*/
/*Iterate over the transport blocks*/
/*tfi = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);*/
/*TFI is 5 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 6.2.4.4*/
tfi = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, 3+offset*8, 5);
/*Figure out the number of tbs and size*/
num_tbs = (fpi->is_uplink) ? p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[chan].ul_chan_num_tbs[tfi] : p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[chan].dl_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
tb_size= (fpi->is_uplink) ? p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_tf_size[tfi] : p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_tf_size[tfi];
/*TODO: This stuff has to be reworked!*/
/*Generates a fake logical channel id for non multiplexed channel*/
if ( p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] != 31 && (p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24 &&
tb_size != 340) ) {
fake_lchid = make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);
}
tb_bit_off = (2+p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow)*8; /*Point to the C/T of first TB*/
/*Set configuration for individual blocks*/
for (j=0; j < num_tbs && j+chan < MAX_MAC_FRAMES; j++) {
/*Set transport channel id (useful for debugging)*/
macinf->trchid[j+chan] = p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan];
/*Transport Channel m31 and 24 might be multiplexed!*/
if ( p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 31 || p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24) {
/****** MUST FIGURE OUT IF THIS IS REALLY MULTIPLEXED OR NOT*******/
/*If Trchid == 31 and only on TB, we have no multiplexing*/
if (0/*p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 31 && num_tbs == 1*/) {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = 1;
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[1]; /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[1]; /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
/*Indicate we don't have multiplexing.*/
else if (p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan] == 24 && tb_size != 340) {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/*g_warning("settin this for %d", pinfo->num);*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = fake_lchid;
macinf->fake_chid[j+chan] = TRUE;
macinf->content[j+chan] = MAC_CONTENT_PS_DTCH; /*lchId_type_table[fake_lchid];*/ /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = RLC_AM;/*lchId_rlc_map[fake_lchid];*/ /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
/*We have multiplexing*/
else {
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = TRUE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/* Peek at C/T, different RLC params for different logical channels */
/*C/T is 4 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 9.2.1, from MAC header (not FP)*/
c_t = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, tb_bit_off/*(2+p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow)*8*/, 4); /* c_t = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);*/
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = c_t+1;
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[c_t+1]; /*Base MAC content on logical channel id (Table is in packet-nbap.h)*/
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[c_t+1]; /*Based RLC mode on logical channel id*/
}
} else {
fake_lchid = make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);
macinf->ctmux[j+chan] = FALSE;/*Set TRUE if this channel is multiplexed (ie. C/T flag exists)*/
/*macinf->content[j+chan] = MAC_CONTENT_CS_DTCH;*/
macinf->content[j+chan] = lchId_type_table[fake_lchid];
rlcinf->mode[j+chan] = lchId_rlc_map[fake_lchid];
/*Generate virtual logical channel id*/
/************************/
/*TODO: Once proper lchid is always set, this has to be removed*/
macinf->fake_chid[j+chan] = TRUE;
macinf->lchid[j+chan] = fake_lchid; /*make_fake_lchid(pinfo, p_conv_data->dchs_in_flow_list[chan]);*/
/************************/
}
/*** Set rlc info ***/
rlcinf->urnti[j+chan] = p_conv_data->com_context_id;
rlcinf->li_size[j+chan] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
#if 0
/*If this entry exists, SECRUITY_MODE is completed (signled by RRC)*/
if ( rrc_ciph_inf && g_tree_lookup(rrc_ciph_inf, GINT_TO_POINTER((gint)p_conv_data->com_context_id)) != NULL ) {
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = TRUE;
} else {
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
}
#endif
rlcinf->ciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[j+chan] = FALSE;
rlcinf->rbid[j+chan] = macinf->lchid[j+chan];
/*Step over this TB and it's C/T flag.*/
tb_bit_off += tb_size+4;
}
offset++;
}
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
break;
case CHANNEL_FACH_FDD:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
/* Set MAC data */
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
macinf->ctmux[0] = 1;
macinf->content[0] = MAC_CONTENT_DCCH;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
/* Set RLC data */
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
/* Make configurable ?(avaliable in NBAP?) */
/* For RLC re-assembly to work we need to fake urnti */
rlcinf->urnti[0] = fpi->channel;
rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;
/* rbid[MAX_RLC_CHANS] */
rlcinf->li_size[0] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
rlcinf->ciphered[0] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[0] = FALSE;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
case CHANNEL_RACH_FDD:
fpi->num_chans = p_conv_data->num_dch_in_flow;
if (is_control_frame) {
/* control frame, we're done */
return fpi;
}
/* Set offset to point to first TFI
* the Number of TFI's = number of DCH's in the flow
*/
offset = 2;
/* set MAC data */
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
for ( chan = 0; chan < fpi->num_chans; chan++ ) {
macinf->ctmux[chan] = 1;
macinf->content[chan] = MAC_CONTENT_DCCH;
rlcinf->urnti[chan] = fpi->com_context_id; /*Note that MAC probably will change this*/
}
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
case CHANNEL_HSDSCH_COMMON:
rlcinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), rlc_info);
macinf = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), umts_mac_info);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0, macinf);
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_rlc, 0, rlcinf);
break;
default:
expert_add_info(pinfo, NULL, &ei_fp_transport_channel_type_unknown);
return NULL;
}
/* Peek at the packet as the per packet info seems not to take the tfi into account */
for (i=0; i<fpi->num_chans; i++) {
tfi = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
/*TFI is 5 bits according to 3GPP TS 25.321, paragraph 6.2.4.4*/
/*tfi = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, offset*8, 5);*/
if (pinfo->link_dir == P2P_DIR_UL) {
fpi->chan_tf_size[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_tf_size[tfi];
fpi->chan_num_tbs[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].ul_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
} else {
fpi->chan_tf_size[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_tf_size[tfi];
fpi->chan_num_tbs[i] = p_conv_data->fp_dch_channel_info[i].dl_chan_num_tbs[tfi];
}
offset++;
}
return fpi;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: epan/dissectors/packet-umts_fp.c in the UMTS FP dissector in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles the reserved C/T value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::remoteDescription()
{
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int fib6_add(struct fib6_node *root, struct rt6_info *rt, struct nl_info *info)
{
struct fib6_node *fn, *pn = NULL;
int err = -ENOMEM;
int allow_create = 1;
int replace_required = 0;
if (info->nlh) {
if (!(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE))
allow_create = 0;
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
replace_required = 1;
}
if (!allow_create && !replace_required)
pr_warn("RTM_NEWROUTE with no NLM_F_CREATE or NLM_F_REPLACE\n");
fn = fib6_add_1(root, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr, rt->rt6i_dst.plen,
offsetof(struct rt6_info, rt6i_dst), allow_create,
replace_required);
if (IS_ERR(fn)) {
err = PTR_ERR(fn);
goto out;
}
pn = fn;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
if (rt->rt6i_src.plen) {
struct fib6_node *sn;
if (!fn->subtree) {
struct fib6_node *sfn;
/*
* Create subtree.
*
* fn[main tree]
* |
* sfn[subtree root]
* \
* sn[new leaf node]
*/
/* Create subtree root node */
sfn = node_alloc();
if (!sfn)
goto st_failure;
sfn->leaf = info->nl_net->ipv6.ip6_null_entry;
atomic_inc(&info->nl_net->ipv6.ip6_null_entry->rt6i_ref);
sfn->fn_flags = RTN_ROOT;
sfn->fn_sernum = fib6_new_sernum();
/* Now add the first leaf node to new subtree */
sn = fib6_add_1(sfn, &rt->rt6i_src.addr,
rt->rt6i_src.plen,
offsetof(struct rt6_info, rt6i_src),
allow_create, replace_required);
if (IS_ERR(sn)) {
/* If it is failed, discard just allocated
root, and then (in st_failure) stale node
in main tree.
*/
node_free(sfn);
err = PTR_ERR(sn);
goto st_failure;
}
/* Now link new subtree to main tree */
sfn->parent = fn;
fn->subtree = sfn;
} else {
sn = fib6_add_1(fn->subtree, &rt->rt6i_src.addr,
rt->rt6i_src.plen,
offsetof(struct rt6_info, rt6i_src),
allow_create, replace_required);
if (IS_ERR(sn)) {
err = PTR_ERR(sn);
goto st_failure;
}
}
if (!fn->leaf) {
fn->leaf = rt;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
}
fn = sn;
}
#endif
err = fib6_add_rt2node(fn, rt, info);
if (!err) {
fib6_start_gc(info->nl_net, rt);
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE))
fib6_prune_clones(info->nl_net, pn, rt);
}
out:
if (err) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
/*
* If fib6_add_1 has cleared the old leaf pointer in the
* super-tree leaf node we have to find a new one for it.
*/
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt) {
pn->leaf = NULL;
atomic_dec(&rt->rt6i_ref);
}
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
pn->leaf = fib6_find_prefix(info->nl_net, pn);
#if RT6_DEBUG >= 2
if (!pn->leaf) {
WARN_ON(pn->leaf == NULL);
pn->leaf = info->nl_net->ipv6.ip6_null_entry;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&pn->leaf->rt6i_ref);
}
#endif
dst_free(&rt->dst);
}
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
/* Subtree creation failed, probably main tree node
is orphan. If it is, shoot it.
*/
st_failure:
if (fn && !(fn->fn_flags & (RTN_RTINFO|RTN_ROOT)))
fib6_repair_tree(info->nl_net, fn);
dst_free(&rt->dst);
return err;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The fib6_add function in net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.5 does not properly implement error-code encoding, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for an IPv6 SIOCADDRT ioctl call.
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool initiate_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
bool ret = false, recvd = false, noresume = false, sockd = false;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL, *nonce1, *sessionid;
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
json_error_t err;
int n2size;
resend:
if (!setup_stratum_socket(pool)) {
sockd = false;
goto out;
}
sockd = true;
if (recvd) {
/* Get rid of any crap lying around if we're resending */
clear_sock(pool);
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": []}", swork_id++);
} else {
if (pool->sessionid)
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\", \"%s\"]}", swork_id++, pool->sessionid);
else
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.subscribe\", \"params\": [\""PACKAGE"/"VERSION"\"]}", swork_id++);
}
if (__stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)) != SEND_OK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send s in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response in initiate_stratum");
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
goto out;
recvd = true;
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_null(res_val) ||
(err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val)
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON-RPC decode failed: %s", ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
sessionid = get_sessionid(res_val);
if (!sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to get sessionid in initiate_stratum");
nonce1 = json_array_string(res_val, 1);
if (!nonce1) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get nonce1 in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
goto out;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(res_val, 2));
if (!n2size) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get n2size in initiate_stratum");
free(sessionid);
free(nonce1);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->sessionid = sessionid;
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (sessionid)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d stratum session id: %s", pool->pool_no, pool->sessionid);
ret = true;
out:
if (ret) {
if (!pool->stratum_url)
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_active = true;
pool->sdiff = 1;
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Pool %d confirmed mining.subscribe with extranonce1 %s extran2size %d",
pool->pool_no, pool->nonce1, pool->n2size);
}
} else {
if (recvd && !noresume) {
/* Reset the sessionid used for stratum resuming in case the pool
* does not support it, or does not know how to respond to the
* presence of the sessionid parameter. */
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->sessionid);
free(pool->nonce1);
pool->sessionid = pool->nonce1 = NULL;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to resume stratum, trying afresh");
noresume = true;
json_decref(val);
goto resend;
}
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Initiate stratum failed");
if (sockd)
suspend_stratum(pool);
}
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing | High | 166,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void flush_tmregs_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If task is not current, it will have been flushed already to
* it's thread_struct during __switch_to().
*
* A reclaim flushes ALL the state or if not in TM save TM SPRs
* in the appropriate thread structures from live.
*/
if (tsk != current)
return;
if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(mfmsr())) {
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_SIGNAL);
} else {
tm_enable();
tm_save_sprs(&(tsk->thread));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the flush_tmregs_to_thread function in arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a guest kernel crash can be triggered from unprivileged userspace during a core dump on a POWER host due to a missing processor feature check and an erroneous use of transactional memory (TM) instructions in the core dump path, leading to a denial of service.
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,356 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decompress_i(AVCodecContext *avctx, uint32_t *dst, int linesize)
{
SCPRContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
GetByteContext *gb = &s->gb;
int cx = 0, cx1 = 0, k = 0, clr = 0;
int run, r, g, b, off, y = 0, x = 0, z, ret;
unsigned backstep = linesize - avctx->width;
const int cxshift = s->cxshift;
unsigned lx, ly, ptype;
reinit_tables(s);
bytestream2_skip(gb, 2);
init_rangecoder(&s->rc, gb);
while (k < avctx->width + 1) {
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[0][cx + cx1], 400, &r);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = r >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[1][cx + cx1], 400, &g);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = g >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[2][cx + cx1], 400, &b);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = b >> cxshift;
ret = decode_value(s, s->run_model[0], 256, 400, &run);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
clr = (b << 16) + (g << 8) + r;
k += run;
while (run-- > 0) {
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
}
off = -linesize - 1;
ptype = 0;
while (x < avctx->width && y < avctx->height) {
ret = decode_value(s, s->op_model[ptype], 6, 1000, &ptype);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ptype == 0) {
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[0][cx + cx1], 400, &r);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = r >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[1][cx + cx1], 400, &g);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cx1 = (cx << 6) & 0xFC0;
cx = g >> cxshift;
ret = decode_unit(s, &s->pixel_model[2][cx + cx1], 400, &b);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
clr = (b << 16) + (g << 8) + r;
}
if (ptype > 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = decode_value(s, s->run_model[ptype], 256, 400, &run);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
switch (ptype) {
case 0:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 1:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dst[y * linesize + x] = dst[ly * linesize + lx];
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
clr = dst[ly * linesize + lx];
break;
case 2:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
clr = dst[y * linesize + x + off + 1];
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 4:
while (run-- > 0) {
uint8_t *odst = (uint8_t *)dst;
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height ||
(y == 1 && x == 0))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (x == 0) {
z = backstep;
} else {
z = 0;
}
r = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 4] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4];
g = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4 + 1] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 5] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 1];
b = odst[(ly * linesize + lx) * 4 + 2] +
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 6] -
odst[((y * linesize + x) + off - z) * 4 + 2];
clr = ((b & 0xFF) << 16) + ((g & 0xFF) << 8) + (r & 0xFF);
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
case 5:
while (run-- > 0) {
if (y < 1 || y >= avctx->height ||
(y == 1 && x == 0))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (x == 0) {
z = backstep;
} else {
z = 0;
}
clr = dst[y * linesize + x + off - z];
dst[y * linesize + x] = clr;
lx = x;
ly = y;
x++;
if (x >= avctx->width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
break;
}
if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample == 16) {
cx1 = (clr & 0x3F00) >> 2;
cx = (clr & 0xFFFFFF) >> 16;
} else {
cx1 = (clr & 0xFC00) >> 4;
cx = (clr & 0xFFFFFF) >> 18;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavcodec/scpr.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 does not properly validate height and width data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Check y in first line loop in decompress_i()
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1478/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5285486908145664
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4] %x", caplen));
return caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(fc);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[fc & 0x7]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
if (hdrlen == -1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"invalid! "));
return caplen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
p+= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
} else {
uint16_t panid = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
caplen -= hdrlen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 170,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
pte_t _dst_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret;
struct page *page;
if (!*pagep) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto out;
ret = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
(const void __user *) src_addr,
pages_per_huge_page(h), false);
/* fallback to copy_from_user outside mmap_sem */
if (unlikely(ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
*pagep = page;
/* don't free the page */
goto out;
}
} else {
page = *pagep;
*pagep = NULL;
}
/*
* The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
* preceding stores to the page contents become visible before
* the set_pte_at() write.
*/
__SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_huge_active(page);
/*
* If shared, add to page cache
*/
if (vm_shared) {
struct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
pgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);
ret = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (ret)
goto out_release_nounlock;
}
ptl = huge_pte_lockptr(h, dst_mm, dst_pte);
spin_lock(ptl);
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(dst_pte)))
goto out_release_unlock;
if (vm_shared) {
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
} else {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, dst_vma, dst_addr);
}
_dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
if (dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
_dst_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte);
_dst_pte = pte_mkyoung(_dst_pte);
set_huge_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
(void)huge_ptep_set_access_flags(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte,
dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), dst_mm);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
out_release_unlock:
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
out_release_nounlock:
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A flaw was found in the hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte function in mm/hugetlb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.12. A lack of size check could cause a denial of service (BUG).
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *uaddr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)msg->msg_name;
const int nonblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
unsigned long cpu_flags;
size_t copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq = 0;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
lock_sock(sk);
copied = -ENOTCONN;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
seq = &llc->copied_seq;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
seq = &peek_seq;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
copied = 0;
do {
u32 offset;
/*
* We need to check signals first, to get correct SIGURG
* handling. FIXME: Need to check this doesn't impact 1003.1g
* and move it down to the bottom of the loop
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (copied)
break;
copied = timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
break;
}
/* Next get a buffer. */
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb) {
offset = *seq;
goto found_ok_skb;
}
/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
break;
if (copied) {
if (sk->sk_err ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
!timeo ||
(flags & MSG_PEEK))
break;
} else {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
break;
if (sk->sk_err) {
copied = sock_error(sk);
break;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) {
/*
* This occurs when user tries to read
* from never connected socket.
*/
copied = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!timeo) {
copied = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
if (copied >= target) { /* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
} else
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo);
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) && peek_seq != llc->copied_seq) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("LLC(%s:%d): Application bug, race in MSG_PEEK\n",
current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current));
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
}
continue;
found_ok_skb:
/* Ok so how much can we use? */
used = skb->len - offset;
if (len < used)
used = len;
if (!(flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
int rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, used);
if (rc) {
/* Exception. Bailout! */
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
*seq += used;
copied += used;
len -= used;
/* For non stream protcols we get one packet per recvmsg call */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
goto copy_uaddr;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
/* Partial read */
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
} while (len > 0);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
copy_uaddr:
if (uaddr != NULL && skb != NULL) {
memcpy(uaddr, llc_ui_skb_cb(skb), sizeof(*uaddr));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*uaddr);
}
if (llc_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
llc_cmsg_rcv(msg, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The llc_ui_recvmsg function in net/llc/af_llc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy* csp) {
//// the first parameter specifies a policy to use as the document csp meaning
//// the document will take ownership of the policy
//// the second parameter specifies a policy to inherit meaning the document
//// will attempt to copy over the policy
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
if (IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 61.0.3163.81 for Android, failed to correctly propagate CSP restrictions to javascript scheme pages, which allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333} | Medium | 172,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: btif_config.c in Bluetooth in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and persistent daemon crash) by triggering a large number of configuration entries, and consequently exceeding the maximum size of a configuration file, aka internal bug 26071376.
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
| Low | 173,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DiscardAndExplicitlyReloadTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | Medium | 172,225 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip, cs;
u16 old_cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc;
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL,
VCPU_SREG_CS);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_RET,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
WARN_ON(ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, old_cs, &old_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.12 does not properly initialize Code Segment (CS) in certain error cases, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> | Low | 166,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForSharedWorker(int64 appcache_id) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
if (appcache_id != kAppCacheNoCacheId) {
LoadSelectedCache(appcache_id);
return;
}
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815} | High | 171,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tPacketIndicationType ParaNdis_PrepareReceivedPacket(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
pRxNetDescriptor pBuffersDesc,
PUINT pnCoalescedSegmentsCount)
{
PMDL pMDL = pBuffersDesc->Holder;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBL = NULL;
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = 1;
if (pMDL)
{
ULONG nBytesStripped = 0;
PNET_PACKET_INFO pPacketInfo = &pBuffersDesc->PacketInfo;
if (pContext->ulPriorityVlanSetting && pPacketInfo->hasVlanHeader)
{
nBytesStripped = ParaNdis_StripVlanHeaderMoveHead(pPacketInfo);
}
ParaNdis_PadPacketToMinimalLength(pPacketInfo);
ParaNdis_AdjustRxBufferHolderLength(pBuffersDesc, nBytesStripped);
pNBL = NdisAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(pContext->BufferListsPool, 0, 0, pMDL, nBytesStripped, pPacketInfo->dataLength);
if (pNBL)
{
virtio_net_hdr_basic *pHeader = (virtio_net_hdr_basic *) pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[0].Virtual;
tChecksumCheckResult csRes;
pNBL->SourceHandle = pContext->MiniportHandle;
NBLSetRSSInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
NBLSet8021QInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
pNBL->MiniportReserved[0] = pBuffersDesc;
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSC
if(pHeader->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE)
{
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = PktGetTCPCoalescedSegmentsCount(pPacketInfo, pContext->MaxPacketSize.nMaxDataSize);
NBLSetRSCInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo, *pnCoalescedSegmentsCount);
}
else
#endif
{
csRes = ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
pContext,
pHeader->flags,
&pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[PARANDIS_FIRST_RX_DATA_PAGE],
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
nBytesStripped);
if (csRes.value)
{
NDIS_TCP_IP_CHECKSUM_NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO qCSInfo;
qCSInfo.Value = NULL;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.IpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.IpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.TcpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.TcpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.UdpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.UdpOK;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO(pNBL, TcpIpChecksumNetBufferListInfo) = qCSInfo.Value;
DPrintf(1, ("Reporting CS %X->%X\n", csRes.value, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qCSInfo.Value));
}
}
pNBL->Status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if defined(ENABLE_HISTORY_LOG)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
RtlOffsetToPointer(pPacketInfo->headersBuffer, ETH_HEADER_SIZE),
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum,
__FUNCTION__
);
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopPacketReceived, pNBL, pPacketInfo->dataLength, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qInfo.Value, packetReview.value);
}
#endif
}
}
return pNBL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcRenderSetPictureFilter(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderSetPictureFilterReq);
PicturePtr pPicture;
int result;
xFixed *params;
int nparams;
char *name;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderSetPictureFilterReq);
VERIFY_PICTURE(pPicture, stuff->picture, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
name = (char *) (stuff + 1);
params = (xFixed *) (name + pad_to_int32(stuff->nbytes));
nparams = ((xFixed *) stuff + client->req_len) - params;
result = SetPictureFilter(pPicture, name, stuff->nbytes, params, nparams);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in RENDER extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError(
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to unregister agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
pte_t _dst_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret;
struct page *page;
if (!*pagep) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto out;
ret = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
(const void __user *) src_addr,
pages_per_huge_page(h), false);
/* fallback to copy_from_user outside mmap_sem */
if (unlikely(ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
*pagep = page;
/* don't free the page */
goto out;
}
} else {
page = *pagep;
*pagep = NULL;
}
/*
* The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
* preceding stores to the page contents become visible before
* the set_pte_at() write.
*/
__SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_huge_active(page);
/*
* If shared, add to page cache
*/
if (vm_shared) {
struct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
pgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);
ret = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (ret)
goto out_release_nounlock;
}
ptl = huge_pte_lockptr(h, dst_mm, dst_pte);
spin_lock(ptl);
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(dst_pte)))
goto out_release_unlock;
if (vm_shared) {
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
} else {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, dst_vma, dst_addr);
}
_dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
if (dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
_dst_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte);
_dst_pte = pte_mkyoung(_dst_pte);
set_huge_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
(void)huge_ptep_set_access_flags(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte,
dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), dst_mm);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
out_release_unlock:
spin_unlock(ptl);
out_release_nounlock:
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A flaw was found in the hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte function in mm/hugetlb.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13. A superfluous implicit page unlock for VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping could trigger a local denial of service (BUG).
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: remove superfluous page unlock in VM_SHARED case
huge_add_to_page_cache->add_to_page_cache implicitly unlocks the page
before returning in case of errors.
The error returned was -EEXIST by running UFFDIO_COPY on a non-hole
offset of a VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping. It was an userland bug that
triggered it and the kernel must cope with it returning -EEXIST from
ioctl(UFFDIO_COPY) as expected.
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:964!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 22582 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.11-300.fc26.x86_64 #1
RIP: unlock_page+0x4a/0x50
Call Trace:
hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte+0xc0/0x320
mcopy_atomic+0x96f/0xbe0
userfaultfd_ioctl+0x218/0xe90
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x600
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Maxime Coquelin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Perevalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ** DISPUTED ** The kex_input_kexinit function in kex.c in OpenSSH 6.x and 7.x through 7.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate KEXINIT requests. NOTE: a third party reports that *OpenSSH upstream does not consider this as a security issue.*
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05 | High | 166,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: init_ext2_xattr(void)
{
ext2_xattr_cache = mb_cache_create("ext2_xattr", 6);
if (!ext2_xattr_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 169,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
* session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q = p;
#endif
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int piv_match_card_continued(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
int type = -1;
piv_private_data_t *priv = NULL;
int saved_type = card->type;
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
/* piv_match_card may be called with card->type, set by opensc.conf */
/* user provide card type must be one we know */
switch (card->type) {
case -1:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE:
type = card->type;
break;
default:
return 0; /* can not handle the card */
}
if (type == -1) {
/*
*try to identify card by ATR or historical data in ATR
* currently all PIV card will respond to piv_find_aid
* the same. But in future may need to know card type first,
* so do it here.
*/
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes != NULL) {
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len == 8 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey4", 8))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey", 7))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO;
}
/*
* https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1239.pdf
* lists 2 ATRS with historical bytes:
* 73 66 74 65 2D 63 64 30 38 30
* 73 66 74 65 20 63 64 31 34 34
* will check for 73 66 74 65
*/
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 4 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "sfte", 4))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes[0] == 0x80u) { /* compact TLV */
size_t datalen;
const u8 *data = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes + 1,
card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len - 1,
0xF0, &datalen);
if (data != NULL) {
int k;
for (k = 0; piv_aids[k].len_long != 0; k++) {
if (datalen == piv_aids[k].len_long
&& !memcmp(data, piv_aids[k].value, datalen)) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (type == -1)
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC;
}
/* allocate and init basic fields */
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(piv_private_data_t));
if (!priv)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (card->type == -1)
card->type = type;
card->drv_data = priv; /* will free if no match, or pass on to piv_init */
priv->aid_file = sc_file_new();
priv->selected_obj = -1;
priv->pin_preference = 0x80; /* 800-73-3 part 1, table 3 */
priv->logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
priv->tries_left = 10; /* will assume OK at start */
priv->pstate = PIV_STATE_MATCH;
/* Some objects will only be present if History object says so */
for (i=0; i < PIV_OBJ_LAST_ENUM -1; i++)
if(piv_objects[i].flags & PIV_OBJECT_NOT_PRESENT)
priv->obj_cache[i].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
sc_lock(card);
/*
* detect if active AID is PIV. NIST 800-73 says Only one PIV application per card
* and PIV must be the default application
* This can avoid doing doing a select_aid and losing the login state on some cards
* We may get interference on some cards by other drivers trying SELECT_AID before
* we get to see if PIV application is still active.
* putting PIV driver first might help.
* This may fail if the wrong AID is active
*/
i = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i < 0) {
/* Detect by selecting applet */
sc_file_t aidfile;
i = piv_find_aid(card, &aidfile);
}
if (i >= 0) {
/*
* We now know PIV AID is active, test DISCOVERY object
* Some CAC cards with PIV don't support DISCOVERY and return
* SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS. Any error other then
* SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND means we cannot use discovery
* to test for active AID.
*/
int i7e = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i7e != 0 && i7e != SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
priv->card_issues |= CI_DISCOVERY_USELESS;
priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
}
}
if (i < 0) {
/* don't match. Does not have a PIV applet. */
sc_unlock(card);
piv_finish(card);
card->type = saved_type;
return 0;
}
/* Matched, caller will use or free priv and sc_lock as needed */
priv->pstate=PIV_STATE_INIT;
return 1; /* match */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 169,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool decode(const SharedBuffer& data, bool onlySize)
{
m_decodingSizeOnly = onlySize;
unsigned newByteCount = data.size() - m_bufferLength;
unsigned readOffset = m_bufferLength - m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer;
m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer += newByteCount;
m_info.src->next_input_byte = (JOCTET*)(data.data()) + readOffset;
if (m_bytesToSkip)
skipBytes(m_bytesToSkip);
m_bufferLength = data.size();
if (setjmp(m_err.setjmp_buffer))
return m_decoder->setFailed();
switch (m_state) {
case JPEG_HEADER:
if (jpeg_read_header(&m_info, true) == JPEG_SUSPENDED)
return false; // I/O suspension.
switch (m_info.jpeg_color_space) {
case JCS_GRAYSCALE:
case JCS_RGB:
case JCS_YCbCr:
m_info.out_color_space = rgbOutputColorSpace();
#if defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_info.saw_JFIF_marker)
break;
if (m_info.saw_Adobe_marker && !m_info.Adobe_transform)
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_RGB;
#endif
break;
case JCS_CMYK:
case JCS_YCCK:
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_CMYK;
break;
default:
return m_decoder->setFailed();
}
m_state = JPEG_START_DECOMPRESS;
if (!m_decoder->setSize(m_info.image_width, m_info.image_height))
return false;
m_decoder->setOrientation(readImageOrientation(info()));
#if ENABLE(IMAGE_DECODER_DOWN_SAMPLING) && defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_decoder->willDownSample() && turboSwizzled(m_info.out_color_space))
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_RGB;
#endif
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
if (!m_decoder->ignoresGammaAndColorProfile()) {
ColorProfile colorProfile = readColorProfile(info());
createColorTransform(colorProfile, colorSpaceHasAlpha(m_info.out_color_space));
#if defined(TURBO_JPEG_RGB_SWIZZLE)
if (m_transform && m_info.out_color_space == JCS_EXT_BGRA)
m_info.out_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGBA;
#endif
}
#endif
m_info.buffered_image = jpeg_has_multiple_scans(&m_info);
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&m_info);
m_samples = (*m_info.mem->alloc_sarray)((j_common_ptr) &m_info, JPOOL_IMAGE, m_info.output_width * 4, 1);
if (m_decodingSizeOnly) {
m_bufferLength -= m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer;
m_info.src->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
return true;
}
case JPEG_START_DECOMPRESS:
m_info.dct_method = dctMethod();
m_info.dither_mode = ditherMode();
m_info.do_fancy_upsampling = doFancyUpsampling();
m_info.enable_2pass_quant = false;
m_info.do_block_smoothing = true;
if (!jpeg_start_decompress(&m_info))
return false; // I/O suspension.
m_state = (m_info.buffered_image) ? JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE : JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL;
case JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL:
if (m_state == JPEG_DECOMPRESS_SEQUENTIAL) {
if (!m_decoder->outputScanlines())
return false; // I/O suspension.
ASSERT(m_info.output_scanline == m_info.output_height);
m_state = JPEG_DONE;
}
case JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE:
if (m_state == JPEG_DECOMPRESS_PROGRESSIVE) {
int status;
do {
status = jpeg_consume_input(&m_info);
} while ((status != JPEG_SUSPENDED) && (status != JPEG_REACHED_EOI));
for (;;) {
if (!m_info.output_scanline) {
int scan = m_info.input_scan_number;
if (!m_info.output_scan_number && (scan > 1) && (status != JPEG_REACHED_EOI))
--scan;
if (!jpeg_start_output(&m_info, scan))
return false; // I/O suspension.
}
if (m_info.output_scanline == 0xffffff)
m_info.output_scanline = 0;
if (!m_decoder->outputScanlines()) {
if (!m_info.output_scanline)
m_info.output_scanline = 0xffffff;
return false; // I/O suspension.
}
if (m_info.output_scanline == m_info.output_height) {
if (!jpeg_finish_output(&m_info))
return false; // I/O suspension.
if (jpeg_input_complete(&m_info) && (m_info.input_scan_number == m_info.output_scan_number))
break;
m_info.output_scanline = 0;
}
}
m_state = JPEG_DONE;
}
case JPEG_DONE:
return jpeg_finish_decompress(&m_info);
case JPEG_ERROR:
return m_decoder->setFailed();
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8 before 3.14.5.3, as used in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52, does not properly implement garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void WriteProfile(j_compress_ptr jpeg_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
iptc;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length,
tag_length;
StringInfo
*custom_profile;
/*
Save image profile as a APP marker.
*/
iptc=MagickFalse;
custom_profile=AcquireStringInfo(65535L);
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
register unsigned char
*p;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(custom_profile);
if (LocaleCompare(name,"EXIF") == 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65533L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65533L);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,XML_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,
(unsigned int) length);
}
if (LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0)
{
register unsigned char
*p;
tag_length=strlen(ICC_PROFILE);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(custom_profile);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p,ICC_PROFILE,tag_length);
p[tag_length]='\0';
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65519L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65519L);
p[12]=(unsigned char) ((i/65519L)+1);
p[13]=(unsigned char) (GetStringInfoLength(profile)/65519L+1);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p+tag_length+3,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,
length);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,ICC_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(
custom_profile),(unsigned int) (length+tag_length+3));
}
}
if (((LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0)) && (iptc == MagickFalse))
{
size_t
roundup;
iptc=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i+=65500L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(profile)-i,65500L);
roundup=(size_t) (length & 0x01);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) GetStringInfoDatum(profile),"8BIM",4) == 0)
{
(void) memcpy(p,"Photoshop 3.0 ",14);
tag_length=14;
}
else
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(p,"Photoshop 3.0 8BIM\04\04\0\0\0\0",24);
tag_length=26;
p[24]=(unsigned char) (length >> 8);
p[25]=(unsigned char) (length & 0xff);
}
p[13]=0x00;
(void) memcpy(p+tag_length,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)+i,length);
if (roundup != 0)
p[length+tag_length]='\0';
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,IPTC_MARKER,GetStringInfoDatum(
custom_profile),(unsigned int) (length+tag_length+roundup));
}
}
if (LocaleCompare(name,"XMP") == 0)
{
StringInfo
*xmp_profile;
/*
Add namespace to XMP profile.
*/
xmp_profile=StringToStringInfo("http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ ");
if (xmp_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
ConcatenateStringInfo(xmp_profile,profile);
GetStringInfoDatum(xmp_profile)[28]='\0';
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(xmp_profile); i+=65533L)
{
length=MagickMin(GetStringInfoLength(xmp_profile)-i,65533L);
jpeg_write_marker(jpeg_info,XML_MARKER,
GetStringInfoDatum(xmp_profile)+i,(unsigned int) length);
}
xmp_profile=DestroyStringInfo(xmp_profile);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"%s profile: %.20g bytes",name,(double) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
custom_profile=DestroyStringInfo(custom_profile);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the WriteProfile function in coders/jpeg.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.5-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Changed the JPEG writer to raise a warning when the exif profile exceeds 65533 bytes and truncate it. | Medium | 168,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int write_output(void)
{
int fd;
struct filter_op *fop;
struct filter_header fh;
size_t ninst, i;
u_char *data;
/* conver the tree to an array of filter_op */
ninst = compile_tree(&fop);
if (fop == NULL)
return -E_NOTHANDLED;
/* create the file */
fd = open(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, 0644);
ON_ERROR(fd, -1, "Can't create file %s", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
/* display the message */
fprintf(stdout, " Writing output to \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
fflush(stdout);
/* compute the header */
fh.magic = htons(EC_FILTER_MAGIC);
strncpy(fh.version, EC_VERSION, sizeof(fh.version));
fh.data = sizeof(fh);
data = create_data_segment(&fh, fop, ninst);
/* write the header */
write(fd, &fh, sizeof(struct filter_header));
/* write the data segment */
write(fd, data, fh.code - fh.data);
/* write the instructions */
for (i = 0; i <= ninst; i++) {
print_progress_bar(&fop[i]);
write(fd, &fop[i], sizeof(struct filter_op));
}
close(fd);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
fprintf(stdout, " -> Script encoded into %d instructions.\n\n", (int)(i - 1));
return E_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The compile_tree function in ef_compiler.c in the Etterfilter utility in Ettercap 0.8.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted filter.
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782) | Medium | 168,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int mount_autodev(const char *name, const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs, const char *lxcpath)
{
int ret;
size_t clen;
char *path;
INFO("Mounting container /dev");
/* $(rootfs->mount) + "/dev/pts" + '\0' */
clen = (rootfs->path ? strlen(rootfs->mount) : 0) + 9;
path = alloca(clen);
ret = snprintf(path, clen, "%s/dev", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= clen)
return -1;
if (!dir_exists(path)) {
WARN("No /dev in container.");
WARN("Proceeding without autodev setup");
return 0;
}
if (mount("none", path, "tmpfs", 0, "size=100000,mode=755")) {
SYSERROR("Failed mounting tmpfs onto %s\n", path);
return false;
}
INFO("Mounted tmpfs onto %s", path);
ret = snprintf(path, clen, "%s/dev/pts", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= clen)
return -1;
/*
* If we are running on a devtmpfs mapping, dev/pts may already exist.
* If not, then create it and exit if that fails...
*/
if (!dir_exists(path)) {
ret = mkdir(path, S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IROTH | S_IXOTH);
if (ret) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create /dev/pts in container");
return -1;
}
}
INFO("Mounted container /dev");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 166,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
{
const struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 hash[4];
keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr[0];
hash[1] = (__force __u32)daddr[1];
hash[2] = (__force __u32)daddr[2];
hash[3] = (__force __u32)daddr[3];
return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return -1L;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/*
* Base is simply the segment selector shifted 4
* bits to the right.
*/
return (unsigned long)(sel << 4);
if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of
* the segments' bases are forced to 0.
*/
unsigned long base;
if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_FS)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_GS)
/*
* swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus,
* MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = 0;
return base;
}
/* In protected mode the segment selector cannot be null. */
if (!sel)
return -1L;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return -1L;
return get_desc_base(desc);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.9, there is a use-after-free for access to an LDT entry because of a race condition between modify_ldt() and a #BR exception for an MPX bounds violation.
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: RenderProcessImpl::RenderProcessImpl()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(shared_mem_cache_cleaner_(
FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(5),
this, &RenderProcessImpl::ClearTransportDIBCache)),
transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0) {
in_process_plugins_ = InProcessPlugins();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(shared_mem_cache_); ++i)
shared_mem_cache_[i] = NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (GetModuleHandle(L"LPK.DLL") == NULL) {
typedef BOOL (__stdcall *GdiInitializeLanguagePack)(int LoadedShapingDLLs);
GdiInitializeLanguagePack gdi_init_lpk =
reinterpret_cast<GdiInitializeLanguagePack>(GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandle(L"GDI32.DLL"),
"GdiInitializeLanguagePack"));
DCHECK(gdi_init_lpk);
if (gdi_init_lpk) {
gdi_init_lpk(0);
}
}
#endif
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
"--debugger-auto-break"
" --prof --prof-lazy");
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kJavaScriptFlags)) {
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kJavaScriptFlags));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,017 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux;
if (vnaux < 1) {
goto beach;
}
vstart += vnaux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In radare 2.0.1, a memory corruption vulnerability exists in store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef() and store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed() in libr/bin/format/elf/elf.c, as demonstrated by an invalid free. This error is due to improper sh_size validation when allocating memory.
Commit Message: Fixed crash in elf.c with 32bit r2 when shdr->sh_size > max size_t | Medium | 167,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_free_message_fields_buffer(NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields)
{
if (fields->Buffer)
{
free(fields->Buffer);
fields->Len = 0;
fields->MaxLen = 0;
fields->Buffer = NULL;
fields->BufferOffset = 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 169,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Segment::GetBlock(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp)
{
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < tp.m_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > tp.m_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, tp.m_pos); //, -1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster->GetEntry(cp, tp);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
unsigned int data_was_unread;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, timeout:%ld\n", __func__, sk, timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSING;
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
/* Clean up any skbs sitting on the receive queue. */
data_was_unread = sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
data_was_unread += sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sctp_sk(sk)->pd_lobby);
/* Walk all associations on an endpoint. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &ep->asocs) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
/* A closed association can still be in the list if
* it belongs to a TCP-style listening socket that is
* not yet accepted. If so, free it. If not, send an
* ABORT or SHUTDOWN based on the linger options.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_association_free(asoc);
continue;
}
}
if (data_was_unread || !skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.lobby) ||
!skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.reasm) ||
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) && !sk->sk_lingertime)) {
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, NULL, 0);
if (chunk)
sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
} else
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
}
/* On a TCP-style socket, block for at most linger_time if set. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && timeout)
sctp_wait_for_close(sk, timeout);
/* This will run the backlog queue. */
release_sock(sk);
/* Supposedly, no process has access to the socket, but
* the net layers still may.
*/
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* Hold the sock, since sk_common_release() will put sock_put()
* and we have just a little more cleanup.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
sk_common_release(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
sock_put(sk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(sock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (list corruption and panic) via a rapid series of system calls related to sockets, as demonstrated by setsockopt calls.
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,628 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct gengetopt_args_info args_info;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linelen = 0;
char *p, *r;
uint32_t *q;
unsigned cmdn = 0;
int rc;
setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
set_program_name (argv[0]);
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain (PACKAGE);
if (cmdline_parser (argc, argv, &args_info) != 0)
return EXIT_FAILURE;
if (args_info.version_given)
{
version_etc (stdout, "idn", PACKAGE_NAME, VERSION,
"Simon Josefsson", (char *) NULL);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
if (args_info.help_given)
usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
/* Backwards compatibility: -n has always been the documented short
form for --nfkc but, before v1.10, -k was the implemented short
form. We now accept both to avoid documentation changes. */
if (args_info.hidden_nfkc_given)
args_info.nfkc_given = 1;
if (!args_info.stringprep_given &&
!args_info.punycode_encode_given && !args_info.punycode_decode_given &&
!args_info.idna_to_ascii_given && !args_info.idna_to_unicode_given &&
!args_info.nfkc_given)
args_info.idna_to_ascii_given = 1;
if ((args_info.stringprep_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_encode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_decode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_ascii_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_unicode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.nfkc_given ? 1 : 0) != 1)
{
error (0, 0, _("only one of -s, -e, -d, -a, -u or -n can be specified"));
usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, "%s %s\n" GREETING, PACKAGE, VERSION);
if (args_info.debug_given)
fprintf (stderr, _("Charset `%s'.\n"), stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, _("Type each input string on a line by itself, "
"terminated by a newline character.\n"));
do
{
if (cmdn < args_info.inputs_num)
line = strdup (args_info.inputs[cmdn++]);
else if (getline (&line, &linelen, stdin) == -1)
{
if (feof (stdin))
break;
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("input error"));
}
if (line[strlen (line) - 1] == '\n')
line[strlen (line) - 1] = '\0';
if (args_info.stringprep_given)
{
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = stringprep_profile (p, &r,
args_info.profile_given ?
args_info.profile_arg : "Nameprep", 0);
free (p);
if (rc != STRINGPREP_OK)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("stringprep_profile: %s"),
stringprep_strerror (rc));
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_encode_given)
{
char encbuf[BUFSIZ];
size_t len, len2;
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, &len);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
len2 = BUFSIZ - 1;
rc = punycode_encode (len, q, NULL, &len2, encbuf);
free (q);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_encode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
encbuf[len2] = '\0';
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (encbuf);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_decode_given)
{
size_t len;
len = BUFSIZ;
q = (uint32_t *) malloc (len * sizeof (q[0]));
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, ENOMEM, N_("malloc"));
rc = punycode_decode (strlen (line), line, &len, q, NULL);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_decode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
q[len] = 0;
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_ascii_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = idna_to_ascii_4z (q, &p,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (q);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_ascii_4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag && !args_info.no_tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z (TLD): %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "tld[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
free (q);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
#endif
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; p[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, p[i]);
}
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_unicode_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (p);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
}
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
}
#endif
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.nfkc_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
r = stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (p, -1);
free (p);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not do NFKC normalization"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
fflush (stdout);
}
while (!feof (stdin) && !ferror (stdin) && (args_info.inputs_num == 0 ||
cmdn < args_info.inputs_num));
free (line);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: idn in libidn before 1.33 might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive memory information by reading a zero byte as input, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-8948.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
break;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = calloc(w, sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
if (!rows)
{
goto quit2;
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
{
r = cmap->Colors[bg].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[bg].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[bg].Blue;
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
{
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
{
if (rows[i][j] == transp)
{
r = cmap->Colors[bg].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[bg].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[bg].Blue;
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
}
finish:
if (progress)
progress(im, 100, 0, last_y, w, h);
}
rc = 1; /* Success */
quit:
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
free(rows[i]);
free(rows);
quit2:
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR > 5 || (GIFLIB_MAJOR == 5 && GIFLIB_MINOR >= 1)
DGifCloseFile(gif, NULL);
#else
DGifCloseFile(gif);
#endif
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The GIF loader in imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or obtain sensitive information via a crafted image, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,079 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: An issue was discovered in GNU libcdio before 2.0.0. There is a double free in get_cdtext_generic() in lib/driver/_cdio_generic.c.
Commit Message: | High | 165,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CmapCoverage::getCoverage(SparseBitSet& coverage, const uint8_t* cmap_data, size_t cmap_size) {
vector<uint32_t> coverageVec;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 4;
const size_t kNumTablesOffset = 2;
const size_t kTableSize = 8;
const size_t kPlatformIdOffset = 0;
const size_t kEncodingIdOffset = 2;
const size_t kOffsetOffset = 4;
const int kMicrosoftPlatformId = 3;
const int kUnicodeBmpEncodingId = 1;
const int kUnicodeUcs4EncodingId = 10;
if (kHeaderSize > cmap_size) {
return false;
}
int numTables = readU16(cmap_data, kNumTablesOffset);
if (kHeaderSize + numTables * kTableSize > cmap_size) {
return false;
}
int bestTable = -1;
for (int i = 0; i < numTables; i++) {
uint16_t platformId = readU16(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + i * kTableSize + kPlatformIdOffset);
uint16_t encodingId = readU16(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + i * kTableSize + kEncodingIdOffset);
if (platformId == kMicrosoftPlatformId && encodingId == kUnicodeUcs4EncodingId) {
bestTable = i;
break;
} else if (platformId == kMicrosoftPlatformId && encodingId == kUnicodeBmpEncodingId) {
bestTable = i;
}
}
#ifdef PRINTF_DEBUG
printf("best table = %d\n", bestTable);
#endif
if (bestTable < 0) {
return false;
}
uint32_t offset = readU32(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + bestTable * kTableSize + kOffsetOffset);
if (offset + 2 > cmap_size) {
return false;
}
uint16_t format = readU16(cmap_data, offset);
bool success = false;
const uint8_t* tableData = cmap_data + offset;
const size_t tableSize = cmap_size - offset;
if (format == 4) {
success = getCoverageFormat4(coverageVec, tableData, tableSize);
} else if (format == 12) {
success = getCoverageFormat12(coverageVec, tableData, tableSize);
}
if (success) {
coverage.initFromRanges(&coverageVec.front(), coverageVec.size() >> 1);
}
#ifdef PRINTF_DEBUG
for (int i = 0; i < coverageVec.size(); i += 2) {
printf("%x:%x\n", coverageVec[i], coverageVec[i + 1]);
}
#endif
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Minikin library in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider negative size values in font data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and reboot loop) via a crafted font, aka internal bug 26413177.
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
| Medium | 174,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int basic_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
!zend_hash_exists(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"))) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: PHP before 5.6.7 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an unexpected data type, related to "type confusion" issues in (1) ext/soap/php_encoding.c, (2) ext/soap/php_http.c, and (3) ext/soap/soap.c, a different issue than CVE-2015-4600.
Commit Message: | High | 165,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_ext_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *s, charset_t src_charset, charset_t dst_charset)
{
size_t count = 0;
#ifdef DEVELOPER
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_DOS:
case CH_UNIX:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a variable dest charset (must be UTF16* or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
switch (src_charset) {
case CH_UTF16LE:
case CH_UTF16BE:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a UTF16 src charset (must be DOS, UNIX, DISPLAY or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
#endif
if (!s) {
return 0;
}
while (*s && !(((uint8_t)*s) & 0x80)) {
s++;
count++;
}
if (!*s) {
return count;
}
while (*s) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(ic, s, src_charset, &c_size);
s += c_size;
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_UTF16BE:
case CH_UTF16MUNGED:
if (c < 0x10000) {
/* Unicode char fits into 16 bits. */
count += 1;
} else {
/* Double-width unicode char - 32 bits. */
count += 2;
}
break;
case CH_UTF8:
/*
* this only checks ranges, and does not
* check for invalid codepoints
*/
if (c < 0x80) {
count += 1;
} else if (c < 0x800) {
count += 2;
} else if (c < 0x10000) {
count += 3;
} else {
count += 4;
}
break;
default:
/*
* non-unicode encoding:
* assume that each codepoint fits into
* one unit in the destination encoding.
*/
count += 1;
}
}
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,671 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *image)
{
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling columns.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586 | Medium | 169,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void ext4_end_io_dio(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
ssize_t size, void *private)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io_end = iocb->private;
struct workqueue_struct *wq;
/* if not async direct IO or dio with 0 bytes write, just return */
if (!io_end || !size)
return;
ext_debug("ext4_end_io_dio(): io_end 0x%p"
"for inode %lu, iocb 0x%p, offset %llu, size %llu\n",
iocb->private, io_end->inode->i_ino, iocb, offset,
size);
/* if not aio dio with unwritten extents, just free io and return */
if (io_end->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN){
ext4_free_io_end(io_end);
iocb->private = NULL;
return;
}
io_end->offset = offset;
io_end->size = size;
wq = EXT4_SB(io_end->inode->i_sb)->dio_unwritten_wq;
/* queue the work to convert unwritten extents to written */
queue_work(wq, &io_end->work);
/* Add the io_end to per-inode completed aio dio list*/
list_add_tail(&io_end->list,
&EXT4_I(io_end->inode)->i_completed_io_list);
iocb->private = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual bool InputMethodIsActivated(const std::string& input_method_id) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> active_input_method_descriptors(
GetActiveInputMethods());
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_descriptors->size(); ++i) {
if (active_input_method_descriptors->at(i).id == input_method_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Node* DOMPatchSupport::patchNode(Node* node, const String& markup, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (node->isDocumentNode() || (node->parentNode() && node->parentNode()->isDocumentNode())) {
patchDocument(markup);
return 0;
}
Node* previousSibling = node->previousSibling();
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = DocumentFragment::create(m_document);
fragment->parseHTML(markup, node->parentElement() ? node->parentElement() : m_document->documentElement());
ContainerNode* parentNode = node->parentNode();
Vector<OwnPtr<Digest> > oldList;
for (Node* child = parentNode->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
oldList.append(createDigest(child, 0));
String markupCopy = markup;
markupCopy.makeLower();
Vector<OwnPtr<Digest> > newList;
for (Node* child = parentNode->firstChild(); child != node; child = child->nextSibling())
newList.append(createDigest(child, 0));
for (Node* child = fragment->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (child->hasTagName(headTag) && !child->firstChild() && markupCopy.find("</head>") == notFound)
continue; // HTML5 parser inserts empty <head> tag whenever it parses <body>
if (child->hasTagName(bodyTag) && !child->firstChild() && markupCopy.find("</body>") == notFound)
continue; // HTML5 parser inserts empty <body> tag whenever it parses </head>
newList.append(createDigest(child, &m_unusedNodesMap));
}
for (Node* child = node->nextSibling(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
newList.append(createDigest(child, 0));
if (!innerPatchChildren(parentNode, oldList, newList, ec)) {
ec = 0;
if (!m_domEditor->replaceChild(parentNode, fragment.release(), node, ec))
return 0;
}
return previousSibling ? previousSibling->nextSibling() : parentNode->firstChild();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: char* _single_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 1 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The SQLWriteFileDSN function in odbcinst/SQLWriteFileDSN.c in unixODBC 2.3.5 has strncpy arguments in the wrong order, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: New Pre Source | High | 169,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct user *dummy = NULL;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask) {
unsigned long mask = PSW_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW_MASK_RI : 0;
if ((data & ~mask) != PSW_USER_BITS)
return -EINVAL;
if ((data & PSW_MASK_EA) && !(data & PSW_MASK_BA))
return -EINVAL;
}
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr) = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* Very special case: old & broken 64 bit gdb writing
* to acrs[15] with a 64 bit value. Ignore the lower
* half of the value and write the upper 32 bit to
* acrs[15]. Sick...
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs[15])
child->thread.acrs[15] = (unsigned int) (data >> 32);
else
#endif
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = data;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writes of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs.fpc)
if ((unsigned int) data != 0 ||
test_fp_ctl(data >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 32)))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs;
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.8 on the s390 platform does not properly restrict address-space control operations in PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA requests, which allows local users to obtain read and write access to kernel memory locations, and consequently gain privileges, via a crafted application that makes a ptrace system call.
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> | High | 166,362 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
int hexdump = FALSE;
int subobj_type, subobj_len;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
subobj_len = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
if (subobj_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
break;
}
if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
break;
}
if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
break;
}
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
return (hexdump);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-lmp.c:lmp_print_data_link_subobjs().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14464/LMP: Add a missing bounds check
In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 169,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The tcp_cwnd_reduction function in net/ipv4/tcp_input.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and system crash) via crafted TCP traffic.
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 167,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ft_smooth_render_generic( FT_Renderer render,
FT_GlyphSlot slot,
FT_Render_Mode mode,
const FT_Vector* origin,
FT_Render_Mode required_mode )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Outline* outline = NULL;
FT_BBox cbox;
FT_UInt width, height, height_org, width_org, pitch;
FT_Bitmap* bitmap;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Int hmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD;
FT_Int vmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD_V;
FT_Pos x_shift, y_shift, x_left, y_top;
FT_Raster_Params params;
/* check glyph image format */
if ( slot->format != render->glyph_format )
{
error = Smooth_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
/* check mode */
if ( mode != required_mode )
return Smooth_Err_Cannot_Render_Glyph;
outline = &slot->outline;
/* translate the outline to the new origin if needed */
if ( origin )
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, origin->x, origin->y );
/* compute the control box, and grid fit it */
FT_Outline_Get_CBox( outline, &cbox );
cbox.xMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.xMin );
cbox.yMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.yMin );
cbox.xMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.xMax );
cbox.yMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.yMax );
width = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.xMax - cbox.xMin ) >> 6 );
height = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.yMax - cbox.yMin ) >> 6 );
bitmap = &slot->bitmap;
memory = render->root.memory;
width_org = width;
height_org = height;
/* release old bitmap buffer */
if ( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP )
{
FT_FREE( bitmap->buffer );
slot->internal->flags &= ~FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
}
/* allocate new one */
pitch = width;
if ( hmul )
{
width = width * 3;
pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 );
}
if ( vmul )
height *= 3;
x_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.xMin;
y_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.yMin;
x_left = (FT_Int)( cbox.xMin >> 6 );
y_top = (FT_Int)( cbox.yMax >> 6 );
#ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING
if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func )
{
FT_Int extra = slot->library->lcd_extra;
if ( hmul )
{
x_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 );
width += 3 * extra;
pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 );
x_left -= extra >> 1;
}
if ( vmul )
{
y_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 );
height += 3 * extra;
y_top += extra >> 1;
}
}
#endif
#if FT_UINT_MAX > 0xFFFFU
/* Required check is ( pitch * height < FT_ULONG_MAX ), */
/* but we care realistic cases only. Always pitch <= width. */
if ( width > 0xFFFFU || height > 0xFFFFU )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ft_smooth_render_generic: glyph too large: %d x %d\n",
width, height ));
return Smooth_Err_Raster_Overflow;
}
#endif
bitmap->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY;
bitmap->num_grays = 256;
bitmap->width = width;
bitmap->rows = height;
bitmap->pitch = pitch;
/* translate outline to render it into the bitmap */
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, -x_shift, -y_shift );
if ( FT_ALLOC( bitmap->buffer, (FT_ULong)pitch * height ) )
goto Exit;
slot->internal->flags |= FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
/* set up parameters */
params.target = bitmap;
params.source = outline;
params.flags = FT_RASTER_FLAG_AA;
#ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING
/* implode outline if needed */
{
FT_Vector* points = outline->points;
FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points;
FT_Vector* vec;
if ( hmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->x *= 3;
if ( vmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->y *= 3;
}
/* render outline into the bitmap */
error = render->raster_render( render->raster, ¶ms );
/* deflate outline if needed */
{
FT_Vector* points = outline->points;
FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points;
FT_Vector* vec;
if ( hmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->x /= 3;
if ( vmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->y /= 3;
}
if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func )
slot->library->lcd_filter_func( bitmap, mode, slot->library );
#else /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */
/* render outline into bitmap */
error = render->raster_render( render->raster, ¶ms );
/* expand it horizontally */
if ( hmul )
{
FT_Byte* line = bitmap->buffer;
FT_UInt hh;
for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh--, line += pitch )
{
FT_UInt xx;
FT_Byte* end = line + width;
for ( xx = width_org; xx > 0; xx-- )
{
FT_UInt pixel = line[xx-1];
end[-3] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end[-2] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end[-1] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end -= 3;
}
}
}
/* expand it vertically */
if ( vmul )
{
FT_Byte* read = bitmap->buffer + ( height - height_org ) * pitch;
FT_Byte* write = bitmap->buffer;
FT_UInt hh;
for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh-- )
{
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
read += pitch;
}
}
#endif /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, x_shift, y_shift );
/*
* XXX: on 16bit system, we return an error for huge bitmap
* to prevent an overflow.
*/
if ( x_left > FT_INT_MAX || y_top > FT_INT_MAX )
return Smooth_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size;
if ( error )
goto Exit;
slot->format = FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP;
slot->bitmap_left = (FT_Int)x_left;
slot->bitmap_top = (FT_Int)y_top;
Exit:
if ( outline && origin )
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, -origin->x, -origin->y );
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the gray_render_span function in smooth/ftgrays.c in FreeType before 2.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 ignores unreachable code, even though it would still be processed by JIT compilers. This behavior, also considered an improper branch-pruning logic issue, could possibly be used by local users for denial of service.
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: horAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
assert((cc%(4*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] += wp[0]; wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt, &unmounted);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
umount_mnt(p);
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 processes MNT_DETACH umount2 system calls without verifying that the MNT_LOCKED flag is unset, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and navigate to filesystem locations beneath a mount by calling umount2 within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Low | 167,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void IOThread::RegisterPrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthSchemes,
"basic,digest,ntlm,negotiate,"
"spdyproxy");
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kDisableAuthNegotiateCnameLookup, false);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableAuthNegotiatePort, false);
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthServerWhitelist, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kAuthNegotiateDelegateWhitelist,
std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kGSSAPILibraryName, std::string());
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthOrigin, std::string());
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kEnableReferrers, true);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, 0);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, 0);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpOriginalContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(prefs::kDailyHttpReceivedContentLength);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthWithDataReductionProxyEnabled);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyOriginalContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterListPref(
prefs::kDailyContentLengthViaDataReductionProxy);
registry->RegisterInt64Pref(prefs::kDailyHttpContentLengthLastUpdateDate, 0L);
#endif
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kBuiltInDnsClientEnabled, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::DoShow() {
const bool initialize_widget = !GetWidget();
if (initialize_widget) {
if (parent_widget_)
parent_widget_->AddObserver(this);
views::Widget* widget = new views::Widget;
views::Widget::InitParams params(views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP);
params.delegate = this;
params.parent = parent_widget_ ? parent_widget_->GetNativeView()
: delegate_->container_view();
AddExtraInitParams(¶ms);
widget->Init(params);
std::unique_ptr<views::View> wrapper = CreateWrapperView();
if (wrapper)
widget->SetContentsView(wrapper.release());
widget->AddObserver(this);
widget->SetVisibilityAnimationTransition(views::Widget::ANIMATE_HIDE);
show_time_ = base::Time::Now();
}
GetWidget()->GetRootView()->SetBorder(CreateBorder());
DoUpdateBoundsAndRedrawPopup();
GetWidget()->Show();
if (initialize_widget)
views::WidgetFocusManager::GetInstance()->AddFocusChangeListener(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android incorrectly allowed reentrance of FrameView::updateLifecyclePhasesInternal(), which allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360} | Medium | 172,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: allocate(struct file *file, int allocate_idat)
{
struct control *control = png_voidcast(struct control*, file->alloc_ptr);
if (allocate_idat)
{
assert(file->idat == NULL);
IDAT_init(&control->idat, file);
}
else /* chunk */
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
chunk_init(&control->chunk, file);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnGetDefaultPrintSettings(
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->GetDefaultPrintSettings(params);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_create(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
ps_create_op = (ih264d_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ih264d_allocate_static_bufs(&dec_hdl, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != dec_hdl))
{
ih264d_free_static_bufs(dec_hdl);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: A vulnerability in the Android media framework (libavc) related to handling dec_hdl memory allocation failures. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-68300072.
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle dec_hdl memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for dec_hdl fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68300072
Test: ran poc before/after
Change-Id: I118ae71f4aded658441f1932bd4ede3536f5028b
(cherry picked from commit 7720b3fe3de04523da3a9ecec2b42a3748529bbd)
| High | 174,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TreeScope::adoptIfNeeded function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/TreeScope.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102, does not prevent script execution during node-adoption operations, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766} | Medium | 172,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: jbig2_image_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int width, int height)
{
Jbig2Image *image;
int stride;
int64_t check;
image = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image, 1);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image structure in jbig2_image_new");
return NULL;
}
stride = ((width - 1) >> 3) + 1; /* generate a byte-aligned stride */
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
check = ((int64_t) stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow from stride(%d)*height(%d)", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
/* Add 1 to accept runs that exceed image width and clamped to width+1 */
image->data = jbig2_new(ctx, uint8_t, (int)check + 1);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image data buffer! [stride(%d)*height(%d) bytes]", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
image->width = width;
image->height = height;
image->stride = stride;
image->refcount = 1;
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: display_sigset( const char *msg, sigset_t *mask )
{
int signo;
NameTableIterator next_sig( SigNames );
if( msg ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, msg );
}
while( (signo = next_sig()) != -1 ) {
if( sigismember(mask,signo) ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS | D_NOHEADER, "%s ", SigNames.get_name(signo) );
}
}
dprintf( D_ALWAYS | D_NOHEADER, "\n" );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static xmlDocPtr dom_document_parser(zval *id, int mode, char *source, int source_len, int options TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
dom_object *intern;
php_libxml_ref_obj *document = NULL;
int validate, recover, resolve_externals, keep_blanks, substitute_ent;
int resolved_path_len;
int old_error_reporting = 0;
char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (id != NULL) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
document = intern->document;
}
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(document);
validate = doc_props->validateonparse;
resolve_externals = doc_props->resolveexternals;
keep_blanks = doc_props->preservewhitespace;
substitute_ent = doc_props->substituteentities;
recover = doc_props->recover;
if (document == NULL) {
efree(doc_props);
}
xmlInitParser();
if (mode == DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
char *file_dest = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (file_dest) {
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(file_dest);
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(source, source_len);
}
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document */
if (mode != DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
#if HAVE_GETCWD
directory = VCWD_GETCWD(resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN);
#elif HAVE_GETWD
directory = VCWD_GETWD(resolved_path);
#endif
if (directory) {
if(ctxt->directory != NULL) {
xmlFree((char *) ctxt->directory);
}
resolved_path_len = strlen(resolved_path);
if (resolved_path[resolved_path_len - 1] != DEFAULT_SLASH) {
resolved_path[resolved_path_len] = DEFAULT_SLASH;
resolved_path[++resolved_path_len] = '\0';
}
ctxt->directory = (char *) xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) resolved_path);
}
}
ctxt->vctxt.error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
ctxt->sax->error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->sax->warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
}
if (validate && ! (options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
}
if (resolve_externals && ! (options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
}
if (substitute_ent && ! (options & XML_PARSE_NOENT)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
}
if (keep_blanks == 0 && ! (options & XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS)) {
options |= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
}
xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
ctxt->recovery = recover;
if (recover) {
old_error_reporting = EG(error_reporting);
EG(error_reporting) = old_error_reporting | E_WARNING;
}
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed || recover) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ctxt->recovery) {
EG(error_reporting) = old_error_reporting;
}
/* If loading from memory, set the base reference uri for the document */
if (ret && ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ static void dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) */
static void dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) {
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp = NULL, *newdoc;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
dom_object *intern;
char *source;
int source_len, refcount, ret;
long options = 0;
id = getThis();
if (id != NULL && ! instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(id), dom_document_class_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
id = NULL;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &source, &source_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!source_len) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string supplied as input");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
newdoc = dom_document_parser(id, mode, source, source_len, options TSRMLS_CC);
if (!newdoc)
RETURN_FALSE;
if (id != NULL) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern != NULL) {
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
doc_prop = NULL;
if (docp != NULL) {
php_libxml_decrement_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *) intern TSRMLS_CC);
doc_prop = intern->document->doc_props;
intern->document->doc_props = NULL;
refcount = php_libxml_decrement_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (refcount != 0) {
docp->_private = NULL;
}
}
intern->document = NULL;
if (php_libxml_increment_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, newdoc TSRMLS_CC) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern->document->doc_props = doc_prop;
}
php_libxml_increment_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, (xmlNodePtr)newdoc, (void *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) newdoc, &ret, NULL);
}
}
/* }}} end dom_parser_document */
/* {{{ proto DOMNode dom_document_load(string source [, int options]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-load
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_METHOD(domdocument, load)
{
dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_load */
/* {{{ proto DOMNode dom_document_loadxml(string source [, int options]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-loadXML
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_METHOD(domdocument, loadXML)
{
dom_parse_document(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_loadxml */
/* {{{ proto int dom_document_save(string file);
Convenience method to save to file
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_save)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
int file_len = 0, bytes, format, saveempty = 0;
dom_object *intern;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
char *file;
long options = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &file, &file_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (file_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Filename");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
/* encoding handled by property on doc */
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(intern->document);
format = doc_props->formatoutput;
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
bytes = xmlSaveFormatFileEnc(file, docp, NULL, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
if (bytes == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(bytes);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_save */
/* {{{ proto string dom_document_savexml([node n]);
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-3-LS/load-save.html#LS-DocumentLS-saveXML
Since: DOM Level 3
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_savexml)
{
zval *id, *nodep = NULL;
xmlDoc *docp;
xmlNode *node;
xmlBufferPtr buf;
xmlChar *mem;
dom_object *intern, *nodeobj;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
int size, format, saveempty = 0;
long options = 0;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O|O!l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &nodep, dom_node_class_entry, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(intern->document);
format = doc_props->formatoutput;
if (nodep != NULL) {
/* Dump contents of Node */
DOM_GET_OBJ(node, nodep, xmlNodePtr, nodeobj);
if (node->doc != docp) {
php_dom_throw_error(WRONG_DOCUMENT_ERR, dom_get_strict_error(intern->document) TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
buf = xmlBufferCreate();
if (!buf) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not fetch buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
xmlNodeDump(buf, docp, node, 0, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
mem = (xmlChar*) xmlBufferContent(buf);
if (!mem) {
xmlBufferFree(buf);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRING(mem, 1);
xmlBufferFree(buf);
} else {
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
saveempty = xmlSaveNoEmptyTags;
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = 1;
}
/* Encoding is handled from the encoding property set on the document */
xmlDocDumpFormatMemory(docp, &mem, &size, format);
if (options & LIBXML_SAVE_NOEMPTYTAG) {
xmlSaveNoEmptyTags = saveempty;
}
if (!size) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(mem, size, 1);
xmlFree(mem);
}
}
/* }}} end dom_document_savexml */
static xmlNodePtr php_dom_free_xinclude_node(xmlNodePtr cur TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
xmlNodePtr xincnode;
xincnode = cur;
cur = cur->next;
xmlUnlinkNode(xincnode);
php_libxml_node_free_resource(xincnode TSRMLS_CC);
return cur;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(xmlNodePtr cur TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
while(cur) {
if (cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) {
cur = php_dom_free_xinclude_node(cur TSRMLS_CC);
/* XML_XINCLUDE_END node will be a sibling of XML_XINCLUDE_START */
while(cur && cur->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END) {
/* remove xinclude processing nodes from recursive xincludes */
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(cur->children TSRMLS_CC);
}
cur = cur->next;
}
if (cur && cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END) {
cur = php_dom_free_xinclude_node(cur TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(cur->children TSRMLS_CC);
}
cur = cur->next;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int dom_document_xinclude([int options])
Substitutues xincludes in a DomDocument */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_xinclude)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
xmlNodePtr root;
long flags = 0;
int err;
dom_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O|l", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
err = xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(docp, flags);
/* XML_XINCLUDE_START and XML_XINCLUDE_END nodes need to be removed as these
are added via xmlXIncludeProcess to mark beginning and ending of xincluded document
but are not wanted in resulting document - must be done even if err as it could fail after
having processed some xincludes */
root = (xmlNodePtr) docp->children;
while(root && root->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE && root->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) {
root = root->next;
}
if (root) {
php_dom_remove_xinclude_nodes(root TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (err) {
RETVAL_LONG(err);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_validate();
Since: DOM extended
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_validate)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
xmlValidCtxt *cvp;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "O", &id, dom_document_class_entry) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
cvp = xmlNewValidCtxt();
cvp->userData = NULL;
cvp->error = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler;
cvp->warning = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler;
if (xmlValidateDocument(cvp, docp)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
xmlFreeValidCtxt(cvp);
}
/* }}} */
#if defined(LIBXML_SCHEMAS_ENABLED)
static void _dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
char *source = NULL, *valid_file = NULL;
int source_len = 0;
xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr parser;
xmlSchemaPtr sptr;
xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vptr;
int is_valid;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Op", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
switch (type) {
case DOM_LOAD_FILE:
valid_file = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema file source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
parser = xmlSchemaNewParserCtxt(valid_file);
break;
case DOM_LOAD_STRING:
parser = xmlSchemaNewMemParserCtxt(source, source_len);
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document
but it is not apparent how to do that for schema's */
break;
default:
return;
}
xmlSchemaSetParserErrors(parser,
(xmlSchemaValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
(xmlSchemaValidityWarningFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
parser);
sptr = xmlSchemaParse(parser);
xmlSchemaFreeParserCtxt(parser);
if (!sptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
vptr = xmlSchemaNewValidCtxt(sptr);
if (!vptr) {
xmlSchemaFree(sptr);
php_error(E_ERROR, "Invalid Schema Validation Context");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
xmlSchemaSetValidErrors(vptr, php_libxml_error_handler, php_libxml_error_handler, vptr);
is_valid = xmlSchemaValidateDoc(vptr, docp);
xmlSchemaFree(sptr);
xmlSchemaFreeValidCtxt(vptr);
if (is_valid == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_schema_validate_file(string filename); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_schema_validate_file)
{
_dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_schema_validate_file */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_schema_validate(string source); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_schema_validate_xml)
{
_dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_schema_validate */
static void _dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
dom_object *intern;
char *source = NULL, *valid_file = NULL;
int source_len = 0;
xmlRelaxNGParserCtxtPtr parser;
xmlRelaxNGPtr sptr;
xmlRelaxNGValidCtxtPtr vptr;
int is_valid;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Op", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
switch (type) {
case DOM_LOAD_FILE:
valid_file = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid RelaxNG file source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
parser = xmlRelaxNGNewParserCtxt(valid_file);
break;
case DOM_LOAD_STRING:
parser = xmlRelaxNGNewMemParserCtxt(source, source_len);
/* If loading from memory, we need to set the base directory for the document
but it is not apparent how to do that for schema's */
break;
default:
return;
}
xmlRelaxNGSetParserErrors(parser,
(xmlRelaxNGValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
(xmlRelaxNGValidityWarningFunc) php_libxml_error_handler,
parser);
sptr = xmlRelaxNGParse(parser);
xmlRelaxNGFreeParserCtxt(parser);
if (!sptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid RelaxNG");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
vptr = xmlRelaxNGNewValidCtxt(sptr);
if (!vptr) {
xmlRelaxNGFree(sptr);
php_error(E_ERROR, "Invalid RelaxNG Validation Context");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
xmlRelaxNGSetValidErrors(vptr, php_libxml_error_handler, php_libxml_error_handler, vptr);
is_valid = xmlRelaxNGValidateDoc(vptr, docp);
xmlRelaxNGFree(sptr);
xmlRelaxNGFreeValidCtxt(vptr);
if (is_valid == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file(string filename); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file)
{
_dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_FILE);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_relaxNG_validate_file */
/* {{{ proto boolean dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml(string source); */
PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml)
{
_dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, DOM_LOAD_STRING);
}
/* }}} end dom_document_relaxNG_validate_xml */
#endif
#if defined(LIBXML_HTML_ENABLED)
static void dom_load_html(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) /* {{{ */
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp = NULL, *newdoc;
dom_object *intern;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_prop;
char *source;
int source_len, refcount, ret;
long options = 0;
htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
id = getThis();
id = getThis();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &source, &source_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (mode == DOM_LOAD_FILE) {
ctxt = htmlCreateFileParserCtxt(source, NULL);
} else {
source_len = xmlStrlen(source);
ctxt = htmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(source, source_len);
}
if (!ctxt) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (options) {
htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
}
ctxt->vctxt.error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
ctxt->sax->error = php_libxml_ctx_error;
ctxt->sax->warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning;
}
htmlParseDocument(ctxt);
newdoc = ctxt->myDoc;
htmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
if (!newdoc)
RETURN_FALSE;
if (id != NULL && instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(id), dom_document_class_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
intern = (dom_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(id TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern != NULL) {
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(intern);
doc_prop = NULL;
if (docp != NULL) {
php_libxml_decrement_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *) intern TSRMLS_CC);
doc_prop = intern->document->doc_props;
intern->document->doc_props = NULL;
refcount = php_libxml_decrement_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (refcount != 0) {
docp->_private = NULL;
}
}
intern->document = NULL;
if (php_libxml_increment_doc_ref((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, newdoc TSRMLS_CC) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern->document->doc_props = doc_prop;
}
php_libxml_increment_node_ptr((php_libxml_node_object *)intern, (xmlNodePtr)newdoc, (void *)intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) newdoc, &ret, NULL);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_linux_shareopts(const char *shareopts, char **plinux_opts)
{
int rc;
assert(plinux_opts != NULL);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
/* default options for Solaris shares */
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_subtree_check", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_root_squash", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "mountpoint", NULL);
rc = foreach_nfs_shareopt(shareopts, get_linux_shareopts_cb,
plinux_opts);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(*plinux_opts);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
}
return (rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: sharenfs 0.6.4, when built with commits bcdd594 and 7d08880 from the zfs repository, provides world readable access to the shared zfs file system, which might allow remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading shared files.
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare. | Low | 170,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,578 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders(const SpdyHeaderBlock& headers) {
SpdyHeaderBlock::const_iterator it = headers.find(kHttp2MethodHeader);
DCHECK(it != headers.end());
if (!(it->second == "GET" || it->second == "HEAD")) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid method "
<< it->second;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_METHOD);
return;
}
if (!SpdyUtils::UrlIsValid(headers)) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid URL "
<< url_;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
if (!session_->IsAuthorized(SpdyUtils::GetHostNameFromHeaderBlock(headers))) {
Reset(QUIC_UNAUTHORIZED_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
request_headers_.reset(new SpdyHeaderBlock(headers.Clone()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack buffer overflow in the QUIC networking stack in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.89 allowed a remote attacker to gain code execution via a malicious server.
Commit Message: Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105} | High | 172,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tsq_depth : %u\n",
svcrdma_max_requests * RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 168,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
unsigned x, y;
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
VignetteContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
if (s->eval_mode == EVAL_MODE_FRAME)
update_context(s, inlink, in);
if (s->desc->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_RGB) {
uint8_t *dst = out->data[0];
const uint8_t *src = in ->data[0];
const float *fmap = s->fmap;
const int dst_linesize = out->linesize[0];
const int src_linesize = in ->linesize[0];
const int fmap_linesize = s->fmap_linesize;
for (y = 0; y < inlink->h; y++) {
uint8_t *dstp = dst;
const uint8_t *srcp = src;
for (x = 0; x < inlink->w; x++, dstp += 3, srcp += 3) {
const float f = fmap[x];
dstp[0] = av_clip_uint8(srcp[0] * f + get_dither_value(s));
dstp[1] = av_clip_uint8(srcp[1] * f + get_dither_value(s));
dstp[2] = av_clip_uint8(srcp[2] * f + get_dither_value(s));
}
dst += dst_linesize;
src += src_linesize;
fmap += fmap_linesize;
}
} else {
int plane;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
uint8_t *dst = out->data[plane];
const uint8_t *src = in ->data[plane];
const float *fmap = s->fmap;
const int dst_linesize = out->linesize[plane];
const int src_linesize = in ->linesize[plane];
const int fmap_linesize = s->fmap_linesize;
const int chroma = plane == 1 || plane == 2;
const int hsub = chroma ? s->desc->log2_chroma_w : 0;
const int vsub = chroma ? s->desc->log2_chroma_h : 0;
const int w = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, hsub);
const int h = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub);
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
uint8_t *dstp = dst;
const uint8_t *srcp = src;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
const double dv = get_dither_value(s);
if (chroma) *dstp++ = av_clip_uint8(fmap[x << hsub] * (*srcp++ - 127) + 127 + dv);
else *dstp++ = av_clip_uint8(fmap[x ] * *srcp++ + dv);
}
dst += dst_linesize;
src += src_linesize;
fmap += fmap_linesize << vsub;
}
}
}
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 166,008 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_givcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_blkcipher rblkcipher;
snprintf(rblkcipher.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "givcipher");
snprintf(rblkcipher.geniv, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<built-in>");
rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rblkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize;
rblkcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.max_keysize;
rblkcipher.ivsize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_BLKCIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_blkcipher), &rblkcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Low | 166,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: png_write_init_3(png_structpp ptr_ptr, png_const_charp user_png_ver,
png_size_t png_struct_size)
{
png_structp png_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* to save current jump buffer */
#endif
int i = 0;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
do
{
if (user_png_ver[i] != png_libpng_ver[i])
{
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_LIBRARY_MISMATCH;
#else
png_ptr->warning_fn = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Application uses deprecated png_write_init() and should be recompiled.");
#endif
}
i++;
} while (png_libpng_ver[i] != 0 && user_png_ver[i] != 0);
png_debug(1, "in png_write_init_3");
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Save jump buffer and error functions */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
if (png_sizeof(png_struct) > png_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(png_ptr);
png_ptr = (png_structp)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_PNG);
*ptr_ptr = png_ptr;
}
/* Reset all variables to 0 */
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
/* Added at libpng-1.2.6 */
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->user_width_max = PNG_USER_WIDTH_MAX;
png_ptr->user_height_max = PNG_USER_HEIGHT_MAX;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Restore jump buffer */
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
png_set_write_fn(png_ptr, png_voidp_NULL, png_rw_ptr_NULL,
png_flush_ptr_NULL);
/* Initialize zbuf - compression buffer */
png_ptr->zbuf_size = PNG_ZBUF_SIZE;
png_ptr->zbuf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_set_filter_heuristics(png_ptr, PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_DEFAULT,
1, png_doublep_NULL, png_doublep_NULL);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | High | 172,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert1");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(a*, , V8a::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8a::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert1();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloatArray( double *numbers, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateFloat( numbers[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 167,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert4Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert4");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(d*, , V8d::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8d::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert4();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
const char* fixed_data;
int fixed_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&fixed_data, &fixed_data_size) ||
(fixed_data_size <= 0)) {
return false;
}
if (fixed_data_size != sizeof(SkBitmap_Data))
return false; // Message is malformed.
const char* variable_data;
int variable_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&variable_data, &variable_data_size) ||
(variable_data_size < 0)) {
return false;
}
const SkBitmap_Data* bmp_data =
reinterpret_cast<const SkBitmap_Data*>(fixed_data);
return bmp_data->InitSkBitmapFromData(r, variable_data, variable_data_size);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562} | Medium | 172,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface(ExecState* exec)
{
JSTestInterfaceConstructor* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestInterfaceConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& str1(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& str2(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
ScriptExecutionContext* context = castedThis->scriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return throwVMError(exec, createReferenceError(exec, "TestInterface constructor associated document is unavailable"));
RefPtr<TestInterface> object = TestInterface::create(context, str1, str2, ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), object.get())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,574 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadCLIPBOARDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
{
HBITMAP
bitmapH;
HPALETTE
hPal;
OpenClipboard(NULL);
bitmapH=(HBITMAP) GetClipboardData(CF_BITMAP);
hPal=(HPALETTE) GetClipboardData(CF_PALETTE);
CloseClipboard();
if ( bitmapH == NULL )
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NoBitmapOnClipboard");
{
BITMAPINFO
DIBinfo;
BITMAP
bitmap;
HBITMAP
hBitmap,
hOldBitmap;
HDC
hDC,
hMemDC;
RGBQUAD
*pBits,
*ppBits;
/* create an offscreen DC for the source */
hMemDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hMemDC,bitmapH);
GetObject(bitmapH,sizeof(BITMAP),(LPSTR) &bitmap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
image->rows=bitmap.bmHeight;
image->columns=bitmap.bmWidth;
}
/*
Initialize the bitmap header info.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&DIBinfo,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) image->columns;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) image->rows;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biBitCount=32;
DIBinfo.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
hDC=GetDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
hBitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&DIBinfo,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &ppBits,
NULL,0);
ReleaseDC(NULL,hDC);
if (hBitmap == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
/* create an offscreen DC */
hDC=CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
if (hDC == 0)
{
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateADC");
}
hOldBitmap=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(hDC,hBitmap);
if (hOldBitmap == 0)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
if (hPal != NULL)
{
/* Kenichi Masuko says this needed */
SelectPalette(hDC, hPal, FALSE);
RealizePalette(hDC);
}
/* bitblt from the memory to the DIB-based one */
BitBlt(hDC,0,0,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,hMemDC,0,0,SRCCOPY);
/* finally copy the pixels! */
pBits=ppBits;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(pBits->rgbBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
pBits++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitSecurityContext(const DocumentInit& initializer) {
DCHECK(!GetSecurityOrigin());
if (!initializer.HasSecurityContext()) {
cookie_url_ = KURL(g_empty_string);
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque());
InitContentSecurityPolicy();
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
return;
}
SandboxFlags sandbox_flags = initializer.GetSandboxFlags();
if (fetcher_->Archive()) {
sandbox_flags |=
kSandboxAll &
~(kSandboxPopups | kSandboxPropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts);
}
EnforceSandboxFlags(sandbox_flags);
SetInsecureRequestPolicy(initializer.GetInsecureRequestPolicy());
if (initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
for (auto to_upgrade : *initializer.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
AddInsecureNavigationUpgrade(to_upgrade);
}
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
cookie_url_ = url_;
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> security_origin =
SecurityOrigin::CreateUniqueOpaque();
Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument();
if (owner) {
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
security_origin->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
if (owner->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanLoadLocalResources())
security_origin->GrantLoadLocalResources();
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
SetSecurityOrigin(std::move(security_origin));
} else if (Document* owner = initializer.OwnerDocument()) {
cookie_url_ = owner->CookieURL();
SetSecurityOrigin(owner->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
policy_to_inherit = owner->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
} else {
cookie_url_ = url_;
SetSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url_));
}
if (initializer.IsHostedInReservedIPRange()) {
SetAddressSpace(GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocalhost()
? mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal
: mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPrivate);
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kLocal);
} else {
SetAddressSpace(mojom::IPAddressSpace::kPublic);
}
if (ImportsController()) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(
ImportsController()->Master()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else {
InitContentSecurityPolicy(nullptr, policy_to_inherit);
}
if (Settings* settings = initializer.GetSettings()) {
if (!settings->GetWebSecurityEnabled()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsLocal()) {
if (settings->GetAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->GrantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->GetAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->BlockLocalAccessFromLocalOrigin();
}
}
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->IsOpaque() &&
SecurityOrigin::Create(url_)->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
GetMutableSecurityOrigin()->SetOpaqueOriginIsPotentiallyTrustworthy(true);
ApplyFeaturePolicy({});
InitSecureContextState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of CSP enforcement during navigations in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889} | Medium | 172,616 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
return kInsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368} | Medium | 173,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
if (data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str) != data_store_map_.end())
return data_store_map_[preview_ui_addr_str]->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xscale1pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* NOTE: there's an A stepping erratum that states if an overflow
* bit already exists and another occurs, the previous
* Overflow bit gets cleared. There's no workaround.
* Fixed in B stepping or later.
*/
pmnc = xscale1pmu_read_pmnc();
/*
* Write the value back to clear the overflow flags. Overflow
* flags remain in pmnc for use below. We also disable the PMU
* while we process the interrupt.
*/
xscale1pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc & ~XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE);
if (!(pmnc & XSCALE1_OVERFLOWED_MASK))
return IRQ_NONE;
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
if (!xscale1_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
irq_work_run();
/*
* Re-enable the PMU.
*/
pmnc = xscale1pmu_read_pmnc() | XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE;
xscale1pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int imagetobmp(opj_image_t * image, const char *outfile) {
int w, h;
int i, pad;
FILE *fdest = NULL;
int adjustR, adjustG, adjustB;
if (image->comps[0].prec < 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported number of components: %d\n", image->comps[0].prec);
return 1;
}
if (image->numcomps >= 3 && image->comps[0].dx == image->comps[1].dx
&& image->comps[1].dx == image->comps[2].dx
&& image->comps[0].dy == image->comps[1].dy
&& image->comps[1].dy == image->comps[2].dy
&& image->comps[0].prec == image->comps[1].prec
&& image->comps[1].prec == image->comps[2].prec) {
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
24 bits color
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c",
(OPJ_UINT8) (h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54) & 0xff, ((54) >> 8) & 0xff,((54) >> 16) & 0xff, ((54) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (24) & 0xff, ((24) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (3 * h * w + 3 * h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}
else
adjustR = 0;
if (image->comps[1].prec > 8) {
adjustG = (int)image->comps[1].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 1 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[1].prec);
}
else
adjustG = 0;
if (image->comps[2].prec > 8) {
adjustB = (int)image->comps[2].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 2 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[2].prec);
}
else
adjustB = 0;
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
OPJ_UINT8 rc, gc, bc;
int r, g, b;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
rc = (OPJ_UINT8)r;
g = image->comps[1].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
g += (image->comps[1].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[1].prec - 1) : 0);
g = ((g >> adjustG)+((g >> (adjustG-1))%2));
if(g > 255) g = 255; else if(g < 0) g = 0;
gc = (OPJ_UINT8)g;
b = image->comps[2].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
b += (image->comps[2].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[2].prec - 1) : 0);
b = ((b >> adjustB)+((b >> (adjustB-1))%2));
if(b > 255) b = 255; else if(b < 0) b = 0;
bc = (OPJ_UINT8)b;
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c", bc, gc, rc);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for (pad = ((3 * w) % 4) ? (4 - (3 * w) % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
} else { /* Gray-scale */
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
8 bits non code (Gray scale)
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + w * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54 + 1024) & 0xff, ((54 + 1024) >> 8) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 16) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (8) & 0xff, ((8) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}else
adjustR = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", i, i, i, 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
int r;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
fprintf(fdest, "%c", (OPJ_UINT8)r);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for ((pad = w % 4) ? (4 - w % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sycc422_t_rgb function in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted jpeg2000 file.
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726 | Medium | 168,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Display::Clear()
{
delete[] m_string;
m_string = NULL;
delete[] m_language;
m_language = NULL;
delete[] m_country;
m_country = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GF_Err hdlr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_HandlerBox *p = (GF_HandlerBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "HandlerBox", trace);
if (p->nameUTF8 && (u32) p->nameUTF8[0] == strlen(p->nameUTF8+1)) {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8+1);
} else {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8);
}
fprintf(trace, "reserved1=\"%d\" reserved2=\"", p->reserved1);
dump_data(trace, (char *) p->reserved2, 12);
fprintf(trace, "\"");
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("HandlerBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in MP4Box in GPAC 0.7.1. There is a heap-based buffer over-read in the isomedia/box_dump.c function hdlr_dump.
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) | High | 169,168 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.11 allows ucma_leave_multicast to access a certain data structure after a cleanup step in ucma_process_join, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free).
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Integer overflow in the getCoverageFormat12 function in CmapCoverage.cpp in the Minikin library in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G and 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (continuous rebooting) via an application that triggers loading of a crafted TTF font, aka internal bug 25645298.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in parsing fonts
A malformed TTF can cause size calculations to overflow. This patch
checks the maximum reasonable value so that the total size fits in 32
bits. It also adds some explicit casting to avoid possible technical
undefined behavior when parsing sized unsigned values.
Bug: 25645298
Change-Id: Id4716132041a6f4f1fbb73ec4e445391cf7d9616
(cherry picked from commit 183c9ec2800baa2ce099ee260c6cbc6121cf1274)
| Medium | 173,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info)
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(job->url, need_preconnect);
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cib_recv_plaintext(int sock)
{
char *buf = NULL;
ssize_t rc = 0;
ssize_t len = 0;
ssize_t chunk_size = 512;
buf = calloc(1, chunk_size);
while (1) {
errno = 0;
rc = read(sock, buf + len, chunk_size);
crm_trace("Got %d more bytes. errno=%d", (int)rc, errno);
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) {
crm_trace("Retry: %d", (int)rc);
if (rc > 0) {
len += rc;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
}
} else if (rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Error receiving message: %d", (int)rc);
goto bail;
} else if (rc == chunk_size) {
len += rc;
chunk_size *= 2;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else if (buf[len + rc - 1] != 0) {
crm_trace("Last char is %d '%c'", buf[len + rc - 1], buf[len + rc - 1]);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
len += rc;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else {
return buf;
}
}
bail:
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. | Medium | 166,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long BlockEntry::GetIndex() const
{
return m_index;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE BrotliResult ProcessCommandsInternal(int safe,
BrotliState* s) {
int pos = s->pos;
int i = s->loop_counter;
BrotliResult result = BROTLI_RESULT_SUCCESS;
BrotliBitReader* br = &s->br;
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28) || !WarmupBitReader(safe, br)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
/* Jump into state machine. */
if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
goto CommandBegin;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER) {
goto CommandInner;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_DECODE_LITERALS) {
goto CommandPostDecodeLiterals;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRAP_COPY) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
} else {
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
CommandBegin:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN;
}
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 156 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[1] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeCommandBlockSwitch(s));
goto CommandBegin;
}
/* Read the insert/copy length in the command */
BROTLI_SAFE(ReadCommand(s, br, &i));
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(i);
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->copy_length);
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->distance_code);
if (i == 0) {
goto CommandPostDecodeLiterals;
}
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= i;
CommandInner:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
}
/* Read the literals in the command */
if (s->trivial_literal_context) {
uint32_t bits;
uint32_t value;
PreloadSymbol(safe, s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
do {
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 162 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[0] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(s));
PreloadSymbol(safe, s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
}
if (!safe) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] = (uint8_t)ReadPreloadedSymbol(
s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
} else {
uint32_t literal;
if (!SafeReadSymbol(s->literal_htree, br, &literal)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
s->ringbuffer[pos] = (uint8_t)literal;
}
--s->block_length[0];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->literal_htree_index);
BROTLI_LOG_ARRAY_INDEX(s->ringbuffer, pos);
++pos;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(pos == s->ringbuffer_size)) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER_WRITE;
--i;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} while (--i != 0);
} else {
uint8_t p1 = s->ringbuffer[(pos - 1) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
uint8_t p2 = s->ringbuffer[(pos - 2) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
do {
const HuffmanCode* hc;
uint8_t context;
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 162 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[0] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(s));
}
context = s->context_lookup1[p1] | s->context_lookup2[p2];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(context);
hc = s->literal_hgroup.htrees[s->context_map_slice[context]];
p2 = p1;
if (!safe) {
p1 = (uint8_t)ReadSymbol(hc, br);
} else {
uint32_t literal;
if (!SafeReadSymbol(hc, br, &literal)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
p1 = (uint8_t)literal;
}
s->ringbuffer[pos] = p1;
--s->block_length[0];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->context_map_slice[context]);
BROTLI_LOG_ARRAY_INDEX(s->ringbuffer, pos & s->ringbuffer_mask);
++pos;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(pos == s->ringbuffer_size)) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER_WRITE;
--i;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} while (--i != 0);
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
CommandPostDecodeLiterals:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_DECODE_LITERALS;
}
if (s->distance_code >= 0) {
--s->dist_rb_idx;
s->distance_code = s->dist_rb[s->dist_rb_idx & 3];
goto postReadDistance; /* We already have the implicit distance */
}
/* Read distance code in the command, unless it was implicitly zero. */
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[2] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeDistanceBlockSwitch(s));
}
BROTLI_SAFE(ReadDistance(s, br));
postReadDistance:
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->distance_code);
if (s->max_distance != s->max_backward_distance) {
if (pos < s->max_backward_distance_minus_custom_dict_size) {
s->max_distance = pos + s->custom_dict_size;
} else {
s->max_distance = s->max_backward_distance;
}
}
i = s->copy_length;
/* Apply copy of LZ77 back-reference, or static dictionary reference if
the distance is larger than the max LZ77 distance */
if (s->distance_code > s->max_distance) {
if (i >= kBrotliMinDictionaryWordLength &&
i <= kBrotliMaxDictionaryWordLength) {
int offset = kBrotliDictionaryOffsetsByLength[i];
int word_id = s->distance_code - s->max_distance - 1;
uint32_t shift = kBrotliDictionarySizeBitsByLength[i];
int mask = (int)BitMask(shift);
int word_idx = word_id & mask;
int transform_idx = word_id >> shift;
offset += word_idx * i;
if (transform_idx < kNumTransforms) {
const uint8_t* word = &kBrotliDictionary[offset];
int len = i;
if (transform_idx == 0) {
memcpy(&s->ringbuffer[pos], word, (size_t)len);
} else {
len = TransformDictionaryWord(
&s->ringbuffer[pos], word, len, transform_idx);
}
pos += len;
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= len;
if (pos >= s->ringbuffer_size) {
/*s->partial_pos_rb += (size_t)s->ringbuffer_size;*/
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRITE_1;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} else {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n",
pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
} else {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n", pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
} else {
const uint8_t *ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length =
s->ringbuffer_end - i;
uint8_t* copy_src = &s->ringbuffer[
(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
uint8_t* copy_dst = &s->ringbuffer[pos];
/* update the recent distances cache */
s->dist_rb[s->dist_rb_idx & 3] = s->distance_code;
++s->dist_rb_idx;
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= i;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->meta_block_remaining_len < 0)) {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n", pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
/* There is 128+ bytes of slack in the ringbuffer allocation.
Also, we have 16 short codes, that make these 16 bytes irrelevant
in the ringbuffer. Let's copy over them as a first guess.
*/
memmove16(copy_dst, copy_src);
/* Now check if the copy extends over the ringbuffer end,
or if the copy overlaps with itself, if yes, do wrap-copy. */
if (copy_src < copy_dst) {
if (copy_dst >= ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
}
if (copy_src + i > copy_dst) {
goto postSelfintersecting;
}
} else {
if (copy_src >= ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
}
if (copy_dst + i > copy_src) {
goto postSelfintersecting;
}
}
pos += i;
if (i > 16) {
if (i > 32) {
memcpy(copy_dst + 16, copy_src + 16, (size_t)(i - 16));
} else {
/* This branch covers about 45% cases.
Fixed size short copy allows more compiler optimizations. */
memmove16(copy_dst + 16, copy_src + 16);
}
}
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
postSelfintersecting:
while (--i >= 0) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] =
s->ringbuffer[(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
++pos;
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
CommandPostWrapCopy:
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRAP_COPY;
while (--i >= 0) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] =
s->ringbuffer[(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
++pos;
if (pos == s->ringbuffer_size) {
/*s->partial_pos_rb += (size_t)s->ringbuffer_size;*/
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRITE_2;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
saveStateAndReturn:
s->pos = pos;
s->loop_counter = i;
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer underflow in the ProcessCommandsInternal function in dec/decode.c in Brotli, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.109, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data with brotli compression.
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736} | Medium | 172,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static u64 __skb_get_nlattr_nest(u64 ctx, u64 A, u64 X, u64 r4, u64 r5)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)(long) ctx;
struct nlattr *nla;
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
nla = (struct nlattr *) &skb->data[A];
if (nla->nla_len > A - skb->len)
return 0;
nla = nla_find_nested(nla, X);
if (nla)
return (void *) nla - (void *) skb->data;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension implementation in the sk_run_filter function in net/core/filter.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.3 uses the reverse order in a certain subtraction, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (over-read and system crash) via crafted BPF instructions. NOTE: the affected code was moved to the __skb_get_nlattr_nest function before the vulnerability was announced.
Commit Message: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = 0;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
/*
* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
* because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
* isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
* template in the template itself.
*/
if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
it->templates, opt, ctx);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
goto err;
}
/* Check tag matches bit map */
if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
goto err;
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* Use new style d2i */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
if (*pval) {
/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
tt = it->templates + i;
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
}
} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
p = *in;
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
/*
* We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
/* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
if (ret > 0)
break;
/* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
errtt = tt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
if (i == it->tcount) {
/* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
if (opt) {
/* Free and zero it */
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
return -1;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
/* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
&p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
}
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
}
}
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
/* Have we ran out of data? */
if (!len)
break;
q = p;
if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
if (!seq_eoc) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
goto err;
}
len -= p - q;
seq_eoc = 0;
q = p;
break;
}
/*
* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
* omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
* data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
* increases efficiency in some cases.
*/
if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
isopt = 0;
else
isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
/*
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1) {
/*
* OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
*/
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
continue;
}
/* Update length */
len -= p - q;
}
/* Check for EOC if expecting one */
if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
/* Check all data read */
if (!seq_nolen && len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
* may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
* and clear any that are.
*/
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
} else {
errtt = seqtt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
err:
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (errtt)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
", Type=", it->sname);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE implementation in crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zh, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0t, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1q, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2e mishandles errors caused by malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE data, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by triggering a decoding failure in a PKCS#7 or CMS application.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Cancel() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Cancel";
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: inf_gtk_certificate_manager_certificate_func(InfXmppConnection* connection,
gnutls_session_t session,
InfCertificateChain* chain,
gpointer user_data)
{
InfGtkCertificateManager* manager;
InfGtkCertificateManagerPrivate* priv;
InfGtkCertificateDialogFlags flags;
gnutls_x509_crt_t presented_cert;
gnutls_x509_crt_t known_cert;
gchar* hostname;
gboolean match_hostname;
gboolean issuer_known;
gnutls_x509_crt_t root_cert;
int ret;
unsigned int verify;
GHashTable* table;
gboolean cert_equal;
time_t expiration_time;
InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery* query;
gchar* text;
GtkWidget* vbox;
GtkWidget* label;
GError* error;
manager = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER(user_data);
priv = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_PRIVATE(manager);
g_object_get(G_OBJECT(connection), "remote-hostname", &hostname, NULL);
presented_cert = inf_certificate_chain_get_own_certificate(chain);
match_hostname = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(presented_cert, hostname);
/* First, validate the certificate */
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify);
error = NULL;
if(ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
inf_gnutls_set_error(&error, ret);
/* Remove the GNUTLS_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN flag from the verification
* result, and if the certificate is still invalid, then set an error. */
if(error == NULL)
{
issuer_known = TRUE;
if(verify & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
{
issuer_known = FALSE;
/* Re-validate the certificate for other failure reasons --
* unfortunately the gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() call
* does not tell us whether the certificate is otherwise invalid
* if a signer is not found already. */
/* TODO: Here it would be good to use the verify flags from the
* certificate credentials, but GnuTLS does not have API to
* retrieve them. */
root_cert = inf_certificate_chain_get_root_certificate(chain);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify(
inf_certificate_chain_get_raw(chain),
inf_certificate_chain_get_n_certificates(chain),
&root_cert,
1,
NULL,
0,
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT,
&verify
);
if(ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
inf_gnutls_set_error(&error, ret);
else if(verify & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
inf_gnutls_certificate_verification_set_error(&error, verify);
}
}
/* Look up the host in our database of pinned certificates if we could not
* fully verify the certificate, i.e. if either the issuer is not known or
* the hostname of the connection does not match the certificate. */
table = NULL;
if(error == NULL)
{
known_cert = NULL;
if(!match_hostname || !issuer_known)
{
/* If we cannot load the known host file, then cancel the connection.
* Otherwise it might happen that someone shows us a certificate that we
* tell the user we don't know, if though actually for that host we expect
* a different certificate. */
table = inf_gtk_certificate_manager_ref_known_hosts(manager, &error);
if(table != NULL)
known_cert = g_hash_table_lookup(table, hostname);
}
}
/* Next, configure the flags for the dialog to be shown based on the
* verification result, and on whether the pinned certificate matches
* the one presented by the host or not. */
flags = 0;
if(error == NULL)
{
if(known_cert != NULL)
{
cert_equal = inf_gtk_certificate_manager_compare_fingerprint(
known_cert,
presented_cert,
&error
);
if(error == NULL && cert_equal == FALSE)
{
if(!match_hostname)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
if(!issuer_known)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN;
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_UNEXPECTED;
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(known_cert);
if(expiration_time != (time_t)(-1))
{
expiration_time -= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_EXPIRATION_TOLERANCE;
if(time(NULL) > expiration_time)
{
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_OLD_EXPIRED;
}
}
}
}
else
{
if(!match_hostname)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
if(!issuer_known)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN;
}
}
/* Now proceed either by accepting the connection, rejecting it, or
* bothering the user with an annoying dialog. */
if(error == NULL)
{
if(flags == 0)
{
if(match_hostname && issuer_known)
{
/* Remove the pinned entry if we now have a valid certificate for
* this host. */
if(table != NULL && g_hash_table_remove(table, hostname) == TRUE)
{
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_write_known_hosts_with_warning(
manager,
table
);
}
}
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_continue(connection);
}
else
{
query = g_slice_new(InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery);
query->manager = manager;
query->known_hosts = table;
query->connection = connection;
query->dialog = inf_gtk_certificate_dialog_new(
priv->parent_window,
0,
flags,
hostname,
chain
);
query->certificate_chain = chain;
table = NULL;
g_object_ref(query->connection);
inf_certificate_chain_ref(chain);
g_signal_connect(
G_OBJECT(connection),
"notify::status",
G_CALLBACK(inf_gtk_certificate_manager_notify_status_cb),
query
);
g_signal_connect(
G_OBJECT(query->dialog),
"response",
G_CALLBACK(inf_gtk_certificate_manager_response_cb),
query
);
gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog),
_("_Cancel connection"),
GTK_RESPONSE_REJECT
);
gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog),
_("C_ontinue connection"),
GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT
);
text = g_strdup_printf(
_("Do you want to continue the connection to host \"%s\"? If you "
"choose to continue, this certificate will be trusted in the "
"future when connecting to this host."),
hostname
);
label = gtk_label_new(text);
gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL(label), TRUE);
gtk_label_set_line_wrap_mode(GTK_LABEL(label), PANGO_WRAP_WORD_CHAR);
gtk_label_set_max_width_chars(GTK_LABEL(label), 60);
gtk_misc_set_alignment(GTK_MISC(label), 0.0, 0.0);
gtk_widget_show(label);
g_free(text);
vbox = gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog));
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
priv->queries = g_slist_prepend(priv->queries, query);
gtk_window_present(GTK_WINDOW(query->dialog));
}
}
else
{
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_cancel(connection, error);
g_error_free(error);
}
if(table != NULL) g_hash_table_unref(table);
g_free(hostname);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-295
Summary: libinfinity before 0.6.6-1 does not validate expired SSL certificates, which allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix expired certificate validation (gobby #61) | High | 168,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS and (2) SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY packet handlers in package_cb.c in libssh before 0.6.5 do not properly validate state, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted SSH packet.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,323 |
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