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assumption regarding the symmetry of the epistemic situation between
different cultures. Cultural imperialism, on the other hand, would require
us to assume an immanent agreement that is contradicted by experience.
So while the argument for cultural relativism turns out to be analytically
fl awed, the one to support cultural imperialism proves empirically faulty.
In this context, Putnam formulates his argument against cultural imperialism
and continues by pointing out two of its important features: fi rst, its
contingent character, since the goodness of the argument depends on the
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
160 Maria Caamaño
contingent fact that people disagree about something – that is, about truth ’ s
dependency on cultural standards (P2 below); and second, its extensibility
to all theories which equate truth or right assertability with what people
(would) agree. The importance of the argument, therefore, does not only
lie on its rebuttal of cultural imperialism but also on its more general refutation
of any defi nition of truth in terms of (possible) agreement among
people. The argument follows a reductio ad absurdum strategy, by refl exively
applying the requirement established in the principle of cultural imperialisms
to that very principle and thereby showing that the assumption
violates the very requirement that it establishes. Finally, a more general aim
of Putnam ’ s argument consists in supporting the view that modern European
and American culture does not have “ norms ” that decide philosophical
questions, as would happen in totalitarian or theocratic cultures.
A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according to
the norms of modern European and American culture is itself neither assertable
nor refutable in a way that requires assent by everyone who does not
deviate from the norms of modern European and American culture. So, if this
statement is true, it follows that it is not true QED. (Putnam, 319)
P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
to the norms of modern European and American culture (assumption for
reductio ).
C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable
according to the norms of modern European and American culture ”
is true (rightly assertable), then it is assertable according to the norms
of modern European and American culture (substitution of ‘ P ’ with
“ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
to the norms of modern European and American culture ” in P1).
P2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not assertable
according to the norms of modern European and American culture.
C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not
true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
to the norms of modern European and American culture and it is
not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is
assertable according to the norms of modern European and American
culture (conjunction, P1, C2).
C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
it is assertable according to the norms of modern European and
American culture ( reductio , P1 – C3).
Putnam’s Argument against Cultural Imperialism 161
Extension of Putnam ’ s Argument
In order to bring Putnam ’ s discussion of his own argument to completion,
it may be interesting to show how it naturally extends to arguments equating
truth with what people (would) agree. Let us see how the refutation
would work in that case:
P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
it (assumption for reductio ).
C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees
with it ” is true (rightly assertable), then everybody agrees with it
(Substitution of ‘ P ’ by “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
everybody agrees with it ” in P1).
P2. Not everybody agrees that “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only
if everybody agrees with it. ”
C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
it ” is not true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
it and it is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable)
only if everybody agrees with it (conjunction, P1, C2).
C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
everybody agrees with it ( reductio , P1 – C3).
43
Davidson on the Very Idea of a
Conceptual Scheme
George Wrisley
Davidson , Donald . “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Proceedings
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 ( 1974 ):
5 – 20 ; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
Davidson , Donald . Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 2nd edn. Oxford :
Clarendon Press , 2001 .
Case , Jennifer . “ On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Southern
Journal of Philosophy 35 ( 1997 ): 1 – 18 .
Malpas , Jeff . “ Donald Davidson . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/Davidson
One of Immanuel Kant ’ s (1724 – 1804) central philosophical concerns was
the relationship between mind and world. He famously inverted the idea
that in knowing the world the mind attempts to mirror a “ mind - independent ”
world, claiming instead that the world we experience necessarily conforms
to certain categories of the mind. While such categories were essentially
universal for Kant, later philosophers replaced the idea of the world ’ s conforming
to the categories of the mind with the idea of the world ’ s conforming
to linguistic or conceptual categories. This change allowed for the idea
of a very strong conceptual/linguistic relativism whereby either the content
of experience or the world itself is relativized to conceptual frameworks or
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

assumption regarding the symmetry of the epistemic situation between

different cultures. Cultural imperialism, on the other hand, would require

us to assume an immanent agreement that is contradicted by experience.

So while the argument for cultural relativism turns out to be analytically

fl awed, the one to support cultural imperialism proves empirically faulty.

In this context, Putnam formulates his argument against cultural imperialism

and continues by pointing out two of its important features: fi rst, its

contingent character, since the goodness of the argument depends on the

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

160 Maria Caamaño

contingent fact that people disagree about something – that is, about truth ’ s

dependency on cultural standards (P2 below); and second, its extensibility

to all theories which equate truth or right assertability with what people

(would) agree. The importance of the argument, therefore, does not only

lie on its rebuttal of cultural imperialism but also on its more general refutation

of any defi nition of truth in terms of (possible) agreement among

people. The argument follows a reductio ad absurdum strategy, by refl exively

applying the requirement established in the principle of cultural imperialisms

to that very principle and thereby showing that the assumption

violates the very requirement that it establishes. Finally, a more general aim

of Putnam ’ s argument consists in supporting the view that modern European

and American culture does not have “ norms ” that decide philosophical

questions, as would happen in totalitarian or theocratic cultures.

A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according to

the norms of modern European and American culture is itself neither assertable

nor refutable in a way that requires assent by everyone who does not

deviate from the norms of modern European and American culture. So, if this

statement is true, it follows that it is not true QED. (Putnam, 319)

P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according

to the norms of modern European and American culture (assumption for

reductio ).

C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable

according to the norms of modern European and American culture ”

is true (rightly assertable), then it is assertable according to the norms

of modern European and American culture (substitution of ‘ P ’ with

“ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according

to the norms of modern European and American culture ” in P1).

P2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according

to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not assertable

according to the norms of modern European and American culture.

C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according

to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not

true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).

C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according

to the norms of modern European and American culture and it is

not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is

assertable according to the norms of modern European and American

culture (conjunction, P1, C2).

C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if

it is assertable according to the norms of modern European and

American culture ( reductio , P1 – C3).

Putnam’s Argument against Cultural Imperialism 161

Extension of Putnam ’ s Argument

In order to bring Putnam ’ s discussion of his own argument to completion,

it may be interesting to show how it naturally extends to arguments equating

truth with what people (would) agree. Let us see how the refutation

would work in that case:

P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with

it (assumption for reductio ).

C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees

with it ” is true (rightly assertable), then everybody agrees with it

(Substitution of ‘ P ’ by “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if

everybody agrees with it ” in P1).

P2. Not everybody agrees that “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only

if everybody agrees with it. ”

C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with

it ” is not true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).

C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with

it and it is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable)

only if everybody agrees with it (conjunction, P1, C2).

C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if

everybody agrees with it ( reductio , P1 – C3).

43

Davidson on the Very Idea of a

Conceptual Scheme

George Wrisley

Davidson , Donald . “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Proceedings

and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 ( 1974 ):

5 – 20 ; reprinted in Davidson (2001).

Davidson , Donald . Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 2nd edn. Oxford :

Clarendon Press , 2001 .

Case , Jennifer . “ On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Southern

Journal of Philosophy 35 ( 1997 ): 1 – 18 .

Malpas , Jeff . “ Donald Davidson . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Fall 2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://

plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/Davidson

One of Immanuel Kant ’ s (1724 – 1804) central philosophical concerns was

the relationship between mind and world. He famously inverted the idea

that in knowing the world the mind attempts to mirror a “ mind - independent ”

world, claiming instead that the world we experience necessarily conforms

to certain categories of the mind. While such categories were essentially

universal for Kant, later philosophers replaced the idea of the world ’ s conforming

to the categories of the mind with the idea of the world ’ s conforming

to linguistic or conceptual categories. This change allowed for the idea

of a very strong conceptual/linguistic relativism whereby either the content

of experience or the world itself is relativized to conceptual frameworks or

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.