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P1. An agent is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could
have done otherwise (PAP).
P2. If PAP is true, then a Frankfurt - style case will absolve its subject from
moral responsibility.
P3. Frankfurt - style cases do not absolve their subjects from moral
responsibility.
C1. PAP is false ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
32
Van Inwagen ’ s Consequence
Argument against Compatibilism
Grant Sterling
van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
One of the most famous recent arguments in the free will and determinism
debate is Peter van Inwagen ’ s consequence argument, which aims to show
that compatibilism is false. Compatibilism is the view that all our actions
could be fully determined by the laws of physics and yet at the same time
we could have free will in the sense necessary for moral responsibility. Van
Inwagen introduces the essence of this argument near the beginning of his
book on free will and then goes on to gives three detailed technical versions
of the argument. Included here is the simple version and the fi rst technical
formalization (which aims to show that under determinism we could never
act in any way other than the way in which we do act).
If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were
born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (16)
Consider any act that (logically) someone might have performed. If it
should turn out that this act was incompatible with the state of the world
before that person ’ s birth taken together with the laws of nature, then it
follows that that person could not have performed that act. Moreover, if
determinism is true, then just any deviation from the actual course of events
would be incompatible with any past state of the world taken together with
the laws of nature. Therefore, if determinism is true, it never has been within
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
124 Grant Sterling
my power to deviate from the actual course of events that has constituted my
history. (75)
P1. If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of
nature and events in the remote past.
P2. The laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us.
P3. If something is not up to us, then its consequences are not up to us.
C1. If the laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us,
then their consequences are not up to us (substitution, P2, P3).
C2. Consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past
are not up to us ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
C3. If determinism is true, then our acts are not up to us (in our control,
within our ability) (substitution, C2, P1).
P4. If our acts are not up to us, then we ’ re not responsible for them.
C4. If determinism is true, we ’ re not responsible for any of our acts
(hypothetical syllogism, C3, P4).
Van Inwagen ’ s First Formalization
Defi nitions:
Let ‘ U ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe right now.
Let ‘ U – 1 ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe the day
before some person ‘ X ’ was born.
Let ‘ A ’ be some action that X did not perform.
Let ‘ L ’ be the laws of nature.
P1. X cannot change U – 1 (no one can change the past state of the universe
at a time before she was even born).
P2. X cannot change L (no one can change the laws of nature).
P3. If determinism is true, then {(U – 1 plus L), entails U} (follows from the
concept of determinism).
P4. If X had done A, then not - U (A is an action that didn ’ t occur, so if it
had occurred the universe wouldn ’ t be exactly the same as it is now).
C1. If X could have done A, X could have made U false (follows semantically
from P4).
C2. If X could have made U false, then X could have made (U – 1 plus
L) false (transposition, P3).
C3. If X could have made (U – 1 plus L) false, then X could have made
L false (De Morgan ’ s, C2, P1, and disjunctive syllogism).
C4. X could not have made L false (P2).
C5. X could not do A ( modus tollens , C3, C4, and a series of implicit
hypothetical syllogisms).
33
Fatalism
Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
Aquinas , Thomas . Summa Theologiae , translated by Fathers of the English
Dominican Province, The Summa Theologiae , 2nd rev. edn., 22 vols.
London : Burns, Oates & Washbourne , 1912 – 36. Reprinted in 5 vols.,
Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981 . E - text in HTML available at
www.newadvent.org/summa
Aristotle . Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione , translated with notes
and glossary by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1961 .
Augustine , Saint . On Free Choice of the Will , translated, with introduction
by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis : Hackett , 1993 .
Rice , Hugh . “ Fatalism . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Fall
2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/fatalism
According to the philosophical doctrine called “ fatalism, ” everything that
happens does so inevitably. Suppose that something is going to happen
tomorrow; let ’ s say that it is going to rain. If it is true now that tomorrow
it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it won ’ t rain tomorrow, so it is
necessary to rain tomorrow. On the other hand, if it is false now that tomorrow
it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it will rain tomorrow, so
it is impossible to rain tomorrow; that is, it is necessary that it won ’ t rain
tomorrow. Since the same reasoning can be applied to every event, everything
that happens does so necessarily and inevitably.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

P1. An agent is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could

have done otherwise (PAP).

P2. If PAP is true, then a Frankfurt - style case will absolve its subject from

moral responsibility.

P3. Frankfurt - style cases do not absolve their subjects from moral

responsibility.

C1. PAP is false ( modus tollens , P2, P3).

32

Van Inwagen ’ s Consequence

Argument against Compatibilism

Grant Sterling

van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .

One of the most famous recent arguments in the free will and determinism

debate is Peter van Inwagen ’ s consequence argument, which aims to show

that compatibilism is false. Compatibilism is the view that all our actions

could be fully determined by the laws of physics and yet at the same time

we could have free will in the sense necessary for moral responsibility. Van

Inwagen introduces the essence of this argument near the beginning of his

book on free will and then goes on to gives three detailed technical versions

of the argument. Included here is the simple version and the fi rst technical

formalization (which aims to show that under determinism we could never

act in any way other than the way in which we do act).

If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of nature

and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were

born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences

of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (16)

Consider any act that (logically) someone might have performed. If it

should turn out that this act was incompatible with the state of the world

before that person ’ s birth taken together with the laws of nature, then it

follows that that person could not have performed that act. Moreover, if

determinism is true, then just any deviation from the actual course of events

would be incompatible with any past state of the world taken together with

the laws of nature. Therefore, if determinism is true, it never has been within

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

124 Grant Sterling

my power to deviate from the actual course of events that has constituted my

history. (75)

P1. If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of

nature and events in the remote past.

P2. The laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us.

P3. If something is not up to us, then its consequences are not up to us.

C1. If the laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us,

then their consequences are not up to us (substitution, P2, P3).

C2. Consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past

are not up to us ( modus ponens , P2, C1).

C3. If determinism is true, then our acts are not up to us (in our control,

within our ability) (substitution, C2, P1).

P4. If our acts are not up to us, then we ’ re not responsible for them.

C4. If determinism is true, we ’ re not responsible for any of our acts

(hypothetical syllogism, C3, P4).

Van Inwagen ’ s First Formalization

Defi nitions:

Let ‘ U ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe right now.

Let ‘ U – 1 ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe the day

before some person ‘ X ’ was born.

Let ‘ A ’ be some action that X did not perform.

Let ‘ L ’ be the laws of nature.

P1. X cannot change U – 1 (no one can change the past state of the universe

at a time before she was even born).

P2. X cannot change L (no one can change the laws of nature).

P3. If determinism is true, then {(U – 1 plus L), entails U} (follows from the

concept of determinism).

P4. If X had done A, then not - U (A is an action that didn ’ t occur, so if it

had occurred the universe wouldn ’ t be exactly the same as it is now).

C1. If X could have done A, X could have made U false (follows semantically

from P4).

C2. If X could have made U false, then X could have made (U – 1 plus

L) false (transposition, P3).

C3. If X could have made (U – 1 plus L) false, then X could have made

L false (De Morgan ’ s, C2, P1, and disjunctive syllogism).

C4. X could not have made L false (P2).

C5. X could not do A ( modus tollens , C3, C4, and a series of implicit

hypothetical syllogisms).

33

Fatalism

Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta

Aquinas , Thomas . Summa Theologiae , translated by Fathers of the English

Dominican Province, The Summa Theologiae , 2nd rev. edn., 22 vols.

London : Burns, Oates & Washbourne , 1912 – 36. Reprinted in 5 vols.,

Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981 . E - text in HTML available at

www.newadvent.org/summa

Aristotle . Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione , translated with notes

and glossary by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1961 .

Augustine , Saint . On Free Choice of the Will , translated, with introduction

by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis : Hackett , 1993 .

Rice , Hugh . “ Fatalism . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Fall

2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://

plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/fatalism

According to the philosophical doctrine called “ fatalism, ” everything that

happens does so inevitably. Suppose that something is going to happen

tomorrow; let ’ s say that it is going to rain. If it is true now that tomorrow

it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it won ’ t rain tomorrow, so it is

necessary to rain tomorrow. On the other hand, if it is false now that tomorrow

it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it will rain tomorrow, so

it is impossible to rain tomorrow; that is, it is necessary that it won ’ t rain

tomorrow. Since the same reasoning can be applied to every event, everything

that happens does so necessarily and inevitably.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,