DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
the source of its causal effi cacy. But determinism requires that the nature
and compelling power of the cause exist in themselves, quite independently
of any characteristic of the entity undergoing the cause – effect process. Since
this necessary condition of determinism is never met by consciousness,
determinism is inapplicable to human experience. Experience cannot be
caused. To experience is to appropriate, to interiorize the given, to make it
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Sartre’s Argument for Freedom 129
one ’ s own. In virtue of the relationship between consciousness and the
given, my freedom to choose is inescapable. Sartre therefore concludes,
“ Man is condemned to be free ” (439).
Suppose that a boy is born into poverty; that is, the socioeconomic condition
of his family is much lower than the average. (The idea of poverty,
fraught with connotations of disvalue, already presupposes an interpretation.)
Trying to explain his later extraordinary drive, we might well cite this
early circumstance as formative – indeed, as determinative. But Sartre
would insist that such an explanation is quite misleading. The poverty could
not have had this effect had the young boy not understood the condition
as shameful. Had he thought of it instead as the source of the strong mutual
dependency in his family and their consequent bonds of solidarity, the drive
for wealth might very well have seemed to him an empty pursuit. Sartre ’ s
point would be that a given socioeconomic circumstance must await the
interpretation of consciousness before it could function as a cause. Life
circumstances cannot impel an effect without the assent of consciousness.
Always to have to interpret the given, to have to forge of the given a motive
and cause, is the inescapable condition of consciousness. The uncaused
source of its own actions, the human being is irremediably free.
No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure
of society, the psychological “ state, ” etc.) is capable by itself of motivating
any act whatsoever. For an act is the projection of [consciousness] toward
what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.
[ . . . ] This implies for consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a
rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as to be
able to consider it in the light of a non - being and so as to be able to confer
on it the meaning which it has in terms of the project of a meaning it does
not have . Under no circumstances can the past in any way by itself produce
an act [ . . . ]. In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative
power with respect to the world and itself [ . . . ] we must recognize that the
indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the
acting being. (436)
P1. In order for a given state of affairs deterministically to cause a human
action, the causal effi cacy of that state of affairs would have to derive
exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs.
P2. A given state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
P3. If a given state of affairs has no meaning in itself, then its meaning must
be conferred upon it by the person experiencing it.
C1. The meaning of a given state of affairs must be conferred upon it
by the person experiencing it ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
P4. The meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
(or cause) the action.
130 Jeffrey Gordon
P5. If the meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
(or cause) the action, then in the case of human action, the causal
effi cacy of the state of affairs does not derive exclusively from characteristics
of that state of affairs.
C2. In the case of human action, the causal effi cacy of the state of affairs
does not derive exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs
( modus ponens , P4, P5).
C3. No given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action
( modus tollens , P1, C3).
P6. If no given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action,
then one ’ s actions are free.
C4. Human beings are inescapably free ( modus ponens , C3, P6).
Part III
Epistemology
35
The Cogito Arguments of Descartes
and Augustine
Descartes , Ren é . Meditations , edited by David B. Manley and Charles S.
Taylor , translated by John Veitch, available at www.wright.edu/cola/
descartes/index.html (accessed June 2010).
Descartes ’ Cogito
Joyce Lazier
Since Descartes ’ argument, “ I think therefore I am, ” presented in Meditation
II, is often taken as the foundation of idealism and also the source of the
mind – body problem, it is a core philosophical argument. The Meditations
are presented as a stream - of - consciousness style of writing, and the arguments
are diffi cult to follow when just reading it straight through. When
put in premise and conclusion form, it is easier to see both the argument
as well as some of its fl aws. After Descartes discards God as the cause of
his thoughts in the fi rst argument, the assumption of the “ evil deceiver ” in
the fi fth argument is the most obvious fl aw, since it contradicts the logic
given in the fi rst argument. If we believe the fi rst argument, that Descartes
is capable of producing thoughts himself so he needn ’ t presume a God, then
we could also think Descartes is capable of producing his own deceit so he
needn ’ t presume a deceiver. So, either the evil demon could be discarded as
the cause of Descartes ’ deceit along with God as the cause of his thoughts,
or God could be presumed to exist along with the deceiver. Furthermore,
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
134 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
besides deceit, which we could cause ourselves, we have no evidence for the
evil deceiver and therefore good reason to doubt (by Descartes ’ own standard
of knowledge) and throw out such an assumption. Another fl aw that
stands out after the reconstruction is an equivocation with “ exist ” as well
as with “ I. ” Most interestingly, this formulation shows that the typical “ I
think therefore I am ” interpretation of Descartes ’ argument is too broad in

the source of its causal effi cacy. But determinism requires that the nature

and compelling power of the cause exist in themselves, quite independently

of any characteristic of the entity undergoing the cause – effect process. Since

this necessary condition of determinism is never met by consciousness,

determinism is inapplicable to human experience. Experience cannot be

caused. To experience is to appropriate, to interiorize the given, to make it

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Sartre’s Argument for Freedom 129

one ’ s own. In virtue of the relationship between consciousness and the

given, my freedom to choose is inescapable. Sartre therefore concludes,

“ Man is condemned to be free ” (439).

Suppose that a boy is born into poverty; that is, the socioeconomic condition

of his family is much lower than the average. (The idea of poverty,

fraught with connotations of disvalue, already presupposes an interpretation.)

Trying to explain his later extraordinary drive, we might well cite this

early circumstance as formative – indeed, as determinative. But Sartre

would insist that such an explanation is quite misleading. The poverty could

not have had this effect had the young boy not understood the condition

as shameful. Had he thought of it instead as the source of the strong mutual

dependency in his family and their consequent bonds of solidarity, the drive

for wealth might very well have seemed to him an empty pursuit. Sartre ’ s

point would be that a given socioeconomic circumstance must await the

interpretation of consciousness before it could function as a cause. Life

circumstances cannot impel an effect without the assent of consciousness.

Always to have to interpret the given, to have to forge of the given a motive

and cause, is the inescapable condition of consciousness. The uncaused

source of its own actions, the human being is irremediably free.

No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure

of society, the psychological “ state, ” etc.) is capable by itself of motivating

any act whatsoever. For an act is the projection of [consciousness] toward

what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.

[ . . . ] This implies for consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a

rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as to be

able to consider it in the light of a non - being and so as to be able to confer

on it the meaning which it has in terms of the project of a meaning it does

not have . Under no circumstances can the past in any way by itself produce

an act [ . . . ]. In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative

power with respect to the world and itself [ . . . ] we must recognize that the

indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the

acting being. (436)

P1. In order for a given state of affairs deterministically to cause a human

action, the causal effi cacy of that state of affairs would have to derive

exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs.

P2. A given state of affairs has no meaning in itself.

P3. If a given state of affairs has no meaning in itself, then its meaning must

be conferred upon it by the person experiencing it.

C1. The meaning of a given state of affairs must be conferred upon it

by the person experiencing it ( modus ponens , P2, P3).

P4. The meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate

(or cause) the action.

130 Jeffrey Gordon

P5. If the meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate

(or cause) the action, then in the case of human action, the causal

effi cacy of the state of affairs does not derive exclusively from characteristics

of that state of affairs.

C2. In the case of human action, the causal effi cacy of the state of affairs

does not derive exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs

( modus ponens , P4, P5).

C3. No given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action

( modus tollens , P1, C3).

P6. If no given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action,

then one ’ s actions are free.

C4. Human beings are inescapably free ( modus ponens , C3, P6).

Part III

Epistemology

35

The Cogito Arguments of Descartes

and Augustine

Descartes , Ren é . Meditations , edited by David B. Manley and Charles S.

Taylor , translated by John Veitch, available at www.wright.edu/cola/

descartes/index.html (accessed June 2010).

Descartes ’ Cogito

Joyce Lazier

Since Descartes ’ argument, “ I think therefore I am, ” presented in Meditation

II, is often taken as the foundation of idealism and also the source of the

mind – body problem, it is a core philosophical argument. The Meditations

are presented as a stream - of - consciousness style of writing, and the arguments

are diffi cult to follow when just reading it straight through. When

put in premise and conclusion form, it is easier to see both the argument

as well as some of its fl aws. After Descartes discards God as the cause of

his thoughts in the fi rst argument, the assumption of the “ evil deceiver ” in

the fi fth argument is the most obvious fl aw, since it contradicts the logic

given in the fi rst argument. If we believe the fi rst argument, that Descartes

is capable of producing thoughts himself so he needn ’ t presume a God, then

we could also think Descartes is capable of producing his own deceit so he

needn ’ t presume a deceiver. So, either the evil demon could be discarded as

the cause of Descartes ’ deceit along with God as the cause of his thoughts,

or God could be presumed to exist along with the deceiver. Furthermore,

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

134 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul

besides deceit, which we could cause ourselves, we have no evidence for the

evil deceiver and therefore good reason to doubt (by Descartes ’ own standard

of knowledge) and throw out such an assumption. Another fl aw that

stands out after the reconstruction is an equivocation with “ exist ” as well

as with “ I. ” Most interestingly, this formulation shows that the typical “ I

think therefore I am ” interpretation of Descartes ’ argument is too broad in