instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
139k
| output
stringlengths 16
138k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int hci_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED)
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
hci_sock_cmsg(sk, msg, skb);
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_USER:
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
break;
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int hci_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED)
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
hci_sock_cmsg(sk, msg, skb);
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_USER:
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
break;
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
| 166,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
| 168,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,16,exception));
}
| 168,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowDCMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) \
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale); \
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data); \
if (graymap != (int *) NULL) \
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap); \
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL) \
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap); \
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL) \
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap); \
if (redmap != (int *) NULL) \
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap); \
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL) \
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory( \
stream_info->offsets); \
if (stream_info != (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL) \
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
explicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
implicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
photometric[MagickPathExtent];
DCMInfo
info;
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
colors,
height,
length,
number_scenes,
quantum,
status,
width;
ssize_t
count,
scene;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
(void) memset(&info,0,sizeof(info));
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MagickPathExtent);
info.bits_allocated=8;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
info.mask=0xffff;
info.max_value=255UL;
info.samples_per_pixel=1;
info.signed_data=(~0UL);
info.rescale_slope=1.0;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
number_scenes=1;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
while (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ; )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
break;
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MagickPathExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MagickPathExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"OF",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) == 0)
quantum=8;
else
quantum=1;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
if ((((unsigned int) group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MagickPathExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,
&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
info.samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
if ((info.samples_per_pixel == 0) || (info.samples_per_pixel > 4))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MagickPathExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
info.polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
info.bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.bits_allocated;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 32))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.bits_allocated)-1;
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
info.significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (info.significant_bits > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.significant_bits;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 16))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.significant_bits)-1;
info.mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(info.significant_bits);
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
info.signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_center=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_width=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_intercept=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_slope=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/info.bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(graymap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*graymap));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (info.bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(redmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*redmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(greenmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*greenmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(bluemap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*bluemap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
info.polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data,
exception);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
{
Image
*last;
last=RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
if (last != (Image *) NULL)
last=DestroyImage(last);
break;
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (info.signed_data == 0xffff)
info.signed_data=(size_t) (info.significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
(void) (((ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for (c=EOF; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
if (fputc(c,file) != c)
break;
}
(void) fclose(file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"jpeg:%s",filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"j2k:%s",filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property,exception),exception);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (info.depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(info.depth)+1);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
info.scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(length,256),
sizeof(*info.scale));
if (info.scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(info.scale,0,MagickMax(length,256)*
sizeof(*info.scale));
range=GetQuantumRange(info.depth);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) GetQuantumRange(info.depth); i++)
info.scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
{
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=TellBlob(image)+8;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=info.depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if ((image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL) &&
(info.samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
int
index;
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << info.depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[0],SEEK_SET);
}
}
if ((info.samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) info.samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
info.window_width=0;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:window");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if (flags & RhoValue)
info.window_center=geometry_info.rho;
if (flags & SigmaValue)
info.window_width=geometry_info.sigma;
info.rescale=MagickTrue;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:rescale");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
info.rescale=IsStringTrue(option);
if ((info.window_center != 0) && (info.window_width == 0))
info.window_width=info.window_center;
status=ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickTrue,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (stream_info->segment_count > 1))
{
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[1],SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickFalse,
exception);
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1269
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowDCMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) \
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale); \
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data); \
if (graymap != (int *) NULL) \
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap); \
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL) \
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap); \
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL) \
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap); \
if (redmap != (int *) NULL) \
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap); \
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL) \
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory( \
stream_info->offsets); \
if (stream_info != (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL) \
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
explicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
implicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
photometric[MagickPathExtent];
DCMInfo
info;
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
colors,
height,
length,
number_scenes,
quantum,
status,
width;
ssize_t
count,
scene;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
(void) memset(&info,0,sizeof(info));
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MagickPathExtent);
info.bits_allocated=8;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
info.mask=0xffff;
info.max_value=255UL;
info.samples_per_pixel=1;
info.signed_data=(~0UL);
info.rescale_slope=1.0;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
number_scenes=1;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
while (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ; )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
break;
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MagickPathExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MagickPathExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"OF",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) == 0)
quantum=8;
else
quantum=1;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
if ((((unsigned int) group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MagickPathExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,
&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
info.samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
if ((info.samples_per_pixel == 0) || (info.samples_per_pixel > 4))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MagickPathExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
info.polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
info.bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.bits_allocated;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 32))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.bits_allocated)-1;
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
info.significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (info.significant_bits > 8)
info.bytes_per_pixel=2;
info.depth=info.significant_bits;
if ((info.depth == 0) || (info.depth > 16))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
info.max_value=(1UL << info.significant_bits)-1;
info.mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(info.significant_bits);
image->depth=info.depth;
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
info.signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_center=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.window_width=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_intercept=StringToDouble((char *) data,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
info.rescale_slope=StringToDouble((char *) data,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/info.bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(graymap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*graymap));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (info.bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(redmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*redmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(greenmap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*greenmap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(colors,65536),
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(bluemap,0,MagickMax(colors,65536)*
sizeof(*bluemap));
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
info.polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data,
exception);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((group == 0xfffc) && (element == 0xfffc))
{
Image
*last;
last=RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
if (last != (Image *) NULL)
last=DestroyImage(last);
break;
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (info.signed_data == 0xffff)
info.signed_data=(size_t) (info.significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
(void) (((ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for (c=EOF; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
if (fputc(c,file) != c)
break;
}
(void) fclose(file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"jpeg:%s",filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"j2k:%s",filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property,exception),exception);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (info.depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(info.depth)+1);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
info.scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(length,256),
sizeof(*info.scale));
if (info.scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(info.scale,0,MagickMax(length,256)*
sizeof(*info.scale));
range=GetQuantumRange(info.depth);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) GetQuantumRange(info.depth); i++)
info.scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (length > (size_t) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
{
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=TellBlob(image)+8;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=info.depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if ((image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL) &&
(info.samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
int
index;
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << info.depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowDCMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index >= 0) &&
(index <= (int) info.max_value))
index=(int) info.scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
}
tag=((unsigned int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) |
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
{
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
ThrowDCMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
info.bytes_per_pixel=1;
info.depth=8;
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[0],SEEK_SET);
}
}
if ((info.samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) info.samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
info.window_width=0;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:window");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if (flags & RhoValue)
info.window_center=geometry_info.rho;
if (flags & SigmaValue)
info.window_width=geometry_info.sigma;
info.rescale=MagickTrue;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:rescale");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
info.rescale=IsStringTrue(option);
if ((info.window_center != 0) && (info.window_width == 0))
info.window_width=info.window_center;
status=ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickTrue,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (stream_info->segment_count > 1))
{
if (stream_info->offset_count > 0)
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
stream_info->offsets[0]+stream_info->segments[1],SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadDCMPixels(image,&info,stream_info,MagickFalse,
exception);
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (TellBlob(image) < (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (info.scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
info.scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info.scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 170,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
size_t name_len = strlen(name);
int ret = 0;
if (name_len + size > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root))
return -ENOSPC;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode), name,
name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
ret = -ENODATA;
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* remove the attribute
*/
if (!value)
goto out;
} else {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, 0);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
}
if (!di && !value)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
}
again:
ret = btrfs_insert_xattr_item(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, value, size);
/*
* If we're setting an xattr to a new value but the new value is say
* exactly BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE, we could end up with EOVERFLOW getting
* back from split_leaf. This is because it thinks we'll be extending
* the existing item size, but we're asking for enough space to add the
* item itself. So if we get EOVERFLOW just set ret to EEXIST and let
* the rest of the function figure it out.
*/
if (ret == -EOVERFLOW)
ret = -EEXIST;
if (ret == -EEXIST) {
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto out;
/*
* We can't use the path we already have since we won't have the
* proper locking for a delete, so release the path and
* re-lookup to delete the thing.
*/
btrfs_release_path(path);
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
/* Shouldn't happen but just in case... */
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* We have a value to set, so go back and try to insert it now.
*/
if (value) {
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int do_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di = NULL;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
size_t name_len = strlen(name);
int ret = 0;
if (name_len + size > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root))
return -ENOSPC;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->skip_release_on_error = 1;
if (!value) {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, -1);
if (!di && (flags & XATTR_REPLACE))
ret = -ENODATA;
else if (di)
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
goto out;
}
/*
* For a replace we can't just do the insert blindly.
* Do a lookup first (read-only btrfs_search_slot), and return if xattr
* doesn't exist. If it exists, fall down below to the insert/replace
* path - we can't race with a concurrent xattr delete, because the VFS
* locks the inode's i_mutex before calling setxattr or removexattr.
*/
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) {
ASSERT(mutex_is_locked(&inode->i_mutex));
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, 0);
if (!di) {
ret = -ENODATA;
goto out;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
di = NULL;
}
ret = btrfs_insert_xattr_item(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, value, size);
if (ret == -EOVERFLOW) {
/*
* We have an existing item in a leaf, split_leaf couldn't
* expand it. That item might have or not a dir_item that
* matches our target xattr, so lets check.
*/
ret = 0;
btrfs_assert_tree_locked(path->nodes[0]);
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (!di && !(flags & XATTR_REPLACE)) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
} else if (ret == -EEXIST) {
ret = 0;
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
ASSERT(di); /* logic error */
} else if (ret) {
goto out;
}
if (di && (flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
ret = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
if (di) {
/*
* We're doing a replace, and it must be atomic, that is, at
* any point in time we have either the old or the new xattr
* value in the tree. We don't want readers (getxattr and
* listxattrs) to miss a value, this is specially important
* for ACLs.
*/
const int slot = path->slots[0];
struct extent_buffer *leaf = path->nodes[0];
const u16 old_data_len = btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, di);
const u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
const u32 data_size = sizeof(*di) + name_len + size;
struct btrfs_item *item;
unsigned long data_ptr;
char *ptr;
if (size > old_data_len) {
if (btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, leaf) <
(size - old_data_len)) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
}
if (old_data_len + name_len + sizeof(*di) == item_size) {
/* No other xattrs packed in the same leaf item. */
if (size > old_data_len)
btrfs_extend_item(root, path,
size - old_data_len);
else if (size < old_data_len)
btrfs_truncate_item(root, path, data_size, 1);
} else {
/* There are other xattrs packed in the same item. */
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_extend_item(root, path, data_size);
}
item = btrfs_item_nr(slot);
ptr = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, char);
ptr += btrfs_item_size(leaf, item) - data_size;
di = (struct btrfs_dir_item *)ptr;
btrfs_set_dir_data_len(leaf, di, size);
data_ptr = ((unsigned long)(di + 1)) + name_len;
write_extent_buffer(leaf, value, data_ptr, size);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
} else {
/*
* Insert, and we had space for the xattr, so path->slots[0] is
* where our xattr dir_item is and btrfs_insert_xattr_item()
* filled it.
*/
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
| 166,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 6: /* _CLASS_ */
#line 96 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).class_vector)); }
#line 1045 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 26: /* alternative */
#line 97 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1051 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 27: /* concatenation */
#line 98 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1057 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 28: /* repeat */
#line 99 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1063 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 29: /* single */
#line 100 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1069 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 6: /* _CLASS_ */
#line 104 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).class_vector)); }
#line 1053 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 26: /* alternative */
#line 105 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1059 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 27: /* concatenation */
#line 106 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1065 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 28: /* repeat */
#line 107 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1071 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 29: /* single */
#line 108 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1077 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
}
| 168,103 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
else {
char *dot_pool, *dot_reconnect;
dot_pool = strchr(pool->sockaddr_url, '.');
if (!dot_pool) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request for pool without domain '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
dot_reconnect = strchr(url, '.');
if (!dot_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to url without domain '%s'",
url);
return false;
}
if (strcmp(dot_pool, dot_reconnect)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to non-matching domain url '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
}
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
sprintf(address, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum reconnect requested from pool %d to %s", pool->pool_no, address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
else {
char *dot_pool, *dot_reconnect;
dot_pool = strchr(pool->sockaddr_url, '.');
if (!dot_pool) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request for pool without domain '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
dot_reconnect = strchr(url, '.');
if (!dot_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to url without domain '%s'",
url);
return false;
}
if (strcmp(dot_pool, dot_reconnect)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to non-matching domain url '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
}
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
snprintf(address, 254, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum reconnect requested from pool %d to %s", pool->pool_no, address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 166,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_directory)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_SplFileInfo_functions);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.clone_obj = spl_filesystem_object_clone;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.cast_object = spl_filesystem_object_cast;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.get_debug_info = spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->serialize = zend_class_serialize_deny;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->unserialize = zend_class_unserialize_deny;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(DirectoryIterator, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_DirectoryIterator_functions);
zend_class_implements(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(DirectoryIterator, SeekableIterator);
spl_ce_DirectoryIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(FilesystemIterator, DirectoryIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_FilesystemIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_SELF", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "FOLLOW_SYMLINKS", SPL_FILE_DIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_FILENAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "NEW_CURRENT_AND_KEY", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "OTHER_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "SKIP_DOTS", SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "UNIX_PATHS", SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
spl_ce_FilesystemIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_RecursiveDirectoryIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, RecursiveIterator);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers, &spl_filesystem_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers.get_method = spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check;
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(GlobIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_GlobIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(GlobIterator, Countable);
#endif
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplFileObject, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplFileObject_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, RecursiveIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "DROP_NEW_LINE", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_AHEAD", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "SKIP_EMPTY", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_CSV", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV);
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplTempFileObject, SplFileObject, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplTempFileObject_functions);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_directory)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_SplFileInfo_functions);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.clone_obj = spl_filesystem_object_clone;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.cast_object = spl_filesystem_object_cast;
spl_filesystem_object_handlers.get_debug_info = spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->serialize = zend_class_serialize_deny;
spl_ce_SplFileInfo->unserialize = zend_class_unserialize_deny;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(DirectoryIterator, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_DirectoryIterator_functions);
zend_class_implements(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(DirectoryIterator, SeekableIterator);
spl_ce_DirectoryIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(FilesystemIterator, DirectoryIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_FilesystemIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "CURRENT_AS_SELF", SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_PATHNAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "FOLLOW_SYMLINKS", SPL_FILE_DIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "KEY_AS_FILENAME", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "NEW_CURRENT_AND_KEY", SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "OTHER_MODE_MASK", SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "SKIP_DOTS", SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(FilesystemIterator, "UNIX_PATHS", SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS);
spl_ce_FilesystemIterator->get_iterator = spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new, spl_RecursiveDirectoryIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, RecursiveIterator);
memcpy(&spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers, &spl_filesystem_object_handlers, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_filesystem_object_check_handlers.get_method = spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check;
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(GlobIterator, FilesystemIterator, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_GlobIterator_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(GlobIterator, Countable);
#endif
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplFileObject, SplFileInfo, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplFileObject_functions);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, RecursiveIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(SplFileObject, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "DROP_NEW_LINE", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_AHEAD", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "SKIP_EMPTY", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(SplFileObject, "READ_CSV", SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV);
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(SplTempFileObject, SplFileObject, spl_filesystem_object_new_check, spl_SplTempFileObject_functions);
return SUCCESS;
}
| 167,026 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13028/BOOTP: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 170,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error = 0;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
if (address < mmap_min_addr)
return -EPERM;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
| 169,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getFramebufferAttachmentParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned attachment = toInt32(args[1]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[2]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(target, attachment, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getFramebufferAttachmentParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned attachment = toInt32(args[1]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[2]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(target, attachment, pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
| 171,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool TokenExitsSVG(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
return DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(token.Data(),
SVGNames::foreignObjectTag.LocalName());
}
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | static bool TokenExitsSVG(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
| 173,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int OmniboxViewWin::OnPerformDropImpl(const views::DropTargetEvent& event,
bool in_drag) {
const ui::OSExchangeData& data = event.data();
if (data.HasURL()) {
GURL url;
string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(&url, &title)) {
string16 text(StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
SetUserText(text);
if (url.spec().length() == text.length())
model()->AcceptInput(CURRENT_TAB, true);
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
int string_drop_position = drop_highlight_position();
string16 text;
if ((string_drop_position != -1 || !in_drag) && data.GetString(&text)) {
DCHECK(string_drop_position == -1 ||
((string_drop_position >= 0) &&
(string_drop_position <= GetTextLength())));
if (in_drag) {
if (event.source_operations()== ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE)
MoveSelectedText(string_drop_position);
else
InsertText(string_drop_position, text);
} else {
PasteAndGo(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | int OmniboxViewWin::OnPerformDropImpl(const views::DropTargetEvent& event,
bool in_drag) {
const ui::OSExchangeData& data = event.data();
if (data.HasURL()) {
GURL url;
string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(&url, &title)) {
string16 text(StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
SetUserText(text);
model()->AcceptInput(CURRENT_TAB, true);
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
int string_drop_position = drop_highlight_position();
string16 text;
if ((string_drop_position != -1 || !in_drag) && data.GetString(&text)) {
DCHECK(string_drop_position == -1 ||
((string_drop_position >= 0) &&
(string_drop_position <= GetTextLength())));
if (in_drag) {
if (event.source_operations()== ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE)
MoveSelectedText(string_drop_position);
else
InsertText(string_drop_position, text);
} else {
PasteAndGo(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
| 170,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bta_hl_co_put_rx_data (UINT8 app_id, tBTA_HL_MDL_HANDLE mdl_handle,
UINT16 data_size, UINT8 *p_data, UINT16 evt)
{
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
tBTA_HL_STATUS status = BTA_HL_STATUS_FAIL;
int r;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_id=%d mdl_handle=0x%x data_size=%d",
__FUNCTION__,app_id, mdl_handle, data_size);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(mdl_handle, &app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
if ((p_dcb->p_rx_pkt = (UINT8 *)btif_hl_get_buf(data_size)) != NULL)
{
memcpy(p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, p_data, data_size);
if (p_dcb->p_scb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=0x%x mdl_idx=0x%x data_size=%d",
app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, data_size);
r = send(p_dcb->p_scb->socket_id[1], p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, data_size, 0);
if (r == data_size)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("socket send success data_size=%d", data_size);
status = BTA_HL_STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("socket send failed r=%d data_size=%d",r, data_size);
}
}
btif_hl_free_buf((void **) &p_dcb->p_rx_pkt);
}
}
bta_hl_ci_put_rx_data(mdl_handle, status, evt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void bta_hl_co_put_rx_data (UINT8 app_id, tBTA_HL_MDL_HANDLE mdl_handle,
UINT16 data_size, UINT8 *p_data, UINT16 evt)
{
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
tBTA_HL_STATUS status = BTA_HL_STATUS_FAIL;
int r;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_id=%d mdl_handle=0x%x data_size=%d",
__FUNCTION__,app_id, mdl_handle, data_size);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(mdl_handle, &app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
if ((p_dcb->p_rx_pkt = (UINT8 *)btif_hl_get_buf(data_size)) != NULL)
{
memcpy(p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, p_data, data_size);
if (p_dcb->p_scb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=0x%x mdl_idx=0x%x data_size=%d",
app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx, data_size);
r = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(p_dcb->p_scb->socket_id[1], p_dcb->p_rx_pkt, data_size, 0));
if (r == data_size)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("socket send success data_size=%d", data_size);
status = BTA_HL_STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("socket send failed r=%d data_size=%d",r, data_size);
}
}
btif_hl_free_buf((void **) &p_dcb->p_rx_pkt);
}
}
bta_hl_ci_put_rx_data(mdl_handle, status, evt);
}
| 173,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_process_variant_of_array_of_ints123 (MyObject *obj, GValue *variant, GError **error)
{
GArray *array;
int i;
int j;
j = 0;
array = (GArray *)g_value_get_boxed (variant);
for (i = 0; i <= 2; i++)
{
j = g_array_index (array, int, i);
if (j != i + 1)
goto error;
}
return TRUE;
error:
*error = g_error_new (MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"Error decoding a variant of type ai (i + 1 = %i, j = %i)",
i, j + 1);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_process_variant_of_array_of_ints123 (MyObject *obj, GValue *variant, GError **error)
| 165,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcount */
len = args->len = ntohl(*p++);
/*
* The protocol specifies a maximum of 8192 bytes.
*/
if (len > NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2)
return 0;
/*
* Check to make sure that we got the right number of
* bytes.
*/
hdr = (void*)p - head->iov_base;
dlen = head->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len - hdr;
/*
* Round the length of the data which was specified up to
* the next multiple of XDR units and then compare that
* against the length which was actually received.
* Note that when RPCSEC/GSS (for example) is used, the
* data buffer can be padded so dlen might be larger
* than required. It must never be smaller.
*/
if (dlen < XDR_QUADLEN(len)*4)
return 0;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_base = (void*)p;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_len = head->iov_len - hdr;
v = 0;
while (len > rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len) {
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[v]);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = len;
args->vlen = v + 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops
The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add
checks to catch these.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcount */
len = args->len = ntohl(*p++);
/*
* The protocol specifies a maximum of 8192 bytes.
*/
if (len > NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2)
return 0;
/*
* Check to make sure that we got the right number of
* bytes.
*/
hdr = (void*)p - head->iov_base;
if (hdr > head->iov_len)
return 0;
dlen = head->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len - hdr;
/*
* Round the length of the data which was specified up to
* the next multiple of XDR units and then compare that
* against the length which was actually received.
* Note that when RPCSEC/GSS (for example) is used, the
* data buffer can be padded so dlen might be larger
* than required. It must never be smaller.
*/
if (dlen < XDR_QUADLEN(len)*4)
return 0;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_base = (void*)p;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_len = head->iov_len - hdr;
v = 0;
while (len > rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len) {
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[v]);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = len;
args->vlen = v + 1;
return 1;
}
| 168,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GetStartupData(HANDLE pipe, STARTUP_DATA *sud)
{
size_t size, len;
BOOL ret = FALSE;
WCHAR *data = NULL;
DWORD bytes, read;
bytes = PeekNamedPipeAsync(pipe, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("PeekNamedPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"PeekNamedPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
size = bytes / sizeof(*data);
if (size == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malformed startup data: 1 byte received"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
data = malloc(bytes);
if (data == NULL)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malloc failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"malloc");
goto out;
}
read = ReadPipeAsync(pipe, data, bytes, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes != read)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ReadPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"ReadPipeAsync");
goto out;
}
if (data[size - 1] != 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data is not NULL terminated"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->directory = data;
len = wcslen(sud->directory) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at working directory"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->options = sud->directory + len;
len = wcslen(sud->options) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at command line options"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto out;
}
sud->std_input = sud->options + len;
data = NULL; /* don't free data */
ret = TRUE;
out:
free(data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <[email protected]>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | GetStartupData(HANDLE pipe, STARTUP_DATA *sud)
{
size_t size, len;
WCHAR *data = NULL;
DWORD bytes, read;
bytes = PeekNamedPipeAsync(pipe, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("PeekNamedPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"PeekNamedPipeAsync");
goto err;
}
size = bytes / sizeof(*data);
if (size == 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malformed startup data: 1 byte received"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto err;
}
data = malloc(bytes);
if (data == NULL)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("malloc failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"malloc");
goto err;
}
read = ReadPipeAsync(pipe, data, bytes, 1, &exit_event);
if (bytes != read)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_SYSERR, TEXT("ReadPipeAsync failed"));
ReturnLastError(pipe, L"ReadPipeAsync");
goto err;
}
if (data[size - 1] != 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data is not NULL terminated"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto err;
}
sud->directory = data;
len = wcslen(sud->directory) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at working directory"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto err;
}
sud->options = sud->directory + len;
len = wcslen(sud->options) + 1;
size -= len;
if (size <= 0)
{
MsgToEventLog(M_ERR, TEXT("Startup data ends at command line options"));
ReturnError(pipe, ERROR_STARTUP_DATA, L"GetStartupData", 1, &exit_event);
goto err;
}
sud->std_input = sud->options + len;
return TRUE;
err:
sud->directory = NULL; /* caller must not free() */
free(data);
return FALSE;
}
| 169,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void registerURL(const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerURL(file, file, mimeType);
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void registerURL(const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerMockedURLLoad(KURL(m_baseUrl, file), WebString::fromUTF8(file), m_folder, WebString::fromUTF8(mimeType));
}
| 171,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
/* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295 | fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
/*
* If the realm of the presented tgt is neither the client nor the server
* realm, it is a transit realm and must be added to transited set.
*/
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
| 168,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PP_Flash_Menu* ReadMenu(int depth,
const IPC::Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter) {
if (depth > kMaxMenuDepth)
return NULL;
++depth;
PP_Flash_Menu* menu = new PP_Flash_Menu;
menu->items = NULL;
if (!m->ReadUInt32(iter, &menu->count)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
if (menu->count == 0)
return menu;
menu->items = new PP_Flash_MenuItem[menu->count];
memset(menu->items, 0, sizeof(PP_Flash_MenuItem) * menu->count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i) {
if (!ReadMenuItem(depth, m, iter, menu->items + i)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
}
return menu;
}
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | PP_Flash_Menu* ReadMenu(int depth,
const IPC::Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter) {
if (depth > kMaxMenuDepth)
return NULL;
++depth;
PP_Flash_Menu* menu = new PP_Flash_Menu;
menu->items = NULL;
if (!m->ReadUInt32(iter, &menu->count)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
if (menu->count == 0)
return menu;
if (menu->count > kMaxMenuEntries) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
menu->items = new PP_Flash_MenuItem[menu->count];
memset(menu->items, 0, sizeof(PP_Flash_MenuItem) * menu->count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i) {
if (!ReadMenuItem(depth, m, iter, menu->items + i)) {
FreeMenu(menu);
return NULL;
}
}
return menu;
}
| 171,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: parse_device(dev_t *pdev, struct archive *a, char *val)
{
#define MAX_PACK_ARGS 3
unsigned long numbers[MAX_PACK_ARGS];
char *p, *dev;
int argc;
pack_t *pack;
dev_t result;
const char *error = NULL;
memset(pdev, 0, sizeof(*pdev));
if ((dev = strchr(val, ',')) != NULL) {
/*
* Device's major/minor are given in a specified format.
* Decode and pack it accordingly.
*/
*dev++ = '\0';
if ((pack = pack_find(val)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown format `%s'", val);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
argc = 0;
while ((p = la_strsep(&dev, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*p == '\0') {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Missing number");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
numbers[argc++] = (unsigned long)mtree_atol(&p);
if (argc > MAX_PACK_ARGS) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Too many arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
}
if (argc < 2) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Not enough arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
result = (*pack)(argc, numbers, &error);
if (error != NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"%s", error);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
} else {
/* file system raw value. */
result = (dev_t)mtree_atol(&val);
}
*pdev = result;
return ARCHIVE_OK;
#undef MAX_PACK_ARGS
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119 | parse_device(dev_t *pdev, struct archive *a, char *val)
{
#define MAX_PACK_ARGS 3
unsigned long numbers[MAX_PACK_ARGS];
char *p, *dev;
int argc;
pack_t *pack;
dev_t result;
const char *error = NULL;
memset(pdev, 0, sizeof(*pdev));
if ((dev = strchr(val, ',')) != NULL) {
/*
* Device's major/minor are given in a specified format.
* Decode and pack it accordingly.
*/
*dev++ = '\0';
if ((pack = pack_find(val)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown format `%s'", val);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
argc = 0;
while ((p = la_strsep(&dev, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*p == '\0') {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Missing number");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
if (argc >= MAX_PACK_ARGS) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Too many arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
numbers[argc++] = (unsigned long)mtree_atol(&p);
}
if (argc < 2) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Not enough arguments");
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
result = (*pack)(argc, numbers, &error);
if (error != NULL) {
archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"%s", error);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
} else {
/* file system raw value. */
result = (dev_t)mtree_atol(&val);
}
*pdev = result;
return ARCHIVE_OK;
#undef MAX_PACK_ARGS
}
| 167,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long vorbis_book_decodevs_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t *a,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
int step=n/book->dim;
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
int i,j,o;
if (!v) return -1;
for (j=0;j<step;j++){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for(i=0,o=j;i<book->dim;i++,o+=step)
a[o]+=v[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | long vorbis_book_decodevs_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t *a,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
int step=n/book->dim;
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
int i,j,o;
if (!v) return -1;
for (j=0;j<step;j++){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for(i=0,o=j;i<book->dim;i++,o+=step)
a[o]+=v[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
| 173,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
for (std::vector< base::Callback<void(ui::Compositor*)> >::const_iterator
it = on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.begin();
it != on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.end(); ++it) {
it->Run(compositor);
}
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks() {
for (std::vector<base::Closure>::const_iterator
it = on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.begin();
it != on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.end(); ++it) {
it->Run();
}
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.clear();
}
| 171,384 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* First slice of a picture is always considered as part of new picture */
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 2)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
if((ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 0) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice++;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* If the slice is part of new picture, do End of Pic processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
UWORD8 uc_mbs_exceed = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
/*u2_total_mbs_coded is forced to u2_max_mb_addr+ 1 at the end of decode ,so
,if it is first slice in pic dont consider u2_total_mbs_coded to detect new picture */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
uc_mbs_exceed = 1;
}
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || uc_mbs_exceed)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
#if WIN32
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(" ------ PIC SKIPPED ------\n");
#endif
return RET_LAST_SKIP;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2))
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
}
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* First slice of a picture is always considered as part of new picture */
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 2)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
if(i1_is_end_of_poc)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
if((ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 0) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice++;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
| 174,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 impeg2d_get_slice_pos(dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core)
{
WORD32 u4_bits;
WORD32 i4_row;
dec_state_t *ps_dec = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
WORD32 i4_prev_row;
stream_t s_bitstrm;
WORD32 i4_start_row;
WORD32 i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
WORD32 i;
s_bitstrm = ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
i4_prev_row = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0]->i4_start_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[1]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[2]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[3]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0]->i4_end_mb_y = ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[1]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[2]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[3]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
if(ps_dec->i4_num_cores == 1)
return 0;
/* Reset the jobq to start of the jobq buffer */
impeg2_jobq_reset((jobq_t *)ps_dec->pv_jobq);
i4_start_row = -1;
i4_slice_bistream_ofst = 0;
while(1)
{
WORD32 i4_is_slice;
if(s_bitstrm.u4_offset + START_CODE_LEN >= s_bitstrm.u4_max_offset)
{
break;
}
u4_bits = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&s_bitstrm,START_CODE_LEN);
i4_row = u4_bits & 0xFF;
/* Detect end of frame */
i4_is_slice = (((u4_bits >> 8) == 0x01) && (i4_row) && (i4_row <= ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb));
if(!i4_is_slice)
break;
i4_row -= 1;
if(i4_prev_row != i4_row)
{
/* Create a job for previous slice row */
if(i4_start_row != -1)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i4_start_row;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = i4_row;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_PROCESS;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return ret;
}
/* Store current slice's bitstream offset */
i4_slice_bistream_ofst = s_bitstrm.u4_offset >> 3;
i4_slice_bistream_ofst -= (size_t)s_bitstrm.pv_bs_buf & 3;
i4_prev_row = i4_row;
/* Store current slice's row position */
i4_start_row = i4_row;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(&s_bitstrm, START_CODE_LEN);
/* Flush the bytes till a start code is encountered */
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&s_bitstrm, 24) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(&s_bitstrm, 8);
if(s_bitstrm.u4_offset >= s_bitstrm.u4_max_offset)
{
break;
}
}
}
/* Create job for the last slice row */
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i4_start_row;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_PROCESS;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return e_ret;
}
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_disp_pic) && ((0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P != ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)))
{
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u2_vertical_size; i+=64)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y >>= 4;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = (i + 64);
s_job.i2_end_mb_y >>= 4;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = 0;
ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return ret;
}
}
impeg2_jobq_terminate(ps_dec->pv_jobq);
ps_dec->i4_bytes_consumed = s_bitstrm.u4_offset >> 3;
ps_dec->i4_bytes_consumed -= ((size_t)s_bitstrm.pv_bs_buf & 3);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WORD32 impeg2d_get_slice_pos(dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core)
{
WORD32 u4_bits;
WORD32 i4_row;
dec_state_t *ps_dec = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
WORD32 i4_prev_row;
stream_t s_bitstrm;
WORD32 i4_start_row;
WORD32 i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
WORD32 i;
s_bitstrm = ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
i4_prev_row = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0]->i4_start_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[1]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[2]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[3]->i4_start_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0]->i4_end_mb_y = ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[1]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[2]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[3]->i4_end_mb_y = -1;
if(ps_dec->i4_num_cores == 1)
return 0;
/* Reset the jobq to start of the jobq buffer */
impeg2_jobq_reset((jobq_t *)ps_dec->pv_jobq);
i4_start_row = -1;
i4_slice_bistream_ofst = 0;
while(1)
{
WORD32 i4_is_slice;
if(s_bitstrm.u4_offset + START_CODE_LEN >= s_bitstrm.u4_max_offset)
{
break;
}
u4_bits = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&s_bitstrm,START_CODE_LEN);
i4_row = u4_bits & 0xFF;
/* Detect end of frame */
i4_is_slice = (((u4_bits >> 8) == 0x01) && (i4_row) && (i4_row <= ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb));
if(!i4_is_slice)
break;
i4_row -= 1;
if(i4_prev_row < i4_row)
{
/* Create a job for previous slice row */
if(i4_start_row != -1)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i4_start_row;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = i4_row;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_PROCESS;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return ret;
}
/* Store current slice's bitstream offset */
i4_slice_bistream_ofst = s_bitstrm.u4_offset >> 3;
i4_slice_bistream_ofst -= (size_t)s_bitstrm.pv_bs_buf & 3;
i4_prev_row = i4_row;
/* Store current slice's row position */
i4_start_row = i4_row;
} else if (i4_prev_row > i4_row) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26070014");
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(&s_bitstrm, START_CODE_LEN);
/* Flush the bytes till a start code is encountered */
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&s_bitstrm, 24) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(&s_bitstrm, 8);
if(s_bitstrm.u4_offset >= s_bitstrm.u4_max_offset)
{
break;
}
}
}
/* Create job for the last slice row */
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i4_start_row;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_PROCESS;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = i4_slice_bistream_ofst;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return e_ret;
}
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_disp_pic) && ((0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P != ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)))
{
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u2_vertical_size; i+=64)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T ret;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y = i;
s_job.i2_start_mb_y >>= 4;
s_job.i2_end_mb_y = (i + 64);
s_job.i2_end_mb_y >>= 4;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i4_bistream_ofst = 0;
ret = impeg2_jobq_queue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 0);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
return ret;
}
}
impeg2_jobq_terminate(ps_dec->pv_jobq);
ps_dec->i4_bytes_consumed = s_bitstrm.u4_offset >> 3;
ps_dec->i4_bytes_consumed -= ((size_t)s_bitstrm.pv_bs_buf & 3);
return 0;
}
| 173,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_set(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, transform_display *that, png_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_set(
const image_transform *this, transform_display *that, png_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(pp);
/* NOTE: don't expect this to expand tRNS */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,632 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
int ret = 0;
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
void *p = au->reply_buf;
void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &reply, sizeof(reply));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != sizeof(reply))
return -EPERM;
if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = 0;
dout("verify_authorizer_reply nonce %llx got %llx ret %d\n",
au->nonce, le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one), ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
int ret = 0;
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
void *preply = &reply;
void *p = au->reply_buf;
void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &preply, sizeof(reply));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != sizeof(reply))
return -EPERM;
if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = 0;
dout("verify_authorizer_reply nonce %llx got %llx ret %d\n",
au->nonce, le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one), ret);
return ret;
}
| 166,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
else
asn1_cb = 0;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
/*
* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
* because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
* isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
* template in the template itself.
*/
if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
it->templates, opt, ctx);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
goto err;
}
/* Check tag matches bit map */
if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
goto err;
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* Use new style d2i */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Allocate structure */
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
/* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
if (ret > 0)
break;
/* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
errtt = tt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
if (i == it->tcount) {
/* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
if (opt) {
/* Free and zero it */
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
return -1;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
/* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
&p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
}
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
}
/*
* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
* omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
* data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
* increases efficiency in some cases.
*/
if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
isopt = 0;
else
isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
/*
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1) {
/*
* OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
*/
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
continue;
}
/* Update length */
len -= p - q;
}
/* Check for EOC if expecting one */
if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
/* Check all data read */
if (!seq_nolen && len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
* may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
* and clear any that are.
*/
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
} else {
errtt = seqtt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
else
asn1_cb = 0;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
/*
* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
* because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
* isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
* template in the template itself.
*/
if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
it->templates, opt, ctx);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
goto err;
}
/* Check tag matches bit map */
if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
goto err;
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* Use new style d2i */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
if (*pval) {
/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
tt = it->templates + i;
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
}
} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
/* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
if (ret > 0)
break;
/* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
errtt = tt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
if (i == it->tcount) {
/* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
if (opt) {
/* Free and zero it */
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
return -1;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
/* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
&p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
}
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
}
}
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
}
/*
* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
* omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
* data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
* increases efficiency in some cases.
*/
if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
isopt = 0;
else
isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
/*
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1) {
/*
* OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
*/
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
continue;
}
/* Update length */
len -= p - q;
}
/* Check for EOC if expecting one */
if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
/* Check all data read */
if (!seq_nolen && len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
* may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
* and clear any that are.
*/
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
} else {
errtt = seqtt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
| 164,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
{
return m_channels;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long AudioTrack::GetChannels() const
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j) {
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
if (pTrack == NULL)
continue;
if (tn == pTrack->GetNumber())
return pTrack;
}
return NULL; // not found
}
| 174,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Platform::IntPoint InRegionScrollableArea::calculateMinimumScrollPosition(const Platform::IntSize& viewportSize, float overscrollLimitFactor) const
{
ASSERT(!allowsOverscroll());
return Platform::IntPoint(-(viewportSize.width() * overscrollLimitFactor),
-(viewportSize.height() * overscrollLimitFactor));
}
Commit Message: Remove minimum and maximum scroll position as they are no
longer required due to changes in ScrollViewBase.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87298
Patch by Genevieve Mak <[email protected]> on 2012-05-23
Reviewed by Antonio Gomes.
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea):
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.h:
(InRegionScrollableArea):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118233 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Platform::IntPoint InRegionScrollableArea::calculateMinimumScrollPosition(const Platform::IntSize& viewportSize, float overscrollLimitFactor) const
| 170,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
{
register TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint64 bytecount;
uint64 offset;
uint32 rowblock;
uint64 rowblockbytes;
uint64 stripbytes;
uint32 strip;
uint64 nstrips64;
uint32 nstrips32;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint64* newcounts;
uint64* newoffsets;
bytecount = td->td_stripbytecount[0];
offset = td->td_stripoffset[0];
assert(td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if ((td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR)&&
(!isUpSampled(tif)))
rowblock = td->td_ycbcrsubsampling[1];
else
rowblock = 1;
rowblockbytes = TIFFVTileSize64(tif, rowblock);
/*
* Make the rows hold at least one scanline, but fill specified amount
* of data if possible.
*/
if (rowblockbytes > STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT) {
stripbytes = rowblockbytes;
rowsperstrip = rowblock;
} else if (rowblockbytes > 0 ) {
uint32 rowblocksperstrip;
rowblocksperstrip = (uint32) (STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT / rowblockbytes);
rowsperstrip = rowblocksperstrip * rowblock;
stripbytes = rowblocksperstrip * rowblockbytes;
}
else
return;
/*
* never increase the number of strips in an image
*/
if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip)
return;
nstrips64 = TIFFhowmany_64(bytecount, stripbytes);
if ((nstrips64==0)||(nstrips64>0xFFFFFFFF)) /* something is wonky, do nothing. */
return;
nstrips32 = (uint32)nstrips64;
newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array");
newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array");
if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) {
/*
* Unable to allocate new strip information, give up and use
* the original one strip information.
*/
if (newcounts != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newcounts);
if (newoffsets != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newoffsets);
return;
}
/*
* Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets
* that reflect the broken-up format.
*/
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips32; strip++) {
if (stripbytes > bytecount)
stripbytes = bytecount;
newcounts[strip] = stripbytes;
newoffsets[strip] = offset;
offset += stripbytes;
bytecount -= stripbytes;
}
/*
* Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info.
*/
td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips32;
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripoffset);
td->td_stripbytecount = newcounts;
td->td_stripoffset = newoffsets;
td->td_stripbytecountsorted = 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
{
register TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint64 bytecount;
uint64 offset;
uint32 rowblock;
uint64 rowblockbytes;
uint64 stripbytes;
uint32 strip;
uint32 nstrips;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint64* newcounts;
uint64* newoffsets;
bytecount = td->td_stripbytecount[0];
offset = td->td_stripoffset[0];
assert(td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if ((td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR)&&
(!isUpSampled(tif)))
rowblock = td->td_ycbcrsubsampling[1];
else
rowblock = 1;
rowblockbytes = TIFFVTileSize64(tif, rowblock);
/*
* Make the rows hold at least one scanline, but fill specified amount
* of data if possible.
*/
if (rowblockbytes > STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT) {
stripbytes = rowblockbytes;
rowsperstrip = rowblock;
} else if (rowblockbytes > 0 ) {
uint32 rowblocksperstrip;
rowblocksperstrip = (uint32) (STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT / rowblockbytes);
rowsperstrip = rowblocksperstrip * rowblock;
stripbytes = rowblocksperstrip * rowblockbytes;
}
else
return;
/*
* never increase the number of rows per strip
*/
if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip)
return;
nstrips = TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip);
if( nstrips == 0 )
return;
newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array");
newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array");
if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) {
/*
* Unable to allocate new strip information, give up and use
* the original one strip information.
*/
if (newcounts != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newcounts);
if (newoffsets != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newoffsets);
return;
}
/*
* Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets
* that reflect the broken-up format.
*/
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
if (stripbytes > bytecount)
stripbytes = bytecount;
newcounts[strip] = stripbytes;
newoffsets[strip] = stripbytes ? offset : 0;
offset += stripbytes;
bytecount -= stripbytes;
}
/*
* Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info.
*/
td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips;
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripoffset);
td->td_stripbytecount = newcounts;
td->td_stripoffset = newoffsets;
td->td_stripbytecountsorted = 1;
}
| 168,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=26857
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
break;
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
((number_pixels*sun_info.depth) > (8*sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+bytes_per_line % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
SyslogsLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->syslogs_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetSyslogsLibrary(
| 170,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int _c2s_sx_sasl_callback(int cb, void *arg, void **res, sx_t s, void *cbarg) {
c2s_t c2s = (c2s_t) cbarg;
const char *my_realm, *mech;
sx_sasl_creds_t creds;
static char buf[3072];
char mechbuf[256];
struct jid_st jid;
jid_static_buf jid_buf;
int i, r;
sess_t sess;
char skey[44];
host_t host;
/* init static jid */
jid_static(&jid,&jid_buf);
/* retrieve our session */
assert(s != NULL);
sprintf(skey, "%d", s->tag);
/*
* Retrieve the session, note that depending on the operation,
* session may be null.
*/
sess = xhash_get(c2s->sessions, skey);
switch(cb) {
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM:
if(s->req_to == NULL) /* this shouldn't happen */
my_realm = "";
else {
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
*res = (void *)NULL;
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
my_realm = host->realm;
if(my_realm == NULL)
my_realm = s->req_to;
}
strncpy(buf, my_realm, 256);
*res = (void *)buf;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get realm: realm is '%s'", buf);
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->get_password && (sess->host->ar->get_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm: "", buf) == 0) {
*res = buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: check pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->check_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->check_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", (char *)creds->pass) == 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
if(sess->host->ar->get_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->get_password)(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", buf) != 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if (strcmp(creds->pass, buf)==0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_AUTHZID:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
/* we need authzid to validate */
if(creds->authzid == NULL || creds->authzid[0] == '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* authzid must be a valid jid */
if(jid_reset(&jid, creds->authzid, -1) == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have domain == stream to addr */
if(!s->req_to || (strcmp(jid.domain, s->req_to) != 0))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have no resource */
if(jid.resource[0] != '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and user has right to authorize as */
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed) {
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (char *)creds->realm, (char *)creds->authzid))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
} else {
if (strcmp(creds->authnid, jid.node) == 0 &&
(sess->host->ar->user_exists)(sess->host->ar, sess, jid.node, jid.domain))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID:
/* generate a jid for SASL ANONYMOUS */
jid_reset(&jid, s->req_to, -1);
/* make node a random string */
jid_random_part(&jid, jid_NODE);
strcpy(buf, jid.node);
*res = (void *)buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_MECH:
mech = (char *)arg;
strncpy(mechbuf, mech, sizeof(mechbuf));
mechbuf[sizeof(mechbuf)-1]='\0';
for(i = 0; mechbuf[i]; i++) mechbuf[i] = tolower(mechbuf[i]);
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_WARNING, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Determine if our configuration will let us use this mechanism.
* We support different mechanisms for both SSL and normal use */
if (strcmp(mechbuf, "digest-md5") == 0) {
/* digest-md5 requires that our authreg support get_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
} else if (strcmp(mechbuf, "plain") == 0) {
/* plain requires either get_password or check_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL && host->ar->check_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Using SSF is potentially dangerous, as SASL can also set the
* SSF of the connection. However, SASL shouldn't do so until after
* we've finished mechanism establishment
*/
if (s->ssf>0) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.ssl-mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* Work out if our configuration will let us use this mechanism */
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
default:
break;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
CWE ID: CWE-287 | static int _c2s_sx_sasl_callback(int cb, void *arg, void **res, sx_t s, void *cbarg) {
c2s_t c2s = (c2s_t) cbarg;
const char *my_realm, *mech;
sx_sasl_creds_t creds;
static char buf[3072];
char mechbuf[256];
struct jid_st jid;
jid_static_buf jid_buf;
int i, r;
sess_t sess;
char skey[44];
host_t host;
/* init static jid */
jid_static(&jid,&jid_buf);
/* retrieve our session */
assert(s != NULL);
sprintf(skey, "%d", s->tag);
/*
* Retrieve the session, note that depending on the operation,
* session may be null.
*/
sess = xhash_get(c2s->sessions, skey);
switch(cb) {
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM:
if(s->req_to == NULL) /* this shouldn't happen */
my_realm = "";
else {
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_ERR, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
*res = (void *)NULL;
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
my_realm = host->realm;
if(my_realm == NULL)
my_realm = s->req_to;
}
strncpy(buf, my_realm, 256);
*res = (void *)buf;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get realm: realm is '%s'", buf);
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_GET_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: get pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->get_password && (sess->host->ar->get_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm: "", buf) == 0) {
*res = buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_PASS:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: check pass (authnid=%s, realm=%s)", creds->authnid, creds->realm);
if(sess->host->ar->check_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->check_password)(
sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", (char *)creds->pass) == 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
if(sess->host->ar->get_password != NULL) {
if ((sess->host->ar->get_password)(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (creds->realm != NULL) ? (char *)creds->realm : "", buf) != 0)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if (strcmp(creds->pass, buf)==0)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_AUTHZID:
assert(sess != NULL);
creds = (sx_sasl_creds_t) arg;
/* we need authzid to validate */
if(creds->authzid == NULL || creds->authzid[0] == '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* authzid must be a valid jid */
if(jid_reset(&jid, creds->authzid, -1) == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have domain == stream to addr */
if(!s->req_to || (strcmp(jid.domain, s->req_to) != 0))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and have no resource */
if(jid.resource[0] != '\0')
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* and user has right to authorize as */
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed) {
if (sess->host->ar->user_authz_allowed(sess->host->ar, sess, (char *)creds->authnid, (char *)creds->realm, (char *)creds->authzid))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
} else {
if (strcmp(creds->authnid, jid.node) == 0 &&
(sess->host->ar->user_exists)(sess->host->ar, sess, jid.node, jid.domain))
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
case sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID:
/* generate a jid for SASL ANONYMOUS */
jid_reset(&jid, s->req_to, -1);
/* make node a random string */
jid_random_part(&jid, jid_NODE);
strcpy(buf, jid.node);
*res = (void *)buf;
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
break;
case sx_sasl_cb_CHECK_MECH:
mech = (char *)arg;
strncpy(mechbuf, mech, sizeof(mechbuf));
mechbuf[sizeof(mechbuf)-1]='\0';
for(i = 0; mechbuf[i]; i++) mechbuf[i] = tolower(mechbuf[i]);
log_debug(ZONE, "sx sasl callback: check mech (mech=%s)", mechbuf);
/* get host for request */
host = xhash_get(c2s->hosts, s->req_to);
if(host == NULL) {
log_write(c2s->log, LOG_WARNING, "SASL callback for non-existing host: %s", s->req_to);
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Determine if our configuration will let us use this mechanism.
* We support different mechanisms for both SSL and normal use */
if (strcmp(mechbuf, "digest-md5") == 0) {
/* digest-md5 requires that our authreg support get_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
} else if (strcmp(mechbuf, "plain") == 0) {
/* plain requires either get_password or check_password */
if (host->ar->get_password == NULL && host->ar->check_password == NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
/* Using SSF is potentially dangerous, as SASL can also set the
* SSF of the connection. However, SASL shouldn't do so until after
* we've finished mechanism establishment
*/
if (s->ssf>0) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.ssl-mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
}
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "authreg.mechanisms.sasl.%s",mechbuf);
if (r < -1 || r > sizeof(buf))
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
/* Work out if our configuration will let us use this mechanism */
if(config_get(c2s->config,buf) != NULL)
return sx_sasl_ret_OK;
else
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
default:
break;
}
return sx_sasl_ret_FAIL;
}
| 168,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_variant)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_VARIANT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_variant)
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_variant)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_VARIANT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
| 167,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int btrfs_add_link(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *parent_inode, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int name_len, int add_backref, u64 index)
{
int ret = 0;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(parent_inode)->root;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
u64 parent_ino = btrfs_ino(parent_inode);
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
memcpy(&key, &BTRFS_I(inode)->root->root_key, sizeof(key));
} else {
key.objectid = ino;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = 0;
}
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
ret = btrfs_add_root_ref(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
key.objectid, root->root_key.objectid,
parent_ino, index, name, name_len);
} else if (add_backref) {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, root, name, name_len, ino,
parent_ino, index);
}
/* Nothing to clean up yet */
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = btrfs_insert_dir_item(trans, root, name, name_len,
parent_inode, &key,
btrfs_inode_type(inode), index);
if (ret == -EEXIST)
goto fail_dir_item;
else if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
}
btrfs_i_size_write(parent_inode, parent_inode->i_size +
name_len * 2);
inode_inc_iversion(parent_inode);
parent_inode->i_mtime = parent_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, parent_inode);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
fail_dir_item:
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
u64 local_index;
int err;
err = btrfs_del_root_ref(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
key.objectid, root->root_key.objectid,
parent_ino, &local_index, name, name_len);
} else if (add_backref) {
u64 local_index;
int err;
err = btrfs_del_inode_ref(trans, root, name, name_len,
ino, parent_ino, &local_index);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int btrfs_add_link(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *parent_inode, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int name_len, int add_backref, u64 index)
{
int ret = 0;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(parent_inode)->root;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
u64 parent_ino = btrfs_ino(parent_inode);
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
memcpy(&key, &BTRFS_I(inode)->root->root_key, sizeof(key));
} else {
key.objectid = ino;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = 0;
}
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
ret = btrfs_add_root_ref(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
key.objectid, root->root_key.objectid,
parent_ino, index, name, name_len);
} else if (add_backref) {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, root, name, name_len, ino,
parent_ino, index);
}
/* Nothing to clean up yet */
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = btrfs_insert_dir_item(trans, root, name, name_len,
parent_inode, &key,
btrfs_inode_type(inode), index);
if (ret == -EEXIST || ret == -EOVERFLOW)
goto fail_dir_item;
else if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
}
btrfs_i_size_write(parent_inode, parent_inode->i_size +
name_len * 2);
inode_inc_iversion(parent_inode);
parent_inode->i_mtime = parent_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, parent_inode);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
fail_dir_item:
if (unlikely(ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
u64 local_index;
int err;
err = btrfs_del_root_ref(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
key.objectid, root->root_key.objectid,
parent_ino, &local_index, name, name_len);
} else if (add_backref) {
u64 local_index;
int err;
err = btrfs_del_inode_ref(trans, root, name, name_len,
ino, parent_ino, &local_index);
}
return ret;
}
| 166,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode ||
!psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 ||
!pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 ||
!pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", " (\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/*#3521 */
if(bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* /");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" =~ /");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
/* strcat(szBuffer, "[0-9,a-z,A-Z,\\s]*"); */
/* iBuffer+=17; */
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '/';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode ||
!psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 ||
!pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 ||
!pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", " (\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/*#3521 */
if(bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* /");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" =~ /");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
if( 1 + 2 * nLength + 1 + 1 >= sizeof(szTmp) )
return NULL;
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] &&
pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
/* strcat(szBuffer, "[0-9,a-z,A-Z,\\s]*"); */
/* iBuffer+=17; */
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '/';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
| 168,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool UsbChooserContext::HasDevicePermission(
const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin,
const device::mojom::UsbDeviceInfo& device_info) {
if (UsbBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(device_info))
return false;
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return false;
auto it = ephemeral_devices_.find(
std::make_pair(requesting_origin, embedding_origin));
if (it != ephemeral_devices_.end() &&
base::ContainsKey(it->second, device_info.guid)) {
return true;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>> device_list =
GetGrantedObjects(requesting_origin, embedding_origin);
for (const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>& device_dict :
device_list) {
int vendor_id;
int product_id;
base::string16 serial_number;
if (device_dict->GetInteger(kVendorIdKey, &vendor_id) &&
device_info.vendor_id == vendor_id &&
device_dict->GetInteger(kProductIdKey, &product_id) &&
device_info.product_id == product_id &&
device_dict->GetString(kSerialNumberKey, &serial_number) &&
device_info.serial_number == serial_number) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool UsbChooserContext::HasDevicePermission(
const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin,
const device::mojom::UsbDeviceInfo& device_info) {
if (UsbBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(device_info))
return false;
if (usb_policy_allowed_devices_->IsDeviceAllowed(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, device_info)) {
return true;
}
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return false;
auto it = ephemeral_devices_.find(
std::make_pair(requesting_origin, embedding_origin));
if (it != ephemeral_devices_.end() &&
base::ContainsKey(it->second, device_info.guid)) {
return true;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>> device_list =
GetGrantedObjects(requesting_origin, embedding_origin);
for (const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>& device_dict :
device_list) {
int vendor_id;
int product_id;
base::string16 serial_number;
if (device_dict->GetInteger(kVendorIdKey, &vendor_id) &&
device_info.vendor_id == vendor_id &&
device_dict->GetInteger(kProductIdKey, &product_id) &&
device_info.product_id == product_id &&
device_dict->GetString(kSerialNumberKey, &serial_number) &&
device_info.serial_number == serial_number) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
| 173,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *cJSON_PrintUnformatted( cJSON *item )
{
return print_value( item, 0, 0 );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *cJSON_PrintUnformatted( cJSON *item )
char *cJSON_Print(cJSON *item) {return print_value(item,0,1,0);}
char *cJSON_PrintUnformatted(cJSON *item) {return print_value(item,0,0,0);}
char *cJSON_PrintBuffered(cJSON *item,int prebuffer,int fmt)
{
printbuffer p;
p.buffer=(char*)cJSON_malloc(prebuffer);
p.length=prebuffer;
p.offset=0;
return print_value(item,0,fmt,&p);
}
| 167,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_array_has_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int check_empty TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long index;
zval *rv, *value = NULL, **tmp;
if (check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_has) {
zval *offset_tmp = offset;
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset_tmp);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_has, "offsetExists", &rv, offset_tmp);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset_tmp);
if (rv && zend_is_true(rv)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
if (check_empty != 1) {
return 1;
} else if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
}
return 0;
}
}
if (!value) {
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
switch(Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(offset), Z_STRLEN_P(offset)+1, (void **) &tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_RESOURCE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return 0;
}
if (check_empty && check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
value = *tmp;
}
}
return check_empty ? zend_is_true(value) : Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int spl_array_has_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int check_empty TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long index;
zval *rv, *value = NULL, **tmp;
if (check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_has) {
zval *offset_tmp = offset;
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset_tmp);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_has, "offsetExists", &rv, offset_tmp);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset_tmp);
if (rv && zend_is_true(rv)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
if (check_empty != 1) {
return 1;
} else if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&rv);
}
return 0;
}
}
if (!value) {
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
switch(Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(offset), Z_STRLEN_P(offset)+1, (void **) &tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_RESOURCE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (check_empty == 2) {
return 1;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
break;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return 0;
}
if (check_empty && check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_get) {
value = spl_array_read_dimension_ex(1, object, offset, BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
value = *tmp;
}
}
return check_empty ? zend_is_true(value) : Z_TYPE_P(value) != IS_NULL;
} /* }}} */
| 166,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
RELEASE_ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
| 171,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = 0;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = pinctrl_register(&amd_pinctrl_desc,
&pdev->dev, gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
goto out1;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
out1:
pinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl registration
Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean
error path.
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret = 0;
int irq_base;
struct resource *res;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev;
gpio_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct amd_gpio), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gpio_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gpio_dev->lock);
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio io resource.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->base = devm_ioremap_nocache(&pdev->dev, res->start,
resource_size(res));
if (!gpio_dev->base)
return -ENOMEM;
irq_base = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (irq_base < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get gpio IRQ.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
gpio_dev->pdev = pdev;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_input = amd_gpio_direction_input;
gpio_dev->gc.direction_output = amd_gpio_direction_output;
gpio_dev->gc.get = amd_gpio_get_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set = amd_gpio_set_value;
gpio_dev->gc.set_debounce = amd_gpio_set_debounce;
gpio_dev->gc.dbg_show = amd_gpio_dbg_show;
gpio_dev->gc.base = 0;
gpio_dev->gc.label = pdev->name;
gpio_dev->gc.owner = THIS_MODULE;
gpio_dev->gc.parent = &pdev->dev;
gpio_dev->gc.ngpio = TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS;
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_GPIO)
gpio_dev->gc.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
#endif
gpio_dev->groups = kerncz_groups;
gpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);
amd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
gpio_dev->pctrl = devm_pinctrl_register(&pdev->dev, &amd_pinctrl_desc,
gpio_dev);
if (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't register pinctrl driver\n");
return PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);
}
ret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),
0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to add pin range\n");
goto out2;
}
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
0,
handle_simple_irq,
IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not add irqchip\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out2;
}
gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&gpio_dev->gc,
&amd_gpio_irqchip,
irq_base,
amd_gpio_irq_handler);
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gpio_dev);
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "amd gpio driver loaded\n");
return ret;
out2:
gpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);
return ret;
}
| 170,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask */
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct ip6t_entry *e = (struct ip6t_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_err("iptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
big jump. */
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_INET_NUMHOOKS);
#ifdef DEBUG_IP_FIREWALL_USER
if (e->comefrom
& (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
duprintf("Back unset "
"on hook %u "
"rule %u\n",
hook, pos);
}
#endif
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
}
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask */
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct ip6t_entry *e = (struct ip6t_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_err("iptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
big jump. */
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_INET_NUMHOOKS);
#ifdef DEBUG_IP_FIREWALL_USER
if (e->comefrom
& (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)) {
duprintf("Back unset "
"on hook %u "
"rule %u\n",
hook, pos);
}
#endif
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
}
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
| 167,375 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now =
!now_for_test_.is_null() ? now_for_test_ : base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
| 170,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void qrio_prstcfg(u8 bit, u8 mode)
{
u32 prstcfg;
u8 i;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
prstcfg = in_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (mode & (1<<i))
set_bit(2*bit+i, &prstcfg);
else
clear_bit(2*bit+i, &prstcfg);
}
out_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF, prstcfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void qrio_prstcfg(u8 bit, u8 mode)
{
u32 prstcfg;
u8 i;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
prstcfg = in_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (mode & (1 << i))
set_bit(2 * bit + i, &prstcfg);
else
clear_bit(2 * bit + i, &prstcfg);
}
out_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF, prstcfg);
}
| 169,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
| 166,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
MaybeDumpCopiedNonSameOriginEntry("New page navigation", params, is_in_page,
GetLastCommittedEntry());
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
| 172,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_parse_segment_header(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, size_t *p_header_size)
{
Jbig2Segment *result;
uint8_t rtscarf;
uint32_t rtscarf_long;
uint32_t *referred_to_segments;
int referred_to_segment_count;
int referred_to_segment_size;
int pa_size;
int offset;
/* minimum possible size of a jbig2 segment header */
if (buf_size < 11)
return NULL;
result = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Segment, 1);
if (result == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "failed to allocate segment in jbig2_parse_segment_header");
return result;
}
/* 7.2.2 */
result->number = jbig2_get_uint32(buf);
/* 7.2.3 */
result->flags = buf[4];
/* 7.2.4 referred-to segments */
rtscarf = buf[5];
if ((rtscarf & 0xe0) == 0xe0) {
rtscarf_long = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + 5);
referred_to_segment_count = rtscarf_long & 0x1fffffff;
offset = 5 + 4 + (referred_to_segment_count + 1) / 8;
} else {
referred_to_segment_count = (rtscarf >> 5);
offset = 5 + 1;
}
result->referred_to_segment_count = referred_to_segment_count;
/* we now have enough information to compute the full header length */
referred_to_segment_size = result->number <= 256 ? 1 : result->number <= 65536 ? 2 : 4; /* 7.2.5 */
pa_size = result->flags & 0x40 ? 4 : 1; /* 7.2.6 */
if (offset + referred_to_segment_count * referred_to_segment_size + pa_size + 4 > buf_size) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "jbig2_parse_segment_header() called with insufficient data", -1);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, result);
return NULL;
}
/* 7.2.5 */
if (referred_to_segment_count) {
int i;
referred_to_segments = jbig2_new(ctx, uint32_t, referred_to_segment_count * referred_to_segment_size);
if (referred_to_segments == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate referred_to_segments " "in jbig2_parse_segment_header");
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < referred_to_segment_count; i++) {
referred_to_segments[i] =
(referred_to_segment_size == 1) ? buf[offset] :
(referred_to_segment_size == 2) ? jbig2_get_uint16(buf + offset) : jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
offset += referred_to_segment_size;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "segment %d refers to segment %d", result->number, referred_to_segments[i]);
}
result->referred_to_segments = referred_to_segments;
} else { /* no referred-to segments */
result->referred_to_segments = NULL;
}
/* 7.2.6 */
if (result->flags & 0x40) {
result->page_association = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
offset += 4;
} else {
result->page_association = buf[offset++];
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "segment %d is associated with page %d", result->number, result->page_association);
/* 7.2.7 */
result->data_length = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
*p_header_size = offset + 4;
/* no body parsing results yet */
result->result = NULL;
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_parse_segment_header(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, size_t *p_header_size)
{
Jbig2Segment *result;
uint8_t rtscarf;
uint32_t rtscarf_long;
uint32_t *referred_to_segments;
uint32_t referred_to_segment_count;
uint32_t referred_to_segment_size;
uint32_t pa_size;
uint32_t offset;
/* minimum possible size of a jbig2 segment header */
if (buf_size < 11)
return NULL;
result = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Segment, 1);
if (result == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "failed to allocate segment in jbig2_parse_segment_header");
return result;
}
/* 7.2.2 */
result->number = jbig2_get_uint32(buf);
/* 7.2.3 */
result->flags = buf[4];
/* 7.2.4 referred-to segments */
rtscarf = buf[5];
if ((rtscarf & 0xe0) == 0xe0) {
rtscarf_long = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + 5);
referred_to_segment_count = rtscarf_long & 0x1fffffff;
offset = 5 + 4 + (referred_to_segment_count + 1) / 8;
} else {
referred_to_segment_count = (rtscarf >> 5);
offset = 5 + 1;
}
result->referred_to_segment_count = referred_to_segment_count;
/* we now have enough information to compute the full header length */
referred_to_segment_size = result->number <= 256 ? 1 : result->number <= 65536 ? 2 : 4; /* 7.2.5 */
pa_size = result->flags & 0x40 ? 4 : 1; /* 7.2.6 */
if (offset + referred_to_segment_count * referred_to_segment_size + pa_size + 4 > buf_size) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "jbig2_parse_segment_header() called with insufficient data", -1);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, result);
return NULL;
}
/* 7.2.5 */
if (referred_to_segment_count) {
uint32_t i;
referred_to_segments = jbig2_new(ctx, uint32_t, referred_to_segment_count * referred_to_segment_size);
if (referred_to_segments == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate referred_to_segments " "in jbig2_parse_segment_header");
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < referred_to_segment_count; i++) {
referred_to_segments[i] =
(referred_to_segment_size == 1) ? buf[offset] :
(referred_to_segment_size == 2) ? jbig2_get_uint16(buf + offset) : jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
offset += referred_to_segment_size;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "segment %d refers to segment %d", result->number, referred_to_segments[i]);
}
result->referred_to_segments = referred_to_segments;
} else { /* no referred-to segments */
result->referred_to_segments = NULL;
}
/* 7.2.6 */
if (result->flags & 0x40) {
result->page_association = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
offset += 4;
} else {
result->page_association = buf[offset++];
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, result->number, "segment %d is associated with page %d", result->number, result->page_association);
/* 7.2.7 */
result->data_length = jbig2_get_uint32(buf + offset);
*p_header_size = offset + 4;
/* no body parsing results yet */
result->result = NULL;
return result;
}
| 165,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InterstitialPage* WebContentsImpl::GetInterstitialPage() const {
return GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | InterstitialPage* WebContentsImpl::GetInterstitialPage() const {
return interstitial_page_;
}
| 172,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void msleep(uint64_t ms) {
usleep(ms * 1000);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void msleep(uint64_t ms) {
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(ms * 1000));
}
| 173,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int llc_ui_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddrlen, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_llc sllc;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
int rc = 0;
memset(&sllc, 0, sizeof(sllc));
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
*uaddrlen = sizeof(sllc);
memset(uaddr, 0, *uaddrlen);
if (peer) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
if(llc->dev)
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->daddr.lsap;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, &llc->daddr.mac, IFHWADDRLEN);
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!llc->sap)
goto out;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->sap->laddr.lsap;
if (llc->dev) {
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr,
IFHWADDRLEN);
}
}
rc = 0;
sllc.sllc_family = AF_LLC;
memcpy(uaddr, &sllc, sizeof(sllc));
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: llc: fix info leak via getsockname()
The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.
Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int llc_ui_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddrlen, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_llc sllc;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
int rc = -EBADF;
memset(&sllc, 0, sizeof(sllc));
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
*uaddrlen = sizeof(sllc);
if (peer) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
if(llc->dev)
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->daddr.lsap;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, &llc->daddr.mac, IFHWADDRLEN);
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!llc->sap)
goto out;
sllc.sllc_sap = llc->sap->laddr.lsap;
if (llc->dev) {
sllc.sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
memcpy(&sllc.sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr,
IFHWADDRLEN);
}
}
rc = 0;
sllc.sllc_family = AF_LLC;
memcpy(uaddr, &sllc, sizeof(sllc));
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
| 166,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CleanUp(DownloadId id) {
MockDownloadFile* file = download_file_factory_->GetExistingFile(id);
ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL);
EXPECT_CALL(*file, Cancel());
download_file_manager_->CancelDownload(id);
EXPECT_TRUE(NULL == download_file_manager_->GetDownloadFile(id));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CleanUp(DownloadId id) {
MockDownloadFile* file = download_file_factory_->GetExistingFile(id);
ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL);
EXPECT_CALL(*file, Cancel());
download_file_manager_->CancelDownload(id);
EXPECT_EQ(NULL, download_file_manager_->GetDownloadFile(id));
}
| 170,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int mount_entry_on_systemfs(struct mntent *mntent)
{
return mount_entry_on_generic(mntent, mntent->mnt_dir);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static inline int mount_entry_on_systemfs(struct mntent *mntent)
{
return mount_entry_on_generic(mntent, mntent->mnt_dir, NULL);
}
| 166,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __init netlink_add_usersock_entry(void)
{
struct listeners *listeners;
int groups = 32;
listeners = kzalloc(sizeof(*listeners) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!listeners)
panic("netlink_add_usersock_entry: Cannot allocate listeners\n");
netlink_table_grab();
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].groups = groups;
rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].listeners, listeners);
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].module = THIS_MODULE;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].registered = 1;
netlink_table_ungrab();
}
Commit Message: netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes
Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other
processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink
asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root
process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers.
The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in
two ways:
a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from
some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped.
b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin
of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any
message not coming from the kernel.
However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has
been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility.
So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd,
know that the event was triggered by some user-space action.
Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming
from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink.
This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set
in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing
applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between
two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is
NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink
userspace communication.
Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink
userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default,
I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to
communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information
that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using
NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void __init netlink_add_usersock_entry(void)
{
struct listeners *listeners;
int groups = 32;
listeners = kzalloc(sizeof(*listeners) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!listeners)
panic("netlink_add_usersock_entry: Cannot allocate listeners\n");
netlink_table_grab();
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].groups = groups;
rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].listeners, listeners);
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].module = THIS_MODULE;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].registered = 1;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].nl_nonroot = NL_NONROOT_SEND;
netlink_table_ungrab();
}
| 167,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ppp_register_net_channel(struct net *net, struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch;
struct ppp_net *pn;
pch = kzalloc(sizeof(struct channel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pch)
return -ENOMEM;
pn = ppp_pernet(net);
pch->ppp = NULL;
pch->chan = chan;
pch->chan_net = net;
chan->ppp = pch;
init_ppp_file(&pch->file, CHANNEL);
pch->file.hdrlen = chan->hdrlen;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
pch->lastseq = -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK */
init_rwsem(&pch->chan_sem);
spin_lock_init(&pch->downl);
rwlock_init(&pch->upl);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
pch->file.index = ++pn->last_channel_index;
list_add(&pch->list, &pn->new_channels);
atomic_inc(&channel_count);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int ppp_register_net_channel(struct net *net, struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch;
struct ppp_net *pn;
pch = kzalloc(sizeof(struct channel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pch)
return -ENOMEM;
pn = ppp_pernet(net);
pch->ppp = NULL;
pch->chan = chan;
pch->chan_net = get_net(net);
chan->ppp = pch;
init_ppp_file(&pch->file, CHANNEL);
pch->file.hdrlen = chan->hdrlen;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
pch->lastseq = -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK */
init_rwsem(&pch->chan_sem);
spin_lock_init(&pch->downl);
rwlock_init(&pch->upl);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
pch->file.index = ++pn->last_channel_index;
list_add(&pch->list, &pn->new_channels);
atomic_inc(&channel_count);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
return 0;
}
| 167,229 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst;
break;
case 4:
ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst;
break;
case 8:
ctxt->_eip = dst;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n");
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static inline void assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
static inline int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
int cs_l)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst;
break;
case 4:
ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst;
break;
case 8:
if ((cs_l && is_noncanonical_address(dst)) ||
(!cs_l && (dst & ~(u32)-1)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = dst;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n");
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
static inline int assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
{
return assign_eip_far(ctxt, dst, ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64);
}
| 169,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (uid >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (multiuser_get_app_id(uid) >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 173,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
int len;
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
if (config.hostsocket != NULL)
len = snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"redis %s",
config.hostsocket);
else
len = anetFormatAddr(config.prompt, sizeof(config.prompt),
config.hostip, config.hostport);
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
len += snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"[%d]",
config.dbnum);
snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"> ");
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
sds prompt = sdsempty();
if (config.hostsocket != NULL) {
prompt = sdscatfmt(prompt,"redis %s",config.hostsocket);
} else {
char addr[256];
anetFormatAddr(addr, sizeof(addr), config.hostip, config.hostport);
prompt = sdscatlen(prompt,addr,strlen(addr));
}
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
prompt = sdscatfmt(prompt,"[%i]",config.dbnum);
/* Copy the prompt in the static buffer. */
prompt = sdscatlen(prompt,"> ",2);
snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"%s",prompt);
sdsfree(prompt);
}
| 169,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
| 167,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = false;
if (!SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_attrib_0)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
| 170,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else {
int64_t i;
/* Overflow detected - can happen if source has a larger MAC table.
* We simply set overflow flag so there's no need to maintain the
* table of addresses, discard them all.
* Note: 64 bit math to avoid integer overflow.
*/
for (i = 0; i < (int64_t)n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN; ++i) {
qemu_get_byte(f);
}
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
| 165,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
LoginLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->login_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
| 170,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setStrokeStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedStrokeColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().StrokeStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (OriginClean() && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean()) {
SetOriginTainted();
ClearResolvedFilters();
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetStrokeStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void BaseRenderingContext2D::setStrokeStyle(
const StringOrCanvasGradientOrCanvasPattern& style) {
DCHECK(!style.IsNull());
String color_string;
CanvasStyle* canvas_style = nullptr;
if (style.IsString()) {
color_string = style.GetAsString();
if (color_string == GetState().UnparsedStrokeColor())
return;
Color parsed_color = 0;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(parsed_color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().StrokeStyle()->IsEquivalentRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb())) {
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
return;
}
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromRGBA(parsed_color.Rgb());
} else if (style.IsCanvasGradient()) {
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromGradient(style.GetAsCanvasGradient());
} else if (style.IsCanvasPattern()) {
CanvasPattern* canvas_pattern = style.GetAsCanvasPattern();
if (!origin_tainted_by_content_ && !canvas_pattern->OriginClean())
SetOriginTaintedByContent();
canvas_style = CanvasStyle::CreateFromPattern(canvas_pattern);
}
DCHECK(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetStrokeStyle(canvas_style);
ModifiableState().SetUnparsedStrokeColor(color_string);
ModifiableState().ClearResolvedFilter();
}
| 172,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int command_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 value, void *data)
{
struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
int err;
dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!pci_is_enabled(dev) && is_enable_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: enable\n",
pci_name(dev));
err = pci_enable_device(dev);
if (err)
return err;
if (dev_data)
dev_data->enable_intx = 1;
} else if (pci_is_enabled(dev) && !is_enable_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: disable\n",
pci_name(dev));
pci_disable_device(dev);
if (dev_data)
dev_data->enable_intx = 0;
}
if (!dev->is_busmaster && is_master_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: set bus master\n",
pci_name(dev));
pci_set_master(dev);
}
if (value & PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG
DRV_NAME ": %s: enable memory-write-invalidate\n",
pci_name(dev));
err = pci_set_mwi(dev);
if (err) {
pr_warn("%s: cannot enable memory-write-invalidate (%d)\n",
pci_name(dev), err);
value &= ~PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE;
}
}
return pci_write_config_word(dev, offset, value);
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int command_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 value, void *data)
{
struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data;
int err;
u16 val;
struct pci_cmd_info *cmd = data;
dev_data = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
if (!pci_is_enabled(dev) && is_enable_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: enable\n",
pci_name(dev));
err = pci_enable_device(dev);
if (err)
return err;
if (dev_data)
dev_data->enable_intx = 1;
} else if (pci_is_enabled(dev) && !is_enable_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: disable\n",
pci_name(dev));
pci_disable_device(dev);
if (dev_data)
dev_data->enable_intx = 0;
}
if (!dev->is_busmaster && is_master_cmd(value)) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG DRV_NAME ": %s: set bus master\n",
pci_name(dev));
pci_set_master(dev);
}
if (value & PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE) {
if (unlikely(verbose_request))
printk(KERN_DEBUG
DRV_NAME ": %s: enable memory-write-invalidate\n",
pci_name(dev));
err = pci_set_mwi(dev);
if (err) {
pr_warn("%s: cannot enable memory-write-invalidate (%d)\n",
pci_name(dev), err);
value &= ~PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE;
}
}
cmd->val = value;
if (!permissive && (!dev_data || !dev_data->permissive))
return 0;
/* Only allow the guest to control certain bits. */
err = pci_read_config_word(dev, offset, &val);
if (err || val == value)
return err;
value &= PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
value |= val & ~PCI_COMMAND_GUEST;
return pci_write_config_word(dev, offset, value);
}
| 166,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const
{
return m_height;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const
| 174,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[64];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks;
cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0,
0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[JPC_MAXBANDS];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks;
cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0,
0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
| 168,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int bmp_getint32(jas_stream_t *in, int_fast32_t *val)
{
int n;
uint_fast32_t v;
int c;
for (n = 4, v = 0;;) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v |= (c << 24);
if (--n <= 0) {
break;
}
v >>= 8;
}
if (val) {
*val = v;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int bmp_getint32(jas_stream_t *in, int_fast32_t *val)
{
int n;
uint_fast32_t v;
int c;
for (n = 4, v = 0;;) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v |= (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, c) << 24);
if (--n <= 0) {
break;
}
v >>= 8;
}
if (val) {
*val = v;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mem_resize(jas_stream_memobj_t *m, int bufsize)
{
unsigned char *buf;
assert(m->buf_);
assert(bufsize >= 0);
if (!(buf = jas_realloc2(m->buf_, bufsize, sizeof(unsigned char)))) {
return -1;
}
m->buf_ = buf;
m->bufsize_ = bufsize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static int mem_resize(jas_stream_memobj_t *m, int bufsize)
{
unsigned char *buf;
//assert(m->buf_);
assert(bufsize >= 0);
if (!(buf = jas_realloc2(m->buf_, bufsize, sizeof(unsigned char))) &&
bufsize) {
return -1;
}
m->buf_ = buf;
m->bufsize_ = bufsize;
return 0;
}
| 168,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void exitErrorHandler(jpeg_common_struct *error) {
j_decompress_ptr cinfo = (j_decompress_ptr)error;
str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
src->abort = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void exitErrorHandler(jpeg_common_struct *error) {
j_decompress_ptr cinfo = (j_decompress_ptr)error;
str_src_mgr * src = (struct str_src_mgr *)cinfo->src;
longjmp(src->setjmp_buffer, 1);
}
| 165,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool was_restored,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
DCHECK(!rfh->GetParent());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry;
if (params.intended_as_new_entry) {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
} else if (params.nav_entry_id) {
entry = GetEntryWithUniqueID(params.nav_entry_id);
if (is_in_page) {
NavigationEntryImpl* last_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() == last_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() &&
last_entry->GetSSL().initialized && !entry->GetSSL().initialized &&
was_restored) {
entry->GetSSL() = last_entry->GetSSL();
}
} else {
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
} else {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!is_in_page)
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
DCHECK(entry);
entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry->SetURL(params.url);
entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
if (entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(entry, params.url);
DCHECK(entry->site_instance() == nullptr ||
!entry->GetRedirectChain().empty() ||
entry->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance());
entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id);
if (ui::PageTransitionIsRedirect(params.transition) && !is_in_page)
entry->GetFavicon() = FaviconStatus();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
last_committed_entry_index_ = GetIndexOfEntry(entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool was_restored,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
DCHECK(!rfh->GetParent());
NavigationEntryImpl* entry;
if (params.intended_as_new_entry) {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
MaybeDumpCopiedNonSameOriginEntry("Existing page navigation", params,
is_in_page, entry);
} else if (params.nav_entry_id) {
entry = GetEntryWithUniqueID(params.nav_entry_id);
if (is_in_page) {
NavigationEntryImpl* last_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() == last_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() &&
last_entry->GetSSL().initialized && !entry->GetSSL().initialized &&
was_restored) {
entry->GetSSL() = last_entry->GetSSL();
}
} else {
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
} else {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!is_in_page)
entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
DCHECK(entry);
entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry->SetURL(params.url);
entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
if (entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(entry, params.url);
DCHECK(entry->site_instance() == nullptr ||
!entry->GetRedirectChain().empty() ||
entry->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance());
entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
rfh->frame_tree_node(), params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.redirects, params.page_state,
params.method, params.post_id);
if (ui::PageTransitionIsRedirect(params.transition) && !is_in_page)
entry->GetFavicon() = FaviconStatus();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
last_committed_entry_index_ = GetIndexOfEntry(entry);
}
| 172,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > ss * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, ss * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
pos, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len));
return -1;
}
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + pos, len);
return len;
}
| 165,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; ട > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more entries to the confusables list for IDN
U+04CA (ӊ) => h
U+0E1F (ฟ) => w
U+0E23 (ร) => s
Bug: 813925, 813814
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: If81ea9bf1c1729f1b6ffc71d718dc5950ac825b5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927741
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538159}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// U+04C8 (ӈ), U+04CA (ӊ), U+0527 (ԧ), U+0529 (ԩ)} => h
// - {U+03C9 (ω), U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ), U+0E1F (ฟ)} => w
// - {U+0D1F (ട), U+0E23 (ร)} => s
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,733 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidatorTest& Properties(
const RefCountedPropertyTreeState& state) {
data_.chunks.back().properties = state;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | CompositedLayerRasterInvalidatorTest& Properties(
const TransformPaintPropertyNode& t,
const ClipPaintPropertyNode& c,
const EffectPaintPropertyNode& e) {
Properties(PropertyTreeState(&t, &c, &e));
return *this;
}
| 171,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 173,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | RuntimeCustomBindings::RuntimeCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetManifest",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToExtension", "runtime.connect",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToExtension,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("OpenChannelToNativeApp", "runtime.connectNative",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::OpenChannelToNativeApp,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetExtensionViews",
base::Bind(&RuntimeCustomBindings::GetExtensionViews,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int aa_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i, j, idx, largest_idx = -1;
uint32_t nkey, nval, toc_size, npairs, header_seed = 0, start;
char key[128], val[128], codec_name[64] = {0};
uint8_t output[24], dst[8], src[8];
int64_t largest_size = -1, current_size = -1, chapter_pos;
struct toc_entry {
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t size;
} TOC[MAX_TOC_ENTRIES];
uint32_t header_key_part[4];
uint8_t header_key[16] = {0};
AADemuxContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
/* parse .aa header */
avio_skip(pb, 4); // file size
avio_skip(pb, 4); // magic string
toc_size = avio_rb32(pb); // TOC size
avio_skip(pb, 4); // unidentified integer
if (toc_size > MAX_TOC_ENTRIES)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < toc_size; i++) { // read TOC
avio_skip(pb, 4); // TOC entry index
TOC[i].offset = avio_rb32(pb); // block offset
TOC[i].size = avio_rb32(pb); // block size
}
avio_skip(pb, 24); // header termination block (ignored)
npairs = avio_rb32(pb); // read dictionary entries
if (npairs > MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRIES)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < npairs; i++) {
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
avio_skip(pb, 1); // unidentified integer
nkey = avio_rb32(pb); // key string length
nval = avio_rb32(pb); // value string length
avio_get_str(pb, nkey, key, sizeof(key));
avio_get_str(pb, nval, val, sizeof(val));
if (!strcmp(key, "codec")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Codec is <%s>\n", val);
strncpy(codec_name, val, sizeof(codec_name) - 1);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "HeaderSeed")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "HeaderSeed is <%s>\n", val);
header_seed = atoi(val);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "HeaderKey")) { // this looks like "1234567890 1234567890 1234567890 1234567890"
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "HeaderKey is <%s>\n", val);
sscanf(val, "%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32,
&header_key_part[0], &header_key_part[1], &header_key_part[2], &header_key_part[3]);
for (idx = 0; idx < 4; idx++) {
AV_WB32(&header_key[idx * 4], header_key_part[idx]); // convert each part to BE!
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Processed HeaderKey is ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%02x", header_key[i]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
} else {
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, key, val, 0);
}
}
/* verify fixed key */
if (c->aa_fixed_key_len != 16) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "aa_fixed_key value needs to be 16 bytes!\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* verify codec */
if ((c->codec_second_size = get_second_size(codec_name)) == -1) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unknown codec <%s>!\n", codec_name);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* decryption key derivation */
c->tea_ctx = av_tea_alloc();
if (!c->tea_ctx)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
av_tea_init(c->tea_ctx, c->aa_fixed_key, 16);
output[0] = output[1] = 0; // purely for padding purposes
memcpy(output + 2, header_key, 16);
idx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { // TEA CBC with weird mixed endianness
AV_WB32(src, header_seed);
AV_WB32(src + 4, header_seed + 1);
header_seed += 2;
av_tea_crypt(c->tea_ctx, dst, src, 1, NULL, 0); // TEA ECB encrypt
for (j = 0; j < TEA_BLOCK_SIZE && idx < 18; j+=1, idx+=1) {
output[idx] = output[idx] ^ dst[j];
}
}
memcpy(c->file_key, output + 2, 16); // skip first 2 bytes of output
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "File key is ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%02x", c->file_key[i]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
/* decoder setup */
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st) {
av_freep(&c->tea_ctx);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
if (!strcmp(codec_name, "mp332")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_MP3;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 22050;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 32000 * TIMEPREC);
} else if (!strcmp(codec_name, "acelp85")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_SIPR;
st->codecpar->block_align = 19;
st->codecpar->channels = 1;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 8500;
st->codecpar->bit_rate = 8500;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 8500 * TIMEPREC);
} else if (!strcmp(codec_name, "acelp16")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_SIPR;
st->codecpar->block_align = 20;
st->codecpar->channels = 1;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 16000;
st->codecpar->bit_rate = 16000;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 16000 * TIMEPREC);
}
/* determine, and jump to audio start offset */
for (i = 1; i < toc_size; i++) { // skip the first entry!
current_size = TOC[i].size;
if (current_size > largest_size) {
largest_idx = i;
largest_size = current_size;
}
}
start = TOC[largest_idx].offset;
avio_seek(pb, start, SEEK_SET);
st->start_time = 0;
c->content_start = start;
c->content_end = start + largest_size;
while ((chapter_pos = avio_tell(pb)) >= 0 && chapter_pos < c->content_end) {
int chapter_idx = s->nb_chapters;
uint32_t chapter_size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (chapter_size == 0) break;
chapter_pos -= start + CHAPTER_HEADER_SIZE * chapter_idx;
avio_skip(pb, 4 + chapter_size);
if (!avpriv_new_chapter(s, chapter_idx, st->time_base,
chapter_pos * TIMEPREC, (chapter_pos + chapter_size) * TIMEPREC, NULL))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
st->duration = (largest_size - CHAPTER_HEADER_SIZE * s->nb_chapters) * TIMEPREC;
ff_update_cur_dts(s, st, 0);
avio_seek(pb, start, SEEK_SET);
c->current_chapter_size = 0;
c->seek_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/aadec: Check for scanf() failure
Fixes: use of uninitialized variables
Fixes: blank.aa
Found-by: Chamal De Silva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | static int aa_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i, j, idx, largest_idx = -1;
uint32_t nkey, nval, toc_size, npairs, header_seed = 0, start;
char key[128], val[128], codec_name[64] = {0};
uint8_t output[24], dst[8], src[8];
int64_t largest_size = -1, current_size = -1, chapter_pos;
struct toc_entry {
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t size;
} TOC[MAX_TOC_ENTRIES];
uint32_t header_key_part[4];
uint8_t header_key[16] = {0};
AADemuxContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
int ret;
/* parse .aa header */
avio_skip(pb, 4); // file size
avio_skip(pb, 4); // magic string
toc_size = avio_rb32(pb); // TOC size
avio_skip(pb, 4); // unidentified integer
if (toc_size > MAX_TOC_ENTRIES)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < toc_size; i++) { // read TOC
avio_skip(pb, 4); // TOC entry index
TOC[i].offset = avio_rb32(pb); // block offset
TOC[i].size = avio_rb32(pb); // block size
}
avio_skip(pb, 24); // header termination block (ignored)
npairs = avio_rb32(pb); // read dictionary entries
if (npairs > MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRIES)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < npairs; i++) {
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
avio_skip(pb, 1); // unidentified integer
nkey = avio_rb32(pb); // key string length
nval = avio_rb32(pb); // value string length
avio_get_str(pb, nkey, key, sizeof(key));
avio_get_str(pb, nval, val, sizeof(val));
if (!strcmp(key, "codec")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Codec is <%s>\n", val);
strncpy(codec_name, val, sizeof(codec_name) - 1);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "HeaderSeed")) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "HeaderSeed is <%s>\n", val);
header_seed = atoi(val);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "HeaderKey")) { // this looks like "1234567890 1234567890 1234567890 1234567890"
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "HeaderKey is <%s>\n", val);
ret = sscanf(val, "%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32"%"SCNu32,
&header_key_part[0], &header_key_part[1], &header_key_part[2], &header_key_part[3]);
if (ret != 4)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (idx = 0; idx < 4; idx++) {
AV_WB32(&header_key[idx * 4], header_key_part[idx]); // convert each part to BE!
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Processed HeaderKey is ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%02x", header_key[i]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
} else {
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, key, val, 0);
}
}
/* verify fixed key */
if (c->aa_fixed_key_len != 16) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "aa_fixed_key value needs to be 16 bytes!\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* verify codec */
if ((c->codec_second_size = get_second_size(codec_name)) == -1) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unknown codec <%s>!\n", codec_name);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* decryption key derivation */
c->tea_ctx = av_tea_alloc();
if (!c->tea_ctx)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
av_tea_init(c->tea_ctx, c->aa_fixed_key, 16);
output[0] = output[1] = 0; // purely for padding purposes
memcpy(output + 2, header_key, 16);
idx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { // TEA CBC with weird mixed endianness
AV_WB32(src, header_seed);
AV_WB32(src + 4, header_seed + 1);
header_seed += 2;
av_tea_crypt(c->tea_ctx, dst, src, 1, NULL, 0); // TEA ECB encrypt
for (j = 0; j < TEA_BLOCK_SIZE && idx < 18; j+=1, idx+=1) {
output[idx] = output[idx] ^ dst[j];
}
}
memcpy(c->file_key, output + 2, 16); // skip first 2 bytes of output
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "File key is ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%02x", c->file_key[i]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
/* decoder setup */
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st) {
av_freep(&c->tea_ctx);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
if (!strcmp(codec_name, "mp332")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_MP3;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 22050;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 32000 * TIMEPREC);
} else if (!strcmp(codec_name, "acelp85")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_SIPR;
st->codecpar->block_align = 19;
st->codecpar->channels = 1;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 8500;
st->codecpar->bit_rate = 8500;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 8500 * TIMEPREC);
} else if (!strcmp(codec_name, "acelp16")) {
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_SIPR;
st->codecpar->block_align = 20;
st->codecpar->channels = 1;
st->codecpar->sample_rate = 16000;
st->codecpar->bit_rate = 16000;
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL_RAW;
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 8, 16000 * TIMEPREC);
}
/* determine, and jump to audio start offset */
for (i = 1; i < toc_size; i++) { // skip the first entry!
current_size = TOC[i].size;
if (current_size > largest_size) {
largest_idx = i;
largest_size = current_size;
}
}
start = TOC[largest_idx].offset;
avio_seek(pb, start, SEEK_SET);
st->start_time = 0;
c->content_start = start;
c->content_end = start + largest_size;
while ((chapter_pos = avio_tell(pb)) >= 0 && chapter_pos < c->content_end) {
int chapter_idx = s->nb_chapters;
uint32_t chapter_size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (chapter_size == 0) break;
chapter_pos -= start + CHAPTER_HEADER_SIZE * chapter_idx;
avio_skip(pb, 4 + chapter_size);
if (!avpriv_new_chapter(s, chapter_idx, st->time_base,
chapter_pos * TIMEPREC, (chapter_pos + chapter_size) * TIMEPREC, NULL))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
st->duration = (largest_size - CHAPTER_HEADER_SIZE * s->nb_chapters) * TIMEPREC;
ff_update_cur_dts(s, st, 0);
avio_seek(pb, start, SEEK_SET);
c->current_chapter_size = 0;
c->seek_offset = 0;
return 0;
}
| 169,656 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!renderer_process_);
if (base::GetProcId(renderer_process) == renderer_pid_)
renderer_process_ = renderer_process;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
| 170,934 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || len < 1 || len > 8) {
// Invalid: Negative payload size, negative or 0 length integer, or integer
// larger than 64 bits (libwebm cannot handle them).
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
// Avoid rolling over pos when very close to LONG_LONG_MAX.
const unsigned long long rollover_check =
static_cast<unsigned long long>(pos) + len;
if (rollover_check > LONG_LONG_MAX)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if (stop >= 0 && pos >= stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
| 173,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Editor::Transpose() {
if (!CanEdit())
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(GetFrame().GetDocument()), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (frame_->GetDocument()->GetFrame() != frame_)
return;
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(GetFrame());
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | void Editor::Transpose() {
//// TODO(yosin): We should move |Transpose()| into |ExecuteTranspose()| in
//// "EditorCommand.cpp"
void Transpose(LocalFrame& frame) {
Editor& editor = frame.GetEditor();
if (!editor.CanEdit())
return;
Document* const document = frame.GetDocument();
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const String& text = PlainText(range);
if (text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& transposed = text.Right(1) + text.Left(1);
if (DispatchBeforeInputInsertText(
EventTargetNodeForDocument(document), transposed,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose,
new StaticRangeVector(1, StaticRange::Create(range))) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
// 'beforeinput' event handler may destroy document->
if (frame.GetDocument() != document)
return;
document->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& new_range = ComputeRangeForTranspose(frame);
if (new_range.IsNull())
return;
const String& new_text = PlainText(new_range);
if (new_text.length() != 2)
return;
const String& new_transposed = new_text.Right(1) + new_text.Left(1);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SetBaseAndExtent(new_range).Build();
if (CreateVisibleSelection(new_selection) !=
frame.Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree())
frame.Selection().SetSelection(new_selection);
editor.ReplaceSelectionWithText(new_transposed, false, false,
InputEvent::InputType::kInsertTranspose);
}
| 172,011 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void cp2112_gpio_set(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset, int value)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
buf[0] = CP2112_GPIO_SET;
buf[1] = value ? 0xff : 0;
buf[2] = 1 << offset;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_SET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_SET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0)
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static void cp2112_gpio_set(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset, int value)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
buf[0] = CP2112_GPIO_SET;
buf[1] = value ? 0xff : 0;
buf[2] = 1 << offset;
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_SET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_SET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
if (ret < 0)
hid_err(hdev, "error setting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
}
| 168,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftGSM::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if(((inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * kMSGSMFrameSize) != inHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("input buffer not multiple of %d (%d).", kMSGSMFrameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int n = mSignalledError ? 0 : DecodeGSM(mGsm,
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer), inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = n * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SoftGSM::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if(((inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * kMSGSMFrameSize) != inHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("input buffer not multiple of %d (%d).", kMSGSMFrameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < (inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * 320) {
ALOGE("output buffer is not large enough (%d).", outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793367");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int n = mSignalledError ? 0 : DecodeGSM(mGsm,
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer), inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = n * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
if (sk) {
unix_sock_count++;
max_level = max(max_level,
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level);
}
}
if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
/*
* Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
* collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
* candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
*/
UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
if (sk) {
unix_sock_count++;
max_level = max(max_level,
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level);
}
}
if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
/*
* Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
* collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
* candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
*/
UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
| 167,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = (1 << KVM_X2APIC_CID_BITS) - 1;
new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
| 165,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls))
return true;
if (tab_id >= 0) {
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
if (tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab)) {
return true;
}
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(int tab_id,
bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(const GURL& document_url,
const Extension* extension,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
bool has_active_tab = false;
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
has_active_tab = tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab);
}
// We check GetPageAccess() (in addition the the <all_urls> and activeTab
// checks below) for the case of URLs that can be conditionally granted (such
// as file:// URLs or chrome:// URLs for component extensions), and to respect
// policy restrictions, if any. If an extension has <all_urls>,
// GetPageAccess() will still (correctly) return false if, for instance, the
// URL is a file:// URL and the extension does not have file access.
// See https://crbug.com/810220.
if (GetPageAccess(extension, document_url, tab_id, error) != ACCESS_ALLOWED) {
if (!document_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme))
return false;
// Most extensions will not have (and cannot get) access to chrome:// URLs
// (which are restricted). However, allowing them to capture these URLs can
// be useful, such as in the case of capturing a screenshot. Allow
// extensions that have been explicitly invoked (and have the activeTab)
// permission to capture chrome:// URLs.
if (has_active_tab)
return true;
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls))
return true;
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
if (tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab)) {
return true;
}
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
| 173,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host,
bool is_guest_view_hack)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
window_(nullptr),
in_shutdown_(false),
in_bounds_changed_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(nullptr),
popup_child_host_view_(nullptr),
is_loading_(false),
has_composition_text_(false),
background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
needs_begin_frames_(false),
needs_flush_input_(false),
added_frame_observer_(false),
cursor_visibility_state_in_renderer_(UNKNOWN),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_(nullptr),
legacy_window_destroyed_(false),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#endif
has_snapped_to_boundary_(false),
is_guest_view_hack_(is_guest_view_hack),
device_scale_factor_(0.0f),
event_handler_(new RenderWidgetHostViewEventHandler(host_, this, this)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!is_guest_view_hack_)
host_->SetView(this);
if (GetTextInputManager())
GetTextInputManager()->AddObserver(this);
bool overscroll_enabled = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOverscrollHistoryNavigation) != "0";
SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(overscroll_enabled);
selection_controller_client_.reset(
new TouchSelectionControllerClientAura(this));
CreateSelectionController();
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh) {
ignore_result(rvh->GetWebkitPreferences());
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host,
bool is_guest_view_hack)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
window_(nullptr),
in_shutdown_(false),
in_bounds_changed_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(nullptr),
popup_child_host_view_(nullptr),
is_loading_(false),
has_composition_text_(false),
background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
needs_begin_frames_(false),
needs_flush_input_(false),
added_frame_observer_(false),
cursor_visibility_state_in_renderer_(UNKNOWN),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
legacy_render_widget_host_HWND_(nullptr),
legacy_window_destroyed_(false),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#endif
has_snapped_to_boundary_(false),
is_guest_view_hack_(is_guest_view_hack),
device_scale_factor_(0.0f),
event_handler_(new RenderWidgetHostViewEventHandler(host_, this, this)),
frame_sink_id_(host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (!is_guest_view_hack_)
host_->SetView(this);
if (GetTextInputManager())
GetTextInputManager()->AddObserver(this);
bool overscroll_enabled = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kOverscrollHistoryNavigation) != "0";
SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(overscroll_enabled);
selection_controller_client_.reset(
new TouchSelectionControllerClientAura(this));
CreateSelectionController();
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(host_);
if (rvh) {
ignore_result(rvh->GetWebkitPreferences());
}
}
| 172,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: __xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id' */
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | __xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml);
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
xmlAttr *xIter = NULL;
char *path = xml_get_path(xml);
/* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id'
* Except in the ACLs section
*/
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0 && strstr(path, "/"XML_CIB_TAG_ACLS"/") == NULL) {
/* Delay the acl check */
continue;
} else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml));
break;
} else {
crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path);
if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(xml);
xmlFreeNode(xml);
}
free(path);
return;
}
}
free(path);
}
while (cIter != NULL) {
xmlNode *child = cIter;
cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */
__xml_acl_post_process(child);
}
}
| 166,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::InitDataReductionProxySettings(
PrefService* prefs,
DataReductionProxyIOData* io_data,
std::unique_ptr<DataReductionProxyService> data_reduction_proxy_service) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(prefs);
DCHECK(io_data);
DCHECK(io_data->config());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service);
prefs_ = prefs;
config_ = io_data->config();
data_reduction_proxy_service_ = std::move(data_reduction_proxy_service);
data_reduction_proxy_service_->AddObserver(this);
InitPrefMembers();
RecordDataReductionInit();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue()) {
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(true);
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnSettingsInitialized();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DataReductionProxySettings::InitDataReductionProxySettings(
PrefService* prefs,
DataReductionProxyIOData* io_data,
std::unique_ptr<DataReductionProxyService> data_reduction_proxy_service) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(prefs);
DCHECK(io_data);
DCHECK(io_data->config());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service);
prefs_ = prefs;
config_ = io_data->config();
data_reduction_proxy_service_ = std::move(data_reduction_proxy_service);
data_reduction_proxy_service_->AddObserver(this);
RecordDataReductionInit();
registrar_.Init(prefs_);
registrar_.Add(
prefs::kDataSaverEnabled,
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxySettings::OnProxyEnabledPrefChange,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(prefs_)) {
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(true);
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnSettingsInitialized();
}
| 172,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr;
UWORD16 u2_total_len;
UWORD16 u2_len;
UWORD16 u2_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_next_word;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
else
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(ps_stream);
if(ps_dec->u2_first_mb)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* Section 6.3.17 */
/* The first MB of a slice cannot be skipped */
/* But the mb_addr_incr can be > 1, because at the beginning of */
/* a slice, it indicates the offset from the last MB in the */
/* previous row. Hence for the first slice in a row, the */
/* mb_addr_incr needs to be 1. */
/****************************************************************/
/* MB_x is set to zero whenever MB_y changes. */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = u2_mb_addr_incr - 1;
/* For error resilience */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = MIN(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, (ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - 1));
/****************************************************************/
/* mb_addr_incr is forced to 1 because in this decoder it is used */
/* more as an indicator of the number of MBs skipped than the */
/* as defined by the standard (Section 6.3.17) */
/****************************************************************/
u2_mb_addr_incr = 1;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
}
else
{
/****************************************************************/
/* In MPEG-2, the last MB of the row cannot be skipped and the */
/* mb_addr_incr cannot be such that it will take the current MB */
/* beyond the current row */
/* In MPEG-1, the slice could start and end anywhere and is not */
/* restricted to a row like in MPEG-2. Hence this check should */
/* not be done for MPEG-1 streams. */
/****************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 &&
((ps_dec->u2_mb_x + u2_mb_addr_incr) > ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb))
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - ps_dec->u2_mb_x;
}
impeg2d_dec_skip_mbs(ps_dec, (UWORD16)(u2_mb_addr_incr - 1));
}
}
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,16);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* MB type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
u2_mb_type = ps_dec->pu2_mb_type[BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,10)];
u2_len = BITS(u2_mb_type,15,8);
u2_total_len = u2_len;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << u2_len);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* motion type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
WORD32 i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
if((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) && ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,14);
u2_total_len += MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN);
i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
}
if ((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) &&
((i4_motion_type == 0) ||
(i4_motion_type == 3) ||
(i4_motion_type == 4) ||
(i4_motion_type >= 7)))
{
i4_motion_type = 1;
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dct type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_CODED) && ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = BIT((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15);
u2_total_len += MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN);
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u2_mb_type & MB_QUANT)
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,11);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
u2_total_len += MB_QUANT_SCALE_CODE_LEN;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,u2_total_len);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Set the function pointers */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_coded_mb = (UWORD16)(u2_mb_type & MB_CODED);
if(u2_mb_type & MB_BIDRECT)
{
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = BIDIRECT;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK)
{
UWORD16 u2_refPic = !(u2_mb_type & MB_MV_FORW);
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = (e_pred_direction_t)u2_refPic;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA)
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
impeg2d_dec_intra_mb(ps_dec);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb =0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = FORW;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 0;
impeg2d_dec_0mv_coded_mb(ps_dec);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* decode cbp */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if((u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA))
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0x3f;
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
if((ps_dec->u2_coded_mb))
{
UWORD16 cbpValue;
cbpValue = gau2_impeg2d_cbp_code[impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_CBP_LEN)];
ps_dec->u2_cbp = cbpValue & 0xFF;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,(cbpValue >> 8) & 0x0FF);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
WORD32 impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr;
UWORD16 u2_total_len;
UWORD16 u2_len;
UWORD16 u2_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_next_word;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
else
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(ps_stream);
if(ps_dec->u2_first_mb)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* Section 6.3.17 */
/* The first MB of a slice cannot be skipped */
/* But the mb_addr_incr can be > 1, because at the beginning of */
/* a slice, it indicates the offset from the last MB in the */
/* previous row. Hence for the first slice in a row, the */
/* mb_addr_incr needs to be 1. */
/****************************************************************/
/* MB_x is set to zero whenever MB_y changes. */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = u2_mb_addr_incr - 1;
/* For error resilience */
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = MIN(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, (ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - 1));
/****************************************************************/
/* mb_addr_incr is forced to 1 because in this decoder it is used */
/* more as an indicator of the number of MBs skipped than the */
/* as defined by the standard (Section 6.3.17) */
/****************************************************************/
u2_mb_addr_incr = 1;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
}
else
{
/****************************************************************/
/* In MPEG-2, the last MB of the row cannot be skipped and the */
/* mb_addr_incr cannot be such that it will take the current MB */
/* beyond the current row */
/* In MPEG-1, the slice could start and end anywhere and is not */
/* restricted to a row like in MPEG-2. Hence this check should */
/* not be done for MPEG-1 streams. */
/****************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 &&
((ps_dec->u2_mb_x + u2_mb_addr_incr) > ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb))
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - ps_dec->u2_mb_x;
}
impeg2d_dec_skip_mbs(ps_dec, (UWORD16)(u2_mb_addr_incr - 1));
}
}
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,16);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* MB type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
u2_mb_type = ps_dec->pu2_mb_type[BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,10)];
u2_len = BITS(u2_mb_type,15,8);
u2_total_len = u2_len;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << u2_len);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* motion type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
WORD32 i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
if((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) && ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,14);
u2_total_len += MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN);
i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
}
if ((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) &&
((i4_motion_type == 0) ||
(i4_motion_type == 3) ||
(i4_motion_type == 4) ||
(i4_motion_type >= 7)))
{
i4_motion_type = 1;
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dct type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_CODED) && ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = BIT((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15);
u2_total_len += MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN);
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u2_mb_type & MB_QUANT)
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,11);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
u2_total_len += MB_QUANT_SCALE_CODE_LEN;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,u2_total_len);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Set the function pointers */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_coded_mb = (UWORD16)(u2_mb_type & MB_CODED);
if(u2_mb_type & MB_BIDRECT)
{
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = BIDIRECT;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
if(NULL == ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params)
return -1;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK)
{
UWORD16 u2_refPic = !(u2_mb_type & MB_MV_FORW);
UWORD16 u2_index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = (e_pred_direction_t)u2_refPic;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[u2_index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
if(NULL == ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params)
return -1;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA)
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
impeg2d_dec_intra_mb(ps_dec);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb =0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = FORW;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 0;
impeg2d_dec_0mv_coded_mb(ps_dec);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* decode cbp */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if((u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA))
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0x3f;
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
if((ps_dec->u2_coded_mb))
{
UWORD16 cbpValue;
cbpValue = gau2_impeg2d_cbp_code[impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_CBP_LEN)];
ps_dec->u2_cbp = cbpValue & 0xFF;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,(cbpValue >> 8) & 0x0FF);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 174,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (value);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
char *tmp = node->value;
node->value = strdup (value);
free (tmp);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
| 168,095 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MakeUsernameForAccount(const base::DictionaryValue* result,
base::string16* gaia_id,
wchar_t* username,
DWORD username_length,
wchar_t* domain,
DWORD domain_length,
wchar_t* sid,
DWORD sid_length) {
DCHECK(gaia_id);
DCHECK(username);
DCHECK(domain);
DCHECK(sid);
*gaia_id = GetDictString(result, kKeyId);
HRESULT hr = GetSidFromId(*gaia_id, sid, sid_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->FindUserBySID(sid, username, username_length,
domain, domain_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
return;
}
LOGFN(INFO) << "No existing user found associated to gaia id:" << *gaia_id;
wcscpy_s(domain, domain_length, OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain().c_str());
username[0] = 0;
sid[0] = 0;
base::string16 os_username = GetDictString(result, kKeyEmail);
std::transform(os_username.begin(), os_username.end(), os_username.begin(),
::tolower);
base::string16::size_type at = os_username.find(L"@gmail.com");
if (at == base::string16::npos)
at = os_username.find(L"@googlemail.com");
if (at != base::string16::npos) {
os_username.resize(at);
} else {
std::string username_utf8 =
gaia::SanitizeEmail(base::UTF16ToUTF8(os_username));
size_t tld_length =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
gaia::ExtractDomainName(username_utf8),
net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
if (tld_length > 0) {
username_utf8.resize(username_utf8.length() - tld_length - 1);
os_username = base::UTF8ToUTF16(username_utf8);
}
}
if (os_username.size() > kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1)
os_username.resize(kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1);
for (auto& c : os_username) {
if (wcschr(L"@\\[]:|<>+=;?*", c) != nullptr || c < 32)
c = L'_';
}
wcscpy_s(username, username_length, os_username.c_str());
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void MakeUsernameForAccount(const base::DictionaryValue* result,
base::string16* gaia_id,
wchar_t* username,
DWORD username_length,
wchar_t* domain,
DWORD domain_length,
wchar_t* sid,
DWORD sid_length,
bool* is_consumer_account) {
DCHECK(gaia_id);
DCHECK(username);
DCHECK(domain);
DCHECK(sid);
DCHECK(is_consumer_account);
// Determine if the email is a consumer domain (gmail.com or googlemail.com).
base::string16 email = GetDictString(result, kKeyEmail);
std::transform(email.begin(), email.end(), email.begin(), ::tolower);
base::string16::size_type consumer_domain_pos = email.find(L"@gmail.com");
if (consumer_domain_pos == base::string16::npos)
consumer_domain_pos = email.find(L"@googlemail.com");
*is_consumer_account = consumer_domain_pos != base::string16::npos;
*gaia_id = GetDictString(result, kKeyId);
HRESULT hr = GetSidFromId(*gaia_id, sid, sid_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->FindUserBySID(sid, username, username_length,
domain, domain_length);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
return;
}
LOGFN(INFO) << "No existing user found associated to gaia id:" << *gaia_id;
wcscpy_s(domain, domain_length, OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain().c_str());
username[0] = 0;
sid[0] = 0;
base::string16 os_username = email;
// If the email is a consumer domain, strip it.
if (consumer_domain_pos != base::string16::npos) {
os_username.resize(consumer_domain_pos);
} else {
std::string username_utf8 =
gaia::SanitizeEmail(base::UTF16ToUTF8(os_username));
size_t tld_length =
net::registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
gaia::ExtractDomainName(username_utf8),
net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
if (tld_length > 0) {
username_utf8.resize(username_utf8.length() - tld_length - 1);
os_username = base::UTF8ToUTF16(username_utf8);
}
}
if (os_username.size() > kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1)
os_username.resize(kWindowsUsernameBufferLength - 1);
for (auto& c : os_username) {
if (wcschr(L"@\\[]:|<>+=;?*", c) != nullptr || c < 32)
c = L'_';
}
wcscpy_s(username, username_length, os_username.c_str());
}
| 172,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPANGOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
cairo_font_options_t
*font_options;
cairo_surface_t
*surface;
char
*caption,
*property;
cairo_t
*cairo_image;
const char
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PangoAlignment
align;
PangoContext
*context;
PangoFontMap
*fontmap;
PangoGravity
gravity;
PangoLayout
*layout;
PangoRectangle
extent;
PixelPacket
fill_color;
RectangleInfo
page;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
stride;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"pango:",6) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option+6);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption"));
/*
Get context.
*/
fontmap=pango_cairo_font_map_new();
pango_cairo_font_map_set_resolution(PANGO_CAIRO_FONT_MAP(fontmap),
image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution);
font_options=cairo_font_options_create();
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:hinting");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"full") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_FULL);
}
context=pango_font_map_create_context(fontmap);
pango_cairo_context_set_font_options(context,font_options);
cairo_font_options_destroy(font_options);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:language");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_context_set_language(context,pango_language_from_string(option));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
pango_context_set_base_dir(context,draw_info->direction ==
RightToLeftDirection ? PANGO_DIRECTION_RTL : PANGO_DIRECTION_LTR);
switch (draw_info->gravity)
{
case NorthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_NORTH;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
case WestGravity:
case SouthWestGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_WEST;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
case EastGravity:
case SouthEastGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_EAST;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_SOUTH;
break;
}
default:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_AUTO;
break;
}
}
pango_context_set_base_gravity(context,gravity);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:gravity-hint");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"line") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_LINE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"natural") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_NATURAL);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"strong") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_STRONG);
}
/*
Configure layout.
*/
layout=pango_layout_new(context);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:auto-dir");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_auto_dir(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:ellipsize");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"end") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_END);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"middle") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_MIDDLE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"start") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_START);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:justify");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_justify(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:single-paragraph");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_single_paragraph_mode(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:wrap");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_CHAR);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word-char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD_CHAR);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:indent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_indent(layout,(int) ((StringToLong(option)*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)*PANGO_SCALE+45)/
90.0+0.5));
switch (draw_info->align)
{
case CenterAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER; break;
case RightAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT; break;
case LeftAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT; break;
default:
{
if (draw_info->gravity == CenterGravity)
{
align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER;
break;
}
align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT;
break;
}
}
if ((align != PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER) &&
(draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection))
align=(PangoAlignment) (PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT+PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT-align);
pango_layout_set_alignment(layout,align);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
{
PangoFontDescription
*description;
/*
Set font.
*/
description=pango_font_description_from_string(draw_info->font);
pango_font_description_set_size(description,(int) (PANGO_SCALE*
draw_info->pointsize+0.5));
pango_layout_set_font_description(layout,description);
pango_font_description_free(description);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:markup");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) == MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_text(layout,caption,-1);
else
{
GError
*error;
error=(GError *) NULL;
if (pango_parse_markup(caption,-1,0,NULL,NULL,NULL,&error) == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
error->message,"`%s'",image_info->filename);
pango_layout_set_markup(layout,caption,-1);
}
pango_layout_context_changed(layout);
page.x=0;
page.y=0;
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
if (image->columns == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->columns=(extent.x+extent.width+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.x;
}
else
{
image->columns-=2*page.x;
pango_layout_set_width(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->columns*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->rows=(extent.y+extent.height+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.y;
}
else
{
image->rows-=2*page.y;
pango_layout_set_height(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->rows*
(image->y_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->y_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
/*
Render markup.
*/
stride=(size_t) cairo_format_stride_for_width(CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,stride*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
surface=cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(pixels,CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,(int) stride);
cairo_image=cairo_create(surface);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_CLEAR);
cairo_paint(cairo_image);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_OVER);
cairo_translate(cairo_image,page.x,page.y);
pango_cairo_show_layout(cairo_image,layout);
cairo_destroy(cairo_image);
cairo_surface_destroy(surface);
g_object_unref(layout);
g_object_unref(fontmap);
/*
Convert surface to image.
*/
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.opacity=QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
/*
Disassociate alpha.
*/
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*fill_color.opacity;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
fill_color.blue*=gamma;
fill_color.green*=gamma;
fill_color.red*=gamma;
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,fill_color.opacity,q,(MagickRealType)
q->opacity,q);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadPANGOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
cairo_font_options_t
*font_options;
cairo_surface_t
*surface;
char
*caption,
*property;
cairo_t
*cairo_image;
const char
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PangoAlignment
align;
PangoContext
*context;
PangoFontMap
*fontmap;
PangoGravity
gravity;
PangoLayout
*layout;
PangoRectangle
extent;
PixelPacket
fill_color;
RectangleInfo
page;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
stride;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"pango:",6) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option+6);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,option);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption"));
/*
Get context.
*/
fontmap=pango_cairo_font_map_new();
pango_cairo_font_map_set_resolution(PANGO_CAIRO_FONT_MAP(fontmap),
image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution);
font_options=cairo_font_options_create();
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:hinting");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"full") != 0)
cairo_font_options_set_hint_style(font_options,CAIRO_HINT_STYLE_FULL);
}
context=pango_font_map_create_context(fontmap);
pango_cairo_context_set_font_options(context,font_options);
cairo_font_options_destroy(font_options);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:language");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_context_set_language(context,pango_language_from_string(option));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
pango_context_set_base_dir(context,draw_info->direction ==
RightToLeftDirection ? PANGO_DIRECTION_RTL : PANGO_DIRECTION_LTR);
switch (draw_info->gravity)
{
case NorthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_NORTH;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
case WestGravity:
case SouthWestGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_WEST;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
case EastGravity:
case SouthEastGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_EAST;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_SOUTH;
break;
}
default:
{
gravity=PANGO_GRAVITY_AUTO;
break;
}
}
pango_context_set_base_gravity(context,gravity);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:gravity-hint");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"line") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_LINE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"natural") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_NATURAL);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"strong") == 0)
pango_context_set_gravity_hint(context,PANGO_GRAVITY_HINT_STRONG);
}
/*
Configure layout.
*/
layout=pango_layout_new(context);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:auto-dir");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_auto_dir(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:ellipsize");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"end") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_END);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"middle") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_MIDDLE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"none") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_NONE);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"start") == 0)
pango_layout_set_ellipsize(layout,PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_START);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:justify");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_justify(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:single-paragraph");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_single_paragraph_mode(layout,1);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:wrap");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_CHAR);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"word-char") == 0)
pango_layout_set_wrap(layout,PANGO_WRAP_WORD_CHAR);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:indent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
pango_layout_set_indent(layout,(int) ((StringToLong(option)*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)*PANGO_SCALE+45)/
90.0+0.5));
switch (draw_info->align)
{
case CenterAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER; break;
case RightAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT; break;
case LeftAlign: align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT; break;
default:
{
if (draw_info->gravity == CenterGravity)
{
align=PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER;
break;
}
align=PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT;
break;
}
}
if ((align != PANGO_ALIGN_CENTER) &&
(draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection))
align=(PangoAlignment) (PANGO_ALIGN_LEFT+PANGO_ALIGN_RIGHT-align);
pango_layout_set_alignment(layout,align);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
{
PangoFontDescription
*description;
/*
Set font.
*/
description=pango_font_description_from_string(draw_info->font);
pango_font_description_set_size(description,(int) (PANGO_SCALE*
draw_info->pointsize+0.5));
pango_layout_set_font_description(layout,description);
pango_font_description_free(description);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pango:markup");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) && (IsMagickTrue(option) == MagickFalse))
pango_layout_set_text(layout,caption,-1);
else
{
GError
*error;
error=(GError *) NULL;
if (pango_parse_markup(caption,-1,0,NULL,NULL,NULL,&error) == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
error->message,"`%s'",image_info->filename);
pango_layout_set_markup(layout,caption,-1);
}
pango_layout_context_changed(layout);
page.x=0;
page.y=0;
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
if (image->columns == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->columns=(extent.x+extent.width+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.x;
}
else
{
image->columns-=2*page.x;
pango_layout_set_width(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->columns*
(image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->x_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
pango_layout_get_extents(layout,NULL,&extent);
image->rows=(extent.y+extent.height+PANGO_SCALE/2)/PANGO_SCALE+2*page.y;
}
else
{
image->rows-=2*page.y;
pango_layout_set_height(layout,(int) ((PANGO_SCALE*image->rows*
(image->y_resolution == 0.0 ? 90.0 : image->y_resolution)+45.0)/90.0+
0.5));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Render markup.
*/
stride=(size_t) cairo_format_stride_for_width(CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,(int)
image->columns);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,stride*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
surface=cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(pixels,CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows,(int) stride);
cairo_image=cairo_create(surface);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_CLEAR);
cairo_paint(cairo_image);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_OVER);
cairo_translate(cairo_image,page.x,page.y);
pango_cairo_show_layout(cairo_image,layout);
cairo_destroy(cairo_image);
cairo_surface_destroy(surface);
g_object_unref(layout);
g_object_unref(fontmap);
/*
Convert surface to image.
*/
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.opacity=QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
/*
Disassociate alpha.
*/
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*fill_color.opacity;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
fill_color.blue*=gamma;
fill_color.green*=gamma;
fill_color.red*=gamma;
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,fill_color.opacity,q,(MagickRealType)
q->opacity,q);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
| 171,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = timr->it_sigev_notify == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
| 169,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL png2pnm (FILE *png_file, FILE *pnm_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL raw, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte buf[8];
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
png_uint_32 width;
png_uint_32 height;
int bit_depth;
int channels;
int color_type;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
int ret;
int i;
long dep_16;
/* read and check signature in PNG file */
ret = fread (buf, 1, 8, png_file);
if (ret != 8)
return FALSE;
ret = png_sig_cmp (buf, 0, 8);
if (ret)
return FALSE;
/* create png and info structures */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
}
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* set up the input control for C streams */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
png_set_sig_bytes (png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
/* read the file information */
png_read_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get size and bit-depth of the PNG-image */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr,
&width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* set-up the transformations */
/* transform paletted images into full-color rgb */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* expand images to bit-depth 8 (only applicable for grayscale images) */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* transform transparency maps into full alpha-channel */
if (png_get_valid (png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_tRNS))
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
#ifdef NJET
/* downgrade 16-bit images to 8 bit */
if (bit_depth == 16)
png_set_strip_16 (png_ptr);
/* transform grayscale images into full-color */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
png_set_gray_to_rgb (png_ptr);
/* only if file has a file gamma, we do a correction */
if (png_get_gAMA (png_ptr, info_ptr, &file_gamma))
png_set_gamma (png_ptr, (double) 2.2, file_gamma);
#endif
/* all transformations have been registered; now update info_ptr data,
* get rowbytes and channels, and allocate image memory */
png_read_update_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get the new color-type and bit-depth (after expansion/stripping) */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* check for 16-bit files */
if (bit_depth == 16)
{
raw = FALSE;
#ifdef __TURBOC__
pnm_file->flags &= ~((unsigned) _F_BIN);
#endif
}
/* calculate new number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should never happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
/* check if alpha is expected to be present in file */
if (alpha && !alpha_present)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: PNG-file doesn't contain alpha channel\n");
exit (1);
}
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = png_get_rowbytes (png_ptr, info_ptr);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL) {
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
png_read_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* read rest of file, and get additional chunks in info_ptr - REQUIRED */
png_read_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the read, and free any memory allocated - REQUIRED */
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
/* write header of PNM file */
if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
else if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P6" : "P3");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if ((alpha) &&
((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)))
{
fprintf (alpha_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (alpha_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write data to PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , pnm_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + ((long) *pix_ptr++));
}
else
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
if (alpha_present)
{
if (!alpha)
{
pix_ptr++; /* alpha */
if (bit_depth == 16)
pix_ptr++;
}
else /* output alpha-channel as pgm file */
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , alpha_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
else
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
} /* if alpha_present */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 == 3)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for col */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 != 0)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for row */
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of source */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | BOOL png2pnm (FILE *png_file, FILE *pnm_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL raw, BOOL alpha)
BOOL png2pnm (FILE *png_file, FILE *pnm_file, FILE *alpha_file,
volatile BOOL raw, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte buf[8];
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
png_uint_32 width;
png_uint_32 height;
int bit_depth;
int channels;
int color_type;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
int ret;
int i;
long dep_16;
/* read and check signature in PNG file */
ret = fread (buf, 1, 8, png_file);
if (ret != 8)
return FALSE;
ret = png_sig_cmp (buf, 0, 8);
if (ret)
return FALSE;
/* create png and info structures */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct (png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return FALSE; /* out of memory */
}
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* set up the input control for C streams */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
png_set_sig_bytes (png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
/* read the file information */
png_read_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get size and bit-depth of the PNG-image */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr,
&width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* set-up the transformations */
/* transform paletted images into full-color rgb */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* expand images to bit-depth 8 (only applicable for grayscale images) */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && bit_depth < 8)
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
/* transform transparency maps into full alpha-channel */
if (png_get_valid (png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_INFO_tRNS))
png_set_expand (png_ptr);
#ifdef NJET
/* downgrade 16-bit images to 8-bit */
if (bit_depth == 16)
png_set_strip_16 (png_ptr);
/* transform grayscale images into full-color */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
png_set_gray_to_rgb (png_ptr);
/* only if file has a file gamma, we do a correction */
if (png_get_gAMA (png_ptr, info_ptr, &file_gamma))
png_set_gamma (png_ptr, (double) 2.2, file_gamma);
#endif
/* all transformations have been registered; now update info_ptr data,
* get rowbytes and channels, and allocate image memory */
png_read_update_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* get the new color-type and bit-depth (after expansion/stripping) */
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* check for 16-bit files */
if (bit_depth == 16)
{
raw = FALSE;
#ifdef __TURBOC__
pnm_file->flags &= ~((unsigned) _F_BIN);
#endif
}
/* calculate new number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should never happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
/* check if alpha is expected to be present in file */
if (alpha && !alpha_present)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: PNG-file doesn't contain alpha channel\n");
exit (1);
}
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = png_get_rowbytes (png_ptr, info_ptr);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *)
malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL) {
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return FALSE;
}
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **)
malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free (png_pixels);
png_pixels = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < ((int) height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* now we can go ahead and just read the whole image */
png_read_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* read rest of file, and get additional chunks in info_ptr - REQUIRED */
png_read_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the read, and free any memory allocated - REQUIRED */
png_destroy_read_struct (&png_ptr, &info_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
/* write header of PNM file */
if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
else if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
{
fprintf (pnm_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P6" : "P3");
fprintf (pnm_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if ((alpha) &&
((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)))
{
fprintf (alpha_file, "%s\n", (raw) ? "P5" : "P2");
fprintf (alpha_file, "%d %d\n", (int) width, (int) height);
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld\n", ((1L << (int) bit_depth) - 1L));
}
/* write data to PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < (int) height; row++)
{
for (col = 0; col < (int) width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , pnm_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + ((long) *pix_ptr++));
}
else
fprintf (pnm_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
if (alpha_present)
{
if (!alpha)
{
pix_ptr++; /* alpha */
if (bit_depth == 16)
pix_ptr++;
}
else /* output alpha-channel as pgm file */
{
if (raw)
fputc ((int) *pix_ptr++ , alpha_file);
else
if (bit_depth == 16){
dep_16 = (long) *pix_ptr++;
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (dep_16 << 8) + (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
else
fprintf (alpha_file, "%ld ", (long) *pix_ptr++);
}
} /* if alpha_present */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 == 3)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for col */
if (!raw)
if (col % 4 != 0)
fprintf (pnm_file, "\n");
} /* end for row */
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of source */
| 173,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
bool found_cred=false;
CredentialWrapper * cred = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user = NULL;
void * data = NULL;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "sending cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred)) {
if (cred->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
socket->encode();
if (found_cred) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Found cred %s\n", cred->GetStorageName());
int data_size;
int rc = LoadData (cred->GetStorageName(), data, data_size);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential::LoadData returned %d\n", rc);
if (rc == 0) {
goto EXIT;
}
socket->code (data_size);
socket->code_bytes (data, data_size);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Credential name %s for owner %s returned to user %s\n",
name, owner, user);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Cannot find cred %s\n", name);
int rc = CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code (rc);
}
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if ( name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
if ( owner != NULL) {
free (owner);
}
if ( data != NULL) {
free (data);
}
return rtnVal;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | get_cred_handler(Service * /*service*/, int /*i*/, Stream *stream) {
char * name = NULL;
int rtnVal = FALSE;
bool found_cred=false;
CredentialWrapper * cred = NULL;
char * owner = NULL;
const char * user = NULL;
void * data = NULL;
ReliSock * socket = (ReliSock*)stream;
if (!socket->triedAuthentication()) {
CondorError errstack;
if( ! SecMan::authenticate_sock(socket, READ, &errstack) ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to authenticate, qutting\n");
goto EXIT;
}
}
socket->decode();
if (!socket->code(name)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error receiving credential name\n");
goto EXIT;
}
user = socket->getFullyQualifiedUser();
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Authenticated as %s\n", user);
if (strchr (name, ':')) {
owner = strdup (name);
char * pColon = strchr (owner, ':');
*pColon = '\0';
sprintf (name, "%s", (char*)(pColon+sizeof(char)));
if (strcmp (owner, user) != 0) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Requesting another user's (%s) credential %s\n", owner, name);
if (!isSuperUser (user)) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "User %s is NOT super user, request DENIED\n", user);
goto EXIT;
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "User %s is super user, request GRANTED\n", user);
}
}
} else {
owner = strdup (user);
}
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "sending cred %s for user %s\n", name, owner);
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(cred)) {
if (cred->cred->GetType() == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
if ((strcmp(cred->cred->GetName(), name) == 0) &&
(strcmp(cred->cred->GetOwner(), owner) == 0)) {
found_cred=true;
break; // found it
}
}
}
socket->encode();
if (found_cred) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Found cred %s\n", cred->GetStorageName());
int data_size;
int rc = LoadData (cred->GetStorageName(), data, data_size);
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential::LoadData returned %d\n", rc);
if (rc == 0) {
goto EXIT;
}
socket->code (data_size);
socket->code_bytes (data, data_size);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Credential name %s for owner %s returned to user %s\n",
name, owner, user);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Cannot find cred %s\n", name);
int rc = CREDD_CREDENTIAL_NOT_FOUND;
socket->code (rc);
}
rtnVal = TRUE;
EXIT:
if ( name != NULL) {
free (name);
}
if ( owner != NULL) {
free (owner);
}
if ( data != NULL) {
free (data);
}
return rtnVal;
}
| 165,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
sas_destruct_devices(port);
sas_destruct_ports(port);
sas_probe_devices(port);
}
| 169,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_split)
{
char *arg_pattern;
int arg_pattern_len;
php_mb_regex_t *re;
OnigRegion *regs = NULL;
char *string;
OnigUChar *pos, *chunk_pos;
int string_len;
int n, err;
long count = -1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &string, &string_len, &count) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (count > 0) {
count--;
}
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((re = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, MBREX(regex_default_options), MBREX(current_mbctype), MBREX(regex_default_syntax) TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string;
err = 0;
regs = onig_region_new();
/* churn through str, generating array entries as we go */
while (count != 0 && (pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < string_len) {
int beg, end;
err = onig_search(re, (OnigUChar *)string, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), pos, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), regs, 0);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
beg = regs->beg[0], end = regs->end[0];
/* add it to the array */
if ((pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < end) {
if (beg < string_len && beg >= (chunk_pos - (OnigUChar *)string)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, ((OnigUChar *)(string + beg) - chunk_pos), 1);
--count;
} else {
err = -2;
break;
}
/* point at our new starting point */
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string + end;
} else {
pos++;
}
onig_region_free(regs, 0);
}
onig_region_free(regs, 1);
/* see if we encountered an error */
if (err <= -2) {
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex search failure in mbsplit(): %s", err_str);
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* otherwise we just have one last element to add to the array */
n = ((OnigUChar *)(string + string_len) - chunk_pos);
if (n > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, n, 1);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "", 0, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | PHP_FUNCTION(mb_split)
{
char *arg_pattern;
int arg_pattern_len;
php_mb_regex_t *re;
OnigRegion *regs = NULL;
char *string;
OnigUChar *pos, *chunk_pos;
int string_len;
int n, err;
long count = -1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &string, &string_len, &count) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (count > 0) {
count--;
}
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((re = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, MBREX(regex_default_options), MBREX(current_mbctype), MBREX(regex_default_syntax) TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string;
err = 0;
regs = onig_region_new();
/* churn through str, generating array entries as we go */
while (count != 0 && (pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < string_len) {
int beg, end;
err = onig_search(re, (OnigUChar *)string, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), pos, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), regs, 0);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
beg = regs->beg[0], end = regs->end[0];
/* add it to the array */
if ((pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < end) {
if (beg < string_len && beg >= (chunk_pos - (OnigUChar *)string)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, ((OnigUChar *)(string + beg) - chunk_pos), 1);
--count;
} else {
err = -2;
break;
}
/* point at our new starting point */
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string + end;
} else {
pos++;
}
onig_region_free(regs, 0);
}
onig_region_free(regs, 1);
/* see if we encountered an error */
if (err <= -2) {
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex search failure in mbsplit(): %s", err_str);
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* otherwise we just have one last element to add to the array */
n = ((OnigUChar *)(string + string_len) - chunk_pos);
if (n > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, n, 1);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "", 0, 1);
}
}
| 167,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
sanitized_objects->erase(ui::Clipboard::CBF_SMBITMAP);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
SanitizeObjectMap(sanitized_objects.get(), kFilterBitmap);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
| 171,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk) {
if (opt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk) {
if (opt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
}
| 167,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=26848
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,855 |
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