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stringlengths 90
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to WriteBlob reported in #490.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
if (length != 0)
{
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
}
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
| 168,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
// rangeLength and rangeOffset must be a subset of the allocated data in the buffer.
// corner case: we permit rangeOffset == end-of-buffer with rangeLength == 0.
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
| 174,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(const base::string16& group_title) {
constexpr gfx::Insets kPlaceholderInsets = gfx::Insets(4, 27);
SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kPlaceholderInsets));
views::FlexLayout* layout =
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::FlexLayout>());
layout->SetOrientation(views::LayoutOrientation::kHorizontal)
.SetCollapseMargins(true)
.SetMainAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kStart)
.SetCrossAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kCenter);
auto title = std::make_unique<views::Label>(group_title);
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_TO_HEAD);
title->SetElideBehavior(gfx::FADE_TAIL);
auto* title_ptr = AddChildView(std::move(title));
layout->SetFlexForView(title_ptr,
views::FlexSpecification::ForSizeRule(
views::MinimumFlexSizeRule::kScaleToZero,
views::MaximumFlexSizeRule::kUnbounded));
auto group_menu_button = views::CreateVectorImageButton(/*listener*/ nullptr);
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(group_menu_button.get(), kBrowserToolsIcon);
AddChildView(std::move(group_menu_button));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(const base::string16& group_title) {
TabGroupHeader::TabGroupHeader(TabController* controller, int group)
: controller_(controller), group_(group) {
DCHECK(controller);
constexpr gfx::Insets kPlaceholderInsets = gfx::Insets(4, 27);
SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kPlaceholderInsets));
views::FlexLayout* layout =
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::FlexLayout>());
layout->SetOrientation(views::LayoutOrientation::kHorizontal)
.SetCollapseMargins(true)
.SetMainAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kStart)
.SetCrossAxisAlignment(views::LayoutAlignment::kCenter);
auto title = std::make_unique<views::Label>(GetGroupData()->title());
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_TO_HEAD);
title->SetElideBehavior(gfx::FADE_TAIL);
title_label_ = AddChildView(std::move(title));
layout->SetFlexForView(title_label_,
views::FlexSpecification::ForSizeRule(
views::MinimumFlexSizeRule::kScaleToZero,
views::MaximumFlexSizeRule::kUnbounded));
auto group_menu_button = views::CreateVectorImageButton(/*listener*/ nullptr);
views::SetImageFromVectorIcon(group_menu_button.get(), kBrowserToolsIcon);
AddChildView(std::move(group_menu_button));
}
| 172,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndcnt = 0;
int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
(tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);
if (newly_acked_sacked <= 0 || WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd))
return;
tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
if (delta < 0) {
u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
!(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
} else {
sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
}
sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
}
| 167,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: write_message( RenderState state )
{
ADisplay adisplay = (ADisplay)state->display.disp;
if ( state->message == NULL )
{
FontFace face = &state->faces[state->face_index];
int idx, total;
idx = face->index;
total = 1;
while ( total + state->face_index < state->num_faces &&
face[total].filepath == face[0].filepath )
total++;
total += idx;
state->message = state->message0;
if ( total > 1 )
sprintf( state->message0, "%s %d/%d @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename, idx + 1, total,
state->char_size );
else
sprintf( state->message0, "%s @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename,
state->char_size );
}
grWriteCellString( adisplay->bitmap, 0, DIM_Y - 10, state->message,
adisplay->fore_color );
state->message = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | write_message( RenderState state )
{
ADisplay adisplay = (ADisplay)state->display.disp;
if ( state->message == NULL )
{
FontFace face = &state->faces[state->face_index];
int idx, total;
idx = face->index;
total = 1;
while ( total + state->face_index < state->num_faces &&
face[total].filepath == face[0].filepath )
total++;
total += idx;
state->message = state->message0;
if ( total > 1 )
sprintf( state->message0, "%.100s %d/%d @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename, idx + 1, total,
state->char_size );
else
sprintf( state->message0, "%.100s @ %5.1fpt",
state->filename,
state->char_size );
}
grWriteCellString( adisplay->bitmap, 0, DIM_Y - 10, state->message,
adisplay->fore_color );
state->message = NULL;
}
| 164,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_process_extgstate(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_csi *csi, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_obj *obj;
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LW);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_w)
proc->op_w(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LC);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_J)
proc->op_J(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LJ);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_j)
proc->op_j(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ML);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_M)
proc->op_M(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_D);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_d)
{
pdf_obj *dash_array = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *dash_phase = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
proc->op_d(ctx, proc, dash_array, pdf_to_real(ctx, dash_phase));
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_RI);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_ri)
proc->op_ri(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_FL);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_i)
proc->op_i(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Font);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_Tf)
{
pdf_obj *font_ref = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *font_size = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
pdf_font_desc *font = load_font_or_hail_mary(ctx, csi->doc, csi->rdb, font_ref, 0, csi->cookie);
fz_try(ctx)
proc->op_Tf(ctx, proc, "ExtGState", font, pdf_to_real(ctx, font_size));
fz_always(ctx)
pdf_drop_font(ctx, font);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
/* overprint and color management */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OP);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OP)
proc->op_gs_OP(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_op);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_op)
proc->op_gs_op(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OPM);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OPM)
proc->op_gs_OPM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_int(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_UseBlackPtComp);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp)
proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp(ctx, proc, obj);
/* transfer functions */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR2);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Identity) && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Default))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
if (!obj) /* TR is ignored in the presence of TR2 */
{
pdf_obj *tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, tr))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
}
/* transparency state */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_CA);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_CA)
proc->op_gs_CA(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ca);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_ca)
proc->op_gs_ca(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_BM);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj))
obj = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_BM)
proc->op_gs_BM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_SMask);
if (proc->op_gs_SMask)
{
if (pdf_is_dict(ctx, obj))
{
pdf_xobject *xobj;
pdf_obj *group, *s, *bc, *tr;
float softmask_bc[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
int colorspace_n = 1;
int k, luminosity;
fz_var(xobj);
group = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_G);
if (!group)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_SYNTAX, "cannot load softmask xobject (%d 0 R)", pdf_to_num(ctx, obj));
xobj = pdf_load_xobject(ctx, csi->doc, group);
fz_try(ctx)
{
colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, xobj);
if (colorspace)
colorspace_n = fz_colorspace_n(ctx, colorspace);
/* Default background color is black. */
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = 0;
/* Which in CMYK means not all zeros! This should really be
* a test for subtractive color spaces, but this will have
* to do for now. */
if (fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, colorspace))
softmask_bc[3] = 1.0f;
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, colorspace);
bc = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_BC);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, bc))
{
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = pdf_to_real(ctx, pdf_array_get(ctx, bc, k));
}
s = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_S);
if (pdf_name_eq(ctx, s, PDF_NAME_Luminosity))
luminosity = 1;
else
luminosity = 0;
tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (tr && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, xobj, csi->rdb, softmask_bc, luminosity);
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_drop_xobject(ctx, xobj);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
else if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_None))
{
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | pdf_process_extgstate(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_csi *csi, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_obj *obj;
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LW);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_w)
proc->op_w(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LC);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_J)
proc->op_J(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LJ);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_j)
proc->op_j(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ML);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_M)
proc->op_M(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_D);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_d)
{
pdf_obj *dash_array = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *dash_phase = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
proc->op_d(ctx, proc, dash_array, pdf_to_real(ctx, dash_phase));
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_RI);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_ri)
proc->op_ri(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_FL);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_i)
proc->op_i(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Font);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_Tf)
{
pdf_obj *font_ref = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *font_size = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
pdf_font_desc *font = load_font_or_hail_mary(ctx, csi->doc, csi->rdb, font_ref, 0, csi->cookie);
fz_try(ctx)
proc->op_Tf(ctx, proc, "ExtGState", font, pdf_to_real(ctx, font_size));
fz_always(ctx)
pdf_drop_font(ctx, font);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
/* overprint and color management */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OP);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OP)
proc->op_gs_OP(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_op);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_op)
proc->op_gs_op(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OPM);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OPM)
proc->op_gs_OPM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_int(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_UseBlackPtComp);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp)
proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp(ctx, proc, obj);
/* transfer functions */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR2);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Identity) && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Default))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
if (!obj) /* TR is ignored in the presence of TR2 */
{
pdf_obj *tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, tr))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
}
/* transparency state */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_CA);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_CA)
proc->op_gs_CA(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ca);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_ca)
proc->op_gs_ca(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_BM);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj))
obj = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_BM)
proc->op_gs_BM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_SMask);
if (proc->op_gs_SMask)
{
if (pdf_is_dict(ctx, obj))
{
pdf_xobject *xobj;
pdf_obj *group, *s, *bc, *tr;
float softmask_bc[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
int colorspace_n = 1;
int k, luminosity;
fz_var(xobj);
group = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_G);
xobj = pdf_load_xobject(ctx, csi->doc, group);
fz_try(ctx)
{
colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, xobj);
if (colorspace)
colorspace_n = fz_colorspace_n(ctx, colorspace);
/* Default background color is black. */
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = 0;
/* Which in CMYK means not all zeros! This should really be
* a test for subtractive color spaces, but this will have
* to do for now. */
if (fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, colorspace))
softmask_bc[3] = 1.0f;
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, colorspace);
bc = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_BC);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, bc))
{
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = pdf_to_real(ctx, pdf_array_get(ctx, bc, k));
}
s = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_S);
if (pdf_name_eq(ctx, s, PDF_NAME_Luminosity))
luminosity = 1;
else
luminosity = 0;
tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (tr && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, xobj, csi->rdb, softmask_bc, luminosity);
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_drop_xobject(ctx, xobj);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
else if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_None))
{
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
}
}
| 164,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int vnc_hextile_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x,
int y, int w, int h)
{
int i, j;
int has_fg, has_bg;
uint8_t *last_fg, *last_bg;
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
last_fg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(vd->server->pf.bytes_per_pixel);
last_bg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(vd->server->pf.bytes_per_pixel);
has_fg = has_bg = 0;
for (j = y; j < (y + h); j += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
vs->hextile.send_tile(vs, i, j,
MIN(16, x + w - i), MIN(16, y + h - j),
last_bg, last_fg, &has_bg, &has_fg);
}
}
g_free(last_fg);
g_free(last_bg);
return 1;
}
void vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(VncState *vs, int generic)
{
if (!generic) {
switch (vs->ds->surface->pf.bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_32;
break;
}
} else {
switch (vs->ds->surface->pf.bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_32;
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int vnc_hextile_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x,
int y, int w, int h)
{
int i, j;
int has_fg, has_bg;
uint8_t *last_fg, *last_bg;
last_fg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES);
last_bg = (uint8_t *) g_malloc(VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES);
has_fg = has_bg = 0;
for (j = y; j < (y + h); j += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
for (i = x; i < (x + w); i += 16) {
vs->hextile.send_tile(vs, i, j,
MIN(16, x + w - i), MIN(16, y + h - j),
last_bg, last_fg, &has_bg, &has_fg);
}
}
g_free(last_fg);
g_free(last_bg);
return 1;
}
void vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(VncState *vs, int generic)
{
if (!generic) {
switch (VNC_SERVER_FB_BITS) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_32;
break;
}
} else {
switch (VNC_SERVER_FB_BITS) {
case 8:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_8;
break;
case 16:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_16;
break;
case 32:
vs->hextile.send_tile = send_hextile_tile_generic_32;
break;
}
}
}
}
| 165,459 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vp9_worker_end(&worker_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_get_worker_interface()->end(&worker_);
}
| 174,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int cg_write(const char *path, const char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *localbuf = NULL;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
struct file_info *f = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
bool r;
if (f->type != LXC_TYPE_CGFILE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: directory cache info used in cg_write\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (offset)
return 0;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
localbuf = alloca(size+1);
localbuf[size] = '\0';
memcpy(localbuf, buf, size);
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file)) == NULL) {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, O_WRONLY)) {
size = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(f->file, "tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/tasks") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "/cgroup.procs") == 0 ||
strcmp(f->file, "cgroup.procs") == 0)
r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, fc->uid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
else
r = cgfs_set_value(f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);
if (!r)
size = -EINVAL;
out:
free_key(k);
return size;
}
| 166,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
if (!current_surface_ && host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active() &&
!released_front_lock_.get()) {
released_front_lock_ = GetCompositor()->GetCompositorLock();
}
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(ui::GetHiddenWindow(), ShowWindowsCallback, lparam);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
if (!current_surface_ && host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active() &&
!released_front_lock_.get()) {
released_front_lock_ = GetCompositor()->GetCompositorLock();
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(ui::GetHiddenWindow(), ShowWindowsCallback, lparam);
#endif
}
| 171,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct mapped_device *dm_get_from_kobject(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
md = container_of(kobj, struct mapped_device, kobj_holder.kobj);
if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) ||
dm_deleting_md(md))
return NULL;
dm_get(md);
return md;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | struct mapped_device *dm_get_from_kobject(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
md = container_of(kobj, struct mapped_device, kobj_holder.kobj);
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) || dm_deleting_md(md)) {
md = NULL;
goto out;
}
dm_get(md);
out:
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
return md;
}
| 169,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart(ndo, "MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
| 167,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::UntrustedSigninConfirmed(
StartSyncMode response) {
if (response == UNDO_SYNC) {
CancelSigninAndDelete();
} else {
if (response == CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST)
start_mode_ = response;
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
signin->CompletePendingSignin();
}
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::UntrustedSigninConfirmed(
StartSyncMode response) {
if (response == UNDO_SYNC) {
CancelSigninAndDelete();
// If this was not an interstitial signin, (i.e. it was a SAML signin)
// then the browser page is now blank and should redirect to the NTP.
if (source_ != SyncPromoUI::SOURCE_UNKNOWN) {
EnsureBrowser();
chrome::NavigateParams params(browser_, GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL),
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL);
params.disposition = CURRENT_TAB;
params.window_action = chrome::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
chrome::Navigate(¶ms);
}
} else {
if (response == CONFIGURE_SYNC_FIRST)
start_mode_ = response;
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
signin->CompletePendingSignin();
}
}
| 171,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = false;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_del_rcu(&ctx->clist);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
static void __timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = false;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_del_rcu(&ctx->clist);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
}
| 168,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
switch (msr->index) {
case MSR_FS_BASE:
case MSR_GS_BASE:
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
case MSR_CSTAR:
case MSR_LSTAR:
if (is_noncanonical_address(msr->data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
/*
* IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
* non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on
* AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits, because it does
* not implement 64-bit SYSENTER).
*
* 64-bit code should hence be able to write a non-canonical
* value on AMD. Making the address canonical ensures that
* vmentry does not fail on Intel after writing a non-canonical
* value, and that something deterministic happens if the guest
* invokes 64-bit SYSENTER.
*/
msr->data = get_canonical(msr->data);
}
return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr);
}
| 166,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext(
Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(geolocation_infobar_queue_controller_(
new GeolocationInfoBarQueueController(
base::Bind(
&ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::NotifyPermissionSet,
this),
profile))) {
}
Commit Message: Don't retain reference to ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext
ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext owns
GeolocationInfoBarQueueController, so make sure that the callback
passed to GeolocationInfoBarQueueController doesn't increase the
reference count on ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext (which
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11072012 accidentally does).
TBR=bulach
BUG=152921
TEST=unittest:chrome_geolocation_permission_context on memory.fyi bot
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@160881 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext(
Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(geolocation_infobar_queue_controller_(
new GeolocationInfoBarQueueController(
base::Bind(
&ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::NotifyPermissionSet,
base::Unretained(this)),
profile))) {
}
| 171,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mojom::AppPtr AppControllerImpl::CreateAppPtr(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
auto app = chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::App::New();
app->app_id = update.AppId();
app->type = update.AppType();
app->display_name = update.Name();
app->readiness = update.Readiness();
if (app->type == apps::mojom::AppType::kArc) {
app->android_package_name = MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(app->app_id);
}
return app;
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | mojom::AppPtr AppControllerImpl::CreateAppPtr(const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
mojom::AppPtr AppControllerService::CreateAppPtr(
const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
auto app = chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::App::New();
app->app_id = update.AppId();
app->type = update.AppType();
app->display_name = update.Name();
app->readiness = update.Readiness();
if (app->type == apps::mojom::AppType::kArc) {
app->android_package_name = MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(app->app_id);
}
return app;
}
| 172,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PropertyTreeManager::EmitClipMaskLayer() {
int clip_id = EnsureCompositorClipNode(current_clip_);
CompositorElementId mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id;
cc::Layer* mask_layer = client_.CreateOrReuseSynthesizedClipLayer(
current_clip_, mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id);
cc::EffectNode& mask_isolation = *GetEffectTree().Node(current_effect_id_);
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<uint64_t>(cc::EffectNode::INVALID_STABLE_ID),
mask_isolation.stable_id);
mask_isolation.stable_id = mask_isolation_id.ToInternalValue();
cc::EffectNode& mask_effect = *GetEffectTree().Node(
GetEffectTree().Insert(cc::EffectNode(), current_effect_id_));
mask_effect.stable_id = mask_effect_id.ToInternalValue();
mask_effect.clip_id = clip_id;
mask_effect.has_render_surface = true;
mask_effect.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
const TransformPaintPropertyNode* clip_space =
current_clip_->LocalTransformSpace();
root_layer_->AddChild(mask_layer);
mask_layer->set_property_tree_sequence_number(sequence_number_);
mask_layer->SetTransformTreeIndex(EnsureCompositorTransformNode(clip_space));
int scroll_id =
EnsureCompositorScrollNode(&clip_space->NearestScrollTranslationNode());
mask_layer->SetScrollTreeIndex(scroll_id);
mask_layer->SetClipTreeIndex(clip_id);
mask_layer->SetEffectTreeIndex(mask_effect.id);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | void PropertyTreeManager::EmitClipMaskLayer() {
int clip_id = EnsureCompositorClipNode(current_clip_);
CompositorElementId mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id;
cc::Layer* mask_layer = client_.CreateOrReuseSynthesizedClipLayer(
current_clip_, mask_isolation_id, mask_effect_id);
cc::EffectNode& mask_isolation = *GetEffectTree().Node(current_effect_id_);
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<uint64_t>(cc::EffectNode::INVALID_STABLE_ID),
mask_isolation.stable_id);
mask_isolation.stable_id = mask_isolation_id.ToInternalValue();
cc::EffectNode& mask_effect = *GetEffectTree().Node(
GetEffectTree().Insert(cc::EffectNode(), current_effect_id_));
mask_effect.stable_id = mask_effect_id.ToInternalValue();
mask_effect.clip_id = clip_id;
mask_effect.has_render_surface = true;
mask_effect.blend_mode = SkBlendMode::kDstIn;
const auto* clip_space = current_clip_->LocalTransformSpace();
root_layer_->AddChild(mask_layer);
mask_layer->set_property_tree_sequence_number(sequence_number_);
mask_layer->SetTransformTreeIndex(EnsureCompositorTransformNode(clip_space));
int scroll_id =
EnsureCompositorScrollNode(&clip_space->NearestScrollTranslationNode());
mask_layer->SetScrollTreeIndex(scroll_id);
mask_layer->SetClipTreeIndex(clip_id);
mask_layer->SetEffectTreeIndex(mask_effect.id);
}
| 171,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: t42_parse_charstrings( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table code_table = &loader->charstrings;
PS_Table name_table = &loader->glyph_names;
PS_Table swap_table = &loader->swap_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_UInt n;
FT_UInt notdef_index = 0;
FT_Byte notdef_found = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( ft_isdigit( *parser->root.cursor ) )
{
loader->num_glyphs = (FT_UInt)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '<' )
{
/* We have `<< ... >>'. Count the number of `/' in the dictionary */
/* to get its size. */
FT_UInt count = 0;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
if ( *parser->root.cursor == '/' )
count++;
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '>' )
{
loader->num_glyphs = count;
parser->root.cursor = cur; /* rewind */
break;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: invalid token\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* initialize tables */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( code_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( name_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Initialize table for swapping index notdef_index and */
/* index 0 names and codes (if necessary). */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( swap_table, 4, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
n = 0;
for (;;)
{
/* The format is simple: */
/* `/glyphname' + index [+ def] */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* We stop when we find an `end' keyword or '>' */
if ( *cur == 'e' &&
cur + 3 < limit &&
cur[1] == 'n' &&
cur[2] == 'd' &&
t42_is_space( cur[3] ) )
break;
if ( *cur == '>' )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
if ( *cur == '/' )
{
FT_PtrDist len;
if ( cur + 1 >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
cur++; /* skip `/' */
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* add a trailing zero to the name table */
name_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
/* record index of /.notdef */
if ( *cur == '.' &&
ft_strcmp( ".notdef",
(const char*)(name_table->elements[n]) ) == 0 )
{
notdef_index = n;
notdef_found = 1;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
(void)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
code_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
n++;
if ( n >= loader->num_glyphs )
break;
}
}
loader->num_glyphs = n;
if ( !notdef_found )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: no /.notdef glyph\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* if /.notdef does not occupy index 0, do our magic. */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)name_table->elements[0] ) )
{
/* Swap glyph in index 0 with /.notdef glyph. First, add index 0 */
/* name and code entries to swap_table. Then place notdef_index */
/* name and code entries into swap_table. Then swap name and code */
/* entries at indices notdef_index and 0 using values stored in */
/* swap_table. */
/* Index 0 name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 0,
name_table->elements[0],
name_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index 0 code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 1,
code_table->elements[0],
code_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 2,
name_table->elements[notdef_index],
name_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 3,
code_table->elements[notdef_index],
code_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[0],
swap_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[1],
swap_table->lengths [1] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[2],
swap_table->lengths [2] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[3],
swap_table->lengths [3] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | t42_parse_charstrings( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table code_table = &loader->charstrings;
PS_Table name_table = &loader->glyph_names;
PS_Table swap_table = &loader->swap_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_UInt n;
FT_UInt notdef_index = 0;
FT_Byte notdef_found = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( ft_isdigit( *parser->root.cursor ) )
{
loader->num_glyphs = (FT_UInt)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '<' )
{
/* We have `<< ... >>'. Count the number of `/' in the dictionary */
/* to get its size. */
FT_UInt count = 0;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
if ( *parser->root.cursor == '/' )
count++;
else if ( *parser->root.cursor == '>' )
{
loader->num_glyphs = count;
parser->root.cursor = cur; /* rewind */
break;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: invalid token\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* initialize tables */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( code_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( name_table,
loader->num_glyphs,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Initialize table for swapping index notdef_index and */
/* index 0 names and codes (if necessary). */
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( swap_table, 4, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
n = 0;
for (;;)
{
/* The format is simple: */
/* `/glyphname' + index [+ def] */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* We stop when we find an `end' keyword or '>' */
if ( *cur == 'e' &&
cur + 3 < limit &&
cur[1] == 'n' &&
cur[2] == 'd' &&
t42_is_space( cur[3] ) )
break;
if ( *cur == '>' )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
if ( *cur == '/' )
{
FT_PtrDist len;
if ( cur + 2 >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
cur++; /* skip `/' */
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* add a trailing zero to the name table */
name_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
/* record index of /.notdef */
if ( *cur == '.' &&
ft_strcmp( ".notdef",
(const char*)(name_table->elements[n]) ) == 0 )
{
notdef_index = n;
notdef_found = 1;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
(void)T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, n, cur, len + 1 );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
code_table->elements[n][len] = '\0';
n++;
if ( n >= loader->num_glyphs )
break;
}
}
loader->num_glyphs = n;
if ( !notdef_found )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: no /.notdef glyph\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* if /.notdef does not occupy index 0, do our magic. */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)name_table->elements[0] ) )
{
/* Swap glyph in index 0 with /.notdef glyph. First, add index 0 */
/* name and code entries to swap_table. Then place notdef_index */
/* name and code entries into swap_table. Then swap name and code */
/* entries at indices notdef_index and 0 using values stored in */
/* swap_table. */
/* Index 0 name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 0,
name_table->elements[0],
name_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index 0 code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 1,
code_table->elements[0],
code_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index name */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 2,
name_table->elements[notdef_index],
name_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* Index notdef_index code */
error = T1_Add_Table( swap_table, 3,
code_table->elements[notdef_index],
code_table->lengths [notdef_index] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[0],
swap_table->lengths [0] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, notdef_index,
swap_table->elements[1],
swap_table->lengths [1] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( name_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[2],
swap_table->lengths [2] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
error = T1_Add_Table( code_table, 0,
swap_table->elements[3],
swap_table->lengths [3] );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
| 164,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/348
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,next_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
| 168,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (npalette > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (colour_type == 3) /* must have a palette */
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
else if (npalette != 0)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "+tRNS");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
| 173,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DataView::getInt8Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DataView.getInt8");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
DataView* imp = V8DataView::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(unsigned, byteOffset, toUInt32(args[0]));
int8_t result = imp->getInt8(byteOffset, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8::Integer::New(result);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DataView::getInt8Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DataView.getInt8");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
DataView* imp = V8DataView::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(unsigned, byteOffset, toUInt32(args[0]));
int8_t result = imp->getInt8(byteOffset, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8::Integer::New(result);
}
| 171,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
switch (bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
| 164,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing_size(void *user_data, int *size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
*size = 0;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (ioctl(slot->fd, FIONREAD, size) == 0) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to determine bytes remaining to be read on fd %d: %s", __func__, slot->fd, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing_size(void *user_data, int *size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
*size = 0;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(slot->fd, FIONREAD, size)) == 0) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to determine bytes remaining to be read on fd %d: %s", __func__, slot->fd, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
| 173,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline RefPtr<DocumentFragment> createFragmentFromSource(const String& sourceString, const String& sourceMIMEType, Document* outputDoc)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = outputDoc->createDocumentFragment();
if (sourceMIMEType == "text/html") {
RefPtr<HTMLBodyElement> fakeBody = HTMLBodyElement::create(outputDoc);
fragment->parseHTML(sourceString, fakeBody.get());
} else if (sourceMIMEType == "text/plain")
fragment->parserAddChild(Text::create(outputDoc, sourceString));
else {
bool successfulParse = fragment->parseXML(sourceString, 0);
if (!successfulParse)
return 0;
}
return fragment;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static inline RefPtr<DocumentFragment> createFragmentFromSource(const String& sourceString, const String& sourceMIMEType, Document* outputDoc)
| 170,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
v8::Local<v8::Value> call_with_args[] = {
context()->module_system()->NewInstance()};
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]), 1,
call_with_args);
}
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem(
void V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsFunction());
ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled(context()->module_system());
context()->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(args[0]));
}
| 171,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
struct iowarrior *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
/* allocate memory for our device state and initialize it */
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iowarrior), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev == NULL) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Out of memory\n");
return retval;
}
mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, 0);
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, 0);
spin_lock_init(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->read_wait);
atomic_set(&dev->write_busy, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->write_wait);
dev->udev = udev;
dev->interface = interface;
iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct);
/* set up the endpoint information */
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
dev->int_in_endpoint = endpoint;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_out(endpoint))
/* this one will match for the IOWarrior56 only */
dev->int_out_endpoint = endpoint;
}
/* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */
dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint);
if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) &&
(dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56))
/* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */
dev->report_size = 7;
/* create the urb and buffer for reading */
dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_urb) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate interrupt_in_urb\n");
goto error;
}
dev->int_in_buffer = kmalloc(dev->report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_buffer) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate int_in_buffer\n");
goto error;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(dev->int_in_urb, dev->udev,
usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
dev->int_in_buffer, dev->report_size,
iowarrior_callback, dev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bInterval);
/* create an internal buffer for interrupt data from the device */
dev->read_queue =
kmalloc(((dev->report_size + 1) * MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->read_queue) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate read_queue\n");
goto error;
}
/* Get the serial-number of the chip */
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
usb_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber, dev->chip_serial,
sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
if (strlen(dev->chip_serial) != 8)
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
/* Set the idle timeout to 0, if this is interface 0 */
if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) {
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0A,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, 0,
0, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
/* allow device read and ioctl */
dev->present = 1;
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */
usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
retval = usb_register_dev(interface, &iowarrior_class);
if (retval) {
/* something prevented us from registering this driver */
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Not able to get a minor for this device.\n");
usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
goto error;
}
dev->minor = interface->minor;
/* let the user know what node this device is now attached to */
dev_info(&interface->dev, "IOWarrior product=0x%x, serial=%s interface=%d "
"now attached to iowarrior%d\n", dev->product_id, dev->chip_serial,
iface_desc->desc.bInterfaceNumber, dev->minor - IOWARRIOR_MINOR_BASE);
return retval;
error:
iowarrior_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
struct iowarrior *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
/* allocate memory for our device state and initialize it */
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iowarrior), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev == NULL) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Out of memory\n");
return retval;
}
mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, 0);
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, 0);
spin_lock_init(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->read_wait);
atomic_set(&dev->write_busy, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->write_wait);
dev->udev = udev;
dev->interface = interface;
iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct);
if (iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Invalid number of endpoints\n");
retval = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
/* set up the endpoint information */
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
dev->int_in_endpoint = endpoint;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_out(endpoint))
/* this one will match for the IOWarrior56 only */
dev->int_out_endpoint = endpoint;
}
/* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */
dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint);
if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) &&
(dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56))
/* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */
dev->report_size = 7;
/* create the urb and buffer for reading */
dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_urb) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate interrupt_in_urb\n");
goto error;
}
dev->int_in_buffer = kmalloc(dev->report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_buffer) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate int_in_buffer\n");
goto error;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(dev->int_in_urb, dev->udev,
usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
dev->int_in_buffer, dev->report_size,
iowarrior_callback, dev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bInterval);
/* create an internal buffer for interrupt data from the device */
dev->read_queue =
kmalloc(((dev->report_size + 1) * MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->read_queue) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate read_queue\n");
goto error;
}
/* Get the serial-number of the chip */
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
usb_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber, dev->chip_serial,
sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
if (strlen(dev->chip_serial) != 8)
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
/* Set the idle timeout to 0, if this is interface 0 */
if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) {
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0A,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, 0,
0, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
/* allow device read and ioctl */
dev->present = 1;
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */
usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
retval = usb_register_dev(interface, &iowarrior_class);
if (retval) {
/* something prevented us from registering this driver */
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Not able to get a minor for this device.\n");
usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
goto error;
}
dev->minor = interface->minor;
/* let the user know what node this device is now attached to */
dev_info(&interface->dev, "IOWarrior product=0x%x, serial=%s interface=%d "
"now attached to iowarrior%d\n", dev->product_id, dev->chip_serial,
iface_desc->desc.bInterfaceNumber, dev->minor - IOWARRIOR_MINOR_BASE);
return retval;
error:
iowarrior_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
| 167,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cJSON_strcasecmp( const char *s1, const char *s2 )
{
if ( ! s1 )
return ( s1 == s2 ) ? 0 : 1;
if ( ! s2 )
return 1;
for ( ; tolower(*s1) == tolower(*s2); ++s1, ++s2)
if( *s1 == 0 )
return 0;
return tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s1) - tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s2);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int cJSON_strcasecmp( const char *s1, const char *s2 )
static int cJSON_strcasecmp(const char *s1,const char *s2)
{
if (!s1) return (s1==s2)?0:1;if (!s2) return 1;
for(; tolower(*s1) == tolower(*s2); ++s1, ++s2) if(*s1 == 0) return 0;
return tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s1) - tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s2);
}
| 167,297 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __exit ipgre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre close: can't remove protocol\n");
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void __exit ipgre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre close: can't remove protocol\n");
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
}
| 165,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
app_controller_->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::GetAppController(
mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
AppControllerService::Get(context_)->BindRequest(std::move(request));
}
| 172,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error = -EACCES;
/* We don't need a base pointer in the /proc filesystem */
path_put(&nd->path);
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(inode, &nd->path);
nd->last_type = LAST_BIND;
out:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error = -EACCES;
/* We don't need a base pointer in the /proc filesystem */
path_put(&nd->path);
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(inode, &nd->path);
out:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
| 166,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(
GraphicsContext& context,
const DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> scroll_offset_node) {
PaintController& paint_controller = context.GetPaintController();
DCHECK_NE(paint_controller.CurrentPaintChunkProperties().Transform(),
scroll_offset_node.get());
if (paint_controller.DisplayItemConstructionIsDisabled())
return;
paint_controller.CreateAndAppend<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, type, std::move(scroll_offset_node));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Record(
GraphicsContext& context,
const DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type,
const TransformPaintPropertyNode& scroll_offset_node) {
PaintController& paint_controller = context.GetPaintController();
DCHECK_NE(paint_controller.CurrentPaintChunkProperties().Transform(),
&scroll_offset_node);
if (paint_controller.DisplayItemConstructionIsDisabled())
return;
paint_controller.CreateAndAppend<ScrollHitTestDisplayItem>(
client, type, scroll_offset_node);
}
| 171,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ldp_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr,
u_short msg_tlen)
{
struct ldp_tlv_header {
uint8_t type[2];
uint8_t length[2];
};
const struct ldp_tlv_header *ldp_tlv_header;
u_short tlv_type,tlv_len,tlv_tlen,af,ft_flags;
u_char fec_type;
u_int ui,vc_info_len, vc_info_tlv_type, vc_info_tlv_len,idx;
char buf[100];
int i;
ldp_tlv_header = (const struct ldp_tlv_header *)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_tlv_header);
tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->length);
if (tlv_len + 4 > msg_tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of message"));
return 0;
}
tlv_tlen=tlv_len;
tlv_type=LDP_MASK_TLV_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->type));
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u, Flags: [%s and %s forward if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len,
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore",
LDP_MASK_F_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "do" : "don't"));
tptr+=sizeof(struct ldp_tlv_header);
switch(tlv_type) {
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_HELLO:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hold Time: %us, Flags: [%s Hello%s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x8000) ? "Targeted" : "Link",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x4000) ? ", Request for targeted Hellos" : ""));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV4_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Transport Address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV6_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Transport Address: %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_CONFIG_SEQ_NUMBER:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence Number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST:
TLV_TCHECK(LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen -= LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Address Family: %s, addresses",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown (%u)", af)));
switch (af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
default:
/* unknown AF */
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version: %u, Keepalive: %us, Flags: [Downstream %s, Loop Detection %s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x8000) ? "On Demand" : "Unsolicited",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x4000) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"
));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FEC:
TLV_TCHECK(1);
fec_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s FEC (0x%02x)",
tok2str(ldp_fec_values, "Unknown", fec_type),
fec_type));
tptr+=1;
tlv_tlen-=1;
switch(fec_type) {
case LDP_FEC_WILDCARD:
break;
case LDP_FEC_PREFIX:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen-=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
if (af == AFNUM_INET) {
i=decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix %s", buf));
}
else if (af == AFNUM_INET6) {
i=decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix %s", buf));
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Address family %u prefix", af));
break;
case LDP_FEC_HOSTADDRESS:
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_VC:
/*
* We assume the type was supposed to be one of the MPLS
* Pseudowire Types.
*/
TLV_TCHECK(7);
vc_info_len = *(tptr+2);
/*
* According to RFC 4908, the VC info Length field can be zero,
* in which case not only are there no interface parameters,
* there's no VC ID.
*/
if (vc_info_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
vc_info_len));
break;
}
/* Make sure we have the VC ID as well */
TLV_TCHECK(11);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+7),
vc_info_len));
if (vc_info_len < 4) {
/* minimum 4, for the VC ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (invalid, < 4"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
vc_info_len -= 4; /* subtract out the VC ID, giving the length of the interface parameters */
/* Skip past the fixed information and the VC ID */
tptr+=11;
tlv_tlen-=11;
TLV_TCHECK(vc_info_len);
while (vc_info_len > 2) {
vc_info_tlv_type = *tptr;
vc_info_tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
if (vc_info_tlv_len < 2)
break;
if (vc_info_len < vc_info_tlv_len)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tInterface Parameter: %s (0x%02x), len %u",
tok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_values,"Unknown",vc_info_tlv_type),
vc_info_tlv_type,
vc_info_tlv_len));
switch(vc_info_tlv_type) {
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_DESC:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
for (idx = 2; idx < vc_info_tlv_len; idx++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_VCCV:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Control Channels (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+2),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cc_values, "none", *(tptr+2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t CV Types (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+3),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cv_values, "none", *(tptr+3))));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+2, "\n\t\t ", vc_info_tlv_len-2);
break;
}
vc_info_len -= vc_info_tlv_len;
tptr += vc_info_tlv_len;
}
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_GENERIC_LABEL:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Label: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0xfffff));
break;
case LDP_TLV_STATUS:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Status: 0x%02x, Flags: [%s and %s forward]",
ui&0x3fffffff,
ui&0x80000000 ? "Fatal error" : "Advisory Notification",
ui&0x40000000 ? "do" : "don't"));
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", causing Message ID: 0x%08x", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FT_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ft_flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%sReconnect, %sSave State, %sAll-Label Protection, %s Checkpoint, %sRe-Learn State]",
ft_flags&0x8000 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x8 ? "" : "Don't ",
ft_flags&0x4 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x2 ? "Sequence Numbered Label" : "All Labels",
ft_flags&0x1 ? "" : "Don't "));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Reconnect Timeout: %ums", ui));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Recovery Time: %ums", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_MTU:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_TLV_HOP_COUNT:
case LDP_TLV_PATH_VECTOR:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_FR_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_EXTD_STATUS:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_PDU:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_MSG:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_FR_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_LABEL_REQUEST_MSG_ID:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_tlen);
break;
}
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
badtlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of TLV"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ldp_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr,
u_short msg_tlen)
{
struct ldp_tlv_header {
uint8_t type[2];
uint8_t length[2];
};
const struct ldp_tlv_header *ldp_tlv_header;
u_short tlv_type,tlv_len,tlv_tlen,af,ft_flags;
u_char fec_type;
u_int ui,vc_info_len, vc_info_tlv_type, vc_info_tlv_len,idx;
char buf[100];
int i;
ldp_tlv_header = (const struct ldp_tlv_header *)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_tlv_header);
tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->length);
if (tlv_len + 4 > msg_tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of message"));
return 0;
}
tlv_tlen=tlv_len;
tlv_type=LDP_MASK_TLV_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->type));
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u, Flags: [%s and %s forward if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len,
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore",
LDP_MASK_F_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "do" : "don't"));
tptr+=sizeof(struct ldp_tlv_header);
switch(tlv_type) {
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_HELLO:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hold Time: %us, Flags: [%s Hello%s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x8000) ? "Targeted" : "Link",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x4000) ? ", Request for targeted Hellos" : ""));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV4_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Transport Address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV6_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Transport Address: %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_CONFIG_SEQ_NUMBER:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence Number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST:
TLV_TCHECK(LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen -= LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Address Family: %s, addresses",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown (%u)", af)));
switch (af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
default:
/* unknown AF */
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version: %u, Keepalive: %us, Flags: [Downstream %s, Loop Detection %s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x8000) ? "On Demand" : "Unsolicited",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x4000) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"
));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FEC:
TLV_TCHECK(1);
fec_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s FEC (0x%02x)",
tok2str(ldp_fec_values, "Unknown", fec_type),
fec_type));
tptr+=1;
tlv_tlen-=1;
switch(fec_type) {
case LDP_FEC_WILDCARD:
break;
case LDP_FEC_PREFIX:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen-=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
if (af == AFNUM_INET) {
i=decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix %s", buf));
}
else if (af == AFNUM_INET6) {
i=decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix %s", buf));
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Address family %u prefix", af));
break;
case LDP_FEC_HOSTADDRESS:
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_VC:
/*
* We assume the type was supposed to be one of the MPLS
* Pseudowire Types.
*/
TLV_TCHECK(7);
vc_info_len = *(tptr+2);
/*
* According to RFC 4908, the VC info Length field can be zero,
* in which case not only are there no interface parameters,
* there's no VC ID.
*/
if (vc_info_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
vc_info_len));
break;
}
/* Make sure we have the VC ID as well */
TLV_TCHECK(11);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+7),
vc_info_len));
if (vc_info_len < 4) {
/* minimum 4, for the VC ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (invalid, < 4"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
vc_info_len -= 4; /* subtract out the VC ID, giving the length of the interface parameters */
/* Skip past the fixed information and the VC ID */
tptr+=11;
tlv_tlen-=11;
TLV_TCHECK(vc_info_len);
while (vc_info_len > 2) {
vc_info_tlv_type = *tptr;
vc_info_tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
if (vc_info_tlv_len < 2)
break;
if (vc_info_len < vc_info_tlv_len)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tInterface Parameter: %s (0x%02x), len %u",
tok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_values,"Unknown",vc_info_tlv_type),
vc_info_tlv_type,
vc_info_tlv_len));
switch(vc_info_tlv_type) {
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_DESC:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
for (idx = 2; idx < vc_info_tlv_len; idx++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_VCCV:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Control Channels (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+2),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cc_values, "none", *(tptr+2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t CV Types (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+3),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cv_values, "none", *(tptr+3))));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+2, "\n\t\t ", vc_info_tlv_len-2);
break;
}
vc_info_len -= vc_info_tlv_len;
tptr += vc_info_tlv_len;
}
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_GENERIC_LABEL:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Label: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0xfffff));
break;
case LDP_TLV_STATUS:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Status: 0x%02x, Flags: [%s and %s forward]",
ui&0x3fffffff,
ui&0x80000000 ? "Fatal error" : "Advisory Notification",
ui&0x40000000 ? "do" : "don't"));
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", causing Message ID: 0x%08x", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FT_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(12);
ft_flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%sReconnect, %sSave State, %sAll-Label Protection, %s Checkpoint, %sRe-Learn State]",
ft_flags&0x8000 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x8 ? "" : "Don't ",
ft_flags&0x4 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x2 ? "Sequence Numbered Label" : "All Labels",
ft_flags&0x1 ? "" : "Don't "));
/* 16 bits (FT Flags) + 16 bits (Reserved) */
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Reconnect Timeout: %ums", ui));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Recovery Time: %ums", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_MTU:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_TLV_HOP_COUNT:
case LDP_TLV_PATH_VECTOR:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_FR_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_EXTD_STATUS:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_PDU:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_MSG:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_FR_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_LABEL_REQUEST_MSG_ID:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_tlen);
break;
}
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
badtlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of TLV"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
| 169,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnVSync(device::mojom::blink::VRPosePtr pose,
mojo::common::mojom::blink::TimeDeltaPtr time,
int16_t frame_id,
device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status error) {
v_sync_connection_failed_ = false;
switch (error) {
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::SUCCESS:
break;
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::CLOSING:
return;
}
pending_vsync_ = false;
WTF::TimeDelta time_delta =
WTF::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(time->microseconds);
if (timebase_ < 0) {
timebase_ = WTF::MonotonicallyIncreasingTime() - time_delta.InSecondsF();
}
frame_pose_ = std::move(pose);
vr_frame_id_ = frame_id;
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timebase_ + time_delta.InSecondsF()));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | void VRDisplay::OnVSync(device::mojom::blink::VRPosePtr pose,
mojo::common::mojom::blink::TimeDeltaPtr time,
int16_t frame_id,
device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status error) {
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__;
v_sync_connection_failed_ = false;
switch (error) {
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::SUCCESS:
break;
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::CLOSING:
return;
}
pending_vsync_ = false;
WTF::TimeDelta time_delta =
WTF::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(time->microseconds);
if (timebase_ < 0) {
timebase_ = WTF::MonotonicallyIncreasingTime() - time_delta.InSecondsF();
}
frame_pose_ = std::move(pose);
vr_frame_id_ = frame_id;
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timebase_ + time_delta.InSecondsF()));
}
| 171,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::RejectPromise(
ImageBitmapRejectionReason reason) {
switch (reason) {
case kUndecodableImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The source image could not be decoded."));
break;
case kAllocationFailureImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The ImageBitmap could not be allocated."));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
factory_->DidFinishLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::RejectPromise(
ImageBitmapRejectionReason reason) {
switch (reason) {
case kUndecodableImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The source image could not be decoded."));
break;
case kAllocationFailureImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The ImageBitmap could not be allocated."));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
loader_.reset();
factory_->DidFinishLoading(this);
}
| 173,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTService::getCharacteristicsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& characteristicsUUID) {
if (!device()->gatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!device()->isValidService(m_service->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, kInvalidService));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
device()->gatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!characteristicsUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = characteristicsUUID;
service->RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
m_service->instance_id, quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_service->instance_id, quantity,
wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTService::getCharacteristicsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& characteristicsUUID) {
if (!device()->gatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!device()->isValidService(m_service->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, kInvalidService));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
device()->gatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
m_service->instance_id, quantity, characteristicsUUID,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_service->instance_id, quantity,
wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
| 172,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_studio_block(MpegEncContext *s, int32_t block[64], int n)
{
Mpeg4DecContext *ctx = s->avctx->priv_data;
int cc, dct_dc_size, dct_diff, code, j, idx = 1, group = 0, run = 0,
additional_code_len, sign, mismatch;
VLC *cur_vlc = &ctx->studio_intra_tab[0];
uint8_t *const scantable = s->intra_scantable.permutated;
const uint16_t *quant_matrix;
uint32_t flc;
const int min = -1 * (1 << (s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + 6));
const int max = ((1 << (s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + 6)) - 1);
mismatch = 1;
memset(block, 0, 64 * sizeof(int32_t));
if (n < 4) {
cc = 0;
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_luma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
quant_matrix = s->intra_matrix;
} else {
cc = (n & 1) + 1;
if (ctx->rgb)
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_luma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
else
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_chroma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
quant_matrix = s->chroma_intra_matrix;
}
if (dct_dc_size < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dct_dc_size vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (dct_dc_size == 0) {
dct_diff = 0;
} else {
dct_diff = get_xbits(&s->gb, dct_dc_size);
if (dct_dc_size > 8) {
if(!check_marker(s->avctx, &s->gb, "dct_dc_size > 8"))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
s->last_dc[cc] += dct_diff;
if (s->mpeg_quant)
block[0] = s->last_dc[cc] * (8 >> s->intra_dc_precision);
else
block[0] = s->last_dc[cc] * (8 >> s->intra_dc_precision) * (8 >> s->dct_precision);
/* TODO: support mpeg_quant for AC coefficients */
block[0] = av_clip(block[0], min, max);
mismatch ^= block[0];
/* AC Coefficients */
while (1) {
group = get_vlc2(&s->gb, cur_vlc->table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
if (group < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal ac coefficient group vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
additional_code_len = ac_state_tab[group][0];
cur_vlc = &ctx->studio_intra_tab[ac_state_tab[group][1]];
if (group == 0) {
/* End of Block */
break;
} else if (group >= 1 && group <= 6) {
/* Zero run length (Table B.47) */
run = 1 << additional_code_len;
if (additional_code_len)
run += get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
idx += run;
continue;
} else if (group >= 7 && group <= 12) {
/* Zero run length and +/-1 level (Table B.48) */
code = get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
sign = code & 1;
code >>= 1;
run = (1 << (additional_code_len - 1)) + code;
idx += run;
j = scantable[idx++];
block[j] = sign ? 1 : -1;
} else if (group >= 13 && group <= 20) {
/* Level value (Table B.49) */
j = scantable[idx++];
block[j] = get_xbits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
} else if (group == 21) {
/* Escape */
j = scantable[idx++];
additional_code_len = s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + s->dct_precision + 4;
flc = get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
if (flc >> (additional_code_len-1))
block[j] = -1 * (( flc ^ ((1 << additional_code_len) -1)) + 1);
else
block[j] = flc;
}
block[j] = ((8 * 2 * block[j] * quant_matrix[j] * s->qscale) >> s->dct_precision) / 32;
block[j] = av_clip(block[j], min, max);
mismatch ^= block[j];
}
block[63] ^= mismatch & 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check idx in mpeg4_decode_studio_block()
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: 13500/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer-5769760178962432
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Kieran Kunhya <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int mpeg4_decode_studio_block(MpegEncContext *s, int32_t block[64], int n)
{
Mpeg4DecContext *ctx = s->avctx->priv_data;
int cc, dct_dc_size, dct_diff, code, j, idx = 1, group = 0, run = 0,
additional_code_len, sign, mismatch;
VLC *cur_vlc = &ctx->studio_intra_tab[0];
uint8_t *const scantable = s->intra_scantable.permutated;
const uint16_t *quant_matrix;
uint32_t flc;
const int min = -1 * (1 << (s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + 6));
const int max = ((1 << (s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + 6)) - 1);
mismatch = 1;
memset(block, 0, 64 * sizeof(int32_t));
if (n < 4) {
cc = 0;
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_luma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
quant_matrix = s->intra_matrix;
} else {
cc = (n & 1) + 1;
if (ctx->rgb)
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_luma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
else
dct_dc_size = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ctx->studio_chroma_dc.table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
quant_matrix = s->chroma_intra_matrix;
}
if (dct_dc_size < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dct_dc_size vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else if (dct_dc_size == 0) {
dct_diff = 0;
} else {
dct_diff = get_xbits(&s->gb, dct_dc_size);
if (dct_dc_size > 8) {
if(!check_marker(s->avctx, &s->gb, "dct_dc_size > 8"))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
s->last_dc[cc] += dct_diff;
if (s->mpeg_quant)
block[0] = s->last_dc[cc] * (8 >> s->intra_dc_precision);
else
block[0] = s->last_dc[cc] * (8 >> s->intra_dc_precision) * (8 >> s->dct_precision);
/* TODO: support mpeg_quant for AC coefficients */
block[0] = av_clip(block[0], min, max);
mismatch ^= block[0];
/* AC Coefficients */
while (1) {
group = get_vlc2(&s->gb, cur_vlc->table, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 2);
if (group < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal ac coefficient group vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
additional_code_len = ac_state_tab[group][0];
cur_vlc = &ctx->studio_intra_tab[ac_state_tab[group][1]];
if (group == 0) {
/* End of Block */
break;
} else if (group >= 1 && group <= 6) {
/* Zero run length (Table B.47) */
run = 1 << additional_code_len;
if (additional_code_len)
run += get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
idx += run;
continue;
} else if (group >= 7 && group <= 12) {
/* Zero run length and +/-1 level (Table B.48) */
code = get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
sign = code & 1;
code >>= 1;
run = (1 << (additional_code_len - 1)) + code;
idx += run;
if (idx > 63)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
j = scantable[idx++];
block[j] = sign ? 1 : -1;
} else if (group >= 13 && group <= 20) {
/* Level value (Table B.49) */
if (idx > 63)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
j = scantable[idx++];
block[j] = get_xbits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
} else if (group == 21) {
/* Escape */
if (idx > 63)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
j = scantable[idx++];
additional_code_len = s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample + s->dct_precision + 4;
flc = get_bits(&s->gb, additional_code_len);
if (flc >> (additional_code_len-1))
block[j] = -1 * (( flc ^ ((1 << additional_code_len) -1)) + 1);
else
block[j] = flc;
}
block[j] = ((8 * 2 * block[j] * quant_matrix[j] * s->qscale) >> s->dct_precision) / 32;
block[j] = av_clip(block[j], min, max);
mismatch ^= block[j];
}
block[63] ^= mismatch & 1;
return 0;
}
| 169,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
return false;
}
| 170,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type = InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
} else if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
}
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest)
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
| 172,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow when handling MPEG4 tx3g atom
When the sum of the 'size' and 'chunk_size' variables is larger than 2^32,
an integer overflow occurs. Using the result value to allocate memory
leads to an undersized buffer allocation and later a potentially
exploitable heap corruption condition. Ensure that integer overflow does
not occur.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: Id050a36b33196864bdd98b5ea24241f95a0b5d1f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 173,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsValidURL(const GURL& url, PortPermission port_permission) {
return url.is_valid() && url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS() &&
(url.port().empty() || (port_permission == ALLOW_NON_STANDARD_PORTS));
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | bool IsValidURL(const GURL& url, PortPermission port_permission) {
return url.is_valid() && url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS() &&
(url.port().empty() || g_ignore_port_numbers ||
(port_permission == ALLOW_NON_STANDARD_PORTS));
}
| 172,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t fuse_fill_write_pages(struct fuse_req *req,
struct address_space *mapping,
struct iov_iter *ii, loff_t pos)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(mapping->host);
unsigned offset = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
size_t count = 0;
int err;
req->in.argpages = 1;
req->page_descs[0].offset = offset;
do {
size_t tmp;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(ii));
bytes = min_t(size_t, bytes, fc->max_write - count);
again:
err = -EFAULT;
if (iov_iter_fault_in_readable(ii, bytes))
break;
err = -ENOMEM;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, 0);
if (!page)
break;
if (mapping_writably_mapped(mapping))
flush_dcache_page(page);
tmp = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, ii, offset, bytes);
flush_dcache_page(page);
if (!tmp) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
bytes = min(bytes, iov_iter_single_seg_count(ii));
goto again;
}
err = 0;
req->pages[req->num_pages] = page;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].length = tmp;
req->num_pages++;
iov_iter_advance(ii, tmp);
count += tmp;
pos += tmp;
offset += tmp;
if (offset == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
offset = 0;
if (!fc->big_writes)
break;
} while (iov_iter_count(ii) && count < fc->max_write &&
req->num_pages < req->max_pages && offset == 0);
return count > 0 ? count : err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static ssize_t fuse_fill_write_pages(struct fuse_req *req,
struct address_space *mapping,
struct iov_iter *ii, loff_t pos)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(mapping->host);
unsigned offset = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
size_t count = 0;
int err;
req->in.argpages = 1;
req->page_descs[0].offset = offset;
do {
size_t tmp;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset,
iov_iter_count(ii));
bytes = min_t(size_t, bytes, fc->max_write - count);
again:
err = -EFAULT;
if (iov_iter_fault_in_readable(ii, bytes))
break;
err = -ENOMEM;
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, 0);
if (!page)
break;
if (mapping_writably_mapped(mapping))
flush_dcache_page(page);
tmp = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(page, ii, offset, bytes);
flush_dcache_page(page);
iov_iter_advance(ii, tmp);
if (!tmp) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
bytes = min(bytes, iov_iter_single_seg_count(ii));
goto again;
}
err = 0;
req->pages[req->num_pages] = page;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].length = tmp;
req->num_pages++;
count += tmp;
pos += tmp;
offset += tmp;
if (offset == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
offset = 0;
if (!fc->big_writes)
break;
} while (iov_iter_count(ii) && count < fc->max_write &&
req->num_pages < req->max_pages && offset == 0);
return count > 0 ? count : err;
}
| 167,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
| 173,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> GetShmFromMojoHandle(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
size_t memory_size = 0;
bool read_only_flag = false;
const MojoResult result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(
std::move(handle), &memory_handle, &memory_size, &read_only_flag);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return nullptr;
DCHECK_GT(memory_size, 0u);
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm =
std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(memory_handle, read_only_flag);
if (!shm->Map(memory_size)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Map shared memory failed.";
return nullptr;
}
return shm;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> GetShmFromMojoHandle(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
size_t memory_size = 0;
mojo::UnwrappedSharedMemoryHandleProtection protection;
const MojoResult result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(
std::move(handle), &memory_handle, &memory_size, &protection);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return nullptr;
DCHECK_GT(memory_size, 0u);
const bool read_only =
protection == mojo::UnwrappedSharedMemoryHandleProtection::kReadOnly;
std::unique_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shm =
std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(memory_handle, read_only);
if (!shm->Map(memory_size)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Map shared memory failed.";
return nullptr;
}
return shm;
}
| 172,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ZeroSuggestProvider::Start(const AutocompleteInput& input,
bool minimal_changes) {
TRACE_EVENT0("omnibox", "ZeroSuggestProvider::Start");
matches_.clear();
if (!input.from_omnibox_focus() || client()->IsOffTheRecord() ||
input.type() == metrics::OmniboxInputType::INVALID)
return;
Stop(true, false);
set_field_trial_triggered(false);
set_field_trial_triggered_in_session(false);
results_from_cache_ = false;
permanent_text_ = input.text();
current_query_ = input.current_url().spec();
current_title_ = input.current_title();
current_page_classification_ = input.current_page_classification();
current_url_match_ = MatchForCurrentURL();
std::string url_string = GetContextualSuggestionsUrl();
GURL suggest_url(url_string);
if (!suggest_url.is_valid())
return;
const TemplateURLService* template_url_service =
client()->GetTemplateURLService();
const TemplateURL* default_provider =
template_url_service->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
const bool can_send_current_url =
CanSendURL(input.current_url(), suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
GURL arbitrary_insecure_url(kArbitraryInsecureUrlString);
ZeroSuggestEligibility eligibility = ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE;
if (!can_send_current_url) {
const bool can_send_ordinary_url =
CanSendURL(arbitrary_insecure_url, suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
eligibility = can_send_ordinary_url
? ZeroSuggestEligibility::URL_INELIGIBLE
: ZeroSuggestEligibility::GENERALLY_INELIGIBLE;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Omnibox.ZeroSuggest.Eligible.OnFocus", static_cast<int>(eligibility),
static_cast<int>(ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE_MAX_VALUE));
if (can_send_current_url &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestPersonalizedFieldTrial() &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestMostVisitedFieldTrial()) {
if (OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeFieldTrial()) {
url_string +=
"/url=" + net::EscapePath(current_query_) +
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeAdditionalFields();
suggest_url = GURL(url_string);
} else {
base::string16 prefix;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_term_args(prefix);
search_term_args.current_page_url = current_query_;
suggest_url =
GURL(default_provider->suggestions_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_term_args, template_url_service->search_terms_data()));
}
} else if (!ShouldShowNonContextualZeroSuggest(input.current_url())) {
return;
}
done_ = false;
MaybeUseCachedSuggestions();
Run(suggest_url);
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID: | void ZeroSuggestProvider::Start(const AutocompleteInput& input,
bool minimal_changes) {
TRACE_EVENT0("omnibox", "ZeroSuggestProvider::Start");
matches_.clear();
if (!input.from_omnibox_focus() || client()->IsOffTheRecord() ||
input.type() == metrics::OmniboxInputType::INVALID)
return;
Stop(true, false);
set_field_trial_triggered(false);
set_field_trial_triggered_in_session(false);
results_from_cache_ = false;
permanent_text_ = input.text();
current_query_ = input.current_url().spec();
current_title_ = input.current_title();
current_page_classification_ = input.current_page_classification();
current_url_match_ = MatchForCurrentURL();
GURL suggest_url(GetContextualSuggestionsUrl());
if (!suggest_url.is_valid())
return;
const TemplateURLService* template_url_service =
client()->GetTemplateURLService();
const TemplateURL* default_provider =
template_url_service->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
const bool can_send_current_url =
CanSendURL(input.current_url(), suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
GURL arbitrary_insecure_url(kArbitraryInsecureUrlString);
ZeroSuggestEligibility eligibility = ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE;
if (!can_send_current_url) {
const bool can_send_ordinary_url =
CanSendURL(arbitrary_insecure_url, suggest_url, default_provider,
current_page_classification_,
template_url_service->search_terms_data(), client());
eligibility = can_send_ordinary_url
? ZeroSuggestEligibility::URL_INELIGIBLE
: ZeroSuggestEligibility::GENERALLY_INELIGIBLE;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Omnibox.ZeroSuggest.Eligible.OnFocus", static_cast<int>(eligibility),
static_cast<int>(ZeroSuggestEligibility::ELIGIBLE_MAX_VALUE));
if (can_send_current_url &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestPersonalizedFieldTrial() &&
!OmniboxFieldTrial::InZeroSuggestMostVisitedFieldTrial()) {
if (UseExperimentalSuggestService(*template_url_service)) {
suggest_url = GURL(
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeServerAddress() +
"/url=" + net::EscapePath(current_query_) +
OmniboxFieldTrial::ZeroSuggestRedirectToChromeAdditionalFields());
} else {
base::string16 prefix;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_term_args(prefix);
search_term_args.current_page_url = current_query_;
suggest_url =
GURL(default_provider->suggestions_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_term_args, template_url_service->search_terms_data()));
}
} else if (!ShouldShowNonContextualZeroSuggest(input.current_url())) {
return;
}
done_ = false;
MaybeUseCachedSuggestions();
Run(suggest_url);
}
| 172,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
PNG_CONST int error_action = 1; /* no error, no defines in png.h */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_rgb_to_gray(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set, data.green_to_set);
# else
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set,
data.green_to_set);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_cHRM_SUPPORTED
if (that->pm->current_encoding != 0)
{
/* We have an encoding so a cHRM chunk may have been set; if so then
* check that the libpng APIs give the correct (X,Y,Z) values within
* some margin of error for the round trip through the chromaticity
* form.
*/
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ
# define API_form "FP"
# define API_type double
# define API_cvt(x) (x)
# else
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ_fixed
# define API_form "fixed"
# define API_type png_fixed_point
# define API_cvt(x) ((double)(x)/PNG_FP_1)
# endif
API_type rX, gX, bX;
API_type rY, gY, bY;
API_type rZ, gZ, bZ;
if ((API_function(pp, pi, &rX, &rY, &rZ, &gX, &gY, &gZ, &bX, &bY, &bZ)
& PNG_INFO_cHRM) != 0)
{
double maxe;
PNG_CONST char *el;
color_encoding e, o;
/* Expect libpng to return a normalized result, but the original
* color space encoding may not be normalized.
*/
modifier_current_encoding(that->pm, &o);
normalize_color_encoding(&o);
/* Sanity check the pngvalid code - the coefficients should match
* the normalized Y values of the encoding unless they were
* overridden.
*/
if (data.red_to_set == -1 && data.green_to_set == -1 &&
(fabs(o.red.Y - data.red_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.green.Y - data.green_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.blue.Y - data.blue_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON))
png_error(pp, "internal pngvalid cHRM coefficient error");
/* Generate a colour space encoding. */
e.gamma = o.gamma; /* not used */
e.red.X = API_cvt(rX);
e.red.Y = API_cvt(rY);
e.red.Z = API_cvt(rZ);
e.green.X = API_cvt(gX);
e.green.Y = API_cvt(gY);
e.green.Z = API_cvt(gZ);
e.blue.X = API_cvt(bX);
e.blue.Y = API_cvt(bY);
e.blue.Z = API_cvt(bZ);
/* This should match the original one from the png_modifier, within
* the range permitted by the libpng fixed point representation.
*/
maxe = 0;
el = "-"; /* Set to element name with error */
# define CHECK(col,x)\
{\
double err = fabs(o.col.x - e.col.x);\
if (err > maxe)\
{\
maxe = err;\
el = #col "(" #x ")";\
}\
}
CHECK(red,X)
CHECK(red,Y)
CHECK(red,Z)
CHECK(green,X)
CHECK(green,Y)
CHECK(green,Z)
CHECK(blue,X)
CHECK(blue,Y)
CHECK(blue,Z)
/* Here in both fixed and floating cases to check the values read
* from the cHRm chunk. PNG uses fixed point in the cHRM chunk, so
* we can't expect better than +/-.5E-5 on the result, allow 1E-5.
*/
if (maxe >= 1E-5)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[256];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, API_form);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " cHRM ");
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, el);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " error: ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, maxe, 7);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " ");
/* Print the color space without the gamma value: */
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &o, 0);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " -> ");
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &e, 0);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* READ_cHRM */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
const int error_action = 1; /* no error, no defines in png.h */
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
png_set_rgb_to_gray(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set, data.green_to_set);
# else
png_set_rgb_to_gray_fixed(pp, error_action, data.red_to_set,
data.green_to_set);
# endif
# ifdef PNG_READ_cHRM_SUPPORTED
if (that->pm->current_encoding != 0)
{
/* We have an encoding so a cHRM chunk may have been set; if so then
* check that the libpng APIs give the correct (X,Y,Z) values within
* some margin of error for the round trip through the chromaticity
* form.
*/
# ifdef PNG_FLOATING_POINT_SUPPORTED
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ
# define API_form "FP"
# define API_type double
# define API_cvt(x) (x)
# else
# define API_function png_get_cHRM_XYZ_fixed
# define API_form "fixed"
# define API_type png_fixed_point
# define API_cvt(x) ((double)(x)/PNG_FP_1)
# endif
API_type rX, gX, bX;
API_type rY, gY, bY;
API_type rZ, gZ, bZ;
if ((API_function(pp, pi, &rX, &rY, &rZ, &gX, &gY, &gZ, &bX, &bY, &bZ)
& PNG_INFO_cHRM) != 0)
{
double maxe;
const char *el;
color_encoding e, o;
/* Expect libpng to return a normalized result, but the original
* color space encoding may not be normalized.
*/
modifier_current_encoding(that->pm, &o);
normalize_color_encoding(&o);
/* Sanity check the pngvalid code - the coefficients should match
* the normalized Y values of the encoding unless they were
* overridden.
*/
if (data.red_to_set == -1 && data.green_to_set == -1 &&
(fabs(o.red.Y - data.red_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.green.Y - data.green_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON ||
fabs(o.blue.Y - data.blue_coefficient) > DBL_EPSILON))
png_error(pp, "internal pngvalid cHRM coefficient error");
/* Generate a colour space encoding. */
e.gamma = o.gamma; /* not used */
e.red.X = API_cvt(rX);
e.red.Y = API_cvt(rY);
e.red.Z = API_cvt(rZ);
e.green.X = API_cvt(gX);
e.green.Y = API_cvt(gY);
e.green.Z = API_cvt(gZ);
e.blue.X = API_cvt(bX);
e.blue.Y = API_cvt(bY);
e.blue.Z = API_cvt(bZ);
/* This should match the original one from the png_modifier, within
* the range permitted by the libpng fixed point representation.
*/
maxe = 0;
el = "-"; /* Set to element name with error */
# define CHECK(col,x)\
{\
double err = fabs(o.col.x - e.col.x);\
if (err > maxe)\
{\
maxe = err;\
el = #col "(" #x ")";\
}\
}
CHECK(red,X)
CHECK(red,Y)
CHECK(red,Z)
CHECK(green,X)
CHECK(green,Y)
CHECK(green,Z)
CHECK(blue,X)
CHECK(blue,Y)
CHECK(blue,Z)
/* Here in both fixed and floating cases to check the values read
* from the cHRm chunk. PNG uses fixed point in the cHRM chunk, so
* we can't expect better than +/-.5E-5 on the result, allow 1E-5.
*/
if (maxe >= 1E-5)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[256];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, API_form);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " cHRM ");
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, el);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " error: ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, maxe, 7);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " ");
/* Print the color space without the gamma value: */
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &o, 0);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " -> ");
pos = safecat_color_encoding(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, &e, 0);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* READ_cHRM */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
size_t key_len;
const char *p;
int i;
int n;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (key_len <= data->dirdepth ||
buflen < (strlen(data->basedir) + 2 * data->dirdepth + key_len + 5 + sizeof(FILE_PREFIX))) {
return NULL;
}
p = key;
memcpy(buf, data->basedir, data->basedir_len);
n = data->basedir_len;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
for (i = 0; i < (int)data->dirdepth; i++) {
buf[n++] = *p++;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
}
memcpy(buf + n, FILE_PREFIX, sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1);
n += sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1;
memcpy(buf + n, key, key_len);
n += key_len;
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* On Win32 locked files that are closed without being explicitly unlocked
will be unlocked only when "system resources become available". */
flock(data->fd, LOCK_UN);
#endif
close(data->fd);
data->fd = -1;
}
}
static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (data->fd < 0 || !data->lastkey || strcmp(key, data->lastkey)) {
if (data->lastkey) {
efree(data->lastkey);
data->lastkey = NULL;
}
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
data->lastkey = estrdup(key);
data->fd = VCWD_OPEN_MODE(buf, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, data->filemode);
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* check to make sure that the opened file is not a symlink, linking to data outside of allowable dirs */
if (PG(open_basedir)) {
struct stat sbuf;
if (fstat(data->fd, &sbuf)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode) && php_check_open_basedir(buf TSRMLS_CC)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
}
#endif
flock(data->fd, LOCK_EX);
#ifdef F_SETFD
# ifndef FD_CLOEXEC
# define FD_CLOEXEC 1
# endif
if (fcntl(data->fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "fcntl(%d, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) failed: %s (%d)", data->fd, strerror(errno), errno);
}
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "open(%s, O_RDWR) failed: %s (%d)", buf, strerror(errno), errno);
}
}
}
static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
#define PS_FILES_DATA ps_files *data = PS_GET_MOD_DATA()
PS_OPEN_FUNC(files)
(now - sbuf.st_mtime) > maxlifetime) {
VCWD_UNLINK(buf);
nrdels++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
size_t key_len;
const char *p;
int i;
int n;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (key_len <= data->dirdepth ||
buflen < (strlen(data->basedir) + 2 * data->dirdepth + key_len + 5 + sizeof(FILE_PREFIX))) {
return NULL;
}
p = key;
memcpy(buf, data->basedir, data->basedir_len);
n = data->basedir_len;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
for (i = 0; i < (int)data->dirdepth; i++) {
buf[n++] = *p++;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
}
memcpy(buf + n, FILE_PREFIX, sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1);
n += sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1;
memcpy(buf + n, key, key_len);
n += key_len;
ps_files_close(data);
if (php_session_valid_key(key) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* On Win32 locked files that are closed without being explicitly unlocked
will be unlocked only when "system resources become available". */
flock(data->fd, LOCK_UN);
#endif
close(data->fd);
data->fd = -1;
}
}
static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (data->fd < 0 || !data->lastkey || strcmp(key, data->lastkey)) {
if (data->lastkey) {
efree(data->lastkey);
data->lastkey = NULL;
}
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
data->lastkey = estrdup(key);
data->fd = VCWD_OPEN_MODE(buf, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, data->filemode);
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* check to make sure that the opened file is not a symlink, linking to data outside of allowable dirs */
if (PG(open_basedir)) {
struct stat sbuf;
if (fstat(data->fd, &sbuf)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode) && php_check_open_basedir(buf TSRMLS_CC)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
}
#endif
flock(data->fd, LOCK_EX);
#ifdef F_SETFD
# ifndef FD_CLOEXEC
# define FD_CLOEXEC 1
# endif
if (fcntl(data->fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "fcntl(%d, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) failed: %s (%d)", data->fd, strerror(errno), errno);
}
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "open(%s, O_RDWR) failed: %s (%d)", buf, strerror(errno), errno);
}
}
}
static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
static int ps_files_key_exists(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat sbuf;
if (!key || !ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (VCWD_STAT(buf, &sbuf)) {
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
#define PS_FILES_DATA ps_files *data = PS_GET_MOD_DATA()
PS_OPEN_FUNC(files)
(now - sbuf.st_mtime) > maxlifetime) {
VCWD_UNLINK(buf);
nrdels++;
}
}
| 164,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Cues::Find(long long time_ns, const Track* pTrack, const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const {
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment)) {
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j) {
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool Cues::Find(long long time_ns, const Track* pTrack, const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const {
if (time_ns < 0 || pTrack == NULL || m_cue_points == NULL || m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment)) {
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j) {
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
if (k >= jj)
return false;
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
if (i > j)
return false;
}
if (i != j || i > jj || i <= ii)
return false;
pCP = *--i;
if (pCP == NULL || pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) > time_ns)
return false;
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
| 173,811 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT: {
struct kvm_vcpu_init init;
if (copy_from_user(&init, argp, sizeof(init)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vcpu_set_target(vcpu, &init);
}
case KVM_SET_ONE_REG:
case KVM_GET_ONE_REG: {
struct kvm_one_reg reg;
if (copy_from_user(®, argp, sizeof(reg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_SET_ONE_REG)
return kvm_arm_set_reg(vcpu, ®);
else
return kvm_arm_get_reg(vcpu, ®);
}
case KVM_GET_REG_LIST: {
struct kvm_reg_list __user *user_list = argp;
struct kvm_reg_list reg_list;
unsigned n;
if (copy_from_user(®_list, user_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
n = reg_list.n;
reg_list.n = kvm_arm_num_regs(vcpu);
if (copy_to_user(user_list, ®_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
if (n < reg_list.n)
return -E2BIG;
return kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(vcpu, user_list->reg);
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT: {
struct kvm_vcpu_init init;
if (copy_from_user(&init, argp, sizeof(init)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vcpu_set_target(vcpu, &init);
}
case KVM_SET_ONE_REG:
case KVM_GET_ONE_REG: {
struct kvm_one_reg reg;
if (unlikely(!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu)))
return -ENOEXEC;
if (copy_from_user(®, argp, sizeof(reg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_SET_ONE_REG)
return kvm_arm_set_reg(vcpu, ®);
else
return kvm_arm_get_reg(vcpu, ®);
}
case KVM_GET_REG_LIST: {
struct kvm_reg_list __user *user_list = argp;
struct kvm_reg_list reg_list;
unsigned n;
if (unlikely(!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu)))
return -ENOEXEC;
if (copy_from_user(®_list, user_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
n = reg_list.n;
reg_list.n = kvm_arm_num_regs(vcpu);
if (copy_to_user(user_list, ®_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
if (n < reg_list.n)
return -E2BIG;
return kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(vcpu, user_list->reg);
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| 165,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void file_sb_list_del(struct file *file)
{
if (!list_empty(&file->f_u.fu_list)) {
lg_local_lock_cpu(&files_lglock, file_list_cpu(file));
list_del_init(&file->f_u.fu_list);
lg_local_unlock_cpu(&files_lglock, file_list_cpu(file));
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void file_sb_list_del(struct file *file)
| 166,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() {
PrefService* DataReductionProxySettings::GetOriginalProfilePrefs() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return prefs_;
}
| 172,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestConfirmation(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey) {
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestConfirmation(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey) {
DictionaryValue params;
params.SetString("pairing", "bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
params.SetInteger("passkey", passkey);
SendDeviceNotification(device, ¶ms);
}
| 170,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
count=ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
if (count != 512)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment,exception);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
image->alpha_trait=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if ((MagickSizeType) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Create bi-level colormap.
*/
image->colors=2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((size_t) number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
if ((MagickSizeType) (bytes_per_pixel*max_packets) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
number_pixels,max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pixels,0,MagickMax(number_pixels,max_packets)*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)),q);
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(image,q);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].red),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].green),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].blue),q);
}
SetPixelAlpha(image,image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueAlpha,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count == 1) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
count=ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
if (count != 512)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment,exception);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
image->alpha_trait=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if ((MagickSizeType) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Create bi-level colormap.
*/
image->colors=2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((size_t) number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
if ((MagickSizeType) (bytes_per_pixel*max_packets) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
number_pixels,max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pixels,0,MagickMax(number_pixels,max_packets)*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)),q);
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(image,q);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].red),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].green),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].blue),q);
}
SetPixelAlpha(image,image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueAlpha,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count == 1) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 169,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
if (po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (po->fanout) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
| 167,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextcprl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno < pi->numcomps; ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
pirlvl = pi->picomp->pirlvls;
pi->xstep = pi->picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
pi->ystep = pi->picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
for (rlvlno = 1, pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[1];
rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
pi->xstep = JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, pi->picomp->hsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
pi->ystep = JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, pi->picomp->vsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcheightexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend;
pi->y += pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend;
pi->x += pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls && pi->rlvlno <
pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno, ++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind *
pi->pirlvl->numhprcs +
prchind;
assert(pi->prcno <
pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno <
pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpc_pi_nextcprl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp = &pi->picomps[pi->compno];
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend) && pi->compno < pi->numcomps;
++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
pirlvl = pi->picomp->pirlvls;
// Check for the potential for overflow problems.
if (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2 ||
pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls >
JAS_UINTFAST32_NUMBITS - 2) {
return -1;
}
pi->xstep = pi->picomp->hsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
pi->ystep = pi->picomp->vsamp * (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1));
for (rlvlno = 1, pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[1];
rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
pi->xstep = JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, pi->picomp->hsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcwidthexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
pi->ystep = JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, pi->picomp->vsamp *
(JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << (pirlvl->prcheightexpn +
pi->picomp->numrlvls - rlvlno - 1)));
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend;
pi->y += pi->ystep - (pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend;
pi->x += pi->xstep - (pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls && pi->rlvlno <
pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno, ++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart &&
((trx0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart &&
((try0 << r) % (JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t, 1) << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x,
pi->picomp->hsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0, pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y,
pi->picomp->vsamp << r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) -
JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0, pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend);
++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
get_page(buf->page);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
bool generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
return try_get_page(buf->page);
}
| 170,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TestingPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | void TestingPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
RELEASE_ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
| 172,239 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
if (s->block_size % 512) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be a multiple of 512",
s->block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (s->block_size == 0) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size cannot be zero");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cloop's create_compressed_fs.c warns about block sizes beyond 256 KB but
* we can accept more. Prevent ridiculous values like 4 GB - 1 since we
* need a buffer this big.
*/
if (s->block_size > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be %u MB or less",
s->block_size,
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / (1024 * 1024));
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
if (s->block_size % 512) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be a multiple of 512",
s->block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (s->block_size == 0) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size cannot be zero");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cloop's create_compressed_fs.c warns about block sizes beyond 256 KB but
* we can accept more. Prevent ridiculous values like 4 GB - 1 since we
* need a buffer this big.
*/
if (s->block_size > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be %u MB or less",
s->block_size,
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / (1024 * 1024));
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
if (s->n_blocks > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(uint64_t)) {
/* Prevent integer overflow */
error_setg(errp, "n_blocks %u must be %zu or less",
s->n_blocks,
UINT32_MAX / sizeof(uint64_t));
return -EINVAL;
}
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
| 165,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, version;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (cmd < 0 || shmid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
version = ipc_parse_version(&cmd);
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
return shmctl_nolock(ns, shmid, cmd, version, buf);
case IPC_RMID:
case IPC_SET:
return shmctl_down(ns, shmid, cmd, buf, version);
case SHM_LOCK:
case SHM_UNLOCK:
{
struct file *shm_file;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock1;
}
audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock1;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
kuid_t euid = current_euid();
err = -EPERM;
if (!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.uid) &&
!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.cuid))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK && !rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK))
goto out_unlock0;
}
shm_file = shp->shm_file;
if (is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK) {
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
err = shmem_lock(shm_file, 1, user);
if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)) {
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = user;
}
goto out_unlock0;
}
/* SHM_UNLOCK */
if (!(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED))
goto out_unlock0;
shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
get_file(shm_file);
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
shmem_unlock_mapping(shm_file->f_mapping);
fput(shm_file);
return err;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock0:
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
out_unlock1:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, version;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (cmd < 0 || shmid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
version = ipc_parse_version(&cmd);
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
return shmctl_nolock(ns, shmid, cmd, version, buf);
case IPC_RMID:
case IPC_SET:
return shmctl_down(ns, shmid, cmd, buf, version);
case SHM_LOCK:
case SHM_UNLOCK:
{
struct file *shm_file;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock1;
}
audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock1;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
kuid_t euid = current_euid();
err = -EPERM;
if (!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.uid) &&
!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.cuid))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK && !rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK))
goto out_unlock0;
}
shm_file = shp->shm_file;
/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
if (shm_file == NULL) {
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_unlock0;
}
if (is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK) {
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
err = shmem_lock(shm_file, 1, user);
if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)) {
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = user;
}
goto out_unlock0;
}
/* SHM_UNLOCK */
if (!(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED))
goto out_unlock0;
shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
get_file(shm_file);
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
shmem_unlock_mapping(shm_file->f_mapping);
fput(shm_file);
return err;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock0:
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
out_unlock1:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
| 165,910 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void snd_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer * timer, unsigned long ticks_left)
{
struct snd_timer_instance *ti, *ts, *tmp;
unsigned long resolution, ticks;
struct list_head *p, *ack_list_head;
unsigned long flags;
int use_tasklet = 0;
if (timer == NULL)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
/* remember the current resolution */
if (timer->hw.c_resolution)
resolution = timer->hw.c_resolution(timer);
else
resolution = timer->hw.resolution;
/* loop for all active instances
* Here we cannot use list_for_each_entry because the active_list of a
* processed instance is relinked to done_list_head before the callback
* is called.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(ti, tmp, &timer->active_list_head,
active_list) {
if (!(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING))
continue;
ti->pticks += ticks_left;
ti->resolution = resolution;
if (ti->cticks < ticks_left)
ti->cticks = 0;
else
ti->cticks -= ticks_left;
if (ti->cticks) /* not expired */
continue;
if (ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO) {
ti->cticks = ti->ticks;
} else {
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
if (--timer->running)
list_del(&ti->active_list);
}
if ((timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_TASKLET) ||
(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST))
ack_list_head = &timer->ack_list_head;
else
ack_list_head = &timer->sack_list_head;
if (list_empty(&ti->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ti->ack_list, ack_list_head);
list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list) {
ts->pticks = ti->pticks;
ts->resolution = resolution;
if (list_empty(&ts->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ts->ack_list, ack_list_head);
}
}
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED)
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, timer->sticks);
if (timer->running) {
if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_STOP) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
timer->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
}
if (!(timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_AUTO) ||
(timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE)) {
/* restart timer */
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
} else {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
}
/* now process all fast callbacks */
while (!list_empty(&timer->ack_list_head)) {
p = timer->ack_list_head.next; /* get first item */
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, ack_list);
/* remove from ack_list and make empty */
list_del_init(p);
ticks = ti->pticks;
ti->pticks = 0;
ti->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
if (ti->callback)
ti->callback(ti, resolution, ticks);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
}
/* do we have any slow callbacks? */
use_tasklet = !list_empty(&timer->sack_list_head);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
if (use_tasklet)
tasklet_schedule(&timer->task_queue);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix double unlink of active_list
ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are
unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile
snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves
the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice,
and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer.
The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void snd_timer_interrupt(struct snd_timer * timer, unsigned long ticks_left)
{
struct snd_timer_instance *ti, *ts, *tmp;
unsigned long resolution, ticks;
struct list_head *p, *ack_list_head;
unsigned long flags;
int use_tasklet = 0;
if (timer == NULL)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
/* remember the current resolution */
if (timer->hw.c_resolution)
resolution = timer->hw.c_resolution(timer);
else
resolution = timer->hw.resolution;
/* loop for all active instances
* Here we cannot use list_for_each_entry because the active_list of a
* processed instance is relinked to done_list_head before the callback
* is called.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(ti, tmp, &timer->active_list_head,
active_list) {
if (!(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING))
continue;
ti->pticks += ticks_left;
ti->resolution = resolution;
if (ti->cticks < ticks_left)
ti->cticks = 0;
else
ti->cticks -= ticks_left;
if (ti->cticks) /* not expired */
continue;
if (ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO) {
ti->cticks = ti->ticks;
} else {
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
if (--timer->running)
list_del_init(&ti->active_list);
}
if ((timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_TASKLET) ||
(ti->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST))
ack_list_head = &timer->ack_list_head;
else
ack_list_head = &timer->sack_list_head;
if (list_empty(&ti->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ti->ack_list, ack_list_head);
list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list) {
ts->pticks = ti->pticks;
ts->resolution = resolution;
if (list_empty(&ts->ack_list))
list_add_tail(&ts->ack_list, ack_list_head);
}
}
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED)
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, timer->sticks);
if (timer->running) {
if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_STOP) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
timer->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
}
if (!(timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_AUTO) ||
(timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE)) {
/* restart timer */
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
} else {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
}
/* now process all fast callbacks */
while (!list_empty(&timer->ack_list_head)) {
p = timer->ack_list_head.next; /* get first item */
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, ack_list);
/* remove from ack_list and make empty */
list_del_init(p);
ticks = ti->pticks;
ti->pticks = 0;
ti->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
if (ti->callback)
ti->callback(ti, resolution, ticks);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
}
/* do we have any slow callbacks? */
use_tasklet = !list_empty(&timer->sack_list_head);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
if (use_tasklet)
tasklet_schedule(&timer->task_queue);
}
| 167,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length)
{
XcursorComment *comment;
if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
return NULL;
{
XcursorComment *comment;
if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
return NULL;
comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1);
comment->comment[0] = '\0';
return comment;
}
void
XcursorCommentDestroy (XcursorComment *comment)
{
free (comment);
}
XcursorComments *
XcursorCommentsCreate (int size)
{
XcursorComments *comments;
comments = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComments) +
size * sizeof (XcursorComment *));
if (!comments)
return NULL;
comments->ncomment = 0;
comments->comments = (XcursorComment **) (comments + 1);
return comments;
}
void
XcursorCommentsDestroy (XcursorComments *comments)
{
int n;
if (!comments)
return;
for (n = 0; n < comments->ncomment; n++)
XcursorCommentDestroy (comments->comments[n]);
free (comments);
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorReadUInt (XcursorFile *file, XcursorUInt *u)
{
unsigned char bytes[4];
if (!file || !u)
return XcursorFalse;
if ((*file->read) (file, bytes, 4) != 4)
return XcursorFalse;
*u = ((bytes[0] << 0) |
(bytes[1] << 8) |
(bytes[2] << 16) |
(bytes[3] << 24));
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorReadBytes (XcursorFile *file, char *bytes, int length)
{
if (!file || !bytes || (*file->read) (file, (unsigned char *) bytes, length) != length)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteUInt (XcursorFile *file, XcursorUInt u)
{
unsigned char bytes[4];
if (!file)
return XcursorFalse;
bytes[0] = u;
bytes[1] = u >> 8;
bytes[2] = u >> 16;
bytes[3] = u >> 24;
if ((*file->write) (file, bytes, 4) != 4)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteBytes (XcursorFile *file, char *bytes, int length)
{
if (!file || !bytes || (*file->write) (file, (unsigned char *) bytes, length) != length)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static void
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
free (fileHeader);
}
static XcursorFileHeader *
_XcursorFileHeaderCreate (XcursorUInt ntoc)
{
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader;
if (ntoc > 0x10000)
return NULL;
fileHeader = malloc (sizeof (XcursorFileHeader) +
ntoc * sizeof (XcursorFileToc));
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = XCURSOR_MAGIC;
fileHeader->header = XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
fileHeader->version = XCURSOR_FILE_VERSION;
fileHeader->ntoc = ntoc;
fileHeader->tocs = (XcursorFileToc *) (fileHeader + 1);
return fileHeader;
}
static XcursorFileHeader *
_XcursorReadFileHeader (XcursorFile *file)
{
XcursorFileHeader head, *fileHeader;
XcursorUInt skip;
int n;
if (!file)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.magic))
return NULL;
if (head.magic != XCURSOR_MAGIC)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.header))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.version))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.ntoc))
return NULL;
skip = head.header - XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (skip)
if ((*file->seek) (file, skip, SEEK_CUR) == EOF)
return NULL;
fileHeader = _XcursorFileHeaderCreate (head.ntoc);
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = head.magic;
fileHeader->header = head.header;
fileHeader->version = head.version;
fileHeader->ntoc = head.ntoc;
for (n = 0; n < fileHeader->ntoc; n++)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].type))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].subtype))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].position))
break;
}
if (n != fileHeader->ntoc)
{
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (fileHeader);
return NULL;
}
return fileHeader;
}
static XcursorUInt
_XcursorFileHeaderLength (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
return (XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN +
fileHeader->ntoc * XCURSOR_FILE_TOC_LEN);
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteFileHeader (XcursorFile *file, XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
int toc;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->magic))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->ntoc))
return XcursorFalse;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].position))
return XcursorFalse;
}
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorSeekToToc (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || \
(*file->seek) (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].position, SEEK_SET) == EOF)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc,
XcursorChunkHeader *chunkHeader)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || !chunkHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorSeekToToc (file, fileHeader, toc))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
/* sanity check */
if (chunkHeader->type != fileHeader->tocs[toc].type ||
chunkHeader->subtype != fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorFileWriteChunkHeader (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc,
XcursorChunkHeader *chunkHeader)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || !chunkHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorSeekToToc (file, fileHeader, toc))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
#define dist(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) - (b) : (b) - (a))
static XcursorDim
_XcursorFindBestSize (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
XcursorDim size,
int *nsizesp)
{
int n;
int nsizes = 0;
XcursorDim bestSize = 0;
XcursorDim thisSize;
if (!fileHeader || !nsizesp)
return 0;
for (n = 0; n < fileHeader->ntoc; n++)
{
if (fileHeader->tocs[n].type != XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE)
continue;
thisSize = fileHeader->tocs[n].subtype;
if (!bestSize || dist (thisSize, size) < dist (bestSize, size))
{
bestSize = thisSize;
nsizes = 1;
}
else if (thisSize == bestSize)
nsizes++;
}
*nsizesp = nsizes;
return bestSize;
}
static int
_XcursorFindImageToc (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
XcursorDim size,
int count)
{
int toc;
XcursorDim thisSize;
if (!fileHeader)
return 0;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
if (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type != XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE)
continue;
thisSize = fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype;
if (thisSize != size)
continue;
if (!count)
break;
count--;
}
if (toc == fileHeader->ntoc)
return -1;
return toc;
}
static XcursorImage *
_XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
/* Create the image and initialize it */
image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height);
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length)
{
XcursorComment *comment;
if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
return NULL;
{
XcursorComment *comment;
if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
return NULL;
comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1);
comment->comment[0] = '\0';
return comment;
}
void
XcursorCommentDestroy (XcursorComment *comment)
{
free (comment);
}
XcursorComments *
XcursorCommentsCreate (int size)
{
XcursorComments *comments;
comments = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComments) +
size * sizeof (XcursorComment *));
if (!comments)
return NULL;
comments->ncomment = 0;
comments->comments = (XcursorComment **) (comments + 1);
return comments;
}
void
XcursorCommentsDestroy (XcursorComments *comments)
{
int n;
if (!comments)
return;
for (n = 0; n < comments->ncomment; n++)
XcursorCommentDestroy (comments->comments[n]);
free (comments);
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorReadUInt (XcursorFile *file, XcursorUInt *u)
{
unsigned char bytes[4];
if (!file || !u)
return XcursorFalse;
if ((*file->read) (file, bytes, 4) != 4)
return XcursorFalse;
*u = ((bytes[0] << 0) |
(bytes[1] << 8) |
(bytes[2] << 16) |
(bytes[3] << 24));
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorReadBytes (XcursorFile *file, char *bytes, int length)
{
if (!file || !bytes || (*file->read) (file, (unsigned char *) bytes, length) != length)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteUInt (XcursorFile *file, XcursorUInt u)
{
unsigned char bytes[4];
if (!file)
return XcursorFalse;
bytes[0] = u;
bytes[1] = u >> 8;
bytes[2] = u >> 16;
bytes[3] = u >> 24;
if ((*file->write) (file, bytes, 4) != 4)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteBytes (XcursorFile *file, char *bytes, int length)
{
if (!file || !bytes || (*file->write) (file, (unsigned char *) bytes, length) != length)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static void
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
free (fileHeader);
}
static XcursorFileHeader *
_XcursorFileHeaderCreate (XcursorUInt ntoc)
{
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader;
if (ntoc > 0x10000)
return NULL;
fileHeader = malloc (sizeof (XcursorFileHeader) +
ntoc * sizeof (XcursorFileToc));
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = XCURSOR_MAGIC;
fileHeader->header = XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
fileHeader->version = XCURSOR_FILE_VERSION;
fileHeader->ntoc = ntoc;
fileHeader->tocs = (XcursorFileToc *) (fileHeader + 1);
return fileHeader;
}
static XcursorFileHeader *
_XcursorReadFileHeader (XcursorFile *file)
{
XcursorFileHeader head, *fileHeader;
XcursorUInt skip;
int n;
if (!file)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.magic))
return NULL;
if (head.magic != XCURSOR_MAGIC)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.header))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.version))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.ntoc))
return NULL;
skip = head.header - XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (skip)
if ((*file->seek) (file, skip, SEEK_CUR) == EOF)
return NULL;
fileHeader = _XcursorFileHeaderCreate (head.ntoc);
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = head.magic;
fileHeader->header = head.header;
fileHeader->version = head.version;
fileHeader->ntoc = head.ntoc;
for (n = 0; n < fileHeader->ntoc; n++)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].type))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].subtype))
break;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &fileHeader->tocs[n].position))
break;
}
if (n != fileHeader->ntoc)
{
_XcursorFileHeaderDestroy (fileHeader);
return NULL;
}
return fileHeader;
}
static XcursorUInt
_XcursorFileHeaderLength (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
return (XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN +
fileHeader->ntoc * XCURSOR_FILE_TOC_LEN);
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorWriteFileHeader (XcursorFile *file, XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader)
{
int toc;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->magic))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->ntoc))
return XcursorFalse;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].position))
return XcursorFalse;
}
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorSeekToToc (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || \
(*file->seek) (file, fileHeader->tocs[toc].position, SEEK_SET) == EOF)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc,
XcursorChunkHeader *chunkHeader)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || !chunkHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorSeekToToc (file, fileHeader, toc))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
/* sanity check */
if (chunkHeader->type != fileHeader->tocs[toc].type ||
chunkHeader->subtype != fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
static XcursorBool
_XcursorFileWriteChunkHeader (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc,
XcursorChunkHeader *chunkHeader)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || !chunkHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorSeekToToc (file, fileHeader, toc))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorWriteUInt (file, chunkHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
#define dist(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) - (b) : (b) - (a))
static XcursorDim
_XcursorFindBestSize (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
XcursorDim size,
int *nsizesp)
{
int n;
int nsizes = 0;
XcursorDim bestSize = 0;
XcursorDim thisSize;
if (!fileHeader || !nsizesp)
return 0;
for (n = 0; n < fileHeader->ntoc; n++)
{
if (fileHeader->tocs[n].type != XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE)
continue;
thisSize = fileHeader->tocs[n].subtype;
if (!bestSize || dist (thisSize, size) < dist (bestSize, size))
{
bestSize = thisSize;
nsizes = 1;
}
else if (thisSize == bestSize)
nsizes++;
}
*nsizesp = nsizes;
return bestSize;
}
static int
_XcursorFindImageToc (XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
XcursorDim size,
int count)
{
int toc;
XcursorDim thisSize;
if (!fileHeader)
return 0;
for (toc = 0; toc < fileHeader->ntoc; toc++)
{
if (fileHeader->tocs[toc].type != XCURSOR_IMAGE_TYPE)
continue;
thisSize = fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype;
if (thisSize != size)
continue;
if (!count)
break;
count--;
}
if (toc == fileHeader->ntoc)
return -1;
return toc;
}
static XcursorImage *
_XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE ||
head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
/* Create the image and initialize it */
image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height);
if (image == NULL)
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
| 164,628 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread() {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_) {
is_started_ = false;
if (ipc_) {
ipc_->CloseStream(stream_id_);
ipc_->RemoveDelegate(stream_id_);
}
stream_id_ = 0;
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (!audio_thread_.get())
return;
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
audio_thread_->Stop(NULL);
audio_thread_.reset();
audio_callback_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread() {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_) {
is_started_ = false;
if (ipc_) {
ipc_->CloseStream(stream_id_);
ipc_->RemoveDelegate(stream_id_);
}
stream_id_ = 0;
}
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
audio_thread_.Stop(NULL);
audio_callback_.reset();
}
| 170,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fifo_open(notify_fifo_t* fifo, int (*script_exit)(thread_t *), const char *type)
{
int ret;
int sav_errno;
if (fifo->name) {
sav_errno = 0;
if (!(ret = mkfifo(fifo->name, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)))
fifo->created_fifo = true;
else {
sav_errno = errno;
if (sav_errno != EEXIST)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to create %snotify fifo %s", type, fifo->name);
}
if (!sav_errno || sav_errno == EEXIST) {
/* Run the notify script if there is one */
if (fifo->script)
notify_fifo_exec(master, script_exit, fifo, fifo->script);
/* Now open the fifo */
if ((fifo->fd = open(fifo->name, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to open %snotify fifo %s - errno %d", type, fifo->name, errno);
if (fifo->created_fifo) {
unlink(fifo->name);
fifo->created_fifo = false;
}
}
}
if (fifo->fd == -1) {
FREE(fifo->name);
fifo->name = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | fifo_open(notify_fifo_t* fifo, int (*script_exit)(thread_t *), const char *type)
{
int ret;
int sav_errno;
if (fifo->name) {
sav_errno = 0;
if (!(ret = mkfifo(fifo->name, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)))
fifo->created_fifo = true;
else {
sav_errno = errno;
if (sav_errno != EEXIST)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to create %snotify fifo %s", type, fifo->name);
}
if (!sav_errno || sav_errno == EEXIST) {
/* Run the notify script if there is one */
if (fifo->script)
notify_fifo_exec(master, script_exit, fifo, fifo->script);
/* Now open the fifo */
if ((fifo->fd = open(fifo->name, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW)) == -1) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to open %snotify fifo %s - errno %d", type, fifo->name, errno);
if (fifo->created_fifo) {
unlink(fifo->name);
fifo->created_fifo = false;
}
}
}
if (fifo->fd == -1) {
FREE(fifo->name);
fifo->name = NULL;
}
}
}
| 168,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver));
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dictionary(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
int entry = dictionary->FindEntry(isolate, k);
if (entry == SeededNumberDictionary::kNotFound) {
continue;
}
PropertyDetails details = GetDetailsImpl(*dictionary, entry);
switch (details.kind()) {
case kData: {
Object* element_k = dictionary->ValueAt(entry);
if (value->StrictEquals(element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
break;
}
case kAccessor: {
LookupIterator it(isolate, receiver, k,
LookupIterator::OWN_SKIP_INTERCEPTOR);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
Handle<Object> element_k;
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(
isolate, element_k, JSObject::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) return Just<int64_t>(k);
if (!JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver)) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
if (*dictionary == receiver->elements()) continue;
if (receiver->GetElementsKind() != DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
dictionary = handle(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
break;
}
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver));
Handle<Map> original_map(receiver->map(), isolate);
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dictionary(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(receiver->map(), *original_map);
int entry = dictionary->FindEntry(isolate, k);
if (entry == SeededNumberDictionary::kNotFound) {
continue;
}
PropertyDetails details = GetDetailsImpl(*dictionary, entry);
switch (details.kind()) {
case kData: {
Object* element_k = dictionary->ValueAt(entry);
if (value->StrictEquals(element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
break;
}
case kAccessor: {
LookupIterator it(isolate, receiver, k,
LookupIterator::OWN_SKIP_INTERCEPTOR);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
Handle<Object> element_k;
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(
isolate, element_k, JSObject::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) return Just<int64_t>(k);
if (!JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver)) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
if (*dictionary == receiver->elements()) continue;
if (receiver->GetElementsKind() != DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
dictionary = handle(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
break;
}
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
| 174,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_params __user *_params)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_params params;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct snd_timer_read *tr;
struct snd_timer_tread *ttr;
int err;
tu = file->private_data;
if (!tu->timeri)
return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
if (!t)
return -EBADFD;
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, _params, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE) && params.ticks < 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(params.queue_size < 32 || params.queue_size > 1024)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.filter & ~((1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_SUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESUME)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MPAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
snd_timer_stop(tu->timeri);
spin_lock_irq(&t->lock);
tu->timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT);
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_AUTO)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EXCLUSIVE)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EARLY_EVENT)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&t->lock);
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(unsigned int)tu->queue_size != params.queue_size) {
if (tu->tread) {
ttr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*ttr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ttr) {
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->tqueue = ttr;
}
} else {
tr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*tr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tr) {
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->queue = tr;
}
}
}
tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
if (tu->tread) {
struct snd_timer_tread tread;
tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
tread.val = 0;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &tread);
} else {
struct snd_timer_read *r = &tu->queue[0];
r->resolution = 0;
r->ticks = 0;
tu->qused++;
tu->qtail++;
}
}
tu->filter = params.filter;
tu->ticks = params.ticks;
err = 0;
_end:
if (copy_to_user(_params, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS
The stack object “tread” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_params __user *_params)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_params params;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct snd_timer_read *tr;
struct snd_timer_tread *ttr;
int err;
tu = file->private_data;
if (!tu->timeri)
return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
if (!t)
return -EBADFD;
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, _params, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE) && params.ticks < 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(params.queue_size < 32 || params.queue_size > 1024)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.filter & ~((1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_SUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESUME)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MPAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
snd_timer_stop(tu->timeri);
spin_lock_irq(&t->lock);
tu->timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT);
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_AUTO)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EXCLUSIVE)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EARLY_EVENT)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&t->lock);
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(unsigned int)tu->queue_size != params.queue_size) {
if (tu->tread) {
ttr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*ttr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ttr) {
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->tqueue = ttr;
}
} else {
tr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*tr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tr) {
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->queue = tr;
}
}
}
tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
if (tu->tread) {
struct snd_timer_tread tread;
memset(&tread, 0, sizeof(tread));
tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
tread.val = 0;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &tread);
} else {
struct snd_timer_read *r = &tu->queue[0];
r->resolution = 0;
r->ticks = 0;
tu->qused++;
tu->qtail++;
}
}
tu->filter = params.filter;
tu->ticks = params.ticks;
err = 0;
_end:
if (copy_to_user(_params, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
| 167,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderSVGImage::paint(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint&)
{
ANNOTATE_GRAPHICS_CONTEXT(paintInfo, this);
if (paintInfo.context->paintingDisabled() || style()->visibility() == HIDDEN || !m_imageResource->hasImage())
return;
FloatRect boundingBox = repaintRectInLocalCoordinates();
if (!SVGRenderSupport::paintInfoIntersectsRepaintRect(boundingBox, m_localTransform, paintInfo))
return;
PaintInfo childPaintInfo(paintInfo);
bool drawsOutline = style()->outlineWidth() && (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseSelfOutline);
if (drawsOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground) {
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*childPaintInfo.context);
childPaintInfo.applyTransform(m_localTransform);
if (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground) {
SVGRenderingContext renderingContext(this, childPaintInfo);
if (renderingContext.isRenderingPrepared()) {
if (style()->svgStyle()->bufferedRendering() == BR_STATIC && renderingContext.bufferForeground(m_bufferedForeground))
return;
paintForeground(childPaintInfo);
}
}
if (drawsOutline)
paintOutline(childPaintInfo, IntRect(boundingBox));
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid drawing SVG image content when the image is of zero size.
R=pdr
BUG=330420
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/109753004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@164536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void RenderSVGImage::paint(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint&)
{
ANNOTATE_GRAPHICS_CONTEXT(paintInfo, this);
if (paintInfo.context->paintingDisabled() || style()->visibility() == HIDDEN || !m_imageResource->hasImage())
return;
FloatRect boundingBox = repaintRectInLocalCoordinates();
if (!SVGRenderSupport::paintInfoIntersectsRepaintRect(boundingBox, m_localTransform, paintInfo))
return;
PaintInfo childPaintInfo(paintInfo);
bool drawsOutline = style()->outlineWidth() && (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseSelfOutline);
if (drawsOutline || childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground) {
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*childPaintInfo.context);
childPaintInfo.applyTransform(m_localTransform);
if (childPaintInfo.phase == PaintPhaseForeground && !m_objectBoundingBox.isEmpty()) {
SVGRenderingContext renderingContext(this, childPaintInfo);
if (renderingContext.isRenderingPrepared()) {
if (style()->svgStyle()->bufferedRendering() == BR_STATIC && renderingContext.bufferForeground(m_bufferedForeground))
return;
paintForeground(childPaintInfo);
}
}
if (drawsOutline)
paintOutline(childPaintInfo, IntRect(boundingBox));
}
}
| 171,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
| 166,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (code == 0 || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[[email protected]: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (!code || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED || code == KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
| 168,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void perf_event_for_each(struct perf_event *event,
void (*func)(struct perf_event *))
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *sibling;
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
event = event->group_leader;
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void perf_event_for_each(struct perf_event *event,
void (*func)(struct perf_event *))
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *sibling;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
event = event->group_leader;
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
}
| 166,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static plist_t parse_bin_node(struct bplist_data *bplist, const char** object)
{
uint16_t type = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
if (!object)
return NULL;
type = (**object) & BPLIST_MASK;
size = (**object) & BPLIST_FILL;
(*object)++;
if (size == BPLIST_FILL) {
switch (type) {
case BPLIST_DATA:
case BPLIST_STRING:
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_DICT:
{
uint16_t next_size = **object & BPLIST_FILL;
if ((**object & BPLIST_MASK) != BPLIST_UINT) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid size node type for node type 0x%02x: found 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x\n", __func__, type, **object & BPLIST_MASK, BPLIST_UINT);
return NULL;
}
(*object)++;
next_size = 1 << next_size;
if (*object + next_size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: size node data bytes for node type 0x%02x point outside of valid range\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
size = UINT_TO_HOST(*object, next_size);
(*object) += next_size;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case BPLIST_NULL:
switch (size)
{
case BPLIST_TRUE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = TRUE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_FALSE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = FALSE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_NULL:
default:
return NULL;
}
case BPLIST_UINT:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UINT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uint_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_REAL:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_real_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATE:
if (3 != size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid data size for BPLIST_DATE node\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_date_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATA:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATA data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_data_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_STRING:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_STRING data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_string_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
if (size*2 < size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Integer overflow when calculating BPLIST_UNICODE data size.\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + size*2 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UNICODE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_unicode_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_ARRAY data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_array_node(bplist, object, size);
case BPLIST_UID:
if (*object + size+1 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UID data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uid_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DICT:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_dict_node(bplist, object, size);
default:
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: unexpected node type 0x%02x\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static plist_t parse_bin_node(struct bplist_data *bplist, const char** object)
{
uint16_t type = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
if (!object)
return NULL;
type = (**object) & BPLIST_MASK;
size = (**object) & BPLIST_FILL;
(*object)++;
if (size == BPLIST_FILL) {
switch (type) {
case BPLIST_DATA:
case BPLIST_STRING:
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_DICT:
{
uint16_t next_size = **object & BPLIST_FILL;
if ((**object & BPLIST_MASK) != BPLIST_UINT) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid size node type for node type 0x%02x: found 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x\n", __func__, type, **object & BPLIST_MASK, BPLIST_UINT);
return NULL;
}
(*object)++;
next_size = 1 << next_size;
if (*object + next_size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: size node data bytes for node type 0x%02x point outside of valid range\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
size = UINT_TO_HOST(*object, next_size);
(*object) += next_size;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case BPLIST_NULL:
switch (size)
{
case BPLIST_TRUE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = TRUE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_FALSE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = FALSE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_NULL:
default:
return NULL;
}
case BPLIST_UINT:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UINT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uint_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_REAL:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_real_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATE:
if (3 != size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid data size for BPLIST_DATE node\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_date_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATA:
if (*object + size < *object || *object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATA data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_data_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_STRING:
if (*object + size < *object || *object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_STRING data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_string_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
if (size*2 < size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Integer overflow when calculating BPLIST_UNICODE data size.\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + size*2 < *object || *object + size*2 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UNICODE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_unicode_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
if (*object + size < *object || *object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_ARRAY data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_array_node(bplist, object, size);
case BPLIST_UID:
if (*object + size+1 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UID data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uid_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DICT:
if (*object + size < *object || *object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DICT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_dict_node(bplist, object, size);
default:
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: unexpected node type 0x%02x\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
| 168,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
int page_number = params.page_number;
if (page_number < FIRST_PAGE_INDEX || !params.data_size)
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data_bytes =
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size);
DCHECK(data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(page_number,
std::move(data_bytes));
print_preview_ui->OnDidPreviewPage(page_number, params.preview_request_id);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
int page_number = params.page_number;
if (page_number < FIRST_PAGE_INDEX || !params.data_size)
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
if (IsOopifEnabled() && print_preview_ui->source_is_modifiable()) {
auto* client = PrintCompositeClient::FromWebContents(web_contents());
DCHECK(client);
// Use utility process to convert skia metafile to pdf.
client->DoComposite(
params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size,
base::BindOnce(&PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnCompositePdfPageDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params.page_number,
params.preview_request_id));
} else {
NotifyUIPreviewPageReady(
page_number, params.preview_request_id,
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size));
}
}
| 171,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::MarkAsForeignEntry(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
host->MarkAsForeignEntry(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | bool AppCacheBackendImpl::MarkAsForeignEntry(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
return host->MarkAsForeignEntry(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from);
}
| 171,735 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
| 171,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
m->msg_namelen = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
| 166,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Block::GetFrameCount() const
{
return m_frame_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int Block::GetFrameCount() const
| 174,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
if (ses->server->sign)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
| 169,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure that not all tiles lie outside the image area.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (siz->tilexoff >= siz->width || siz->tileyoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("all tiles are outside the image area\n");
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Instance::HandleInputEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
pp::InputEvent event_device_res(event);
{
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
if (!mouse_event.is_null()) {
pp::Point point = mouse_event.GetPosition();
pp::Point movement = mouse_event.GetMovement();
ScalePoint(device_scale_, &point);
ScalePoint(device_scale_, &movement);
mouse_event = pp::MouseInputEvent(
this,
event.GetType(),
event.GetTimeStamp(),
event.GetModifiers(),
mouse_event.GetButton(),
point,
mouse_event.GetClickCount(),
movement);
event_device_res = mouse_event;
}
}
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE &&
(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_MIDDLEBUTTONDOWN)) {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event_device_res);
pp::Point pos = mouse_event.GetPosition();
EnableAutoscroll(pos);
UpdateCursor(CalculateAutoscroll(pos));
return true;
} else {
DisableAutoscroll();
}
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSELEAVE)
thumbnails_.SlideOut();
if (thumbnails_.HandleEvent(event_device_res))
return true;
#endif
if (toolbar_->HandleEvent(event_device_res))
return true;
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE) {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
pp::Point pt = mouse_event.GetPosition();
pp::Rect v_scrollbar_rc;
v_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&v_scrollbar_rc);
if (v_scrollbar_rc.Contains(pt) &&
(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_LEFTBUTTONDOWN)) {
thumbnails_.SlideIn();
}
if (!v_scrollbar_rc.Contains(pt) && thumbnails_.visible() &&
!(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_LEFTBUTTONDOWN) &&
!thumbnails_.rect().Contains(pt)) {
thumbnails_.SlideOut();
}
}
#endif
pp::InputEvent offset_event(event_device_res);
bool try_engine_first = true;
switch (offset_event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEENTER:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSELEAVE: {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event_device_res);
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event_dip(event);
pp::Point point = mouse_event.GetPosition();
point.set_x(point.x() - available_area_.x());
offset_event = pp::MouseInputEvent(
this,
event.GetType(),
event.GetTimeStamp(),
event.GetModifiers(),
mouse_event.GetButton(),
point,
mouse_event.GetClickCount(),
mouse_event.GetMovement());
if (!engine_->IsSelecting()) {
if (!IsOverlayScrollbar() &&
!available_area_.Contains(mouse_event.GetPosition())) {
try_engine_first = false;
} else if (IsOverlayScrollbar()) {
pp::Rect temp;
if ((v_scrollbar_.get() && v_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&temp) &&
temp.Contains(mouse_event_dip.GetPosition())) ||
(h_scrollbar_.get() && h_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&temp) &&
temp.Contains(mouse_event_dip.GetPosition()))) {
try_engine_first = false;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (try_engine_first && engine_->HandleEvent(offset_event))
return true;
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN) {
pp::KeyboardInputEvent keyboard_event(event);
bool no_h_scrollbar = !h_scrollbar_.get();
uint32_t key_code = keyboard_event.GetKeyCode();
bool page_down = no_h_scrollbar && key_code == ui::VKEY_RIGHT;
bool page_up = no_h_scrollbar && key_code == ui::VKEY_LEFT;
if (zoom_mode_ == ZOOM_FIT_TO_PAGE) {
bool has_shift =
keyboard_event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_SHIFTKEY;
bool key_is_space = key_code == ui::VKEY_SPACE;
page_down |= key_is_space || key_code == ui::VKEY_NEXT;
page_up |= (key_is_space && has_shift) || (key_code == ui::VKEY_PRIOR);
}
if (page_down) {
int page = engine_->GetFirstVisiblePage();
if (engine_->GetPageRect(page).bottom() * zoom_ <=
v_scrollbar_->GetValue())
page++;
ScrollToPage(page + 1);
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
} else if (page_up) {
int page = engine_->GetFirstVisiblePage();
if (engine_->GetPageRect(page).y() * zoom_ >= v_scrollbar_->GetValue())
page--;
ScrollToPage(page);
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
}
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && v_scrollbar_->HandleEvent(event)) {
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
if (h_scrollbar_.get() && h_scrollbar_->HandleEvent(event)) {
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
if (timer_pending_ &&
(event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP ||
event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE)) {
timer_factory_.CancelAll();
timer_pending_ = false;
} else if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE &&
engine_->IsSelecting()) {
bool set_timer = false;
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
if (v_scrollbar_.get() &&
(mouse_event.GetPosition().y() <= 0 ||
mouse_event.GetPosition().y() >= (plugin_dip_size_.height() - 1))) {
v_scrollbar_->ScrollBy(
PP_SCROLLBY_LINE, mouse_event.GetPosition().y() >= 0 ? 1: -1);
set_timer = true;
}
if (h_scrollbar_.get() &&
(mouse_event.GetPosition().x() <= 0 ||
mouse_event.GetPosition().x() >= (plugin_dip_size_.width() - 1))) {
h_scrollbar_->ScrollBy(PP_SCROLLBY_LINE,
mouse_event.GetPosition().x() >= 0 ? 1: -1);
set_timer = true;
}
if (set_timer) {
last_mouse_event_ = pp::MouseInputEvent(event);
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
timer_factory_.NewCallback(&Instance::OnTimerFired);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(kDragTimerMs, callback);
timer_pending_ = true;
}
}
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN &&
event.GetModifiers() & kDefaultKeyModifier) {
pp::KeyboardInputEvent keyboard_event(event);
switch (keyboard_event.GetKeyCode()) {
case 'A':
engine_->SelectAll();
return true;
}
}
return (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Instance::HandleInputEvent(const pp::InputEvent& event) {
pp::InputEvent event_device_res(event);
{
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
if (!mouse_event.is_null()) {
pp::Point point = mouse_event.GetPosition();
pp::Point movement = mouse_event.GetMovement();
ScalePoint(device_scale_, &point);
ScalePoint(device_scale_, &movement);
mouse_event = pp::MouseInputEvent(
this,
event.GetType(),
event.GetTimeStamp(),
event.GetModifiers(),
mouse_event.GetButton(),
point,
mouse_event.GetClickCount(),
movement);
event_device_res = mouse_event;
}
}
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE &&
(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_MIDDLEBUTTONDOWN)) {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event_device_res);
pp::Point pos = mouse_event.GetPosition();
EnableAutoscroll(pos);
UpdateCursor(CalculateAutoscroll(pos));
return true;
} else {
DisableAutoscroll();
}
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSELEAVE)
thumbnails_.SlideOut();
if (thumbnails_.HandleEvent(event_device_res))
return true;
#endif
if (toolbar_->HandleEvent(event_device_res))
return true;
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE) {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
pp::Point pt = mouse_event.GetPosition();
pp::Rect v_scrollbar_rc;
v_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&v_scrollbar_rc);
if (v_scrollbar_rc.Contains(pt) &&
(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_LEFTBUTTONDOWN)) {
thumbnails_.SlideIn();
}
if (!v_scrollbar_rc.Contains(pt) && thumbnails_.visible() &&
!(event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_LEFTBUTTONDOWN) &&
!thumbnails_.rect().Contains(pt)) {
thumbnails_.SlideOut();
}
}
#endif
pp::InputEvent offset_event(event_device_res);
bool try_engine_first = true;
switch (offset_event.GetType()) {
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEENTER:
case PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSELEAVE: {
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event_device_res);
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event_dip(event);
pp::Point point = mouse_event.GetPosition();
point.set_x(point.x() - available_area_.x());
offset_event = pp::MouseInputEvent(
this,
event.GetType(),
event.GetTimeStamp(),
event.GetModifiers(),
mouse_event.GetButton(),
point,
mouse_event.GetClickCount(),
mouse_event.GetMovement());
if (!engine_->IsSelecting()) {
if (!IsOverlayScrollbar() &&
!available_area_.Contains(mouse_event.GetPosition())) {
try_engine_first = false;
} else if (IsOverlayScrollbar()) {
pp::Rect temp;
if ((v_scrollbar_.get() && v_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&temp) &&
temp.Contains(mouse_event_dip.GetPosition())) ||
(h_scrollbar_.get() && h_scrollbar_->GetLocation(&temp) &&
temp.Contains(mouse_event_dip.GetPosition()))) {
try_engine_first = false;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (try_engine_first && engine_->HandleEvent(offset_event))
return true;
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN) {
pp::KeyboardInputEvent keyboard_event(event);
bool no_h_scrollbar = !h_scrollbar_.get();
uint32_t key_code = keyboard_event.GetKeyCode();
bool page_down = no_h_scrollbar && key_code == ui::VKEY_RIGHT;
bool page_up = no_h_scrollbar && key_code == ui::VKEY_LEFT;
if (zoom_mode_ == ZOOM_FIT_TO_PAGE) {
bool has_shift =
keyboard_event.GetModifiers() & PP_INPUTEVENT_MODIFIER_SHIFTKEY;
bool key_is_space = key_code == ui::VKEY_SPACE;
page_down |= key_is_space || key_code == ui::VKEY_NEXT;
page_up |= (key_is_space && has_shift) || (key_code == ui::VKEY_PRIOR);
}
if (page_down) {
int page = engine_->GetFirstVisiblePage();
if (page == -1)
return true;
if (engine_->GetPageRect(page).bottom() * zoom_ <=
v_scrollbar_->GetValue())
page++;
ScrollToPage(page + 1);
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
} else if (page_up) {
int page = engine_->GetFirstVisiblePage();
if (page == -1)
return true;
if (engine_->GetPageRect(page).y() * zoom_ >= v_scrollbar_->GetValue())
page--;
ScrollToPage(page);
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
}
if (v_scrollbar_.get() && v_scrollbar_->HandleEvent(event)) {
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
if (h_scrollbar_.get() && h_scrollbar_->HandleEvent(event)) {
UpdateCursor(PP_CURSORTYPE_POINTER);
return true;
}
if (timer_pending_ &&
(event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEUP ||
event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE)) {
timer_factory_.CancelAll();
timer_pending_ = false;
} else if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEMOVE &&
engine_->IsSelecting()) {
bool set_timer = false;
pp::MouseInputEvent mouse_event(event);
if (v_scrollbar_.get() &&
(mouse_event.GetPosition().y() <= 0 ||
mouse_event.GetPosition().y() >= (plugin_dip_size_.height() - 1))) {
v_scrollbar_->ScrollBy(
PP_SCROLLBY_LINE, mouse_event.GetPosition().y() >= 0 ? 1: -1);
set_timer = true;
}
if (h_scrollbar_.get() &&
(mouse_event.GetPosition().x() <= 0 ||
mouse_event.GetPosition().x() >= (plugin_dip_size_.width() - 1))) {
h_scrollbar_->ScrollBy(PP_SCROLLBY_LINE,
mouse_event.GetPosition().x() >= 0 ? 1: -1);
set_timer = true;
}
if (set_timer) {
last_mouse_event_ = pp::MouseInputEvent(event);
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
timer_factory_.NewCallback(&Instance::OnTimerFired);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(kDragTimerMs, callback);
timer_pending_ = true;
}
}
if (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN &&
event.GetModifiers() & kDefaultKeyModifier) {
pp::KeyboardInputEvent keyboard_event(event);
switch (keyboard_event.GetKeyCode()) {
case 'A':
engine_->SelectAll();
return true;
}
}
return (event.GetType() == PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_MOUSEDOWN);
}
| 171,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: parse_encoding( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */
/* and we must load it now */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' )
{
T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding;
FT_Int count, n;
PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bool only_immediates = 0;
/* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */
if ( *cur == '[' )
{
count = 256;
only_immediates = 1;
parser->root.cursor++;
}
else
count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
/* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */
loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
char_table, count, memory ) ) )
{
parser->root.error = error;
return;
}
/* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
char* notdef = (char *)".notdef";
T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 );
}
/* Now we need to read records of the form */
/* */
/* ... charcode /charname ... */
/* */
/* for each entry in our table. */
/* */
/* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */
/* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */
/* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */
/* */
/* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */
/* */
/* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */
/* */
/* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */
/* */
/* /Encoding [ ... ] */
/* */
/* we only read immediates. */
n = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */
if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit )
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' &&
IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur += 3;
break;
}
}
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur++;
break;
}
/* check whether we've found an entry */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates )
{
FT_Int charcode;
if ( only_immediates )
charcode = n;
else
{
charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
cur = parser->root.cursor;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode,
cur, len + 1 );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0';
n++;
}
else if ( only_immediates )
{
/* Since the current position is not updated for */
/* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */
/* we don't do anything here. */
/* */
/* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */
/* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */
/* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */
/* type1 font. */
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | parse_encoding( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */
/* and we must load it now */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' )
{
T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding;
FT_Int count, n;
PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bool only_immediates = 0;
/* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */
if ( *cur == '[' )
{
count = 256;
only_immediates = 1;
parser->root.cursor++;
}
else
count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
/* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */
loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
char_table, count, memory ) ) )
{
parser->root.error = error;
return;
}
/* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
char* notdef = (char *)".notdef";
T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 );
}
/* Now we need to read records of the form */
/* */
/* ... charcode /charname ... */
/* */
/* for each entry in our table. */
/* */
/* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */
/* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */
/* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */
/* */
/* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */
/* */
/* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */
/* */
/* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */
/* */
/* /Encoding [ ... ] */
/* */
/* we only read immediates. */
n = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */
if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit )
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' &&
IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur += 3;
break;
}
}
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur++;
break;
}
/* check whether we've found an entry */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates )
{
FT_Int charcode;
if ( only_immediates )
charcode = n;
else
{
charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* protect against invalid charcode */
if ( cur == parser->root.cursor )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
cur = parser->root.cursor;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode,
cur, len + 1 );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0';
n++;
}
else if ( only_immediates )
{
/* Since the current position is not updated for */
/* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */
/* we don't do anything here. */
/* */
/* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */
/* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */
/* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */
/* type1 font. */
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
}
| 164,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94 | static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->mode == SSI_SD_CMDARG &&
(s->arglen < 0 || s->arglen >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->cmdarg))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->mode == SSI_SD_RESPONSE &&
(s->response_pos < 0 || s->response_pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->response) ||
(!s->stopping && s->arglen > ARRAY_SIZE(s->response)))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
| 165,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
{
/* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *tmp;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longg ;
int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
return NULL;
BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longN);
memset(tmp, 0, longN);
longg = BN_bn2bin(g,tmp) ;
/* use the zeros behind to pad on left */
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp + longg, longN-longg);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longg);
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digest, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
return BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
{
/* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *tmp;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longg ;
int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
if (BN_ucmp(g, N) >= 0)
return NULL;
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
return NULL;
BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longN);
memset(tmp, 0, longN);
longg = BN_bn2bin(g,tmp) ;
/* use the zeros behind to pad on left */
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp + longg, longN-longg);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longg);
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digest, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
return BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
}
| 165,173 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
source_stride_ = (width_ + 31) & ~31;
reference_stride_ = width_ * 2;
rnd_.Reset(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
if (bd_ == -1) {
use_high_bit_depth_ = false;
bit_depth_ = VPX_BITS_8;
source_data_ = source_data8_;
reference_data_ = reference_data8_;
second_pred_ = second_pred8_;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
use_high_bit_depth_ = true;
bit_depth_ = static_cast<vpx_bit_depth_t>(bd_);
source_data_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(source_data16_);
reference_data_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(reference_data16_);
second_pred_ = CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(second_pred16_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
mask_ = (1 << bit_depth_) - 1;
source_stride_ = (width_ + 31) & ~31;
reference_stride_ = width_ * 2;
rnd_.Reset(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
}
| 174,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
| 169,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void uipc_check_interrupt_locked(void)
{
if (SAFE_FD_ISSET(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &uipc_main.read_set))
{
char sig_recv = 0;
recv(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void uipc_check_interrupt_locked(void)
{
if (SAFE_FD_ISSET(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &uipc_main.read_set))
{
char sig_recv = 0;
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(uipc_main.signal_fds[0], &sig_recv, sizeof(sig_recv), MSG_WAITALL));
}
}
| 173,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 42:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4 or 6"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
static int
dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
/*
* 13.1. Timestamp Option
*
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* |00101001|00000110| Timestamp Value |
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* Type=41 Length=6
*/
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 6]"));
break;
case 42:
/*
* 13.3. Timestamp Echo Option
*
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* |00101010|00000110| Timestamp Echo |
* +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
* Type=42 Len=6
*
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
* |00101010|00001000| Timestamp Echo | Elapsed Time |
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+--------+--------+
* Type=42 Len=8 (4 bytes)
*
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
* |00101010|00001010| Timestamp Echo | Elapsed Time |
* +--------+--------+------- ... -------+------- ... -------+
* Type=42 Len=10 (4 bytes) (4 bytes)
*/
switch (optlen) {
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 8:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (elapsed time %u)", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 6)));
break;
case 10:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (elapsed time %u)", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 6)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 6 or 8 or 10]"));
break;
}
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [optlen != 4 or 6]"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
| 169,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
file_sb_list_del(f);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
| 166,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jas_stream_read(jas_stream_t *stream, void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
int c;
char *bufptr;
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(stream)) == EOF) {
return n;
}
*bufptr++ = c;
++n;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int jas_stream_read(jas_stream_t *stream, void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
int c;
char *bufptr;
if (cnt < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_read");
}
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(stream)) == EOF) {
return n;
}
*bufptr++ = c;
++n;
}
return n;
}
| 168,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
/* Create the entry. */
const char *linkname;
mode_t final_mode, mode;
int r;
/* We identify hard/symlinks according to the link names. */
/* Since link(2) and symlink(2) don't handle modes, we're done here. */
linkname = archive_entry_hardlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if !HAVE_LINK
return (EPERM);
#else
r = link(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
/*
* New cpio and pax formats allow hardlink entries
* to carry data, so we may have to open the file
* for hardlink entries.
*
* If the hardlink was successfully created and
* the archive doesn't have carry data for it,
* consider it to be non-authoritative for meta data.
* This is consistent with GNU tar and BSD pax.
* If the hardlink does carry data, let the last
* archive entry decide ownership.
*/
if (r == 0 && a->filesize <= 0) {
a->todo = 0;
a->deferred = 0;
} else if (r == 0 && a->filesize > 0) {
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
if (a->fd < 0)
r = errno;
}
return (r);
#endif
}
linkname = archive_entry_symlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if HAVE_SYMLINK
return symlink(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
#else
return (EPERM);
#endif
}
/*
* The remaining system calls all set permissions, so let's
* try to take advantage of that to avoid an extra chmod()
* call. (Recall that umask is set to zero right now!)
*/
/* Mode we want for the final restored object (w/o file type bits). */
final_mode = a->mode & 07777;
/*
* The mode that will actually be restored in this step. Note
* that SUID, SGID, etc, require additional work to ensure
* security, so we never restore them at this point.
*/
mode = final_mode & 0777 & ~a->user_umask;
switch (a->mode & AE_IFMT) {
default:
/* POSIX requires that we fall through here. */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case AE_IFREG:
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
r = (a->fd < 0);
break;
case AE_IFCHR:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
/* Note: we use AE_IFCHR for the case label, and
* S_IFCHR for the mknod() call. This is correct. */
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFCHR,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a char device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFBLK:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFBLK,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a block device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFDIR:
mode = (mode | MINIMUM_DIR_MODE) & MAXIMUM_DIR_MODE;
r = mkdir(a->name, mode);
if (r == 0) {
/* Defer setting dir times. */
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_TIMES);
a->todo &= ~TODO_TIMES;
/* Never use an immediate chmod(). */
/* We can't avoid the chmod() entirely if EXTRACT_PERM
* because of SysV SGID inheritance. */
if ((mode != final_mode)
|| (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM))
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_MODE);
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
}
break;
case AE_IFIFO:
#ifdef HAVE_MKFIFO
r = mkfifo(a->name, mode);
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a fifo. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKFIFO */
}
/* All the system calls above set errno on failure. */
if (r)
return (errno);
/* If we managed to set the final mode, we've avoided a chmod(). */
if (mode == final_mode)
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
/* Create the entry. */
const char *linkname;
mode_t final_mode, mode;
int r;
/* these for check_symlinks_fsobj */
char *linkname_copy; /* non-const copy of linkname */
struct archive_string error_string;
int error_number;
/* We identify hard/symlinks according to the link names. */
/* Since link(2) and symlink(2) don't handle modes, we're done here. */
linkname = archive_entry_hardlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if !HAVE_LINK
return (EPERM);
#else
archive_string_init(&error_string);
linkname_copy = strdup(linkname);
if (linkname_copy == NULL) {
return (EPERM);
}
/* TODO: consider using the cleaned-up path as the link target? */
r = cleanup_pathname_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
free(linkname_copy);
/* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
return (EPERM);
}
r = check_symlinks_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
free(linkname_copy);
/* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
return (EPERM);
}
free(linkname_copy);
r = link(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
/*
* New cpio and pax formats allow hardlink entries
* to carry data, so we may have to open the file
* for hardlink entries.
*
* If the hardlink was successfully created and
* the archive doesn't have carry data for it,
* consider it to be non-authoritative for meta data.
* This is consistent with GNU tar and BSD pax.
* If the hardlink does carry data, let the last
* archive entry decide ownership.
*/
if (r == 0 && a->filesize <= 0) {
a->todo = 0;
a->deferred = 0;
} else if (r == 0 && a->filesize > 0) {
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
if (a->fd < 0)
r = errno;
}
return (r);
#endif
}
linkname = archive_entry_symlink(a->entry);
if (linkname != NULL) {
#if HAVE_SYMLINK
return symlink(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
#else
return (EPERM);
#endif
}
/*
* The remaining system calls all set permissions, so let's
* try to take advantage of that to avoid an extra chmod()
* call. (Recall that umask is set to zero right now!)
*/
/* Mode we want for the final restored object (w/o file type bits). */
final_mode = a->mode & 07777;
/*
* The mode that will actually be restored in this step. Note
* that SUID, SGID, etc, require additional work to ensure
* security, so we never restore them at this point.
*/
mode = final_mode & 0777 & ~a->user_umask;
switch (a->mode & AE_IFMT) {
default:
/* POSIX requires that we fall through here. */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case AE_IFREG:
a->fd = open(a->name,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
__archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(a->fd);
r = (a->fd < 0);
break;
case AE_IFCHR:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
/* Note: we use AE_IFCHR for the case label, and
* S_IFCHR for the mknod() call. This is correct. */
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFCHR,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a char device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFBLK:
#ifdef HAVE_MKNOD
r = mknod(a->name, mode | S_IFBLK,
archive_entry_rdev(a->entry));
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a block device node. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKNOD */
case AE_IFDIR:
mode = (mode | MINIMUM_DIR_MODE) & MAXIMUM_DIR_MODE;
r = mkdir(a->name, mode);
if (r == 0) {
/* Defer setting dir times. */
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_TIMES);
a->todo &= ~TODO_TIMES;
/* Never use an immediate chmod(). */
/* We can't avoid the chmod() entirely if EXTRACT_PERM
* because of SysV SGID inheritance. */
if ((mode != final_mode)
|| (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM))
a->deferred |= (a->todo & TODO_MODE);
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
}
break;
case AE_IFIFO:
#ifdef HAVE_MKFIFO
r = mkfifo(a->name, mode);
break;
#else
/* TODO: Find a better way to warn about our inability
* to restore a fifo. */
return (EINVAL);
#endif /* HAVE_MKFIFO */
}
/* All the system calls above set errno on failure. */
if (r)
return (errno);
/* If we managed to set the final mode, we've avoided a chmod(). */
if (mode == final_mode)
a->todo &= ~TODO_MODE;
return (0);
}
| 167,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_begin_opacity(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict,
char *opacity_att, fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag)
{
float opacity;
if (!opacity_att && !opacity_mask_tag)
return;
opacity = 1;
if (opacity_att)
opacity = fz_atof(opacity_att);
if (opacity_mask_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(opacity_mask_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
char *scb_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Opacity");
char *scb_color_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Color");
if (scb_opacity_att)
opacity = opacity * fz_atof(scb_opacity_att);
if (scb_color_att)
{
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
float samples[32];
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, scb_color_att, &colorspace, samples);
opacity = opacity * samples[0];
}
opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
}
if (doc->opacity_top + 1 < nelem(doc->opacity))
{
doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top + 1] = doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top] * opacity;
doc->opacity_top++;
}
if (opacity_mask_tag)
{
fz_begin_mask(doc->dev, area, 0, NULL, NULL);
xps_parse_brush(doc, ctm, area, base_uri, dict, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_end_mask(doc->dev);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xps_begin_opacity(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict,
char *opacity_att, fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag)
{
float opacity;
if (!opacity_att && !opacity_mask_tag)
return;
opacity = 1;
if (opacity_att)
opacity = fz_atof(opacity_att);
if (opacity_mask_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(opacity_mask_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
char *scb_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Opacity");
char *scb_color_att = fz_xml_att(opacity_mask_tag, "Color");
if (scb_opacity_att)
opacity = opacity * fz_atof(scb_opacity_att);
if (scb_color_att)
{
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
float samples[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, scb_color_att, &colorspace, samples);
opacity = opacity * samples[0];
}
opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
}
if (doc->opacity_top + 1 < nelem(doc->opacity))
{
doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top + 1] = doc->opacity[doc->opacity_top] * opacity;
doc->opacity_top++;
}
if (opacity_mask_tag)
{
fz_begin_mask(doc->dev, area, 0, NULL, NULL);
xps_parse_brush(doc, ctm, area, base_uri, dict, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_end_mask(doc->dev);
}
}
| 165,227 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int get_scl(void)
{
return qrio_get_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int get_scl(void)
| 169,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void svc_rdma_destroy_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
while (!list_empty(&xprt->sc_maps)) {
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = list_first_entry(&xprt->sc_maps,
struct svc_rdma_req_map, free);
list_del(&map->free);
kfree(map);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static void svc_rdma_destroy_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _zip_read_eocd64(zip_source_t *src, zip_buffer_t *buffer, zip_uint64_t buf_offset, unsigned int flags, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
zip_uint64_t offset;
zip_uint8_t eocd[EOCD64LEN];
zip_uint64_t eocd_offset;
zip_uint64_t size, nentry, i, eocdloc_offset;
bool free_buffer;
zip_uint32_t num_disks, num_disks64, eocd_disk, eocd_disk64;
eocdloc_offset = _zip_buffer_offset(buffer);
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* magic already verified */
num_disks = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_disk = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (eocd_offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN < eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN > eocdloc_offset + buf_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset >= buf_offset && eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN <= buf_offset + _zip_buffer_size(buffer)) {
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset - buf_offset);
free_buffer = false;
}
else {
if (zip_source_seek(src, (zip_int64_t)eocd_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(error, src);
return NULL;
}
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new_from_source(src, EOCD64LEN, eocd, error)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
free_buffer = true;
}
if (memcmp(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4), EOCD64_MAGIC, 4) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && size + eocd_offset + 12 != buf_offset + eocdloc_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* skip version made by/needed */
num_disks64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
eocd_disk64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
/* if eocd values are 0xffff, we have to use eocd64 values.
otherwise, if the values are not the same, it's inconsistent;
in any case, if the value is not 0, we don't support it */
if (num_disks == 0xffff) {
num_disks = num_disks64;
}
if (eocd_disk == 0xffff) {
eocd_disk = eocd_disk64;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && (eocd_disk != eocd_disk64 || num_disks != num_disks64)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (num_disks != 0 || eocd_disk != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
nentry = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
i = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (nentry != i) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
if (offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || offset+size < offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && offset+size != eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd=_zip_cdir_new(nentry, error)) == NULL)
return NULL;
cd->is_zip64 = true;
cd->size = size;
cd->offset = offset;
return cd;
}
Commit Message: Make eocd checks more consistent between zip and zip64 cases.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | _zip_read_eocd64(zip_source_t *src, zip_buffer_t *buffer, zip_uint64_t buf_offset, unsigned int flags, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
zip_uint64_t offset;
zip_uint8_t eocd[EOCD64LEN];
zip_uint64_t eocd_offset;
zip_uint64_t size, nentry, i, eocdloc_offset;
bool free_buffer;
zip_uint32_t num_disks, num_disks64, eocd_disk, eocd_disk64;
eocdloc_offset = _zip_buffer_offset(buffer);
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* magic already verified */
num_disks = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_disk = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
eocd_offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (eocd_offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN < eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN > eocdloc_offset + buf_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset >= buf_offset && eocd_offset + EOCD64LEN <= buf_offset + _zip_buffer_size(buffer)) {
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset - buf_offset);
free_buffer = false;
}
else {
if (zip_source_seek(src, (zip_int64_t)eocd_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(error, src);
return NULL;
}
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new_from_source(src, EOCD64LEN, eocd, error)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
free_buffer = true;
}
if (memcmp(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4), EOCD64_MAGIC, 4) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && size + eocd_offset + 12 != buf_offset + eocdloc_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* skip version made by/needed */
num_disks64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
eocd_disk64 = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
/* if eocd values are 0xffff, we have to use eocd64 values.
otherwise, if the values are not the same, it's inconsistent;
in any case, if the value is not 0, we don't support it */
if (num_disks == 0xffff) {
num_disks = num_disks64;
}
if (eocd_disk == 0xffff) {
eocd_disk = eocd_disk64;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && (eocd_disk != eocd_disk64 || num_disks != num_disks64)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (num_disks != 0 || eocd_disk != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
nentry = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
i = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (nentry != i) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(buffer);
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return NULL;
}
if (free_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
if (offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX || offset+size < offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if (offset+size > buf_offset + eocd_offset) {
/* cdir spans past EOCD record */
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && offset+size != buf_offset + eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd=_zip_cdir_new(nentry, error)) == NULL)
return NULL;
cd->is_zip64 = true;
cd->size = size;
cd->offset = offset;
return cd;
}
| 167,771 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void markPointer(Visitor* visitor, HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
const GCInfo* gcInfo = ThreadHeap::gcInfo(header->gcInfoIndex());
if (gcInfo->hasVTable() && !vTableInitialized(header->payload())) {
visitor->markHeaderNoTracing(header);
ASSERT(isUninitializedMemory(header->payload(), header->payloadSize()));
} else {
visitor->markHeader(header, gcInfo->m_trace);
}
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void markPointer(Visitor* visitor, HeapObjectHeader* header) {
header->checkHeader();
const GCInfo* gcInfo = ThreadHeap::gcInfo(header->gcInfoIndex());
if (gcInfo->hasVTable() && !vTableInitialized(header->payload())) {
visitor->markHeaderNoTracing(header);
ASSERT(isUninitializedMemory(header->payload(), header->payloadSize()));
} else {
visitor->markHeader(header, gcInfo->m_trace);
}
}
| 172,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTestBadProto", DefragTestBadProto);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
| 168,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::SocketStream* socket, const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info, bool fatal) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError socket_id="
<< socket_id;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnSSLCertificateError";
return;
}
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
content::GlobalRequestID request_id(-1, socket_id);
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE, socket->url(),
render_process_id_, socket_stream_host->render_view_id(), ssl_info,
fatal);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::SocketStream* socket, const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info, bool fatal) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnSSLCertificateError socket_id="
<< socket_id;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnSSLCertificateError";
return;
}
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
content::GlobalRequestID request_id(-1, socket_id);
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
AsWeakPtr(), request_id, ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE, socket->url(),
render_process_id_, socket_stream_host->render_view_id(), ssl_info,
fatal);
}
| 170,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceTracker::CleanupInstanceData(PP_Instance instance,
bool delete_instance) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(instance, PP_ID_TYPE_INSTANCE))
<< instance << " is not a PP_Instance.";
InstanceMap::iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
InstanceData& data = *found->second;
ResourceSet::iterator cur_res = data.resources.begin();
while (cur_res != data.resources.end()) {
ResourceMap::iterator found_resource = live_resources_.find(*cur_res);
if (found_resource == live_resources_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Resource* resource = found_resource->second.first;
resource->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(true);
live_resources_.erase(*cur_res);
}
ResourceSet::iterator current = cur_res++;
data.resources.erase(current);
}
DCHECK(data.resources.empty());
VarSet::iterator cur_var = data.object_vars.begin();
while (cur_var != data.object_vars.end()) {
VarSet::iterator current = cur_var++;
PP_Var object_pp_var;
object_pp_var.type = PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT;
object_pp_var.value.as_id = *current;
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object_var(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(object_pp_var));
if (object_var.get())
object_var->InstanceDeleted();
live_vars_.erase(*current);
data.object_vars.erase(*current);
}
DCHECK(data.object_vars.empty());
if (delete_instance)
instance_map_.erase(found);
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ResourceTracker::CleanupInstanceData(PP_Instance instance,
bool delete_instance) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(instance, PP_ID_TYPE_INSTANCE))
<< instance << " is not a PP_Instance.";
InstanceMap::iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
InstanceData& data = *found->second;
ResourceSet::iterator cur_res = data.ref_resources.begin();
while (cur_res != data.ref_resources.end()) {
ResourceMap::iterator found_resource = live_resources_.find(*cur_res);
if (found_resource == live_resources_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Resource* resource = found_resource->second.first;
resource->LastPluginRefWasDeleted();
live_resources_.erase(*cur_res);
}
ResourceSet::iterator current = cur_res++;
data.ref_resources.erase(current);
}
DCHECK(data.ref_resources.empty());
VarSet::iterator cur_var = data.object_vars.begin();
while (cur_var != data.object_vars.end()) {
VarSet::iterator current = cur_var++;
PP_Var object_pp_var;
object_pp_var.type = PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT;
object_pp_var.value.as_id = *current;
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object_var(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(object_pp_var));
if (object_var.get())
object_var->InstanceDeleted();
live_vars_.erase(*current);
data.object_vars.erase(*current);
}
DCHECK(data.object_vars.empty());
// Clear any resources that still reference this instance.
for (std::set<Resource*>::iterator res = data.assoc_resources.begin();
res != data.assoc_resources.end();
++res)
(*res)->ClearInstance();
data.assoc_resources.clear();
if (delete_instance)
instance_map_.erase(found);
}
| 170,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void rd_release_device_space(struct rd_dev *rd_dev)
{
u32 i, j, page_count = 0, sg_per_table;
struct rd_dev_sg_table *sg_table;
struct page *pg;
struct scatterlist *sg;
if (!rd_dev->sg_table_array || !rd_dev->sg_table_count)
return;
sg_table = rd_dev->sg_table_array;
for (i = 0; i < rd_dev->sg_table_count; i++) {
sg = sg_table[i].sg_table;
sg_per_table = sg_table[i].rd_sg_count;
for (j = 0; j < sg_per_table; j++) {
pg = sg_page(&sg[j]);
if (pg) {
__free_page(pg);
page_count++;
}
}
kfree(sg);
}
pr_debug("CORE_RD[%u] - Released device space for Ramdisk"
" Device ID: %u, pages %u in %u tables total bytes %lu\n",
rd_dev->rd_host->rd_host_id, rd_dev->rd_dev_id, page_count,
rd_dev->sg_table_count, (unsigned long)page_count * PAGE_SIZE);
kfree(sg_table);
rd_dev->sg_table_array = NULL;
rd_dev->sg_table_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: target/rd: Refactor rd_build_device_space + rd_release_device_space
This patch refactors rd_build_device_space() + rd_release_device_space()
into rd_allocate_sgl_table() + rd_release_device_space() so that they
may be used seperatly for setup + release of protection information
scatterlists.
Also add explicit memset of pages within rd_allocate_sgl_table() based
upon passed 'init_payload' value.
v2 changes:
- Drop unused sg_table from rd_release_device_space (Wei)
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void rd_release_device_space(struct rd_dev *rd_dev)
static u32 rd_release_sgl_table(struct rd_dev *rd_dev, struct rd_dev_sg_table *sg_table,
u32 sg_table_count)
{
struct page *pg;
struct scatterlist *sg;
u32 i, j, page_count = 0, sg_per_table;
for (i = 0; i < sg_table_count; i++) {
sg = sg_table[i].sg_table;
sg_per_table = sg_table[i].rd_sg_count;
for (j = 0; j < sg_per_table; j++) {
pg = sg_page(&sg[j]);
if (pg) {
__free_page(pg);
page_count++;
}
}
kfree(sg);
}
kfree(sg_table);
return page_count;
}
static void rd_release_device_space(struct rd_dev *rd_dev)
{
u32 page_count;
if (!rd_dev->sg_table_array || !rd_dev->sg_table_count)
return;
page_count = rd_release_sgl_table(rd_dev, rd_dev->sg_table_array,
rd_dev->sg_table_count);
pr_debug("CORE_RD[%u] - Released device space for Ramdisk"
" Device ID: %u, pages %u in %u tables total bytes %lu\n",
rd_dev->rd_host->rd_host_id, rd_dev->rd_dev_id, page_count,
rd_dev->sg_table_count, (unsigned long)page_count * PAGE_SIZE);
rd_dev->sg_table_array = NULL;
rd_dev->sg_table_count = 0;
}
| 166,316 |
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