DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Complete Failure of Translation
P2. Let us consider the possibility of complete failure of translation between
languages.
P3. A conceptual scheme implies a dualism of scheme and (uninterpreted)
content. The scheme is the conceptual apparatus of a language, where a
language consists of sentences held to be true. The content is either the
world/reality or experience/evidence understood as uninterpreted, that
is, a neutral something to which the scheme stands in a relation.
P4. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
the scheme ’ s organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
we can make sense of the idea of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content.
P5. If sense can be made of the scheme ’ s organizing the content, then
the content is a nonindividuated object, or if the scheme organizes the
content, then the content consists of parts.
P6. A nonindividuated object cannot be organized.
P7. The content cannot consist of parts prior to being organized by the
scheme, since it is supposed to be the scheme that organizes the content
into parts.
C1. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme organizes the
content (destructive dilemma, P5, P6, P7).
P8. Consider the possibility of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content. Saying that
a scheme fi ts the content just means that it is borne out by the evidence,
166 George Wrisley
which simply means that the scheme is true (or largely true to allow for
error).
P9. From P8, this means that a scheme X will be different from, for
example, that of the English language if and only if X is (largely) true
but untranslatable into English.
P10. However, we cannot separate the concepts of truth and translation in
this way. Here is why, according to Davidson:
P11a. Following Alfred Tarski ’ s work on the concept of truth (and
Tarski ’ s work gives us the best understanding of truth), the true sentences
of a language must conform to Tarski ’ s Convention T, which
says that for every sentence s of (the language) L, a theorem can be
given of the form ‘ s is true if and only if p ’ where ‘ s ’ is replaced by a
description of s and ‘ p ’ by s itself if L is English, and by a translation
of s into English if L is not English. An example using English and
German: “ ‘ Es schneit ’ is true if and only if it is snowing. ” All true
sentences of a language conforming to Convention T constitute a
“ theory of truth ” for that language.
P11b. In the case we are considering, X is a conceptual scheme different
from English, which means (a) X is true, but untranslatable. But (b)
if X is true, then a theory of truth for X can be given. And (c) if a
theory of truth for X can be given, then, by Convention T, translations
of sentences of X into English can be given. However, by the supposition
that X is a different conceptual scheme from English, its sentences
are untranslatable into English.
P11c. We cannot make sense of the claim that X is true (two instances
of modus tollens from 11b, beginning with (c) and (a), and then the
negation of the antecedent of (c) together with (b)).
P12. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme fi ts the content, for
if the scheme fi ts the content, then it is true and untranslatable into
another language. But, by P11c, we cannot make sense of a true and
untranslatable language.
C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma P4,
C1, P12).
Partial Failure of Translation
P13. Let us consider the possibility of partial failure of translation between
languages. Two languages that have partial failure of translation will
embody different schemes to the extent that they have parts that are not
intertranslatable.
Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 167
P14. The proper way to approach the translation of an unknown language
into a known language is by interpreting the utterances of the speakers
of the unknown language from the perspective of speakers of the known
language. Such interpretation will consist in forming hypotheses as to
what the speakers ’ utterances mean.
P15. The formation of such hypotheses requires attributions of both
meaning and belief. As a matter of interpretation, we know what a person
’ s utterances mean in relation to knowing what he believes in a given
context. For example, if a speaker utters “ Hartchep ” right after a thunderclap,
our hypothesizing that “ Hartchep ” means thunder consists in
attributing the belief that the sound that occurred was thunder to the
speaker. If we thought the speaker believed the sound to have been an
explosion (even though we knew it had been thunder), we would likely
not hypothesize that “ Hartchep ” means thunder.
P16. Assume that even when we cannot know what a speaker believes or
means, we can know whether a speaker holds a particular utterance to
be true.
P17. To facilitate the possibility of interpretation, we should employ the
principle of charity and assume that the beliefs of the people we are
interpreting are by and large true (by our lights).
P18. If it is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by
speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are
to interpret those rejected sentences, then depending on the evidence
available, we will either translate them into sentences that we accept or
sentences that we reject.
P19. If the evidence available for interpreting those rejected sentences of X
leads us to translate them into sentences that we accept as true, then this
can be taken to mean either that our schemes differ at this point or that
our beliefs differ.
P20. If we are in a position in which we can either take our schemes to
differ or our beliefs to differ at a particular point, then there is neither
a general principle nor evidence that could possibly determine whether
it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
P21. If there is neither a general principle nor evidence that could possibly
determine whether it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief,

Complete Failure of Translation

P2. Let us consider the possibility of complete failure of translation between

languages.

P3. A conceptual scheme implies a dualism of scheme and (uninterpreted)

content. The scheme is the conceptual apparatus of a language, where a

language consists of sentences held to be true. The content is either the

world/reality or experience/evidence understood as uninterpreted, that

is, a neutral something to which the scheme stands in a relation.

P4. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate

conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of

the scheme ’ s organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of

translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then

we can make sense of the idea of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content.

P5. If sense can be made of the scheme ’ s organizing the content, then

the content is a nonindividuated object, or if the scheme organizes the

content, then the content consists of parts.

P6. A nonindividuated object cannot be organized.

P7. The content cannot consist of parts prior to being organized by the

scheme, since it is supposed to be the scheme that organizes the content

into parts.

C1. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme organizes the

content (destructive dilemma, P5, P6, P7).

P8. Consider the possibility of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content. Saying that

a scheme fi ts the content just means that it is borne out by the evidence,

166 George Wrisley

which simply means that the scheme is true (or largely true to allow for

error).

P9. From P8, this means that a scheme X will be different from, for

example, that of the English language if and only if X is (largely) true

but untranslatable into English.

P10. However, we cannot separate the concepts of truth and translation in

this way. Here is why, according to Davidson:

P11a. Following Alfred Tarski ’ s work on the concept of truth (and

Tarski ’ s work gives us the best understanding of truth), the true sentences

of a language must conform to Tarski ’ s Convention T, which

says that for every sentence s of (the language) L, a theorem can be

given of the form ‘ s is true if and only if p ’ where ‘ s ’ is replaced by a

description of s and ‘ p ’ by s itself if L is English, and by a translation

of s into English if L is not English. An example using English and

German: “ ‘ Es schneit ’ is true if and only if it is snowing. ” All true

sentences of a language conforming to Convention T constitute a

“ theory of truth ” for that language.

P11b. In the case we are considering, X is a conceptual scheme different

from English, which means (a) X is true, but untranslatable. But (b)

if X is true, then a theory of truth for X can be given. And (c) if a

theory of truth for X can be given, then, by Convention T, translations

of sentences of X into English can be given. However, by the supposition

that X is a different conceptual scheme from English, its sentences

are untranslatable into English.

P11c. We cannot make sense of the claim that X is true (two instances

of modus tollens from 11b, beginning with (c) and (a), and then the

negation of the antecedent of (c) together with (b)).

P12. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme fi ts the content, for

if the scheme fi ts the content, then it is true and untranslatable into

another language. But, by P11c, we cannot make sense of a true and

untranslatable language.

C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation

as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma P4,

C1, P12).

Partial Failure of Translation

P13. Let us consider the possibility of partial failure of translation between

languages. Two languages that have partial failure of translation will

embody different schemes to the extent that they have parts that are not

intertranslatable.

Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 167

P14. The proper way to approach the translation of an unknown language

into a known language is by interpreting the utterances of the speakers

of the unknown language from the perspective of speakers of the known

language. Such interpretation will consist in forming hypotheses as to

what the speakers ’ utterances mean.

P15. The formation of such hypotheses requires attributions of both

meaning and belief. As a matter of interpretation, we know what a person

’ s utterances mean in relation to knowing what he believes in a given

context. For example, if a speaker utters “ Hartchep ” right after a thunderclap,

our hypothesizing that “ Hartchep ” means thunder consists in

attributing the belief that the sound that occurred was thunder to the

speaker. If we thought the speaker believed the sound to have been an

explosion (even though we knew it had been thunder), we would likely

not hypothesize that “ Hartchep ” means thunder.

P16. Assume that even when we cannot know what a speaker believes or

means, we can know whether a speaker holds a particular utterance to

be true.

P17. To facilitate the possibility of interpretation, we should employ the

principle of charity and assume that the beliefs of the people we are

interpreting are by and large true (by our lights).

P18. If it is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by

speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are

to interpret those rejected sentences, then depending on the evidence

available, we will either translate them into sentences that we accept or

sentences that we reject.

P19. If the evidence available for interpreting those rejected sentences of X

leads us to translate them into sentences that we accept as true, then this

can be taken to mean either that our schemes differ at this point or that

our beliefs differ.

P20. If we are in a position in which we can either take our schemes to

differ or our beliefs to differ at a particular point, then there is neither

a general principle nor evidence that could possibly determine whether

it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.

P21. If there is neither a general principle nor evidence that could possibly

determine whether it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief,