DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c respect.
C1. E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
in some more or less specifi c respect (instantiation, P2).
P3. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if it has a content to the effect
that the physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c
respect, then it includes no further content.
C2. If E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
in some more or less specifi c respect, then E includes no further
content (instantiation, P3).
140 Stephen Hetherington
C3. E includes no further content ( modus ponens , C1, C2).
P4. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if it includes no further content,
then in particular it includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
of not being an instance of dreaming.
C4. If E includes no further content, then in particular E includes no
further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
dreaming (instantiation, P4).
C5. In particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
of not being an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C3, C4).
P5. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if in particular it includes no
further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
dreaming, then it is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an
instance of dreaming.
C6. If, in particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
of not being an instance of dreaming, then E is not providing
conclusive evidence of not being an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
P5).
C7. E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
dreaming ( modus ponens , C5, C6).
P6. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if it is not providing conclusive
evidence of not being an instance of dreaming, then the person who is
or would be having the experience does not know with certainty that it
is not an instance of dreaming.
C8. If E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
dreaming, then the person who is or would be having E does not know
with certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
P6).
C8. The person who is or would be having E does not know with
certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C7,
C8).
P7. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
be having it does not know with certainty that it is not an instance of
dreaming, then she does not know at all that it is not an instance of
dreaming.
C9. If the person who is or would be having E does not know with
certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming, then she does not
know at all that E is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation, P7).
C10. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C8, C9).
Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 141
P8. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
be having it does not know at all that it is not an instance of dreaming,
then he does not know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical
world.
C11. If the person who is or would be having E does not know at all
that it is not an instance of dreaming, then he does not know at all
that E is a sensory experience of the physical world (instantiation, P8).
C12. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
it is a sensory experience of the physical world ( modus ponens , C10.
C11).
P9. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
be having the experience does not know at all that it is a sensory experience
of the physical world, then it is not providing her with any knowledge
of the physical world.
C13. If the person who is or would be having experience E does not
know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical world, then
E is not providing her with any knowledge of the physical world
(instantiation, P9).
C14. E is not providing any knowledge of the physical world to the
person who is or would be having experience E ( modus ponens , C12,
C13).
C15. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world is not providing any knowledge
of the physical world to the person who is or would be having
the experience (universal generalization, P1, C14).
C16. No actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of
the physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience
(quantifi er - negation, C15).
P10. If no actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of the
physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience,
then knowledge of the physical world is impossible.
C17. Knowledge of the physical world is impossible ( modus ponens ,
C16, P10).
37
The Transparency of Experience
Argument
Carlos M. Mu ñ oz - Su á rez
Block , Ned . “ Mental Paint and Mental Latex , ” in Philosophical Issues 7,
Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 19 – 49 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview ,
1996 .
Dretske , Fred . Naturalizing the Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,

physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c respect.

C1. E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so

in some more or less specifi c respect (instantiation, P2).

P3. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if it has a content to the effect

that the physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c

respect, then it includes no further content.

C2. If E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so

in some more or less specifi c respect, then E includes no further

content (instantiation, P3).

140 Stephen Hetherington

C3. E includes no further content ( modus ponens , C1, C2).

P4. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if it includes no further content,

then in particular it includes no further and conclusive mark or indication

of not being an instance of dreaming.

C4. If E includes no further content, then in particular E includes no

further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of

dreaming (instantiation, P4).

C5. In particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication

of not being an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C3, C4).

P5. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if in particular it includes no

further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of

dreaming, then it is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an

instance of dreaming.

C6. If, in particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication

of not being an instance of dreaming, then E is not providing

conclusive evidence of not being an instance of dreaming (instantiation,

P5).

C7. E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of

dreaming ( modus ponens , C5, C6).

P6. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if it is not providing conclusive

evidence of not being an instance of dreaming, then the person who is

or would be having the experience does not know with certainty that it

is not an instance of dreaming.

C8. If E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of

dreaming, then the person who is or would be having E does not know

with certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation,

P6).

C8. The person who is or would be having E does not know with

certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C7,

C8).

P7. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would

be having it does not know with certainty that it is not an instance of

dreaming, then she does not know at all that it is not an instance of

dreaming.

C9. If the person who is or would be having E does not know with

certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming, then she does not

know at all that E is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation, P7).

C10. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that

it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C8, C9).

Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 141

P8. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would

be having it does not know at all that it is not an instance of dreaming,

then he does not know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical

world.

C11. If the person who is or would be having E does not know at all

that it is not an instance of dreaming, then he does not know at all

that E is a sensory experience of the physical world (instantiation, P8).

C12. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that

it is a sensory experience of the physical world ( modus ponens , C10.

C11).

P9. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would

be having the experience does not know at all that it is a sensory experience

of the physical world, then it is not providing her with any knowledge

of the physical world.

C13. If the person who is or would be having experience E does not

know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical world, then

E is not providing her with any knowledge of the physical world

(instantiation, P9).

C14. E is not providing any knowledge of the physical world to the

person who is or would be having experience E ( modus ponens , C12,

C13).

C15. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world is not providing any knowledge

of the physical world to the person who is or would be having

the experience (universal generalization, P1, C14).

C16. No actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of

the physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience

(quantifi er - negation, C15).

P10. If no actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a

sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of the

physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience,

then knowledge of the physical world is impossible.

C17. Knowledge of the physical world is impossible ( modus ponens ,

C16, P10).

37

The Transparency of Experience

Argument

Carlos M. Mu ñ oz - Su á rez

Block , Ned . “ Mental Paint and Mental Latex , ” in Philosophical Issues 7,

Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 19 – 49 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview ,

1996 .

Dretske , Fred . Naturalizing the Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,