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two senses. First, as the argument shows, he claims to know he exists when
he is thinking, which allows for the possibility of his not knowing he exists
when he is not thinking. Second, the “ I am ” in “ I think, therefore, I am ”
suggests existence of the “ I ” independent of thought. But Descartes ’ argument
does not prove this “ I ” ; it just proves thought. At most, his argument
proves “ thought exists. ”
But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from
the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the
slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may
designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why
suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them?
Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses
or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent
on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the
persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no
sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same
time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I
was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once
of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing
all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived;
and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am
nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,
in fi ne, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that
this proposition [ pronunciatum ] I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it
is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.
P1. Either God or I cause thoughts to arise in my mind.
P2. If I can produce the thoughts myself, I needn ’ t suppose such a God.
P3. I can produce the thoughts myself.
C1. I needn ’ t suppose God ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
P4. If I can produce thoughts myself, then I am something.
P5. I can produce thoughts myself.
C2. I am something ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
P6. I was persuaded that there was nothing in the world.
P7. If I am persuaded, then I existed.
P8. I was persuaded.
C3. I existed ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
The Cogito Arguments of Descartes and Augustine 135
P9. There is an evil demon who is constantly deceiving me that I ’ m
something.
P10. If I am deceived, then I am conscious that I am something.
P11. I am deceived.
C4. I am conscious that I am something ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
P12. If I am conscious that I ’ m something, then I cannot be nothing.
P13. I am conscious that I ’ m something.
C5. I am not nothing ( modus ponens , P12, P13).
P14. If I am not nothing, then I exist.
P15. I am not nothing.
C6. I exist ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
Augustine ’ s “ Si fallor, sum ” Argument (If I Am Mistaken,
I Exist)
Augustine . The City of God against the Pagans , edited and translated by R.
W. Dyson . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , translated by John
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, UK :
Cambridge University Press , 1999 .
Menn , Stephen . Descartes and Augustine . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
University Press , 1998 .
Brett Gaul
Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) occupies an interesting place in the
history of philosophy. A bishop in the Roman Catholic Church, Augustine
is one of the main fi gures responsible for incorporating elements of Greek
and Roman philosophy into Christianity, and his ideas still exert a powerful
infl uence in Christian philosophy even today. In The City of God , his
longest and arguably his most important and infl uential work, Augustine
defends Christianity against the criticisms of unbelievers and displays his
considerable knowledge of classical thought. One of the many classical
views Augustine addresses is skepticism – the belief that no genuine knowledge
is possible. Augustine defends the possibility of genuine knowledge by
arguing that he cannot be mistaken about his own existence ( “ Si fallor,
sum ” ). The argument is signifi cant because it predates by about 1,200 years
Descartes ’ more famous French “ Je pense, donc je suis ” and Latin “ Cogito,
ergo sum ” ( “ I think, therefore I am ” ) arguments from the Discourse on
Method and Principles of Philosophy , respectively. Although it is unclear
136 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
whether Descartes bases his versions of the argument on Augustine ’ s, we
know from Descartes ’ own correspondence that he did read Augustine.
It is, however, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms
that I am wholly certain that I exist, and that I know this fact and love it. So
far as these truths are concerned, I do not at all fear the arguments of the
Academics when they say, What if you are mistaken? For if I am mistaken, I
exist. He who does not exist clearly cannot be mistaken; and so, if I am
mistaken, then, by the same token, I exist. And since, if I am mistaken, it is
certain that I exist, how can I be mistaken in supposing that I exist? Since,
therefore, I would have to exist even if I were mistaken, it is beyond doubt
that I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist. (Augustine, 484)
P1. If I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence,
then I know that I exist because the ability to consider something is a
suffi cient condition for existence.
P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
C1. I know that I exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
Alternatively:
P1. If I do not exist, then I cannot consider whether I might be mistaken
about my own existence because existence is a necessary condition for
the ability to consider anything.
P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
C1. I exist ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
36
The Cartesian Dreaming Argument
for External - World
Skepticism

two senses. First, as the argument shows, he claims to know he exists when

he is thinking, which allows for the possibility of his not knowing he exists

when he is not thinking. Second, the “ I am ” in “ I think, therefore, I am ”

suggests existence of the “ I ” independent of thought. But Descartes ’ argument

does not prove this “ I ” ; it just proves thought. At most, his argument

proves “ thought exists. ”

But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from

the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the

slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may

designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why

suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them?

Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses

or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent

on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the

persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no

sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same

time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I

was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once

of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing

all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived;

and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am

nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,

in fi ne, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that

this proposition [ pronunciatum ] I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it

is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.

P1. Either God or I cause thoughts to arise in my mind.

P2. If I can produce the thoughts myself, I needn ’ t suppose such a God.

P3. I can produce the thoughts myself.

C1. I needn ’ t suppose God ( modus ponens , P2, P3).

P4. If I can produce thoughts myself, then I am something.

P5. I can produce thoughts myself.

C2. I am something ( modus ponens , P4, P5).

P6. I was persuaded that there was nothing in the world.

P7. If I am persuaded, then I existed.

P8. I was persuaded.

C3. I existed ( modus ponens , P7, P8).

The Cogito Arguments of Descartes and Augustine 135

P9. There is an evil demon who is constantly deceiving me that I ’ m

something.

P10. If I am deceived, then I am conscious that I am something.

P11. I am deceived.

C4. I am conscious that I am something ( modus ponens , P10, P11).

P12. If I am conscious that I ’ m something, then I cannot be nothing.

P13. I am conscious that I ’ m something.

C5. I am not nothing ( modus ponens , P12, P13).

P14. If I am not nothing, then I exist.

P15. I am not nothing.

C6. I exist ( modus ponens , P14, P15).

Augustine ’ s “ Si fallor, sum ” Argument (If I Am Mistaken,

I Exist)

Augustine . The City of God against the Pagans , edited and translated by R.

W. Dyson . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .

Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , translated by John

Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, UK :

Cambridge University Press , 1999 .

Menn , Stephen . Descartes and Augustine . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge

University Press , 1998 .

Brett Gaul

Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) occupies an interesting place in the

history of philosophy. A bishop in the Roman Catholic Church, Augustine

is one of the main fi gures responsible for incorporating elements of Greek

and Roman philosophy into Christianity, and his ideas still exert a powerful

infl uence in Christian philosophy even today. In The City of God , his

longest and arguably his most important and infl uential work, Augustine

defends Christianity against the criticisms of unbelievers and displays his

considerable knowledge of classical thought. One of the many classical

views Augustine addresses is skepticism – the belief that no genuine knowledge

is possible. Augustine defends the possibility of genuine knowledge by

arguing that he cannot be mistaken about his own existence ( “ Si fallor,

sum ” ). The argument is signifi cant because it predates by about 1,200 years

Descartes ’ more famous French “ Je pense, donc je suis ” and Latin “ Cogito,

ergo sum ” ( “ I think, therefore I am ” ) arguments from the Discourse on

Method and Principles of Philosophy , respectively. Although it is unclear

136 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul

whether Descartes bases his versions of the argument on Augustine ’ s, we

know from Descartes ’ own correspondence that he did read Augustine.

It is, however, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms

that I am wholly certain that I exist, and that I know this fact and love it. So

far as these truths are concerned, I do not at all fear the arguments of the

Academics when they say, What if you are mistaken? For if I am mistaken, I

exist. He who does not exist clearly cannot be mistaken; and so, if I am

mistaken, then, by the same token, I exist. And since, if I am mistaken, it is

certain that I exist, how can I be mistaken in supposing that I exist? Since,

therefore, I would have to exist even if I were mistaken, it is beyond doubt

that I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist. (Augustine, 484)

P1. If I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence,

then I know that I exist because the ability to consider something is a

suffi cient condition for existence.

P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.

C1. I know that I exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

Alternatively:

P1. If I do not exist, then I cannot consider whether I might be mistaken

about my own existence because existence is a necessary condition for

the ability to consider anything.

P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.

C1. I exist ( modus tollens , P1, P2).

36

The Cartesian Dreaming Argument

for External - World

Skepticism