instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
139k
| output
stringlengths 16
138k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
redir_content =
ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
else
redir_content = ~0ULL;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
| 166,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const
{
if (m_duration < 0)
return -1;
assert(m_timecodeScale >= 1);
const double dd = double(m_duration) * double(m_timecodeScale);
const long long d = static_cast<long long>(dd);
return d;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const
| 174,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleGetPreview(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK_EQ(3U, args->GetSize());
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> settings(GetSettingsDictionary(args));
if (!settings.get())
return;
int request_id = -1;
if (!settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, &request_id))
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewRequest(request_id);
settings->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
print_preview_ui->GetPrintPreviewUIAddress());
++regenerate_preview_request_count_;
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (!initiator_tab) {
ReportUserActionHistogram(INITIATOR_TAB_CLOSED);
print_preview_ui->OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
return;
}
bool display_header_footer = false;
if (!settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
&display_header_footer)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
if (display_header_footer) {
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetTitle());
std::string url;
NavigationEntry* entry =
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry)
url = entry->GetVirtualURL().spec();
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL, url);
}
bool generate_draft_data = false;
bool success = settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData,
&generate_draft_data);
DCHECK(success);
if (!generate_draft_data) {
double draft_page_count_double = -1;
success = args->GetDouble(1, &draft_page_count_double);
DCHECK(success);
int draft_page_count = static_cast<int>(draft_page_count_double);
bool preview_modifiable = false;
success = args->GetBoolean(2, &preview_modifiable);
DCHECK(success);
if (draft_page_count != -1 && preview_modifiable &&
print_preview_ui->GetAvailableDraftPageCount() != draft_page_count) {
settings->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
}
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request start";
RenderViewHost* rvh = initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
rvh->Send(new PrintMsg_PrintPreview(rvh->GetRoutingID(), *settings));
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleGetPreview(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK_EQ(3U, args->GetSize());
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> settings(GetSettingsDictionary(args));
if (!settings.get())
return;
int request_id = -1;
if (!settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, &request_id))
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewRequest(request_id);
settings->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewUIID,
print_preview_ui->GetIDForPrintPreviewUI());
++regenerate_preview_request_count_;
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (!initiator_tab) {
ReportUserActionHistogram(INITIATOR_TAB_CLOSED);
print_preview_ui->OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
return;
}
bool display_header_footer = false;
if (!settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
&display_header_footer)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
if (display_header_footer) {
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetTitle());
std::string url;
NavigationEntry* entry =
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry)
url = entry->GetVirtualURL().spec();
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL, url);
}
bool generate_draft_data = false;
bool success = settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData,
&generate_draft_data);
DCHECK(success);
if (!generate_draft_data) {
double draft_page_count_double = -1;
success = args->GetDouble(1, &draft_page_count_double);
DCHECK(success);
int draft_page_count = static_cast<int>(draft_page_count_double);
bool preview_modifiable = false;
success = args->GetBoolean(2, &preview_modifiable);
DCHECK(success);
if (draft_page_count != -1 && preview_modifiable &&
print_preview_ui->GetAvailableDraftPageCount() != draft_page_count) {
settings->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
}
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request start";
RenderViewHost* rvh = initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
rvh->Send(new PrintMsg_PrintPreview(rvh->GetRoutingID(), *settings));
}
| 170,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_alloc2(lutsize, sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_alloc2(pclr->numchans, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
pclr->bpc = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_alloc2(lutsize, sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_alloc2(pclr->numchans, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
| 170,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MediaStreamDispatcherHost::MediaStreamDispatcherHost(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager)
: render_process_id_(render_process_id),
render_frame_id_(render_frame_id),
media_stream_manager_(media_stream_manager),
salt_and_origin_callback_(
base::BindRepeating(&GetMediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin)),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.set_connection_error_handler(
base::Bind(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::CancelAllRequests,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | MediaStreamDispatcherHost::MediaStreamDispatcherHost(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager)
: render_process_id_(render_process_id),
render_frame_id_(render_frame_id),
requester_id_(next_requester_id_++),
media_stream_manager_(media_stream_manager),
salt_and_origin_callback_(
base::BindRepeating(&GetMediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin)),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
}
| 173,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
{
unsigned char *opt = *option;
unsigned char *tag;
unsigned char opt_iter;
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len;
u8 tag_len;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
u32 tag_iter;
/* caller already checks for length values that are too large */
opt_len = opt[1];
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
goto validate_return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(get_unaligned_be32(&opt[2]));
if (doi_def == NULL) {
err_offset = 2;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
opt_iter = CIPSO_V4_HDR_LEN;
tag = opt + opt_iter;
while (opt_iter < opt_len) {
for (tag_iter = 0; doi_def->tags[tag_iter] != tag[0];)
if (doi_def->tags[tag_iter] == CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID ||
++tag_iter == CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag_len = tag[1];
if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
switch (tag[0]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
/* We are already going to do all the verification
* necessary at the socket layer so from our point of
* view it is safe to turn these checks off (and less
* work), however, the CIPSO draft says we should do
* all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't
* really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate
* ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */
if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) {
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
/* This is a non-standard tag that we only allow for
* local connections, so if the incoming interface is
* not the loopback device drop the packet. */
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len != CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
default:
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag += tag_len;
opt_iter += tag_len;
}
validate_return_locked:
rcu_read_unlock();
validate_return:
*option = opt + err_offset;
return err_offset;
}
Commit Message: cipso: don't follow a NULL pointer when setsockopt() is called
As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
the setsockopt() syscall).
This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In
the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
not something we want to allow.
A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
caught early in cipso_v4_validate():
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <string.h>
struct local_tag {
char type;
char length;
char info[4];
};
struct cipso {
char type;
char length;
char doi[4];
struct local_tag local;
};
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int sockfd;
struct cipso cipso = {
.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
.local = {
.type = 128,
.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
},
};
memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
cipso.doi[3] = 3;
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#define SOL_IP 0
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));
return 0;
}
CC: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
{
unsigned char *opt = *option;
unsigned char *tag;
unsigned char opt_iter;
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len;
u8 tag_len;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
u32 tag_iter;
/* caller already checks for length values that are too large */
opt_len = opt[1];
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
goto validate_return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(get_unaligned_be32(&opt[2]));
if (doi_def == NULL) {
err_offset = 2;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
opt_iter = CIPSO_V4_HDR_LEN;
tag = opt + opt_iter;
while (opt_iter < opt_len) {
for (tag_iter = 0; doi_def->tags[tag_iter] != tag[0];)
if (doi_def->tags[tag_iter] == CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID ||
++tag_iter == CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag_len = tag[1];
if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
switch (tag[0]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
/* We are already going to do all the verification
* necessary at the socket layer so from our point of
* view it is safe to turn these checks off (and less
* work), however, the CIPSO draft says we should do
* all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't
* really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate
* ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */
if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) {
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
/* This is a non-standard tag that we only allow for
* local connections, so if the incoming interface is
* not the loopback device drop the packet. Further,
* there is no legitimate reason for setting this from
* userspace so reject it if skb is NULL. */
if (skb == NULL || !(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len != CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
default:
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag += tag_len;
opt_iter += tag_len;
}
validate_return_locked:
rcu_read_unlock();
validate_return:
*option = opt + err_offset;
return err_offset;
}
| 166,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jpc_dec_decodepkts(jpc_dec_t *dec, jas_stream_t *pkthdrstream, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_pi_t *pi;
int ret;
tile = dec->curtile;
pi = tile->pi;
for (;;) {
if (!tile->pkthdrstream || jas_stream_peekc(tile->pkthdrstream) == EOF) {
switch (jpc_dec_lookahead(in)) {
case JPC_MS_EOC:
case JPC_MS_SOT:
return 0;
break;
case JPC_MS_SOP:
case JPC_MS_EPH:
case 0:
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
}
if ((ret = jpc_pi_next(pi))) {
return ret;
}
if (dec->maxpkts >= 0 && dec->numpkts >= dec->maxpkts) {
jas_eprintf("warning: stopping decode prematurely as requested\n");
return 0;
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("packet offset=%08ld prg=%d cmptno=%02d "
"rlvlno=%02d prcno=%03d lyrno=%02d\n", (long)
jas_stream_getrwcount(in), jpc_pi_prg(pi), jpc_pi_cmptno(pi),
jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi), jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi));
}
if (jpc_dec_decodepkt(dec, pkthdrstream, in, jpc_pi_cmptno(pi), jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi),
jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi))) {
return -1;
}
++dec->numpkts;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int jpc_dec_decodepkts(jpc_dec_t *dec, jas_stream_t *pkthdrstream, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_pi_t *pi;
int ret;
tile = dec->curtile;
pi = tile->pi;
for (;;) {
if (!tile->pkthdrstream || jas_stream_peekc(tile->pkthdrstream) == EOF) {
switch (jpc_dec_lookahead(in)) {
case JPC_MS_EOC:
case JPC_MS_SOT:
return 0;
break;
case JPC_MS_SOP:
case JPC_MS_EPH:
case 0:
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
}
if ((ret = jpc_pi_next(pi))) {
return ret;
}
if (dec->maxpkts >= 0 && dec->numpkts >= dec->maxpkts) {
jas_eprintf("warning: stopping decode prematurely as requested\n");
return 0;
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("packet offset=%08ld prg=%d cmptno=%02d "
"rlvlno=%02d prcno=%03d lyrno=%02d\n", (long)
jas_stream_getrwcount(in), jpc_pi_prg(pi), jpc_pi_cmptno(pi),
jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi), jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi));
}
if (jpc_dec_decodepkt(dec, pkthdrstream, in, jpc_pi_cmptno(pi),
jpc_pi_rlvlno(pi), jpc_pi_prcno(pi), jpc_pi_lyrno(pi))) {
return -1;
}
++dec->numpkts;
}
return 0;
}
| 169,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t read_and_process_frames(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer, ssize_t frames_num)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
ssize_t frames_wr = 0; /* Number of frames actually read */
size_t bytes_per_sample = audio_bytes_per_sample(stream->common.get_format(&stream->common));
void *proc_buf_out = buffer;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
audio_buffer_t in_buf;
audio_buffer_t out_buf;
int i;
bool has_processing = in->num_preprocessors != 0;
#endif
/* Additional channels might be added on top of main_channels:
* - aux_channels (by processing effects)
* - extra channels due to HW limitations
* In case of additional channels, we cannot work inplace
*/
size_t src_channels = in->config.channels;
size_t dst_channels = audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(in->main_channels);
bool channel_remapping_needed = (dst_channels != src_channels);
size_t src_buffer_size = frames_num * src_channels * bytes_per_sample;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
if (has_processing) {
/* since all the processing below is done in frames and using the config.channels
* as the number of channels, no changes is required in case aux_channels are present */
while (frames_wr < frames_num) {
/* first reload enough frames at the end of process input buffer */
if (in->proc_buf_frames < (size_t)frames_num) {
ssize_t frames_rd;
if (in->proc_buf_size < (size_t)frames_num) {
in->proc_buf_size = (size_t)frames_num;
in->proc_buf_in = realloc(in->proc_buf_in, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_in != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_in");
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
in->proc_buf_out = realloc(in->proc_buf_out, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_out != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_out");
proc_buf_out = in->proc_buf_out;
}
}
frames_rd = read_frames(in,
in->proc_buf_in +
in->proc_buf_frames * src_channels * bytes_per_sample,
frames_num - in->proc_buf_frames);
if (frames_rd < 0) {
/* Return error code */
frames_wr = frames_rd;
break;
}
in->proc_buf_frames += frames_rd;
}
/* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount indicate respectively
* the maximum number of frames to be consumed and produced by process() */
in_buf.frameCount = in->proc_buf_frames;
in_buf.s16 = in->proc_buf_in;
out_buf.frameCount = frames_num - frames_wr;
out_buf.s16 = (int16_t *)proc_buf_out + frames_wr * in->config.channels;
/* FIXME: this works because of current pre processing library implementation that
* does the actual process only when the last enabled effect process is called.
* The generic solution is to have an output buffer for each effect and pass it as
* input to the next.
*/
for (i = 0; i < in->num_preprocessors; i++) {
(*in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe)->process(in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe,
&in_buf,
&out_buf);
}
/* process() has updated the number of frames consumed and produced in
* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount respectively
* move remaining frames to the beginning of in->proc_buf_in */
in->proc_buf_frames -= in_buf.frameCount;
if (in->proc_buf_frames) {
memcpy(in->proc_buf_in,
in->proc_buf_in + in_buf.frameCount * src_channels * bytes_per_sample,
in->proc_buf_frames * in->config.channels * audio_bytes_per_sample(in_get_format(in)));
}
/* if not enough frames were passed to process(), read more and retry. */
if (out_buf.frameCount == 0) {
ALOGW("No frames produced by preproc");
continue;
}
if ((frames_wr + (ssize_t)out_buf.frameCount) <= frames_num) {
frames_wr += out_buf.frameCount;
} else {
/* The effect does not comply to the API. In theory, we should never end up here! */
ALOGE("preprocessing produced too many frames: %d + %zd > %d !",
(unsigned int)frames_wr, out_buf.frameCount, (unsigned int)frames_num);
frames_wr = frames_num;
}
}
}
else
#endif //PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
{
/* No processing effects attached */
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
/* With additional channels, we cannot use original buffer */
if (in->proc_buf_size < src_buffer_size) {
in->proc_buf_size = src_buffer_size;
in->proc_buf_out = realloc(in->proc_buf_out, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_out != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_out");
}
proc_buf_out = in->proc_buf_out;
}
frames_wr = read_frames(in, proc_buf_out, frames_num);
ALOG_ASSERT(frames_wr <= frames_num, "read more frames than requested");
}
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
size_t ret = adjust_channels(proc_buf_out, src_channels, buffer, dst_channels,
bytes_per_sample, frames_wr * src_channels * bytes_per_sample);
ALOG_ASSERT(ret == (frames_wr * dst_channels * bytes_per_sample));
}
return frames_wr;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static ssize_t read_and_process_frames(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer, ssize_t frames_num)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
ssize_t frames_wr = 0; /* Number of frames actually read */
size_t bytes_per_sample = audio_bytes_per_sample(stream->common.get_format(&stream->common));
void *proc_buf_out = buffer;
/* Additional channels might be added on top of main_channels:
* - aux_channels (by processing effects)
* - extra channels due to HW limitations
* In case of additional channels, we cannot work inplace
*/
size_t src_channels = in->config.channels;
size_t dst_channels = audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(in->main_channels);
bool channel_remapping_needed = (dst_channels != src_channels);
const size_t src_frame_size = src_channels * bytes_per_sample;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
const bool has_processing = in->num_preprocessors != 0;
#else
const bool has_processing = false;
#endif
/* With additional channels or processing, we need intermediate buffers */
if (channel_remapping_needed || has_processing) {
const size_t src_buffer_size = frames_num * src_frame_size;
if (in->proc_buf_size < src_buffer_size) {
in->proc_buf_size = src_buffer_size;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
/* we always reallocate both buffers in case # of effects change dynamically. */
in->proc_buf_in = realloc(in->proc_buf_in, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_in != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_in");
#endif
in->proc_buf_out = realloc(in->proc_buf_out, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_out != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_out");
}
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
proc_buf_out = in->proc_buf_out;
}
}
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
if (has_processing) {
/* since all the processing below is done in frames and using the config.channels
* as the number of channels, no changes is required in case aux_channels are present */
while (frames_wr < frames_num) {
/* first reload enough frames at the end of process input buffer */
if (in->proc_buf_frames < (size_t)frames_num) {
ssize_t frames_rd = read_frames(in,
(char *)in->proc_buf_in + in->proc_buf_frames * src_frame_size,
frames_num - in->proc_buf_frames);
if (frames_rd < 0) {
/* Return error code */
frames_wr = frames_rd;
break;
}
in->proc_buf_frames += frames_rd;
}
/* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount indicate respectively
* the maximum number of frames to be consumed and produced by process() */
audio_buffer_t in_buf;
audio_buffer_t out_buf;
in_buf.frameCount = in->proc_buf_frames;
in_buf.s16 = in->proc_buf_in; /* currently assumes PCM 16 effects */
out_buf.frameCount = frames_num - frames_wr;
out_buf.s16 = (int16_t *)proc_buf_out + frames_wr * src_channels;
/* FIXME: this works because of current pre processing library implementation that
* does the actual process only when the last enabled effect process is called.
* The generic solution is to have an output buffer for each effect and pass it as
* input to the next.
*/
for (int i = 0; i < in->num_preprocessors; i++) {
(*in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe)->process(in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe,
&in_buf,
&out_buf);
}
/* process() has updated the number of frames consumed and produced in
* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount respectively
* move remaining frames to the beginning of in->proc_buf_in */
in->proc_buf_frames -= in_buf.frameCount;
if (in->proc_buf_frames) {
memcpy(in->proc_buf_in,
(char *)in->proc_buf_in + in_buf.frameCount * src_frame_size,
in->proc_buf_frames * src_frame_size);
}
/* if not enough frames were passed to process(), read more and retry. */
if (out_buf.frameCount == 0) {
ALOGW("No frames produced by preproc");
continue;
}
if ((frames_wr + (ssize_t)out_buf.frameCount) <= frames_num) {
frames_wr += out_buf.frameCount;
} else {
/* The effect does not comply to the API. In theory, we should never end up here! */
ALOGE("preprocessing produced too many frames: %d + %zd > %d !",
(unsigned int)frames_wr, out_buf.frameCount, (unsigned int)frames_num);
frames_wr = frames_num;
}
}
}
else
#endif //PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
{
/* No processing effects attached */
frames_wr = read_frames(in, proc_buf_out, frames_num);
ALOG_ASSERT(frames_wr <= frames_num, "read more frames than requested");
}
/* check negative frames_wr (error) before channel remapping to avoid overwriting memory. */
if (channel_remapping_needed && frames_wr > 0) {
size_t ret = adjust_channels(proc_buf_out, src_channels, buffer, dst_channels,
bytes_per_sample, frames_wr * src_frame_size);
ALOG_ASSERT(ret == (frames_wr * dst_channels * bytes_per_sample));
}
return frames_wr;
}
| 173,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::ZeroTest() {
for (int i = 0; i <= 255; ++i) {
memset(src_, i, block_size_);
for (int j = 0; j <= 255; ++j) {
memset(ref_, j, block_size_);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, var) << "src values: " << i << "ref values: " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::ZeroTest() {
for (int i = 0; i <= 255; ++i) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(src_, i, block_size_);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_), i << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
for (int j = 0; j <= 255; ++j) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(ref_, j, block_size_);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_), j << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, var) << "src values: " << i << " ref values: " << j;
}
}
}
| 174,593 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: initpyfribidi (void)
{
PyObject *module;
/* XXX What should be done if we fail here? */
module = Py_InitModule3 ("pyfribidi", PyfribidiMethods,
_pyfribidi__doc__);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "RTL", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "LTR", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "ON", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON);
PyModule_AddStringConstant (module, "__author__",
"Yaacov Zamir and Nir Soffer");
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | initpyfribidi (void)
init_pyfribidi (void)
{
PyObject *module = Py_InitModule ("_pyfribidi", PyfribidiMethods);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "RTL", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "LTR", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "ON", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON);
}
| 165,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semtimedop, int, semid, struct sembuf __user *, tsops,
unsigned, nsops, const struct timespec __user *, timeout)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sembuf fast_sops[SEMOPM_FAST];
struct sembuf* sops = fast_sops, *sop;
struct sem_undo *un;
int undos = 0, alter = 0, max;
struct sem_queue queue;
unsigned long jiffies_left = 0;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
struct list_head tasks;
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
if (nsops < 1 || semid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (nsops > ns->sc_semopm)
return -E2BIG;
if(nsops > SEMOPM_FAST) {
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops)*nsops,GFP_KERNEL);
if(sops==NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user (sops, tsops, nsops * sizeof(*tsops))) {
error=-EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (timeout) {
struct timespec _timeout;
if (copy_from_user(&_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout))) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (_timeout.tv_sec < 0 || _timeout.tv_nsec < 0 ||
_timeout.tv_nsec >= 1000000000L) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
jiffies_left = timespec_to_jiffies(&_timeout);
}
max = 0;
for (sop = sops; sop < sops + nsops; sop++) {
if (sop->sem_num >= max)
max = sop->sem_num;
if (sop->sem_flg & SEM_UNDO)
undos = 1;
if (sop->sem_op != 0)
alter = 1;
}
if (undos) {
un = find_alloc_undo(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(un)) {
error = PTR_ERR(un);
goto out_free;
}
} else
un = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tasks);
rcu_read_lock();
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
if (un)
rcu_read_unlock();
error = PTR_ERR(sma);
goto out_free;
}
error = -EFBIG;
if (max >= sma->sem_nsems) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, alter ? S_IWUGO : S_IRUGO)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = security_sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
if (error) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
/*
* semid identifiers are not unique - find_alloc_undo may have
* allocated an undo structure, it was invalidated by an RMID
* and now a new array with received the same id. Check and fail.
* This case can be detected checking un->semid. The existence of
* "un" itself is guaranteed by rcu.
*/
error = -EIDRM;
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
if (un) {
if (un->semid == -1) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_unlock_free;
} else {
/*
* rcu lock can be released, "un" cannot disappear:
* - sem_lock is acquired, thus IPC_RMID is
* impossible.
* - exit_sem is impossible, it always operates on
* current (or a dead task).
*/
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
error = try_atomic_semop (sma, sops, nsops, un, task_tgid_vnr(current));
if (error <= 0) {
if (alter && error == 0)
do_smart_update(sma, sops, nsops, 1, &tasks);
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/* We need to sleep on this operation, so we put the current
* task into the pending queue and go to sleep.
*/
queue.sops = sops;
queue.nsops = nsops;
queue.undo = un;
queue.pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
queue.alter = alter;
if (nsops == 1) {
struct sem *curr;
curr = &sma->sem_base[sops->sem_num];
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
} else {
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
sma->complex_count++;
}
queue.status = -EINTR;
queue.sleeper = current;
sleep_again:
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
sem_unlock(sma);
if (timeout)
jiffies_left = schedule_timeout(jiffies_left);
else
schedule();
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
if (error != -EINTR) {
/* fast path: update_queue already obtained all requested
* resources.
* Perform a smp_mb(): User space could assume that semop()
* is a memory barrier: Without the mb(), the cpu could
* speculatively read in user space stale data that was
* overwritten by the previous owner of the semaphore.
*/
smp_mb();
goto out_free;
}
sma = sem_obtain_lock(ns, semid);
/*
* Wait until it's guaranteed that no wakeup_sem_queue_do() is ongoing.
*/
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
/*
* Array removed? If yes, leave without sem_unlock().
*/
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If queue.status != -EINTR we are woken up by another process.
* Leave without unlink_queue(), but with sem_unlock().
*/
if (error != -EINTR) {
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/*
* If an interrupt occurred we have to clean up the queue
*/
if (timeout && jiffies_left == 0)
error = -EAGAIN;
/*
* If the wakeup was spurious, just retry
*/
if (error == -EINTR && !signal_pending(current))
goto sleep_again;
unlink_queue(sma, &queue);
out_unlock_free:
sem_unlock(sma);
out_wakeup:
wake_up_sem_queue_do(&tasks);
out_free:
if(sops != fast_sops)
kfree(sops);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semtimedop, int, semid, struct sembuf __user *, tsops,
unsigned, nsops, const struct timespec __user *, timeout)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sembuf fast_sops[SEMOPM_FAST];
struct sembuf* sops = fast_sops, *sop;
struct sem_undo *un;
int undos = 0, alter = 0, max, locknum;
struct sem_queue queue;
unsigned long jiffies_left = 0;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
struct list_head tasks;
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
if (nsops < 1 || semid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (nsops > ns->sc_semopm)
return -E2BIG;
if(nsops > SEMOPM_FAST) {
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops)*nsops,GFP_KERNEL);
if(sops==NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user (sops, tsops, nsops * sizeof(*tsops))) {
error=-EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (timeout) {
struct timespec _timeout;
if (copy_from_user(&_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout))) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
if (_timeout.tv_sec < 0 || _timeout.tv_nsec < 0 ||
_timeout.tv_nsec >= 1000000000L) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
jiffies_left = timespec_to_jiffies(&_timeout);
}
max = 0;
for (sop = sops; sop < sops + nsops; sop++) {
if (sop->sem_num >= max)
max = sop->sem_num;
if (sop->sem_flg & SEM_UNDO)
undos = 1;
if (sop->sem_op != 0)
alter = 1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tasks);
if (undos) {
/* On success, find_alloc_undo takes the rcu_read_lock */
un = find_alloc_undo(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(un)) {
error = PTR_ERR(un);
goto out_free;
}
} else {
un = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
}
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
error = PTR_ERR(sma);
goto out_free;
}
error = -EFBIG;
if (max >= sma->sem_nsems) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, alter ? S_IWUGO : S_IRUGO)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
error = security_sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
if (error) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_wakeup;
}
/*
* semid identifiers are not unique - find_alloc_undo may have
* allocated an undo structure, it was invalidated by an RMID
* and now a new array with received the same id. Check and fail.
* This case can be detected checking un->semid. The existence of
* "un" itself is guaranteed by rcu.
*/
error = -EIDRM;
locknum = sem_lock(sma, sops, nsops);
if (un && un->semid == -1)
goto out_unlock_free;
error = try_atomic_semop (sma, sops, nsops, un, task_tgid_vnr(current));
if (error <= 0) {
if (alter && error == 0)
do_smart_update(sma, sops, nsops, 1, &tasks);
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/* We need to sleep on this operation, so we put the current
* task into the pending queue and go to sleep.
*/
queue.sops = sops;
queue.nsops = nsops;
queue.undo = un;
queue.pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
queue.alter = alter;
if (nsops == 1) {
struct sem *curr;
curr = &sma->sem_base[sops->sem_num];
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &curr->sem_pending);
} else {
if (alter)
list_add_tail(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
else
list_add(&queue.list, &sma->sem_pending);
sma->complex_count++;
}
queue.status = -EINTR;
queue.sleeper = current;
sleep_again:
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
sem_unlock(sma, locknum);
if (timeout)
jiffies_left = schedule_timeout(jiffies_left);
else
schedule();
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
if (error != -EINTR) {
/* fast path: update_queue already obtained all requested
* resources.
* Perform a smp_mb(): User space could assume that semop()
* is a memory barrier: Without the mb(), the cpu could
* speculatively read in user space stale data that was
* overwritten by the previous owner of the semaphore.
*/
smp_mb();
goto out_free;
}
sma = sem_obtain_lock(ns, semid, sops, nsops, &locknum);
/*
* Wait until it's guaranteed that no wakeup_sem_queue_do() is ongoing.
*/
error = get_queue_result(&queue);
/*
* Array removed? If yes, leave without sem_unlock().
*/
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If queue.status != -EINTR we are woken up by another process.
* Leave without unlink_queue(), but with sem_unlock().
*/
if (error != -EINTR) {
goto out_unlock_free;
}
/*
* If an interrupt occurred we have to clean up the queue
*/
if (timeout && jiffies_left == 0)
error = -EAGAIN;
/*
* If the wakeup was spurious, just retry
*/
if (error == -EINTR && !signal_pending(current))
goto sleep_again;
unlink_queue(sma, &queue);
out_unlock_free:
sem_unlock(sma, locknum);
out_wakeup:
wake_up_sem_queue_do(&tasks);
out_free:
if(sops != fast_sops)
kfree(sops);
return error;
}
| 165,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable(obuf);
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
if (!pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf)) {
if (ret == 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable(obuf);
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
| 170,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | ssize_t socket_write_and_transfer_fd(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count, int fd) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_FD)
return socket_write(socket, buf, count);
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
iov.iov_base = (void *)buf;
iov.iov_len = count;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
struct cmsghdr *header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
header->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
header->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(header) = fd;
ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(sendmsg(socket->fd, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT));
close(fd);
return ret;
}
| 173,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int wc_ecc_gen_k(WC_RNG* rng, int size, mp_int* k, mp_int* order)
{
int err;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
byte* buf;
#else
byte buf[ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN];
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
buf = (byte*)XMALLOC(ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (buf == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
#endif
/*generate 8 extra bytes to mitigate bias from the modulo operation below*/
/*see section A.1.2 in 'Suite B Implementor's Guide to FIPS 186-3 (ECDSA)'*/
size += 8;
/* make up random string */
err = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, buf, size);
/* load random buffer data into k */
if (err == 0)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(k, (byte*)buf, size);
/* quick sanity check to make sure we're not dealing with a 0 key */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(k) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
/* the key should be smaller than the order of base point */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_cmp(k, order) != MP_LT) {
err = mp_mod(k, order, k);
}
}
ForceZero(buf, ECC_MAXSIZE);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(buf, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int wc_ecc_gen_k(WC_RNG* rng, int size, mp_int* k, mp_int* order)
{
int err;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
byte* buf;
#else
byte buf[ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN];
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
buf = (byte*)XMALLOC(ECC_MAXSIZE_GEN, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (buf == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
#endif
/*generate 8 extra bytes to mitigate bias from the modulo operation below*/
/*see section A.1.2 in 'Suite B Implementor's Guide to FIPS 186-3 (ECDSA)'*/
size += 8;
/* make up random string */
err = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, buf, size);
/* load random buffer data into k */
if (err == 0)
err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(k, (byte*)buf, size);
/* the key should be smaller than the order of base point */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_cmp(k, order) != MP_LT) {
err = mp_mod(k, order, k);
}
}
/* quick sanity check to make sure we're not dealing with a 0 key */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(k) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
ForceZero(buf, ECC_MAXSIZE);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(buf, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
#endif
return err;
}
| 169,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCookies(
std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&ClearCookiesOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void NetworkHandler::ClearBrowserCookies(
std::unique_ptr<ClearBrowserCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&ClearCookiesOnIO,
base::Unretained(storage_partition_->GetURLRequestContext()),
std::move(callback)));
}
| 172,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual uint8_t* GetReference(int block_idx) {
return reference_data_ + block_idx * kDataBlockSize;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual uint8_t* GetReference(int block_idx) {
virtual uint8_t *GetReference(int block_idx) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (use_high_bit_depth_)
return CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(reference_data_) +
block_idx * kDataBlockSize);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
return reference_data_ + block_idx * kDataBlockSize;
}
| 174,573 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: alloc_limit_failure (char *fn_name, size_t size)
{
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Maximum allocation size exceeded "
"(maxsize = %lu; size = %lu).\n",
fn_name,
(unsigned long)alloc_limit,
(unsigned long)size);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | alloc_limit_failure (char *fn_name, size_t size)
{
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Maximum allocation size exceeded "
"(maxsize = %lu; size = %lu).\n",
fn_name,
(unsigned long)alloc_limit,
(unsigned long)size);
}
| 168,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | uint64 Clipboard::GetSequenceNumber(Buffer buffer) {
if (buffer == BUFFER_STANDARD)
return SelectionChangeObserver::GetInstance()->clipboard_sequence_number();
else
return SelectionChangeObserver::GetInstance()->primary_sequence_number();
}
| 170,962 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int usb_parse_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int cfgidx,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
int cfgno;
int nintf, nintf_orig;
int i, j, n;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
unsigned char *buffer2;
int size2;
struct usb_descriptor_header *header;
int len, retval;
u8 inums[USB_MAXINTERFACES], nalts[USB_MAXINTERFACES];
unsigned iad_num = 0;
memcpy(&config->desc, buffer, USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE);
if (config->desc.bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CONFIG ||
config->desc.bLength < USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE ||
config->desc.bLength > size) {
dev_err(ddev, "invalid descriptor for config index %d: "
"type = 0x%X, length = %d\n", cfgidx,
config->desc.bDescriptorType, config->desc.bLength);
return -EINVAL;
}
cfgno = config->desc.bConfigurationValue;
buffer += config->desc.bLength;
size -= config->desc.bLength;
nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
if (nintf > USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has too many interfaces: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, nintf, USB_MAXINTERFACES);
nintf = USB_MAXINTERFACES;
}
/* Go through the descriptors, checking their length and counting the
* number of altsettings for each interface */
n = 0;
for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size);
size2 > 0;
(buffer2 += header->bLength, size2 -= header->bLength)) {
if (size2 < sizeof(struct usb_descriptor_header)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d descriptor has %d excess "
"byte%s, ignoring\n",
cfgno, size2, plural(size2));
break;
}
header = (struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer2;
if ((header->bLength > size2) || (header->bLength < 2)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid descriptor "
"of length %d, skipping remainder of the config\n",
cfgno, header->bLength);
break;
}
if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_INTERFACE) {
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) header;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface descriptor of length %d, "
"skipping\n", cfgno, d->bLength);
continue;
}
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
if ((dev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_HONOR_BNUMINTERFACES) &&
n >= nintf_orig) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has more interface "
"descriptors, than it declares in "
"bNumInterfaces, ignoring interface "
"number: %d\n", cfgno, inum);
continue;
}
if (inum >= nintf_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface number: %d but max is %d\n",
cfgno, inum, nintf_orig - 1);
/* Have we already encountered this interface?
* Count its altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum)
break;
}
if (i < n) {
if (nalts[i] < 255)
++nalts[i];
} else if (n < USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
inums[n] = inum;
nalts[n] = 1;
++n;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType ==
USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION) {
if (iad_num == USB_MAXIADS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "found more Interface "
"Association Descriptors "
"than allocated for in "
"configuration %d\n", cfgno);
} else {
config->intf_assoc[iad_num] =
(struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor
*)header;
iad_num++;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_DEVICE ||
header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CONFIG)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d contains an unexpected "
"descriptor of type 0x%X, skipping\n",
cfgno, header->bDescriptorType);
} /* for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size); ...) */
size = buffer2 - buffer;
config->desc.wTotalLength = cpu_to_le16(buffer2 - buffer0);
if (n != nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has %d interface%s, different from "
"the descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, n, plural(n), nintf_orig);
else if (n == 0)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interfaces?\n", cfgno);
config->desc.bNumInterfaces = nintf = n;
/* Check for missing interface numbers */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < nintf; ++j) {
if (inums[j] == i)
break;
}
if (j >= nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interface number "
"%d\n", cfgno, i);
}
/* Allocate the usb_interface_caches and altsetting arrays */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
j = nalts[i];
if (j > USB_MAXALTSETTING) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many alternate settings for "
"config %d interface %d: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inums[i], j, USB_MAXALTSETTING);
nalts[i] = j = USB_MAXALTSETTING;
}
len = sizeof(*intfc) + sizeof(struct usb_host_interface) * j;
config->intf_cache[i] = intfc = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!intfc)
return -ENOMEM;
kref_init(&intfc->ref);
}
/* FIXME: parse the BOS descriptor */
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first interface descriptor */
config->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
config->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "configuration");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Parse all the interface/altsetting descriptors */
while (size > 0) {
retval = usb_parse_interface(ddev, cfgno, config,
buffer, size, inums, nalts);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
/* Check for missing altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
for (j = 0; j < intfc->num_altsetting; ++j) {
for (n = 0; n < intfc->num_altsetting; ++n) {
if (intfc->altsetting[n].desc.
bAlternateSetting == j)
break;
}
if (n >= intfc->num_altsetting)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d has no "
"altsetting %d\n", cfgno, inums[i], j);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix out-of-bounds in usb_set_configuration
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface
association descriptor. He writes:
It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION
descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in
usb_parse_configuration(), so find_iad() might do out-of-bounds access
to intf_assoc->bInterfaceCount.
And he's right, we don't check for crazy descriptors of this type very well, so
resolve this problem. Yet another issue found by syzkaller...
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int usb_parse_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int cfgidx,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
int cfgno;
int nintf, nintf_orig;
int i, j, n;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
unsigned char *buffer2;
int size2;
struct usb_descriptor_header *header;
int len, retval;
u8 inums[USB_MAXINTERFACES], nalts[USB_MAXINTERFACES];
unsigned iad_num = 0;
memcpy(&config->desc, buffer, USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE);
if (config->desc.bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CONFIG ||
config->desc.bLength < USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE ||
config->desc.bLength > size) {
dev_err(ddev, "invalid descriptor for config index %d: "
"type = 0x%X, length = %d\n", cfgidx,
config->desc.bDescriptorType, config->desc.bLength);
return -EINVAL;
}
cfgno = config->desc.bConfigurationValue;
buffer += config->desc.bLength;
size -= config->desc.bLength;
nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
if (nintf > USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has too many interfaces: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, nintf, USB_MAXINTERFACES);
nintf = USB_MAXINTERFACES;
}
/* Go through the descriptors, checking their length and counting the
* number of altsettings for each interface */
n = 0;
for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size);
size2 > 0;
(buffer2 += header->bLength, size2 -= header->bLength)) {
if (size2 < sizeof(struct usb_descriptor_header)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d descriptor has %d excess "
"byte%s, ignoring\n",
cfgno, size2, plural(size2));
break;
}
header = (struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer2;
if ((header->bLength > size2) || (header->bLength < 2)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid descriptor "
"of length %d, skipping remainder of the config\n",
cfgno, header->bLength);
break;
}
if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_INTERFACE) {
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) header;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface descriptor of length %d, "
"skipping\n", cfgno, d->bLength);
continue;
}
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
if ((dev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_HONOR_BNUMINTERFACES) &&
n >= nintf_orig) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has more interface "
"descriptors, than it declares in "
"bNumInterfaces, ignoring interface "
"number: %d\n", cfgno, inum);
continue;
}
if (inum >= nintf_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface number: %d but max is %d\n",
cfgno, inum, nintf_orig - 1);
/* Have we already encountered this interface?
* Count its altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum)
break;
}
if (i < n) {
if (nalts[i] < 255)
++nalts[i];
} else if (n < USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
inums[n] = inum;
nalts[n] = 1;
++n;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType ==
USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION) {
struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *d;
d = (struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *)header;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE) {
dev_warn(ddev,
"config %d has an invalid interface association descriptor of length %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, d->bLength);
continue;
}
if (iad_num == USB_MAXIADS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "found more Interface "
"Association Descriptors "
"than allocated for in "
"configuration %d\n", cfgno);
} else {
config->intf_assoc[iad_num] = d;
iad_num++;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_DEVICE ||
header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CONFIG)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d contains an unexpected "
"descriptor of type 0x%X, skipping\n",
cfgno, header->bDescriptorType);
} /* for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size); ...) */
size = buffer2 - buffer;
config->desc.wTotalLength = cpu_to_le16(buffer2 - buffer0);
if (n != nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has %d interface%s, different from "
"the descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, n, plural(n), nintf_orig);
else if (n == 0)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interfaces?\n", cfgno);
config->desc.bNumInterfaces = nintf = n;
/* Check for missing interface numbers */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < nintf; ++j) {
if (inums[j] == i)
break;
}
if (j >= nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interface number "
"%d\n", cfgno, i);
}
/* Allocate the usb_interface_caches and altsetting arrays */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
j = nalts[i];
if (j > USB_MAXALTSETTING) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many alternate settings for "
"config %d interface %d: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inums[i], j, USB_MAXALTSETTING);
nalts[i] = j = USB_MAXALTSETTING;
}
len = sizeof(*intfc) + sizeof(struct usb_host_interface) * j;
config->intf_cache[i] = intfc = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!intfc)
return -ENOMEM;
kref_init(&intfc->ref);
}
/* FIXME: parse the BOS descriptor */
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first interface descriptor */
config->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
config->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "configuration");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Parse all the interface/altsetting descriptors */
while (size > 0) {
retval = usb_parse_interface(ddev, cfgno, config,
buffer, size, inums, nalts);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
/* Check for missing altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
for (j = 0; j < intfc->num_altsetting; ++j) {
for (n = 0; n < intfc->num_altsetting; ++n) {
if (intfc->altsetting[n].desc.
bAlternateSetting == j)
break;
}
if (n >= intfc->num_altsetting)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d has no "
"altsetting %d\n", cfgno, inums[i], j);
}
}
return 0;
}
| 167,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
| 172,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_perform_op(cib_t * cib, const char *op, const char *host, const char *section,
xmlNode * data, xmlNode ** output_data, int call_options, const char *name)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
xmlNode *op_msg = NULL;
xmlNode *op_reply = NULL;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (sync_timer == NULL) {
sync_timer = calloc(1, sizeof(struct timer_rec_s));
}
if (cib->state == cib_disconnected) {
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (output_data != NULL) {
*output_data = NULL;
}
if (op == NULL) {
crm_err("No operation specified");
return -EINVAL;
}
cib->call_id++;
/* prevent call_id from being negative (or zero) and conflicting
* with the cib_errors enum
* use 2 because we use it as (cib->call_id - 1) below
*/
if (cib->call_id < 1) {
cib->call_id = 1;
}
op_msg =
cib_create_op(cib->call_id, private->callback.token, op, host, section, data, call_options,
NULL);
if (op_msg == NULL) {
return -EPROTO;
}
crm_trace("Sending %s message to CIB service", op);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, op_msg, private->command.encrypted);
free_xml(op_msg);
if ((call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
crm_trace("Discarding reply");
return pcmk_ok;
} else if (!(call_options & cib_sync_call)) {
return cib->call_id;
}
crm_trace("Waiting for a syncronous reply");
if (cib->call_timeout > 0) {
/* We need this, even with msgfromIPC_timeout(), because we might
* get other/older replies that don't match the active request
*/
timer_expired = FALSE;
sync_timer->call_id = cib->call_id;
sync_timer->timeout = cib->call_timeout * 1000;
sync_timer->ref = g_timeout_add(sync_timer->timeout, cib_timeout_handler, sync_timer);
}
while (timer_expired == FALSE) {
int reply_id = -1;
int msg_id = cib->call_id;
op_reply = crm_recv_remote_msg(private->command.session, private->command.encrypted);
if (op_reply == NULL) {
break;
}
crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLID, &reply_id);
CRM_CHECK(reply_id > 0, free_xml(op_reply);
if (sync_timer->ref > 0) {
g_source_remove(sync_timer->ref); sync_timer->ref = 0;}
return -ENOMSG) ;
if (reply_id == msg_id) {
break;
} else if (reply_id < msg_id) {
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else if ((reply_id - 10000) > msg_id) {
/* wrap-around case */
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else {
crm_err("Received a __future__ reply:" " %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
}
free_xml(op_reply);
op_reply = NULL;
}
if (sync_timer->ref > 0) {
g_source_remove(sync_timer->ref);
sync_timer->ref = 0;
}
if (timer_expired) {
return -ETIME;
}
/* if(IPC_ISRCONN(native->command_channel) == FALSE) { */
/* crm_err("CIB disconnected: %d", */
/* native->command_channel->ch_status); */
/* cib->state = cib_disconnected; */
/* } */
if (op_reply == NULL) {
crm_err("No reply message - empty");
return -ENOMSG;
}
crm_trace("Syncronous reply received");
/* Start processing the reply... */
if (crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_RC, &rc) != 0) {
rc = -EPROTO;
}
if (rc == -pcmk_err_diff_resync) {
/* This is an internal value that clients do not and should not care about */
rc = pcmk_ok;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EPERM) {
crm_log_xml_debug(op_reply, "passed");
} else {
/* } else if(rc == -ETIME) { */
crm_err("Call failed: %s", pcmk_strerror(rc));
crm_log_xml_warn(op_reply, "failed");
}
if (output_data == NULL) {
/* do nothing more */
} else if (!(call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
xmlNode *tmp = get_message_xml(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLDATA);
if (tmp == NULL) {
crm_trace("No output in reply to \"%s\" command %d", op, cib->call_id - 1);
} else {
*output_data = copy_xml(tmp);
}
}
free_xml(op_reply);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_remote_perform_op(cib_t * cib, const char *op, const char *host, const char *section,
xmlNode * data, xmlNode ** output_data, int call_options, const char *name)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
int disconnected = 0;
int remaining_time = 0;
time_t start_time;
xmlNode *op_msg = NULL;
xmlNode *op_reply = NULL;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (cib->state == cib_disconnected) {
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (output_data != NULL) {
*output_data = NULL;
}
if (op == NULL) {
crm_err("No operation specified");
return -EINVAL;
}
cib->call_id++;
/* prevent call_id from being negative (or zero) and conflicting
* with the cib_errors enum
* use 2 because we use it as (cib->call_id - 1) below
*/
if (cib->call_id < 1) {
cib->call_id = 1;
}
op_msg =
cib_create_op(cib->call_id, private->callback.token, op, host, section, data, call_options,
NULL);
if (op_msg == NULL) {
return -EPROTO;
}
crm_trace("Sending %s message to CIB service", op);
if (!(call_options & cib_sync_call)) {
crm_send_remote_msg(private->callback.session, op_msg, private->command.encrypted);
} else {
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, op_msg, private->command.encrypted);
}
free_xml(op_msg);
if ((call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
crm_trace("Discarding reply");
return pcmk_ok;
} else if (!(call_options & cib_sync_call)) {
return cib->call_id;
}
crm_trace("Waiting for a syncronous reply");
start_time = time(NULL);
remaining_time = cib->call_timeout ? cib->call_timeout : 60;
while (remaining_time > 0 && !disconnected) {
int reply_id = -1;
int msg_id = cib->call_id;
crm_recv_remote_msg(private->command.session, &private->command.recv_buf, private->command.encrypted, remaining_time * 1000, &disconnected);
op_reply = crm_parse_remote_buffer(&private->command.recv_buf);
if (!op_reply) {
break;
}
crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLID, &reply_id);
if (reply_id == msg_id) {
break;
} else if (reply_id < msg_id) {
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else if ((reply_id - 10000) > msg_id) {
/* wrap-around case */
crm_debug("Received old reply: %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
crm_log_xml_trace(op_reply, "Old reply");
} else {
crm_err("Received a __future__ reply:" " %d (wanted %d)", reply_id, msg_id);
}
free_xml(op_reply);
op_reply = NULL;
/* wasn't the right reply, try and read some more */
remaining_time = time(NULL) - start_time;
}
/* if(IPC_ISRCONN(native->command_channel) == FALSE) { */
/* crm_err("CIB disconnected: %d", */
/* native->command_channel->ch_status); */
/* cib->state = cib_disconnected; */
/* } */
if (disconnected) {
crm_err("Disconnected while waiting for reply.");
return -ENOTCONN;
} else if (op_reply == NULL) {
crm_err("No reply message - empty");
return -ENOMSG;
}
crm_trace("Syncronous reply received");
/* Start processing the reply... */
if (crm_element_value_int(op_reply, F_CIB_RC, &rc) != 0) {
rc = -EPROTO;
}
if (rc == -pcmk_err_diff_resync) {
/* This is an internal value that clients do not and should not care about */
rc = pcmk_ok;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EPERM) {
crm_log_xml_debug(op_reply, "passed");
} else {
/* } else if(rc == -ETIME) { */
crm_err("Call failed: %s", pcmk_strerror(rc));
crm_log_xml_warn(op_reply, "failed");
}
if (output_data == NULL) {
/* do nothing more */
} else if (!(call_options & cib_discard_reply)) {
xmlNode *tmp = get_message_xml(op_reply, F_CIB_CALLDATA);
if (tmp == NULL) {
crm_trace("No output in reply to \"%s\" command %d", op, cib->call_id - 1);
} else {
*output_data = copy_xml(tmp);
}
}
free_xml(op_reply);
return rc;
}
| 166,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fill_autodev(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs)
{
int ret;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int i;
mode_t cmask;
INFO("Creating initial consoles under container /dev");
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
ERROR("Error calculating container /dev location");
return -1;
}
if (!dir_exists(path)) // ignore, just don't try to fill in
return 0;
INFO("Populating container /dev");
cmask = umask(S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(lxc_devs) / sizeof(lxc_devs[0]); i++) {
const struct lxc_devs *d = &lxc_devs[i];
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
ret = mknod(path, d->mode, makedev(d->maj, d->min));
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
char hostpath[MAXPATHLEN];
FILE *pathfile;
ret = snprintf(hostpath, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/%s", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
pathfile = fopen(path, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create device mount target '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
fclose(pathfile);
if (mount(hostpath, path, 0, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed bind mounting device %s from host into container",
d->name);
return -1;
}
}
}
umask(cmask);
INFO("Populated container /dev");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static int fill_autodev(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs)
{
int ret;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
int i;
mode_t cmask;
INFO("Creating initial consoles under container /dev");
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
ERROR("Error calculating container /dev location");
return -1;
}
if (!dir_exists(path)) // ignore, just don't try to fill in
return 0;
INFO("Populating container /dev");
cmask = umask(S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(lxc_devs) / sizeof(lxc_devs[0]); i++) {
const struct lxc_devs *d = &lxc_devs[i];
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
ret = mknod(path, d->mode, makedev(d->maj, d->min));
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
char hostpath[MAXPATHLEN];
FILE *pathfile;
ret = snprintf(hostpath, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/%s", d->name);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
pathfile = fopen(path, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create device mount target '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
fclose(pathfile);
if (safe_mount(hostpath, path, 0, MS_BIND, NULL,
rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : NULL) != 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed bind mounting device %s from host into container",
d->name);
return -1;
}
}
}
umask(cmask);
INFO("Populated container /dev");
return 0;
}
| 166,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
/*
* Can't pass hstate in here because it is called from the
* compound page destructor.
*/
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(page);
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
struct address_space *mapping;
mapping = (struct address_space *) page_private(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(page_mapcount(page));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid] && huge_page_order(h) < MAX_ORDER) {
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->surplus_huge_pages--;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
} else {
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (mapping)
hugetlb_put_quota(mapping, 1);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
/*
* Can't pass hstate in here because it is called from the
* compound page destructor.
*/
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(page);
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
struct hugepage_subpool *spool =
(struct hugepage_subpool *)page_private(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(page_mapcount(page));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid] && huge_page_order(h) < MAX_ORDER) {
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->surplus_huge_pages--;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
} else {
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
}
| 165,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return;
if ((algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if ((algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
static inline bool mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return false;
*type |= algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
*mask |= algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if (*type & *mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL)
return true;
else
return false;
}
| 168,520 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreateSimpleArtifactWithOpacity(TestPaintArtifact& artifact,
float opacity,
bool include_preceding_chunk,
bool include_subsequent_chunk) {
if (include_preceding_chunk)
AddSimpleRectChunk(artifact);
auto effect = CreateOpacityEffect(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(), opacity);
artifact
.Chunk(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(), effect)
.RectDrawing(FloatRect(0, 0, 100, 100), Color::kBlack);
if (include_subsequent_chunk)
AddSimpleRectChunk(artifact);
Update(artifact.Build());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | void CreateSimpleArtifactWithOpacity(TestPaintArtifact& artifact,
float opacity,
bool include_preceding_chunk,
bool include_subsequent_chunk) {
if (include_preceding_chunk)
AddSimpleRectChunk(artifact);
auto effect = CreateOpacityEffect(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(), opacity);
artifact.Chunk(t0(), c0(), *effect)
.RectDrawing(FloatRect(0, 0, 100, 100), Color::kBlack);
if (include_subsequent_chunk)
AddSimpleRectChunk(artifact);
Update(artifact.Build());
}
| 171,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const String& source,
Document* owner_document) {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!document_loader_ ||
document->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReplaceDocumentViaJavaScriptURL);
const KURL& url = document->Url();
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy =
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(url)
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew;
StopAllLoaders();
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(document);
frame_->DetachChildren();
if (!frame_->IsAttached() || document != frame_->GetDocument())
return;
frame_->GetDocument()->Shutdown();
Client()->TransitionToCommittedForNewPage();
document_loader_->ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy, source);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | void FrameLoader::ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
const String& source,
Document* owner_document) {
Document* document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!document_loader_ ||
document->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReplaceDocumentViaJavaScriptURL);
const KURL& url = document->Url();
// The document CSP is the correct one as it is used for CSP checks
// done previously before getting here:
// HTMLFormElement::ScheduleFormSubmission
// HTMLFrameElementBase::OpenURL
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy =
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(url, document->GetContentSecurityPolicy())
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew;
StopAllLoaders();
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(document);
frame_->DetachChildren();
if (!frame_->IsAttached() || document != frame_->GetDocument())
return;
frame_->GetDocument()->Shutdown();
Client()->TransitionToCommittedForNewPage();
document_loader_->ReplaceDocumentWhileExecutingJavaScriptURL(
url, owner_document, global_object_reuse_policy, source);
}
| 173,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ServiceManagerContext::ServiceManagerContext() {
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest packaged_services_request;
if (service_manager::ServiceManagerIsRemote()) {
auto invitation =
mojo::edk::IncomingBrokerClientInvitation::AcceptFromCommandLine(
mojo::edk::TransportProtocol::kLegacy);
packaged_services_request =
service_manager::GetServiceRequestFromCommandLine(invitation.get());
} else {
std::unique_ptr<BuiltinManifestProvider> manifest_provider =
base::MakeUnique<BuiltinManifestProvider>();
static const struct ManifestInfo {
const char* name;
int resource_id;
} kManifests[] = {
{mojom::kBrowserServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_BROWSER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kGpuServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_GPU_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPackagedServicesServiceName,
IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PACKAGED_SERVICES_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPluginServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PLUGIN_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kRendererServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_RENDERER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kUtilityServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_UTILITY_MANIFEST},
{catalog::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CATALOG_MANIFEST},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kManifests); ++i) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(kManifests[i].name,
kManifests[i].resource_id);
}
for (const auto& manifest :
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetExtraServiceManifests()) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(manifest.name,
manifest.resource_id);
}
in_process_context_ = new InProcessServiceManagerContext;
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr packaged_services_service;
packaged_services_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&packaged_services_service);
in_process_context_->Start(packaged_services_service.PassInterface(),
std::move(manifest_provider));
}
packaged_services_connection_ = ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
std::move(packaged_services_request),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr root_browser_service;
ServiceManagerConnection::SetForProcess(ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_browser_service),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)));
auto* browser_connection = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess();
service_manager::mojom::PIDReceiverPtr pid_receiver;
packaged_services_connection_->GetConnector()->StartService(
service_manager::Identity(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
service_manager::mojom::kRootUserID),
std::move(root_browser_service), mojo::MakeRequest(&pid_receiver));
pid_receiver->SetPID(base::GetCurrentProcId());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo device_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
base::android::ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> java_nfc_delegate;
java_nfc_delegate.Reset(Java_ContentNfcDelegate_create(env));
DCHECK(!java_nfc_delegate.is_null());
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO),
base::Bind(&WakeLockContextHost::GetNativeViewForContext),
std::move(java_nfc_delegate));
#else
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
#endif
device_info.task_runner = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(device::mojom::kServiceName,
device_info);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGlobalResourceCoordinator)) {
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo resource_coordinator_info;
resource_coordinator_info.factory =
base::Bind(&resource_coordinator::ResourceCoordinatorService::Create);
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, resource_coordinator_info);
}
ContentBrowserClient::StaticServiceMap services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterInProcessServices(&services);
for (const auto& entry : services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(entry.first,
entry.second);
}
g_io_thread_connector.Get() = browser_connection->GetConnector()->Clone();
ContentBrowserClient::OutOfProcessServiceMap out_of_process_services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterOutOfProcessServices(
&out_of_process_services);
out_of_process_services[data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Data Decoder Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
bool network_service_enabled =
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService);
if (network_service_enabled) {
out_of_process_services[content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Network Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NETWORK};
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(video_capture::kMojoVideoCapture)) {
out_of_process_services[video_capture::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Video Capture Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_UTILITY_PROCESS)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kMediaServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Media Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
#endif
for (const auto& service : out_of_process_services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
service.first, base::Bind(&StartServiceInUtilityProcess, service.first,
service.second.first, service.second.second));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_GPU_PROCESS)
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
media::mojom::kMediaServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess, media::mojom::kMediaServiceName));
#endif
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess,
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName));
packaged_services_connection_->Start();
RegisterCommonBrowserInterfaces(browser_connection);
browser_connection->Start();
if (network_service_enabled) {
browser_connection->GetConnector()->StartService(
mojom::kNetworkServiceName);
}
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ServiceManagerContext::ServiceManagerContext() {
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest packaged_services_request;
if (service_manager::ServiceManagerIsRemote()) {
auto invitation =
mojo::edk::IncomingBrokerClientInvitation::AcceptFromCommandLine(
mojo::edk::TransportProtocol::kLegacy);
packaged_services_request =
service_manager::GetServiceRequestFromCommandLine(invitation.get());
} else {
std::unique_ptr<BuiltinManifestProvider> manifest_provider =
base::MakeUnique<BuiltinManifestProvider>();
static const struct ManifestInfo {
const char* name;
int resource_id;
} kManifests[] = {
{mojom::kBrowserServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_BROWSER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kGpuServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_GPU_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPackagedServicesServiceName,
IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PACKAGED_SERVICES_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPluginServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PLUGIN_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kRendererServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_RENDERER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kUtilityServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_UTILITY_MANIFEST},
{catalog::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CATALOG_MANIFEST},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kManifests); ++i) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(kManifests[i].name,
kManifests[i].resource_id);
}
for (const auto& manifest :
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetExtraServiceManifests()) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(manifest.name,
manifest.resource_id);
}
in_process_context_ = new InProcessServiceManagerContext;
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr packaged_services_service;
packaged_services_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&packaged_services_service);
in_process_context_->Start(packaged_services_service.PassInterface(),
std::move(manifest_provider));
}
packaged_services_connection_ = ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
std::move(packaged_services_request),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr root_browser_service;
ServiceManagerConnection::SetForProcess(ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_browser_service),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)));
auto* browser_connection = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess();
service_manager::mojom::PIDReceiverPtr pid_receiver;
packaged_services_connection_->GetConnector()->StartService(
service_manager::Identity(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
service_manager::mojom::kRootUserID),
std::move(root_browser_service), mojo::MakeRequest(&pid_receiver));
pid_receiver->SetPID(base::GetCurrentProcId());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo device_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
base::android::ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> java_nfc_delegate;
java_nfc_delegate.Reset(Java_ContentNfcDelegate_create(env));
DCHECK(!java_nfc_delegate.is_null());
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO),
base::Bind(&WakeLockContextHost::GetNativeViewForContext),
std::move(java_nfc_delegate));
#else
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
#endif
device_info.task_runner = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(device::mojom::kServiceName,
device_info);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGlobalResourceCoordinator)) {
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo resource_coordinator_info;
resource_coordinator_info.factory =
base::Bind(&resource_coordinator::ResourceCoordinatorService::Create);
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, resource_coordinator_info);
}
ContentBrowserClient::StaticServiceMap services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterInProcessServices(&services);
for (const auto& entry : services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(entry.first,
entry.second);
}
g_io_thread_connector.Get() = browser_connection->GetConnector()->Clone();
ContentBrowserClient::OutOfProcessServiceMap out_of_process_services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterOutOfProcessServices(
&out_of_process_services);
out_of_process_services[data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Data Decoder Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
bool network_service_enabled =
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService);
if (network_service_enabled) {
out_of_process_services[content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Network Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NETWORK};
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(video_capture::kMojoVideoCapture)) {
out_of_process_services[video_capture::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Video Capture Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_UTILITY_PROCESS)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kMediaServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Media Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_STANDALONE_CDM_SERVICE)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kCdmServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Content Decryption Module Service"),
SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
#endif
for (const auto& service : out_of_process_services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
service.first, base::Bind(&StartServiceInUtilityProcess, service.first,
service.second.first, service.second.second));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_GPU_PROCESS)
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
media::mojom::kMediaServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess, media::mojom::kMediaServiceName));
#endif
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess,
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName));
packaged_services_connection_->Start();
RegisterCommonBrowserInterfaces(browser_connection);
browser_connection->Start();
if (network_service_enabled) {
browser_connection->GetConnector()->StartService(
mojom::kNetworkServiceName);
}
}
| 171,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CancelPendingTask() {
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | CancelPendingTask() {
| 173,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int check_pmd_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
const nodemask_t *nodes, unsigned long flags,
void *private)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
if (check_pte_range(vma, pmd, addr, next, nodes,
flags, private))
return -EIO;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static inline int check_pmd_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
const nodemask_t *nodes, unsigned long flags,
void *private)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
if (pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
if (check_pte_range(vma, pmd, addr, next, nodes,
flags, private))
return -EIO;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 0;
}
| 165,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *)
(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET);
struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb;
unsigned int blocksize;
if (F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC != le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Magic Mismatch, valid(0x%x) - read(0x%x)",
F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB page cache size */
if (F2FS_BLKSIZE != PAGE_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid page_cache_size (%lu), supports only 4KB\n",
PAGE_SIZE);
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB block size */
blocksize = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
if (blocksize != F2FS_BLKSIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid blocksize (%u), supports only 4KB\n",
blocksize);
return 1;
}
/* check log blocks per segment */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg) != 9) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log blocks per segment (%u)\n",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support 512/1024/2048/4096 bytes sector size */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) >
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) <
F2FS_MIN_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Invalid log sectorsize (%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block) +
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) !=
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log sectors per block(%u) log sectorsize(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino) != 3) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid Fs Meta Ino: node(%u) meta(%u) root(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino));
return 1;
}
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check segment count
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *)
(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET);
struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb;
unsigned int blocksize;
if (F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC != le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Magic Mismatch, valid(0x%x) - read(0x%x)",
F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB page cache size */
if (F2FS_BLKSIZE != PAGE_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid page_cache_size (%lu), supports only 4KB\n",
PAGE_SIZE);
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support only 4KB block size */
blocksize = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize);
if (blocksize != F2FS_BLKSIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid blocksize (%u), supports only 4KB\n",
blocksize);
return 1;
}
/* check log blocks per segment */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg) != 9) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log blocks per segment (%u)\n",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg));
return 1;
}
/* Currently, support 512/1024/2048/4096 bytes sector size */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) >
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) <
F2FS_MIN_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Invalid log sectorsize (%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block) +
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) !=
F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid log sectors per block(%u) log sectorsize(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectors_per_block),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize));
return 1;
}
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino) != 3) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid Fs Meta Ino: node(%u) meta(%u) root(%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino),
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino));
return 1;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count) > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Invalid segment count (%u)",
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count));
return 1;
}
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 168,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
int sigalg_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
}
# endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
if (limit - data < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
if (limit - data != len)
goto err;
while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (limit - data < size)
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
# endif
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned char *sdata;
int servname_type;
int dsize;
if (size < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3) {
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata, len);
dsize -= 3;
if (len > dsize)
goto err;
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type) {
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
goto err;
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
(char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
dsize -= len;
}
if (dsize != 0)
goto err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
goto err;
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
goto err;
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
goto err;
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
goto err;
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
ellipticcurvelist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
ellipticcurvelist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
}
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
else
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
int dsize;
if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
goto err;
sigalg_seen = 1;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
goto err;
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
goto err;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
if (size < 5)
goto err;
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *sdata;
int dsize;
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
while (dsize > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
goto err;
}
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0) {
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
goto err;
}
}
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
*/
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
data += size;
}
/* Spurious data on the end */
if (data != limit)
goto err;
*p = data;
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
int sigalg_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
}
# endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
if (limit - data < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
if (limit - data != len)
goto err;
while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (limit - data < size)
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
# endif
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned char *sdata;
int servname_type;
int dsize;
if (size < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3) {
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata, len);
dsize -= 3;
if (len > dsize)
goto err;
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type) {
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
goto err;
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
(char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
dsize -= len;
}
if (dsize != 0)
goto err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
goto err;
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
goto err;
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
goto err;
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
goto err;
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
ellipticcurvelist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
ellipticcurvelist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
}
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
else
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
int dsize;
if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
goto err;
sigalg_seen = 1;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
goto err;
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
goto err;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
if (size < 5)
goto err;
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *sdata;
int dsize;
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (dsize > 0) {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
}
while (dsize > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0) {
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
goto err;
}
}
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
*/
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
data += size;
}
/* Spurious data on the end */
if (data != limit)
goto err;
*p = data;
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
| 164,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MaxTextExtent],
text[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
*indexes;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++)
if (depth >= 64)
break;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) type;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
blue,
green,
index,
opacity,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
index=0.0;
opacity=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&opacity);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
index*=0.01*range;
opacity*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.index=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (index+0.5),
range);
pixel.opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (opacity+
0.5),range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes,pixel.index);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,pixel.opacity);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/713
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MaxTextExtent],
text[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
*indexes;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if ((max_value == 0) || (max_value > 4294967295))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) type;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
blue,
green,
index,
opacity,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
index=0.0;
opacity=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&opacity);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
index*=0.01*range;
opacity*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.index=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (index+0.5),
range);
pixel.opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (opacity+
0.5),range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes,pixel.index);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,pixel.opacity);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 167,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: network_init ()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
char *ca_path, *ca_path2;
gnutls_global_init ();
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (&gnutls_xcred);
ca_path = string_expand_home (CONFIG_STRING(config_network_gnutls_ca_file));
if (ca_path)
{
ca_path2 = string_replace (ca_path, "%h", weechat_home);
if (ca_path2)
{
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file (gnutls_xcred, ca_path2,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free (ca_path2);
}
free (ca_path);
}
gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_set_certificates);
network_init_ok = 1;
gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | network_init ()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
char *ca_path, *ca_path2;
gnutls_global_init ();
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (&gnutls_xcred);
ca_path = string_expand_home (CONFIG_STRING(config_network_gnutls_ca_file));
if (ca_path)
{
ca_path2 = string_replace (ca_path, "%h", weechat_home);
if (ca_path2)
{
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file (gnutls_xcred, ca_path2,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free (ca_path2);
}
free (ca_path);
}
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_verify_certificates);
gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_set_certificates);
network_init_ok = 1;
gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
#endif
}
| 164,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) //pixel width
{
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x3A) //pixel height
{
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0383E3) //frame rate
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
VideoTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) // error
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long VideoTrack::Parse(
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) { // pixel width
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x3A) { // pixel height
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0383E3) { // frame rate
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
| 174,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn);
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: iommu: fix the third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages (CVE-2014-3601)
The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong,
It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'.
By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to
go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size.
Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never
unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS.
Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case,
because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus
allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot
happen because of the condition that can trigger the error:
- out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page)
should not be possible for the attacker to trigger
- when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn
will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside
kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The
page thus would not be unpinned at all.
Reported-by: Jack Morgenstein <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags = IOMMU_READ;
if (!(slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
flags |= IOMMU_WRITE;
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_noncoherent)
flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
while (gfn < end_gfn) {
unsigned long page_size;
/* Check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn))) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Get the page size we could use to map */
page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
/* Make sure the page_size does not exceed the memslot */
while ((gfn + (page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) > end_gfn)
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure gfn is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while ((gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/* Make sure hva is aligned to the page size we want to map */
while (__gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn) & (page_size - 1))
page_size >>= 1;
/*
* Pin all pages we are about to map in memory. This is
* important because we unmap and unpin in 4kb steps later.
*/
pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) {
gfn += 1;
continue;
}
/* Map into IO address space */
r = iommu_map(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
page_size, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%llx\n", pfn);
kvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size);
goto unmap_pages;
}
gfn += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return 0;
unmap_pages:
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, slot->base_gfn, gfn - slot->base_gfn);
return r;
}
| 166,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void btif_fetch_local_bdaddr(bt_bdaddr_t *local_addr)
{
char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
uint8_t valid_bda = FALSE;
int val_size = 0;
const uint8_t null_bdaddr[BD_ADDR_LEN] = {0,0,0,0,0,0};
/* Get local bdaddr storage path from property */
if (property_get(PROPERTY_BT_BDADDR_PATH, val, NULL))
{
int addr_fd;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s, local bdaddr is stored in %s", __func__, val);
if ((addr_fd = open(val, O_RDONLY)) != -1)
{
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
read(addr_fd, val, FACTORY_BT_BDADDR_STORAGE_LEN);
/* If this is not a reserved/special bda, then use it */
if ((string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr)) &&
(memcmp(local_addr->address, null_bdaddr, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0))
{
valid_bda = TRUE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Got Factory BDA %s", __func__, val);
}
close(addr_fd);
}
}
if(!valid_bda)
{
val_size = sizeof(val);
if(btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("local bdaddr from bt_config.xml is %s", val);
return;
}
}
/* No factory BDADDR found. Look for previously generated random BDA */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* No BDADDR found in file. Look for BDA in factory property */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(FACTORY_BT_ADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* Generate new BDA if necessary */
if (!valid_bda)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
/* Seed the random number generator */
srand((unsigned int) (time(0)));
/* No autogen BDA. Generate one now. */
local_addr->address[0] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[1] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[2] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[3] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[4] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[5] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
/* Convert to ascii, and store as a persistent property */
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("No preset BDA. Generating BDA: %s for prop %s",
(char*)bdstr, PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
if (property_set(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, (char*)bdstr) < 0)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Failed to set random BDA in prop %s",PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
}
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
val_size = sizeof(val);
if (btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
if (strcmp(bdstr, val) ==0)
{
return;
}
}
btif_config_set_str("Adapter", "Address", bdstr);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void btif_fetch_local_bdaddr(bt_bdaddr_t *local_addr)
{
char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
uint8_t valid_bda = FALSE;
int val_size = 0;
const uint8_t null_bdaddr[BD_ADDR_LEN] = {0,0,0,0,0,0};
/* Get local bdaddr storage path from property */
if (property_get(PROPERTY_BT_BDADDR_PATH, val, NULL))
{
int addr_fd;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s, local bdaddr is stored in %s", __func__, val);
if ((addr_fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(val, O_RDONLY))) != -1)
{
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(addr_fd, val, FACTORY_BT_BDADDR_STORAGE_LEN));
/* If this is not a reserved/special bda, then use it */
if ((string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr)) &&
(memcmp(local_addr->address, null_bdaddr, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0))
{
valid_bda = TRUE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Got Factory BDA %s", __func__, val);
}
close(addr_fd);
}
}
if(!valid_bda)
{
val_size = sizeof(val);
if(btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("local bdaddr from bt_config.xml is %s", val);
return;
}
}
/* No factory BDADDR found. Look for previously generated random BDA */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* No BDADDR found in file. Look for BDA in factory property */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(FACTORY_BT_ADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* Generate new BDA if necessary */
if (!valid_bda)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
/* Seed the random number generator */
srand((unsigned int) (time(0)));
/* No autogen BDA. Generate one now. */
local_addr->address[0] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[1] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[2] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[3] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[4] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[5] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
/* Convert to ascii, and store as a persistent property */
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("No preset BDA. Generating BDA: %s for prop %s",
(char*)bdstr, PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
if (property_set(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, (char*)bdstr) < 0)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Failed to set random BDA in prop %s",PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
}
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
val_size = sizeof(val);
if (btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
if (strcmp(bdstr, val) ==0)
{
return;
}
}
btif_config_set_str("Adapter", "Address", bdstr);
}
| 173,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value;
if (!GetPrivate(global, kModulesField, &modules_value) ||
modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value;
if (!GetPrivate(global, kModulesField, &modules_value) ||
modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetPrivateProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetPrivateProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
| 173,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2) &&
(rep.length >> 1) == rep.numKeyPerModifier) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
| 164,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL &&
gx_device_is_null(i_ctx_p->pgs->device)) {
/* if the job replaced the device with the nulldevice, we we need to grestore
away that device, so the block below can properly dispense
with the default device.
*/
int code = gs_grestoreall(i_ctx_p->pgs);
if (code < 0) return_error(gs_error_Fatal);
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
| 164,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::GetIndex() const
{
return m_index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::GetIndex() const
Cluster::Cluster(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long element_start
/* long long element_size */)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_index(idx),
m_pos(element_start),
m_element_size(-1 /* element_size */),
m_timecode(-1),
m_entries(NULL),
m_entries_size(0),
m_entries_count(-1) // means "has not been parsed yet"
{}
Cluster::~Cluster() {
if (m_entries_count <= 0)
return;
BlockEntry** i = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const j = m_entries + m_entries_count;
while (i != j) {
BlockEntry* p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_entries;
}
| 174,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
int chunks)
{
ary->wc_discrim = xdr_one;
ary->wc_nchunks = cpu_to_be32(chunks);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_array(struct rpcrdma_write_array *ary,
| 168,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct ip_options *ip_options_get_alloc(const int optlen)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options) + ((optlen + 3) & ~3),
GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static struct ip_options *ip_options_get_alloc(const int optlen)
static struct ip_options_rcu *ip_options_get_alloc(const int optlen)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu) + ((optlen + 3) & ~3),
GFP_KERNEL);
}
| 165,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setv4key_principal_2_svc(setv4key_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setv4key_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblock);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | setv4key_principal_2_svc(setv4key_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setv4key_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblock);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::RecordTimingMetrics(
const page_load_metrics::mojom::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
ukm::builders::PageLoad builder(info.source_id);
bool is_user_initiated_navigation =
info.user_initiated_info.browser_initiated ||
timing.input_to_navigation_start;
builder.SetExperimental_Navigation_UserInitiated(
is_user_initiated_navigation);
if (timing.input_to_navigation_start) {
builder.SetExperimental_InputToNavigationStart(
timing.input_to_navigation_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.parse_timing->parse_start) {
builder.SetParseTiming_NavigationToParseStart(
timing.parse_timing->parse_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToDOMContentLoadedEventFired(
timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start.value()
.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->load_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToLoadEventFired(
timing.document_timing->load_event_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstContentfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToFirstMeaningfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> largest_content_paint_time;
uint64_t largest_content_paint_size;
AssignTimeAndSizeForLargestContentfulPaint(largest_content_paint_time,
largest_content_paint_size,
timing.paint_timing);
if (largest_content_paint_size > 0 &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
largest_content_paint_time, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestContentPaint(
largest_content_paint_time.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->interactive) {
base::TimeDelta time_to_interactive =
timing.interactive_timing->interactive.value();
if (!timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input ||
timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input.value() >
time_to_interactive) {
builder.SetExperimental_NavigationToInteractive(
time_to_interactive.InMilliseconds());
}
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputDelay2(
first_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputTimestamp2(
first_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputDelay2(
longest_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputTimestamp2(
longest_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
builder.SetNet_CacheBytes(ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(cache_bytes_, 1.3));
builder.SetNet_NetworkBytes(
ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(network_bytes_, 1.3));
if (main_frame_timing_)
ReportMainResourceTimingMetrics(timing, &builder);
builder.Record(ukm::UkmRecorder::Get());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::RecordTimingMetrics(
const page_load_metrics::mojom::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
ukm::builders::PageLoad builder(info.source_id);
if (timing.input_to_navigation_start) {
builder.SetExperimental_InputToNavigationStart(
timing.input_to_navigation_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.parse_timing->parse_start) {
builder.SetParseTiming_NavigationToParseStart(
timing.parse_timing->parse_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToDOMContentLoadedEventFired(
timing.document_timing->dom_content_loaded_event_start.value()
.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.document_timing->load_event_start) {
builder.SetDocumentTiming_NavigationToLoadEventFired(
timing.document_timing->load_event_start.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint) {
builder.SetPaintTiming_NavigationToFirstContentfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_contentful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToFirstMeaningfulPaint(
timing.paint_timing->first_meaningful_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastImagePaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_image_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->largest_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.has_value() &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLastTextPaint(
timing.paint_timing->last_text_paint.value().InMilliseconds());
}
base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> largest_content_paint_time;
uint64_t largest_content_paint_size;
AssignTimeAndSizeForLargestContentfulPaint(largest_content_paint_time,
largest_content_paint_size,
timing.paint_timing);
if (largest_content_paint_size > 0 &&
WasStartedInForegroundOptionalEventInForeground(
largest_content_paint_time, info)) {
builder.SetExperimental_PaintTiming_NavigationToLargestContentPaint(
largest_content_paint_time.value().InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->interactive) {
base::TimeDelta time_to_interactive =
timing.interactive_timing->interactive.value();
if (!timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input ||
timing.interactive_timing->first_invalidating_input.value() >
time_to_interactive) {
builder.SetExperimental_NavigationToInteractive(
time_to_interactive.InMilliseconds());
}
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputDelay2(
first_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta first_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->first_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_FirstInputTimestamp2(
first_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_delay =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_delay.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputDelay2(
longest_input_delay.InMilliseconds());
}
if (timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp) {
base::TimeDelta longest_input_timestamp =
timing.interactive_timing->longest_input_timestamp.value();
builder.SetInteractiveTiming_LongestInputTimestamp2(
longest_input_timestamp.InMilliseconds());
}
builder.SetNet_CacheBytes(ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(cache_bytes_, 1.3));
builder.SetNet_NetworkBytes(
ukm::GetExponentialBucketMin(network_bytes_, 1.3));
if (main_frame_timing_)
ReportMainResourceTimingMetrics(timing, &builder);
builder.Record(ukm::UkmRecorder::Get());
}
| 172,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
krb5_ticket *ticket,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
const char **e_text,
AuthorizationData **auth_data,
const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL, rsp = NULL, tp = NULL, dp = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_out_principal = NULL;
char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL, *tpn = NULL, *dpn = NULL, *krbtgt_out_n = NULL;
hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
krb5_principals spp = NULL;
const EncryptionKey *ekey;
krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
krb5_kvno kvno;
krb5_data rspac;
const char *our_realm = /* Realm of this KDC */
krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, 1);
char **capath = NULL;
size_t num_capath = 0;
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
PrincipalName *s;
Realm r;
EncTicketPart adtkt;
char opt_str[128];
int signedpath = 0;
Key *tkey_check;
Key *tkey_sign;
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
s = b->sname;
r = b->realm;
/*
* Always to do CANON, see comment below about returned server principal (rsp).
*/
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
Ticket *t;
hdb_entry_ex *uu;
krb5_principal p;
Key *uukey;
krb5uint32 second_kvno = 0;
krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr = NULL;
if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No second ticket present in request");
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
if(t->enc_part.kvno){
second_kvno = *t->enc_part.kvno;
kvno_ptr = &second_kvno;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, kvno_ptr,
NULL, &uu);
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
if(ret){
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry, NULL,
t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
if(ret){
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
s = &adtkt.cname;
r = adtkt.crealm;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
if(*opt_str)
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
/*
* Fetch server
*/
server_lookup:
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags,
NULL, NULL, &server);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
goto out;
} else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(server->entry.principal->realm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s.",
ref_realm, spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
ref_realm, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
} else if (ret) {
const char *new_rlm, *msg;
Realm req_rlm;
krb5_realm *realms;
if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
if (capath == NULL) {
/* With referalls, hierarchical capaths are always enabled */
ret = _krb5_find_capath(context, tgt->crealm, our_realm,
req_rlm, TRUE, &capath, &num_capath);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
new_rlm = num_capath > 0 ? capath[--num_capath] : NULL;
if (new_rlm) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt from %s via %s for "
"realm %s not found, trying %s", tgt->crealm,
our_realm, req_rlm, new_rlm);
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
KRB5_TGS_NAME, ref_realm, NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
}
} else if (need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s that was not found",
realms[0], spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realms[0], NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret) {
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto out;
}
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto server_lookup;
}
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* the name returned to the client depend on what was asked for,
* return canonical name if kdc_options.canonicalize was set, the
* client wants the true name of the principal, if not it just
* wants the name its asked for.
*/
if (b->kdc_options.canonicalize)
rsp = server->entry.principal;
else
rsp = sp;
/*
* Select enctype, return key and kvno.
*/
{
krb5_enctype etype;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
size_t i;
ekey = &adtkt.key;
for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
break;
if(i == b->etype.len) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto out;
}
etype = b->etype.val[i];
kvno = 0;
} else {
Key *skey;
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, sp) ?
config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
server, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &etype,
NULL);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, server, spn,
NULL, &skey);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no supported etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ekey = &skey->key;
kvno = server->entry.kvno;
}
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
* not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
* backward.
*/
/*
* Validate authoriation data
*/
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, NULL, /* XXX use the right kvno! */
krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
goto out;
}
/*
* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
* sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
* have been an incoming trust)
*/
ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
&krbtgt_out_principal,
our_realm,
KRB5_TGS_NAME,
our_realm,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out_principal, &krbtgt_out_n);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_out_principal,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
if (ret) {
char *ktpn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No such principal %s (needed for authz-data signature keys) "
"while processing TGS-REQ for service %s with krbtg %s",
krbtgt_out_n, spn, (ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
/*
* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
* krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
* encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
* the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
* this) before the strcmp()
*/
if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
char *ktpn;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
(ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
if(ret == 0)
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, krbtgt_out, krbtgt_out_n,
NULL, &tkey_sign);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry, NULL,
tkey_sign->key.keytype, &tkey_sign);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &clientdb, &client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
/* This is OK, we are just trying to find out if they have
* been disabled or deleted in the meantime, missing secrets
* is OK */
} else if(ret){
const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
krbtgt_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal);
if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
cpn);
goto out;
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
}
ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp, NULL,
client, server, krbtgt,
&tkey_check->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* also check the krbtgt for signature */
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
tgt,
&spp,
&signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Process request
*/
/* by default the tgt principal matches the client principal */
tp = cp;
tpn = cpn;
if (client) {
const PA_DATA *sdata;
int i = 0;
sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
if (sdata) {
krb5_crypto crypto;
krb5_data datack;
PA_S4U2Self self;
const char *str;
ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
sdata->padata_value.length,
&self, NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
datack.data,
datack.length,
&self.cksum);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
self.name,
self.realm);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
if(rspac.data) {
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (ret) {
const char *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1,
"S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
tpn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&rspac);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
}
}
/*
* Check that service doing the impersonating is
* requesting a ticket to it-self.
*/
ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
"to impersonate to service "
"(tried for user %s to service %s)",
cpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
/*
* If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
* delegation, remove the forward flag.
*/
if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
str = "[forwardable]";
} else {
b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
str = "";
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
"service %s %s", cpn, tpn, spn, str);
}
}
/*
* Constrained delegation
*/
if (client != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets->len != 0
&& b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
{
int ad_signedpath = 0;
Key *clientkey;
Ticket *t;
/*
* Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
* self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
*/
if (!signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
hdb_kvno2keys(context, &client->entry,
t->enc_part.kvno ? * t->enc_part.kvno : 0),
t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
if(ret){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"failed to decrypt ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
adtkt.cname,
adtkt.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&dp,
t->sname,
t->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, dp, &dpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* check that ticket is valid */
if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s ",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
client, server, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s not allowed",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, tpn);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
/*
* generate the PAC for the user.
*
* TODO: pass in t->sname and t->realm and build
* a S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob to the PAC.
*/
ret = check_PAC(context, config, tp, dp,
client, server, krbtgt,
&clientkey->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&adtkt, &rspac, &ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify delegated PAC failed to %s for client"
"%s (%s) as %s from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, dpn, tpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
*/
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
&adtkt,
NULL,
&ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s failed with %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
if (!ad_signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket not signed with PAC nor SignedPath service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
"from %s (%s) to %s", tpn, cpn, dpn, spn);
}
/*
* Check flags
*/
ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
client, cpn,
server, spn,
FALSE);
if(ret)
goto out;
if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(context,
krbtgt->entry.principal,
server->entry.principal)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
goto out;
}
/*
* If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
* auth_data reply .
*/
if (ref_realm) {
PA_DATA pa;
krb5_crypto crypto;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed building server referral");
goto out;
}
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
goto out;
}
}
/*
*
*/
ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
config,
b,
tp,
tgt,
replykey,
rk_is_subkey,
ekey,
&sessionkey,
kvno,
*auth_data,
server,
rsp,
spn,
client,
cp,
krbtgt_out,
tkey_sign->key.keytype,
spp,
&rspac,
&enc_pa_data,
e_text,
reply);
out:
if (tpn != cpn)
free(tpn);
free(spn);
free(cpn);
free(dpn);
free(krbtgt_out_n);
_krb5_free_capath(context, capath);
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
if(krbtgt_out)
_kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
if(server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
if(client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (tp && tp != cp)
krb5_free_principal(context, tp);
krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
krb5_free_principal(context, dp);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_out_principal);
free(ref_realm);
free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295 | tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
krb5_ticket *ticket,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
const char **e_text,
AuthorizationData **auth_data,
const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL, rsp = NULL, tp = NULL, dp = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_out_principal = NULL;
char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL, *tpn = NULL, *dpn = NULL, *krbtgt_out_n = NULL;
hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
krb5_principals spp = NULL;
const EncryptionKey *ekey;
krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
krb5_kvno kvno;
krb5_data rspac;
const char *tgt_realm = /* Realm of TGT issuer */
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt->entry.principal);
const char *our_realm = /* Realm of this KDC */
krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, 1);
char **capath = NULL;
size_t num_capath = 0;
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
PrincipalName *s;
Realm r;
EncTicketPart adtkt;
char opt_str[128];
int signedpath = 0;
Key *tkey_check;
Key *tkey_sign;
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
s = b->sname;
r = b->realm;
/*
* Always to do CANON, see comment below about returned server principal (rsp).
*/
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
Ticket *t;
hdb_entry_ex *uu;
krb5_principal p;
Key *uukey;
krb5uint32 second_kvno = 0;
krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr = NULL;
if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No second ticket present in request");
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
if(t->enc_part.kvno){
second_kvno = *t->enc_part.kvno;
kvno_ptr = &second_kvno;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, kvno_ptr,
NULL, &uu);
krb5_free_principal(context, p);
if(ret){
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry, NULL,
t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
if(ret){
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
_kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
s = &adtkt.cname;
r = adtkt.crealm;
}
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
if(*opt_str)
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
/*
* Fetch server
*/
server_lookup:
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags,
NULL, NULL, &server);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
goto out;
} else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(server->entry.principal->realm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s.",
ref_realm, spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
ref_realm, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
} else if (ret) {
const char *new_rlm, *msg;
Realm req_rlm;
krb5_realm *realms;
if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
if (capath == NULL) {
/* With referalls, hierarchical capaths are always enabled */
ret = _krb5_find_capath(context, tgt->crealm, our_realm,
req_rlm, TRUE, &capath, &num_capath);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
new_rlm = num_capath > 0 ? capath[--num_capath] : NULL;
if (new_rlm) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt from %s via %s for "
"realm %s not found, trying %s", tgt->crealm,
our_realm, req_rlm, new_rlm);
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
if (ref_realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto out;
}
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
KRB5_TGS_NAME, ref_realm, NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto server_lookup;
}
} else if (need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Returning a referral to realm %s for "
"server %s that was not found",
realms[0], spn);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
sp = NULL;
krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realms[0], NULL);
free(spn);
spn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
if (ret) {
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto out;
}
free(ref_realm);
ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
goto server_lookup;
}
krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* the name returned to the client depend on what was asked for,
* return canonical name if kdc_options.canonicalize was set, the
* client wants the true name of the principal, if not it just
* wants the name its asked for.
*/
if (b->kdc_options.canonicalize)
rsp = server->entry.principal;
else
rsp = sp;
/*
* Select enctype, return key and kvno.
*/
{
krb5_enctype etype;
if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
size_t i;
ekey = &adtkt.key;
for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
break;
if(i == b->etype.len) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto out;
}
etype = b->etype.val[i];
kvno = 0;
} else {
Key *skey;
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, sp) ?
config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
config->svc_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
server, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &etype,
NULL);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, server, spn,
NULL, &skey);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Server (%s) has no supported etypes", spn);
goto out;
}
ekey = &skey->key;
kvno = server->entry.kvno;
}
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
* not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
* backward.
*/
/*
* Validate authoriation data
*/
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, NULL, /* XXX use the right kvno! */
krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
goto out;
}
/*
* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
* sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
* have been an incoming trust)
*/
ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
&krbtgt_out_principal,
our_realm,
KRB5_TGS_NAME,
our_realm,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out_principal, &krbtgt_out_n);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to make krbtgt principal name object for "
"authz-data signatures");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_out_principal,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
if (ret) {
char *ktpn = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No such principal %s (needed for authz-data signature keys) "
"while processing TGS-REQ for service %s with krbtg %s",
krbtgt_out_n, spn, (ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
/*
* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
* krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
* encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
* the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
* this) before the strcmp()
*/
if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
char *ktpn;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &ktpn);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
(ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
if(ret == 0)
free(ktpn);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config, krbtgt_out, krbtgt_out_n,
NULL, &tkey_sign);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry, NULL,
tkey_sign->key.keytype, &tkey_sign);
if(ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &clientdb, &client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
/* This is OK, we are just trying to find out if they have
* been disabled or deleted in the meantime, missing secrets
* is OK */
} else if(ret){
const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
krbtgt_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal);
if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
cpn);
goto out;
}
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
}
ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp, NULL,
client, server, krbtgt,
&tkey_check->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* also check the krbtgt for signature */
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
tgt,
&spp,
&signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Process request
*/
/* by default the tgt principal matches the client principal */
tp = cp;
tpn = cpn;
if (client) {
const PA_DATA *sdata;
int i = 0;
sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
if (sdata) {
krb5_crypto crypto;
krb5_data datack;
PA_S4U2Self self;
const char *str;
ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
sdata->padata_value.length,
&self, NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
datack.data,
datack.length,
&self.cksum);
krb5_data_free(&datack);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
self.name,
self.realm);
free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
if(rspac.data) {
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (ret) {
const char *msg;
/*
* If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
* should exist in the local database.
*
*/
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 1,
"S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
tpn, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&rspac);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
tpn);
goto out;
}
}
}
/*
* Check that service doing the impersonating is
* requesting a ticket to it-self.
*/
ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
"to impersonate to service "
"(tried for user %s to service %s)",
cpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
/*
* If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
* delegation, remove the forward flag.
*/
if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
str = "[forwardable]";
} else {
b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
str = "";
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
"service %s %s", cpn, tpn, spn, str);
}
}
/*
* Constrained delegation
*/
if (client != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets != NULL
&& b->additional_tickets->len != 0
&& b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
{
int ad_signedpath = 0;
Key *clientkey;
Ticket *t;
/*
* Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
* self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
*/
if (!signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
hdb_kvno2keys(context, &client->entry,
t->enc_part.kvno ? * t->enc_part.kvno : 0),
t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
if(ret){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"failed to decrypt ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&tp,
adtkt.cname,
adtkt.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&dp,
t->sname,
t->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, dp, &dpn);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* check that ticket is valid */
if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s ",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
client, server, sp);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s not allowed",
cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
goto out;
}
ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, tpn);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
/*
* generate the PAC for the user.
*
* TODO: pass in t->sname and t->realm and build
* a S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob to the PAC.
*/
ret = check_PAC(context, config, tp, dp,
client, server, krbtgt,
&clientkey->key,
ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
&adtkt, &rspac, &ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Verify delegated PAC failed to %s for client"
"%s (%s) as %s from %s with %s",
spn, cpn, dpn, tpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
*/
ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
cp,
&adtkt,
NULL,
&ad_signedpath);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s failed with %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
goto out;
}
if (!ad_signedpath) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket not signed with PAC nor SignedPath service %s failed "
"for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
"from %s",
spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
"from %s (%s) to %s", tpn, cpn, dpn, spn);
}
/*
* Check flags
*/
ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
client, cpn,
server, spn,
FALSE);
if(ret)
goto out;
if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(context,
krbtgt->entry.principal,
server->entry.principal)){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
goto out;
}
/*
* If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
* auth_data reply .
*/
if (ref_realm) {
PA_DATA pa;
krb5_crypto crypto;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed building server referral");
goto out;
}
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
goto out;
}
}
/*
*
*/
ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
config,
b,
tp,
tgt,
replykey,
rk_is_subkey,
ekey,
&sessionkey,
kvno,
*auth_data,
server,
rsp,
spn,
client,
cp,
tgt_realm,
krbtgt_out,
tkey_sign->key.keytype,
spp,
&rspac,
&enc_pa_data,
e_text,
reply);
out:
if (tpn != cpn)
free(tpn);
free(spn);
free(cpn);
free(dpn);
free(krbtgt_out_n);
_krb5_free_capath(context, capath);
krb5_data_free(&rspac);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
if(krbtgt_out)
_kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
if(server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
if(client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
if (tp && tp != cp)
krb5_free_principal(context, tp);
krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
krb5_free_principal(context, dp);
krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_out_principal);
free(ref_realm);
free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
return ret;
}
| 168,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::loadSimpleDefaultStyle()
{
ASSERT(!defaultStyle);
ASSERT(!simpleDefaultStyleSheet);
defaultStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultPrintStyle = defaultStyle;
defaultQuirksStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
simpleDefaultStyleSheet = parseUASheet(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet, strlen(simpleUserAgentStyleSheet));
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(simpleDefaultStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(parseUASheet(ViewportStyle::viewportStyleSheet()), screenEval());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::loadSimpleDefaultStyle()
| 171,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
{
GIOChannel *handle, *ssl_handle;
handle = net_connect_ip(ip, port, my_ip);
if (handle == NULL)
return NULL;
ssl_handle = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
if (ssl_handle == NULL)
g_io_channel_unref(handle);
return ssl_handle;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, const char* hostname, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
{
GIOChannel *handle, *ssl_handle;
handle = net_connect_ip(ip, port, my_ip);
if (handle == NULL)
return NULL;
ssl_handle = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, hostname, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
if (ssl_handle == NULL)
g_io_channel_unref(handle);
return ssl_handle;
}
| 165,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int MSG_ReadBits( msg_t *msg, int bits ) {
int value;
int get;
qboolean sgn;
int i, nbits;
if ( msg->readcount > msg->cursize ) {
return 0;
}
value = 0;
if ( bits < 0 ) {
bits = -bits;
sgn = qtrue;
} else {
sgn = qfalse;
}
if (msg->oob) {
if (msg->readcount + (bits>>3) > msg->cursize) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
if(bits==8)
{
value = msg->data[msg->readcount];
msg->readcount += 1;
msg->bit += 8;
}
else if(bits==16)
{
short temp;
CopyLittleShort(&temp, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
value = temp;
msg->readcount += 2;
msg->bit += 16;
}
else if(bits==32)
{
CopyLittleLong(&value, &msg->data[msg->readcount]);
msg->readcount += 4;
msg->bit += 32;
}
else
Com_Error(ERR_DROP, "can't read %d bits", bits);
} else {
nbits = 0;
if (bits&7) {
nbits = bits&7;
if (msg->bit + nbits > msg->cursize << 3) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
for(i=0;i<nbits;i++) {
value |= (Huff_getBit(msg->data, &msg->bit)<<i);
}
bits = bits - nbits;
}
if (bits) {
for(i=0;i<bits;i+=8) {
Huff_offsetReceive (msgHuff.decompressor.tree, &get, msg->data, &msg->bit, msg->cursize<<3);
value |= (get<<(i+nbits));
if (msg->bit > msg->cursize<<3) {
msg->readcount = msg->cursize + 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
msg->readcount = (msg->bit>>3)+1;
}
if ( sgn && bits > 0 && bits < 32 ) {
if ( value & ( 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) ) {
value |= -1 ^ ( ( 1 << bits ) - 1 );
}
}
return value;
}
| 167,998 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_setattr_nonsize(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
struct iattr *iattr,
int flags)
{
xfs_mount_t *mp = ip->i_mount;
struct inode *inode = VFS_I(ip);
int mask = iattr->ia_valid;
xfs_trans_t *tp;
int error;
kuid_t uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, iuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
kgid_t gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, igid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
struct xfs_dquot *udqp = NULL, *gdqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *olddquot1 = NULL, *olddquot2 = NULL;
ASSERT((mask & ATTR_SIZE) == 0);
/*
* If disk quotas is on, we make sure that the dquots do exist on disk,
* before we start any other transactions. Trying to do this later
* is messy. We don't care to take a readlock to look at the ids
* in inode here, because we can't hold it across the trans_reserve.
* If the IDs do change before we take the ilock, we're covered
* because the i_*dquot fields will get updated anyway.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_ON(mp) && (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID))) {
uint qflags = 0;
if ((mask & ATTR_UID) && XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
uid = iattr->ia_uid;
qflags |= XFS_QMOPT_UQUOTA;
} else {
uid = inode->i_uid;
}
if ((mask & ATTR_GID) && XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
gid = iattr->ia_gid;
qflags |= XFS_QMOPT_GQUOTA;
} else {
gid = inode->i_gid;
}
/*
* We take a reference when we initialize udqp and gdqp,
* so it is important that we never blindly double trip on
* the same variable. See xfs_create() for an example.
*/
ASSERT(udqp == NULL);
ASSERT(gdqp == NULL);
error = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(ip, xfs_kuid_to_uid(uid),
xfs_kgid_to_gid(gid),
xfs_get_projid(ip),
qflags, &udqp, &gdqp, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
}
error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_ichange, 0, 0, 0, &tp);
if (error)
goto out_dqrele;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID)) {
/*
* These IDs could have changed since we last looked at them.
* But, we're assured that if the ownership did change
* while we didn't have the inode locked, inode's dquot(s)
* would have changed also.
*/
iuid = inode->i_uid;
igid = inode->i_gid;
gid = (mask & ATTR_GID) ? iattr->ia_gid : igid;
uid = (mask & ATTR_UID) ? iattr->ia_uid : iuid;
/*
* Do a quota reservation only if uid/gid is actually
* going to change.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) &&
((XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp) && !uid_eq(iuid, uid)) ||
(XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp) && !gid_eq(igid, gid)))) {
ASSERT(tp);
error = xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve(tp, ip, udqp, gdqp,
NULL, capable(CAP_FOWNER) ?
XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES : 0);
if (error) /* out of quota */
goto out_cancel;
}
}
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID)) {
/*
* CAP_FSETID overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file will be
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!capable(CAP_FSETID))
inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
* Change the ownerships and register quota modifications
* in the transaction.
*/
if (!uid_eq(iuid, uid)) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
ASSERT(mask & ATTR_UID);
ASSERT(udqp);
olddquot1 = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_udquot, udqp);
}
ip->i_d.di_uid = xfs_kuid_to_uid(uid);
inode->i_uid = uid;
}
if (!gid_eq(igid, gid)) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
ASSERT(xfs_sb_version_has_pquotino(&mp->m_sb) ||
!XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp));
ASSERT(mask & ATTR_GID);
ASSERT(gdqp);
olddquot2 = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_gdquot, gdqp);
}
ip->i_d.di_gid = xfs_kgid_to_gid(gid);
inode->i_gid = gid;
}
}
if (mask & ATTR_MODE)
xfs_setattr_mode(ip, iattr);
if (mask & (ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_MTIME))
xfs_setattr_time(ip, iattr);
xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_attrchg);
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
error = xfs_trans_commit(tp);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
/*
* Release any dquot(s) the inode had kept before chown.
*/
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot1);
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot2);
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* XXX(hch): Updating the ACL entries is not atomic vs the i_mode
* update. We could avoid this with linked transactions
* and passing down the transaction pointer all the way
* to attr_set. No previous user of the generic
* Posix ACL code seems to care about this issue either.
*/
if ((mask & ATTR_MODE) && !(flags & XFS_ATTR_NOACL)) {
error = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
return 0;
out_cancel:
xfs_trans_cancel(tp);
out_dqrele:
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | xfs_setattr_nonsize(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
struct iattr *iattr,
int flags)
{
xfs_mount_t *mp = ip->i_mount;
struct inode *inode = VFS_I(ip);
int mask = iattr->ia_valid;
xfs_trans_t *tp;
int error;
kuid_t uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, iuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
kgid_t gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, igid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
struct xfs_dquot *udqp = NULL, *gdqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *olddquot1 = NULL, *olddquot2 = NULL;
ASSERT((mask & ATTR_SIZE) == 0);
/*
* If disk quotas is on, we make sure that the dquots do exist on disk,
* before we start any other transactions. Trying to do this later
* is messy. We don't care to take a readlock to look at the ids
* in inode here, because we can't hold it across the trans_reserve.
* If the IDs do change before we take the ilock, we're covered
* because the i_*dquot fields will get updated anyway.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_ON(mp) && (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID))) {
uint qflags = 0;
if ((mask & ATTR_UID) && XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
uid = iattr->ia_uid;
qflags |= XFS_QMOPT_UQUOTA;
} else {
uid = inode->i_uid;
}
if ((mask & ATTR_GID) && XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
gid = iattr->ia_gid;
qflags |= XFS_QMOPT_GQUOTA;
} else {
gid = inode->i_gid;
}
/*
* We take a reference when we initialize udqp and gdqp,
* so it is important that we never blindly double trip on
* the same variable. See xfs_create() for an example.
*/
ASSERT(udqp == NULL);
ASSERT(gdqp == NULL);
error = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(ip, xfs_kuid_to_uid(uid),
xfs_kgid_to_gid(gid),
xfs_get_projid(ip),
qflags, &udqp, &gdqp, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
}
error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_ichange, 0, 0, 0, &tp);
if (error)
goto out_dqrele;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID)) {
/*
* These IDs could have changed since we last looked at them.
* But, we're assured that if the ownership did change
* while we didn't have the inode locked, inode's dquot(s)
* would have changed also.
*/
iuid = inode->i_uid;
igid = inode->i_gid;
gid = (mask & ATTR_GID) ? iattr->ia_gid : igid;
uid = (mask & ATTR_UID) ? iattr->ia_uid : iuid;
/*
* Do a quota reservation only if uid/gid is actually
* going to change.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) &&
((XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp) && !uid_eq(iuid, uid)) ||
(XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp) && !gid_eq(igid, gid)))) {
ASSERT(tp);
error = xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve(tp, ip, udqp, gdqp,
NULL, capable(CAP_FOWNER) ?
XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES : 0);
if (error) /* out of quota */
goto out_cancel;
}
}
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & (ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID)) {
/*
* CAP_FSETID overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file will be
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!capable(CAP_FSETID))
inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
* Change the ownerships and register quota modifications
* in the transaction.
*/
if (!uid_eq(iuid, uid)) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_UQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
ASSERT(mask & ATTR_UID);
ASSERT(udqp);
olddquot1 = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_udquot, udqp);
}
ip->i_d.di_uid = xfs_kuid_to_uid(uid);
inode->i_uid = uid;
}
if (!gid_eq(igid, gid)) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_GQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
ASSERT(xfs_sb_version_has_pquotino(&mp->m_sb) ||
!XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp));
ASSERT(mask & ATTR_GID);
ASSERT(gdqp);
olddquot2 = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_gdquot, gdqp);
}
ip->i_d.di_gid = xfs_kgid_to_gid(gid);
inode->i_gid = gid;
}
}
if (mask & ATTR_MODE)
xfs_setattr_mode(ip, iattr);
if (mask & (ATTR_ATIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_MTIME))
xfs_setattr_time(ip, iattr);
xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, xs_ig_attrchg);
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
error = xfs_trans_commit(tp);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
/*
* Release any dquot(s) the inode had kept before chown.
*/
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot1);
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot2);
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* XXX(hch): Updating the ACL entries is not atomic vs the i_mode
* update. We could avoid this with linked transactions
* and passing down the transaction pointer all the way
* to attr_set. No previous user of the generic
* Posix ACL code seems to care about this issue either.
*/
if ((mask & ATTR_MODE) && !(flags & XFS_ATTR_NOACL)) {
error = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);
if (error)
return error;
}
return 0;
out_cancel:
xfs_trans_cancel(tp);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
out_dqrele:
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
return error;
}
| 169,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
| 172,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_data(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp, int cbChId,
wStream* s)
{
UINT32 ChannelId;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "process_data: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32"", Sp,
cbChId,
ChannelId);
return dvcman_receive_channel_data(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId, s);
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | static UINT drdynvc_process_data(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp, int cbChId,
wStream* s)
{
UINT32 ChannelId;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < drdynvc_cblen_to_bytes(cbChId))
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "process_data: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32"", Sp,
cbChId,
ChannelId);
return dvcman_receive_channel_data(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId, s);
}
| 168,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool config_save(const config_t *config, const char *filename) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(filename != NULL);
assert(*filename != '\0');
char *temp_filename = osi_calloc(strlen(filename) + 5);
if (!temp_filename) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for filename.", __func__);
return false;
}
strcpy(temp_filename, filename);
strcat(temp_filename, ".new");
FILE *fp = fopen(temp_filename, "wt");
if (!fp) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
for (const list_node_t *node = list_begin(config->sections); node != list_end(config->sections); node = list_next(node)) {
const section_t *section = (const section_t *)list_node(node);
fprintf(fp, "[%s]\n", section->name);
for (const list_node_t *enode = list_begin(section->entries); enode != list_end(section->entries); enode = list_next(enode)) {
const entry_t *entry = (const entry_t *)list_node(enode);
fprintf(fp, "%s = %s\n", entry->key, entry->value);
}
if (list_next(node) != list_end(config->sections))
fputc('\n', fp);
}
fflush(fp);
fclose(fp);
if (chmod(temp_filename, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to change file permissions '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
if (rename(temp_filename, filename) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to commit file '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
osi_free(temp_filename);
return true;
error:;
unlink(temp_filename);
osi_free(temp_filename);
return false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool config_save(const config_t *config, const char *filename) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(filename != NULL);
assert(*filename != '\0');
// Steps to ensure content of config file gets to disk:
//
// 1) Open and write to temp file (e.g. bt_config.conf.new).
// 2) Sync the temp file to disk with fsync().
// 3) Rename temp file to actual config file (e.g. bt_config.conf).
// This ensures atomic update.
// 4) Sync directory that has the conf file with fsync().
// This ensures directory entries are up-to-date.
int dir_fd = -1;
FILE *fp = NULL;
// Build temp config file based on config file (e.g. bt_config.conf.new).
static const char *temp_file_ext = ".new";
const int filename_len = strlen(filename);
const int temp_filename_len = filename_len + strlen(temp_file_ext) + 1;
char *temp_filename = osi_calloc(temp_filename_len);
snprintf(temp_filename, temp_filename_len, "%s%s", filename, temp_file_ext);
// Extract directory from file path (e.g. /data/misc/bluedroid).
char *temp_dirname = osi_strdup(filename);
const char *directoryname = dirname(temp_dirname);
if (!directoryname) {
LOG_ERROR("%s error extracting directory from '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
dir_fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(directoryname, O_RDONLY));
if (dir_fd < 0) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to open dir '%s': %s", __func__, directoryname, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
fp = fopen(temp_filename, "wt");
if (!fp) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
for (const list_node_t *node = list_begin(config->sections); node != list_end(config->sections); node = list_next(node)) {
const section_t *section = (const section_t *)list_node(node);
if (fprintf(fp, "[%s]\n", section->name) < 0) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write to file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
for (const list_node_t *enode = list_begin(section->entries); enode != list_end(section->entries); enode = list_next(enode)) {
const entry_t *entry = (const entry_t *)list_node(enode);
if (fprintf(fp, "%s = %s\n", entry->key, entry->value) < 0) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write to file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
}
if (list_next(node) != list_end(config->sections)) {
if (fputc('\n', fp) == EOF) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write to file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
}
}
// Sync written temp file out to disk. fsync() is blocking until data makes it to disk.
if (fsync(fileno(fp)) < 0) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to fsync file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
}
if (fclose(fp) == EOF) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to close file '%s': %s", __func__, temp_filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
fp = NULL;
if (chmod(temp_filename, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to change file permissions '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
// Rename written temp file to the actual config file.
if (rename(temp_filename, filename) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to commit file '%s': %s", __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
// This should ensure the directory is updated as well.
if (fsync(dir_fd) < 0) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to fsync dir '%s': %s", __func__, directoryname, strerror(errno));
}
if (close(dir_fd) < 0) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to close dir '%s': %s", __func__, directoryname, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
osi_free(temp_filename);
osi_free(temp_dirname);
return true;
error:
// This indicates there is a write issue. Unlink as partial data is not acceptable.
unlink(temp_filename);
if (fp)
fclose(fp);
if (dir_fd != -1)
close(dir_fd);
osi_free(temp_filename);
osi_free(temp_dirname);
return false;
}
| 173,479 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int xmkstemp(char **tmpname, char *dir)
{
char *localtmp;
char *tmpenv;
mode_t old_mode;
int fd, rc;
/* Some use cases must be capable of being moved atomically
* with rename(2), which is the reason why dir is here. */
if (dir != NULL)
tmpenv = dir;
else
tmpenv = getenv("TMPDIR");
if (tmpenv)
rc = asprintf(&localtmp, "%s/%s.XXXXXX", tmpenv,
program_invocation_short_name);
else
rc = asprintf(&localtmp, "%s/%s.XXXXXX", _PATH_TMP,
program_invocation_short_name);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
old_mode = umask(077);
fd = mkostemp(localtmp, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC);
umask(old_mode);
if (fd == -1) {
free(localtmp);
localtmp = NULL;
}
*tmpname = localtmp;
return fd;
}
Commit Message: chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int xmkstemp(char **tmpname, char *dir)
int xmkstemp(char **tmpname, const char *dir, const char *prefix)
{
char *localtmp;
const char *tmpenv;
mode_t old_mode;
int fd, rc;
/* Some use cases must be capable of being moved atomically
* with rename(2), which is the reason why dir is here. */
tmpenv = dir ? dir : getenv("TMPDIR");
if (!tmpenv)
tmpenv = _PATH_TMP;
rc = asprintf(&localtmp, "%s/%s.XXXXXX", tmpenv, prefix);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
old_mode = umask(077);
fd = mkostemp(localtmp, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC);
umask(old_mode);
if (fd == -1) {
free(localtmp);
localtmp = NULL;
}
*tmpname = localtmp;
return fd;
}
| 168,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigateOnUIThread(
const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void NavigateOnUIThread(
void NavigateOnUIThread(const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
int frame_tree_node_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
params.frame_tree_node_id = frame_tree_node_id;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
| 173,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
return previous_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
return previous_input_method_;
}
| 170,515 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iov_fault_in_pages_write(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
{
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
while (len > 0) {
unsigned long this_len;
this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (fault_in_pages_writeable(iov->iov_base, this_len))
break;
len -= this_len;
iov++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static int iov_fault_in_pages_write(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
| 169,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_mac_header(skb) < skb->head + frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr);
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_mac_header(skb) < skb->head + frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr, (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb));
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
| 165,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<input_method::InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(
GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
| 170,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
frameCopy->mData = 0;
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
| 173,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
video_ = new libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource(kVP9TestFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(video_ != NULL);
video_->Init();
video_->Begin();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
decoder_ = new libvpx_test::VP9Decoder(cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder_ != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
video_ = new libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource(kVP9TestFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(video_ != NULL);
video_->Init();
video_->Begin();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
decoder_ = new libvpx_test::VP9Decoder(cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder_ != NULL);
}
| 174,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)doc);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Commit Message: Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)doc);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
| 170,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len) if (*end_ptr++ == '\\') end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len)
{
if (*end_ptr++ == '\\')
{
if (*end_ptr == '\0')
{
/* prevent buffer overflow when last input character is a backslash */
return 0;
}
end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
}
}
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
| 169,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_malloc(size_t size)
{
NT_ASSERT(size);
#pragma prefast(suppress : 30030) // Allocating executable POOL_TYPE memory
CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *block = (CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
NonPagedPool, size + sizeof(CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK), CS_WINKERNEL_POOL_TAG);
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->size = size;
return block->data;
}
Commit Message: provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions (#870)
* provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions
* fix some style issues.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_malloc(size_t size)
{
NT_ASSERT(size);
#pragma prefast(suppress : 30030) // Allocating executable POOL_TYPE memory
size_t number_of_bytes = 0;
CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *block = NULL;
// A specially crafted size value can trigger the overflow.
// If the sum in a value that overflows or underflows the capacity of the type,
// the function returns NULL.
if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlSizeTAdd(size, sizeof(CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK), &number_of_bytes))) {
return NULL;
}
block = (CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
NonPagedPool, number_of_bytes, CS_WINKERNEL_POOL_TAG);
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->size = size;
return block->data;
}
| 168,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
int type;
switch (variable) {
case NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool:
case NPNVasdEnabledBool:
case NPNVisOfflineBool:
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
case NPNVprivateModeBool:
case NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:
type = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
type = RPC_TYPE_UINT32;
break;
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
type = RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT;
break;
default:
type = RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
break;
}
return type;
}
| 165,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: [email protected] # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, size)))
return -EFAULT;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
| 167,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *sock_poll_thread(void *arg)
{
struct pollfd pfds[MAX_POLL];
memset(pfds, 0, sizeof(pfds));
int h = (intptr_t)arg;
for(;;)
{
prepare_poll_fds(h, pfds);
int ret = poll(pfds, ts[h].poll_count, -1);
if(ret == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("poll ret -1, exit the thread, errno:%d, err:%s", errno, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if(ret != 0)
{
int need_process_data_fd = TRUE;
if(pfds[0].revents) //cmd fd always is the first one
{
asrt(pfds[0].fd == ts[h].cmd_fdr);
if(!process_cmd_sock(h))
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, process_cmd_sock return false, exit...", h);
break;
}
if(ret == 1)
need_process_data_fd = FALSE;
else ret--; //exclude the cmd fd
}
if(need_process_data_fd)
process_data_sock(h, pfds, ret);
}
else {APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d", ret)};
}
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("socket poll thread exiting, h:%d", h);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void *sock_poll_thread(void *arg)
{
struct pollfd pfds[MAX_POLL];
memset(pfds, 0, sizeof(pfds));
int h = (intptr_t)arg;
for(;;)
{
prepare_poll_fds(h, pfds);
int ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pfds, ts[h].poll_count, -1));
if(ret == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("poll ret -1, exit the thread, errno:%d, err:%s", errno, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if(ret != 0)
{
int need_process_data_fd = TRUE;
if(pfds[0].revents) //cmd fd always is the first one
{
asrt(pfds[0].fd == ts[h].cmd_fdr);
if(!process_cmd_sock(h))
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, process_cmd_sock return false, exit...", h);
break;
}
if(ret == 1)
need_process_data_fd = FALSE;
else ret--; //exclude the cmd fd
}
if(need_process_data_fd)
process_data_sock(h, pfds, ret);
}
else {APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d", ret)};
}
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("socket poll thread exiting, h:%d", h);
return 0;
}
| 173,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
const Segment* pSegment,
long long off, //relative to start of segment payload
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0); //relative to segment
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = pSegment->m_start + off; //absolute
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 0; //we don't even have a complete cluster
const long long segment_stop =
(pSegment->m_size < 0) ? -1 : pSegment->m_start + pSegment->m_size;
long long cluster_stop = -1; //interpreted later to mean "unknown size"
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //weird: not cluster ID
return -1; //generic error
pos += len; //consume Cluster ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0)
return 0; //cluster does not have entries
pos += len; //consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
{
cluster_stop = pos + size;
assert(cluster_stop >= 0);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (cluster_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (cluster_stop > total))
return 0; //cluster does not have any entries
}
}
for (;;)
{
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return 0; //no entries detected
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
return 0; //no entries found
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
return 0; //no entries found
pos += len; //consume id field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not supported inside cluster
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return 1; //have at least one entry
if (id == 0x23) //SimpleBlock ID
return 1; //have at least one entry
pos += size; //consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
const Segment* pSegment,
long long off, // relative to start of segment payload
long long& pos, long& len) {
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0); // relative to segment
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = pSegment->m_start + off; // absolute
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 0; // we don't even have a complete cluster
const long long segment_stop =
(pSegment->m_size < 0) ? -1 : pSegment->m_start + pSegment->m_size;
long long cluster_stop = -1; // interpreted later to mean "unknown size"
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) // weird: not cluster ID
return -1; // generic error
pos += len; // consume Cluster ID field
// read size field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0)
return 0; // cluster does not have entries
pos += len; // consume size field
// pos now points to start of payload
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size) {
cluster_stop = pos + size;
assert(cluster_stop >= 0);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (cluster_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (cluster_stop > total))
// return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //too conservative
return 0; // cluster does not have any entries
}
}
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return 0; // no entries detected
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
// This is the distinguished set of ID's we use to determine
// that we have exhausted the sub-element's inside the cluster
// whose ID we parsed earlier.
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return 0; // no entries found
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return 0; // no entries found
pos += len; // consume id field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
// read size field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume size field
// pos now points to start of payload
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // not supported inside cluster
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
}
| 174,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void vmacache_flush_all(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
count_vm_vmacache_event(VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES);
/*
* Single threaded tasks need not iterate the entire
* list of process. We can avoid the flushing as well
* since the mm's seqnum was increased and don't have
* to worry about other threads' seqnum. Current's
* flush will occur upon the next lookup.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) == 1)
return;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
/*
* Only flush the vmacache pointers as the
* mm seqnum is already set and curr's will
* be set upon invalidation when the next
* lookup is done.
*/
if (mm == p->mm)
vmacache_flush(p);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely
Jann Horn points out that the vmacache_flush_all() function is not only
potentially expensive, it's buggy too. It also happens to be entirely
unnecessary, because the sequence number overflow case can be avoided by
simply making the sequence number be 64-bit. That doesn't even grow the
data structures in question, because the other adjacent fields are
already 64-bit.
So simplify the whole thing by just making the sequence number overflow
case go away entirely, which gets rid of all the complications and makes
the code faster too. Win-win.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that the VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES statistics
also just goes away entirely with this ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void vmacache_flush_all(struct mm_struct *mm)
| 169,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct powermate_device *pm;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
int pipe, maxp;
int error = -ENOMEM;
interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
return -EIO;
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0a, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
pm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct powermate_device), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!pm || !input_dev)
goto fail1;
if (powermate_alloc_buffers(udev, pm))
goto fail2;
pm->irq = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->irq)
goto fail2;
pm->config = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->config)
goto fail3;
pm->udev = udev;
pm->intf = intf;
pm->input = input_dev;
usb_make_path(udev, pm->phys, sizeof(pm->phys));
strlcat(pm->phys, "/input0", sizeof(pm->phys));
spin_lock_init(&pm->lock);
switch (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct)) {
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_NEW:
input_dev->name = pm_name_powermate;
break;
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_OLD:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
break;
default:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: unknown product id %04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
input_dev->phys = pm->phys;
usb_to_input_id(udev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, pm);
input_dev->event = powermate_input_event;
input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_0)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_0);
input_dev->relbit[BIT_WORD(REL_DIAL)] = BIT_MASK(REL_DIAL);
input_dev->mscbit[BIT_WORD(MSC_PULSELED)] = BIT_MASK(MSC_PULSELED);
/* get a handle to the interrupt data pipe */
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, endpoint->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
if (maxp < POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN || maxp > POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: Expected payload of %d--%d bytes, found %d bytes!\n",
POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX, maxp);
maxp = POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(pm->irq, udev, pipe, pm->data,
maxp, powermate_irq,
pm, endpoint->bInterval);
pm->irq->transfer_dma = pm->data_dma;
pm->irq->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* register our interrupt URB with the USB system */
if (usb_submit_urb(pm->irq, GFP_KERNEL)) {
error = -EIO;
goto fail4;
}
error = input_register_device(pm->input);
if (error)
goto fail5;
/* force an update of everything */
pm->requires_update = UPDATE_PULSE_ASLEEP | UPDATE_PULSE_AWAKE | UPDATE_PULSE_MODE | UPDATE_STATIC_BRIGHTNESS;
powermate_pulse_led(pm, 0x80, 255, 0, 1, 0); // set default pulse parameters
usb_set_intfdata(intf, pm);
return 0;
fail5: usb_kill_urb(pm->irq);
fail4: usb_free_urb(pm->config);
fail3: usb_free_urb(pm->irq);
fail2: powermate_free_buffers(udev, pm);
fail1: input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(pm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct powermate_device *pm;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
int pipe, maxp;
int error = -ENOMEM;
interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
if (interface->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1)
return -EINVAL;
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
return -EIO;
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0a, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
pm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct powermate_device), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!pm || !input_dev)
goto fail1;
if (powermate_alloc_buffers(udev, pm))
goto fail2;
pm->irq = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->irq)
goto fail2;
pm->config = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->config)
goto fail3;
pm->udev = udev;
pm->intf = intf;
pm->input = input_dev;
usb_make_path(udev, pm->phys, sizeof(pm->phys));
strlcat(pm->phys, "/input0", sizeof(pm->phys));
spin_lock_init(&pm->lock);
switch (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct)) {
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_NEW:
input_dev->name = pm_name_powermate;
break;
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_OLD:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
break;
default:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: unknown product id %04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
input_dev->phys = pm->phys;
usb_to_input_id(udev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, pm);
input_dev->event = powermate_input_event;
input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_0)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_0);
input_dev->relbit[BIT_WORD(REL_DIAL)] = BIT_MASK(REL_DIAL);
input_dev->mscbit[BIT_WORD(MSC_PULSELED)] = BIT_MASK(MSC_PULSELED);
/* get a handle to the interrupt data pipe */
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, endpoint->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
if (maxp < POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN || maxp > POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: Expected payload of %d--%d bytes, found %d bytes!\n",
POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX, maxp);
maxp = POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(pm->irq, udev, pipe, pm->data,
maxp, powermate_irq,
pm, endpoint->bInterval);
pm->irq->transfer_dma = pm->data_dma;
pm->irq->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* register our interrupt URB with the USB system */
if (usb_submit_urb(pm->irq, GFP_KERNEL)) {
error = -EIO;
goto fail4;
}
error = input_register_device(pm->input);
if (error)
goto fail5;
/* force an update of everything */
pm->requires_update = UPDATE_PULSE_ASLEEP | UPDATE_PULSE_AWAKE | UPDATE_PULSE_MODE | UPDATE_STATIC_BRIGHTNESS;
powermate_pulse_led(pm, 0x80, 255, 0, 1, 0); // set default pulse parameters
usb_set_intfdata(intf, pm);
return 0;
fail5: usb_kill_urb(pm->irq);
fail4: usb_free_urb(pm->config);
fail3: usb_free_urb(pm->irq);
fail2: powermate_free_buffers(udev, pm);
fail1: input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(pm);
return error;
}
| 167,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestFlashMessageLoop::TestFlashMessageLoop(TestingInstance* instance)
: TestCase(instance),
message_loop_(NULL),
callback_factory_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | TestFlashMessageLoop::TestFlashMessageLoop(TestingInstance* instance)
: TestCase(instance),
| 172,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const
{
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
| 174,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TIFFReadEncodedStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 strip, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFReadEncodedStrip";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint32 stripsperplane;
uint32 stripinplane;
uint16 plane;
uint32 rows;
tmsize_t stripsize;
if (!TIFFCheckRead(tif,0))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (strip>=td->td_nstrips)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,
"%lu: Strip out of range, max %lu",(unsigned long)strip,
(unsigned long)td->td_nstrips);
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
/*
* Calculate the strip size according to the number of
* rows in the strip (check for truncated last strip on any
* of the separations).
*/
rowsperstrip=td->td_rowsperstrip;
if (rowsperstrip>td->td_imagelength)
rowsperstrip=td->td_imagelength;
stripsperplane=((td->td_imagelength+rowsperstrip-1)/rowsperstrip);
stripinplane=(strip%stripsperplane);
plane=(uint16)(strip/stripsperplane);
rows=td->td_imagelength-stripinplane*rowsperstrip;
if (rows>rowsperstrip)
rows=rowsperstrip;
stripsize=TIFFVStripSize(tif,rows);
if (stripsize==0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
/* shortcut to avoid an extra memcpy() */
if( td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_NONE &&
size!=(tmsize_t)(-1) && size >= stripsize &&
!isMapped(tif) &&
((tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)==0) )
{
if (TIFFReadRawStrip1(tif, strip, buf, stripsize, module) != stripsize)
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits(buf,stripsize);
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return (stripsize);
}
if ((size!=(tmsize_t)(-1))&&(size<stripsize))
stripsize=size;
if (!TIFFFillStrip(tif,strip))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if ((*tif->tif_decodestrip)(tif,buf,stripsize,plane)<=0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return(stripsize);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596
CWE ID: CWE-369 | TIFFReadEncodedStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 strip, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFReadEncodedStrip";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint32 stripsperplane;
uint32 stripinplane;
uint16 plane;
uint32 rows;
tmsize_t stripsize;
if (!TIFFCheckRead(tif,0))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (strip>=td->td_nstrips)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,
"%lu: Strip out of range, max %lu",(unsigned long)strip,
(unsigned long)td->td_nstrips);
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
/*
* Calculate the strip size according to the number of
* rows in the strip (check for truncated last strip on any
* of the separations).
*/
rowsperstrip=td->td_rowsperstrip;
if (rowsperstrip>td->td_imagelength)
rowsperstrip=td->td_imagelength;
stripsperplane= TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip);
stripinplane=(strip%stripsperplane);
plane=(uint16)(strip/stripsperplane);
rows=td->td_imagelength-stripinplane*rowsperstrip;
if (rows>rowsperstrip)
rows=rowsperstrip;
stripsize=TIFFVStripSize(tif,rows);
if (stripsize==0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
/* shortcut to avoid an extra memcpy() */
if( td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_NONE &&
size!=(tmsize_t)(-1) && size >= stripsize &&
!isMapped(tif) &&
((tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)==0) )
{
if (TIFFReadRawStrip1(tif, strip, buf, stripsize, module) != stripsize)
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits(buf,stripsize);
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return (stripsize);
}
if ((size!=(tmsize_t)(-1))&&(size<stripsize))
stripsize=size;
if (!TIFFFillStrip(tif,strip))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if ((*tif->tif_decodestrip)(tif,buf,stripsize,plane)<=0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return(stripsize);
}
| 168,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionBookmarksTest()
: client_(NULL), model_(NULL), node_(NULL), folder_(NULL) {}
Commit Message: Added unit test for new portion of GetMetaInfo API
BUG=383600
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/348833003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@278908 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ExtensionBookmarksTest()
| 171,186 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsAllowed(const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension,
const GURL& url,
PermittedFeature feature,
int tab_id) {
const PermissionsData* permissions_data = extension->permissions_data();
bool script =
permissions_data->CanAccessPage(url, tab_id, nullptr) &&
permissions_data->CanRunContentScriptOnPage(url, tab_id, nullptr);
bool capture = permissions_data->CanCaptureVisiblePage(url, tab_id, NULL);
switch (feature) {
case PERMITTED_SCRIPT_ONLY:
return script && !capture;
case PERMITTED_CAPTURE_ONLY:
return capture && !script;
case PERMITTED_BOTH:
return script && capture;
case PERMITTED_NONE:
return !script && !capture;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IsAllowed(const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension,
const GURL& url,
PermittedFeature feature,
int tab_id) {
const PermissionsData* permissions_data = extension->permissions_data();
bool script =
permissions_data->CanAccessPage(url, tab_id, nullptr) &&
permissions_data->CanRunContentScriptOnPage(url, tab_id, nullptr);
bool capture = permissions_data->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
url, tab_id, NULL, extensions::CaptureRequirement::kActiveTabOrAllUrls);
switch (feature) {
case PERMITTED_SCRIPT_ONLY:
return script && !capture;
case PERMITTED_CAPTURE_ONLY:
return capture && !script;
case PERMITTED_BOTH:
return script && capture;
case PERMITTED_NONE:
return !script && !capture;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
| 173,003 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() const {
return Textfield::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() &&
!model()->is_caret_visible() && !model()->is_keyword_selected();
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
[email protected]
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool OmniboxViewViews::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() const {
bool show_with_caret = base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
omnibox::kUIExperimentShowPlaceholderWhenCaretShowing);
return Textfield::ShouldShowPlaceholderText() &&
(show_with_caret || !model()->is_caret_visible()) &&
!model()->is_keyword_selected();
}
| 172,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rm_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
int rc;
bool found_cred;
CredentialWrapper * cred_wrapper = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Attempting to delete cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
found_cred=false;
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred_wrapper)) {
if (cred_wrapper->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
credentials.DeleteCurrent();
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
if (found_cred) {
priv_state priv = set_root_priv();
unlink (cred_wrapper->GetStorageName());
SaveCredentialList();
set_priv(priv);
delete cred_wrapper;
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Removed credential %s for owner %s\n", name, owner);
} else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to remove credential %s:%s (not found)\n", owner, name);
}
free (owner);
socket->encode();
rc = (found_cred)?CREDD_SUCCESS:CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code(rc);
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if (name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | rm_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
int rc;
bool found_cred;
CredentialWrapper * cred_wrapper = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, "%s", (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Attempting to delete cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
found_cred=false;
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred_wrapper)) {
if (cred_wrapper->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred_wrapper->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
credentials.DeleteCurrent();
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
if (found_cred) {
priv_state priv = set_root_priv();
unlink (cred_wrapper->GetStorageName());
SaveCredentialList();
set_priv(priv);
delete cred_wrapper;
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Removed credential %s for owner %s\n", name, owner);
} else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to remove credential %s:%s (not found)\n", owner, name);
}
free (owner);
socket->encode();
rc = (found_cred)?CREDD_SUCCESS:CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code(rc);
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if (name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
return rtnVal;
}
| 165,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: asn1_get_octet_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *str_len)
{
int len_len;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
/* if(str==NULL) return ASN1_SUCCESS; */
*str_len = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len);
if (*str_len < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = *str_len + len_len;
if (str_size >= *str_len)
memcpy (str, der + len_len, *str_len);
else
{
return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | asn1_get_octet_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *str_len)
{
int len_len = 0;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
/* if(str==NULL) return ASN1_SUCCESS; */
*str_len = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len);
if (*str_len < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = *str_len + len_len;
if (str_size >= *str_len)
memcpy (str, der + len_len, *str_len);
else
{
return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
| 165,178 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
if (sender == close_button_) {
Dismiss();
return;
}
if (!base::Contains(enabled_actions_,
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender)) ||
!media_session_id_.has_value()) {
return;
}
media_session::PerformMediaSessionAction(
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender),
media_controller_remote_);
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void LockScreenMediaControlsView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
if (!base::Contains(enabled_actions_,
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender)) ||
!media_session_id_.has_value()) {
return;
}
media_session::PerformMediaSessionAction(
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender),
media_controller_remote_);
}
| 172,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct pid *good_sigevent(sigevent_t * event)
{
struct task_struct *rtn = current->group_leader;
if ((event->sigev_notify & SIGEV_THREAD_ID ) &&
(!(rtn = find_task_by_vpid(event->sigev_notify_thread_id)) ||
!same_thread_group(rtn, current) ||
(event->sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) != SIGEV_SIGNAL))
return NULL;
if (((event->sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) != SIGEV_NONE) &&
((event->sigev_signo <= 0) || (event->sigev_signo > SIGRTMAX)))
return NULL;
return task_pid(rtn);
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static struct pid *good_sigevent(sigevent_t * event)
{
struct task_struct *rtn = current->group_leader;
switch (event->sigev_notify) {
case SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID:
rtn = find_task_by_vpid(event->sigev_notify_thread_id);
if (!rtn || !same_thread_group(rtn, current))
return NULL;
/* FALLTHRU */
case SIGEV_SIGNAL:
case SIGEV_THREAD:
if (event->sigev_signo <= 0 || event->sigev_signo > SIGRTMAX)
return NULL;
/* FALLTHRU */
case SIGEV_NONE:
return task_pid(rtn);
default:
return NULL;
}
}
| 169,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: feed_table_block_tag(struct table *tbl,
char *line, struct table_mode *mode, int indent, int cmd)
{
int offset;
if (mode->indent_level <= 0 && indent == -1)
return;
if (mode->indent_level >= CHAR_MAX && indent == 1)
return;
setwidth(tbl, mode);
feed_table_inline_tag(tbl, line, mode, -1);
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
if (indent == 1) {
mode->indent_level++;
if (mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent += INDENT_INCR;
}
else if (indent == -1) {
mode->indent_level--;
if (mode->indent_level < MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent -= INDENT_INCR;
}
offset = tbl->indent;
if (cmd == HTML_DT) {
if (mode->indent_level > 0 && mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
offset -= INDENT_INCR;
}
if (tbl->indent > 0) {
check_minimum0(tbl, 0);
addcontentssize(tbl, offset);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | feed_table_block_tag(struct table *tbl,
char *line, struct table_mode *mode, int indent, int cmd)
{
int offset;
if (mode->indent_level <= 0 && indent == -1)
return;
if (mode->indent_level >= CHAR_MAX && indent == 1)
return;
setwidth(tbl, mode);
feed_table_inline_tag(tbl, line, mode, -1);
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
if (indent == 1) {
mode->indent_level++;
if (mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent += INDENT_INCR;
}
else if (indent == -1) {
mode->indent_level--;
if (mode->indent_level < MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
tbl->indent -= INDENT_INCR;
}
if (tbl->indent < 0)
tbl->indent = 0;
offset = tbl->indent;
if (cmd == HTML_DT) {
if (mode->indent_level > 0 && mode->indent_level <= MAX_INDENT_LEVEL)
offset -= INDENT_INCR;
if (offset < 0)
offset = 0;
}
if (tbl->indent > 0) {
check_minimum0(tbl, 0);
addcontentssize(tbl, offset);
}
}
| 169,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool blk_kick_flush(struct request_queue *q, struct blk_flush_queue *fq)
{
struct list_head *pending = &fq->flush_queue[fq->flush_pending_idx];
struct request *first_rq =
list_first_entry(pending, struct request, flush.list);
struct request *flush_rq = fq->flush_rq;
/* C1 described at the top of this file */
if (fq->flush_pending_idx != fq->flush_running_idx || list_empty(pending))
return false;
/* C2 and C3 */
if (!list_empty(&fq->flush_data_in_flight) &&
time_before(jiffies,
fq->flush_pending_since + FLUSH_PENDING_TIMEOUT))
return false;
/*
* Issue flush and toggle pending_idx. This makes pending_idx
* different from running_idx, which means flush is in flight.
*/
fq->flush_pending_idx ^= 1;
blk_rq_init(q, flush_rq);
/*
* Borrow tag from the first request since they can't
* be in flight at the same time.
*/
if (q->mq_ops) {
flush_rq->mq_ctx = first_rq->mq_ctx;
flush_rq->tag = first_rq->tag;
}
flush_rq->cmd_type = REQ_TYPE_FS;
flush_rq->cmd_flags = WRITE_FLUSH | REQ_FLUSH_SEQ;
flush_rq->rq_disk = first_rq->rq_disk;
flush_rq->end_io = flush_end_io;
return blk_flush_queue_rq(flush_rq, false);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static bool blk_kick_flush(struct request_queue *q, struct blk_flush_queue *fq)
{
struct list_head *pending = &fq->flush_queue[fq->flush_pending_idx];
struct request *first_rq =
list_first_entry(pending, struct request, flush.list);
struct request *flush_rq = fq->flush_rq;
/* C1 described at the top of this file */
if (fq->flush_pending_idx != fq->flush_running_idx || list_empty(pending))
return false;
/* C2 and C3 */
if (!list_empty(&fq->flush_data_in_flight) &&
time_before(jiffies,
fq->flush_pending_since + FLUSH_PENDING_TIMEOUT))
return false;
/*
* Issue flush and toggle pending_idx. This makes pending_idx
* different from running_idx, which means flush is in flight.
*/
fq->flush_pending_idx ^= 1;
blk_rq_init(q, flush_rq);
/*
* Borrow tag from the first request since they can't
* be in flight at the same time. And acquire the tag's
* ownership for flush req.
*/
if (q->mq_ops) {
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
flush_rq->mq_ctx = first_rq->mq_ctx;
flush_rq->tag = first_rq->tag;
fq->orig_rq = first_rq;
hctx = q->mq_ops->map_queue(q, first_rq->mq_ctx->cpu);
blk_mq_tag_set_rq(hctx, first_rq->tag, flush_rq);
}
flush_rq->cmd_type = REQ_TYPE_FS;
flush_rq->cmd_flags = WRITE_FLUSH | REQ_FLUSH_SEQ;
flush_rq->rq_disk = first_rq->rq_disk;
flush_rq->end_io = flush_end_io;
return blk_flush_queue_rq(flush_rq, false);
}
| 169,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char* lookup_loc_range(const char* loc_range, HashTable* hash_arr, int canonicalize TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i = 0;
int cur_arr_len = 0;
int result = 0;
char* lang_tag = NULL;
zval** ele_value = NULL;
char** cur_arr = NULL;
char* cur_loc_range = NULL;
char* can_loc_range = NULL;
int saved_pos = 0;
char* return_value = NULL;
cur_arr = ecalloc(zend_hash_num_elements(hash_arr)*2, sizeof(char *));
/* convert the array to lowercase , also replace hyphens with the underscore and store it in cur_arr */
for(zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(hash_arr);
zend_hash_has_more_elements(hash_arr) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(hash_arr)) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data(hash_arr, (void**)&ele_value) == FAILURE) {
/* Should never actually fail since the key is known to exist.*/
continue;
}
if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING) {
/* element value is not a string */
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: locale array element is not a string", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2] = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value), Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
result = strToMatch(Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value), cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2]);
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2+1] = Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value);
cur_arr_len++ ;
} /* end of for */
/* Canonicalize array elements */
if(canonicalize) {
for(i=0; i<cur_arr_len; i++) {
lang_tag = get_icu_value_internal(cur_arr[i*2], LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG, &result, 0);
if(result != 1 || lang_tag == NULL || !lang_tag[0]) {
if(lang_tag) {
efree(lang_tag);
}
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[i*2] = erealloc(cur_arr[i*2], strlen(lang_tag)+1);
result = strToMatch(lang_tag, cur_arr[i*2]);
efree(lang_tag);
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
}
}
if(canonicalize) {
/* Canonicalize the loc_range */
can_loc_range = get_icu_value_internal(loc_range, LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG, &result , 0);
if( result != 1 || can_loc_range == NULL || !can_loc_range[0]) {
/* Error */
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize loc_range" , 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if(can_loc_range) {
efree(can_loc_range);
}
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
} else {
loc_range = can_loc_range;
}
}
cur_loc_range = ecalloc(1, strlen(loc_range)+1);
/* convert to lower and replace hyphens */
result = strToMatch(loc_range, cur_loc_range);
if(can_loc_range) {
efree(can_loc_range);
}
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
/* Lookup for the lang_tag match */
saved_pos = strlen(cur_loc_range);
while(saved_pos > 0) {
for(i=0; i< cur_arr_len; i++){
if(cur_arr[i*2] != NULL && strlen(cur_arr[i*2]) == saved_pos && strncmp(cur_loc_range, cur_arr[i*2], saved_pos) == 0) {
/* Match found */
return_value = estrdup(canonicalize?cur_arr[i*2]:cur_arr[i*2+1]);
efree(cur_loc_range);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(return_value);
}
}
saved_pos = getStrrtokenPos(cur_loc_range, saved_pos);
}
/* Match not found */
efree(cur_loc_range);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static char* lookup_loc_range(const char* loc_range, HashTable* hash_arr, int canonicalize TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i = 0;
int cur_arr_len = 0;
int result = 0;
char* lang_tag = NULL;
zval** ele_value = NULL;
char** cur_arr = NULL;
char* cur_loc_range = NULL;
char* can_loc_range = NULL;
int saved_pos = 0;
char* return_value = NULL;
cur_arr = ecalloc(zend_hash_num_elements(hash_arr)*2, sizeof(char *));
/* convert the array to lowercase , also replace hyphens with the underscore and store it in cur_arr */
for(zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(hash_arr);
zend_hash_has_more_elements(hash_arr) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(hash_arr)) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data(hash_arr, (void**)&ele_value) == FAILURE) {
/* Should never actually fail since the key is known to exist.*/
continue;
}
if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING) {
/* element value is not a string */
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: locale array element is not a string", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2] = estrndup(Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value), Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
result = strToMatch(Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value), cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2]);
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[cur_arr_len*2+1] = Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value);
cur_arr_len++ ;
} /* end of for */
/* Canonicalize array elements */
if(canonicalize) {
for(i=0; i<cur_arr_len; i++) {
lang_tag = get_icu_value_internal(cur_arr[i*2], LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG, &result, 0);
if(result != 1 || lang_tag == NULL || !lang_tag[0]) {
if(lang_tag) {
efree(lang_tag);
}
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
cur_arr[i*2] = erealloc(cur_arr[i*2], strlen(lang_tag)+1);
result = strToMatch(lang_tag, cur_arr[i*2]);
efree(lang_tag);
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
}
}
if(canonicalize) {
/* Canonicalize the loc_range */
can_loc_range = get_icu_value_internal(loc_range, LOC_CANONICALIZE_TAG, &result , 0);
if( result != 1 || can_loc_range == NULL || !can_loc_range[0]) {
/* Error */
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize loc_range" , 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if(can_loc_range) {
efree(can_loc_range);
}
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
} else {
loc_range = can_loc_range;
}
}
cur_loc_range = ecalloc(1, strlen(loc_range)+1);
/* convert to lower and replace hyphens */
result = strToMatch(loc_range, cur_loc_range);
if(can_loc_range) {
efree(can_loc_range);
}
if(result == 0) {
intl_error_set(NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "lookup_loc_range: unable to canonicalize lang_tag" , 0 TSRMLS_CC);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
/* Lookup for the lang_tag match */
saved_pos = strlen(cur_loc_range);
while(saved_pos > 0) {
for(i=0; i< cur_arr_len; i++){
if(cur_arr[i*2] != NULL && strlen(cur_arr[i*2]) == saved_pos && strncmp(cur_loc_range, cur_arr[i*2], saved_pos) == 0) {
/* Match found */
return_value = estrdup(canonicalize?cur_arr[i*2]:cur_arr[i*2+1]);
efree(cur_loc_range);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(return_value);
}
}
saved_pos = getStrrtokenPos(cur_loc_range, saved_pos);
}
/* Match not found */
efree(cur_loc_range);
LOOKUP_CLEAN_RETURN(NULL);
}
| 167,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
{
struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
key_check(key);
/* the key must be writable */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* attempt to update it if supported */
if (!key->type->update)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
up_write(&key->sem);
error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
{
struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
int ret;
key_check(key);
/* the key must be writable */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* attempt to update it if supported */
if (!key->type->update)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
down_write(&key->sem);
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
up_write(&key->sem);
error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
return ret;
}
| 167,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Microtask::performCheckpoint()
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
V8PerIsolateData* isolateData = V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate);
ASSERT(isolateData);
if (isolateData->recursionLevel() || isolateData->performingMicrotaskCheckpoint() || isolateData->destructionPending() || ScriptForbiddenScope::isScriptForbidden())
return;
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(true);
{
V8RecursionScope recursionScope(isolate);
isolate->RunMicrotasks();
}
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(false);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void Microtask::performCheckpoint()
void Microtask::performCheckpoint(v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
V8PerIsolateData* isolateData = V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate);
ASSERT(isolateData);
if (isolateData->recursionLevel() || isolateData->performingMicrotaskCheckpoint() || isolateData->destructionPending() || ScriptForbiddenScope::isScriptForbidden())
return;
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(true);
{
V8RecursionScope recursionScope(isolate);
isolate->RunMicrotasks();
}
isolateData->setPerformingMicrotaskCheckpoint(false);
}
| 171,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
goal = ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(ext_inode_hdr(inode)));
if (goal > le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) {
flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL;
goal--;
} else
goal = ext4_inode_to_goal_block(inode);
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, flags,
NULL, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
return err;
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto out;
}
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data,
sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data));
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* old root could have indexes or leaves
* so calculate e_max right way */
if (ext_depth(inode))
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
else
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Update top-level index: num,max,pointer */
neh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh), newblock);
if (neh->eh_depth == 0) {
/* Root extent block becomes index block */
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 0));
EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block =
EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh)->ee_block;
}
ext_debug("new root: num %d(%d), lblock %d, ptr %llu\n",
le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_max),
le32_to_cpu(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)));
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out:
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
size_t ext_size = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
goal = ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(ext_inode_hdr(inode)));
if (goal > le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) {
flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL;
goal--;
} else
goal = ext4_inode_to_goal_block(inode);
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, flags,
NULL, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
return err;
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto out;
}
ext_size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data, ext_size);
/* zero out unused area in the extent block */
memset(bh->b_data + ext_size, 0, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - ext_size);
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* old root could have indexes or leaves
* so calculate e_max right way */
if (ext_depth(inode))
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
else
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Update top-level index: num,max,pointer */
neh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh), newblock);
if (neh->eh_depth == 0) {
/* Root extent block becomes index block */
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 0));
EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block =
EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh)->ee_block;
}
ext_debug("new root: num %d(%d), lblock %d, ptr %llu\n",
le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_max),
le32_to_cpu(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)));
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out:
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
| 169,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const
{
return m_pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const
| 174,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
{
return m_timecodeScale;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
| 174,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks();
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
| 171,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_asymm_operate(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *src_data, size_t src_len,
void *dst_data, uint64_t *dst_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
uint64_t dlen64;
size_t dlen;
struct tee_obj *o;
void *label = NULL;
size_t label_len = 0;
size_t n;
int salt_len;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) src_data, src_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&dlen64, dst_len, sizeof(dlen64));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dlen = dlen64;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) dst_data, dlen);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * num_params);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD:
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_encrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_decrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else {
/*
* We will panic because "the mode is not compatible
* with the function"
*/
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
break;
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512:
for (n = 0; n < num_params; n++) {
if (params[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_RSA_OAEP_LABEL) {
label = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
label_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
break;
}
}
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_encrypt(cs->algo, o->attr,
label, label_len,
src_data, src_len,
dst_data, &dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_decrypt(
cs->algo, o->attr, label, label_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
break;
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_RSASSA_NA1)
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5:
#endif
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512:
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params, src_len);
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256:
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
TEE_Result res2;
dlen64 = dlen;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(dst_len, &dlen64, sizeof(*dst_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | TEE_Result syscall_asymm_operate(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *src_data, size_t src_len,
void *dst_data, uint64_t *dst_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
uint64_t dlen64;
size_t dlen;
struct tee_obj *o;
void *label = NULL;
size_t label_len = 0;
size_t n;
int salt_len;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) src_data, src_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&dlen64, dst_len, sizeof(dlen64));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dlen = dlen64;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) dst_data, dlen);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
size_t alloc_size = 0;
if (MUL_OVERFLOW(sizeof(TEE_Attribute), num_params, &alloc_size))
return TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW;
params = malloc(alloc_size);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD:
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_encrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_decrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else {
/*
* We will panic because "the mode is not compatible
* with the function"
*/
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
break;
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512:
for (n = 0; n < num_params; n++) {
if (params[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_RSA_OAEP_LABEL) {
label = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
label_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
break;
}
}
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_encrypt(cs->algo, o->attr,
label, label_len,
src_data, src_len,
dst_data, &dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_decrypt(
cs->algo, o->attr, label, label_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
break;
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_RSASSA_NA1)
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5:
#endif
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512:
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params, src_len);
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256:
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
TEE_Result res2;
dlen64 = dlen;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(dst_len, &dlen64, sizeof(*dst_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
}
return res;
}
| 169,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
get_named_pipe_client_pid_(NULL),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
| 171,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
| 171,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebSocketJob::OnSentData(SocketStream* socket, int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnSentHandshakeRequest(socket, amount_sent);
return;
}
if (delegate_) {
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
DCHECK(current_buffer_);
current_buffer_->DidConsume(amount_sent);
if (current_buffer_->BytesRemaining() > 0)
return;
amount_sent = send_frame_handler_->GetOriginalBufferSize();
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
current_buffer_ = NULL;
send_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
delegate_->OnSentData(socket, amount_sent);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(this, &WebSocketJob::SendPending));
}
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void WebSocketJob::OnSentData(SocketStream* socket, int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnSentHandshakeRequest(socket, amount_sent);
return;
}
if (delegate_) {
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
DCHECK(current_buffer_);
current_buffer_->DidConsume(amount_sent);
if (current_buffer_->BytesRemaining() > 0)
return;
amount_sent = send_frame_handler_->GetOriginalBufferSize();
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
current_buffer_ = NULL;
send_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
if (method_factory_.empty()) {
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&WebSocketJob::SendPending));
}
delegate_->OnSentData(socket, amount_sent);
}
}
| 170,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Block Tifinagh + Latin mix
BUG=chromium:722639
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToU*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2894313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#474199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
// - Disalow mixing of Latin and Tifinagh.
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"(^[\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\u0585\u0581]+$|)"
R"([a-z][\u0585\u0581]+[a-z]|)"
R"(^[og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|[\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|)"
R"([\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\p{scx=armn}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=cans}]|)"
R"([\p{sc=tfng}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\p{sc=tfng}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339])",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 172,363 |
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