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foundationalist has actually continued the regress. This is sometimes called
the “ meta - regress problem ” for foundationalism. The question for the
contextualist is whether these systems of mutually supporting beliefs have
anything to do with the truth, as it seems that systems of crazy beliefs (e.g.,
conspiracy theories) are coherent and function similarly but are terribly
wrong. This is called the “ alternate systems problem ” for coherentism. The
question for the contextualists is whether contextually appropriate assumption
amounts to justifi cation – surely some contexts are defi ned by the fact
that people make assumptions in them, but that doesn ’ t mean they have
knowledge. This is called the “ problem of credulity ” for contextualists. The
question for the infi nitist is whether infi nitism is simply another form of
skepticism, as it seems that no one ever actually has an infi nite series of
justifying reasons and so no one actually knows anything. This is called the
problem of “ crypto - skepticism ” for infi nitists. The regress skeptic is, for
lack of a better term, skeptical as to whether there are adequate answers
to these challenges.
P1. If any believer is reasonably (or justifi ably) to hold a belief, then that
believer must do so on the justifying basis of another justifi ed belief.
P2. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, then that believer must reasonably
hold another belief to justify that fi rst belief, and a third belief to
hold that second one, and a further fourth belief to hold that third one,
and so on. Call this a “ chain of reasons. ”
C1. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, that believer must have a
justifying chain of reasons (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
P3. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
of a circular chain of reasons.
P4. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
of an infi nite chain of reasons.
The Regress Argument for Skepticism 151
P5. If any believer holds a belief on the basis of a belief without justifi cation,
that believer does not reasonably hold the fi rst belief.
C2. No believers with chains of reasons with unjustifi ed beliefs at their
ends are justifi ed (universal generalization, P2, P5).
P6. Chains of reasons either (a) are circular, (b) end with unjustifi ed beliefs,
or (c) are infi nite.
C3. For any believer ’ s chain of reasons, it either (a) goes in a circle, (b)
ends with an unjustifi ed commitment, or (c) goes on to infi nity (instantiation,
P6).
C4. There are no beliefs for which believers are justifi ed in holding them
(destructive trilemma, P3, P4, P6).
39
Moore ’ s Anti - Skeptical
Arguments
Matthew Frise
Moore , G. E. “ Four Forms of Scepticism, ” and “ Proof of an External
World, ” in Epistemology: An Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon
Kim , and Matthew McGrath , 24 – 8 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 2000 .
Reid , Thomas . Philosophical Works . Hildesheim : Olms , 1983 .
External - world skepticism – the view that we do not know that anything
outside our minds exists – has always been a central issue in epistemology.
G. E. Moore, one of the most infl uential analytic philosophers of the twentieth
century, popularized two types of arguments against skepticism that
make reference to commonsense claims, claims such as “ I know this is a
pencil ” and “ Here is a hand. ” The strategy of the fi rst type of argument is
to point out that commonsense claims are more certain than the skeptic ’ s
assumptions (at least some of them). The conclusion is not that commonsense
knowledge disproves skepticism, but that our commonsense knowledge
is in no danger of being undermined by skepticism. The strategy of
the second type of argument is to cite things in the external world that we
clearly know to exist, thereby demonstrating knowledge that the external
world itself exists. An argument of this type is formally valid, but many
think it fails to disprove skepticism because it “ begs the question ” ; knowledge
of its premises allegedly presupposes knowledge of its conclusion.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Arguments 153
Below, we give the skeleton of both types of arguments, making the reasoning
and conclusion of each explicit.
What I want, however, fi nally to emphasize is this: Russell ’ s view that I do
not know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I
am right, on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don ’ t know
these things immediately; (2) That they don ’ t follow logically from any thing
or things that I do know immediately; (3) That if (1) and (2) are true, my
belief in or knowledge of them must be ‘ based on an analogical or inductive
argument ’ ; and (4) That what is so based cannot be certain knowledge . And
what I can ’ t help asking myself is this: Is it, in fact, as certain that all these
four assumptions are true, as that I do know that this is a pencil and that you
are conscious? I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do
know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single
one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four. That is to say, though,
as I have said, I agree with Russell that (1), (2), and (3) are true; yet of no
one even of these three do I feel as certain as that I do know for certain that
this is a pencil. Nay more: I do not think it is rational to be as certain of any
one of these four propositions as of the proposition that I do know that this
is a pencil. (Moore, 28)
P1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions imply that propositions such as “ I know this
is a pencil ” are false.
P2. If proposition A is more certain than proposition B, B cannot falsify A.
P3. “ I know this is a pencil ” is more certain than any of the skeptic ’ s
assumptions.
C1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions cannot falsify that “ I know this is a
pencil ” ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By
holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the
right hand, ‘ Here is one hand ’ , and adding, as I make a certain gesture with
the left, ‘ and here is another ’ . (Moore, 24)
P1. Here is a hand, here is another.
P2. If hands exist, then external objects exist.
C1. External objects exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

foundationalist has actually continued the regress. This is sometimes called

the “ meta - regress problem ” for foundationalism. The question for the

contextualist is whether these systems of mutually supporting beliefs have

anything to do with the truth, as it seems that systems of crazy beliefs (e.g.,

conspiracy theories) are coherent and function similarly but are terribly

wrong. This is called the “ alternate systems problem ” for coherentism. The

question for the contextualists is whether contextually appropriate assumption

amounts to justifi cation – surely some contexts are defi ned by the fact

that people make assumptions in them, but that doesn ’ t mean they have

knowledge. This is called the “ problem of credulity ” for contextualists. The

question for the infi nitist is whether infi nitism is simply another form of

skepticism, as it seems that no one ever actually has an infi nite series of

justifying reasons and so no one actually knows anything. This is called the

problem of “ crypto - skepticism ” for infi nitists. The regress skeptic is, for

lack of a better term, skeptical as to whether there are adequate answers

to these challenges.

P1. If any believer is reasonably (or justifi ably) to hold a belief, then that

believer must do so on the justifying basis of another justifi ed belief.

P2. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, then that believer must reasonably

hold another belief to justify that fi rst belief, and a third belief to

hold that second one, and a further fourth belief to hold that third one,

and so on. Call this a “ chain of reasons. ”

C1. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, that believer must have a

justifying chain of reasons (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).

P3. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis

of a circular chain of reasons.

P4. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis

of an infi nite chain of reasons.

The Regress Argument for Skepticism 151

P5. If any believer holds a belief on the basis of a belief without justifi cation,

that believer does not reasonably hold the fi rst belief.

C2. No believers with chains of reasons with unjustifi ed beliefs at their

ends are justifi ed (universal generalization, P2, P5).

P6. Chains of reasons either (a) are circular, (b) end with unjustifi ed beliefs,

or (c) are infi nite.

C3. For any believer ’ s chain of reasons, it either (a) goes in a circle, (b)

ends with an unjustifi ed commitment, or (c) goes on to infi nity (instantiation,

P6).

C4. There are no beliefs for which believers are justifi ed in holding them

(destructive trilemma, P3, P4, P6).

39

Moore ’ s Anti - Skeptical

Arguments

Matthew Frise

Moore , G. E. “ Four Forms of Scepticism, ” and “ Proof of an External

World, ” in Epistemology: An Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon

Kim , and Matthew McGrath , 24 – 8 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 2000 .

Reid , Thomas . Philosophical Works . Hildesheim : Olms , 1983 .

External - world skepticism – the view that we do not know that anything

outside our minds exists – has always been a central issue in epistemology.

G. E. Moore, one of the most infl uential analytic philosophers of the twentieth

century, popularized two types of arguments against skepticism that

make reference to commonsense claims, claims such as “ I know this is a

pencil ” and “ Here is a hand. ” The strategy of the fi rst type of argument is

to point out that commonsense claims are more certain than the skeptic ’ s

assumptions (at least some of them). The conclusion is not that commonsense

knowledge disproves skepticism, but that our commonsense knowledge

is in no danger of being undermined by skepticism. The strategy of

the second type of argument is to cite things in the external world that we

clearly know to exist, thereby demonstrating knowledge that the external

world itself exists. An argument of this type is formally valid, but many

think it fails to disprove skepticism because it “ begs the question ” ; knowledge

of its premises allegedly presupposes knowledge of its conclusion.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Arguments 153

Below, we give the skeleton of both types of arguments, making the reasoning

and conclusion of each explicit.

What I want, however, fi nally to emphasize is this: Russell ’ s view that I do

not know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I

am right, on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don ’ t know

these things immediately; (2) That they don ’ t follow logically from any thing

or things that I do know immediately; (3) That if (1) and (2) are true, my

belief in or knowledge of them must be ‘ based on an analogical or inductive

argument ’ ; and (4) That what is so based cannot be certain knowledge . And

what I can ’ t help asking myself is this: Is it, in fact, as certain that all these

four assumptions are true, as that I do know that this is a pencil and that you

are conscious? I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do

know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single

one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four. That is to say, though,

as I have said, I agree with Russell that (1), (2), and (3) are true; yet of no

one even of these three do I feel as certain as that I do know for certain that

this is a pencil. Nay more: I do not think it is rational to be as certain of any

one of these four propositions as of the proposition that I do know that this

is a pencil. (Moore, 28)

P1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions imply that propositions such as “ I know this

is a pencil ” are false.

P2. If proposition A is more certain than proposition B, B cannot falsify A.

P3. “ I know this is a pencil ” is more certain than any of the skeptic ’ s

assumptions.

C1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions cannot falsify that “ I know this is a

pencil ” ( modus ponens , P2, P3).

I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By

holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the

right hand, ‘ Here is one hand ’ , and adding, as I make a certain gesture with

the left, ‘ and here is another ’ . (Moore, 24)

P1. Here is a hand, here is another.

P2. If hands exist, then external objects exist.

C1. External objects exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).