instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DWORD SetProcessIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
const wchar_t* integrity_level_str = GetIntegrityLevelString(integrity_level);
if (!integrity_level_str) {
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
std::wstring ace_access = SDDL_NO_READ_UP;
ace_access += SDDL_NO_WRITE_UP;
DWORD error = SetObjectIntegrityLabel(::GetCurrentProcess(), SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,
ace_access.c_str(),
integrity_level_str);
if (ERROR_SUCCESS != error)
return error;
HANDLE token_handle;
if (!::OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT,
&token_handle))
return ::GetLastError();
base::win::ScopedHandle token(token_handle);
return SetTokenIntegrityLevel(token.Get(), integrity_level);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging an improper cast, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347. | High | 170,101 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mldv2_query_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int mrc;
int mrt, qqi;
u_int nsrcs;
register u_int i;
/* Minimum len is 28 */
if (len < 28) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
mrc = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
if (mrc < 32768) {
mrt = mrc;
} else {
mrt = ((mrc & 0x0fff) | 0x1000) << (((mrc & 0x7000) >> 12) + 3);
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [max resp delay=%d]", mrt));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[25]);
if (bp[24] & 0x08) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," sflag"));
}
if (bp[24] & 0x07) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," robustness=%d", bp[24] & 0x07));
}
if (bp[25] < 128) {
qqi = bp[25];
} else {
qqi = ((bp[25] & 0x0f) | 0x10) << (((bp[25] & 0x70) >> 4) + 3);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," qqi=%d", qqi));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[26], 2);
nsrcs = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[26]);
if (nsrcs > 0) {
if (len < 28 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources]"));
else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (i = 0; i < nsrcs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test. | High | 169,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: UriSuite() {
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testDistinction)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpFour)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixPass)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixFail)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUri)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort22_Bug1948038)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_12)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort5)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort6)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostRegname)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFuture)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostEmpty)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents_Bug20070701)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEscaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUnescaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testTrailingSlash)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testAddBase)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString_Bug1950126)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntax)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeCrash_Bug20080224)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFilenameUriConversion)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_FreeUriMembers_Bug20080116)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_Report2418192)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testPervertedQueryString);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryStringEndingInEqualSign_NonBug32);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryList)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryListPair)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryDissection_Bug3590761)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFreeCrash_Bug20080827)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testParseInvalid_Bug16)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEquals)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testHostTextTermination_Issue15)
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in uriparser before 0.9.0. UriQuery.c allows an out-of-bounds write via a uriComposeQuery* or uriComposeQueryEx* function because the '&' character is mishandled in certain contexts.
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team | High | 168,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _WM_ParseNewHmi(uint8_t *hmi_data, uint32_t hmi_size) {
uint32_t hmi_tmp = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_base = hmi_data;
uint16_t hmi_bpm = 0;
uint16_t hmi_division = 0;
uint32_t *hmi_track_offset = NULL;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t j = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_addr = NULL;
uint32_t *hmi_track_header_length = NULL;
struct _mdi *hmi_mdi = NULL;
uint32_t tempo_f = 5000000.0;
uint32_t *hmi_track_end = NULL;
uint8_t hmi_tracks_ended = 0;
uint8_t *hmi_running_event = NULL;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
uint32_t *hmi_delta = NULL;
uint32_t smallest_delta = 0;
uint32_t subtract_delta = 0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0;
float sample_remainder = 0;
float samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
struct _note {
uint32_t length;
uint8_t channel;
} *note;
UNUSED(hmi_size);
if (memcmp(hmi_data, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
hmi_bpm = hmi_data[212];
hmi_division = 60;
hmi_track_cnt = hmi_data[228];
hmi_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(hmi_mdi, hmi_division);
if ((_WM_MixerOptions & WM_MO_ROUNDTEMPO)) {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmi_bpm) + 0.5f;
} else {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmi_bpm);
}
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(hmi_division, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(hmi_mdi, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
hmi_track_offset = (uint32_t *)malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_track_header_length = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_track_end = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_delta = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmi_track_cnt);
note = malloc(sizeof(struct _note) * 128 * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_running_event = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * 128 * hmi_track_cnt);
hmi_data += 370;
smallest_delta = 0xffffffff;
if (hmi_size < (370 + (hmi_track_cnt * 17))) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, "file too short", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_track_offset[0] = *hmi_data; // To keep Xcode happy
for (i = 0; i < hmi_track_cnt; i++) {
hmi_track_offset[i] = *hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 8);
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 16);
hmi_track_offset[i] += (*hmi_data++ << 24);
if (hmi_size < (hmi_track_offset[i] + 0x5a + 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, "file too short", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_addr = hmi_base + hmi_track_offset[i];
if (memcmp(hmi_addr, "HMI-MIDITRACK", 13)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMI, NULL, 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_track_header_length[i] = hmi_addr[0x57];
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x58] << 8);
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x59] << 16);
hmi_track_header_length[i] += (hmi_addr[0x5a] << 24);
hmi_addr += hmi_track_header_length[i];
hmi_track_offset[i] += hmi_track_header_length[i];
hmi_delta[i] = 0;
if (*hmi_addr > 0x7f) {
do {
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) + (*hmi_addr & 0x7f);
hmi_addr++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_addr > 0x7f);
}
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) + (*hmi_addr & 0x7f);
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
hmi_addr++;
if (hmi_delta[i] < smallest_delta) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
hmi_track_end[i] = 0;
hmi_running_event[i] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
note[hmi_tmp].channel = 0;
}
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f= (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmi_mdi->events[hmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
while (hmi_tracks_ended < hmi_track_cnt) {
smallest_delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < hmi_track_cnt; i++) {
if (hmi_track_end[i]) continue;
for (j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
note[hmi_tmp].length -= subtract_delta;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > note[hmi_tmp].length)) {
smallest_delta = note[hmi_tmp].length;
}
} else {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
}
}
}
if (hmi_delta[i]) {
hmi_delta[i] -= subtract_delta;
if (hmi_delta[i]) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > hmi_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
continue;
}
}
do {
hmi_data = hmi_base + hmi_track_offset[i];
hmi_delta[i] = 0;
if (hmi_data[0] == 0xfe) {
if (hmi_data[1] == 0x10) {
hmi_tmp = (hmi_data[4] + 5);
hmi_data += hmi_tmp;
hmi_track_offset[i] += hmi_tmp;
} else if (hmi_data[1] == 0x15) {
hmi_data += 4;
hmi_track_offset[i] += 4;
}
hmi_data += 4;
hmi_track_offset[i] += 4;
} else {
if ((setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(hmi_mdi,hmi_data,hmi_running_event[i])) == 0) {
goto _hmi_end;
}
if ((hmi_data[0] == 0xff) && (hmi_data[1] == 0x2f) && (hmi_data[2] == 0x00)) {
hmi_track_end[i] = 1;
hmi_tracks_ended++;
for(j = 0; j < 128; j++) {
hmi_tmp = (128 * i) + j;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
}
}
goto _hmi_next_track;
}
if ((*hmi_data == 0xF0) || (*hmi_data == 0xF7)) {
hmi_running_event[i] = 0;
} else if (*hmi_data < 0xF0) {
if (*hmi_data >= 0x80) {
hmi_running_event[i] = *hmi_data;
}
}
if ((hmi_running_event[i] & 0xf0) == 0x90) {
if (*hmi_data > 127) {
hmi_tmp = hmi_data[1];
} else {
hmi_tmp = *hmi_data;
}
hmi_tmp += (i * 128);
note[hmi_tmp].channel = hmi_running_event[i] & 0xf;
hmi_data += setup_ret;
hmi_track_offset[i] += setup_ret;
note[hmi_tmp].length = 0;
if (*hmi_data > 0x7f) {
do {
note[hmi_tmp].length = (note[hmi_tmp].length << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_data > 0x7F);
}
note[hmi_tmp].length = (note[hmi_tmp].length << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
if (note[hmi_tmp].length) {
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > note[hmi_tmp].length)) {
smallest_delta = note[hmi_tmp].length;
}
} else {
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(hmi_mdi, note[hmi_tmp].channel, j, 0);
}
} else {
hmi_data += setup_ret;
hmi_track_offset[i] += setup_ret;
}
}
if (*hmi_data > 0x7f) {
do {
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (*hmi_data > 0x7F);
}
hmi_delta[i] = (hmi_delta[i] << 7) | (*hmi_data & 0x7F);
hmi_data++;
hmi_track_offset[i]++;
} while (!hmi_delta[i]);
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > hmi_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = hmi_delta[i];
}
_hmi_next_track:
hmi_tmp = 0;
UNUSED(hmi_tmp);
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f= (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmi_mdi->events[hmi_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmi_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
}
if ((hmi_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _hmi_end;
}
hmi_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
hmi_mdi->current_event = &hmi_mdi->events[0];
hmi_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
hmi_mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(hmi_mdi);
_hmi_end:
free(hmi_track_offset);
free(hmi_track_header_length);
free(hmi_track_end);
free(hmi_delta);
free(note);
free(hmi_running_event);
if (hmi_mdi->reverb) return (hmi_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(hmi_mdi);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.) | Medium | 168,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void InputHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (frame_host == host_)
return;
ClearInputState();
if (host_) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->RemoveInputEventObserver(this);
if (ignore_input_events_)
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetIgnoreInputEvents(false);
}
host_ = frame_host;
if (host_) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->AddInputEventObserver(this);
if (ignore_input_events_)
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetIgnoreInputEvents(true);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length))))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 58.0.3029.83 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226} | Medium | 172,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void usage(char *progname) {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
progname);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not limit process-memory usage, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28615448.
Commit Message: limit mediaserver memory
Limit mediaserver using rlimit, to prevent it from bringing down the system
via the low memory killer.
Default max is 65% of total RAM, but can be customized via system property.
Bug: 28471206
Bug: 28615448
Change-Id: Ic84137435d1ef0a6883e9789a4b4f399e4283f05
| High | 173,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
int datagram_reply)
{
krb5_context context = r->context;
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
AS_REP rep;
KDCOptions f;
krb5_enctype setype;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
Key *skey;
int found_pa = 0;
int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
METHOD_DATA error_method;
const PA_DATA *pa;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
error_method.len = 0;
error_method.val = NULL;
/*
* Look for FAST armor and unwrap
*/
ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
goto out;
}
b = &req->req_body;
f = b->kdc_options;
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->sname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
} else{
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&r->server_princ,
*(b->sname),
b->realm);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->server_princ, &r->server_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
} else {
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&r->client_princ,
*(b->cname),
b->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client_princ, &r->client_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
r->client_name, from, r->server_name);
/*
*
*/
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
if (!_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
} else if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
"anonymous client name: %s", r->client_name);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
*
*/
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
&r->clientdb, &r->client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->client_name);
goto out;
} else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, r->client->entry.principal,
&fixed_client_name);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
r->client_name, fixed_client_name);
free(fixed_client_name);
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
&error_method,
r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
NULL,
r->server_princ,
NULL,
&r->client->entry.principal->realm,
NULL, NULL,
reply);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->client_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, r->server_princ,
HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
NULL, NULL, &r->server);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->server_name);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->server_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
* Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
* supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
* the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
*
* The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
* to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
* enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
* decrypt.
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, r->server_princ) ?
config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &r->sessionetype,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
"to use for the session key",
r->client_name, from);
goto out;
}
/*
* Pre-auth processing
*/
if(req->padata){
unsigned int n;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
/* Check if preauth matching */
for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
continue;
if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
continue;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->client_name);
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
if (pa) {
ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
pat[n].name, r->client_name);
found_pa = 1;
r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
}
}
}
if (found_pa == 0) {
Key *ckey = NULL;
size_t n;
for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
continue;
ret = krb5_padata_add(context, &error_method,
pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
r->client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* RFC4120 requires:
* - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
*
* Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
* the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
* that instead.
*/
if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
&error_method, ckey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
&error_method, ckey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
* anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
*/
if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(b)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
goto out;
}
if (ckey == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
goto out;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status) {
r->clientdb->hdb_auth_status(context, r->clientdb, r->client,
HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
* with in a preauth mech.
*/
ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, r->client, r->client_name,
r->server, r->server_name,
req, &error_method);
if(ret)
goto out;
/*
* Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
* the client since the client never needs to read that data.
*/
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
r->server, r->server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
|| (_kdc_is_anon_request(b) && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
goto out;
}
/*
* Build reply
*/
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, r->client_princ)) {
Realm anon_realm=KRB5_ANON_REALM;
ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep.crealm);
} else
ret = copy_Realm(&r->client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, r->client->entry.principal);
if (ret)
goto out;
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
r->server->entry.principal);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types. */
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
#undef CNT
r->et.flags.initial = 1;
if(r->client->entry.flags.forwardable && r->server->entry.flags.forwardable)
r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
else if (f.forwardable) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if(r->client->entry.flags.proxiable && r->server->entry.flags.proxiable)
r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if(r->client->entry.flags.postdate && r->server->entry.flags.postdate)
r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad address list in requested");
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &r->et.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &r->et.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
}
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
if(r->client->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_life);
if(r->server->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_life);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
#endif
r->et.endtime = t;
if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
f.renewable = 1;
if(b->rtime == NULL){
ALLOC(b->rtime);
*b->rtime = 0;
}
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
*b->rtime = *b->till;
}
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
t = *b->rtime;
if(t == 0)
t = MAX_TIME;
if(r->client->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->client->entry.max_renew);
if(r->server->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *r->server->entry.max_renew);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
#endif
ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
*r->et.renew_till = t;
r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
}
}
if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b))
r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(r->et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
}
r->et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
*
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
*
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (r->client->entry.pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->entry.pw_end)) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
if (r->client->entry.valid_end || r->client->entry.pw_end) {
ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
if (r->client->entry.valid_end) {
if (r->client->entry.pw_end)
*r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->entry.valid_end,
*r->client->entry.pw_end);
else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.valid_end;
} else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->entry.pw_end;
} else
r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
if (r->et.starttime) {
ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
*r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
}
r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
if (r->et.renew_till) {
ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
*r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
}
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
if (ret)
goto out;
if(r->et.caddr){
ALLOC(r->ek.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
}
/*
* Check and session and reply keys
*/
if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (r->outpadata.len) {
ALLOC(rep.padata);
if (rep.padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* Add the PAC */
if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
generate_pac(r, skey);
}
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime, r->et.starttime,
r->et.endtime, r->et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
r->server,
setype,
r->client->entry.principal,
NULL,
NULL,
&r->et);
if (ret)
goto out;
log_as_req(context, config, r->reply_key.keytype, setype, b);
/*
* We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
*/
r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
/*
* Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
*/
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
if (pa) {
ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
}
/*
*
*/
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
r->armor_crypto, req->req_body.nonce,
&rep, &r->et, &r->ek, setype, r->server->entry.kvno,
&skey->key, r->client->entry.kvno,
&r->reply_key, 0, &r->e_text, reply);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Check if message too large
*/
if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(reply);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
}
out:
free_AS_REP(&rep);
/*
* In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
*/
if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(context, r,
&error_method,
r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
ret, r->e_text,
r->server_princ,
&r->client_princ->name,
&r->client_princ->realm,
NULL, NULL,
reply);
if (ret)
goto out2;
}
out2:
free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
free_KDCFastState(&r->fast);
if (error_method.len)
free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method);
if (r->outpadata.len)
free_METHOD_DATA(&r->outpadata);
if (r->client_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, r->client_princ);
r->client_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->client_name) {
free(r->client_name);
r->client_name = NULL;
}
if (r->server_princ){
krb5_free_principal(context, r->server_princ);
r->server_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->server_name) {
free(r->server_name);
r->server_name = NULL;
}
if (r->client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, r->client);
if (r->server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, r->server);
if (r->armor_crypto) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
r->armor_crypto = NULL;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In Heimdal through 7.4, remote unauthenticated attackers are able to crash the KDC by sending a crafted UDP packet containing empty data fields for client name or realm. The parser would unconditionally dereference NULL pointers in that case, leading to a segmentation fault. This is related to the _kdc_as_rep function in kdc/kerberos5.c and the der_length_visible_string function in lib/asn1/der_length.c.
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: MediaInterfaceProxy::GetMediaInterfaceFactory() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!interface_factory_ptr_)
ConnectToService();
DCHECK(interface_factory_ptr_);
return interface_factory_ptr_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 171,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,unsigned char *luma,
unsigned char *chroma1,unsigned char *chroma2,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define IsSync(sum) ((sum & 0xffffff00UL) == 0xfffffe00UL)
#define PCDGetBits(n) \
{ \
sum=(sum << n) & 0xffffffff; \
bits-=n; \
while (bits <= 24) \
{ \
if (p >= (buffer+0x800)) \
{ \
count=ReadBlob(image,0x800,buffer); \
p=buffer; \
} \
sum|=((unsigned int) (*p) << (24-bits)); \
bits+=8; \
p++; \
} \
}
typedef struct PCDTable
{
unsigned int
length,
sequence;
MagickStatusType
mask;
unsigned char
key;
} PCDTable;
PCDTable
*pcd_table[3];
register ssize_t
i,
j;
register PCDTable
*r;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
bits,
length,
plane,
pcd_length[3],
row,
sum;
ssize_t
count,
quantum;
unsigned char
*buffer;
/*
Initialize Huffman tables.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(luma != (unsigned char *) NULL);
assert(chroma1 != (unsigned char *) NULL);
assert(chroma2 != (unsigned char *) NULL);
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(0x800,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
sum=0;
bits=32;
p=buffer+0x800;
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) NULL;
pcd_length[i]=0;
}
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
{
PCDGetBits(8);
length=(sum & 0xff)+1;
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*pcd_table[i]));
if (pcd_table[i] == (PCDTable *) NULL)
{
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
r=pcd_table[i];
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
PCDGetBits(8);
r->length=(unsigned int) (sum & 0xff)+1;
if (r->length > 16)
{
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
return(MagickFalse);
}
PCDGetBits(16);
r->sequence=(unsigned int) (sum & 0xffff) << 16;
PCDGetBits(8);
r->key=(unsigned char) (sum & 0xff);
r->mask=(~((1U << (32-r->length))-1));
r++;
}
pcd_length[i]=(size_t) length;
}
/*
Search for Sync byte.
*/
for (i=0; i < 1; i++)
PCDGetBits(16);
for (i=0; i < 1; i++)
PCDGetBits(16);
while ((sum & 0x00fff000UL) != 0x00fff000UL)
PCDGetBits(8);
while (IsSync(sum) == 0)
PCDGetBits(1);
/*
Recover the Huffman encoded luminance and chrominance deltas.
*/
count=0;
length=0;
plane=0;
row=0;
q=luma;
for ( ; ; )
{
if (IsSync(sum) != 0)
{
/*
Determine plane and row number.
*/
PCDGetBits(16);
row=((sum >> 9) & 0x1fff);
if (row == image->rows)
break;
PCDGetBits(8);
plane=sum >> 30;
PCDGetBits(16);
switch (plane)
{
case 0:
{
q=luma+row*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) image->columns;
break;
}
case 2:
{
q=chroma1+(row >> 1)*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1);
plane--;
break;
}
case 3:
{
q=chroma2+(row >> 1)*image->columns;
count=(ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1);
plane--;
break;
}
default:
{
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcd_table[i]);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",
image->filename);
}
}
length=pcd_length[plane];
continue;
}
/*
Decode luminance or chrominance deltas.
*/
r=pcd_table[plane];
for (i=0; ((i < (ssize_t) length) && ((sum & r->mask) != r->sequence)); i++)
r++;
if ((row > image->rows) || (r == (PCDTable *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"SkipToSyncByte","`%s'",image->filename);
while ((sum & 0x00fff000) != 0x00fff000)
PCDGetBits(8);
while (IsSync(sum) == 0)
PCDGetBits(1);
continue;
}
if (r->key < 128)
quantum=(ssize_t) (*q)+r->key;
else
quantum=(ssize_t) (*q)+r->key-256;
*q=(unsigned char) ((quantum < 0) ? 0 : (quantum > 255) ? 255 : quantum);
q++;
PCDGetBits(r->length);
count--;
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
for (i=0; i < (image->columns > 1536 ? 3 : 1); i++)
pcd_table[i]=(PCDTable *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcd_table[i]);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: In ImageMagick before 7.0.8-25, some memory leaks exist in DecodeImage in coders/pcd.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1450 | Medium | 169,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetCodecId() const
{
return m_info.codecId;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void sendTouchEvent(BlackBerry::Platform::TouchEvent::Type type)
{
BlackBerry::Platform::TouchEvent event;
event.m_type = type;
event.m_points.assign(touches.begin(), touches.end());
BlackBerry::WebKit::DumpRenderTree::currentInstance()->page()->touchEvent(event);
Vector<BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint> t;
for (Vector<BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint>::iterator it = touches.begin(); it != touches.end(); ++it) {
if (it->m_state != BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased) {
it->m_state = BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary;
t.append(*it);
}
}
touches = t;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dccp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
const struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
__be16 orig_sport, orig_dport;
__be32 daddr, nexthop;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
int err;
dp->dccps_role = DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
nexthop = daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (inet->opt != NULL && inet->opt->srr) {
if (daddr == 0)
return -EINVAL;
nexthop = inet->opt->faddr;
}
orig_sport = inet->inet_sport;
orig_dport = usin->sin_port;
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, nexthop, inet->inet_saddr,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
IPPROTO_DCCP,
orig_sport, orig_dport, sk, true);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return PTR_ERR(rt);
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_BROADCAST)) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
return -ENETUNREACH;
}
if (inet->opt == NULL || !inet->opt->srr)
daddr = rt->rt_dst;
if (inet->inet_saddr == 0)
inet->inet_saddr = rt->rt_src;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin_port;
inet->inet_daddr = daddr;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (inet->opt != NULL)
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet->opt->optlen;
/*
* Socket identity is still unknown (sport may be zero).
* However we set state to DCCP_REQUESTING and not releasing socket
* lock select source port, enter ourselves into the hash tables and
* complete initialization after this.
*/
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_REQUESTING);
err = inet_hash_connect(&dccp_death_row, sk);
if (err != 0)
goto failure;
rt = ip_route_newports(&fl4, rt, orig_sport, orig_dport,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
rt = NULL;
goto failure;
}
/* OK, now commit destination to socket. */
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
dp->dccps_iss = secure_dccp_sequence_number(inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_daddr,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
inet->inet_id = dp->dccps_iss ^ jiffies;
err = dccp_connect(sk);
rt = NULL;
if (err != 0)
goto failure;
out:
return err;
failure:
/*
* This unhashes the socket and releases the local port, if necessary.
*/
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
ip_rt_put(rt);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
inet->inet_dport = 0;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ProcXFixesCopyRegion(ClientPtr client)
{
RegionPtr pSource, pDestination;
REQUEST(xXFixesCopyRegionReq);
VERIFY_REGION(pSource, stuff->source, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_REGION(pDestination, stuff->destination, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!RegionCopy(pDestination, pSource))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | High | 165,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Browser::CanCloseContentsAt(int index) {
if (!CanCloseTab())
return false;
if (tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->count() > 1)
return true;
return CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows user-assisted remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via vectors related to *unusual user interaction.*
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output, ttile_t tile){
uint16 edge=0;
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
uint16 i=0;
ttile_t tilecount=0;
/* tsize_t tilesize=0; */
ttile_t septilecount=0;
tsize_t septilesize=0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint32 xuint32=0;
#endif
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
edge |= t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile);
if( (t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW) && ((edge == 0)
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT) || defined(OJPEG_SUPPORT)
|| (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG)
#endif
)
){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP){
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawTile(input, tile, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
TIFFReverseBits(buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG){
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with "
"bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer=(unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
if(edge!=0){
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[7]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[8]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength ) & 0xff;
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile)){
buffer[9]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[10]=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth ) & 0xff;
}
}
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawTile(input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG){
unsigned char table_end[2];
uint32 count = 0;
buffer= (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if (count >= 4) {
int retTIFFReadRawTile;
/* Ignore EOI marker of JpegTables */
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count - 2);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
/* Store last 2 bytes of the JpegTables */
table_end[0] = buffer[bufferoffset-2];
table_end[1] = buffer[bufferoffset-1];
xuint32 = bufferoffset;
bufferoffset -= 2;
retTIFFReadRawTile= TIFFReadRawTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
if( retTIFFReadRawTile < 0 )
{
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset += retTIFFReadRawTile;
/* Overwrite SOI marker of image scan with previously */
/* saved end of JpegTables */
buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0];
buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1];
}
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample == T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
septilesize=TIFFTileSize(input);
septilecount=TIFFNumberOfTiles(input);
/* tilesize=septilesize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel; */
tilecount=septilecount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedTile(input,
tile + i*tilecount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
septilesize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile + i*tilecount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
}
if(buffer==NULL){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory "
"for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
read = TIFFReadEncodedTile(
input,
tile,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding tile %u of %s",
tile,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for YCbCr to RGB in tile for %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth
*t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
}
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) != 0){
t2p_tile_collapse_left(
buffer,
TIFFTileRowSize(input),
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
}
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(t2p_tile_is_right_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilewidth);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilewidth);
}
if(t2p_tile_is_bottom_edge(t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page], tile) == 0){
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_tilelength);
} else {
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
TIFFSetField(
output,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
t2p->tiff_tiles[t2p->pdf_page].tiles_edgetilelength);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if (t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver)!=0) {
if (hor != 0 && ver != 0) {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0); /* JPEGTABLESMODE_NONE */
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t) 0, buffer,
TIFFStripSize(output));
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer = NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == -1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded tile to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile function in tools/tiff2pdf.c in LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image.
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640 | Medium | 168,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int module_load(
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
YR_OBJECT* module_object,
void* module_data,
size_t module_data_size)
{
set_integer(1, module_object, "constants.one");
set_integer(2, module_object, "constants.two");
set_string("foo", module_object, "constants.foo");
set_string("", module_object, "constants.empty");
set_integer(1, module_object, "struct_array[1].i");
set_integer(0, module_object, "integer_array[%i]", 0);
set_integer(1, module_object, "integer_array[%i]", 1);
set_integer(2, module_object, "integer_array[%i]", 2);
set_string("foo", module_object, "string_array[%i]", 0);
set_string("bar", module_object, "string_array[%i]", 1);
set_string("baz", module_object, "string_array[%i]", 2);
set_sized_string("foo\0bar", 7, module_object, "string_array[%i]", 3);
set_string("foo", module_object, "string_dict[%s]", "foo");
set_string("bar", module_object, "string_dict[\"bar\"]");
set_string("foo", module_object, "struct_dict[%s].s", "foo");
set_integer(1, module_object, "struct_dict[%s].i", "foo");
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in the yr_object_array_set_item() function in object.c in YARA 3.x allows a denial-of-service attack by scanning a crafted .NET file.
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary. | Medium | 168,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertCache(const CacheRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO Caches (cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard,"
" update_time, cache_size)"
" VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->cache_id);
statement.BindInt64(1, record->group_id);
statement.BindBool(2, record->online_wildcard);
statement.BindInt64(3, record->update_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(4, record->cache_size);
return statement.Run();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 172,979 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::AuthorizeService(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& uuid,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(CANCELLED);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int raw_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
err = ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
goto out;
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin->sin_port = 0;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
if (err)
return err;
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void Con_Dump_f( void ) {
int l, x, i;
short *line;
fileHandle_t f;
int bufferlen;
char *buffer;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: condump <filename>\n" );
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".txt" );
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf ("ERROR: couldn't open %s.\n", filename);
return;
}
Com_Printf ("Dumped console text to %s.\n", filename );
for ( l = con.current - con.totallines + 1 ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++ )
if ( ( line[x] & 0xff ) != ' ' ) {
break;
}
if ( x != con.linewidth ) {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 3 * sizeof ( char );
#else
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 2 * sizeof ( char );
#endif
buffer = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( bufferlen );
buffer[bufferlen-1] = 0;
for ( ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
buffer[i] = line[i] & 0xff;
for ( x = con.linewidth - 1 ; x >= 0 ; x-- )
{
if ( buffer[x] == ' ' ) {
buffer[x] = 0;
} else {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\r\n");
#else
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\n");
#endif
FS_Write( buffer, strlen( buffer ), f );
}
Hunk_FreeTempMemory( buffer );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks | High | 170,079 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::releaseEncoder() {
if (!mStarted) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
PVCleanUpVideoEncoder(mHandle);
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData = NULL;
delete mEncParams;
mEncParams = NULL;
delete mHandle;
mHandle = NULL;
mStarted = false;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process. This issue is rated as High because it could be used to gain local access to elevated capabilities, which are not normally accessible to a third-party application. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-34749392.
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
| High | 174,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int simple_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return 0;
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The simple_set_acl function in fs/posix_acl.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.6 preserves the setgid bit during a setxattr call involving a tmpfs filesystem, which allows local users to gain group privileges by leveraging the existence of a setgid program with restrictions on execute permissions. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-7097.
Commit Message: tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Low | 168,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanRunOnPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
const URLPatternSet& permitted_url_patterns,
std::string* error) const {
if (g_policy_delegate &&
!g_policy_delegate->CanExecuteScriptOnPage(
extension, document_url, top_frame_url, tab_id, process_id, error)) {
return false;
}
bool can_execute_everywhere = CanExecuteScriptEverywhere(extension);
if (!can_execute_everywhere &&
!ExtensionsClient::Get()->IsScriptableURL(document_url, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kExtensionsOnChromeURLs)) {
if (document_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessChromeUrl;
return false;
}
}
if (top_frame_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) &&
top_frame_url.GetOrigin() !=
Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension->id()).GetOrigin() &&
!can_execute_everywhere) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kCannotAccessExtensionUrl;
return false;
}
if (HasTabSpecificPermissionToExecuteScript(tab_id, top_frame_url))
return true;
bool can_access = permitted_url_patterns.MatchesURL(document_url);
if (!can_access && error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(manifest_errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return can_access;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Debugger extension API in browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94 does not validate a tab's URL before an attach operation, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access limitations via an extension that uses a restricted URL, as demonstrated by a chrome:// URL.
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
int value;
UINT error;
UINT32 ChannelId;
wStream* data_out;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "process_close_request: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32"",
Sp,
cbChId, ChannelId);
if ((error = dvcman_close_channel(drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_close_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
return error;
}
data_out = Stream_New(NULL, 4);
if (!data_out)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
value = (CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU << 4) | (cbChId & 0x03);
Stream_Write_UINT8(data_out, value);
drdynvc_write_variable_uint(data_out, ChannelId);
error = drdynvc_send(drdynvc, data_out);
if (error)
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "VirtualChannelWriteEx failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(error), error);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: FreeRDP FreeRDP 2.0.0-rc3 released version before commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3 contains a Other/Unknown vulnerability in channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c, drdynvc_process_capability_request that can result in The RDP server can read the client's memory.. This attack appear to be exploitable via RDPClient must connect the rdp server with echo option. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3.
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks | High | 168,935 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDDSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status,
cubemap = MagickFalse,
volume = MagickFalse,
matte;
CompressionType
compression;
DDSInfo
dds_info;
DDSDecoder
*decoder;
size_t
n,
num_images;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (ReadDDSInfo(image, &dds_info) != MagickTrue) {
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP)
cubemap = MagickTrue;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_VOLUME && dds_info.depth > 0)
volume = MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image, 128, SEEK_SET);
/*
Determine pixel format
*/
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_RGB)
{
compression = NoCompression;
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_ALPHAPIXELS)
{
matte = MagickTrue;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGBA;
}
else
{
matte = MagickTrue;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGB;
}
}
else if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_LUMINANCE)
{
compression = NoCompression;
if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_ALPHAPIXELS)
{
/* Not sure how to handle this */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
else
{
matte = MagickFalse;
decoder = ReadUncompressedRGB;
}
}
else if (dds_info.pixelformat.flags & DDPF_FOURCC)
{
switch (dds_info.pixelformat.fourcc)
{
case FOURCC_DXT1:
{
matte = MagickFalse;
compression = DXT1Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT1;
break;
}
case FOURCC_DXT3:
{
matte = MagickTrue;
compression = DXT3Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT3;
break;
}
case FOURCC_DXT5:
{
matte = MagickTrue;
compression = DXT5Compression;
decoder = ReadDXT5;
break;
}
default:
{
/* Unknown FOURCC */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
}
}
else
{
/* Neither compressed nor uncompressed... thus unsupported */
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
num_images = 1;
if (cubemap)
{
/*
Determine number of faces defined in the cubemap
*/
num_images = 0;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEX) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEX) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEY) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEY) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_POSITIVEZ) num_images++;
if (dds_info.ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP_NEGATIVEZ) num_images++;
}
if (volume)
num_images = dds_info.depth;
for (n = 0; n < num_images; n++)
{
if (n != 0)
{
/* Start a new image */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->matte = matte;
image->compression = compression;
image->columns = dds_info.width;
image->rows = dds_info.height;
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
image->depth = 8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((decoder)(image, &dds_info, exception) != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added check for bogus num_images value. | Medium | 170,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *url, const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%s)", url);
status_t err = BAD_VALUE;
if (url != NULL) {
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(httpService, url, headers))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
| High | 173,537 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: size_t CancelableFileOperation(Function operation,
HANDLE file,
BufferType* buffer,
size_t length,
WaitableEvent* io_event,
WaitableEvent* cancel_event,
CancelableSyncSocket* socket,
DWORD timeout_in_ms) {
ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(buffer[0]) == sizeof(char), incorrect_buffer_type);
DCHECK_GT(length, 0u);
DCHECK_LE(length, kMaxMessageLength);
DCHECK_NE(file, SyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
TimeTicks current_time, finish_time;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE) {
current_time = TimeTicks::Now();
finish_time =
current_time + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timeout_in_ms);
}
size_t count = 0;
do {
OVERLAPPED ol = { 0 };
ol.hEvent = io_event->handle();
const DWORD chunk = GetNextChunkSize(count, length);
DWORD len = 0;
const BOOL operation_ok = operation(
file, static_cast<BufferType*>(buffer) + count, chunk, &len, &ol);
if (!operation_ok) {
if (::GetLastError() == ERROR_IO_PENDING) {
HANDLE events[] = { io_event->handle(), cancel_event->handle() };
const int wait_result = WaitForMultipleObjects(
ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(events), events, FALSE,
timeout_in_ms == INFINITE ?
timeout_in_ms :
static_cast<DWORD>(
(finish_time - current_time).InMilliseconds()));
if (wait_result != WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0) {
CancelIo(file);
}
if (!GetOverlappedResult(file, &ol, &len, TRUE))
len = 0;
if (wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 1) {
DVLOG(1) << "Shutdown was signaled. Closing socket.";
socket->Close();
return count;
}
DCHECK(wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0 || wait_result == WAIT_TIMEOUT);
} else {
break;
}
}
count += len;
if (len != chunk)
break;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE && count < length)
current_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
} while (count < length &&
(timeout_in_ms == INFINITE || current_time < finish_time));
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The get_dht function in jdmarker.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.3.0, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48 and other products, does not set all elements of a certain Huffman value array during the reading of segments that follow Define Huffman Table (DHT) JPEG markers, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from uninitialized memory locations via a crafted JPEG image.
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
[email protected]
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835} | Medium | 171,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cosine_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr,
Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int pkt_len;
char line[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1)
return FALSE;
if (file_gets(line, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Parse the header */
pkt_len = parse_cosine_rec_hdr(phdr, line, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
/* Convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
return parse_cosine_hex_dump(wth->random_fh, phdr, pkt_len, buf, err,
err_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: wiretap/cosine.c in the CoSine file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: Ia70f33b71ff28451190fcf144c333fd1362646b2
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15172
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.16 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a long string.
Commit Message: Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit. | Medium | 166,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) && (image->depth == 1)
? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted PSD file, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/348 | Medium | 170,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: init_global_keywords(bool global_active)
{
/* global definitions mapping */
install_keyword_root("linkbeat_use_polling", use_polling_handler, global_active);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
install_keyword_root("net_namespace", &net_namespace_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("namespace_with_ipsets", &namespace_ipsets_handler, global_active);
#endif
install_keyword_root("use_pid_dir", &use_pid_dir_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("instance", &instance_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("child_wait_time", &child_wait_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("global_defs", NULL, global_active);
install_keyword("router_id", &routerid_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email_from", &emailfrom_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_server", &smtpserver_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_helo_name", &smtphelo_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_connect_timeout", &smtpto_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email", &email_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_alert", &smtp_alert_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_vrrp", &smtp_alert_vrrp_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_checker", &smtp_alert_checker_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("dynamic_interfaces", &dynamic_interfaces_handler);
install_keyword("no_email_faults", &no_email_faults_handler);
install_keyword("default_interface", &default_interface_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_timeouts", &lvs_timeouts);
install_keyword("lvs_flush", &lvs_flush_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("lvs_sync_daemon", &lvs_syncd_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group4", &vrrp_mcast_group4_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group6", &vrrp_mcast_group6_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_delay", &vrrp_garp_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_repeat", &vrrp_garp_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh", &vrrp_garp_refresh_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh_repeat", &vrrp_garp_refresh_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_repeat", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_interval", &vrrp_garp_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_gna_interval", &vrrp_gna_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert", &vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert", &vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_version", &vrrp_version_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_iptables", &vrrp_iptables_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_LIBIPSET_
install_keyword("vrrp_ipsets", &vrrp_ipsets_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("vrrp_check_unicast_src", &vrrp_check_unicast_src_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_skip_check_adv_addr", &vrrp_check_adv_addr_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_strict", &vrrp_strict_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_priority", &vrrp_prio_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_no_swap", &vrrp_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("vrrp_rt_priority", &vrrp_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("vrrp_rlimit_rtime", &vrrp_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
install_keyword("notify_fifo", &global_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("notify_fifo_script", &global_notify_fifo_script);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo", &vrrp_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo_script", &vrrp_notify_fifo_script);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo", &lvs_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo_script", &lvs_notify_fifo_script);
install_keyword("checker_priority", &checker_prio_handler);
install_keyword("checker_no_swap", &checker_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("checker_rt_priority", &checker_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("checker_rlimit_rtime", &checker_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
install_keyword("bfd_priority", &bfd_prio_handler);
install_keyword("bfd_no_swap", &bfd_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("bfd_rt_priority", &bfd_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("bfd_rlimit_rtime", &bfd_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
install_keyword("snmp_socket", &snmp_socket_handler);
install_keyword("enable_traps", &trap_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_VRRP_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_vrrp", &snmp_vrrp_handler);
install_keyword("enable_snmp_keepalived", &snmp_vrrp_handler); /* Deprecated v2.0.0 */
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFC_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfc", &snmp_rfc_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV2_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv2", &snmp_rfcv2_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv3", &snmp_rfcv3_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_CHECKER_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_checker", &snmp_checker_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_DBUS_
install_keyword("enable_dbus", &enable_dbus_handler);
install_keyword("dbus_service_name", &dbus_service_name_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("script_user", &script_user_handler);
install_keyword("enable_script_security", &script_security_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("rs_init_notifies", &rs_init_notifies_handler);
install_keyword("no_checker_emails", &no_checker_emails_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_policy", &vrrp_rx_bufs_policy_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier", &vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier_handler);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: shared_memory_handle(const gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle& handle) {
if (handle.type != gfx::SHARED_MEMORY_BUFFER &&
handle.type != gfx::DXGI_SHARED_HANDLE &&
handle.type != gfx::ANDROID_HARDWARE_BUFFER)
return mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle();
return mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle.handle, handle.handle.GetSize(),
false);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: updateDevice(const struct header * headers, time_t t)
{
struct device ** pp = &devlist;
struct device * p = *pp; /* = devlist; */
while(p)
{
if( p->headers[HEADER_NT].l == headers[HEADER_NT].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].l))
&& p->headers[HEADER_USN].l == headers[HEADER_USN].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].l)) )
{
/*printf("found! %d\n", (int)(t - p->t));*/
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "device updated : %.*s", headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
p->t = t;
/* update Location ! */
if(headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l > p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l)
{
struct device * tmp;
tmp = realloc(p, sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l);
if(!tmp) /* allocation error */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice() : memory allocation error");
free(p);
return 0;
}
p = tmp;
*pp = p;
}
memcpy(p->data + p->headers[0].l + p->headers[1].l,
headers[2].p, headers[2].l);
/* TODO : check p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l */
return 0;
}
pp = &p->next;
p = *pp; /* p = p->next; */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "new device discovered : %.*s",
headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
/* add */
{
char * pc;
int i;
p = malloc( sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice(): cannot allocate memory");
return -1;
}
p->next = devlist;
p->t = t;
pc = p->data;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
p->headers[i].p = pc;
p->headers[i].l = headers[i].l;
memcpy(pc, headers[i].p, headers[i].l);
pc += headers[i].l;
}
devlist = p;
sendNotifications(NOTIF_NEW, p, NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The updateDevice function in minissdpd.c in MiniUPnP MiniSSDPd 1.4 and 1.5 allows a remote attacker to crash the process due to a Use After Free vulnerability.
Commit Message: updateDevice() remove element from the list when realloc fails | Medium | 169,669 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_create(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
codec_t *ps_codec;
ps_create_op = (ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_static_bufs(&ps_codec_obj, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != ps_codec_obj))
{
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ret = ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
TRACE_INIT(NULL);
STATS_INIT();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: A vulnerability in the Android media framework (libhevc) related to handling ps_codec_obj memory allocation failures. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-68299873.
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
| High | 174,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <
0)
return -1;
}
}
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Anti-Replay feature in the DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 mishandles early use of a new epoch number in conjunction with a large sequence number, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (false-positive packet drops) via spoofed DTLS records, related to rec_layer_d1.c and ssl3_record.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void* lookupOpenGLFunctionAddress(const char* functionName, bool* success = 0)
{
if (success && !*success)
return 0;
void* target = getProcAddress(functionName);
if (target)
return target;
String fullFunctionName(functionName);
fullFunctionName.append("ARB");
target = getProcAddress(fullFunctionName.utf8().data());
if (target)
return target;
fullFunctionName = functionName;
fullFunctionName.append("EXT");
target = getProcAddress(fullFunctionName.utf8().data());
#if defined(GL_ES_VERSION_2_0)
fullFunctionName = functionName;
fullFunctionName.append("ANGLE");
target = getProcAddress(fullFunctionName.utf8().data());
fullFunctionName = functionName;
fullFunctionName.append("APPLE");
target = getProcAddress(fullFunctionName.utf8().data());
#endif
if (!target && success)
*success = false;
return target;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: OpenGLShims: fix check for ANGLE GLES2 extensions
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111656
Patch by Sergio Correia <[email protected]> on 2013-03-07
Reviewed by Simon Hausmann.
The check for ANGLE GLES2 extensions is currently being overriden
with checks for APPLE extensions in lookupOpenGLFunctionAddress().
No new tests. No user visible behavior changed.
* platform/graphics/OpenGLShims.cpp:
(WebCore::lookupOpenGLFunctionAddress):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145079 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
handle.parent_client_id = context_->GetChannelID();
handle.parent_context_id = context_->GetContextID();
handle.parent_texture_id[0] = context_->createTexture();
handle.parent_texture_id[1] = context_->createTexture();
handle.sync_point = context_->insertSyncPoint();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TransformPaintPropertyNode* TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root() {
DEFINE_STATIC_REF(
TransformPaintPropertyNode, root,
base::AdoptRef(new TransformPaintPropertyNode(
nullptr,
State{TransformationMatrix(), FloatPoint3D(), false,
BackfaceVisibility::kVisible, 0, CompositingReason::kNone,
CompositorElementId(), ScrollPaintPropertyNode::Root()})));
return root;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
size_t minimum)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
/* Copy mode. */
/*
* Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
* Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
* available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
* decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
*/
*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated 7-Zip file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail >
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > size)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed = bytes_avail;
} else if (zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer == NULL) {
/* Decompression has failed. */
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
/* Packed mode. */
if (minimum > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining) {
/*
* If remaining uncompressed data size is less than
* the minimum size, fill the buffer up to the
* minimum size.
*/
if (extract_pack_stream(a, minimum) < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (size > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
else
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
*buff = zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer;
zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer += bytes_avail;
}
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining -= bytes_avail;
return (bytes_avail);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive version commit bf9aec176c6748f0ee7a678c5f9f9555b9a757c1 onwards (release v3.0.2 onwards) contains a CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in 7zip decompression, archive_read_support_format_7zip.c, header_bytes() that can result in a crash (denial of service). This attack appears to be exploitable via the victim opening a specially crafted 7zip file.
Commit Message: 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym. | Medium | 169,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,611 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionsContainsFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Contains::Params> params(Contains::Params::Create(*args_));
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions, &error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
results_ = Contains::Results::Create(
GetExtension()->GetActivePermissions()->Contains(*permissions));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The extension functionality in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not verify that use of the permissions API is consistent with file permissions, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Resource::~Resource() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cliprdr_process(STREAM s)
{
uint16 type, status;
uint32 length, format;
uint8 *data;
in_uint16_le(s, type);
in_uint16_le(s, status);
in_uint32_le(s, length);
data = s->p;
logger(Clipboard, Debug, "cliprdr_process(), type=%d, status=%d, length=%d", type, status,
length);
if (status == CLIPRDR_ERROR)
{
switch (type)
{
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK:
/* FIXME: We seem to get this when we send an announce while the server is
still processing a paste. Try sending another announce. */
cliprdr_send_native_format_announce(last_formats,
last_formats_length);
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE:
ui_clip_request_failed();
break;
default:
logger(Clipboard, Warning,
"cliprdr_process(), unhandled error (type=%d)", type);
}
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case CLIPRDR_CONNECT:
ui_clip_sync();
break;
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ANNOUNCE:
ui_clip_format_announce(data, length);
cliprdr_send_packet(CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK, CLIPRDR_RESPONSE, NULL, 0);
return;
case CLIPRDR_FORMAT_ACK:
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_REQUEST:
in_uint32_le(s, format);
ui_clip_request_data(format);
break;
case CLIPRDR_DATA_RESPONSE:
ui_clip_handle_data(data, length);
break;
case 7: /* TODO: W2K3 SP1 sends this on connect with a value of 1 */
break;
default:
logger(Clipboard, Warning, "cliprdr_process(), unhandled packet type %d",
type);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 169,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnVSync(device::mojom::blink::VRPosePtr pose,
mojo::common::mojom::blink::TimeDeltaPtr time,
int16_t frame_id,
device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status error) {
v_sync_connection_failed_ = false;
switch (error) {
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::SUCCESS:
break;
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::CLOSING:
return;
}
pending_vsync_ = false;
WTF::TimeDelta time_delta =
WTF::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(time->microseconds);
if (timebase_ < 0) {
timebase_ = WTF::MonotonicallyIncreasingTime() - time_delta.InSecondsF();
}
frame_pose_ = std::move(pose);
vr_frame_id_ = frame_id;
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timebase_ + time_delta.InSecondsF()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167} | High | 171,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void btm_sec_pin_code_request (UINT8 *p_bda)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
tBTM_CB *p_cb = &btm_cb;
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
UINT8 default_pin_code_len = 4;
PIN_CODE default_pin_code = {0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30};
#endif
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request() State: %s, BDA:%04x%08x",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state),
(p_bda[0]<<8)+p_bda[1], (p_bda[2]<<24)+(p_bda[3]<<16)+(p_bda[4]<<8)+p_bda[5] );
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
{
if ( (memcmp (p_bda, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) &&
(btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE) )
{
/* fake this out - porshe carkit issue - */
if(! btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved)
{
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
return;
}
else
{
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved, p_cb->pin_code);
return;
}
}
else if ((btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ)
|| memcmp (p_bda, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("btm_sec_pin_code_request() rejected - state: %s",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state));
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
/* reply pin code again due to counter in_rand when local initiates pairing */
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request from remote dev. for local initiated pairing");
if(! btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, default_pin_code_len, default_pin_code);
}
else
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved, p_cb->pin_code);
}
#else
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
#endif
return;
}
}
p_dev_rec = btm_find_or_alloc_dev (p_bda);
/* received PIN code request. must be non-sm4 */
p_dev_rec->sm4 = BTM_SM4_KNOWN;
if (btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
{
memcpy (btm_cb.pairing_bda, p_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
btm_cb.pairing_flags = BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PEER_STARTED_DD;
/* Make sure we reset the trusted mask to help against attacks */
BTM_SEC_CLR_TRUSTED_DEVICE(p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
}
if (!p_cb->pairing_disabled && (p_cb->cfg.pin_type == HCI_PIN_TYPE_FIXED))
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request fixed pin replying");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, p_cb->cfg.pin_code_len, p_cb->cfg.pin_code);
return;
}
/* Use the connecting device's CoD for the connection */
if ( (!memcmp (p_bda, p_cb->connecting_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN))
&& (p_cb->connecting_dc[0] || p_cb->connecting_dc[1] || p_cb->connecting_dc[2]) )
memcpy (p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_cb->connecting_dc, DEV_CLASS_LEN);
/* We could have started connection after asking user for the PIN code */
if (btm_cb.pin_code_len != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request bonding sending reply");
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len, p_cb->pin_code);
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = btm_cb.pin_code_len;
#endif
/* Mark that we forwarded received from the user PIN code */
btm_cb.pin_code_len = 0;
/* We can change mode back right away, that other connection being established */
/* is not forced to be secure - found a FW issue, so we can not do this
btm_restore_mode(); */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
}
/* If pairing disabled OR (no PIN callback and not bonding) */
/* OR we could not allocate entry in the database reject pairing request */
else if (p_cb->pairing_disabled
|| (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback == NULL)
/* OR Microsoft keyboard can for some reason try to establish connection */
/* the only thing we can do here is to shut it up. Normally we will be originator */
/* for keyboard bonding */
|| (!p_dev_rec->is_originator
&& ((p_dev_rec->dev_class[1] & BTM_COD_MAJOR_CLASS_MASK) == BTM_COD_MAJOR_PERIPHERAL)
&& (p_dev_rec->dev_class[2] & BTM_COD_MINOR_KEYBOARD)) )
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING("btm_sec_pin_code_request(): Pairing disabled:%d; PIN callback:%x, Dev Rec:%x!",
p_cb->pairing_disabled, p_cb->api.p_pin_callback, p_dev_rec);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
}
/* Notify upper layer of PIN request and start expiration timer */
else
{
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = 0;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_LOCAL_PIN);
/* Pin code request can not come at the same time as connection request */
memcpy (p_cb->connecting_bda, p_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy (p_cb->connecting_dc, p_dev_rec->dev_class, DEV_CLASS_LEN);
/* Check if the name is known */
/* Even if name is not known we might not be able to get one */
/* this is the case when we are already getting something from the */
/* device, so HCI level is flow controlled */
/* Also cannot send remote name request while paging, i.e. connection is not completed */
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN)
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request going for callback");
btm_cb.pairing_flags |= BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PIN_REQD;
if (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback)
(*p_cb->api.p_pin_callback) (p_bda, p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name);
}
else
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request going for remote name");
/* We received PIN code request for the device with unknown name */
/* it is not user friendly just to ask for the PIN without name */
/* try to get name at first */
if (!btsnd_hcic_rmt_name_req (p_dev_rec->bd_addr,
HCI_PAGE_SCAN_REP_MODE_R1,
HCI_MANDATARY_PAGE_SCAN_MODE, 0))
{
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN;
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name[0] = 'f';
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name[1] = '0';
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("can not send rmt_name_req?? fake a name and call callback");
btm_cb.pairing_flags |= BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PIN_REQD;
if (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback)
(*p_cb->api.p_pin_callback) (p_bda, p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name);
}
}
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT feature in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to bypass intended pairing restrictions via a crafted device, aka internal bug 26551752.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
| Medium | 173,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int read_escaped_char(
yyscan_t yyscanner,
uint8_t* escaped_char)
{
char text[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0};
text[0] = '\\';
text[1] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[1] == EOF)
return 0;
if (text[1] == 'x')
{
text[2] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[2] == EOF)
return 0;
text[3] = RE_YY_INPUT(yyscanner);
if (text[3] == EOF)
return 0;
}
*escaped_char = escaped_char_value(text);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | Medium | 168,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr_shortform_to_leaf(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
struct xfs_buf **leaf_bp)
{
xfs_inode_t *dp;
xfs_attr_shortform_t *sf;
xfs_attr_sf_entry_t *sfe;
xfs_da_args_t nargs;
char *tmpbuffer;
int error, i, size;
xfs_dablk_t blkno;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_ifork_t *ifp;
trace_xfs_attr_sf_to_leaf(args);
dp = args->dp;
ifp = dp->i_afp;
sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)ifp->if_u1.if_data;
size = be16_to_cpu(sf->hdr.totsize);
tmpbuffer = kmem_alloc(size, KM_SLEEP);
ASSERT(tmpbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(tmpbuffer, ifp->if_u1.if_data, size);
sf = (xfs_attr_shortform_t *)tmpbuffer;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, -size, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
xfs_bmap_local_to_extents_empty(dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
bp = NULL;
error = xfs_da_grow_inode(args, &blkno);
if (error) {
/*
* If we hit an IO error middle of the transaction inside
* grow_inode(), we may have inconsistent data. Bail out.
*/
if (error == -EIO)
goto out;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */
memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */
goto out;
}
ASSERT(blkno == 0);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_create(args, blkno, &bp);
if (error) {
error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp);
bp = NULL;
if (error)
goto out;
xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */
memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */
goto out;
}
memset((char *)&nargs, 0, sizeof(nargs));
nargs.dp = dp;
nargs.geo = args->geo;
nargs.firstblock = args->firstblock;
nargs.dfops = args->dfops;
nargs.total = args->total;
nargs.whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
nargs.trans = args->trans;
nargs.op_flags = XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT;
sfe = &sf->list[0];
for (i = 0; i < sf->hdr.count; i++) {
nargs.name = sfe->nameval;
nargs.namelen = sfe->namelen;
nargs.value = &sfe->nameval[nargs.namelen];
nargs.valuelen = sfe->valuelen;
nargs.hashval = xfs_da_hashname(sfe->nameval,
sfe->namelen);
nargs.flags = XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK_TO_ARGS(sfe->flags);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(bp, &nargs); /* set a->index */
ASSERT(error == -ENOATTR);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_add(bp, &nargs);
ASSERT(error != -ENOSPC);
if (error)
goto out;
sfe = XFS_ATTR_SF_NEXTENTRY(sfe);
}
error = 0;
*leaf_bp = bp;
out:
kmem_free(tmpbuffer);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.3. An OOPS may occur for a corrupted xfs image after xfs_da_shrink_inode() is called with a NULL bp.
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct symbol_t* MACH0_(get_symbols)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
const char *symstr;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int from, to, i, j, s, stridx, symbols_size, symbols_count;
SdbHash *hash;
if (!bin || !bin->symtab || !bin->symstr) {
return NULL;
}
/* parse symbol table */
/* parse dynamic symbol table */
symbols_count = (bin->dysymtab.nextdefsym + \
bin->dysymtab.nlocalsym + \
bin->dysymtab.nundefsym );
symbols_count += bin->nsymtab;
symbols_size = (symbols_count + 1) * 2 * sizeof (struct symbol_t);
if (symbols_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(symbols = calloc (1, symbols_size))) {
return NULL;
}
hash = sdb_ht_new ();
j = 0; // symbol_idx
for (s = 0; s < 2; s++) {
switch (s) {
case 0:
from = bin->dysymtab.iextdefsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nextdefsym;
break;
case 1:
from = bin->dysymtab.ilocalsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nlocalsym;
break;
#if NOT_USED
case 2:
from = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nundefsym;
break;
#endif
}
if (from == to) {
continue;
}
#define OLD 1
#if OLD
from = R_MIN (R_MAX (0, from), symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = R_MIN (to , symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = R_MIN (to, bin->nsymtab);
#else
from = R_MIN (R_MAX (0, from), symbols_size/sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = symbols_count; //symbols_size/sizeof(struct symbol_t);
#endif
int maxsymbols = symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t);
if (to > 0x500000) {
bprintf ("WARNING: corrupted mach0 header: symbol table is too big %d\n", to);
free (symbols);
sdb_ht_free (hash);
return NULL;
}
if (symbols_count >= maxsymbols) {
symbols_count = maxsymbols - 1;
}
for (i = from; i < to && j < symbols_count; i++, j++) {
symbols[j].offset = addr_to_offset (bin, bin->symtab[i].n_value);
symbols[j].addr = bin->symtab[i].n_value;
symbols[j].size = 0; /* TODO: Is it anywhere? */
if (bin->symtab[i].n_type & N_EXT) {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_EXT;
} else {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_LOCAL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[i].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char*)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "???";
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((ut8)(symstr[i] & 0xff) == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
if (len > 0) {
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
}
if (!symstr_dup) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
} else {
r_str_ncpy (symbols[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (symbols[j].name, -1);
symbols[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
}
free (symstr_dup);
} else {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
}
symbols[j].last = 0;
}
if (inSymtab (hash, symbols, symbols[j].name, symbols[j].addr)) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
j--;
}
}
}
to = R_MIN (bin->nsymtab, bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + bin->dysymtab.nundefsym);
for (i = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym; i < to; i++) {
if (j > symbols_count) {
bprintf ("mach0-get-symbols: error\n");
break;
}
if (parse_import_stub(bin, &symbols[j], i))
symbols[j++].last = 0;
}
#if 1
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsymtab; i++) {
struct MACH0_(nlist) *st = &bin->symtab[i];
#if 0
bprintf ("stridx %d -> section %d type %d value = %d\n",
st->n_strx, st->n_sect, st->n_type, st->n_value);
#endif
stridx = st->n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char*)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "???";
}
int section = st->n_sect;
if (section == 1 && j < symbols_count) { // text ??st->n_type == 1)
/* is symbol */
symbols[j].addr = st->n_value; // + text_base;
symbols[j].offset = addr_to_offset (bin, symbols[j].addr);
symbols[j].size = 0; /* find next symbol and crop */
if (st->n_type & N_EXT) {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_EXT;
} else {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_LOCAL;
}
strncpy (symbols[j].name, symstr, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
symbols[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 1] = 0;
symbols[j].last = 0;
if (inSymtab (hash, symbols, symbols[j].name, symbols[j].addr)) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
} else {
j++;
}
}
}
#endif
sdb_ht_free (hash);
symbols[j].last = 1;
return symbols;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The parse_import_ptr() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted Mach-O file.
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026) | Medium | 169,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionSettingsHandler::GetLocalizedValues(
DictionaryValue* localized_strings) {
RegisterTitle(localized_strings, "extensionSettings",
IDS_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS_SETTING_WINDOWS_TITLE);
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsVisitWebsite",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_VISIT_WEBSITE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsDeveloperMode",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_DEVELOPER_MODE_LINK));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsNoExtensions",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_NONE_INSTALLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsSuggestGallery",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_NONE_INSTALLED_SUGGEST_GALLERY,
ASCIIToUTF16(google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(
GURL(extension_urls::GetWebstoreLaunchURL())).spec())));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsGetMoreExtensions",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_GET_MORE_EXTENSIONS,
ASCIIToUTF16(google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(
GURL(extension_urls::GetWebstoreLaunchURL())).spec())));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsExtensionId",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ID));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsExtensionPath",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_PATH));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsInspectViews",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_INSPECT_VIEWS));
localized_strings->SetString("viewIncognito",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_VIEW_INCOGNITO));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnable",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnabled",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsRemove",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_REMOVE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsEnableIncognito",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ENABLE_INCOGNITO));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsAllowFileAccess",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsIncognitoWarning",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PRODUCT_NAME)));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsReload",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_RELOAD));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsOptions",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_OPTIONS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsPolicyControlled",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_POLICY_CONTROLLED));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsShowButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_SHOW_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsLoadUnpackedButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_LOAD_UNPACKED_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsPackButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_PACK_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsUpdateButton",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_UPDATE_BUTTON));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsCrashMessage",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_CRASHED_EXTENSION));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsInDevelopment",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_IN_DEVELOPMENT));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsWarningsTitle",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_WARNINGS_TITLE));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsShowDetails",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_SHOW_DETAILS));
localized_strings->SetString("extensionSettingsHideDetails",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_HIDE_DETAILS));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iovec *from,
int offset, size_t count)
{
int len = iov_length(from, count) - offset;
int copy = skb_headlen(skb);
int size, offset1 = 0;
int i = 0;
/* Skip over from offset */
while (count && (offset >= from->iov_len)) {
offset -= from->iov_len;
++from;
--count;
}
/* copy up to skb headlen */
while (count && (copy > 0)) {
size = min_t(unsigned int, copy, from->iov_len - offset);
if (copy_from_user(skb->data + offset1, from->iov_base + offset,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy > size) {
++from;
--count;
offset = 0;
} else
offset += size;
copy -= size;
offset1 += size;
}
if (len == offset1)
return 0;
while (count--) {
struct page *page[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num_pages;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long truesize;
len = from->iov_len - offset;
if (!len) {
offset = 0;
++from;
continue;
}
base = (unsigned long)from->iov_base + offset;
size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
num_pages = get_user_pages_fast(base, size, 0, &page[i]);
if ((num_pages != size) ||
(num_pages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS - skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) {
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++)
put_page(page[i]);
return -EFAULT;
}
truesize = size * PAGE_SIZE;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->len += len;
skb->truesize += truesize;
atomic_add(truesize, &skb->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
while (len) {
int off = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
int size = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page[i], off, size);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
/* increase sk_wmem_alloc */
base += size;
len -= size;
i++;
}
offset = 0;
++from;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the macvtap device driver in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5, when running in certain configurations, allows privileged KVM guest users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a long descriptor with a long vector length.
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void HTML_put_string(HTStructured * me, const char *s)
{
#ifdef USE_PRETTYSRC
char *translated_string = NULL;
#endif
if (s == NULL || (LYMapsOnly && me->sp[0].tag_number != HTML_OBJECT))
return;
#ifdef USE_PRETTYSRC
if (psrc_convert_string) {
StrAllocCopy(translated_string, s);
TRANSLATE_AND_UNESCAPE_ENTITIES(&translated_string, TRUE, FALSE);
s = (const char *) translated_string;
}
#endif
switch (me->sp[0].tag_number) {
case HTML_COMMENT:
break; /* Do Nothing */
case HTML_TITLE:
HTChunkPuts(&me->title, s);
break;
case HTML_STYLE:
HTChunkPuts(&me->style_block, s);
break;
case HTML_SCRIPT:
HTChunkPuts(&me->script, s);
break;
case HTML_PRE: /* Formatted text */
case HTML_LISTING: /* Literal text */
case HTML_XMP:
case HTML_PLAINTEXT:
/*
* We guarantee that the style is up-to-date in begin_litteral
*/
HText_appendText(me->text, s);
break;
case HTML_OBJECT:
HTChunkPuts(&me->object, s);
break;
case HTML_TEXTAREA:
HTChunkPuts(&me->textarea, s);
break;
case HTML_SELECT:
case HTML_OPTION:
HTChunkPuts(&me->option, s);
break;
case HTML_MATH:
HTChunkPuts(&me->math, s);
break;
default: /* Free format text? */
if (!me->sp->style->freeFormat) {
/*
* If we are within a preformatted text style not caught by the
* cases above (HTML_PRE or similar may not be the last element
* pushed on the style stack). - kw
*/
#ifdef USE_PRETTYSRC
if (psrc_view) {
/*
* We do this so that a raw '\r' in the string will not be
* interpreted as an internal request to break a line - passing
* '\r' to HText_appendText is treated by it as a request to
* insert a blank line - VH
*/
for (; *s; ++s)
HTML_put_character(me, *s);
} else
#endif
HText_appendText(me->text, s);
break;
} else {
const char *p = s;
char c;
if (me->style_change) {
for (; *p && ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r') ||
(*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t')); p++) ; /* Ignore leaders */
if (!*p)
break;
UPDATE_STYLE;
}
for (; *p; p++) {
if (*p == 13 && p[1] != 10) {
/*
* Treat any '\r' which is not followed by '\n' as '\n', to
* account for macintosh lineend in ALT attributes etc. -
* kw
*/
c = '\n';
} else {
c = *p;
}
if (me->style_change) {
if ((c == '\n') || (c == ' ') || (c == '\t'))
continue; /* Ignore it */
UPDATE_STYLE;
}
if (c == '\n') {
if (!FIX_JAPANESE_SPACES) {
if (me->in_word) {
if (HText_getLastChar(me->text) != ' ')
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, ' ');
me->in_word = NO;
}
}
} else if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') {
if (HText_getLastChar(me->text) != ' ')
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, ' ');
} else if (c == '\r') {
/* ignore */
} else {
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, c);
me->in_word = YES;
}
/* set the Last Character */
if (c == '\n' || c == '\t') {
/* set it to a generic separator */
HText_setLastChar(me->text, ' ');
} else if (c == '\r' &&
HText_getLastChar(me->text) == ' ') {
/*
* \r's are ignored. In order to keep collapsing spaces
* correctly, we must default back to the previous
* separator, if there was one. So we set LastChar to a
* generic separator.
*/
HText_setLastChar(me->text, ' ');
} else {
HText_setLastChar(me->text, c);
}
} /* for */
}
} /* end switch */
#ifdef USE_PRETTYSRC
if (psrc_convert_string) {
psrc_convert_string = FALSE;
FREE(translated_string);
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Lynx before 2.8.9dev.16 is vulnerable to a use after free in the HTML parser resulting in memory disclosure, because HTML_put_string() can append a chunk onto itself.
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b | Medium | 167,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int rc;
struct l2tp_ip_sock *lsa = l2tp_ip_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_options *opt = inet->opt;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Get and verify the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *lip = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*lip))
return -EINVAL;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_INET) {
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
daddr = lip->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
connected = 1;
}
/* Allocate a socket buffer */
rc = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) +
4 + len, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto error;
/* Reserve space for headers, putting IP header on 4-byte boundary. */
skb_reserve(skb, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
/* Insert 0 session_id */
*((__be32 *) skb_put(skb, 4)) = 0;
/* Copy user data into skb */
rc = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (rc < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
if (opt && opt->srr)
daddr = opt->faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
}
skb_dst_set(skb, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
rc = ip_queue_xmit(skb);
error:
/* Update stats */
if (rc >= 0) {
lsa->tx_packets++;
lsa->tx_bytes += len;
rc = len;
} else {
lsa->tx_errors++;
}
return rc;
no_route:
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int DefragMfIpv4Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Expected IP length is 20 + 8 + 8 = 36 as only 2 of the
* fragments should be in the re-assembled packet. */
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != 36) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Medium | 168,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
const struct user_desc *info;
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
(count % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (kbuf)
info = kbuf;
else if (__copy_from_user(infobuf, ubuf, count))
return -EFAULT;
else
info = infobuf;
set_tls_desc(target,
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kernel/tls.c in the Thread Local Storage (TLS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 allows local users to bypass the espfix protection mechanism, and consequently makes it easier for local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism, via a crafted application that makes a set_thread_area system call and later reads a 16-bit value.
Commit Message: x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Low | 166,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MessageLoop::RunTask(PendingTask* pending_task) {
DCHECK(nestable_tasks_allowed_);
current_pending_task_ = pending_task;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(*pending_task);
#endif
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = false;
TRACE_TASK_EXECUTION("MessageLoop::RunTask", *pending_task);
for (auto& observer : task_observers_)
observer.WillProcessTask(*pending_task);
task_annotator_.RunTask("MessageLoop::PostTask", pending_task);
for (auto& observer : task_observers_)
observer.DidProcessTask(*pending_task);
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = true;
current_pending_task_ = nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SkMatrix::invertNonIdentity function in core/SkMatrix.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering the use of matrix elements that lead to an infinite result during an inversion calculation.
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263} | High | 171,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GLOzone* X11SurfaceFactory::GetGLOzone(gl::GLImplementation implementation) {
switch (implementation) {
case gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
return glx_implementation_.get();
case gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
return egl_implementation_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 on Android does not prevent navigation to a URL in cases where an intent for the URL lacks CATEGORY_BROWSABLE, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817} | Medium | 171,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void i8042_stop(struct serio *serio)
{
struct i8042_port *port = serio->port_data;
port->exists = false;
/*
* We synchronize with both AUX and KBD IRQs because there is
* a (very unlikely) chance that AUX IRQ is raised for KBD port
* and vice versa.
*/
synchronize_irq(I8042_AUX_IRQ);
synchronize_irq(I8042_KBD_IRQ);
port->serio = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: drivers/input/serio/i8042.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact because the port->exists value can change after it is validated.
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | High | 169,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LockContentsView::OnUsersChanged(
const std::vector<mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr>& users) {
main_view_->RemoveAllChildViews(true /*delete_children*/);
opt_secondary_big_view_ = nullptr;
users_list_ = nullptr;
rotation_actions_.clear();
users_.clear();
if (users.empty()) {
LOG_IF(FATAL, screen_type_ != LockScreen::ScreenType::kLogin)
<< "Empty user list received";
Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->ShowGaiaSignin(
false /*can_close*/, base::nullopt /*prefilled_account*/);
return;
}
for (const mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr& user : users) {
UserState state(user->basic_user_info->account_id);
state.fingerprint_state = user->allow_fingerprint_unlock
? mojom::FingerprintUnlockState::AVAILABLE
: mojom::FingerprintUnlockState::UNAVAILABLE;
users_.push_back(std::move(state));
}
auto box_layout =
std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal);
main_layout_ = box_layout.get();
main_layout_->set_main_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::MAIN_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_CENTER);
main_layout_->set_cross_axis_alignment(
views::BoxLayout::CROSS_AXIS_ALIGNMENT_CENTER);
main_view_->SetLayoutManager(std::move(box_layout));
primary_big_view_ = AllocateLoginBigUserView(users[0], true /*is_primary*/);
main_view_->AddChildView(primary_big_view_);
if (users.size() == 2)
CreateLowDensityLayout(users);
else if (users.size() >= 3 && users.size() <= 6)
CreateMediumDensityLayout(users);
else if (users.size() >= 7)
CreateHighDensityLayout(users);
LayoutAuth(primary_big_view_, opt_secondary_big_view_, false /*animate*/);
OnBigUserChanged();
PreferredSizeChanged();
Layout();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224} | High | 172,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ih264d decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles slice numbers, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28673410.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
| High | 173,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment, idx, element_start);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, VarianceFunctionType>& params = this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
variance_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = new uint8_t[block_size_];
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 166,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int search_old_relocation(struct reloc_struct_t *reloc_table, ut32 addr_to_patch, int n_reloc) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n_reloc; i++) {
if (addr_to_patch == reloc_table[i].data_offset) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The relocs function in libr/bin/p/bin_bflt.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct | Medium | 168,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PrintMsg_Print_Params::Reset() {
page_size = gfx::Size();
content_size = gfx::Size();
printable_area = gfx::Rect();
margin_top = 0;
margin_left = 0;
dpi = 0;
min_shrink = 0;
max_shrink = 0;
desired_dpi = 0;
document_cookie = 0;
selection_only = false;
supports_alpha_blend = false;
preview_ui_addr = std::string();
preview_request_id = 0;
is_first_request = false;
print_scaling_option = WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
print_to_pdf = false;
display_header_footer = false;
date = string16();
title = string16();
url = string16();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,846 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::localDescription()
{
return m_localDescription;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OomInterventionImpl::Check(TimerBase*) {
DCHECK(host_);
OomInterventionMetrics current_memory = GetCurrentMemoryMetrics();
bool oom_detected = false;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_blink_usage_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_private_footprint_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold;
oom_detected |=
detection_args_->swap_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_swap_kb * 1024 > detection_args_->swap_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_vm_size_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold;
ReportMemoryStats(current_memory);
if (oom_detected) {
if (navigate_ads_enabled_) {
for (const auto& page : Page::OrdinaryPages()) {
if (page->MainFrame()->IsLocalFrame()) {
ToLocalFrame(page->MainFrame())
->GetDocument()
->NavigateLocalAdsFrames();
}
}
}
if (renderer_pause_enabled_) {
pauser_.reset(new ScopedPagePauser);
}
host_->OnHighMemoryUsage();
timer_.Stop();
V8GCForContextDispose::Instance().SetForcePageNavigationGC();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Array.prototype.concat implementation in builtins.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.108, does not properly consider element data types, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574} | High | 172,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void finalizeStreamTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(blobRegistryContext->url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: do_ssh2_kex(void)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
options.kex_algorithms);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
"none,[email protected]";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years. | High | 168,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ftc_snode_load( FTC_SNode snode,
FTC_Manager manager,
FT_UInt gindex,
FT_ULong *asize )
{
FT_Error error;
FTC_GNode gnode = FTC_GNODE( snode );
FTC_Family family = gnode->family;
FT_Memory memory = manager->memory;
FT_Face face;
FTC_SBit sbit;
FTC_SFamilyClass clazz;
if ( (FT_UInt)(gindex - gnode->gindex) >= snode->count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ftc_snode_load: invalid glyph index" ));
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
}
sbit = snode->sbits + ( gindex - gnode->gindex );
clazz = (FTC_SFamilyClass)family->clazz;
sbit->buffer = 0;
error = clazz->family_load_glyph( family, gindex, manager, &face );
if ( error )
goto BadGlyph;
{
FT_Int temp;
FT_GlyphSlot slot = face->glyph;
FT_Bitmap* bitmap = &slot->bitmap;
FT_Pos xadvance, yadvance; /* FT_GlyphSlot->advance.{x|y} */
if ( slot->format != FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP )
{
FT_TRACE0(( "ftc_snode_load:"
" glyph loaded didn't return a bitmap\n" ));
goto BadGlyph;
}
/* Check that our values fit into 8-bit containers! */
/* If this is not the case, our bitmap is too large */
/* and we will leave it as `missing' with sbit.buffer = 0 */
#define CHECK_CHAR( d ) ( temp = (FT_Char)d, temp == d )
#define CHECK_BYTE( d ) ( temp = (FT_Byte)d, temp == d )
/* horizontal advance in pixels */
xadvance = ( slot->advance.x + 32 ) >> 6;
yadvance = ( slot->advance.y + 32 ) >> 6;
if ( !CHECK_BYTE( bitmap->rows ) ||
!CHECK_BYTE( bitmap->width ) ||
!CHECK_CHAR( bitmap->pitch ) ||
!CHECK_CHAR( slot->bitmap_left ) ||
!CHECK_CHAR( slot->bitmap_top ) ||
!CHECK_CHAR( xadvance ) ||
!CHECK_CHAR( yadvance ) )
{
FT_TRACE2(( "ftc_snode_load:"
" glyph too large for small bitmap cache\n"));
goto BadGlyph;
}
sbit->width = (FT_Byte)bitmap->width;
sbit->height = (FT_Byte)bitmap->rows;
sbit->pitch = (FT_Char)bitmap->pitch;
sbit->left = (FT_Char)slot->bitmap_left;
sbit->top = (FT_Char)slot->bitmap_top;
sbit->xadvance = (FT_Char)xadvance;
sbit->yadvance = (FT_Char)yadvance;
sbit->format = (FT_Byte)bitmap->pixel_mode;
sbit->max_grays = (FT_Byte)(bitmap->num_grays - 1);
/* copy the bitmap into a new buffer -- ignore error */
error = ftc_sbit_copy_bitmap( sbit, bitmap, memory );
/* now, compute size */
if ( asize )
*asize = FT_ABS( sbit->pitch ) * sbit->height;
} /* glyph loading successful */
/* ignore the errors that might have occurred -- */
/* we mark unloaded glyphs with `sbit.buffer == 0' */
/* and `width == 255', `height == 0' */
/* */
if ( error && FT_ERR_NEQ( error, Out_Of_Memory ) )
{
BadGlyph:
sbit->width = 255;
sbit->height = 0;
sbit->buffer = NULL;
error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( asize )
*asize = 0;
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message: | High | 164,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: virtual void ResetModel() {
last_pts_ = 0;
bits_in_buffer_model_ = cfg_.rc_target_bitrate * cfg_.rc_buf_initial_sz;
frame_number_ = 0;
tot_frame_number_ = 0;
first_drop_ = 0;
num_drops_ = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
bits_total_[i] = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, mode, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct nfs_open_context *nfs_find_open_context(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred, int mode)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
struct nfs_open_context *pos, *ctx = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
list_for_each_entry(pos, &nfsi->open_files, list) {
if (cred != NULL && pos->cred != cred)
continue;
if ((pos->mode & mode) == mode) {
ctx = get_nfs_open_context(pos);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return ctx;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
char **realms = NULL, *hostname = NULL;
krb5_data srealm = request->server->realm;
if (!is_referral_req(kdc_active_realm, request))
goto cleanup;
hostname = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1));
if (hostname == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the hostname doesn't contain a '.', it's not a FQDN. */
if (strchr(hostname, '.') == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_get_host_realm(kdc_context, hostname, &realms);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
srealm.length, srealm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
cleanup:
krb5_free_host_realm(kdc_context, realms);
free(hostname);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: do_tgs_req.c in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.11 before 1.11.4, when a single-component realm name is used, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a TGS-REQ request that triggers an attempted cross-realm referral for a host-based service principal.
Commit Message: KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved | Low | 166,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int nonOpt(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt1(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
if (argsCount <= 2) {
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int opt2(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1, opt2);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 170,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CameraSource::signalBufferReturned(MediaBuffer *buffer) {
ALOGV("signalBufferReturned: %p", buffer->data());
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
for (List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it = mFramesBeingEncoded.begin();
it != mFramesBeingEncoded.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->pointer() == buffer->data()) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame((*it));
mFramesBeingEncoded.erase(it);
++mNumFramesEncoded;
buffer->setObserver(0);
buffer->release();
mFrameCompleteCondition.signal();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"signalBufferReturned: bogus buffer");
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The camera APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allow attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and obtain sensitive information about ANW buffer addresses via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28466701.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
| Medium | 173,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool FindAndUpdateProperty(const chromeos::ImeProperty& new_prop,
chromeos::ImePropertyList* prop_list) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < prop_list->size(); ++i) {
chromeos::ImeProperty& prop = prop_list->at(i);
if (prop.key == new_prop.key) {
const int saved_id = prop.selection_item_id;
prop = new_prop;
prop.selection_item_id = saved_id;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: GpuChannel::GpuChannel(GpuChannelManager* gpu_channel_manager,
GpuWatchdog* watchdog,
gfx::GLShareGroup* share_group,
int client_id,
bool software)
: gpu_channel_manager_(gpu_channel_manager),
client_id_(client_id),
renderer_process_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
renderer_pid_(base::kNullProcessId),
share_group_(share_group ? share_group : new gfx::GLShareGroup),
watchdog_(watchdog),
software_(software),
handle_messages_scheduled_(false),
processed_get_state_fast_(false),
num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_(0),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
DCHECK(gpu_channel_manager);
DCHECK(client_id);
channel_id_ = IPC::Channel::GenerateVerifiedChannelID("gpu");
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
log_messages_ = command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLogPluginMessages);
disallowed_features_.multisampling =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGLMultisampling);
disallowed_features_.driver_bug_workarounds =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuDriverBugWorkarounds);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetBoundsForClientView() const {
if (frame_->IsFullscreen())
return bounds();
return gfx::Rect(0, kCaptionHeight, width(),
std::max(0, height() - kCaptionHeight));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state)
{
vpx_codec_err_t res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
if(data + data_sz <= data)
{
res = VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
}
else
{
/* Parse uncompresssed part of key frame header.
* 3 bytes:- including version, frame type and an offset
* 3 bytes:- sync code (0x9d, 0x01, 0x2a)
* 4 bytes:- including image width and height in the lowest 14 bits
* of each 2-byte value.
*/
uint8_t clear_buffer[10];
const uint8_t *clear = data;
if (decrypt_cb)
{
int n = MIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, n);
clear = clear_buffer;
}
si->is_kf = 0;
if (data_sz >= 10 && !(clear[0] & 0x01)) /* I-Frame */
{
si->is_kf = 1;
/* vet via sync code */
if (clear[3] != 0x9d || clear[4] != 0x01 || clear[5] != 0x2a)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->w = (clear[6] | (clear[7] << 8)) & 0x3fff;
si->h = (clear[8] | (clear[9] << 8)) & 0x3fff;
/*printf("w=%d, h=%d\n", si->w, si->h);*/
if (!(si->h | si->w))
res = VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
else
{
res = VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libvpx in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-11-01 could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Android ID: A-30593765.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
| High | 173,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static long ext4_zero_range(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
loff_t len, int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
handle_t *handle = NULL;
unsigned int max_blocks;
loff_t new_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
int credits;
int partial_begin, partial_end;
loff_t start, end;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
trace_ext4_zero_range(inode, offset, len, mode);
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + len - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Round up offset. This is not fallocate, we neet to zero out
* blocks, so convert interior block aligned part of the range to
* unwritten and possibly manually zero out unaligned parts of the
* range.
*/
start = round_up(offset, 1 << blkbits);
end = round_down((offset + len), 1 << blkbits);
if (start < offset || end > offset + len)
return -EINVAL;
partial_begin = offset & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
partial_end = (offset + len) & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
lblk = start >> blkbits;
max_blocks = (end >> blkbits);
if (max_blocks < lblk)
max_blocks = 0;
else
max_blocks -= lblk;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* Indirect files do not support unwritten extnets
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
offset + len > i_size_read(inode)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
/* Preallocate the range including the unaligned edges */
if (partial_begin || partial_end) {
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file,
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits) >> blkbits,
(round_up((offset + len), 1 << blkbits) -
round_down(offset, 1 << blkbits)) >> blkbits,
new_size, flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Zero range excluding the unaligned edges */
if (max_blocks > 0) {
flags |= (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN |
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE);
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, start, end - 1);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size,
flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out_dio;
}
if (!partial_begin && !partial_end)
goto out_dio;
/*
* In worst case we have to writeout two nonadjacent unwritten
* blocks and update the inode
*/
credits = (2 * ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks(inode, 2)) + 1;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode))
credits += 2;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MISC, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
if (new_size) {
ext4_update_inode_size(inode, new_size);
} else {
/*
* Mark that we allocate beyond EOF so the subsequent truncate
* can proceed even if the new size is the same as i_size.
*/
if ((offset + len) > i_size_read(inode))
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
/* Zero out partial block at the edges of the range */
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset, len);
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC)
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 167,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LoadingStatsCollector::CleanupAbandonedStats() {
base::TimeTicks time_now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
for (auto it = preconnect_stats_.begin(); it != preconnect_stats_.end();) {
if (time_now - it->second->start_time > max_stats_age_) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second,
std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>());
it = preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: setPath(JsonbIterator **it, Datum *path_elems,
bool *path_nulls, int path_len,
JsonbParseState **st, int level, Jsonb *newval, bool create)
{
JsonbValue v;
JsonbValue *res = NULL;
int r;
if (path_nulls[level])
elog(ERROR, "path element at the position %d is NULL", level + 1);
switch (r)
{
case WJB_BEGIN_ARRAY:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathArray(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.array.nElems, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, false);
Assert(r == WJB_END_ARRAY);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_BEGIN_OBJECT:
(void) pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
setPathObject(it, path_elems, path_nulls, path_len, st, level,
newval, v.val.object.nPairs, create);
r = JsonbIteratorNext(it, &v, true);
Assert(r == WJB_END_OBJECT);
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, NULL);
break;
case WJB_ELEM:
case WJB_VALUE:
res = pushJsonbValue(st, r, &v);
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "impossible state");
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in json parsing in PostgreSQL before 9.3.x before 9.3.10 and 9.4.x before 9.4.5 allow attackers to cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors, which are not properly handled in (1) json or (2) jsonb values.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToExtension(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id, int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(source->GetBrowserContext());
MessagePort* receiver = new ExtensionMessagePort(
GetExtensionProcess(profile, target_extension_id), MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
target_extension_id);
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
OpenChannelParams* params = new OpenChannelParams(source, tab_json, receiver,
receiver_port_id,
source_extension_id,
target_extension_id,
channel_name);
if (MaybeAddPendingOpenChannelTask(profile, params)) {
return;
}
OpenChannelImpl(scoped_ptr<OpenChannelParams>(params));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PageInfo::GetSafeBrowsingStatusByMaliciousContentStatus(
security_state::MaliciousContentStatus malicious_content_status,
PageInfo::SafeBrowsingStatus* status,
base::string16* details) {
switch (malicious_content_status) {
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_NONE:
NOTREACHED();
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_MALWARE:
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_MALWARE;
*details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_MALWARE_DETAILS);
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING:
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING;
*details =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_DETAILS);
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE:
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE;
*details =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_UNWANTED_SOFTWARE_DETAILS);
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE:
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE;
*details = password_protection_service_
? password_protection_service_->GetWarningDetailText(
PasswordReuseEvent::SIGN_IN_PASSWORD)
: base::string16();
#endif
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE:
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE;
*details = password_protection_service_
? password_protection_service_->GetWarningDetailText(
PasswordReuseEvent::ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD)
: base::string16();
#endif
break;
case security_state::MALICIOUS_CONTENT_STATUS_BILLING:
*status = PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_BILLING;
*details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_BILLING_DETAILS);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932} | Low | 172,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
md_context m;
switch (xfersum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5: {
uchar seedbuf[4];
md5_begin(&m);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED: {
int32 i;
static char *buf1;
static int32 len1;
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
if (!buf1)
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVAL(buf1,len,checksum_seed);
len += 4;
}
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), CSUM_CHUNK);
/*
* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message: | High | 164,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
else {
char *dot_pool, *dot_reconnect;
dot_pool = strchr(pool->sockaddr_url, '.');
if (!dot_pool) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request for pool without domain '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
dot_reconnect = strchr(url, '.');
if (!dot_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to url without domain '%s'",
url);
return false;
}
if (strcmp(dot_pool, dot_reconnect)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to non-matching domain url '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
}
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
sprintf(address, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum reconnect requested from pool %d to %s", pool->pool_no, address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing | High | 166,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int open_url(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext **pb, const char *url,
AVDictionary *opts, AVDictionary *opts2, int *is_http)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const char *proto_name = NULL;
int ret;
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts, 0);
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts2, 0);
if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL)) {
if (url[6] == '+' || url[6] == ':')
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url + 7);
}
if (!proto_name)
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url);
if (!proto_name)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL) && !av_strstart(proto_name, "file", NULL))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!strncmp(proto_name, url, strlen(proto_name)) && url[strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL) && !strncmp(proto_name, url + 7, strlen(proto_name)) && url[7 + strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (strcmp(proto_name, "file") || !strncmp(url, "file,", 5))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = s->io_open(s, pb, url, AVIO_FLAG_READ, &tmp);
if (ret >= 0) {
char *new_cookies = NULL;
if (!(s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_CUSTOM_IO))
av_opt_get(*pb, "cookies", AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN, (uint8_t**)&new_cookies);
if (new_cookies) {
av_free(c->cookies);
c->cookies = new_cookies;
}
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
}
av_dict_free(&tmp);
if (is_http)
*is_http = av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: FFmpeg before 2.8.12, 3.0.x and 3.1.x before 3.1.9, 3.2.x before 3.2.6, and 3.3.x before 3.3.2 does not properly restrict HTTP Live Streaming filename extensions and demuxer names, which allows attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted playlist data.
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Check local file extensions
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
originally requested by Nicolas.
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in ext/standard/link_win32.c in PHP before 5.6.37, 7.0.x before 7.0.31, 7.1.x before 7.1.20, and 7.2.x before 7.2.8. The linkinfo function on Windows doesn't implement the open_basedir check. This could be abused to find files on paths outside of the allowed directories.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #76459 windows linkinfo lacks openbasedir check | Medium | 169,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Cues::LoadCuePoint() const {
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
if (m_pos >= stop)
return false; // nothing else to do
Init();
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (m_pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = m_pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, m_pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((m_pos + len) <= stop);
m_pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((m_pos + size) <= stop);
if (id != 0x3B) { // CuePoint ID
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
continue;
}
assert(m_preload_count > 0);
CuePoint* const pCP = m_cue_points[m_count];
assert(pCP);
assert((pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0) || (-pCP->GetTimeCode() == idpos));
if (pCP->GetTimeCode() < 0 && (-pCP->GetTimeCode() != idpos))
return false;
pCP->Load(pReader);
++m_count;
--m_preload_count;
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
return true; // yes, we loaded a cue point
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int lua_websocket_read(lua_State *L)
{
apr_socket_t *sock;
apr_status_t rv;
int n = 0;
apr_size_t len = 1;
apr_size_t plen = 0;
unsigned short payload_short = 0;
apr_uint64_t payload_long = 0;
unsigned char *mask_bytes;
char byte;
int plaintext;
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
plaintext = ap_lua_ssl_is_https(r->connection) ? 0 : 1;
mask_bytes = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, 4);
sock = ap_get_conn_socket(r->connection);
/* Get opcode and FIN bit */
if (plaintext) {
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, &byte, &len);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection, &byte, 1);
}
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
unsigned char ubyte, fin, opcode, mask, payload;
ubyte = (unsigned char)byte;
/* fin bit is the first bit */
fin = ubyte >> (CHAR_BIT - 1);
/* opcode is the last four bits (there's 3 reserved bits we don't care about) */
opcode = ubyte & 0xf;
/* Get the payload length and mask bit */
if (plaintext) {
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, &byte, &len);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection, &byte, 1);
}
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
ubyte = (unsigned char)byte;
/* Mask is the first bit */
mask = ubyte >> (CHAR_BIT - 1);
/* Payload is the last 7 bits */
payload = ubyte & 0x7f;
plen = payload;
/* Extended payload? */
if (payload == 126) {
len = 2;
if (plaintext) {
/* XXX: apr_socket_recv does not receive len bits, only up to len bits! */
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, (char*) &payload_short, &len);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection,
(char*) &payload_short, 2);
}
payload_short = ntohs(payload_short);
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
plen = payload_short;
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
/* Super duper extended payload? */
if (payload == 127) {
len = 8;
if (plaintext) {
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, (char*) &payload_long, &len);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection,
(char*) &payload_long, 8);
}
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
plen = ap_ntoh64(&payload_long);
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
"Websocket: Reading %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " (%s) bytes, masking is %s. %s",
plen,
(payload >= 126) ? "extra payload" : "no extra payload",
mask ? "on" : "off",
fin ? "This is a final frame" : "more to follow");
if (mask) {
len = 4;
if (plaintext) {
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, (char*) mask_bytes, &len);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection,
(char*) mask_bytes, 4);
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return 0;
}
}
if (plen < (HUGE_STRING_LEN*1024) && plen > 0) {
apr_size_t remaining = plen;
apr_size_t received;
apr_off_t at = 0;
char *buffer = apr_palloc(r->pool, plen+1);
buffer[plen] = 0;
if (plaintext) {
while (remaining > 0) {
received = remaining;
rv = apr_socket_recv(sock, buffer+at, &received);
if (received > 0 ) {
remaining -= received;
at += received;
}
}
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r,
"Websocket: Frame contained %" APR_OFF_T_FMT " bytes, pushed to Lua stack",
at);
}
else {
rv = lua_websocket_readbytes(r->connection, buffer,
remaining);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r,
"Websocket: SSL Frame contained %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " bytes, "\
"pushed to Lua stack",
remaining);
}
if (mask) {
for (n = 0; n < plen; n++) {
buffer[n] ^= mask_bytes[n%4];
}
}
lua_pushlstring(L, buffer, (size_t) plen); /* push to stack */
lua_pushboolean(L, fin); /* push FIN bit to stack as boolean */
return 2;
}
/* Decide if we need to react to the opcode or not */
if (opcode == 0x09) { /* ping */
char frame[2];
plen = 2;
frame[0] = 0x8A;
frame[1] = 0;
apr_socket_send(sock, frame, &plen); /* Pong! */
lua_websocket_read(L); /* read the next frame instead */
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The lua_websocket_read function in lua_request.c in the mod_lua module in the Apache HTTP Server through 2.4.12 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (child-process crash) by sending a crafted WebSocket Ping frame after a Lua script has called the wsupgrade function.
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 166,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void process_blob(struct rev_info *revs,
struct blob *blob,
show_object_fn show,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *name,
void *cb_data)
{
struct object *obj = &blob->object;
if (!revs->blob_objects)
return;
if (!obj)
die("bad blob object");
if (obj->flags & (UNINTERESTING | SEEN))
return;
obj->flags |= SEEN;
show(obj, path, name, cb_data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> | High | 167,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_NONE, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The load_segment_descriptor implementation in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.5 improperly emulates a *MOV SS, NULL selector* instruction, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) or gain guest OS privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void install_local_socket(asocket* s) {
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
s->id = local_socket_next_id++;
if (local_socket_next_id == 0) {
local_socket_next_id = 1;
}
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_list);
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
| High | 174,152 |
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