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40
The Bias Paradox
Deborah Heikes
Antony , Louise . “ Quine as Feminist , ” in A Mind of One ’ s Own , edited by
Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt , 110 – 53 . Boulder, CO : Westview ,
2002 .
Heikes , Deborah . “ The Bias Paradox: Why It ’ s Not Just for Feminists
Anymore . ” Synthese 138 , 3 ( 2004 ): 315 – 35 .
The bias paradox arises from arguments that reject or decisively revise
standard Cartesian conceptions of pure objectivity and impartiality. Such
conceptions require that we move beyond particularity and contingency in
order to acquire knowledge that is free from bias. Feminist philosophers
are generally concerned with rejecting notions of objectivity that require
this complete elimination of subjectivity. As a rule, feminists believe that
subjectivity can never be entirely eliminated. However, this rejection of a
notion of pure (nonsubjective) neutrality has led the dilemma that Louise
Antony calls the “ bias paradox. ”
For feminists, two fundamental commitments give rise to a dilemma that
seems to require a commitment either to objectivism or relativism. The fi rst
of these commitments is the explicit rejection of the concept of impartial
objectivity, and the second one is the desire to assert the reality and injustice
of women ’ s oppression. The problem is that in the absence of impartiality
(at least as an ideal), there appears to be a lack of principled, normative
criteria for evaluating beliefs across differing epistemic perspectives. At the
same time, feminist philosophers almost unanimously reject the possibility
of impartiality. The dilemma, as Antony presents it, is this: either we
endorse the ideal of objectivity so that we can provide a ground for evaluating
bias or we cease criticizing bias (i.e., we cease distinguishing between
“ good ” biases and “ bad ” biases), since there can be no standard for evaluating
competing biases.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Bias Paradox 155
While this tension is dealt with most straightforwardly in discussions of
naturalized feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science, the
bias paradox is not merely a problem for feminists. Any view that rejects
the Cartesian ideals of pure objectivity and value - neutrality will ultimately
be forced to confront the dilemma that seemingly results from the paradox,
namely, either to endorse pure impartiality or to accept an “ anything goes ”
relativism. The problem, of course, is that most philosophical views deny
that pure impartiality can be achieved, and many argue that it is not even
useful as an ideal. However, the alternative view is that just about every
claim to knowledge is as good as any other claim, and almost no one wishes
to adopt this view. Hence, we encounter the bias paradox.
According to many feminist philosophers, the fl aw in the ideal of impartiality
is supposed to be that the ideal itself is biased: Critics charge either that
the concept of ‘ objectivity ’ serves to articulate a masculine or patriarchal
viewpoint [ … ], or that it has the ideological function of protecting the rights
of those in power, especially men. But how is it possible to criticize the partiality
of the concept of objectivity without presupposing the very value under
attack? Put baldly: If we don ’ t think it ’ s good to be impartial, then how can
we object to men ’ s being partial ? (Antony, 114)
P1. Impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice.
P2. If impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice, then all
epistemic practices are biased.
C1. All epistemic practices are biased ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If all epistemic practices are biased, there can be no impartial criteria
for evaluating the epistemic worth of biases.
C2. There can be no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth
of biases ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. If there are no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth of
biases, then all biases are equal.
C3. All biases are equal ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
Generic bias paradox:
P1. The ideal of impartiality should be rejected.
P2. If we reject the ideal of impartiality, there can be no justifi ed procedure
for normatively distinguishing among competing epistemic views.
C1. There can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
among competing epistemic views ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
among competing epistemic views, then all accounts are epistemically
equal.
C2. All accounts are epistemically equal ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
41
Gettier ’ s Argument against
the Traditional Account
of Knowledge
John M. DePoe 1
Gettier , Edmund . “ Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge? ” Analysis 23 ( 1963 ):
121 – 3 .
The Gettier problem has drawn the attention of epistemologists since
Edmund Gettier (1927 – ) published his three - page article in 1963. The point
of Gettier ’ s argument is to show that the concept of knowledge cannot be
defi ned as justifi ed true belief, and Gettier set out to disprove the traditional
account of knowledge by showing that there are counterexamples to it. If
the traditional account of knowledge is correct, then it is not possible for
a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge (P1). Since the
account maintains that all instances of knowledge are justifi ed true beliefs
and vice versa, in order to refute the traditional account, Gettier needed to
provide an example of a justifi ed true belief that no one would think is an
example of knowledge.
In order to understand Gettier ’ s counterexample, it is fi rst important to
see how advocates of the traditional account understood justifi ed belief.
The correct analysis of justifi cation is a matter of great controversy, but
as a preliminary attempt it may be helpful to think of a person ’ s having a
justifi ed belief as that person ’ s having some evidence or good reasons to
think that the belief is true or likely to be true. Importantly, to have a justi-
1 The author wishes to thank Michael O ’ Rouke (University of Idaho).
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

40

The Bias Paradox

Deborah Heikes

Antony , Louise . “ Quine as Feminist , ” in A Mind of One ’ s Own , edited by

Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt , 110 – 53 . Boulder, CO : Westview ,

2002 .

Heikes , Deborah . “ The Bias Paradox: Why It ’ s Not Just for Feminists

Anymore . ” Synthese 138 , 3 ( 2004 ): 315 – 35 .

The bias paradox arises from arguments that reject or decisively revise

standard Cartesian conceptions of pure objectivity and impartiality. Such

conceptions require that we move beyond particularity and contingency in

order to acquire knowledge that is free from bias. Feminist philosophers

are generally concerned with rejecting notions of objectivity that require

this complete elimination of subjectivity. As a rule, feminists believe that

subjectivity can never be entirely eliminated. However, this rejection of a

notion of pure (nonsubjective) neutrality has led the dilemma that Louise

Antony calls the “ bias paradox. ”

For feminists, two fundamental commitments give rise to a dilemma that

seems to require a commitment either to objectivism or relativism. The fi rst

of these commitments is the explicit rejection of the concept of impartial

objectivity, and the second one is the desire to assert the reality and injustice

of women ’ s oppression. The problem is that in the absence of impartiality

(at least as an ideal), there appears to be a lack of principled, normative

criteria for evaluating beliefs across differing epistemic perspectives. At the

same time, feminist philosophers almost unanimously reject the possibility

of impartiality. The dilemma, as Antony presents it, is this: either we

endorse the ideal of objectivity so that we can provide a ground for evaluating

bias or we cease criticizing bias (i.e., we cease distinguishing between

“ good ” biases and “ bad ” biases), since there can be no standard for evaluating

competing biases.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Bias Paradox 155

While this tension is dealt with most straightforwardly in discussions of

naturalized feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science, the

bias paradox is not merely a problem for feminists. Any view that rejects

the Cartesian ideals of pure objectivity and value - neutrality will ultimately

be forced to confront the dilemma that seemingly results from the paradox,

namely, either to endorse pure impartiality or to accept an “ anything goes ”

relativism. The problem, of course, is that most philosophical views deny

that pure impartiality can be achieved, and many argue that it is not even

useful as an ideal. However, the alternative view is that just about every

claim to knowledge is as good as any other claim, and almost no one wishes

to adopt this view. Hence, we encounter the bias paradox.

According to many feminist philosophers, the fl aw in the ideal of impartiality

is supposed to be that the ideal itself is biased: Critics charge either that

the concept of ‘ objectivity ’ serves to articulate a masculine or patriarchal

viewpoint [ … ], or that it has the ideological function of protecting the rights

of those in power, especially men. But how is it possible to criticize the partiality

of the concept of objectivity without presupposing the very value under

attack? Put baldly: If we don ’ t think it ’ s good to be impartial, then how can

we object to men ’ s being partial ? (Antony, 114)

P1. Impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice.

P2. If impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice, then all

epistemic practices are biased.

C1. All epistemic practices are biased ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If all epistemic practices are biased, there can be no impartial criteria

for evaluating the epistemic worth of biases.

C2. There can be no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth

of biases ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. If there are no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth of

biases, then all biases are equal.

C3. All biases are equal ( modus ponens , C2, P4).

Generic bias paradox:

P1. The ideal of impartiality should be rejected.

P2. If we reject the ideal of impartiality, there can be no justifi ed procedure

for normatively distinguishing among competing epistemic views.

C1. There can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing

among competing epistemic views ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing

among competing epistemic views, then all accounts are epistemically

equal.

C2. All accounts are epistemically equal ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

41

Gettier ’ s Argument against

the Traditional Account

of Knowledge

John M. DePoe 1

Gettier , Edmund . “ Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge? ” Analysis 23 ( 1963 ):

121 – 3 .

The Gettier problem has drawn the attention of epistemologists since

Edmund Gettier (1927 – ) published his three - page article in 1963. The point

of Gettier ’ s argument is to show that the concept of knowledge cannot be

defi ned as justifi ed true belief, and Gettier set out to disprove the traditional

account of knowledge by showing that there are counterexamples to it. If

the traditional account of knowledge is correct, then it is not possible for

a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge (P1). Since the

account maintains that all instances of knowledge are justifi ed true beliefs

and vice versa, in order to refute the traditional account, Gettier needed to

provide an example of a justifi ed true belief that no one would think is an

example of knowledge.

In order to understand Gettier ’ s counterexample, it is fi rst important to

see how advocates of the traditional account understood justifi ed belief.

The correct analysis of justifi cation is a matter of great controversy, but

as a preliminary attempt it may be helpful to think of a person ’ s having a

justifi ed belief as that person ’ s having some evidence or good reasons to

think that the belief is true or likely to be true. Importantly, to have a justi-

1 The author wishes to thank Michael O ’ Rouke (University of Idaho).

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,