wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 118
with sixteen different subgroups. First, information collection consists of
problems that arise in the gathering of information about individuals. I
identified two distinct forms of information collection: surveillance
and interrogation. A second group of problems, information processing,
involves difficulties that arise in the storage, usage, and analysis of per
sonal data. I listed five types of information processing: aggregation,
identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. Third, informa
tion dissemination involves the transfer and publicizing of personal data.
I described seven forms of information dissemination: breach of confi
dentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, ap
propriation, and distortion. Finally, invasion involves interference with
one’s personal life. I identified two forms: intrusion and decisional in
terference.
I do not base this framework on a top-down normative vision about
what I believe privacy ought to be. Rather, it is a bottom-up descriptive
account of the kinds of privacy problems that are addressed in various
discussions about privacy, laws, cases, constitutions, guidelines, and
other sources. T he problems identified in the taxonomy are not eternal
and unchanging. Reasonable people may certainly disagree about the
inclusion of certain problems and the exclusion of others. Even with
such disagreement, the primary function of my approach to conceptu
alizing privacy has been to shift the kind of theoretical discussions we
have about privacy. Instead of looking for a unified conception of pri
vacy, we can free ourselves to focus on the various problems. Shifting
the focus in this way will provide greater clarity and guidance in ad
dressing privacy issues.
Privacy : A New Understanding
173
My taxonomy of privacy endeavors to serv e as a more contextual ap
proach to conceptualizing privacy. O f course, in advocating a contex
tual conception of privacy, the issue remains: At what level of gener
ality7 should the contexts be defined? Although my taxonomy consists
of a much more finely grained set of categories beyond the general cat
egory of “privacy,” I define each type of problem with a fair degree of
generality. As I have argued, if we seek to conceptualize privacy in too
contextual a manner, it is difficult to develop a framework that will
apply beyond just a few circumstances. The purpose of a framework is
to guide analysis. Merely calling for more context in conceptualizing
privacy throws the issue back into the hands of those w ho are strug
gling over a particular problem without telling them how to make
sense of it. Thus it is useful to define problems with some breadth so
long as the generalizations are not overly reductive or distorting.
The taxonomy focuses on problems. I explored a number of other
ways to focus the taxonomy—based on the nature of the information or
matters, individual preferences, and reasonable expectations of privacy.
There is tremendous variability7 in the particular kinds of information
or matters people consider private. N o matter how sensitive something
may be, it might not be private because it is widely known to others.
Privacy is in part a condition of the information or matter, such as
whether it is concealed or held in confidence. On the other hand, pri
vacy is not exclusively a condition because not all information or mat
ters that are concealed are private. The taxonomy focuses on problems
because they are often the starting point for discussion and for the for
mulation of legal and policy responses.
Since privacy is a pluralistic concept, its value should be understood
pluralistically as well. Privacy does not have a uniform value. Its value
varies across different contexts depending upon which form of privacy
is involved and what range of activities are imperiled by a particular
problem. Additionally, I have contended that the value of privacy
should be understood in terms of its contribution to society. Many ac
counts of privacy’s value have sought to understand it in terms of indi
vidual rights that conflict wdth the interests of society. Commentators
have argued that privacy should be protected as an individual right
that trumps competing interests even w7hen these interests have
greater social utility than privacy. In contrast, I have argued that when
privacy protects the individual, it does so because it is in society’s
174
P
r
i v a c y : A N
e w U
n
d
e r
s t
a
n
d
i n
g
interest. Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their social
contribution. Privacy is not just freedom from social control but is in
fact a socially constructed form of protection. The value of privacy
does not emerge from each form of privacy itself but from the range of
activities it protects.
Privacy, in short, involves a cluster of protections against a group of
different but related problems. These problems impede valuable activ
ities that society wants to protect, and therefore society devises ways to
address these problems. By creating these protections, society opens up
a particular realm of freedom we call “privacy.”
T h e N ature of Privacy Problems
To properly weigh privacy against conflicting interests, it is imperative
that we have a complete understanding of die particular privacy prob
lems involved in any given context. We must identify the privacy prob
lems, examine the activities compromised by each, and recognize the
nature of harms to these activities. A problem is a situation that creates
harms to individuals and society. A privacy problem can create many
different types of harm. Throughout the taxonomy, I discussed the
harms created by privacy problems. Sometimes the law comprehends
these harms well, but other times, the law fixates on one kind of harm

with sixteen different subgroups. First, information collection consists of

problems that arise in the gathering of information about individuals. I

identified two distinct forms of information collection: surveillance

and interrogation. A second group of problems, information processing,

involves difficulties that arise in the storage, usage, and analysis of per

sonal data. I listed five types of information processing: aggregation,

identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. Third, informa

tion dissemination involves the transfer and publicizing of personal data.

I described seven forms of information dissemination: breach of confi

dentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, ap

propriation, and distortion. Finally, invasion involves interference with

one’s personal life. I identified two forms: intrusion and decisional in

terference.

I do not base this framework on a top-down normative vision about

what I believe privacy ought to be. Rather, it is a bottom-up descriptive

account of the kinds of privacy problems that are addressed in various

discussions about privacy, laws, cases, constitutions, guidelines, and

other sources. T he problems identified in the taxonomy are not eternal

and unchanging. Reasonable people may certainly disagree about the

inclusion of certain problems and the exclusion of others. Even with

such disagreement, the primary function of my approach to conceptu

alizing privacy has been to shift the kind of theoretical discussions we

have about privacy. Instead of looking for a unified conception of pri

vacy, we can free ourselves to focus on the various problems. Shifting

the focus in this way will provide greater clarity and guidance in ad

dressing privacy issues.

Privacy : A New Understanding

173

My taxonomy of privacy endeavors to serv e as a more contextual ap

proach to conceptualizing privacy. O f course, in advocating a contex

tual conception of privacy, the issue remains: At what level of gener

ality7 should the contexts be defined? Although my taxonomy consists

of a much more finely grained set of categories beyond the general cat

egory of “privacy,” I define each type of problem with a fair degree of

generality. As I have argued, if we seek to conceptualize privacy in too

contextual a manner, it is difficult to develop a framework that will

apply beyond just a few circumstances. The purpose of a framework is

to guide analysis. Merely calling for more context in conceptualizing

privacy throws the issue back into the hands of those w ho are strug

gling over a particular problem without telling them how to make

sense of it. Thus it is useful to define problems with some breadth so

long as the generalizations are not overly reductive or distorting.

The taxonomy focuses on problems. I explored a number of other

ways to focus the taxonomy—based on the nature of the information or

matters, individual preferences, and reasonable expectations of privacy.

There is tremendous variability7 in the particular kinds of information

or matters people consider private. N o matter how sensitive something

may be, it might not be private because it is widely known to others.

Privacy is in part a condition of the information or matter, such as

whether it is concealed or held in confidence. On the other hand, pri

vacy is not exclusively a condition because not all information or mat

ters that are concealed are private. The taxonomy focuses on problems

because they are often the starting point for discussion and for the for

mulation of legal and policy responses.

Since privacy is a pluralistic concept, its value should be understood

pluralistically as well. Privacy does not have a uniform value. Its value

varies across different contexts depending upon which form of privacy

is involved and what range of activities are imperiled by a particular

problem. Additionally, I have contended that the value of privacy

should be understood in terms of its contribution to society. Many ac

counts of privacy’s value have sought to understand it in terms of indi

vidual rights that conflict wdth the interests of society. Commentators

have argued that privacy should be protected as an individual right

that trumps competing interests even w7hen these interests have

greater social utility than privacy. In contrast, I have argued that when

privacy protects the individual, it does so because it is in society’s

174

P

r

i v a c y : A N

e w U

n

d

e r

s t

a

n

d

i n

g

interest. Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their social

contribution. Privacy is not just freedom from social control but is in

fact a socially constructed form of protection. The value of privacy

does not emerge from each form of privacy itself but from the range of

activities it protects.

Privacy, in short, involves a cluster of protections against a group of

different but related problems. These problems impede valuable activ

ities that society wants to protect, and therefore society devises ways to

address these problems. By creating these protections, society opens up

a particular realm of freedom we call “privacy.”

T h e N ature of Privacy Problems

To properly weigh privacy against conflicting interests, it is imperative

that we have a complete understanding of die particular privacy prob

lems involved in any given context. We must identify the privacy prob

lems, examine the activities compromised by each, and recognize the

nature of harms to these activities. A problem is a situation that creates

harms to individuals and society. A privacy problem can create many

different types of harm. Throughout the taxonomy, I discussed the

harms created by privacy problems. Sometimes the law comprehends

these harms well, but other times, the law fixates on one kind of harm