DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
features of V. The argument would be as follows:
P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
dependent entity, Z (weak content version).
P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V, but just what V is about,
that is, Z (strong transparency).
C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and Z (metaphysical
inference * * ).
The Transparency of Experience Argument 145
There is another version about content; this is a version of the weak
content version. Call this the “ property - content ” version (iii): what fi gures
as the content of a sensation are subject - dependent properties (say, colors)
which look like being instantiated in subject - independent particulars (say,
tables). This version can be coupled with weak transparency. We obtain a
third version of TEA: call this “ sense - data ” TEA.
P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
dependent property, Q, looking like instantiated on a mind - independent
particular X (property - content version).
P2. By having a sensation, V, S could introspect Q (Weak Transparency).
C1. There are perceptual intermediaries between S and X.
Sense - data TEA differs from weak TEA since the former specifi es that
perceptual intermediaries can only be sensory properties, say qualia , and
cannot be concrete physical particulars (see Russell). The debate about
transparency and the right comprehension of the content of sensations is
far from being solved; however, there are many detailed theories trying to
do it.
38
The Regress Argument for
Skepticism
Scott Aikin
Sextus Empiricus . Outlines of Scepticism . Translated by Julia Annas and
Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2000 .
Oakley , I. T. “ An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justifi ed Beliefs . ”
American Philosophical Quarterly , 13 , 3 ( 1976 ): 221 – 8 .
Cling , Andrew . “ Reasons, Regresses and Tragedy . ” American Philosophical
Quarterly , 46 , 2 ( 2009 ): 333 – 46 .
The basic thought behind the regress argument is familiar to anyone who
has spoken with an inquisitive child, “ Why? ” is always a good question.
Since the question can be asked of any answer, a recursive pattern very
quickly emerges. For example, “ Eat your vegetables. ” “ Why? ” “ Because
they are good for you. ” “ Why? ” “ Because you want to he healthy. ” “ Why? ”
And then we are off to the races. Translated to an epistemological context,
the regress problem arises because of the simple requirement that if you are
to hold reasonably a belief, you must be able to answer satisfactorily a
“ why ” question with another reasonably held belief or group of beliefs.
This, of course, invites another “ why ” question, which requires another
satisfactory and justifi ably held answer. And then the regress ensues (#49).
It seems that the demand that we go on to infi nity is excessive, that answers
that go in a circle are vicious, and that anytime someone says she does not
need to give further answers, she is acting unreasonably. Skepticism seems
to follow – if we cannot give the adequate backing for our claims, we do
not know those claims to be true.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Regress Argument for Skepticism 147
Sextus Empiricus classically framed the regress problem in his Outlines
of Pyrrhonism as the coordination of fi ve “ modes, ” or strategies, of skeptical
argument. Two of these modes, sometimes called the “ material modes, ”
are those to challenge someone who believes something to defend it. These
are the modes of relativity and dispute. Once a believer starts to defend the
belief, there are only three options for the argument to proceed: either in
(i) a vicious regress, which Sextus calls “ ad infi nitum , ” (ii) a question -
begging circle, which Sextus calls “ reciprocality, ” or (iii) unsupported dogmatic
assertion, which Sextus calls “ hypothesis. ” These three fi nal modes
for argument are called the “ formal modes ” or “ the trilemma. ”
According to the mode deriving from dispute, we fi nd that undecidable
dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life
and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or
to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment. In the mode
of deriving from infi nite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a
source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another source,
which itself needs another, and so ad infi nitum, so that we have no point from
which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows. In
the mode deriving from relativity, [ … ] the existing object appears to be such -
and - such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together
with it, but we suspend judgment on what it is like in its nature. We have the
mode from hypothesis from the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infi nitum,
begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply
and without proof in virtue of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when
what ought to be confi rmatory of the object under investigation needs to be
made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take
either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both.
(Empiricus PH I.165 – 9)
Given the structural problems that come with knowing, we are forced
to suspend judgment about our beliefs generally because they are not justifi
ed. Justifi cation is structurally vexed, and as a consequence, something we
cannot possess. General skepticism about knowledge, then, follows. The
argument ’ s premises are all inherently plausible. The principle of inferential
justifi cation is something that comes with being a responsible believer – if
you believe something, then you should be able to explain why you do so;
that is, you should be able to give a reason that counts in favor of the truth
of your belief. This is simply what it is to be accountable for and in charge
of your beliefs. The responsibility iterates, because the reasons we give must,
themselves, pass this test. And so these chains of reasons are just part of
what it is to be a rational being – we give justifying stories for what we do,
what we say, and what we believe. Without those stories, it is hard to see
ourselves as responsible, reasonable, or rational.
148 Scott Aikin
The principle of noncircular justifi cation comes from the informal argumentative
thought that arguments that have their conclusions function in

features of V. The argument would be as follows:

P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -

dependent entity, Z (weak content version).

P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V, but just what V is about,

that is, Z (strong transparency).

C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and Z (metaphysical

inference * * ).

The Transparency of Experience Argument 145

There is another version about content; this is a version of the weak

content version. Call this the “ property - content ” version (iii): what fi gures

as the content of a sensation are subject - dependent properties (say, colors)

which look like being instantiated in subject - independent particulars (say,

tables). This version can be coupled with weak transparency. We obtain a

third version of TEA: call this “ sense - data ” TEA.

P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -

dependent property, Q, looking like instantiated on a mind - independent

particular X (property - content version).

P2. By having a sensation, V, S could introspect Q (Weak Transparency).

C1. There are perceptual intermediaries between S and X.

Sense - data TEA differs from weak TEA since the former specifi es that

perceptual intermediaries can only be sensory properties, say qualia , and

cannot be concrete physical particulars (see Russell). The debate about

transparency and the right comprehension of the content of sensations is

far from being solved; however, there are many detailed theories trying to

do it.

38

The Regress Argument for

Skepticism

Scott Aikin

Sextus Empiricus . Outlines of Scepticism . Translated by Julia Annas and

Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2000 .

Oakley , I. T. “ An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justifi ed Beliefs . ”

American Philosophical Quarterly , 13 , 3 ( 1976 ): 221 – 8 .

Cling , Andrew . “ Reasons, Regresses and Tragedy . ” American Philosophical

Quarterly , 46 , 2 ( 2009 ): 333 – 46 .

The basic thought behind the regress argument is familiar to anyone who

has spoken with an inquisitive child, “ Why? ” is always a good question.

Since the question can be asked of any answer, a recursive pattern very

quickly emerges. For example, “ Eat your vegetables. ” “ Why? ” “ Because

they are good for you. ” “ Why? ” “ Because you want to he healthy. ” “ Why? ”

And then we are off to the races. Translated to an epistemological context,

the regress problem arises because of the simple requirement that if you are

to hold reasonably a belief, you must be able to answer satisfactorily a

“ why ” question with another reasonably held belief or group of beliefs.

This, of course, invites another “ why ” question, which requires another

satisfactory and justifi ably held answer. And then the regress ensues (#49).

It seems that the demand that we go on to infi nity is excessive, that answers

that go in a circle are vicious, and that anytime someone says she does not

need to give further answers, she is acting unreasonably. Skepticism seems

to follow – if we cannot give the adequate backing for our claims, we do

not know those claims to be true.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Regress Argument for Skepticism 147

Sextus Empiricus classically framed the regress problem in his Outlines

of Pyrrhonism as the coordination of fi ve “ modes, ” or strategies, of skeptical

argument. Two of these modes, sometimes called the “ material modes, ”

are those to challenge someone who believes something to defend it. These

are the modes of relativity and dispute. Once a believer starts to defend the

belief, there are only three options for the argument to proceed: either in

(i) a vicious regress, which Sextus calls “ ad infi nitum , ” (ii) a question -

begging circle, which Sextus calls “ reciprocality, ” or (iii) unsupported dogmatic

assertion, which Sextus calls “ hypothesis. ” These three fi nal modes

for argument are called the “ formal modes ” or “ the trilemma. ”

According to the mode deriving from dispute, we fi nd that undecidable

dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life

and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or

to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment. In the mode

of deriving from infi nite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a

source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another source,

which itself needs another, and so ad infi nitum, so that we have no point from

which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows. In

the mode deriving from relativity, [ … ] the existing object appears to be such -

and - such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together

with it, but we suspend judgment on what it is like in its nature. We have the

mode from hypothesis from the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infi nitum,

begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply

and without proof in virtue of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when

what ought to be confi rmatory of the object under investigation needs to be

made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take

either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both.

(Empiricus PH I.165 – 9)

Given the structural problems that come with knowing, we are forced

to suspend judgment about our beliefs generally because they are not justifi

ed. Justifi cation is structurally vexed, and as a consequence, something we

cannot possess. General skepticism about knowledge, then, follows. The

argument ’ s premises are all inherently plausible. The principle of inferential

justifi cation is something that comes with being a responsible believer – if

you believe something, then you should be able to explain why you do so;

that is, you should be able to give a reason that counts in favor of the truth

of your belief. This is simply what it is to be accountable for and in charge

of your beliefs. The responsibility iterates, because the reasons we give must,

themselves, pass this test. And so these chains of reasons are just part of

what it is to be a rational being – we give justifying stories for what we do,

what we say, and what we believe. Without those stories, it is hard to see

ourselves as responsible, reasonable, or rational.

148 Scott Aikin

The principle of noncircular justifi cation comes from the informal argumentative

thought that arguments that have their conclusions function in