DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
120 Gerald Harrison
name) have been presented by Thomas Reid, Randolph Clarke, Peter van
Inwagen ( Essay ), and Peter Strawson, among others.
Just as it is widely agreed that moral responsibility requires free will, it
is also widely agreed that we are morally responsible for at least some of
what we do some of the time. For Reid, it was a fi rst principle “ that some
aspects of human conduct deserve praise, others blame ” (361). According
to Peter Strawson, our commitment to moral responsibility is so deeply
rooted that it is simply inconceivable that we could give it up, and thus the
reality of moral responsibility sets a boundary condition for where rational
argument can lead.
If our moral responsibility is beyond reasonable doubt, then it must be
beyond reasonable doubt that we possess free will, as the former presupposes
the latter. Thus, we get our positive argument for free will.
Not everyone accepts this argument. A signifi cant minority of philosophers
deny that we are morally responsible. There are, after all, powerful
arguments both for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism
and for thinking that it is incompatible with indeterminism. Such arguments
can be used to raise doubts about whether we have free will, and so to raise
doubts about moral responsibility.
For most, however, the belief that we are morally responsible has greater
initial plausibility than any of the premises of an argument leading to the
denial of free will. Moral responsibility therefore provides the best positive
argument for thinking that we do have free will.
There are, moreover, seemingly unanswerable arguments that, if they are
correct, demonstrate that the existence of moral responsibility entails the
existence of free will, and, therefore, if free will does not exist, moral responsibility
does not exist either. It is, however, evident that moral responsibility
does exist: if there were no such thing as moral responsibility nothing would
be anyone ’ s fault, and it is evident that there are states of affairs to which one
can point and say, correctly, to certain people: That ’ s your fault. (van Inwagen
“ How to Think ” )
P1. If we are morally responsible then we have free will.
P2. We are morally responsible.
C1. We have free will ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
31
Frankfurt ’ s Refutation of
the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities
Gerald Harrison
Frankfurt , Harry . “ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility . ” Journal
of Philosophy 45 ( 1969 ): 829 – 39 .
Fischer , John M. “ Frankfurt - Style Compatibilism , ” in Free Will , edited by
Gary Watson , 190 – 211 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 .
Widerker , David , and Michael McKenna , (eds.). Moral Responsibility and
Alternative Possibilities . Farnham, UK : Ashgate , 2006 .
Endorsed by Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and many others the “ Principle of
Alternative Possibilities ” (PAP for short) states:
PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she
could have done otherwise.
Historically, PAP has been one of the most popular routes to “ incompatibilism
” about moral responsibility (incompatibilism is the view that
moral responsibility and causal determinism – the thesis that there is only
one future compatible with the past and the laws of nature – are incompatible).
After all, if determinism is true, there ’ s a sense in which no one could
ever have acted differently. “ Compatibilists ” (those who believe determinism
and moral responsibility to be compatible) resisted this argument by
arguing that PAP should be given a controversial “ conditional ” interpretation
according to which an agent could have done otherwise if he would
have done so had he desired.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
122 Gerald Harrison
But in 1969, the philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised an argument to
refute PAP. Frankfurt argued that it is possible for circumstances to arise
in which it is clear that a person could not have done otherwise yet also
clear that he is morally responsible for his deed. The defi ning feature of
what has now become known as a “ Frankfurt - style case ” is that an intervention
device does not intervene in a process leading to an action but
would have intervened if the agent had been about to decide differently.
The presence of the intervention mechanism rules out the possibility of the
agent ’ s deciding differently, yet because the intervention mechanism plays
no role in the agent ’ s deliberations and subsequent action, it seems clear
that the agent is fully morally responsible for his action; hence PAP is
refuted.
By refuting PAP, Frankfurt ’ s argument closes off one of the major routes
to incompatibilism and allows compatibilists to bypass the debate over the
correct interpretation of PAP.
Frankfurt ’ s argument remains the focus of considerable debate, with
detractors arguing that it is impossible to construct a Frankfurt - style case
in which all relevant alternative possibilities have been expunged.
Suppose someone, Black, let us say wants Jones to perform a certain
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he
prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is
about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear
to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide
to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear
that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps
to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him
to do. Whatever Jones ’ s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will
have his way [ … ].
Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for
reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black
wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely
the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if
Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. (Frankfurt,
835 – 6)

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

120 Gerald Harrison

name) have been presented by Thomas Reid, Randolph Clarke, Peter van

Inwagen ( Essay ), and Peter Strawson, among others.

Just as it is widely agreed that moral responsibility requires free will, it

is also widely agreed that we are morally responsible for at least some of

what we do some of the time. For Reid, it was a fi rst principle “ that some

aspects of human conduct deserve praise, others blame ” (361). According

to Peter Strawson, our commitment to moral responsibility is so deeply

rooted that it is simply inconceivable that we could give it up, and thus the

reality of moral responsibility sets a boundary condition for where rational

argument can lead.

If our moral responsibility is beyond reasonable doubt, then it must be

beyond reasonable doubt that we possess free will, as the former presupposes

the latter. Thus, we get our positive argument for free will.

Not everyone accepts this argument. A signifi cant minority of philosophers

deny that we are morally responsible. There are, after all, powerful

arguments both for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism

and for thinking that it is incompatible with indeterminism. Such arguments

can be used to raise doubts about whether we have free will, and so to raise

doubts about moral responsibility.

For most, however, the belief that we are morally responsible has greater

initial plausibility than any of the premises of an argument leading to the

denial of free will. Moral responsibility therefore provides the best positive

argument for thinking that we do have free will.

There are, moreover, seemingly unanswerable arguments that, if they are

correct, demonstrate that the existence of moral responsibility entails the

existence of free will, and, therefore, if free will does not exist, moral responsibility

does not exist either. It is, however, evident that moral responsibility

does exist: if there were no such thing as moral responsibility nothing would

be anyone ’ s fault, and it is evident that there are states of affairs to which one

can point and say, correctly, to certain people: That ’ s your fault. (van Inwagen

“ How to Think ” )

P1. If we are morally responsible then we have free will.

P2. We are morally responsible.

C1. We have free will ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

31

Frankfurt ’ s Refutation of

the Principle of Alternative

Possibilities

Gerald Harrison

Frankfurt , Harry . “ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility . ” Journal

of Philosophy 45 ( 1969 ): 829 – 39 .

Fischer , John M. “ Frankfurt - Style Compatibilism , ” in Free Will , edited by

Gary Watson , 190 – 211 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 .

Widerker , David , and Michael McKenna , (eds.). Moral Responsibility and

Alternative Possibilities . Farnham, UK : Ashgate , 2006 .

Endorsed by Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and many others the “ Principle of

Alternative Possibilities ” (PAP for short) states:

PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she

could have done otherwise.

Historically, PAP has been one of the most popular routes to “ incompatibilism

” about moral responsibility (incompatibilism is the view that

moral responsibility and causal determinism – the thesis that there is only

one future compatible with the past and the laws of nature – are incompatible).

After all, if determinism is true, there ’ s a sense in which no one could

ever have acted differently. “ Compatibilists ” (those who believe determinism

and moral responsibility to be compatible) resisted this argument by

arguing that PAP should be given a controversial “ conditional ” interpretation

according to which an agent could have done otherwise if he would

have done so had he desired.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

122 Gerald Harrison

But in 1969, the philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised an argument to

refute PAP. Frankfurt argued that it is possible for circumstances to arise

in which it is clear that a person could not have done otherwise yet also

clear that he is morally responsible for his deed. The defi ning feature of

what has now become known as a “ Frankfurt - style case ” is that an intervention

device does not intervene in a process leading to an action but

would have intervened if the agent had been about to decide differently.

The presence of the intervention mechanism rules out the possibility of the

agent ’ s deciding differently, yet because the intervention mechanism plays

no role in the agent ’ s deliberations and subsequent action, it seems clear

that the agent is fully morally responsible for his action; hence PAP is

refuted.

By refuting PAP, Frankfurt ’ s argument closes off one of the major routes

to incompatibilism and allows compatibilists to bypass the debate over the

correct interpretation of PAP.

Frankfurt ’ s argument remains the focus of considerable debate, with

detractors arguing that it is impossible to construct a Frankfurt - style case

in which all relevant alternative possibilities have been expunged.

Suppose someone, Black, let us say wants Jones to perform a certain

action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he

prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is

about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear

to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide

to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear

that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps

to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him

to do. Whatever Jones ’ s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will

have his way [ … ].

Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for

reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black

wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely

the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if

Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. (Frankfurt,

835 – 6)