DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Gettier and the Traditional Account of Knowledge 157
fi ed belief, one ’ s good reasons do not necessarily need to guarantee that the
belief is true. For example, one may be justifi ed in believing that one is
seeing a zebra based on the evidence of a black - and - white - striped - equine
sensory experience, and one would still be justifi ed, in believing one is seeing
a zebra, even if the animal were not a zebra but a cleverly painted mule
instead. Consequently, for a belief to be justifi ed, it is not necessary for the
belief to be true. As (P2) states, it is possible for one to be justifi ed in believing
a false proposition.
The next part of Gettier ’ s counterexample follows from the principle
expressed by (P3): if one is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then one
is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that
one competently deduces from the original one. Since when deductive reasoning
is performed competently it preserves truth infallibly, one ’ s justifi cation
does not diminish across deductive inference. Perhaps this is best
illustrated by a variation from one of Gettier ’ s examples. Imagine a case
where a trustworthy friend, Mr. Nogot, provides suffi ciently strong evidence
to his friend Jackson for being justifi ed in believing that he (Nogot) owns
a Ford. For example, imagine that in addition to his typically trustworthy
testimony, Mr. Nogot shows Jackson his registration papers, he takes
Jackson for a ride in the Ford, and Jackson has no reason to doubt his
testimony or any of the additional evidence that he has to support the
proposition that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford. Now, Mr. Nogot does not own
a Ford (unbeknownst to Jackson), but this does not prevent Jackson from
being justifi ed in believing that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, since according to
(P2) it is possible for a person to be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
And now to the part relevant to (P3) – suppose that as Jackson is pondering
his justifi ed belief (that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford) with Mr. Nogot in the
room, he deductively reasons that if Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, then someone
in the room owns a Ford; therefore, Jackson concludes, someone in the
room owns a Ford. On the basis of (P3), Jackson is at least as justifi ed in
believing that someone in the room owns a Ford as he is for the proposition
that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford since he deduced the former from the latter,
which is stated in (C1).
The fi nal claim needed to underwrite Gettier ’ s counterexample is stated
in (P4): If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by
accident or luck, then her justifi ed true belief is not knowledge. It has
already been stipulated that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Now let ’ s
suppose that at the time that Jackson deductively reasons from the proposition
that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford to the proposition that someone in the
room owns a Ford, Mr. Havit happens to be the room. Mr. Havit – a person
Jackson has never met or has any justifi cation for believing what kind of
car he owns – is sitting quietly in the corner of the room, and he happens
to own a Ford. So, it turns out that Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the
158 John M. DePoe
room owns a Ford is both justifi ed and true. Recall that it is justifi ed because
he deduced it from a proposition that he is justifi ed in believing. The belief
is true since Mr. Havit owns a Ford and he is in the room. But since Jackson
has no beliefs whatsoever about Mr. Havit, the truth of his justifi ed belief
appears to be accidental or lucky. After all, Jackson would have still believed
that someone in the room owns a Ford even if Mr. Havit wasn ’ t in the
room. Thus, it seems that Jackson ’ s justifi ed belief is true by luck or accident.
In other words, the belief ’ s being true has nothing to do with the
justifi cation Jackson has for holding the belief. For this reason, it would be
wrong to accept that Jackson ’ s justifi ed true belief (that someone in the
room owns a Ford) counts as knowledge.
Since Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the room owns a Ford is a justifi ed
true belief (C2), and it is plainly wrong to think that it counts as knowledge,
Gettier ’ s argument is widely accepted as demonstrating why knowledge
cannot be defi ned as justifi ed true belief (C3).
These [ . . . ] examples show that defi nition (a) [knowledge is justifi ed true
belief] does not state a suffi cient condition for someone ’ s knowing a given
proposition. (Gettier, 123)
P1. If knowledge is justifi ed true belief, then it is not possible for a person
to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge.
P2. A person can be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
P3. If a person is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then she is justifi ed
(at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that she competently
deduces from the original.
C1. A person is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any
proposition that she competently deduces from the original ( modus
ponens , P2, P3).
P4. If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by accident
or luck, then his justifi ed true belief is not knowledge.
P5. Jackson is justifi ed in believing that someone in the room owns a Ford,
which is true by accident or luck.
C2. It is possible for a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t
knowledge ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
C3. It is not the case that knowledge is justifi ed true belief ( modus tollens ,
P1, C2).
42
Putnam ’ s Argument against
Cultural Imperialism
Maria Caama ñ o
Putnam , Hilary . “ Why Reason Can ’ t Be Naturalized , ” in Epistemology: An
Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon Kim , and Mathew McGrath ,
314 – 24 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1999 .
Putnam introduces this argument in the context of criticizing the different
attempts to naturalize reason by reducing it to those standards accepted by
a culture. According to Putnam, reason always results from a balance
between immanence to culture and traditions and transcendence to them.
The fi rst would be manifest in the inherited cultural background in which
any reasoning always takes place; the second would become obvious in our
ability to criticize such cultural background. Both cultural relativism and
cultural imperialism would break the above balance as a result of their
emphasis on immanence. However, facts related to the transcendent side of
reason are precisely the ones that would show the self - refutability of both
views. Cultural relativism would need to make, inconsistently, a transcendent

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Gettier and the Traditional Account of Knowledge 157

fi ed belief, one ’ s good reasons do not necessarily need to guarantee that the

belief is true. For example, one may be justifi ed in believing that one is

seeing a zebra based on the evidence of a black - and - white - striped - equine

sensory experience, and one would still be justifi ed, in believing one is seeing

a zebra, even if the animal were not a zebra but a cleverly painted mule

instead. Consequently, for a belief to be justifi ed, it is not necessary for the

belief to be true. As (P2) states, it is possible for one to be justifi ed in believing

a false proposition.

The next part of Gettier ’ s counterexample follows from the principle

expressed by (P3): if one is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then one

is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that

one competently deduces from the original one. Since when deductive reasoning

is performed competently it preserves truth infallibly, one ’ s justifi cation

does not diminish across deductive inference. Perhaps this is best

illustrated by a variation from one of Gettier ’ s examples. Imagine a case

where a trustworthy friend, Mr. Nogot, provides suffi ciently strong evidence

to his friend Jackson for being justifi ed in believing that he (Nogot) owns

a Ford. For example, imagine that in addition to his typically trustworthy

testimony, Mr. Nogot shows Jackson his registration papers, he takes

Jackson for a ride in the Ford, and Jackson has no reason to doubt his

testimony or any of the additional evidence that he has to support the

proposition that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford. Now, Mr. Nogot does not own

a Ford (unbeknownst to Jackson), but this does not prevent Jackson from

being justifi ed in believing that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, since according to

(P2) it is possible for a person to be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.

And now to the part relevant to (P3) – suppose that as Jackson is pondering

his justifi ed belief (that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford) with Mr. Nogot in the

room, he deductively reasons that if Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, then someone

in the room owns a Ford; therefore, Jackson concludes, someone in the

room owns a Ford. On the basis of (P3), Jackson is at least as justifi ed in

believing that someone in the room owns a Ford as he is for the proposition

that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford since he deduced the former from the latter,

which is stated in (C1).

The fi nal claim needed to underwrite Gettier ’ s counterexample is stated

in (P4): If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by

accident or luck, then her justifi ed true belief is not knowledge. It has

already been stipulated that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Now let ’ s

suppose that at the time that Jackson deductively reasons from the proposition

that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford to the proposition that someone in the

room owns a Ford, Mr. Havit happens to be the room. Mr. Havit – a person

Jackson has never met or has any justifi cation for believing what kind of

car he owns – is sitting quietly in the corner of the room, and he happens

to own a Ford. So, it turns out that Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the

158 John M. DePoe

room owns a Ford is both justifi ed and true. Recall that it is justifi ed because

he deduced it from a proposition that he is justifi ed in believing. The belief

is true since Mr. Havit owns a Ford and he is in the room. But since Jackson

has no beliefs whatsoever about Mr. Havit, the truth of his justifi ed belief

appears to be accidental or lucky. After all, Jackson would have still believed

that someone in the room owns a Ford even if Mr. Havit wasn ’ t in the

room. Thus, it seems that Jackson ’ s justifi ed belief is true by luck or accident.

In other words, the belief ’ s being true has nothing to do with the

justifi cation Jackson has for holding the belief. For this reason, it would be

wrong to accept that Jackson ’ s justifi ed true belief (that someone in the

room owns a Ford) counts as knowledge.

Since Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the room owns a Ford is a justifi ed

true belief (C2), and it is plainly wrong to think that it counts as knowledge,

Gettier ’ s argument is widely accepted as demonstrating why knowledge

cannot be defi ned as justifi ed true belief (C3).

These [ . . . ] examples show that defi nition (a) [knowledge is justifi ed true

belief] does not state a suffi cient condition for someone ’ s knowing a given

proposition. (Gettier, 123)

P1. If knowledge is justifi ed true belief, then it is not possible for a person

to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge.

P2. A person can be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.

P3. If a person is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then she is justifi ed

(at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that she competently

deduces from the original.

C1. A person is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any

proposition that she competently deduces from the original ( modus

ponens , P2, P3).

P4. If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by accident

or luck, then his justifi ed true belief is not knowledge.

P5. Jackson is justifi ed in believing that someone in the room owns a Ford,

which is true by accident or luck.

C2. It is possible for a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t

knowledge ( modus ponens , P4, P5).

C3. It is not the case that knowledge is justifi ed true belief ( modus tollens ,

P1, C2).

42

Putnam ’ s Argument against

Cultural Imperialism

Maria Caama ñ o

Putnam , Hilary . “ Why Reason Can ’ t Be Naturalized , ” in Epistemology: An

Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon Kim , and Mathew McGrath ,

314 – 24 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1999 .

Putnam introduces this argument in the context of criticizing the different

attempts to naturalize reason by reducing it to those standards accepted by

a culture. According to Putnam, reason always results from a balance

between immanence to culture and traditions and transcendence to them.

The fi rst would be manifest in the inherited cultural background in which

any reasoning always takes place; the second would become obvious in our

ability to criticize such cultural background. Both cultural relativism and

cultural imperialism would break the above balance as a result of their

emphasis on immanence. However, facts related to the transcendent side of

reason are precisely the ones that would show the self - refutability of both

views. Cultural relativism would need to make, inconsistently, a transcendent